ML20126F045
| ML20126F045 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1992 |
| From: | Barr K, Wright F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20126E949 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-92-26, NUDOCS 9212300094 | |
| Download: ML20126F045 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000302/1992026
Text
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.[ %g UNITED STATES
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.g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON
~ o REGloN 11
3I 3 $ 101 MARIETT A STRE ET. N.W.
[g ' # ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
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DEC 10 892
Report No.: 50-302/92-26
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Licensee: Florida Power Corporation
3201 34th Street, South
St. Petersburg, FL 33733 >
Docket No.: 50-302 License No.: DPR-72
Facility Name: Crystal River 3
Inspection Conducted: November 2-6, 1992
Inspector: [ )1 CMM ///h92
F.N. Wright, Team Lsad~er Dat'e ,$igned
Team Members: D. Barss, NRR
J. Jamison, Consultant
A. Lony Project Engineer
Approved by:
K. Barr,'CMef
/k9!fk
Date' Signed
Emergency Preparedness Section
Radiological . Protection and Emergency
Preparedness Branch
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of
the annual emergency preparedness exercise. Emergency organization activation
and response were selectively observed in the' licensee's Emergency Response
facilities including: _ Simulator Control Room, Technical Support Center,
Operational Support Center, Emergency Operations facility, and Emergency News
Center. The inspection also included a review of the exercise . scenario and
observation of the licensee's post exercise critique. This exercise was a
Partial Participation Exercise for State and local response agencies.
Results:
'
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not-identified. Two
exercise weaknesses were identifled: (1) concerning failure to issue clear,
accurate and timely Notification messages to State and local agencies and
(2) Failure of the TSC accident assessment staff to recognize unreasonable
estimated dose rates at the site boundary which resulted in an unnecessary-
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General Emergency classification.and protective action recommendations. The
licensee's performance during the exercise was good, with the licensee
9212300094 921210
PDR ADOCK 05000302
O PDR
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successfully meeting most of the exercise objectives. Overall, the exercise
demonstrated an effective capability to protect the public health and safety
in the event of a radiological emergency.
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REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- A. Aunger, Manager, Nuclear Technical-Training
- R. Blume, Supervisor, Nuclear Special Training
- G. Boldt, Vice President, Nuclear Production
- S. Chapin, Radiological Planning Specialist
- S. Cheanenko, Senior Quality Auditor
- M. Collins, Radiological Planning Specialist
- C. Crosten, Nuclear Operations Instructor
.R. Davis, Shift Supervisor
- D. deMontfort, Simulator Instructor
T. Fleming, Simulator Controller
- J. Frijouf, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist
E. Froats, Manager, Nuclear Compliance
- R. Fuller, Senior Nuclear Licensing Engineer
- S. Garry, Corporate Health Physicist
- G. Halnon, Manager, Nuclear Plant Technical Support
- B. Hinkle, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations-
- M. Jacobs, Area Public Information' Coordinator-
- S. Johnson, Manager, Chemistry and Radiation Protection
- L. Kelly, Director, Nuclear Operations Training
- M. Laycock, Radiological _ Planning Specialist
- T. Leachmann,- Manager, Nuclear Chemistry
- G. Longhouser, Superintendent, Nuclear Security
- S. Mansfield, Nuclear Training Instructor '
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- W. Marshall, Manager, Nuclea'r Plant Operations
- D. McCollough, Supervisor, Nuclear Chemistry
- P.- McKee,- Director, Quality Programs
- B. Mclaughlin, Nuclear Regulatory Specialist
- L. Moffatt, Nuclear Shift Manager
- J. Mogg, Supervisor, Telecom. _
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- T. Neaman, Supervisor, Nuclear Plant Security
J. Owen, Nuclear Operations Instructor
- S. Robinson, Manager, Quality. Assessment _ .
-*J. -Springer, Supervisor, Nuclear Simulator Training
- J. Stephenson, Manager, Radiological Emergency Planning
- W. Stephenson, Supervisor, Nuclear. Safety
- R. Widell, Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support
D. Wilder, Radiation Protection Manager
- M. Williams, Specialist, Radiological Emergency Planning
Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians,
and administrative personnel.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission
R. Freudenberger, Resident inspector
- P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended Exit Meeting
2. Exercise Scenario (82301, 82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that
provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major
portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency
Plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, __
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section ll.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and
was discussed with licensee representatives. The scenario developed for
this exercise was adequate to exercise fully the onsite and offsite
emergency organizations of the licensee and to provide sufficient
emergency information to the State and local government agencies to
facilitate their full participation in the exercise. The exercise
scenario was well organized, detailed, and sufficiently challenging to
exercise the participants.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3. Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for
emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established -
and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as -
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A,
and specified criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.A.
The inspector observed that the onsite and offsite emergency
organizations were adequately described and the responsibilities for key
organization positions were clearly defined in approved plans and
implementing procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4. Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine
that the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously
defined, that adequate staffing was provided to ensure initial facility
accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the
interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.B.
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The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization
was well defined, the responsibility and authority for directing actions
necessary to respond to the emergency were clear and that staff were
available to fill key functional positions within the organization.
The licensee adequately demonstratti the ability to alert, notify, and
mobilize licensee response personnel. Augmentation of the initial
onsite emergency response organization was accomplished through
mobilization of additional day-shift personnel and activation of .the
Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). The inspector observed the
activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the
Simulator Control Room (SCR), Technical Support Center (TSC), the
Operational Support Center (OSC), Emergency News Center (ENC), and the
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The inspector determined that the
licensee was able to staff the facilities in a timely manner. Staffing
and assignment of responsibilities at the ERFs were consistent with the
licensee's approved procedures. Because of the scenario scope and-
conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response
organization were not required.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5. Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
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This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and
effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements
to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's EOF have been
made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned
response have been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV. A, and specific crite-ic in
NUREG-0654, Section II.C.
State and local staff could be accommouated at the EOF. Arrangemcots-
l for requesting offsite assistance resources were in place.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6. Emergency Classification System (82301)
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This area was observed to detercine that a standars emergency
, classification and action level scheme were in use by the nuclear-
facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50,
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.D. The licensee's classification scheme is defined in the
Emergency Plan and EPIP-202. Duties of the Emergency Coordinator,
Revision (Rev.) 40, dated September 25, 1992.
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The designated Shift Supervisor in the SCR promptly and correctly used
the procedure to identify and classify the Notification of Unusual Event
(NOVE) and the Alert as did the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC to
classify the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency. Classifications
i for plant conditions were made in a timely manner and were consistent-
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with approved emergency procedures.
During the exercise an error in calculating projected offsite' dose rates l
was made. The error resulted in the projection _of very high dose rates
for the child thyroid, at the site boundary. In accordance with i
licensee procedures, a General Emergency was declared at 09:32 a.m. and
Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) were made in a-Notification
Message issued at 09:52 a.m. When the offsite dose rate error was
confirmed by the staff (Paragraph 11), the licensee elected to remain at-
the General Emergency classification. The inspector determined that the
licensee made the decision to remain in a General Emergency, in part,
due to Citrus County's protective measures that had already began at
09:30 a.m. and the State's insistence to continue with the ordered-
evacuation. State representatives were concerned with the wide spread
confusion that could occur should the protective actions be canceled.
The licensee decided to remain in the General Emergency classification
and recommended an evacuation and sheltering plan that was similar to
that issued by Citrus County.
The dose projection error was considered an Exercise Weakness and is
discussed in further detail in Paragraph 11.
Following initial evacuation the licensee's State and local ' agencies
began discussions on recovery and permitting the evacuated community.to
return to evacuated areas. The licensee downgraded the emergency from a
General to an Alert at 13:00 p.m., which was' the classification guidance .
for the remainder of the exercise.
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The inspector determined that EPIP EM-202 lacked specific procedural
4 guidance for downgrading emergency classifications and entering a
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recovery phase. Such criteria should include, as a minimum, whether or
not a release is continuing, whether the plant conditions _are stable and
expected to remain so, whether the full emergency response organization
is needed to support safe and stable operations, and:whether
radiological and other conditions permit resumption of normal access to
the plant and surrounding areas. -Licensee representatives acknowledged
the procedural deficiency and committed to improve de-classification in
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emergency preparedness procedures. The inspector stated that a review
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of the licensee's procedures addressing de-classification would be
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reviewed in a future inspection as an-Inspector Followup Item (IFI).
IFI 50-302/92-26-01: Review licensee emergency procedures for guidance
on downgrading emergency classifications and entering initial recovery
phase of emergencies.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7. Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to assure that prbcedures were established for
i notification of State and local response organizations and emergency-
- personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup
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messages to response organizations was established. This area was
further observed to assure that means to provide early. notification to
the population within the plume exposure pathway were established
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to
10 CFR 50, and specific guidance specified in Section II.E of.
Procedures for making notifications to offsite authorities were defined
in Emergency Plan and EPIP EM-202. During the exercise the SCR, TSC,
and E0F prepared and issued 1, 5 and 5 Notification messages,
respectively. The inspector observed that Emergency Notification
Message forms were consistently approved with information errors or
information blocks incomplete. The inspector observed the following
problems with offsite notification messages generated during the
emergency exercise:
o Emergency Notification Messages were not numbered or-given a
serial number;
o No Emergency Notification Message was'made for the NOUE. The
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initial Notification Message to the ' State and local agencies,
issued at 07:38 a.m., reported the declaration of an Alert
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classification made at 07:35 a.m., due to a fire in the diesel
generator room. However, the message did not report the
declaration of an NOVE that had been made at 07:26 a.m., due to a
bomb threat. The inspector noted that the Notification Message to
the NRC reporting the Alert classification also reported the NOVE.
o Notification Message 2 reported the Alert emergency declaration-
time as 08:18 a.m. instead of 07:35 a.m., as shown on' Notification
Message 1. The transmissior, of Message number 2 began at-
08:15 a.m. and ended at-08:25 a.m.
o On Notification Messages 4, 5 and 6; the licensee checked "C. A
Release is Occurring--- Expected Duration " in Section 7 of the-
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form. However, the licensee did not inclu3e an estimate of
release duration.
o Notification Messages 6 and 7 reported "High Thyroid Dose Rates"
in Section 5 of the form while reporting the highest offsite
thyroid dose rates were less than 2.8 mrem and 0.5-mrem
respectively-in Section 10 of the form.
o Notification Messages 8 and 9 reported " Radiation Release In
Progress" in Section 5 of the form. However, the licensee
indicated there was no release in Section 7. of the form by
checking "D. A Release Occurred, but stopped-Duration 2.5".
o On Notification Message 11, the licensee reported the down grade
of the emergency classification from a General Emergency to an
Alert but did not provide any basis for the de-classification
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o Notification Message 4 was issued at 09:25 a.m. to provide updated-
information on a Site Area Emergency classification. The message
reported child thyroid dose rates of 50 Rem /hr at the site
boundary. A condition which should have resulted.in a General
Emergency classification. The licensee declared a General
!- Emergency classification at 09:32 a.m.
Additionally, Emergency Notification Message number 5 reporting the
General Emergency classification was not timely. The General Emergency
was declared at 09:32 a.m. The Emergency Coordinator approved the
- - message for release at 09
- 49 a.m. and transmission of the message began
at 09:52 a.m., approximately 20 minutes after the General Emergency
classification was made.
The numerous problems identified above were minor when considered
individually; however, in aggregate they indicate a general weakness in
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the licensee's ability to provide clear and accurate Emergency
Notification Messages to State and local agencies. The inspector stated ,
that failure to provide clear, accurate and timely messages to the State
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and local agencies was an exercise weakness.
Exercise Weakness 50-302/92-26-02: Failure to provide clear, accurate
and timely messages to the State and local agencies.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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8. Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt
communications among principal response organizations and emergency.
personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.F.
The inspector observed that adequate communications existed among the
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licensee's emergency organizations. The TSC and OSC staffs were kept
informed of plant status by the TSC Emergency Coordinator (EC), through
1 routine briefings. OSC teams dispatched to perform work in the plant
In general, communications and interfaces between a licensee's and
State's staff were adequate. However, there was a communication problem
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with Citrus County. At 10:00 a.m., the_ EOF held its first join _t
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briefing which included licensee, State and local agencies. The.
facility had activated at 09:30 a.m. and the State representatives had
- been in the facility only a few minutes prior to the meeting. At that
briefing a Citrus County representative reported that protective actions
had been. ordered by the county at 09:30 a.m. Neither the Stato nor the
licensee representatives were aware that the Citrus County had taken
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protective actions (Paragraph 12). Licensee representatives acknowledged
1 the communication problem and planned to conduct addition training
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sessions with local county agencies to improve communications and their
! understanding of consequences for various reactor accidents.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
9. Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine that information concerning the
simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public
as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific
criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.G.
The ENC was staffed and activated by pre-staged response personnel.
Joint news releases were coordinated and released from the ENC. In
addition, several news conferences were conducted. The inspector
observed the preparation of news releases and the preparation of
material for briefings. The Joint Information Center facilities for
utility, State, local, and NRC representatives were adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities
2 and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and
maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
4 Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.H.
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The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of key
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ERFs, including the SCR, TSC, OSC, and EOF. In addition, the inspector
observed emergency fire and medical drills,
a. Simulator Control Room
The Shift Supervisor demonstrated excellent command and control
throughout the exercise. The Shift Supervisor and Shift Manager
, quickly and accurately evaluated conditions and the Emergency
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Action levels (EAls) to declare the Unusual Event and the Alert
classifications. The Operations staff worked well as a team and
assessments of plant conditions were good. The turnover briefing
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from the control room L. the TSC was effective.
-Emergency procedures were readily available. Both reactor 1
operators and supervisors demonstrated good use of procedures
throughout the exercise. During the exercise the inspector
observed that Procedure OP-305, " Operation of the Pressurizer" 1
Rev.12, dated 3/19/91 was available for use in the SCR. The
current revision to the procedure was Rev. 14. This was
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identified by the operators when attempting to use high pressure j
auxiliary spray. The system was recently installed and was- not ]
included in Rev. 12 of the procedure. The licensee's critique- 1
identified this issue as a problem for corrective action. The
inspector verified that the correct revision of the procedure was ;
located in the control room.
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Use of the plant's simulator, in an active mode, improved realism
of the exercise for Operations personnel. The use of the
simulator was considered a program strength, it was the
licensee's first use of the simulator in a graded exercise and it
performed well.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b. TSC - The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon notification
by the Emergency Coordinator of the simulated emergency condition
leading to an Alert emergency classification. The TSC appeared to
have adequate equipment for the support of the assigned staff.
The facility layout provided for a good interface between the -
Emergency Coordinator and his staff.
Strengths noted in the TSC included good connand and control of
the emergency organization. Periodic briefings regarding the
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incident status and ongoing mitigating actions were routinely
given by the Emergency Coordinator. The briefings were timely and
sufficiently detailed.
The radiological status board was not maintained such that it
served a clear and positive purpose, in the TSC's assessment of
conditions in and around the plant. For example:
o The 09:45 a.m. field team data logged on the status board
showed whole body dose rate of 1 mrem / hour, and the lodine
as "1.18 E2" (with no units). The last value appeared to be
a sample count rate, not a dose (or dose commitment) rate,
but no one questioned it. Subsequent iodine values were
given in mrem /hr.
o No data were entered for " Chem data", RCS or Condensate.
o The " recommended protective actions" block was not utilized.
o Only two field team reports were logged on the board through
the entire exercise, one for time 09:45 a.m. and one for
time 11:45 a.m..
No violations or deviations were identified,
c. OSC - The OSC assembly area, located in the TSC facility was
staffed expeditiously, following the order to activate. The OSC
staff maintained good communication with TSC staff. Necessary
emergency equipment was available to support OSC repair team
activities.
Emergency Repair Teams (ERTs) planned plant entries with the OSC,
TSC and HP staffs before entry into the plant areas. ERTs
maintenance activity ard health physics briefings were timely and
included potential radiological conditions and required protective
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measures. Proper radiological control measures were implemented i
and radiological condit%ns were monitored by HP technicians
accompanying OSC teams. No problems were noted with ERT -i
deployment or controls. However, it was not clear at any point in
time what teams were deployed and with what priority.- Strong- ,
prioritization,-controls and monito.ing practices were not ;
observed by the inspector. Such controls are essential'for proper. <
emergency response organization management. ,
No violations or deviations were identified. ;
d. EOF - Activation of the EOF was not a specific exercise object.
The EOF was located offsite in the Simulator / Training Building
located outside the 10-mile EPZ. The facility appeared to be
adequately designed and equipped to support an emergency response.
The EOF was promptly staffed and activated with pre-staged
qualified personnel. The EOF Director provided timely and
accurate status updates to the EOF staff.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Accident Assessment (82301)
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This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems and
. equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite
consequences of.a radiological emergency condition were in use as
required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV 8, and specific criteria in NVREG-0654, Section 11.1.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of
plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite
and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
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The TSC staff (dose assessment and accident assessment)-carefully
considered and suggested strategies for minimizing both atmospheric and
liquid radioactive releases while cooling down and stabilizing the
plant.
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Radiological Control Objective, Number 2. was: " Demonstrate effective
estimation and assessment of a simulated release of airborne
radioactivity to the environment".
A calculational error was made in determining the initial radioactive
- dose rates for the site boundary. The reported values at 09:08 a.m.
were 43.24 mRen./ hour for the whole body and 50,000 mrem / hour for the
child thyroid. A subsequent re-calculation at 09:53 a.m. resulted in
dose rates of 1.39 mrem / hour for the whole body and 14.41 mrem / hour for
the child thyroid.
On-Site Emergency Response 0rganization Objective, Number 3. was:
" Demonstrate accident assessment and mitigation capabilities in the
-Technical Support Center". During the exercise, the TSC ' staff failed to'
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promptly recognize that high offsite dose projections, 50 Rem / hour at i
site boundary for child thyroid, reported by the dose assessment star i
were inappropriate for existing reactor conditions at 09:30 a.m. At ;
that time there was no evidence of damaged fuel nor was Reactor Coolant
System activity abnormal. The dose rates projected at the site boundary
were not possible with existing conditions. As a result, an
unreasonably high projected thyroid dose was used as the basis for a !
General Emergency declaration. Failure to demonstrate reasonable
accident assessments, relative to the projection of offsite dose rates, +
with known plant conditions was identified as an exercise weakness.
Exercise Weakness 50-302/92-26-03: Failure to demonstrate reasonable
accident assessments, relative to the projection of offsite dose rates. l
with known plant conditions.
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No violations or deviations were identified. '
12. Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective
actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were
developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, -i
including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented
promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in '
NUREG-0654, Section II.J.
The inspector observed the following onsite protective measures:
c When a bomb threat was reported at appr]ximately 07:22 a.m. the i
Emergency Coordinator made a PA announcement to evacuate the
Nuclear Administration Building. Access to the building was not
permitted until the Security Staff surveyed the facility and
declared it safe for occupation.
o An Alert was declared at approximately 07:30 a.m. and at-
07:42 a.m. a PA announcement was made for all non-essential
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personnel to report to their local assembly area. The-licensee
- made the precautionary evacuation in accordance with licensee-
procedures.
o A SAE w:s declared at 08:50 a.m. At 08:55 a.m. a PA announcement
was made for all non-essent il personnel to report to the Main
Assembly Area for accountability. Accountability.was completed
and reported at 09:19 a.m.
The inspector verified that the licensee had and used emergency-
procedures for formulating PARS h r offsite populations within the :
10-mile EPZ. _ During the exercise, PARS were routinely reevaluated for -
accuracy and status updates were piovided to the offsite authorities.
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The licensee made initial PARS at the declaration of a General >
Emergency. The General Emergency '<as declared at 09:32 a.m. and
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reported in Emergency Notification Hessage 5 issued at 09:52. At about
the same time the General Emergency Notification was issued, ;
recalculations of projected offsite doses showed offsite doses were much '
less than those requiring the declaration of a General Emergency and :
protective actions. A briefing in the EOF with licensee, State and q
local agencies was held at 10:00 a.m. The licensee reported that an j
error had been made in the offsite dose rate projections and there did ;
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not appear to be any reason for remaining at.the General Emergency
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classification or to take protective actions. However, the i
representative from Citrus County reported that the county had ordered
protective actions at 09:30 a.m. based upon the information.provided in
Emergency Notification messages. State representatives reported that- l
they would not permit the cancellation of the evacuation that had-
already been started. The State representatives reported that a
cancellation would caase too muG confusion. Therefore, the licensee
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decided to remain in the General Emergency classification and recommend
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an evacJation and sheltering plan similar to that issued by Citrus e
County.
At 09:30 a.m. Citrus County issued the following PARS: evacuated
0-5 mi. 360 degrees; evacuated 5-10 mi. in Sectors E, F, G, H, and J;
and sheltered-the rest,
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At 09:55 a.m. the licensee recommended the following PARS: evacuation
0-5 mi. 360 degrees; evacuation 5-10 mi in Sectors F, G, and H; and
shelter the rest. The' county's PAR's were more conservative than the .
licensee's. The licensee revised the PARS in Notification '
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Message number 7 issued at 10:52 a.m. to match the County's.
No violations or ceviations were identified.
- 13. Radiological-Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determine that means for controlling
radiological exposures during an emergency were established and
implemented for-emergency workers, and that these means included
exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations as required by '
10CFR50.47(b)(ll),andspecificcriteriainNUREG-0654,SectionII.K.
An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled
throughout the exercise by issuing supplemental dosimeters to emergency
workers and by periodic surveys in the ERFs. Exposure guidelines were -
in place for various categories of emergency actions, and adequate *
- protective clothing and respiratory protection were available and used
as appropriate.
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No violathns or deviations were identified.
14, Exercise Critique (82301)
i
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to.
determine whether shortcomings in the performance of the exercise were
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12
brought to the attantion of management and documented for corrective
action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.
Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.N.
The licensee conducted facility critiques with exercise players
immediately following the exercise termination. Licensee controllers
and observers conducted additional critiques price to the formal
critique to management on November 6, 1992.
The quality of the playce critiques varied with facility. In some
player critiques the exercise objectives and a review of the scenario
"as planned" were not made and the players were not given sufficient
resources to make comments or suggestions for improvements. -
The critique to management was well organized and very comprehensive and
included a review of the objectives that had been established for
demonstration during the exercise. Issues identified during the
exercise were thoroughly discussed by licensee representatives during
the critique. The presentation indicated the controllers / evaluators had
been effective in identifying exercise problem areas and critiqued the
performance of the players in an objective and constructive manner. The
licensee's critique addressed numerous substantive deficiencias to be
included in a licensee corrective action program and numerous
improvement items. Overall, the conduct of these critiques was
consistent with the regulatory re. Irements and glidelines cited above
and considered a program strength. Licensee action, on identified
findings will be reviewed during subsequent NRC insp ;tions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15. Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (92701'
_
(Closed) Exercise Weakness 50-302/91-08-01: Emergency Coordinator
failed to recommend PARS associated with plant conditions as specified
in licensee procedures. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response
to the violation, dated August 16, 1991, and verified that the
corrective actions proposed in the response har been completed as
described. This item was closed.
16. Exit Interview
The inspection scope and results were summarized on November 6, 1992
with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described
the areas inspected and discussed in detail the exercise weaknesses
listed below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
Proprietary information ic not contained in this report.
Item Number Description / Reference
50-302/92-26-01 IFI - Review licensee
emergency procedures for
guidance on downgrading
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emergency classifications and -
entering initial recovery
phase of emergencies
-(Paragraph 6).
50-302/92-26-02 EW - Failure to provide clear,
accurate and timely messages
to the State and local
agencies (Paragraph 7).
50-302/92-26-03 EW - Failure to demonstrate
reasonable accident
assessments, relative to the
projection _of offsite dose
rates, with known plant
conditions.
Attachment (12 pages):-
Scope, Objectives, Narrative
Summary, and Scenario Timeline
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EXERCISE _0BJECTIVES
GENERAL OBJECTIVES
1. Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize FPC emergency response
personnel and to activate FPC emergency response centers in a timely
manner.
2. Demonstrate the adequacy, operability, and effective use of emergency
communications equipment.
3. Demonstrate the ability of FPC to support the State of Florida and local
authorities in emergency response activities within the plume exposure
pathway emergency planning zone.
4. Demonstrate that Areas Requiring Corrective Action observed in the 1991
Exercise have been corrected.
OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES (Control Room)
1. Demonstrate the understanding of Emergency Action Levels (EAL's) and
proficiency in recognizing and classifying emergency conditions.
2. Demonstrate accident assessment and mitigation in the Control Room,
including recognition and evaluation of degrading plant conditions, and "
f
recommendation of specific corrective actions to stabilize the plant.
3. Demonstrate the ability to perform emergency notifications, as required,
to the State of Florida, local authorities, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
4. Demonstrate an effective turnover of Emergency Coordinator
responsibilities between the Shift Supervisor and the Director, Nuclear
Plant Operations or Man-On-Call.
ON-SITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION OBJECTIVES
1. Demonstrate effective implementation of EM-206, " Emergency Plan Roster and
Notification".
2. Demonstrate site (Protegted Area) evacuation and provisions to warn ali
personnel within the Owner Controlled Area.
3. Demonstrate accident assessment and mitigation capabilities in the
Technical Support Center (TSC).
4. Demonstrate adequate management and control of on-site emergency response
capabilities.
5. Demonstrate an understanding of EAL's and proficiency in recognizing and
classifying emergency conditions in the TSC.
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6. Demonstrate the receipt and analysis of all field monitoring data and
coordination of those results with non-FPC agencies at the Emerge cy
Operations facility (EOF).
7. Demonstrate an effective transfer of notification responsibilities from
the Emergency Coordinator to the EOF Director when the Emergency
Operations facility is activated.
8. Demonstrate the effectiveness and control of the Emergency Repair Team.
9. Demonstrate the effectiveness and control of the Medical Emergency Team.
10. Demonstrate the eifectiveness and control of the Plant Fire Brigade,
11. Demonstrate the effectiveness and control of the Emergency Sample Team
(samples will be simulated).
12. Demonstrate the effectiveness and control of the Radiation Monitoring
Team.
13. Demonstrate provisions and decision-making capability for utilization of
evacuation routes.
CORPORATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION OBJECTIVES
1. Demonstrate effective implementation of REP-02, " Activation and
Notification of the Corporate Emergency Response Organization".
2. Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain appropriate
communications witi. State and Federal emergency management representatives
including the recommendaticn of protective actions.
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL OBJECTIVES
1. Demonstrate the ability to perform radiological monitoring and assessment
in the plant and site environs.
2. Demonstrate effective estimation and assessment of a (simulated) release
of airborne radioactivity to the environment.
3. Demonstrate the ability to provide the Ee rgency Coordinator and the EOF
Director, timely and sound emergency protective action recommendations.
4. Demonstrate the availability and operability of emergency supplies and
equipment.
5. Demonstrate the ability to control radiological exposure to emergency
workers and Generating Complex Personnel.
6. Demonstrate the capability of decontaminating relocated on-site personnel.
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ENGINEERING OBJECTIVES
1. Demonstrate the capability of ascertaining the need for, and
reouisitioning, parts and components that will be used during recovery and
corrective maintenance of damaged equipment.
SECURITY OBJECTIVES
1. Demonstrate the ability to perform accountability on-site (Protected Area)
within 30 minutes of a site evacuation.
2. Demonstrate the capability of maintainir:g on-site security throughout an
emergency at CR-3, including the capability of establishing and enforcing
access control points.
INFORMATION SERYlCES OBJECTIVES
1. Demonstrate timely activation of the Emergency News Center.
2. Demonstrate tne ability to obtain emergency related information.
3. Demonstrate the ability to disseminate timely, accurate, and appropriate
emergency information.
4. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the release of emergency related
information with State and County Public Information Officers.
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1992 RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN EXERCISE
MARRATIVE SUMMARY
initial Condition n
'
- The unit has been operating at full power for 3 months.
- Primary to secondary leak rate is about three times normal
(0.01 gpm in A 0TSG).
- A radwaste shipment carrying drums of compacted waste is
exiting the protected area.
0700 The Initial Conditions are given to the Simulator Control Room
operators.
0720 The Simulator Control Room receives a telephoned bomb threat stating
that a bomb has been planted in the Nuclear Administration Building.
No other details are known at this time. .
0725 The AC Lube Oil Recirc Pump motor seizes / shorts causing oil to spray
into the "B" Diesel Room and to ignite.
0726 The Simulator Control Room receives a fire alarm from the Emergency
Diesal Generator Engine Room and sends an ANO to investigate.
0727 The Simulator Control Room receives verification of a Fire Pump Start
and an alarm that the sprinkler system in the diesel has actuated.
0728 The ANO confirms that there is a fire in the "B" Diesel Generator-
Room. The Fire Brigade is dispatched to the scene.
0733 A fire brigade member hurrying to respond to the fire trips and falls
down the stairs beside the elevator on the 119' elevation of the
Auxiliary Building.
0735 The Assistant Shift Supervisor reports that thera has been one injury
and that an ambulance is required. The MET is dispatched to the
scene and Citrus EMS is notified via 911. -(SlHULATED)
0738 An ALERT is declared based on a fire lasting greater than 10 minutes.
TSC staffing is initiated and in-shop accountability begins.
0747 The ambulance arrives on-site. (SlHULATED) ,
0800 The Assistant Shift Supervisor reports that the fire is out and that
the governor motor and wires are burnt. The Diesel Lube Oil Recirc
Pump and motor are also damaged. The "B"_ EDG is declared inoperable
and the plant enters a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action statement.
0808 The TSC is declared operational.
0815 The Simulator Control Room receives a second bomb threat call.
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0820 The ambulance exits the protected area (simulated).
0830 An eroded tube in A 0TSG fails and begins leaking at 75 gpc..
0831 Plant shutdown begins by procedure.
0833 feedwater Booster Pump 1A Shaft seizes and the pump is lost due to
overcurrent. The reactor trips at about 90% power causing the tube
leak to increase to ?SO gpm. All main steam safety valves and
atmospheric reliefs vent momentarily initiating an unmonitored
environmental release. When the valves reseat, one valve (MSV-33)
fails slightly open allowing the release to continue.
0838 A SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared based on an OTSG leak greater than
200 gpm. EOF activation begins.
0839 A Nuclear Auxiliary Operator is dispatched to pop the safety valve.
This has no effect.
0853 While exiting the Security Building during the site evacuation, two
workers who had been in the Auxiliary Building, are found to be
contaminated.
0858 A repair team is dispatched from the TSC to repair the leaking main
steam safety valve.
0905 Corporate Security is notified that a suspect responsible for the
bomb threats has been apprehended. It has been detenined that the
threats were a hoax. ,
0933 The EOF is declared operational
1010 The repair team installs a gag on the leaking safety valve stopping
the unmonitored release. However a lower level rr. lease continues
through the condenser and the Auxiliary Building vent. While exiting
the Intermediate Building, one of the ERT members M: ring SCBA)
passes out. The EC is notified and the MET is dispatcbed.
1025 The MET reports that the ERT member was overheated and is now
conscious. He is being returned to the TSC.
1030 A report is received from the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP)-that the
radwaste truck has been involved in an accident. After exiting the
protected area this morning, the driver stopped for breakfast and
then took a short nap in his sleeper cab. While traveling north on
US 19 in Levy County, a cement truck ran a stop sicr. str 9 the
semi-trailer broadside causing it to Jack-knif', and flip onto its
side. The doors of one of the sea / land contair.ers came open and some
of its contents spilled. The FHP conitrms that one of the
investigating officers has a meter and has detected radioactive
materials strewn along the roadway. Immediate assistance is
requested.
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1041 The Exhaust Trunk Expansion Joint on the "A" Feedwater Pump Turbine
cracks causing the Simulator Control Room to receive a Condenser
Vacuum Low alarm. A one-inch per minute vacuum leak decreases
condenser vacuum until the Backup Air Removal Pumps auto start.
1051 The Turbine Building Operator reports the location of the vacuum leak
to the Simulator Control Room.
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1056 A repair team from the TSC is dispatched to the Feedwater Pump.
1115 While in the recirc mode, Air Handling Fan - 62 (AHF-62) trips due to
a blown fuse and causes the failure of the TSC ventilation.
1136 Repairs to the feedwater expansion joint are completed.
1233 A leaki ng Cardox Valve is observed at the Cardox Tank on 119'
elevation of the Turbine Building, the Simulator Control Room is
notified.
1253 A repair team from the TSC is dispatched to the leaking Cardox valve.
1335 The Cardox valve is repaired.
1400 RM-Al2 begins to respond erratically, failing low and then returning
upscale.
1415 An I&C repair team from the TSC is dispatched to RM-Al2.
1445 The Exercise is terminated.
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1992 RERP EXERCISE TIME LINE
-Initial Conditions -HGag in place,
A2 release cont,
-ALERT: Fire in "B" Diesel ERT in SCBA passes out in TB
Room, 1 injury, TSC staffing '
and in-shop accountability "A" side FW Expansion
begins. joint crack, Condenser
Vac low alarm
--ambulance leaves, 2nd
bomb threat received -Radwaste shipment -RM- Al2 erratic
transportation response
---S/G tube leak 075 gpm accident
Plant S/D begins -ERT
-Cardox valve dispatched
Bomb threat failure RM-Al2
determined to be
hoax
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SITE AREA EMERGENCY
Site evacuation, 2
people contaminated -Repair completed EXERCISE
-TSC op at Security to FW expansion TERMINATED
Fire out joint
FWP overcurrent,.
Rx trip from 90%, --Cardox Valve
-Ambulance SG L/R 250 gpm, repaired
arrives Safety fails open (5%)
-Bomb threat -ERT dispatched
(possible UNUSUAL EVENT) to leaking Cardox
--TSC recirc failure valve.
--POD notes pri-sec electrical repair
leak increased X3 required to AHF-62
to 0.01 gpm
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