|
---|
Category:INSPECTION REPORT
MONTHYEARIR 05000293/19990051999-10-0808 October 1999 Insp Rept 50-293/99-05 on 990726-0905.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000293/19990041999-08-27027 August 1999 Insp Rept 50-293/99-04 on 990610-0725.Non-cited Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Operations, Engineering,Maint & Plant Support ML20209G2331999-07-0909 July 1999 Insp Rept 50-293/99-03 on 990419-0609.Violations Noted & Being Treated as non-cited Violations.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support.Response to Main Transformer Fire by Fire Brigade Members Was Good IR 05000293/19990021999-05-17017 May 1999 Insp Rept 50-293/99-02 on 990308-0418.Two Level 4 Violations Occurred & Being Treated as Ncv.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19990011999-04-20020 April 1999 Insp Rept 50-293/99-01 on 990125-0307.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maintenance & Plant Support.Also Included Routine Core Insp of Security Program During Period of 990301-05 IR 05000293/19980101998-12-22022 December 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-10 on 981020-1208.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support,Including Implementation of Fire Protection Program IR 05000293/19980081998-12-0101 December 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-08 on 980907-1019.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000293/19982031998-11-24024 November 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-203 on 980928-1023.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Capability of Selected Sys to Perform Safety Functions Required by Design Bases,Adherence of Sys to Design & Licensing Bases & Consistency of Configuration IR 05000293/19980071998-10-0707 October 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-07 on 980726-0906.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19980061998-08-28028 August 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-06 on 980609-0725.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000293/19980091998-08-20020 August 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-09 on 980713-24.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Engineering Activities in Areas Including Evaluations to Address Operability Concerns,C/A Process & Actions Associated W/Findings from Previous Insps IR 05000293/19980051998-07-0909 July 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-05 on 980421-0608.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support.Concerns W/Fire Proctection Area Were Identified ML20217P7801998-04-0303 April 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-03 on 980302-05 & 11-12.Apparent Violations Being Considered for Escalated Enforcement Action.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Security Force Capability IR 05000293/19980011998-03-24024 March 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-01 on 980107-0224.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000293/19970131998-02-0606 February 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/97-13 on 971111-980106.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000293/19970121997-12-17017 December 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-12 on 971006-10 & 1119.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Eq Documents for EQ Equipment That Required Requalification Due to Containment Environ Changes Resulting from CS Flow Rate Reduction in 1988 IR 05000293/19970111997-12-11011 December 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-11 on 970914-1110.Violations Noted:Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19970101997-11-26026 November 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-10 on 971104-07.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Response Organization, Simulated Events,Mitigation Actions Emergency Declarations & off-site Agencies IR 05000293/19970081997-10-24024 October 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-08 on 970805-0913.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support ML20198L9231997-10-21021 October 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-05 on 970514-0828.Violations Being Considered for Escalated Enforcement Action.Major Areas Inspected:Engineering IR 05000293/19970071997-09-15015 September 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-07 on 970625-0816.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19970801997-09-12012 September 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-80 on 970721-0801.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Effectiveness of Processes for Identifying Resolving & Preventing Issues That Degrade Quality of Plant Operations & Safety ML20216G8181997-09-0404 September 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-09 on 970827-28.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Access Authorization Program IR 05000293/19970041997-08-0707 August 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-04 on 970505-23.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Effectiveness of Licensees Efforts in Maintaining Design Basis of safety-related Sys ML20149K0431997-07-22022 July 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-03 on 970429-0624.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maintenance,Engineering & Plant Support ML20141K7861997-05-22022 May 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-02 on 970303-0428.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support ML20137E5671997-03-18018 March 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-01 on 970112-0302.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering & Plant Support ML20134K5951997-02-0707 February 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/96-10 on 961123-970111.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19960081996-12-18018 December 1996 Insp Rept 50-293/96-08 on 960924-1122.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Engineering,Maint,Plant Support,Radioactive Effluent Controls Program,Radiological Environmental Monitoring & Meteorological Monitoring.Meeting Slides Encl IR 05000293/19960061996-10-30030 October 1996 Insp Rept 50-293/96-06 on 960729-0923.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support ML20129A0441996-10-11011 October 1996 Insp Rept 50-293/96-09 on 960916-20.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Miscellaneous Security & Safeguard Issues,Access Authorization Program & Administration Organization & Background Investigation Elements ML20129D8361996-09-20020 September 1996 Insp Rept 50-293/96-07 on 960708-12,0722-26 & 0828-0903. Non Cited Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:C/As After Licensee Had Identified Potentially Inoperable Primary Containment as Documented in LER 96-04 IR 05000293/19930201994-01-10010 January 1994 Insp Rept 50-293/93-20 on Stated Date.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maintenance & Surveillance, Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19930801993-12-21021 December 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-80 on 931018-23.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Station Blackout Coping Sys,Onsite Ac Supplies & Reliability Program,Plant Mods & QA & Maint Practices for Station Blackout Equipment IR 05000293/19930191993-11-23023 November 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-19 on 930928-1101.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Maint & Surveillance, Engineering,Plant Support,W/Regard to Security & NRC Info Notice 93-079 ML20058D4771993-11-19019 November 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-16 on 930830-1015.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Audits & Surveillances,Training & Qualifications,Radiological Problem Repts & Associated C/A IR 05000293/19930151993-10-15015 October 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-15 on 930817-0927.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiological Controls Maint & Surveillance,Emergency Preparedness,Security,Safety Assessment & Quality Verification IR 05000293/19930171993-09-24024 September 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-17 on 930830-0903.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Controls,Qa Audits & ODCM IR 05000293/19930141993-09-0808 September 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-14 on 930713-0816.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Maintenance & Surveillance,Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19930111993-08-0404 August 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-11 on 930606-11.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Corrective Actions of Previously Identified Electrical Distribution Sys Functional Insp Findings & Observations IR 05000293/19930011993-02-0303 February 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-01 on 930111-14.Weaknesses Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Eop Review,Rev,Approval Process,Qa Involvement in EOP Program & Operator Training in EOPs IR 05000293/19920811993-02-0202 February 1993 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Based Insp Rept 50-293/92-81 on 921130-1218.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Emergency Diesel Generators & Hpcis.App a Encl IR 05000293/19920281993-01-28028 January 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/92-28 on 921124-1231.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint & Surveillance,Emergency Preparedness, Security,Safety Assessment & Quality Verification IR 05000293/19920261993-01-21021 January 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/92-26 on 921207-11.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ep Program Changes, Emergency Response Facilities,Equipment,Instrumentation, Supplies & Organization & Mgt Control IR 05000293/19920231992-12-29029 December 1992 Safety Insp Rept 50-293/92-23 on 921020-1123.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint & Surveillance,Emergency Preparedness, Security & Safety Assessment & Quality Verification IR 05000293/19920241992-11-23023 November 1992 Insp Rept 50-293/92-24 on Stated Date.No Safety Concerns or Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Audits & Surveillances,Collective Personnel Exposure Status,Outage Radiological Controls & Implementation of Exposure Programs IR 05000293/19900201990-11-0707 November 1990 Safety Insp Rept 50-293/90-20 on 900816-1008.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Security, Maint & Surveillance,Engineering & Technical Support, Radiological Controls,Emergency Preparedness & Safety IR 05000293/19900211990-10-11011 October 1990 Insp Rept 50-293/90-21 on 900905-07.Major Areas Inspected: 900902-03 Event Involving Number of Component Malfunctions & Operational Complications Following Shutdown.Operating Procedures Lacked Adequate Guidance for Operators IR 05000293/19900091990-08-20020 August 1990 Insp Rept 50-293/90-09 on 900806-10.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Control of Design, Design Changes,Mods,Engineering & Technical Support Organization,Staffing,Communications,Qa & Training IR 05000293/19900161990-07-30030 July 1990 Partially Withheld Physical Security Insp Rept 50-293/90-16 on 900625-29 (Ref 10CFR73.21).No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support & Program Plans,Protected & Vital Area Physical Barriers & Detection & Assessment Aids 1999-08-27
[Table view] Category:NRC-GENERATED
MONTHYEARIR 05000293/19990051999-10-0808 October 1999 Insp Rept 50-293/99-05 on 990726-0905.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000293/19990041999-08-27027 August 1999 Insp Rept 50-293/99-04 on 990610-0725.Non-cited Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Operations, Engineering,Maint & Plant Support ML20209G2331999-07-0909 July 1999 Insp Rept 50-293/99-03 on 990419-0609.Violations Noted & Being Treated as non-cited Violations.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support.Response to Main Transformer Fire by Fire Brigade Members Was Good IR 05000293/19990021999-05-17017 May 1999 Insp Rept 50-293/99-02 on 990308-0418.Two Level 4 Violations Occurred & Being Treated as Ncv.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19990011999-04-20020 April 1999 Insp Rept 50-293/99-01 on 990125-0307.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maintenance & Plant Support.Also Included Routine Core Insp of Security Program During Period of 990301-05 IR 05000293/19980101998-12-22022 December 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-10 on 981020-1208.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support,Including Implementation of Fire Protection Program IR 05000293/19980081998-12-0101 December 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-08 on 980907-1019.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000293/19982031998-11-24024 November 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-203 on 980928-1023.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Capability of Selected Sys to Perform Safety Functions Required by Design Bases,Adherence of Sys to Design & Licensing Bases & Consistency of Configuration IR 05000293/19980071998-10-0707 October 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-07 on 980726-0906.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19980061998-08-28028 August 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-06 on 980609-0725.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000293/19980091998-08-20020 August 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-09 on 980713-24.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Engineering Activities in Areas Including Evaluations to Address Operability Concerns,C/A Process & Actions Associated W/Findings from Previous Insps IR 05000293/19980051998-07-0909 July 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-05 on 980421-0608.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support.Concerns W/Fire Proctection Area Were Identified ML20217P7801998-04-0303 April 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-03 on 980302-05 & 11-12.Apparent Violations Being Considered for Escalated Enforcement Action.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Security Force Capability IR 05000293/19980011998-03-24024 March 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-01 on 980107-0224.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000293/19970131998-02-0606 February 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/97-13 on 971111-980106.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000293/19970121997-12-17017 December 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-12 on 971006-10 & 1119.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Eq Documents for EQ Equipment That Required Requalification Due to Containment Environ Changes Resulting from CS Flow Rate Reduction in 1988 IR 05000293/19970111997-12-11011 December 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-11 on 970914-1110.Violations Noted:Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19970101997-11-26026 November 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-10 on 971104-07.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Response Organization, Simulated Events,Mitigation Actions Emergency Declarations & off-site Agencies IR 05000293/19970081997-10-24024 October 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-08 on 970805-0913.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support ML20198L9231997-10-21021 October 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-05 on 970514-0828.Violations Being Considered for Escalated Enforcement Action.Major Areas Inspected:Engineering IR 05000293/19970071997-09-15015 September 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-07 on 970625-0816.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19970801997-09-12012 September 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-80 on 970721-0801.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Effectiveness of Processes for Identifying Resolving & Preventing Issues That Degrade Quality of Plant Operations & Safety ML20216G8181997-09-0404 September 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-09 on 970827-28.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Access Authorization Program IR 05000293/19970041997-08-0707 August 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-04 on 970505-23.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Effectiveness of Licensees Efforts in Maintaining Design Basis of safety-related Sys ML20149K0431997-07-22022 July 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-03 on 970429-0624.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maintenance,Engineering & Plant Support ML20141K7861997-05-22022 May 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-02 on 970303-0428.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support ML20137E5671997-03-18018 March 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-01 on 970112-0302.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering & Plant Support ML20134K5951997-02-0707 February 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/96-10 on 961123-970111.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19960081996-12-18018 December 1996 Insp Rept 50-293/96-08 on 960924-1122.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Engineering,Maint,Plant Support,Radioactive Effluent Controls Program,Radiological Environmental Monitoring & Meteorological Monitoring.Meeting Slides Encl IR 05000293/19960061996-10-30030 October 1996 Insp Rept 50-293/96-06 on 960729-0923.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support ML20129A0441996-10-11011 October 1996 Insp Rept 50-293/96-09 on 960916-20.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Miscellaneous Security & Safeguard Issues,Access Authorization Program & Administration Organization & Background Investigation Elements ML20129D8361996-09-20020 September 1996 Insp Rept 50-293/96-07 on 960708-12,0722-26 & 0828-0903. Non Cited Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:C/As After Licensee Had Identified Potentially Inoperable Primary Containment as Documented in LER 96-04 IR 05000293/19930201994-01-10010 January 1994 Insp Rept 50-293/93-20 on Stated Date.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maintenance & Surveillance, Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19930801993-12-21021 December 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-80 on 931018-23.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Station Blackout Coping Sys,Onsite Ac Supplies & Reliability Program,Plant Mods & QA & Maint Practices for Station Blackout Equipment IR 05000293/19930191993-11-23023 November 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-19 on 930928-1101.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Maint & Surveillance, Engineering,Plant Support,W/Regard to Security & NRC Info Notice 93-079 ML20058D4771993-11-19019 November 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-16 on 930830-1015.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Audits & Surveillances,Training & Qualifications,Radiological Problem Repts & Associated C/A IR 05000293/19930151993-10-15015 October 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-15 on 930817-0927.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiological Controls Maint & Surveillance,Emergency Preparedness,Security,Safety Assessment & Quality Verification IR 05000293/19930171993-09-24024 September 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-17 on 930830-0903.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Controls,Qa Audits & ODCM IR 05000293/19930141993-09-0808 September 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-14 on 930713-0816.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Maintenance & Surveillance,Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19930111993-08-0404 August 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-11 on 930606-11.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Corrective Actions of Previously Identified Electrical Distribution Sys Functional Insp Findings & Observations IR 05000293/19930011993-02-0303 February 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/93-01 on 930111-14.Weaknesses Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Eop Review,Rev,Approval Process,Qa Involvement in EOP Program & Operator Training in EOPs IR 05000293/19920811993-02-0202 February 1993 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Based Insp Rept 50-293/92-81 on 921130-1218.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Review of Emergency Diesel Generators & Hpcis.App a Encl IR 05000293/19920281993-01-28028 January 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/92-28 on 921124-1231.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint & Surveillance,Emergency Preparedness, Security,Safety Assessment & Quality Verification IR 05000293/19920261993-01-21021 January 1993 Insp Rept 50-293/92-26 on 921207-11.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ep Program Changes, Emergency Response Facilities,Equipment,Instrumentation, Supplies & Organization & Mgt Control IR 05000293/19920231992-12-29029 December 1992 Safety Insp Rept 50-293/92-23 on 921020-1123.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint & Surveillance,Emergency Preparedness, Security & Safety Assessment & Quality Verification IR 05000293/19920241992-11-23023 November 1992 Insp Rept 50-293/92-24 on Stated Date.No Safety Concerns or Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Audits & Surveillances,Collective Personnel Exposure Status,Outage Radiological Controls & Implementation of Exposure Programs IR 05000293/19900201990-11-0707 November 1990 Safety Insp Rept 50-293/90-20 on 900816-1008.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Security, Maint & Surveillance,Engineering & Technical Support, Radiological Controls,Emergency Preparedness & Safety IR 05000293/19900211990-10-11011 October 1990 Insp Rept 50-293/90-21 on 900905-07.Major Areas Inspected: 900902-03 Event Involving Number of Component Malfunctions & Operational Complications Following Shutdown.Operating Procedures Lacked Adequate Guidance for Operators IR 05000293/19900091990-08-20020 August 1990 Insp Rept 50-293/90-09 on 900806-10.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Control of Design, Design Changes,Mods,Engineering & Technical Support Organization,Staffing,Communications,Qa & Training IR 05000293/19900161990-07-30030 July 1990 Partially Withheld Physical Security Insp Rept 50-293/90-16 on 900625-29 (Ref 10CFR73.21).No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Support & Program Plans,Protected & Vital Area Physical Barriers & Detection & Assessment Aids 1999-08-27
[Table view] Category:TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
MONTHYEARIR 05000293/19990051999-10-0808 October 1999 Insp Rept 50-293/99-05 on 990726-0905.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000293/19990041999-08-27027 August 1999 Insp Rept 50-293/99-04 on 990610-0725.Non-cited Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Operations, Engineering,Maint & Plant Support ML20209G2331999-07-0909 July 1999 Insp Rept 50-293/99-03 on 990419-0609.Violations Noted & Being Treated as non-cited Violations.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support.Response to Main Transformer Fire by Fire Brigade Members Was Good PNO-I-99-026A, on 990518,main Transformer Was Damaged During Testing of Replacement Bushing While Unit Was in Refueling Outage.Current Refueling Outage Was Originally Scheduled to Be Completed on 990607,with Return to Full Power Operation1999-06-0101 June 1999 PNO-I-99-026A:on 990518,main Transformer Was Damaged During Testing of Replacement Bushing While Unit Was in Refueling Outage.Current Refueling Outage Was Originally Scheduled to Be Completed on 990607,with Return to Full Power Operation PNO-I-99-026, on 990518,fire Occurred at Pilgrim Station in Main Electrical Transformer.Licensee Requested off-site Firefighting Assistance.Resident Inspector Responded to Site Upon Notification of Event.Licensee Issued Press Release1999-05-19019 May 1999 PNO-I-99-026:on 990518,fire Occurred at Pilgrim Station in Main Electrical Transformer.Licensee Requested off-site Firefighting Assistance.Resident Inspector Responded to Site Upon Notification of Event.Licensee Issued Press Release IR 05000293/19990021999-05-17017 May 1999 Insp Rept 50-293/99-02 on 990308-0418.Two Level 4 Violations Occurred & Being Treated as Ncv.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19990011999-04-20020 April 1999 Insp Rept 50-293/99-01 on 990125-0307.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maintenance & Plant Support.Also Included Routine Core Insp of Security Program During Period of 990301-05 IR 05000293/19980101998-12-22022 December 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-10 on 981020-1208.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support,Including Implementation of Fire Protection Program IR 05000293/19980081998-12-0101 December 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-08 on 980907-1019.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000293/19982031998-11-24024 November 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-203 on 980928-1023.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Capability of Selected Sys to Perform Safety Functions Required by Design Bases,Adherence of Sys to Design & Licensing Bases & Consistency of Configuration IR 05000293/19983011998-11-24024 November 1998 NRC Operator Licensing Exam Rept 50-293/98-301OL (Including Completed & Graded Tests) for Tests Administered on 981016- 23.Exam Results:All Applicants Passed All Portions of Exam ML20154J8991998-10-0707 October 1998 Notice of Violation from Insp on 980726-0906.Violation Noted:Licensee Did Not Establish Measures to Assure Regulatory Requirements & Design Basis of Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration Sys IR 05000293/19980071998-10-0707 October 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-07 on 980726-0906.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support ML20239A1231998-08-28028 August 1998 Notice of Violation from Insp on 980609-0725.Violation Noted:From 1980 to 980609,licensee Failed to Maintain Provisions to Ensure That One Train of Cables Were Free from Fire Damage IR 05000293/19980061998-08-28028 August 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-06 on 980609-0725.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000293/19980091998-08-20020 August 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-09 on 980713-24.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Engineering Activities in Areas Including Evaluations to Address Operability Concerns,C/A Process & Actions Associated W/Findings from Previous Insps ML20237A3031998-08-0606 August 1998 Notice of Violation from Insp on 980427-0515.Violation Noted:From 960710-970427,licensee Elected Not to Monitor Performance or Condition of Control Rod Drive Sys Against Established Goals IR 05000293/19980051998-07-0909 July 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-05 on 980421-0608.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support.Concerns W/Fire Proctection Area Were Identified ML20247N8441998-05-19019 May 1998 Partially Deleted Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $55,000 (Ref 10CFR2.790(b) for Violations Noted During Insp on 980302-05 & 11-12 ML20247P0221998-05-19019 May 1998 Notice of Violation from Insp on 980225-0418.Violations Noted:Work Plan to Replace External Cooling Water Flexible Hoses to a Core Spray Pump Motor Not Commensurate with Complexity of Task.As Result,Physical Damage Occurred ML20248J3981998-05-14014 May 1998 EN-98-038:on 980519,notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $55,000 Issued to Licensee.Action Based on One Violation Involving Apparent Failures Associated W/Assessment Aids at Facility ML20217N5971998-04-27027 April 1998 Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $165,000.Violations Noted:Between Jan 1995 & 970120 Licensee Failed to Take Prompt & Effective Corrective Action for Significant Condition Adverse to Quality ML20247M3891998-04-22022 April 1998 EN-98-032:on 980427,notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $165,000 Issued to Licensee.Action Based on Two Severity Level III Violations & One Severity Level III Problem Re Failure to Identify & Take C/As ML20217P7801998-04-0303 April 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-03 on 980302-05 & 11-12.Apparent Violations Being Considered for Escalated Enforcement Action.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Security Force Capability ML20217F0101998-03-24024 March 1998 Notice of Violation from Insp on 980107-0224.Violation Noted:Nrc Identified That Condition Outside Design Basis of Plant Involving EDG Fuel Oil Storage Sys Was Not Reported to NRC within 1 Hour IR 05000293/19980011998-03-24024 March 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/98-01 on 980107-0224.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support ML20202D2441998-02-0606 February 1998 Notice of Violation from Insp on 971111-980106.Violations Noted:Util Did Not Properly Evaluate Cause & Implement Corrective Actions to Preclude Repetition of Temporary Temp Detectors Deficiencies from Reactor Vessel Flange IR 05000293/19970131998-02-0606 February 1998 Insp Rept 50-293/97-13 on 971111-980106.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support IR 05000293/19970121997-12-17017 December 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-12 on 971006-10 & 1119.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Eq Documents for EQ Equipment That Required Requalification Due to Containment Environ Changes Resulting from CS Flow Rate Reduction in 1988 ML20197K1101997-12-17017 December 1997 Notice of Violation from Insp on 971006-10 & 1119.Violation Noted:Nine Penetrations Were Not Qualified in That Qualification Methodology Used by Boston Edison Had Not Been Validated by Test Results to Be Equivalent to Type Testing ML20197H2411997-12-11011 December 1997 Notice of Violation from Insp on 970914-1110.Violation Noted:On 971001,licensee Identified That,Tagout T97-61-162 Was Incorrectly Prepared & Applied;Breaker 1021 Was Placed in Closed Vice Open Position as Required by Tagout IR 05000293/19970111997-12-11011 December 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-11 on 970914-1110.Violations Noted:Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19970991997-11-26026 November 1997 Correction to SALP Rept 50-293/97-99.Page 2 of Subj Rept Corrected IR 05000293/19970101997-11-26026 November 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-10 on 971104-07.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Response Organization, Simulated Events,Mitigation Actions Emergency Declarations & off-site Agencies PNO-I-97-072, on 971123,operators Initiated Plant Shutdown When Main Steam Isolation Valves AO-203-1C & AO-203-2B Were Declared Inoperable During Surveillance Test1997-11-24024 November 1997 PNO-I-97-072:on 971123,operators Initiated Plant Shutdown When Main Steam Isolation Valves AO-203-1C & AO-203-2B Were Declared Inoperable During Surveillance Test ML20198P8241997-11-0404 November 1997 SALP Rept 50-293/97-99 for Period 960407-970913 IR 05000293/19970081997-10-24024 October 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-08 on 970805-0913.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Engineering,Maint & Plant Support ML20198L9231997-10-21021 October 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-05 on 970514-0828.Violations Being Considered for Escalated Enforcement Action.Major Areas Inspected:Engineering PNO-I-97-061, on 970922,util Informed Region I of Receipt of Internal Nuclear Safety Concern Potentially Involving Instance of Falsification of Control Room Log in 1989.Formal Investigation Initiated & Press Release Issued1997-09-23023 September 1997 PNO-I-97-061:on 970922,util Informed Region I of Receipt of Internal Nuclear Safety Concern Potentially Involving Instance of Falsification of Control Room Log in 1989.Formal Investigation Initiated & Press Release Issued ML20211A2741997-09-17017 September 1997 Notice of Violation from Insp on 970721-0801.Violation Noted:For Problem Rept PR97.9220,trip of B Residual Heat Removal Pump,Individual Performing Root Cause Analysis Was Not Formally Trained in HPI Methodology IR 05000293/19970071997-09-15015 September 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-07 on 970625-0816.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000293/19970801997-09-12012 September 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-80 on 970721-0801.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Effectiveness of Processes for Identifying Resolving & Preventing Issues That Degrade Quality of Plant Operations & Safety ML20216G8181997-09-0404 September 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-09 on 970827-28.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Access Authorization Program PNO-I-97-053, on 970826,special Security Insp Will Be Performed,That Will Examine Security Activities at Vermont Yankee,Pilgrim & Indian Point 3.Team Will Include Security Specialists from Region I & NRR1997-08-22022 August 1997 PNO-I-97-053:on 970826,special Security Insp Will Be Performed,That Will Examine Security Activities at Vermont Yankee,Pilgrim & Indian Point 3.Team Will Include Security Specialists from Region I & NRR IR 05000293/19970041997-08-0707 August 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-04 on 970505-23.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Effectiveness of Licensees Efforts in Maintaining Design Basis of safety-related Sys ML20149K0431997-07-22022 July 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-03 on 970429-0624.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maintenance,Engineering & Plant Support ML20149K0401997-07-22022 July 1997 Notice of Violation from Insp on 970429-0624.Violation Noted:On 970602,station Services Dept Worker Tied Open Boiler Room Door Which Forms Part of Radiologically Controlled Area & Action Not Directed by RP Personnel ML20149K1311997-07-18018 July 1997 NRC Operator Licensing Exam Rept 50-293/97-06 (Including Completed & Graded Tests) for Tests Administered on 970505-09 ML20149K1291997-07-18018 July 1997 Notice of Violation from Exam on 970505-09.Violation Noted: Two SRO Applications Dtd 970418,documented Five Manipulations Based on Credit Taken for Multiple Manipulations Due to Power Change & One Should Be Credited ML20141K7861997-05-22022 May 1997 Insp Rept 50-293/97-02 on 970303-0428.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support 1999-08-27
[Table view] |
See also: IR 05000293/1996007
Text
- . . _ . _ . _ . - _ . _ . - . ._
.
i
i
i ,
! .
!
!, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
1
l REGION I
,
- . Docket No
- 50-293
'
License No: DPR 35
.
Report No: -50-293/96-07
i
l Licensee: Boston Edison Company
i
i
Facility: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
J .
Location: Plymouth, Massachusetts
i
L
! Dates: July 8-12,1996; July 22-26,.1996
1 August 28 - September 3,1996 (in-office)
{ Inspectors: Leonard Cheung, Senior Reactor Engineer
1
4
Approved by: William H. Ruland, Chief, Electrical Engineering Branch !
i Division of Reactor Safety i
i
r
I
i
i
1
i
l
!
!
!
.
e
?
'
[
9609300208 960920 !*
PDR ADOCK 05000293
-G PDR j
.. , . . . _ . . _ _-_ a
.
.
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
NRC Specialinspection Report 50-293/96-07 !
This specialinspection was conducted: (1) to review licensee's corrective actions after the
licensee had identified potentially inoperable primary containment as documented in
Licensee Event Report (LER) 96-04; (2) to review licensee' corrective actions in the
environmental qualification (EO) program in response to the post-accident environment
changes in the primary containment because of elevated service water temperature. Also
included in this inspection was the review of licensee's corrective actions for resolving two
previously identified electrical unresolved items.
Enaineerina
i
On April 9,1996, the licensee declared the Pilgrim primary containment inoperable and I
entered a 24-hour limiting condition for operation (LCO). The deficient condition was due
to improper trip-setting of the circuit breakers that provided protection for two containment ,
penetrations. The licensee promptly corrected the trip setting and later replaced the i
magnetic-trip-only breakers with thermal magnetic type breakers which provided better i
protection for the penetrations. The licensee postulated that this deficient condition might '
have existed since the initial startup of Pilgrim Station in 1972. There were at least four
opportunities between 1991 and 1993 that this deficient condition should have been ;
identified and corrected earlier. The inspector determined this to be an apparent violation !
of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, which required the deficient j
conditions to be promptly identified and corrected.
The inspector reviewed three EQ packages, two were determined to be acceptable. For
the EQ of General Electrical containment penetrations, the tested temperature did not
envelope the required peak temperature (352 F vs. 379 F). The licensee used ,
thermogravimetric methodology to justify the qualification for the peak-temperature. The !
inspector requested NRR review to determine if this methodology would be acceptable for
this application. This item is unresolved pending the NRR review.
The inspector's review of licensee's corrective actions for two electrical unresolved items
(93-80-03 and 95-09-02) resulted in the closure of these two items.
I
,
ii l
.
.
Report Details
E2 Engineering Support of Facility and Equipment
E2.1 Obiectives (92903)
The objectives of the inspection were: 1) to review licensee's corrective actions in
response to the identification of potentially inoperable primary containment as
documented in licensee event report (LER) 96-04; 2) to review the licensee's
corrective actions in their environmental qualification (EQ) program in response to
the post-accident environment changes in the primary containment because of
elevated service water temperature, and General Electric (GE) calculation errors and
3) to review the licensee's corrective actions for resolving two previously identified
electrical unresolved items and to determine whether these corrective actions were
adequate to close those items.
E2.2 Dearaded Electrical Protection for Containment Penetration
On April 9,1996, the licensee declared the Pilgrim primary containment inoperable
and entered a 24-hour technical specification limiting condition for operation (LCO).
This action was taken because the trip setting of the protection circuit breakers for
two electrical containment penetrations were too high to provide proper protection
of containment integrity. The licensee promptly corrected the trip setting and
terminated the LCO within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
E2.2.1 Failure Mechanism Due to Imoroner Circuit Breaker Settina
There were 16 drywell-unit-cooler fans inside Pilgrim drywell, all driven by 480V j
'
3-phase motors. Twelve of these fans were equipped with 10 HP motors and size
1 starters. The remaining four fans had larger motors and size 2 starters. For the
12 fans with size 1 starters, the 480V power circuits passed through two
containment penetrations (Q105A and 2105B), six circuits for each penetration.
Each of these power circuits was protected by a single magnetic-trip-only circuit j
breaker. There was no backup breakers for Pilgrim's electrical penetration circuits. '
The breakers and starters used at Pilgrim were Westinghouse model HFB-3480ML
molded-case breaker / starter combination units, with H44 overload relays. These
combination units were located in two motor control centers (MCC-B17 and MCC-
B18) outside the primary containment. The contacts for size 1 starters were rated
for a maximum current carrying capacity of 182 amperes. An electrical current
higher than this rating could cause the contacts to be welded.
On February 7,1996, a plant operator noticed that circuit breaker 52-1834 in MCC-
B18 was in a tripped condition. An attempt to reset the breaker was made, but the
breaker tripped during the attempt. Subsequent troubleshooting of the circuit
identified that the fan motor inside the drywell had failed and the motor circuit was
shorted. The licensee later examined the breaker / starter unit and found that the
contacts for two of the three phases were welded. Further investigation by the
licensee revealed that the breaker had a magnetic-trip-only coil (no thermal trip), and
that the trip setting was too high (300 to 400 amperes). Under this condition, a
1
.
.
I
2
current magnitude between 182 amperes and 400 amperes for short duration could
cause the contacts to weld because the thermal overload trip in the starter could
not react quickly enough to interrupt the fault. Once welded, the contacts would
not open even if the thermal overload later tripped. The licensee calculated that if
the current of this magnitude continued for 2 to 4 seconds during an accident,
enough heat might be generated to damage the containment penetration seals, j
causing the containment to lose its integrity. In addition, a current of this ;
magnitude could also damage the breaker's magnetic trip coil which was only j
designed to carry 50 amperes continuously. If the magnetic coil was damaged, i
both the breaker and the contactor would not be able to interrupt a higher short
circuit current if this occurs. ;
l
The licensee later found that another breaker (52-1732), also for a size 1 starter, I
was also tripped due to a short circuit at another failed drywell unit cooler fan
motor. ,
The size 2 starters were not affected by the above condition.
l
E2.2.2 Licensee's immediate Corrective Actions
l
l
After the identification, the licensee promptly reduced the trip setting of 10 of the 1
12 affected circuit breakers to a minimum trip setting (about 160 amperes). The
other two breaker / starter circuits were stillinoperable at that time. The licensee
later replaced all 12 affected magnetic-trip-only breakers with Westinghouse model
HFB-3020L thermal-magnetic molded-case circuit breakers. This type of breaker
provided better protection for the circuit because the thermal part of the breaker l
would trip at a much lower current and quick enough to prevent contact welding. l
The licensee also visually inspected the penetration test pressure gauge of the l
affected penetration (Q105B). The pressure gauge was found to be pressurized j
with a proper reading. '
E2.2.3 Root Cause Evaluation and Duration of Deficient Condition
At the time of the inspection, the licensee had not yet completed the root cause ,
evaluation, and had not determined when the deficient condition had started.
Preliminary document review by the licensee indicated that the deficient condition
existed at least from 1987-1988 timeframe when the existing Westinghouse type
HFB circuit breakers were installed to replace the original Westinghouse type HFA
breakers. The licensee postulated that the deficient condition might have existed
since the initial startup of Pilgrim Station in 1972 because Westinghouse type HFA
breakers were generally known to have been set at the high setting at Pilgrim.
i
.
.
3
E2.2.4 Event Reportina
The licensee reported the above event on May 9,1996, by issuing LER 96-04 in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. In the May 9,1996 cover letter that transmitted
the LER, the licensee made the following commitment as a result of this event:
- Complete the root cause analysis investigation
- Supplement LER 96-04 after completing the root cause analysis
- Review electrical engineering design guidance
- Evaluate approved modification impacted by revised calculations
E2.2.5 Review and Verification of Corrective Actions
The inspector reviewed the following corrective action packages:
a. FRN No. 96-02-22 to reset the variable trip setpoint to the lowest magnetic
trip setting on each of the breakers listed (B1716, B1726, B1731, B1733,
B1734, B1816, B1826, B1831, B1832, B1833), dated April 9,1996.
b. Maintenance Request Dispatch MR No. 19600856, page 4 of 10 showed
that all 10 breakers were set to the "LO" nsition on April 9,1996.
c. FRN No. 96-02-23 to replace existing HFB3480ML breakers with HFB3020L
breakers and test tripping in accordance with testing / acceptance criteria as
specified on Drawings E8-13-8 and E8-15-7.
d. Maintenance Request Dispatch MR No. 19600862, page 5 of 9 showed that
all affected breakers were replaced April 10,1996, to April 23,1996.
e. Electrical Drawings E8-13-8 for MCC B17 (Revision E18, dated July 1996)
and E8-15-7 for MCC B18 (Revision E14, dated July 1996) had been
updated to reflect the new breakers and breaker trip setting.
The inspector also walked down motor control centers MCC B17 and MCC B18 and
verified the replacement of the 12 affected breaker <,. The inspector noticed that the
new contactor installed in MCC cubicle 1834 loded different than other contactors.
The licensee explained that the new contactor was the same model number as the
existing Westinghouse contactor it replaced. Several years ago, Westinghouse
changed the outside appearance of this type of contactor without changing the
model number. The licensee further stated that they had contacted the
manufacturer, who confirmed that the internals of the new contactor was identical
to the "old" one it replaced. The inspector had no further questions.
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -. _ _ _
,
F
i
.
4
t
E2.2.6 Previous Oooortunities for Identifyina and Correctina the Deficiencv
i
The inspector reviewed licensee provided documents and interviewed licensee
representatives to determine whether the licensee should have identified and
corrected the penetration protection deficiency earlier. This document review
revealed that there were at least four opportunities that the licensee should have !
identified and corrected the deficient condition earlier: i
1. The licensee had performed a self-assessment of Pilgrim's electrical
,
distribution system in 1991 before the NRC's electrical distribution system -
l functional inspection (EDSFI). During this self-assessment, the licensee ;
l identified a potential electrical penetration protection deficiency. This issue
l was subsequently documented in PCAQ No.91-165 on July 31,1991. An
( engineering assessment was made on August 1,1991, in response to this -i
!- PCAQ. This engineering assessment stated the potential problem as: .;
!
a) Electrical penetration protection for potential electrical faults within
the primary containment had not been addressed for Pilgrim Station.
.l
b) Electrical faults within the primary containment might result in
electrical penetration seal failure due to excessive heat generation in
the cable if the electrical fault was not cleared by a circuit protective
device in a timely manner.
- .
2. During the 1991 EDSFI, extensive questions had been asked by the team for
,
'
the electrical penetration protection problems, the licensee had reviewed the
design documents and the electrical penetration circuit breaker trip curves to
answer those questions;
3. Following the 1991 EDSFI, the licensee revisited the design documents and
electrical penetration circuit breaker trip curves to address EDSFl unresolved
item 9180-04, and identified about 50 penetration circuits that need to be
modified, the 12 affected circuit breakers were among them. In addition, the
licensee completed two calculations: (1) PS-119, entitled, " Containment
Electrical Penetrations; and (2) PS-124, entitled, " Adequacy of Electrical
Penetrations Under "LOCA" Conditions," to address the penetration
protection issue. Appendix 3 to Calculation PS-119 was the calculation of
penetration ampacity. The inspector's review of Appendix 1, Revision 0, i
dated December 1,1992, (sheet 7 of 27) indicated that the excessively high
trip setting of the magnetic-trip-only breakers was known to the licensee.
The statement from Appendix l was as follows:
i " Analysis of the existing penetration ampacities shows that they are
adequate for the normal circuit loads. In several cases, however, ,
conductor ampacities are below protection setting current values, J
which means that these ampacities may be exceeded in the case of
i
an undetected continuous overload or high-impedance fault. ;
I
,
_. . . _ . . . . __ _ _ _ _ _ , _ ~ . _ _ . . . __ _
. I
--
-
\
l
l.
t
'
5
Some of the circuits, protected from overload by thermal relays, are
,
not adequately protected from short-circuits (the settings of magnetic- l
only breakers exceed NEC limits)."
4. During the June 1993 EDSFl followup inspection (93-11), unresolved item
91-80-04 was closed based on the assumption that the licensee would
evaluate additional modifications to address the penetration problems.
However, the modification for replacing the 12 affected rnagnetic-trip-only
circuit breakers with thermal-magnetic type breakers was not completed until
April 1996 after the Technical Specifications LCO was declared.
I l
'
I E2.2.7 Conclusion
!
'
The inspector concluded that the licensee responded appropriately following the
identification of failure of protection for electrical penetrations. The licensee entered ,
a 24-hour LCO in accordance with Pilgrim Technical Specifications requirements. I
The licensee promptly reset the incorrect trip settings of the affected breakers and
subsequently replaced the existing breakers (with magnetic-trip only coils) with
thermal-magnetic type breakers. The licensee later issued LER 96-04 in accordance
with the 10 CFR 50.73 requirement.
The inspector's review of licensee documents indicated that there were at least four
I opportunities that this deficient condition should have been identified and corrected
earlier as discussed in Section 2.6 of this report. The inspector determined that the
l
above condition constituted an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
l Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions. This criterion requires licensees to identify and
correct deficient conditions promptly. Contrary to this requirement, the licensee
failed to promptly identify and correct the deficient condition involving 12
improperly set breakers that provided protection to the electrical containment.
penetrations. This improper breaker setting rendered the electrical penetrations to
'
be unprotected. Under certain high impedance fault conditions, this improper
setting could cause the primary containment to lose its integrity. This condition
also constitutes a violation of Pilgrim technical specifications, Section 3.7.A, which
requires primary containment integrity be maintained at all times when the reactor is ,
critical. (50-293/96-07-01) I
E2.3 Environmental Qualification of in-Containment Electrical Equipment
E2.3.1 Post-DBA Containment Temperature Profile Chan_gg
'
The licensee contracted General Electric (GE) for an analysis to establish the new
post-DBA (design basis accident) containment temperature profile due to service
water temperature increase from 65 F to 75'F. The GE analysis result indicated
that the new profile differed substantially from the previous one. The licensee later
found out that the unexpected difference was due to GE's calculation error in the
previous containment temperature profile. In response to licensee's question
concerning 10 CFR Part 21 requirement, GE stated that this calculation error
affected Pilgrim only due to Pilgrim's unique containment spray flow pattern l
following a postulated DBA.
! !
I
L -. , . _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _
- . . - - - - - . - .. - - - _ _ _ . _ - - . _ . _ . .
.
.
l
6
Because of these containment temperature profile changes, the licensee established
a program to requalify their in-containment electrical equipment. The affected j
equipment included electrical penetrations, cable (Okonite, Kerite, Rockbestos SIS), i
cable splices, Limitorque components, and some instrumentation. The 1
requalification program involved evaluating existing test reports against the new
temperature profile. The result of the evaluation indicated that most in-containment
equipment could be qualified using existing test reports, except certain Limitorque !
- motor-operated valve (MOV) components, which were required to provide long term
l post-accident monitoring function (Regulatory Guide 1.97 items). The licensee used
l a contractor for the EQ test of the Limitorque components, which was completed in
l March 1996. The inspector's review of the test report is discussed in Section 3.2.2
of this report, y
l
E2.3.2 Review of EQ Documents
The inspector selected three EQ packages for review to determine the adequacy of
l
the licensee's EQ documents. For each of these EQ packages, the inspector
)
l' l
reviewed the Equipment Qualification Evaluation Sheets (EQES), which provided i
service conditions and qualification data for the equipment and identified the j
l equipment type and the qualification test reports. The inspector also reviewed the
]
EQ master list and confirmed that the equipment were on the list. The EQ packages ;
l reviewed were: 1) GE electrical penetrations 2) Limitorque MOV components; and j
l
3) safety relief valve flow monitor. ;
,
E2.3.2.1 General Electric Electrical Containment Penetrations )
!
This package provided qualification for nine containment penetrations. The EQES
l indicated that these penetrations were qualified to " DOR Guidelines." These
penetrations were originally qualified to a peak temperature of 330*F, using a GE
test report entitled, " Prototype Testing Qualification Report," dated
March 16,1970. This test report covered a peak temperature of 352 F.
For the latest qualification requirement, the licensee also included the temperature ]
increase due to electrical heating (45 F) to the post-DBA temperature profile,
resulting in a much higher post-DDA peak temperature of 379 F. Because the 1970
GE test report did not have sufficient post-DBA duration to cover the new
temperature profile, the licensee used another GE test report entitled, " Qualification
Test for F01 Electrical Assembly," dated November 9,1971, to qualify the new
post-DBA condition. The 1971 GE test report only covered a peak temperature of
340 F.
To justify the qualification for the higher peak temperature, the licensee used
thermogravimetric (TGA) methodology based on another GE test report, "GE
Proprietary Document NEDC-32123P, entitled, " Report PIR-CPD92045 Service Life
Estimate for the Epoxy Sealant in the Penetration Assemblies at the Browns' Ferry
Nuclear Plant, Unit 3," dated August 20,1992. This report discussed an isothermal
test of a penetration sealant specimen at 200 C. The specimen lost 10% of its
weight after 2.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The licensee considered this 10% weight loss to be a.
l
l
l
_. . _
- . . _ _
. _ _, ~ . , --
- . _ . ._
- - - . _ - _ _ . - - ._ .- . - _ - __ -- -
i
!
.
7 y
conservative approach. The basis for using TGA result for this application was not i
addressed in'detailin the licensee's analysis, such as the mechanical strength of the !
epoxy sealant and the containment pressure condition which could cause stress in
the epoxy sealant. Since this was a new methodology for justifying the peak
temperature for environmental qualification, the inspector requested NRR to
determine its acceptability for this application. This item is unresolved pending
review result from NRR and further inspection as needed (96-07-02).
On August 15,1996, the licensee supplied additional information for the inspector's
review. The licensee indicated that they had found another GE test report entitled, ,
" Low Voltage Power and Control Nuclear Containment Loss of Coolant Accident i
Qualification Test 100 Series Electrical Penetration F02 Program," dated ,
September 13,1973, that they intended to use to qualify, by similarity, Pilgrim's ,
F01 penetrations. According to GE, both types of penetrations used the same !
epoxy sealant, and the tested conditions were comparable to Pilgrim post-DBA :
conditions. The licensee stated that the complete qualification package would not ;
be ready for several weeks. l
E2.3.2.2 Limitoraue Component Qualification
The components included in this EQ package were: Limitorque limit switches,
Marathon terminal blocks, Kerite cable, and Rockbestos cable. These components
were used for post-accident monitoring (Regulatory Guide 1.97 items) only, which *
required the components to be functional for 30-day post-DBA. These components l
were located inside the Limitorque actuator switch housing. The switch housing
also contained other components which were used for valve controls. However,
those components had been qualified together with the valve actuator for short-
term post-DBA function. Therefore, those components were not included in this EQ
package. !
The Limitorque components were tested at Wyle Laboratories in February and
March 1996. The test results were documented in Wyle Report 45238-1, " Nuclear
Environmental Qualification Test Report on Limitorque Components," dated
March 21,1996. The inspector's review of this report resulted in several
concerns / questions as follows:
1. Section 9.0 of the report outlined the requirements of the test. Acceptance
Criteria No.1 stated that insulation resistance less than 1.0 x 10' ohms or
contact resistance (IR) greater than 1 ohm shall be investigated. The test
report data sheet showed that eight readings of insulation resistances of the
limit switch, the Kerite cable, and the Rockbestos cable were below 1.0 x
10' ohms; six of these readings were actually below the reading capability 'of
the meter (5.0 x 10' ohms). Yet, these readings were not addressed in the !
report;
2. Section 11.0 of the test report indicated that several cracks were observed
in the Kerite cable insulation following the thermal aging test. At least one
of these cracks was caused by aging and not by handling. The report failed
to explain why the cracked cable insulation was acceptable;
?
,
.
.
8
3. Since the qualified lives of most of the tested components were less than 20
years and Pilgrim had operated for 24 years, had these components been
n placed before their qualified lives expired?
l
For the first question, the licensee stated that during the entire test, the leakage
current was being monitored and was within the acceptable range, less than 10
milliamperes. Since the function of the test components was for valve position
indication only (on/off type), the reduced IR values during LOCA testing would not
impact the component's ability to perform their design function. The licensee
agreed that this explanation would be retained in the EQ file.
For the second question, the licensee EQ engineer stated that he personally
observed the crack that was caused by aging; the crack appeared to be a very thin
lateral mark extending approximately halfway around the cable. Because the
.
leakage current of the tested circuit was contihJo.. Sly monitored during testing and
l was found to be low for on/off function, the ir spector had no further questions.
l
l For the above two responses, the licensee revised Wyle Report 45238-1
l
(Revision B) on August 5,1996, to reflect the above statements.
l
For the third question, the licensee provided evidence to the inspector which
- indicated that the components were replaced before their qualified lives expired,
l
l
l E2.3.2.3 Safety Relief Valve Flow Monitor
i
The inspector reviewed the EQES and the test report for this equipment, which was
supplied by TEC Corporation. The test report indicated that this equipment was
tested to a peak temperature of 510 F. The inspector determined the qualification
i of this equipment to be acceptable.
!
E2.3.2.4 Conclusion
,
The inspector concluded that the licensee had established an acceptable program to
l requalify their in-containment electrical equipment because of containment
temperature profile changes due to elevated service water temperature and GE
calculation error. The inspector's review of three EQ packages resulted in an
unresolved item (use of thermogravimetric method to justify peak temperature).
The quality of the Wyle test report could be improved as numerous test anomalies
l were not properly addressed until after the inspection.
E.8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
l
! E.8.1 (Closed) Unresolved item 93-80-03. pertaining to lack of degraded voltage
'
protection when emergency buses were powered by the 23 kV source. During the
1993 station blackout (SBO) inspection, the team was concerned with the ability of
'
the degraded voltage protection to p'otect safety-related loads when powered from
the 23 kV supply. This concern wa, Jentified because the degraded voltage relays
were found to be located on the startup transformer side of the emerger.cy 4.16 kV
bus incoming breaker. This relay would not be capable of sensing a degraded
.
l
'
.
i 9
>
.
voltage condition on the 23 kV supply. The team was concerned that the Class 1E
loads could be damaged by a degraded voltage condition before a SBO condition
l was declared.
l This item was updated during the August 1995 station blackout (SBO) followup
inspection (95-16). During that inspection, the inspector reviewed the Pilgrim
. 4160V single line, meter, and relay diagrams and confirmed that the control room
4 annunciation was provided for a degraded voltage condition when the 23 kV source
'
was being used. The licensee stated that if this degraded condition occurs, the
operator would manually load the SBO diesel generator per station procedure
'
PNPS 2.2.146, " Station Blackout Diesel Generator."
l Following the above inspection, the licensee completed two additional evaluations:
1) Calculation No. PS-161, "20 kV Offsite Source Load Flow Study," dated
, September 8,1995; and 2) Evaluation RC94-0003, which discussed the proper :
resolution of the 23 kV source degraded voltage issue, dated August 2,1995.
In the first document, the licensee used the " DAPPER" program to calculate the load
j
flow for the 23 kV offsite source under six assumed conditions. These calculations
indicated that sufficient voltage existed at each safety-related load.
i '
The second document discussed the procedures to be used in the unlikely event
'
that a degraded voltage condition exists when the 23 kV offsite source is used
j during an SBO condition. l
t
The inspector reviewed these two documents and concluded that this issue was
sufficiently addressed. This item is closed.
! E8.2 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-293/95-09-02 pertained to the safety evaluation of a
2
recirculation pump speed control modification. The inspector reviewed Pilgrim 1
document FRN-35 24 which provided a revised safety evaluation concerning the
recirculation pump control analog-to-digital upgrade.
The revised safety evaluation included an analysis for the major classes of internal
failure modes unique to the digital recirculation pump control equipment and
showed that the corresponding system failure effects were bounded by existing l
analyses. The digital failures covered electronic module failures, major software !
failure of the input, output, control, and display functions of the digital equipment.
The revised evaluation provided affirmative answers to the following questions:
a. If the digital speed control system stops functioning, will the operators know
it, either by observing the panel displays and/or observing an annunciation?
b. If the operators know the system has failed, can they take remedial actions
in time to prevent challenges to any safety system?
- - - - - - . . - - - - - .-. .- . - - - . . . - - - - - - .
.
t
!
4
o
r
l
[ 10 i
> ;
c. If the systern fails in a way such as to present false information, do the l
operators have the means to determine this information is actually false? (
d. Under the given failure effects, are the operators able to take manual control
of the process?
The inspector noted that the licensee's analysis for the above questions was
noteworthy. The inspector concluded that the revised safety evaluation included
the major failure effects unique to the digital recirculation pump speed control
equipment and showed that these failure effects were bounded by existing
analyses. Therefore, Unresolved item (URI) 50-293/95-09-02 is closed.
E3 UFSAR Reviews ;
A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the :
updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) description highlighted the need for a
special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or parameters
to the UFSAR descriptions.
While performing the inspections discussed in this report, the inspector reviewed
the applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected. Pilgrim
UFSAR Section 5.2.3.4.3 discussed electrical penetrations. The inspector noted
that the information provided in this section had not been updated for a long time l
(more than two years) to reflect the more recent environmental conditions. '
Discussion with the licensee revealed that this issue had been identified by the
licensee and was documented in Pilgrim Problem Report 96-0134, dated
April 19,1996. The licensee stated that this UFSAR section would be updated and
submitted to the NRC in the next update cycle, scheduled for July 1997. This l
failure to update the UFSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71, Section 3
constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a non-cited
violation, consistent with Section IV of the Enforcement Policy. The inspector
verified that other reviewed sections of the UFSAR wording were consistent with
the observed plant practices, procedures and/or parameters.
XI Exit Meeting
The inspector met with the licensee personnel at the concludon of the site inspection on
July 26,1996, and summarized the scope of the inspection and the inspection results.
During this inspection, several EQ test reports containing GE proprietary information were
provided by the licensee for the inspector's review. No proprietary information was
knowingly included in this report from those documents. The licensee acknowledged the
inspection findings at that meeting.
This inspector amended the exit meeting in a September 3,1996, telephone call to
Mr. T. Boulette, and other licensee representatives. The inspector stated that after NRC
review of additional licensee supplied documents, an apparent violation and an unresolved
item were identified.
__
i
O
11
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Boston Edison Comoany
T. Boulette, Sr. Vice President - Nuclear
N. Desmond, Manager - Regulatory Relation Group
J. Coughlin, Principal Electrical Engineer
S. Hudson, Department Manager - Electrical EngineerinD
J. Keene, Department Manager - Regulatory Affairs
W. Kline, Manager - Nuclear Engineering Service Group
D. Ellis, Principal Regulatory Affair Engineer
F. Mogolesko, Project Manager - NESG
H. O'Heim, General Manager, Tech. Section
T. Sullivan, Plant Manager
D. Tarantino, Manager - Nuclear Information
T. Venkataraman, Department Manager - QA
NRC
B. Korona, Resident inspector
R. Laura, Sr. Resident inspector
W. Ruland, Chief, Electrical Engineer Branch, Division of Reactor Safety
l
i
!
,
l
l
t
l
l