NPL-97-0252, Forwards Preliminary Description of Corrective Actions Re Plant App R Safe Shutdown Analysis.Corrective Actions Proposed on Attachment Strictly Preliminary & Have Not Had Benefit of Manager Supervisory Staff Review

Forwards Preliminary Description of Corrective Actions Re Plant App R Safe Shutdown Analysis.Corrective Actions Proposed on Attachment Strictly Preliminary & Have Not Had Benefit of Manager Supervisory Staff Review

ML20141A424
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	05/08/1997
From:	Dante Johnson WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NPL-97-0252, NPL-97-252, NUDOCS 9705140291
Download: ML20141A424 (7)

Text

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Wisconsin Electnc POWER COMPANY Point Beach Nuclear Plant @4) M2321 6610 Nuclear Rd., Two Rivers, WI 54241 l NFL 97-0252 10 CFR 50.4 j 10 CFR 50 Appendix R l May 8,1997 Document Control Desk US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mail Station PI 137 Washington,DC 20555 Ladies / Gentlemen: .

DOCKETS 50-266 AND 50-301 BEOUEST FOR INFORMATION ON IllB APPENDIX R REBASELINING PROJECT AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR EXISTING CONDITIONS POINT L3EACil NUCLEAR PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2 in our Emergency Notification System (ENS) report of April 14,1997, wt identified six (6) previously unreported plant conditions related to the Point Beach Appendix R safe shutdown analysis. We are presently evaluating the cause of these conditions and the adequacy of the existing compensatory measures and corrective actions. The results of this evaluation will be transmitted in a Licensee Event Repon (LER) on or about May 15,1997. Also in the last few days, we have l

identified two additional Appendix R issues that are subject to reporting in subsequent LERs. One of these issues (IN 92 18 valves) was reported through ENS on May 7,1997.

In the interim, Mr. Dave Butler of the NRC Region 111 office has requested information about our planned corrective actions for these conditions; short-term compensttory measures and permanent corrective actions. Mr. Butler suggested that this information may be useful to the NRC Startup Assessment Team. We agree that communication of these corrective actions may be beneficial. Therefore, we are attaching a preliminary description of our corrective actions; however, the corrective actions proposed on the attachment are strictly preliminary in nature and have not had the benefit of a Manager's Supersisory Staff (MSS) review and are subject to change. In addition, we fully expect that the Appendix R Rebaselining Project discussed at our management meeting on April 24,1997, will provide furtl~r information that may affect the l approach to some of the proposed pennanent corrective actions.  ;

The attachment describes our proposed general approach to correcting th be comir.itments at this time. Our commitments will be described in the LER and any supplements. Please contact us if l you have any questions. l Sir &tly, /

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PDR ADOCK 05000266' l Attachment F ,

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Appendix R Startup Items ,

As of May 8,1997 i NOTRK ID litle / Description Proposed Corrective Actions 1estative Schedule C N % 553-1 Ac.EJerrinap CaNeSaresher Asem Short Term Short Teras Verify / ensure operable detecuan and suppression in area. In place and completed prior to Entry into fire area (Cable Spreading Room) may be required to Continuous fire watch if either detection or suppression startup operate breakers before abe fire can be assumed extinguished. system is taken out of service.

Restrict work activities and transient combustibles in the Cable Spreading Room to that which is essential for continued plant operations Maintain all c ble trays covered per existing exemption request to eliminate exposure of cables and prevent any combustible pathway for a fire to stan e,d spread in the room.

Hourly fire watch in Cable Spreading Room to verify the above conditions are maintained to reduce the likelihood of any transient combustibic fire exposure.

Stage additional SCBA's at the entrance to the area for use in the event Operators must enter the roorn Revise shutdown pmcedures to identify this potential problem and per.autions Operators may need to enter roem and operate equipment.

Provide imb u i;v. I meeting for Operators to explain the potential problems, conditions and solutions.

Provide Operauons Training on revised AOP procedure.

Prepan: a 50.59 to evaluate operating the plant under these interim conditions.

Long Term Lone Teria Modify G05 circuits to ensure availability of this attemate Modifration in progress, safe shutdown method for a Cable Spreading room fire. This schedule for completion being method has been previously approved for a fire in the 4ky prepared.

Vital Swgr room and will allow shutdown completely ah' of the Cable Spreading room.

Revise Shutdown procedures to address the use of G05 for this fire and train operators on its use.

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Summacry ef Point Beach Nuclear Pla^t -

Appendix R Startup Itetus ,

As of May 8,1997 NUTRKID Iltle / Description Proposed Corrective Actions 1entante Schedule G W 28-# Uhr4 Procedaraf Gasdmace for EDG Leadher Short Tern Short Term rC01502) Revise Safe Shutdown procedures to instruct Operators to la place and completed prior to use G03 or GO4 to shutdown where this condition exists. startup A review of the Appendix R Safe Shutdown procedure AOP. De new G03 and G04 diesels have de control power 10A," Safe Shutdown -Iscal Control" indicated that a available for fues in the Control Room and Cable Spreading potentially unanalyzed process which required the EDG (G01 Room (See above fLw Cable Spreading Room cencem) or G02) to be started with its output breaker closed and the minimum essentialload breakers closed on the 480 V AC Provide instructional meeting for Operators to explain the bus. There is no analysis to i -- s_+ the capability of the potential problems, conditions and solutions.

EDG to reach rated speed and flash its field with these loads already connected during the worste postulated fire in the Provide Operator Training on revised safe shutdown plant. procedures.

Prepare a 50.59 to evaluate operating the plant under these interim conditions.

Long Term Long Term Modify G05 circuits to ensure availability of this attemate Modification in progress, safe shutiown method to address a Cable Spreading room schedule forcompletion being fire . His method has been previously approved for a fue in prepared.

the 4ky Vital Swgr room and will allow shutdown completely independent of the Cable Spreading room.

Revise Shutdown procedures to address the use ofG05 for this fire and train operators on its use.

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Sumat:ry of '

Point Beach Nuclear Plant '

Appendix R Startup Itents ,

As of May 8,1997 SUTRE ID 1itic / Description Proposed Corrective Actions Tentative Schedule CR 96-1361 Imadensrsse BresAcr C ' '-- Causes Instrument Loss Short Teras Skort Term Verify lensure operable detection and suppression in area. In place and completed prior to During a review ofelectrical cable routmg. a licensee engineer Continuous fire watch if either detection or suppression startup identified a 125 VDC power cable that should not have been muted system is taken out of service.

through the North Zone of the AIV Pump Room. The cable s.rpplies 125VDC panel D-28 from bus D-04. A fault on this cable. Restrict wcTk activities and transient combustibles in the in combination with lack of selective breaker coordination on this AFW Pu.np -

Room to that which is essential for continued 125 VDC panel, could result in a loss of 125 VDC bus D-04 and the plant operations yellow channel ofinstrument power. The loss ofinstrument pourt would disable instrumentation that is essential for achieving and flourly fire watch in AFW Pump Room to verify the above maintaining a safe shutdown for Unit 2 until this potential short was conditions are maintained to reduce the likelihood of any cleared and the panel was repowered_ transient combustible fire exposure.

Revise Fire Emergency Plans (FEPs) to provide guidance for Operations in the event of an AFP Roem fire and information on potential problems and how to clear the short and restore plant instrumentation.

Provide instructional meeting fx Opera: ors to explain the potential problems, conditions and solutions.

Prepare a 50.59 to evaluate operatmg the plant under these interim conditions.

• Lone Teran Lone Term Considering modifications to protect circuits (fire mTap) or Feasibility and schedule for rescute cables completion being considered Page 3 of 6

1 Summ ryef '

Poi;t Beach Nuclear Plast - .

Appendix R Startup Items ,

As of May 8,1997 SUTRK ID Title / Description Proposed Corrective Actions Testadve Schedule t

CR 96-889-1 . Inadenuate Coorniination Mar Dasable All Emerrents Power Short Tcra Mort Term

, Verify / ensure operable detection and suppression in area. In place and completed prior to As part of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Addition Contmuous fire watch if either detection or suppression startup Project, the normal 125 VDC supplies to EDG G-02 were system is taken out of service.

repowered from distribution panet D-31. Power cables for this normal power supply were routed through the North Zone of the Restnct work activities in the AFW Pump Room to that AFW Pump Room. Ihe DC supply cables from the other three u hich is essential for continued plant operations EDGs are also routed through this zone, and due to the lack of selective breaker coordination on this 125 VDC panet, an llourly fut watch in t!'c AFW Pump Roem to reduce the Appendix R fire in the North Zone of the AFW Pump Room likelihood and severity of a postulated fue. ,

could result in the trip of the power to the remaining control power circuit to the emergency diesci generator routed outside Revise Fire Emergency Plans (FEPs) to pro ide guidance for this room. Disabling all these power supplies could prevent all AFP Room fire and f,ur EDGs from starting and supplying their required Appendix iuentify this potential problem and precautions Operators R safe shutdown loads until the short is cleared and panel may need to take to clear the short and operate equipment.

repowered.

Provide instructional rnecting for Operators to explain the potential problems and conditions.

Prepare a 50.59 to evaluate operating the plant under these interim conditions.

Loan Term Lear Term Considering modifications to protect circuits (fire wrap) or Feasibility and schedule for reroute cables completion being considered i CR 92-372-4 Lack of Vendlarion Amatrris forSafeSamsdownr- .._ ; Short Term / Lone Term Short Term / Lone Term Purchase portable fans / generators In place and completed prior to A review of the original Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis Proceduralize placement and operation ofequipment. startup indicated that particular ventilation equipment was not listed on the Administratively control and maintain equipment for l Appendix R essential equipment list as equipment necessary to Appendix R use.

achieve safe shutdown. Accordingly, the original analyses did not demonstrate the effects of fires on electrical circuits of ventilation Prepare a 50.59 to evaluate operating the plant under these equipment, and the original analysis had no evaluation of safe conditions. '

shutdown equipment operability for the potential loss of room cooling. After performing, ventilation calculations it was determined that supplemental ventilation would be necessary prior to reaching cold shutdown for Appendix R.

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Samm ry of Point Beach Nuclear Plant Appendix R Startup Items s As of May 8,1997 ,

SUIRK ID Title / Desertpteon Proposed Corrective Actions i Iestative Schedele CR %959-1 Imadepsare Procedrrel Geldener for Bas Srrrppsar Short Terme I Lane Tern Short Term /1.one Term Revise AOP safe shutdown proccb to reflect change and in place and completed prior to A review of the Appendix R Safe Shutdown procedures indicated that identify proper de power panet startup Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOP-10A and AOP-10C) directed plant operators to proceed to the mTong DC power panel for isolating Provide instructional neg for Operators to explain the control power to 4 KV switchgear 2A05 and 480 V bus 2B03. potential problems and eaa^'ian<

Isolating this control power during a fire is necessary to prevent spurious breaker operation on the 2A05 and 2B03 buses. Provide Operations Training on rnised AOP procedure.

Prepare a 50.59 to etaluate operatmg the plant under this condition.

CR %I249-1 IN 92 Not Sharr on MOl's Short term Short Term IR 4 018-12 Identified Yalves susceptible to this damage. In place and completed prior to Concern that fire-induced hot shorts could bypass torque switch-limi; startup r suitch protection and mechanically damage safe shutdown valves Update Operations Notebook to identify susceptible valves.

required to be manually scgali..ed for safe shutdown.

Review Appendix R shutdown paths and identify alternatives available Revise Control Room safe shutdown procedure to identify condition and consider feasibility of an immediate action to deenergize valve operators for a control room fire.

Provide imsmik ud meeting for Operators to explain the potential problems and wh Mark related breakers in the field that would require tripping.

Provide Operations Training on revised AOP procedure.

P Prepare a 50.59 to evaluate operating the plant under these interirn conditions.

Loar Term Long Term Circuit modifications are being considered as recammended Feasibility, conceptual design in IN 92-18 and schedule for completion Re-gearing of valves if possible. being considered at this time.

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Sumarry cf ,

Poi;t Beach Nuclear Plant * .

Appendix R Startup Items .

As of Msy 8,1997 MTIRK ID 16tle / Description Proposed Correctiie Actions lentative Schedule CR JustIssued Adesuracy arEmerreemer fichn=c for Operwer Ac#eser Short Term Short Term M97 Update Operauons Notebook to identify need for portable in plm:e and completed prior to ApperedW FL shutdown includes operator actions in areas which may lights startup not be Cue mated (i c 5% PII, and 13.8 KV Su gr Bldg) and 8-hr battery powered lights net installed along outdoor access and egress Stage and maintain Portable Lanterns and Flashlights routes (i c., SWPil.13.8 kw Swgr Bldg. DGB Building. G05 Bldgl. accessible for Operator use Provide instuctonal meeting for Operators to explain the potential problems and conditions.

Prepare a 50.59 to evaluate operstmg the plant under these interim conditions.

Lone Term Lone Term Install 8-hr battery powered emergency lighting in SWPl{ Modification and schedule for and 13.8 kv Swgr Bldg completion being prepared.

Request Exempuon for 8-hr battery powered lights outdoors and in the G05 Bldg which has emergency lighting equal to or better than 8-hr battery units CR 97-1343 CCWCross Commect l's/rc Short Termione Term Shnyt Term! Lone Term Revise AOP shutdown procedures to use attemate flow paths in place and completed pnor to CCW Cross Connect valve failed following manual operation. This in lieu of this stuck valve. startup valve is currently listed for use in cold shutdown piecedures for certain plant f;re scenanos. Condition previously reported. Provide instructional meeting for Operators to explain the potential problems and conditions.

Proside Operations Training on revised AOP procedure.

Prepare a 50.59 to evaluate operating the plant under this condition.

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