ML20136J208
| ML20136J208 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Neely Research Reactor |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1985 |
| From: | Neely Research Reactor, ATLANTA, GA |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20136J192 | List: |
| References | |
| PROC-851120, NUDOCS 8511250305 | |
| Download: ML20136J208 (22) | |
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0-EMERGENCY PROCEDURES PART I General Rules and Guides for Reacting to Emergencies
- 1. The priorities in any emergency at the NNRC are:
A. Protecting the safety and welfare of the public.
B. Saving lives of and minimizing harm to personnel.
C. Minimizing damage to the facility.
- 2. Any person who works in the Neely Nuclear Research Center (NNRC) and who is a witness to an incident which may develop into an emergency has a choice of either attempting to stop the incident from developing into an emergency (as in the case of a small fire) or leaving the scene and immediately notifying the Emergency Director (E.D.) or any one of his designated alternates.
- 3. Any one working in the NNRC who is a witness to what he or she considers to be an emergency condition should immediately leave the scene by the safest route (see attached plan) to the ,
designated N.W. corner of the parking lot. On the way out, that person should, either by word of mouth, PA system, telephone, or activating the siren, notify the E.D. or any of his designated alternates of the emergency condition.
- 4. All uncontrolled radioactive spills should be treated as emergencies until declared otherwise.
- 5. The response of all personnel to a sounding siren, fire alarm, or a verbal command declaring an emergency on the PA system shall be to imraed ia tely evacuate by the safest route. All personnel shall assemble in the N.W. corner of the parking lot for a head count. Anyone who has any information about the emergency should give such information to the E.D. or his designated alternate.
- 6. No one, except the E.D. and his team of emergency assessors, is allowed to reenter the building until the emergency is declared over.
7 Notification of campus police and outside agencies including the NRC shall be performed in accordance with the approved emergency plan and by the CD on the scene.
- 8. Vhen the nature of the emergency is not known, the E.D. on the scene, along with two other personnel, preferably one H.P. and one R.O., shall enter the NNRC building through the N.W. door and proceed to the Emergency Command Center located in the raachine shop. After obtaining survey meters, the H.P. and 0511250305 851120 PDR ADOCK 05000160 p PDR
, . - . . . .- ~ . - .. ... - . - - - . - , - . . _ _ . -
.. 2 R.O. shall proceed to make general surveys of the building and ;
report to the ED who stays in the Emergency Command Center by
'the telephone. -
- 9. The. E.D. on the scene may call for help from anyone within '
Georgia Tech including the Georgia Tech police. Requests for additional police help should be made by the Georgia Tech police. Requests for help from the Atlanta Fire Department should also be made through the Georgia Tech police.
- 10. No one may enter the Containment Building (C . B . ) when the yellow warning light at the outer door of the airlock is
-flashing. ~ When this light is flashing, call the Control Room for. clarification. If no one is in the Control Room call the E.D. and/or RSO. ,
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3 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES PART II Heavy Water Leak in the Containment Building Leak of D70 in the Containment Building can occur when the GTRR is operating as well as when it is shutdown. Likely places where leaks may develop are pipe joints and pumps. All leaks will lead to spilling of D 0 in the process room and would possibly 2
result in a high concentration of tritium throughout the Containment Building. Heavy water leak detectors are placed at several locations in the process room. Activation of any of these detectors will be annunciated in the Control Room. Activation isolates the C.B. and makes the yellow warning light flash at the outer door of the airlock in the vestibule. No one should attempt to enter the Containment Building when this light is flashing without tirst learning about the nature of the potential danger from the Control Room. If no one is in the Control Room get help from the E.D. and/or the RSO.
It is possible that a small D3 0 leak may go undetected for sometime. The degree of danger to which one may be exposed under such conditions is not easily quantified. ~'Howeyer, it is generally agreed among the operating staff that th'e Kanne chamber willeshow high radiation levels and this will be annunciated in the Control Room. It also will isolate the containment Building but will not cause the warning light to flash at the outer door of the airlock. It is believed that safety would be served better if detection of high radiation levels in the Kanne chamber will cause the warning light to flash. This change in the circuit of the control system will be made after obtaining appropriate approval from the Safeguards Committee.
Leaks that are either small or large that develop during off-hours or when the reactor is not operating will not damage
! either the fuel or the reactor. Consequently, the primary concern here is the protection of personnel: those who are outside the Containment Building should stay out and those who may be inside the Co'ntainment Building during cool down periods should get out immediately via the safest route. A crucial step for protecting personnel is the warning system. To this end the flashing of the warning light at the airlock outer door will be interlocked to the Kanne trip point for Argon-41. As a consequence of the change, when this light is flashing, the Containment Building becomes isolated and the annunciator in the Control Room is activated.
With the isolatign of the Containment Building, and the required ensuing evacuation , the emergency due to the D,0 leak will be contained with no further harm to operating staff, the public or the reactor. The E.D., together with the RSO and operating staff, will plan appropriate steps to bring the situation back to normal.
Evacuation is required if the operator does not have any idea what is causing the C.B. to isolate. If the reason for isolation is known and if in the opinion of the operator the condition that exists is safe, he may choose to stay inside.
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When the reactor is operating at one MW or less and a D,0 leak develops, the operator on duty should scram the reactor and leave the containment Building immediately. At a power level of 1 MW or less the size and/or location of the D 2 0 leak will not result in any damage to the fuel or the reactot provided the automatic ECC system actuates on schedule.
When the reactor is operating at power levels greater than 1 MW the Technical Specifications require that coolant remain covering the fuel for eight hours after shutdown. If a leak develops during such runs, the final outcome will depend on where the leak is and how the operating crew responds. For example, if the leak is between the D0 2 isolation valves and the reactor, the D 0 level in the reactor tank will continue to decrease and the ECb system will ultimately activate to spray D 20 on the fuel in the core for about 35 minutes. During this 35 minutes it is necessary to connect the short hose in the mechanical room making the addition of light water to the spray system possible ,for the next seven hours and 25 minutes. The above scenario, i.e., leak between the tank and isolation valves has only one eventual outcome--the unavoidable addition of light water to the fuel in the core. Current procedures and philosophy for handling such a problem require the reactor operator to stay in the Control Room to make sure that the isolation valves, which automatically close when a certain level of D 0 in the tank is reached, will halt drainage of the D 0. Of dourse no halt to drainage is possible 2
if the leak is between D 0 isolation valves and the reactor tank. The problem with thi$ procedure is that by the time the reactor operator confidently gains such information he may already have received many times the body burden for tritium.
If the leak is, however, beyond the D 0 isolation valves, the closing of the valves will halt t$e D,0 drainage.
Furthermore, as long as the fuel is covered with D 0 no fuel 2
damage will result (see Technical Specifications, Chapter 3).
From an emergency point of view involving a D 0 leak, it is important to protect the reactor operator and oth$r personnel who may be in the Containment Building as the first priority.
Protection of the facility should be accomplished through engineered safety systems. To that enu we will purchase a T.V.
camera and install it in the Control Room with the capabilities of focusing on, among other things, the D 3 0 level dial and have the I
output of the camera displayed in the Emergency Command Center.
This capability climinates the necessity to have the reactor operator stay in the control Room to observe what is happening to
! the D 0 level indicator.
2 Consideration of the above statements leads to the following steps which must be executed in case of a D 0 leak.
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- 1. For operation at power levels equal to or less than one MW
- a. Leaks that develop during operation will ultimately be detected by the Kanne chamber due to tritium release or the D,0 leak detectors. In either case, after the circuit change, the warning light at the outer airlock door and the annunciator in the control Room would be flashing. When this happens the reactor operator shall proceed to scram the reactor, make sure that the Containnent Building is isolated, and announce on the PA system that the Containment Building must be evacuated and to leave by the fastest route. This will be treated as a Center (NNRC) emergency requiring evacuation from all offices and laboratories. The E.D., together with the RSO and operating staff, will plan steps for assessing the situation and ultimate return to normalcy.
- b. No one should attempt to enter the Containment Building when the warning light is flashing at the outer door of the airlock without first clearing his entry with the Control Room. If no one is in the Control Room the E.D.
must be notified.
- c. If a leak develops during off-hours, the warning light will flash; and the first person to discover the flashing light should immediately notify the E.D. or his alternate,
- d. If the reactor is not operating during working hours and personnel are in the Containment Building when a leak develops and if an operator is not in the Control Room, the people working in the Containment Building shall evacuate when they hear the building isolate. Immediate notification of the E.D. is necessary. Training of personnel to recognize building isolation when it happens will be required of all who have access to the Containment Building.
- 2. For operation at power levels greater than 1 MW
- a. Steps to be taken after a D0 leak is detected during operation at power levels 2 greater than 1 MW are exactly similar to the steps described above with one addition.
Upon evacuation the reactor operator should head to the mechanical room to connect the hose which would make possible the introduction of light water ( 11 0 ) in the ECCS if this should become necessary. Int $oductionof 11 , 0 into ECCS will be made only if it becomes apparent that the fuel will become uncovered due to a falling D 3 0 level in the tank. The D0 7 level will be observed by the closed circuit T.V from the Emergency Comuand Center.
The E.D. will make the decision to add 11 0 to the ECC 2
spray systeu.
- b. Emergency power and lighting tor the T.V. camera in the Control Room shall be provided.
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EMERGENCY PROCEDURES Part III Irradiated Fuel Element Becomes Unshielded The. actions to be taken when an irradiated fuel element becomes accidentally unshielded due to whatever reason are:
a.- Immediately run away from the exposed fuel element
- b. Immediately evacuate the containment Building;
- c. Notify E.D. and/or his alternate. The E.D., RSO, and operating staff will develop a strategy for restoring C.B.
to normal.
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After this modification, the response to a fire in the Hot Cell should be as follows:
A. During working hours: Evacuate the building. The E.D. on the scene together with two other personnel, one H.P. and one Hot Cell operator, will re-enter the NNRC and proceed to the Emergency Command Center. After obtaining survey meters, the H.P. and the Hot Cell operator shall proceed to make general surveys of the building and to report to the E.D. who stays in the Emergency Command Center by the telephone.
When fire is confirmed to exist in the Hot 60 cell, the Hot Cell operator should try to transfer any Co sources which are in the Hot Cell to the pool provided it is safe to do so (i.e., radiation field in operation area of the Hot Cell is low enough to allow personnel to work the remote control manipulators). If the radiation field is too high all parties should return to the Emergency Command Center for further study and planning which will involve the Atlanta Fire Department and tge RSO. In all probability the automatic release of the Co gas will extinguish the fire.
B. During off-hours: The fire alarm will be sensed at the Georgia Tech police station and the E.D. and the Atlanta Fire Department will be summoned to the NNRC by the Georgia Tech police. In this situation it is possible that only the E.D.
from the NNRC will be present. He, along with help from the Georgia Tech police and perhaps one fireman, will do the surveying with radiation detection equipment before any action is taken to combat fire. It is important that radiation exposure of all personnel including the Georgia Tech police and Atlaata firemen be assessed and evaluated prior to sending anyone anywhere for any purpose. A fire in the Hot Cell would not constitute a significant hazard to either the public or the facility, and the reason is that the Hot Cell is simply a concrete structure that will contain the fire.
One concern is that a fire could damage the gasket that helps seal the zine bromide in the viewing windows. A damaged seal may result in a slow leak and consequently decrease the attentuation efficiency of the window. For this reason it is important that surveys for establishing the radiation field be made before sending in the firemen.
Another small concern is that the fire may damage tgg stainless steel welds in the tubes that house the Co sources and cause leaks. Even if this were to take place, the Hot Cell would contain the spill with no harm to the public or NNRC personnel.
In summary, it is believed that the installation of a fire detector in the Hot cell and an automptic system to shut off air circulation and turn on the Co gas would constitute a major safety improvement engineered to limit and contain fire in the Hot cell.
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EMERGENCY PROCEDURES Part IV Fire at Noely Nuclear Research Center The Neely Nuclear Research Center is equipped, at numerous locations (see attached figures) with " heat" detectors, any one of which, when activated, will trigger the fire alarm horn. The sounding of the horn is coded such that personnel working at the NNRC can recognize, after training, the general origin of the fire. The code for the fire alarm is as follows:
Containment Labs & Offices Building Building Ground Floor 1-1 1-2 First Floor 2-1 2-2 Second Floor 3-1 3-2 For the ground floor in the Containment Building the fire alarm horn would give one blast, a pause and another blast. For the second floor it is two consecutive blasts, one pause and one last . blast. For the Control Room (second floor). . it is three consecutive blasts, a pause and one last blast. If there is one blast after the pause, it means that the fire is in the Containment Building. The code for the laboratories and halls is as indicated above. As an example, if a fire is on the first floor the horn would give two consecutive blasts followed by one pause and ends.with two more consecutive blasts. Drills designed to make people aware of this code will be initiated soon.
I. The actions to be taken in the event of a fire in the Containment Building are:
A. During Reactor Operation
- a. Scram the reactor, press the scram and shutdown buttons. Verify that the flux is decreasing by l observing the power level recorder, the Log N the power level trip amplifier meters and recorder, the fuel element temperature recorder. If flux is l not decreasing, press open the button for the drain l valves and the individual open buttons for the i clutch magnet circuits to dump top reflector.
- b. Isolate the Containment Building.
- c. Turn to "off" all switches to pumps and control rod drives. Turn key switch ofi.
I L d. As stated in the General Rules and Guides for
( Reacting to Emergencieu; a person witnessing an l incident which may develop into an emergency has a choice of either attempting to stop the incident l
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8 from developing into an emergency or leaving the scene and immediately notifying the E.D. or his alternate. For a small fire, which may be located in the C.B. or elsewhere in the NNHC, the witness has that choice. Should the witness elect and try to put out the fire, he/she may use the nearest fire extinguisher (see Figure 2 for location of fire extinguishers) . Heroism is not encouraged here.
The PA nhould be used to alert all in the building.
- e. The operator on duty should make sure that all personnel are out of the C.B.
B. Reactor is not operating but during working hours. The procedure for reacting to fire in the Containment Building when the reactor is not being operated is a repeat of steps (b) through (c) inclusive.
C. During off-hours:
The only way a fire can be detected when no one is in the Containment Building is through the actuation of the fire detectors positioned at several locations in the Containment Building (see Figure 1) and annunciation at the Georgia Tech police station. When this happens Georgia Tech's police notifies the E.D. or his designated alternate and the Atlanta Fire Department. Plans for combating fire in the C.B. will be devised by the E.D., the RSO, and the fire department personnel on the scene.
II. Actions to be taken in the event of a fire in the Hot Cell Generally speaking, combustibles will be kept gg a minimum in the Hot Cell. The plywood board on which Co sources are hung to produce a certain gamma field will be replaced by an aluminum board about 1/4 inch thick. This b d will be fitted with screw-on metal hooks on which the Co#5 sources will be hung.
There ja presently no fire detector in the Hot Cell. A bottle located of Co gas, to be used as a fire extinguisher, is outside the Hot Cell. If a fire starts inside the Hot Cell and if a person is there to witness the start that person will have to manually open the valve and let the freon flow into the Hot Cell to combat the fire. If no one sees the fire the fire could go on for a long time without being detected.
This situation is being changed to the following: A radiation resistant fire detector will be installed in the Hot Cell and the output of this detector will be routed to: (1) Georgia Tech police, (2) a2 s len id actuator to automatically open the valve of the Co bottle, and (3) a switch which will turn off air circulation in the Hot cell.
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10 III. Actions to be taken in the event of a fire in the labs and/or offices.
The general rule is to evacuate the building when a fire alarm is sounding. The E.D. with help from the Radiation safety office, Georgia Tech police and Atlanta Fire Department will map out a plan for action consistent with public safety and personnel.
IV. Actions to be taken in the event of fire in the storage building of the Radiological Safety Office.
Currently this building located within the fenced area directly north of the C.B. does not have a fire alarm.
The building is not attached to either the Containment Building or the labs and offices in the NNRC. The hazard to the public associated with fire in this building would be the spreading of trace amounts of radioactive elements in waste material. The building is used to store radioactive waste. It is important that a fire alarm be installed in this building.
Actions to be taken are:
- a. Isolate the Containment Building
- b. Turn off the central air system in the NNRC and request that central air in the Electronics Research be turned off,
- c. Plan a strategy for action with the Georgia Tech police and Atlanta Fire Department.
11 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES PART V Zine Bromide Leak in the Hot cell Window Appendix B of the approved Emergency Plan calls for an emergency procedure addressing a hypothetical situation in which the leaded glass in the Hot cell window breaks resulting in a total loss of the zine bromide and loss of shielding efficiency.
After some analysis and based on twenty years of experience with Hot cell Operations, the NNRC staff concluded that the only time the leaded glass of the window is likely to break is during periods of time when heavy objects are being moved in 50 ut of the Hot Coll. Of course, during such periods the Co sources are in the pool and a break in the window glass would not constitute an emergency.
It is possible, however, that the seal in the window between the glass and the outside may crack due to radiation damage to the gasket and cause a slow leak. The consensus among operating personnel is that the leak would be slow--very slow!
Consequently, in order to guard against a slow leak going unnoticed for, perhaps, a long weekend, it has been decided to install a level indicator measuring the zine bromide level in each window. The level indicator will be designed to actuate an alarm which would cause the front door to the NNRC building to be locked so that no one from the outside could come in. Also, when the alarm is actuated, a light above the front door would begin to flash and warn potential visitors to stay away. The alarm itself would have the same sound as the criticality alarm and would be located in the reception room. When activated it would be annunciated at the Georgia Tech police department.
The primary reason for the improvement in engineered safety features of the Hot cell facility is to give edequate and timely warning of an impending energency with regard to the level of zinc bromide. A decrease of about two inches in the level would not cause any harm to anyone because the window is designed with an expansion chamber two inches deep. If the level indicator is set to actuate at the 1/4-1/2 inch level, there would be enough time left (difference between 1/2 inch to 2 inches for 60 the level of zine bromide to drop) to simply put away the Co sources. The danger to Hot Cell operators and NNRC personnel begins when the level of zine bromide drops more than two inches from the top.
Below this level an air gap begins to appear at the top and through this gap gamma rays will stream through unattenuated.
When all of the zine bggmide is out of the window, the dose rate due to 100,000 C1 Co (only approximately 30,000 are available now) on the outside at a location near the manipulators would be 49,000 R/hr. The dose rate at the glass window in the reception room, some twenty feet away is 982 R/hr. The dose rate at the door of the conference room is 245 R/hr. These numbers show why it is important to install the level indicator and the rest of the warning system. Engineered safety features such as this go a long way toward preventing emergencies from developing.
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- 12 In the Event a level indicator in either llot Cell window is actuated, the following actions should be taken:
A. During working hours: Evacuate the building. The E.D. on the scene together with one llo t Cell operator and one li.P., will re-enter the NNRC and proceed to the Emergency Command Center. Af ter obtaining survey raeters, the ll . P . and !!ot Cell operator shall proceed to the flo t Cell working area and carefully make surveys of the radiation levels. By telephonc
! they will inform the E.D. at the Command Center of their for one operator to I findings.
drop the Co Ifft is found that it is safe g
sources in the pool using the manipulators then it should be done calmly but expeditiously. If the dose rate is high (greater than or equal to 10 R/hr.) at the l location where the operator would stand to drop the sources, then the operator and ll.P. should return to the Command Center to participate in developing a strategy for handling the emergency.
B. During off hours: The zine bromide level alarra will be sensed at the Georgia Tech police station first. The E.D. and RSo will be summoned to the NNRC by the police. Action to be taken will be similar to (A) above.
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13 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES PART VI Pool Drain with Co on Bottom The 6 ft. x 20 ft. water pool filled to a depth of 18 ft. fg the storage facility for the approximately 40,000 Ci of Co slugs on hand at the Nuclear Research Center. (Th00 Contor is currently licensed to have 600,000 Ci of Co . It is anticipated that a request will be ggde soon to increase this licenso limit to 1,100,000 Ci of Co .) The wated0 in the pool is an excellent medium through which the Co gammas are shielded. Should this water be drained, due to whatever reason, the radiation levels in the high-bay area would be high and would activato the criticality detector located just above the pool.
In keeping with the philosophy of engineered safety systems to help provide an adequato and timely warning of imponding trouble before the trouble becomes an omorgency, we will install in the pool a water level indicator which would activato a warning signal at the Georgia Tech polico station and above the pool whenever the level drops 6 inches. The logic behind this is that in most casos pool drainage would be slow and drainage of more than 10 ft. off *1 water would be necessary beforo appreciable levels of radiation become a problem. Consequently, the window in time which is available for correctivo action is the time it takes the water lovel to drop 10 feet.
When the water lovel indicator is actuated, the Georgia Toch police will call the E.D. or one of his designated alternates.
The responso of the E.D. shall be to stop, if possiole, the drainago without taking unduo risk. Generally the preferred approach, if during off-hours, is to enter the Emergency Command contor to obtain survey motors, proceed to enter the high bay area through the vestibulo door from the outside (near the airlock of the containment Building), walk slowly toward the pool with survey :
motor in hand. Should the reading be abovo R/hr. get back and summon additional help from RSo and operating staff.
It would be purely speculative to postulato how the pool might be drained out of its water. Small looks can be counter-balanced with adding water from several faucots: one near the pool, one in the janitor's closet, one in the pool (valvo is downstairs), and one outside the vestibulo door. If, however, the drainage is due to a largo crack in the concreto (from, perhaps a major oarthquako), it is concoivable that the drainage cannot be counter-balanced. Under this condition, itmaysgfllbopossible, although unlikely, to be able to ggvo the Co (up to 100,000 C1) to the Hot Coll. If the Co inventory is greator than
- 100,000 C1, it is best that it is covered with enough dirt to l bring down the high radiation field to accoptable levels. Tho dirt is chosen rather than concreto as G0 a temporary solution because it may be castor to retrieve the Co through the dirt.
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! The raagnitude of the68mergency due to having no water in the pool when all the Co sources are at the bottom is hard to quantify. The done levels in the high bay area are expected to be high and are due to scattered gammas from the ceiling and walls.
The danger to the surrouding areas and the public is minimal.
Mirrors will be installed above the pool walls so that the bottom of ti.e pool can be seen from the vicinity of the vestibule door.
15 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES PART VII Rupture of Co Sources Appendix B of the approved Emergency Plan calls for an em85 gen y pr edure addressing a hypothetical situation in which a Co source is somehow rygtured resulting in a widespread contamination. First the Co sources are handled either in the pool under 18 feet of water or in the Hot ggll when all doors are locked shut. Furthermore, moving any Co from either the pool to the Hot cell or from the Hot cell to the pool is normally witnessed by members of two separate and independent organizations, the NNRC staff and the RSO staff. Shortcuts and non-compliance with established procedures under this condition is possible but uggikely. A rupture of any of the doubly encapsulated Co sources on hand would only occur in the Hot Cell or the pool. In either case widespread contamination is not really possible.
G0 The only other situation when a ruptured co source would noggbe contained is when the NNRC is receiving a shipment of Co from, let us say, Savannah River Laboratory. During the course of lowering the shipping cask 6fn the pool water the thermally hot and rupturgg slugs of Co may generate sufficient vapor to carry small Co particles in the air and thus bring about the spread of contamination. If such a scenario were to take place, the high bay area shall be immediately evacuated and ,
- an emergency declared.
"When an emergency is declared, the whole building is evacuated." ;
i The E.D. together with the RSO will devise a strategy to i return the affected areas to normal.
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16 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES PART VIII Accidental Release of Righ Levels of Gaseous Activity to the Atmosphere Release of high levels of radioactive gases to the atraosphere is possible only when the reactor is operating and only if multiple failures were to occur in sequence. For example, unless the fuel melts no major release of radioactive gas is possibic.
If one starts from the premise, that due to whatever reason, however unlikely, one or more fuel elements melt then in order for radioactive gases to be released two consecutive and independent fail-safe isolation valves would have to fail also. The probability of occurrence of these f ailures is very, very staall.
Nevertheless, should a release of high levels of radioactive gases take place, the E.D. with the help of the RSO will estimate dose commitment and if deemed necessary will call on Georgia Tech police to help in evacuating the areas downwind to 500 feet from NNRC. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the state environmental protection division will be informed and called upon for help. .
The E.D., with help from RSO, NRC, and state officials will plan a strategy for recovery.
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