ML20125A748

IE Insp Rept 50-348/79-23 on 790604-08.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions Taken in Response to IE Bulletins 79-06,06A & 06A,Revision 1 & Plant Operations

ML20125A748
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	06/21/1979
From:	Belisle G, Hardin A, Verdery E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20125A747	List: ML20125A744 ML20125A748
References
50-348-79-23, NUDOCS 7908170202
Download: ML20125A748 (9)

See also: IR 05000348/1979023

Text

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[p ucuq'o, UNITED STATES

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I ,n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION 11

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W SulTE 3100

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Report No. 50-348/79-23

Licensee: Alabama Power Company

600 North 18th Street

Birmingham, Alabama 35291

Facility Name: Farley Unit 1

Docket No. 50-348

License No. NPF-2

Inspection at Farley Site near Ashford, Alabama

Inspectors:THb% E 6 kt /14

Date Sigded

A. K. Hardin (June 4y7, 1979)

G.

0 . Belisle-(June

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6-8, 1979)

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Date ' Signed

Approved by:D  % , 6[b I14

E.H.Verdery, Acting)_ectionCL'.ef,RONS Date Sighed

Branch

SUMMARY

Inspection on June 4-7, 1979

Areas Inspected

This special, announced inspection involved 57 inspector-hours onsite in the

areas of the licensee's actions taken in response to IE Bulletins 79-06,79-06A, and 79-06A, Revision 1; and to inspect plant operations.

j Results

Of the two areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations

were identified,

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• W. G. Hairston, Plant Manager

• • J. D. Woodard, Assistant Plant Manager

• K. W. McCracken, Technical Superintendent

• D. C. Poole, Operations Superintendent

• J. W. Kale, Operations Quality Assurance

• • • J. E. Garlington, Operations Supervisor

• • • R. D. Hill, Plant Quality Assurance Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, and operators.

• Attended June 7 and June 8 exit interview.

• • Attended June 7 exit interview only.

• • • Attended June 8 exit interview only.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 7 and June 8,

1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. There were no

questions raised by the licensee regarding the findings. The licensee

stated they were taking certain actions which they believed would enhance

their safety program. These actions are noted in the report as open

items associated with a specific inspection area.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Bulletin 79-06,79-06A, and 79-06A, Revision 1

The review and verification of licensee actions related to the bulletins

listed above was separated into three categories. These were: (1)

onsite review of operator training; (2) ocrite inspection of engineered

safety features (ESF); and (3) onsite asses. ment of operating procedures.

Item 1, onsite review of operator training is reported in IE Report

Number 50-348/79-22. Also, the assessment of operator awareness of the

criteria for operation of reactor coolant pumps and how to determine the

50 degree sub:ooling of the RCS, as specified in Bulletin 79-06A, is

reported in IE Report No. 50-348/79-22. All other inspection items

related to the above bulletins are reported below.

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A. Onsite Inspection of Engineered Safety Features

(1) Inspection of Engineered Safety Feature (EST) Procedures and

Alignments

The inspector reviewed ESF system valve, breaker and switch

alignment operating procedures against current drawings to

verify the adequacy of alignment procedures. In addition, a

system walkdown of ESF operating procedures was performed to

verify that accessible valves, breakerr. and switches were in

the proper position. The following ESF system operating

procedures (SOP's) were reviewed and walked down:

S0P 7.0 Residual Heat Removal System DWG. 175041

S0P 8.0 High Head Safety Injection System DWG. 175038

S0P 9.0 Containment Spray System DWG. 175038

SOP 22.0 Auxiliary Feed System DWG. 175007

SOP 23.0 Component Cooling Water System DWG. 175002

SOP 24.0 Service Water System DWG. 170119

(2) Review of ESF Surveillance Test and Maintenance Procedures

The inspector reviewed the following surveillance test proce-

dures and maintenance procedures to verify that when they are  !

completed the systems will be returned to an operable condition: l

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3.2 Boric Acid Traasfer Pump and

Borated Water Operability test

4.1 Charging Pump 1A Inservice Test

4.2 Charging Pump IB Inservice Test

22.1 Auxiliary Feed Pump 1A Inservice Test

22.2 Auxiliary Feed Pump IB Inservice Test

23.1 Component Cooling Water 1A Inservice Test

23.2 Component Cooling Water IB Inservice Test

23.4 Component Cooling Water IA Annual Inservice Test

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23.5 Component Cooling Water IB Annual Inservice Test

23.6 Component Cooling Water IC Annual Inservice Test

23.8 Component Cooling Water Valve Inservice Test

22.8 Auxiliary Feedwater System Valve Inservice Test

24.7 Service Water System Valve Inservice Test

4.3 Charging Pump IC Inservice Test

4.4 Charging Pump 1A Annual Inservice Test

4.5 Charging Pump 1B Annual Inservice Test

4.6 Charging Pump IC. Annual Inservice Test

10.2 ECCS High Head Runout Valves

Alignment Verification

11.1 RHR Pump 1A Inservice Test

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11.2 RHR Pump 1B Inservice Test

11.6 RHR Valves Intervice Test

16.1 Containment Spray Pump 1A Inservice Test

16.2 Containment Spray Pump IB Inservice Test

16.6 Spray and Phase B Actuation Test

16.7 Containment Spray System Valve Inservice Test

5.1 CVCS/HHSI Pump Bearing Maintenance

5.4 Maintenance of Charging /High Head

Safety Injection Pump

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6.1 Repair of RHR Pump

40.1 Hydro Test of Turbine Driven

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge

Within the areas inspected no discrepancies were identified.

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(3) Standard Operating Procedure Check Lists

The inspector reviewed some ESF equipment Standard Operating

Procedure System Checklist as an additional verification of

system operability. Those reviewed were:

7.0 Residual Heat Removal System

8.0 Safety Injection System Accumulation

8.1 Safety Injection System High Head Injection

9.0 Containment Spray System

10.0 Post LOCA Containment Pressurization and Vent System

22.0 Auxiliary Feedwater System

23.0 Component Cooling Water System

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24.0 Service Water System

36.0 Plant Electrical Distribution Lineup

36.1 S/U, Unit, Main Transformer Prep For Startup

36.2 4160V AC Electrical Distribution System

36.3 600, 480 and 280V AC Electrical Distribution System

No problems were identified. 1

(4) Engineered Safety Feature Surveillance Tests

The following surveillance tests related to the engineered safety

features were reviewed to compare the as found data against the

acceptance criteria. There were no significant discrepancies

observed between data obtained in the tests and acceptance criteria.

The questions raised by the inspector on the test d ta were satis-

factorily resolved by the licensee at the exit interview. The

surveillance tests reviewed were:

- STP 28.3 Diesel Cencrator Load Rejection Test

- STP 28.4 Diesel Cencrator Emergency Start and Full

Load Test (for DGIC, 2E and 1-2A)

- STP 25.1 River Water Pumps 4 and 5 Inservice Test

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- STP 24.6 Service Water Buried Pipe Inspection

- STP 24.4 Service Water Pump ID, IE, and IC Annual Inservice Test

- STP 24.3 Service Water Pump 1A, IB, and 3C Annual Inservice Test

- STP 23,8 Component Cooling Water Valve Inservice Test

- STP 25.4 River Water Pumps 8, 9, and 10 Annual Inservice Test

- STP 25.3 River Water Pumps 4 and 5 Annual Inservice Test

- STP 23.6 Component Cooling Water Pump IC Annual Inservice Test

- STP 23.5 Component Cooling Water Pump 1B Annual Inservice Test

- STP 23.4 Component Coeling Water Pump 1A Annual Inservice Test

- STP 22.11 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A (IB) LOSP Test

- STP 22.10 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Blackout

Start Test

- STP 22.9 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A and IB Auto Start Test

- STP 22.2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B Inservice Test

- STP 22.1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A Inservice Test

- STP 22.7 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Train A Functional Test

- STP 22.6 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Train B Functional Test

- STP 16.7 Containment Spray System Valve Inservice Test

- STP 16.6 Spray and Phase B Actuation Test

- STP 16.4 Containment Spray Pump 1B Annual Inservice Test

- STP 16.3 Containment Spray Pump 1A Annual Inservice Test

- STP 16.2 Containment Spray Pump 1A Inservice Test

- STP 16.1 Containment Spray Pump IB Inservice Test

l - STP 13.0 Boron Injection Tank Heat Tracing Operability Test

- STP 12.0 Boron Injection Tank Operability Test

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- STP 11.2 RHR Pump 1B Inservice Test l

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- STP 11.1 RHR Pump IA Inservice Test

- STP 10.3 ECCS Valve Inservice Test

- STP 10.2 ECCS High Head Runout Valves Alignment Verification

- STP 4.6 Charging Pump IC Annual Inservice Inspection )

- STP 4.4 Charging Pump 1A Annual Inservice Test

- STP 4.3 Charging Pump IC Inservice Test

- STP 4.1 Charging Pump 1A Inservice Test

(5) Reactor Protection System Revision l

The licensee has issued and is is:plementing Plant Change Notice ,

No. B-79-382 entitled " Pressurizer Safety Injection". The l

purpose of the plant change notice is to provide for deletion

of the pressurizer level from coincidence with low pressurizer

pressure for safety injection and to install a 2-out-of-3 low

pressurizer signal to actuate the safety injection system.

The safety evaluation contained in the PCN package concludes

that the existing or original analysis is valid for safety

injection (SI) as a function of pressurizer pressure signals

only in that SI would be actuated at least as soon as with the

cofacident signal. The licensee stated they are about 90

percent cociplete with the installation and expect to complete

it by June 9, 1979 prict to reactor startup from the current

refueling outage.

(6) Return of Safety System to Service Following Extended Outages

The adequacy of administrative controls to assure that engineered

safety features are returned to operability at the conclusion

of an exter.ded outage were reviewed by discussion with licensee

representatives and review of Surveillance Test Procedures

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(STP's), Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's), and Administra*

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tive Procedures (AP's).

A. System Alignment Verification

On April 18, 1979, the licensee issued a temp,rary change

to AP-16 which requires double verification of system

alignment and operability for all safety related systems.

The inspector observed that a double verification of valve

alignment was being performed on returning systems to

l service following the present refueling outage. The

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licensee stated they were trying to determine the extent

they would continue to perform double verific ation of

system alignments, but expected that the final revision of

AP-16 would include at least double verification of Engi-

neered Safety Features (348/78-23-01).

D. Onsite Assessment of Operating Procedures

(1) The licensee does not require partial actuation of

safety injection to assist in pressurizer level

control during routine operation event induced

pressurizer level transients. On the Farley plant

the safety injection system, on initation, goes

through the boron injection task, injecting water

containing 20,000 ppm boron, therefore no routine

event would require cartial actuation of the SI

system. - Operating trocedures do allow the operation

of an additional charging pump to control transients I

in pressurizer level using the normal operating flow  ;

path.

(2) The licensee does not have procedures for feeding a  ;

dry steam generator. The licensee stated that proce-

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dures were available for controlling feed to a generator

in which level had fallen below the feed ring but

that these procedures were for water hammer control.

(3) The licensee's resent tagging practices do not con-

tain specific requirements to preclude tags obscuring

switch positions. The licensee has stated they are

putting two new tagging devices into effect. For

horizontal switch mountings, boxes will be fabricated

which fit over the switch being tagged out. The box

will be transparent and contain the lockout tag. For

vertically mounted panels the licensee is procuring

small tags of a size that when installed on vertical

panel switches will reduce the potential for the tag

to obscure any other indicator status. (348/79-23-02).

(4) The operating conditions and precautions when securing

a reactor coolant pump are contained in Emergency

Operating Procedures 1 and 3. These instruct the

operator to secure the reactor coolant pumps on

actuation of phase B containment isolation, verifi-

cation that high head safety injection pumps are ,

operating and if reactor coolant pressure is below I

1550 psig.

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7. Auxiliary Feedwater System Valve Alignment

System checklist S0P 22.0 A was used to observe the position of auxiliary

feedwater system valves. On April 28, 1979 the licensee had aligned the

system for service and the system had been reverified as being correctly

aligned for service on May 28, 1979. There were no valve positions

observed to be incorrectly aligned. However there were a number of

valves which did not have an identification tag or mark and, in order to

ascertain that the correct valve was being locked open or locked closed,

the valve had to be traced from a known position in the line. The licensee

stated at the exit interview that they planned to have the valves tagged

before returning to power operation from the current refueling outage

(348/79-23-03).