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Category:DEFICIENCY REPORTS (PER 10CFR50.55E & PART 21)
MONTHYEARML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML18065B1351998-01-0606 January 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Use of Deltstrat Code for RCS Flow Rate Determination.Code Corrects for Temps to Determine Hot Leg Bulk Coolant Temp ML20203J2521997-12-0101 December 1997 Deficiency Rept Re Failed Mdr Relays at Entergy Operations Inc,Waterford 3 Nuclear Generation Station.Caused by Contaminated Grease.Housekeeping Procedures Formalized & Added Enclosed Booth Isolating Mdr Final Assembly LD-97-033, Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Potter & Brumfield Mdr Relays, Models 170-1 & 7032.Extended Problem to Include All Mdr Relay Models W/Date Codes 93XX-95XX.Root Cause Analysis, Written Rept & Recommended Corrective Actions Due by 9712011997-11-20020 November 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Potter & Brumfield Mdr Relays, Models 170-1 & 7032.Extended Problem to Include All Mdr Relay Models W/Date Codes 93XX-95XX.Root Cause Analysis, Written Rept & Recommended Corrective Actions Due by 971201 LD-97-028, Part 21 Rept Re Contamination of Lubricant Which Has Led to Hardening of Lubricant in Certain Potter & Brumfield Mdr Relay Models 170-1 & 7032.Will Distribute Copy of Rept to Utils Having ABB-CE Designed Nuclear Steam Supply Sys1997-10-13013 October 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Contamination of Lubricant Which Has Led to Hardening of Lubricant in Certain Potter & Brumfield Mdr Relay Models 170-1 & 7032.Will Distribute Copy of Rept to Utils Having ABB-CE Designed Nuclear Steam Supply Sys LD-97-024, Part 21 Rept Re Error in Energy Redistribution Factor Used in LOCA Analysis for Listed Plants for Which ABB-CE Performed Analysis.Issued Recommendations Info Bulletin 97-0041997-08-14014 August 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Error in Energy Redistribution Factor Used in LOCA Analysis for Listed Plants for Which ABB-CE Performed Analysis.Issued Recommendations Info Bulletin 97-004 ML20140A9661997-05-29029 May 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Ksv Emergency Diesel Generator Power Piston Failure.Caused by Jacket Water in Combustion Chamber. Recommends That Users Verify That Crown Thickness at Valve Cutout Be 100 Minimum ML18065B0111996-10-18018 October 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Application of Certain Aspects of ABB-CE Safety Analysis Methodology ML20117K9731996-09-10010 September 1996 Follow-up Part 21 Rept of Re Failures of Waterford 3 Dedication Testing Process of Seven Commercial Grade Barksdale Pressure Switches ML20116C7031996-07-29029 July 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Failures Identified by Waterford 3 Dedication Testing Process of 7 Commercial Grade Barksdale Pressure Switches ML20117G4641996-05-14014 May 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Cooper Bessemer Reciprocating Products,Div of Cooper Cameron Corp,Issued Ltr to Define Utils/Plants Containing Similar Equipment as Supplied on Cooper Bessemer Ksv & Enterprise Dsr EDGs LD-96-009, Part 21 Rept Re Potential Instrumentation Decalibr at Low Power.Affected Utils Should Ensure That Log Power Channels Properly Calibr & cross-correlated to Linear Power Channels at 100% Reactor Power1996-04-15015 April 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Instrumentation Decalibr at Low Power.Affected Utils Should Ensure That Log Power Channels Properly Calibr & cross-correlated to Linear Power Channels at 100% Reactor Power ML20077D3431994-11-29029 November 1994 Part 21 Rept Re Suspect Master Connecting Rods & Contains Info Location in Engine for Rods ML20078G3051994-11-0909 November 1994 Rev to Part 21 Rept Re Potential Problem W/Master Power Connecting Rods.Vendor Recommends Listed Utils Perform Visual Insp of Master Rods to Determine Applicability of Rept LD-94-019, Suppl Part 21 Rept Re Notification of Potential Defect in motor-driven Relays Supplied by ABB-CE to Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3.Entergy Oparations Aware of Info1994-03-16016 March 1994 Suppl Part 21 Rept Re Notification of Potential Defect in motor-driven Relays Supplied by ABB-CE to Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3.Entergy Oparations Aware of Info LD-93-177, Part 21 Rept Re Potter & Brumfield motor-driven Relays Models 7032,7033 & 7034 Supplied by ABB/C-E to Entergy Operations Waterford Steam Electric Station,Unit 3.Eighty- Two Percent of Affected Relays Tested1993-12-23023 December 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Potter & Brumfield motor-driven Relays Models 7032,7033 & 7034 Supplied by ABB/C-E to Entergy Operations Waterford Steam Electric Station,Unit 3.Eighty- Two Percent of Affected Relays Tested LD-93-003, Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Potter & Brumfield Model 170-1 Relay.One of Two Rotor Return Springs Broke & Portion of Spring Lodged Between Rotor & Stator.Rotor Springs Supplied by Lewis Spring Co.Info Bulletin Being Prepared1993-01-13013 January 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Potter & Brumfield Model 170-1 Relay.One of Two Rotor Return Springs Broke & Portion of Spring Lodged Between Rotor & Stator.Rotor Springs Supplied by Lewis Spring Co.Info Bulletin Being Prepared ML20126J5961992-12-31031 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Loss of RHR Cooling During Nozzle Dam Removal.Nozzle Dams May Create Trapped Air Column Behind Cold Leg Nozzle Dam.Mod to Nozzle Dams Currently Underway. Ltrs to Affected Utils Encl ML20125C7161992-12-0707 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Possibility for Malfunction of Declutching Mechanisms in SMB/SB-000 & SMB/SB/SBD-00 Actuators. Malfunction Only Occurs During Seismic Event.Balanced Levers May Be Purchased from Vendor.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20127M5201992-11-24024 November 1992 Final Part 21 Rept Re Reject Lot Serial Numbers of Defective Fuel Nozzle Tips,Consisting of Corrected Page 6 of 921102 Rept Re Reject Lots for Fuel Injector Assembly ML20127P5861992-11-23023 November 1992 Followup to 921005 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in SB/SBD-1 Housing Cover Screws.Procedure Re Replacement of SBD-1 Spring Cover Bolts Encl.All Fasteners Should Be Loosened & Removed.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20115D6331992-10-15015 October 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Nuclear Logistics Inc 10CFR21 Notification for Gnb Industrial Battery Co Batteries.Util Will Obtain Replacement Batteries from C&D Power Sys,Inc & Alarm Features to Be Tested by End of Refuel 5 ML20118B4391992-09-11011 September 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Degradation in Abb Type 27N Undervoltage Relays Used in Electrical Switchgear.Recommends That Users Review Applications Requiring Exposures Greater than 1E03 Rads TID W/Time Delay Function Option ML20101Q9311992-07-0808 July 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Failure to Comply w/1 Minute Rating of NCX-17 Cells Mfg by Gnb Battery Co (Formally Gould).Addl Testing of Cell Sizes & End Voltages Scheduled to Begin on 920713 & Be Completed on 920815 L-91-002, Supplemental Part 21 Rept Re GE Reactor Trip Breakers Used in safety-grade Equipment.Initially Reported on 901228.List of Plants Supplied w/C-E Breakers Encl1991-01-0404 January 1991 Supplemental Part 21 Rept Re GE Reactor Trip Breakers Used in safety-grade Equipment.Initially Reported on 901228.List of Plants Supplied w/C-E Breakers Encl ML17223A7451990-01-26026 January 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Backup Rings Furnished in Spare Parts Seal Kits & in 25 Gpm 4 Way Valves as Part of Actuators Made of Incorrect Matl.Rings Should Be Viton & Have Been Identified as Buna N ML20246P7111989-07-17017 July 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Quench Cracks in Bar of A-SA-193 Grade B7 Component.Quench Cracks Found in One Bar of Matl.Listed Purchasers Informed of Potential Defect.Next Rept Will Be Submitted When Addl Info Becomes Available ML20247P7991989-04-0404 April 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Atmospheric Dump Valves.Cause of Failure Speculative But Result of Piston Ring That Failed to Seal. Resolution to Problem Requires Increasing Pilot Valve Capacity & Reworking of Plug to Enlarge Pilot Flow Area ML20234C7351987-06-23023 June 1987 Supplemental Part 21 Rept Re Silicone Foam Seal Anomolies at Wolf Creek Generating Station ML20211P7211987-02-23023 February 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Rockbestos Coaxial Cable Used in Sorrento Electronics Digital & Analog high-range Radiation Monitor. Insulation Resistance at High Temp Not High Enough for Ion Chamber & Associated Electronics to Operate Properly ML20215G6801986-10-10010 October 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Vendor Tests of air-operated Diaphragm Valves Revealing Natural Frequencies Less than Required Values of 33 Hz.Initially Reported on 841227.No Adverse Effects Noted During Testing ML20215G5351986-10-10010 October 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Vendor Tests of air-operated Diaphragm Valves Revealing Natural Frequencies Less than Required Values of 33 Hz.Initially Reported on 841227.No Adverse Effects Noted During Testing ML20153D8861986-02-17017 February 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Penetration & Conduit Seal Configurations During Fire Tests.Initially Reported on 860214.Evaluation of Number & Location of Defective Seals in Progress.Nrc Assistance Requested ML20140A5281985-12-19019 December 1985 Part 21 Rept Forwarding Ltr Sent to Customers Re Check Valves Missing Lock Welds on Hinge Supports or Hinge Support Capscrews,Per 851121 Request.List of Customers Receiving Ltr Also Encl ML20135E1161985-09-0505 September 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Use of Connectron non-IEEE Qualified Matl in Spare Part Terminal Blocks Supplied to Facilities. Appropriate Customers Notified.Terminal Blocks Should Be Reviewed to Identify Defective Matl W3P85-1442, Final Potentially Reportable Deficiency Rept 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Preventive Maint Program Implemented.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e)1985-08-0101 August 1985 Final Potentially Reportable Deficiency Rept 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Preventive Maint Program Implemented.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e) ML20133G9741985-07-31031 July 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Anchor/Darling Valve Co Swing Check Valves W/Loose Set Screws &/Or Missing Lock Welds,Reported by Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.All Customers W/Similar Valves Notified.Ltr Re Waterford 3 Valves Encl W3P85-1420, Potentially Reportable Deficiency Rept PRD-180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals. Initially Reported on 840918.Submittal of Written Rept on Deficiency Rescheduled for 8508011985-06-27027 June 1985 Potentially Reportable Deficiency Rept PRD-180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals. Initially Reported on 840918.Submittal of Written Rept on Deficiency Rescheduled for 850801 W3P85-1400, Potentially Reportable Deficiency 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Addl Time Needed to Evaluate Deficiency. Next Rept Will Be Submitted by 8507011985-05-29029 May 1985 Potentially Reportable Deficiency 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Addl Time Needed to Evaluate Deficiency. Next Rept Will Be Submitted by 850701 ML20128G5101985-05-24024 May 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Heat Numbers to Be Added & Deleted from Sublist Sheet A,Based on Review of NRC W3P85-1240, Potentially Reportable Deficiency Rept PRD-180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals. Initially Reported on 840918.Written Rept Submittal Date Extended Until 8505311985-04-29029 April 1985 Potentially Reportable Deficiency Rept PRD-180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals. Initially Reported on 840918.Written Rept Submittal Date Extended Until 850531 W3P85-0785, Interim Deficiency Rept 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Addl Time to Evaluate Safety Significance Required. Submittal of Written Rept Rescheduled for 8504301985-03-25025 March 1985 Interim Deficiency Rept 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Addl Time to Evaluate Safety Significance Required. Submittal of Written Rept Rescheduled for 850430 W3P85-0551, Significant Const Deficiency Rept 93 Re Charging & Letdown Containment Isolation Valve.Potential Exists for Valve to Stick Open Due to Thermal Contraction.Testing Under Temp Conditions Being Performed1985-03-0606 March 1985 Significant Const Deficiency Rept 93 Re Charging & Letdown Containment Isolation Valve.Potential Exists for Valve to Stick Open Due to Thermal Contraction.Testing Under Temp Conditions Being Performed W3P85-0544, Supplemental Final Significant Const Deficiency 93 Re Failure of Containment Isolation Valve CVC-103 to Close After Plant Cooldown.Details Will Be Provided on Valve Failure When Info Obtained1985-02-27027 February 1985 Supplemental Final Significant Const Deficiency 93 Re Failure of Containment Isolation Valve CVC-103 to Close After Plant Cooldown.Details Will Be Provided on Valve Failure When Info Obtained W3P85-0509, Interim Rept of Potentially Reportable Deficiency 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Addl Time to Evaluate Safety Significance Needed.Next Rept Delayed Until 8503291985-02-26026 February 1985 Interim Rept of Potentially Reportable Deficiency 180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Addl Time to Evaluate Safety Significance Needed.Next Rept Delayed Until 850329 W3P85-0337, Final Significant Const Deficiency Rept SCD-80 Re Unsatisfactory Stroking of Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Supply shut-off Valves.Pneumatic Operators for Valves 2MS-V611A & V612 Replaced w/D-C Motors1985-02-22022 February 1985 Final Significant Const Deficiency Rept SCD-80 Re Unsatisfactory Stroking of Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Supply shut-off Valves.Pneumatic Operators for Valves 2MS-V611A & V612 Replaced w/D-C Motors W3P85-0339, Final Significant Const Deficiency Rept SCD-93 Re Charging & Letdown Containment Isolation Valve Deficiency.Vendor Repaired Valve W/New Seats Sized for Max Interference Fit1985-02-21021 February 1985 Final Significant Const Deficiency Rept SCD-93 Re Charging & Letdown Containment Isolation Valve Deficiency.Vendor Repaired Valve W/New Seats Sized for Max Interference Fit W3P85-0338, Final Part 21 & Const Deficiency Rept SCD-37 Re Unreliable Temp Signals from Resistance Temp Detectors (Rtd).Initially Reported on 810710.Safety-related RTDs Replaced or Environmentally Sealed.Design Change Notice Issued1985-02-21021 February 1985 Final Part 21 & Const Deficiency Rept SCD-37 Re Unreliable Temp Signals from Resistance Temp Detectors (Rtd).Initially Reported on 810710.Safety-related RTDs Replaced or Environmentally Sealed.Design Change Notice Issued W3P85-0083, Deficiency Rept PRD-180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Safety-related & Environmentally Qualified Equipment Manuals to Be Reviewed.Next Rept Anticipated by 8502281985-01-14014 January 1985 Deficiency Rept PRD-180 Re Failure to Maintain Adequate Document Control of Vendor Manuals.Initially Reported on 840918.Safety-related & Environmentally Qualified Equipment Manuals to Be Reviewed.Next Rept Anticipated by 850228 1999-03-12
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217F2891999-10-13013 October 1999 Drill 99-08 Emergency Preparedness Exercise on 991013 ML20217G7211999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Waterford 3 Ses. with ML20211Q2141999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Waterord 3 Ses.With ML20210Q6361999-07-31031 July 1999 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Waterford 3 ML20210S0581999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Waterford 3.With ML20210D8951999-07-23023 July 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting First 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Plan Requests for Relief ISI-018 - ISI-020 ML20209H3781999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Waterford 3 Ses. with ML20195J8951999-06-17017 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief for Listed ISI Parts for Current Interval,Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(5)(iii) ML20207E8631999-06-0303 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee 990114 Submittal of one-time Request for Relief from ASME B&PV Code IST Requirements for Pressure Safety Valves at Plant,Unit 3 ML20195K3391999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Waterford 3 Ses.With ML20195C3041999-05-28028 May 1999 Annual Rept on Abb CE ECCS Performance Evaluation Models ML20206S7401999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Waterford 3.With ML20205T2621999-04-22022 April 1999 LER 99-S02-00:on 990216,contract Employee Inappropriately Granted Unescorted Access to Plant Protected Area.Caused by Personnel Error.Security Personnel Performed Review of Work & Work Area That Individual Was Involved with ML20205N9671999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Waterford 3 Ses.With ML20205E8531999-03-30030 March 1999 Corrected Pages COLR 3/4 1-4 & COLR 3/4 2-6 to Rev 1, Cycle 10, Colr ML20205A6331999-03-25025 March 1999 SER Accepting Request to Use Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assemblies as an Alternative Repair Method,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) for Reactor Coolant Sys Applications at Plant,Unit 3 ML20204H1401999-03-23023 March 1999 Rev 1 to Engineering Rept C-NOME-ER-0120, Design Evaluation of Various Applications at Waterford Unit 3 ML20204H1231999-03-22022 March 1999 Rev 1 to Design Rept C-PENG-DR-006, Addendum to Cenc Rept 1444 Analytical Rept for Waterford Unit 3 Piping ML20204H2451999-03-22022 March 1999 Rev 2 to C-NOME-SP-0067, Design Specification for Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly (Mnsa) Waterford Unit 3 ML20204F0791999-03-17017 March 1999 Rev 1 to Waterford 3 COLR for Cycle 10 ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20207F3491999-03-0505 March 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990203,contraband Was Discovered in Plant Protected Area.Bottle Was Determined to Have Been There Since Original Plant Construction.Bottle Was Removed & Security Personnel Performed Search of Area.With ML20204B5141999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Waterford 3.With ML20203H8591999-02-17017 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Second Ten Year ISI Program & Associated Relief Requests for Plant,Unit 3 ML20199H6261999-01-21021 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Classification of Instrument Air Tubing & Components for Safety Related Valve Top Works.Staff Recommends That EOI Revise Licensing Basis to Permit Incorporation of Change ML20199C9101998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Waterford 3.With ML20196F4911998-12-0101 December 1998 SER Accepting Request for Relief ISI2-09 for Waterford Steam Electric Station,Unit 3 & Arkansas Nuclear One,Unit 2 ML20206N4131998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Waterford 3.With ML20195C4841998-11-0606 November 1998 SER Accepting QA Program Change to Consolidate Four Existing QA Programs for Arkansas Nuclear One,Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,River Bend Station & Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Into Single QA Program ML20195E5161998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Waterford 3.With ML20155C1351998-10-26026 October 1998 Rev B to Entergy QA Program Manual ML20154K0801998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Waterford 3 Ses. with ML20151W8331998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Waterford,Unit 3. with ML20237B6831998-08-17017 August 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 980723,discovered That Waterford 3 Physical Security Plan,Safeguards Document Was Not Under Positive Control of Authorized Person at All Times.Caused by Human Error/Inappropriate Action.Counseled Employee Involved ML20237C5661998-08-17017 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request for Exemption from Section Iii.O of Appendix R to 10CFR50 ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML20237B5261998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Waterford 3 ML20236S9031998-07-22022 July 1998 SER Accepting Rev 19 to Quality Assurance Program for Waterford Steam Electric Station,Unit 3 ML20198H3911998-07-14014 July 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 5 to HI-961586, Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of Waterford-3 Spent Fuel Pool ML20236N4181998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Waterford,Unit 3 ML20248E7781998-06-0101 June 1998 Annual Rept on Abb CE ECCS Performance Evaluation Models ML20249A4711998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Waterford 3 Ses ML20196A4051998-05-31031 May 1998 Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments,Per 10CFR50.59 for 970601-980531. with ML20198H4681998-05-20020 May 1998 Non-proprietary Rev 1 to HI-981942, Independent Review of Waterford Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool Cfd Model ML20247A3891998-05-0101 May 1998 SG Eddy Current Examination (8th Refueling Outage) ML20247F6761998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for Waterford,Unit 3.W/ ML20217M8951998-04-30030 April 1998 QA Program Manual ML20217P8281998-04-0707 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Authorization for Alternative to Requirements of ASME Section Xi,Subarticle IWA-5250 Bolting Exam for Plants,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20216B1751998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Waterford 3 Ses ML20217M1411998-03-0303 March 1998 Rev 2 of Waterford 3 Cycle 9 Colr 1999-09-30
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M E ENTERGY ["W " """"" '"*'
R.F. Ourski
) W3F192-0329 A4.05 QA
! October 15, 1992 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Attn: Docuraent Control Desk L Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Waterford 3 SES Docket No. 50-382 License 40. hPF-38 Batteries 3A-S, 3B-S, and 3AB-S
\ #
) Centlemen:
E Waterford 3 personnel have discussed with the NRC recent developments and new information regarding the Nuclaar Logistics Inc. (NLI) 10 CFR 21 notification for the Glib Industrial Battery 'n (GNB) batteries. These developments and new information had a bearing on Waterford 3 existing plans, evaluations, and commitments for the 3A-S, 3B-S, and 3AB-S batteries. We have now completed our assessment of the various technical and licensing issues, and an integrated approach has been established to address the resolution of the various issues.
The purpose of this letter is to inform the NRC about our integrated approach, see attachment, and how the approach provides for the res':lution of the various m issues for the batteries.
Please contact me or Rt,bert J Muriilo should there be any questions regarding this letter.
- Very truly yours, ,
7 l J
<ffusu'Vf'%uclear Safety
?
r6c#or
(/./ -
fRFB/RJM/dc Attachment J.L. Milhoan, NRC Region IV cc:
W.R. Johnson, NRC Region IV T.O. McKernon, NRC Region IV P. Wagner, NRC Region IV D.L. Wigginton, NRC-NRR R.B. McGehee N.S. Reynolds NRC Resident Inspectors Office
@fOi!?d@r P
fM7L
AttachmeAt._19 Letter W3F192-0322 1.0 finckaround The following background information about the buttories is summarized.
Information about the Wtterford 3 batteries was submitted to the NRC in letters W3F1-91-0387, W3F192-0015, and W3F192-0079 dated August 30, 1991, February 28, 1992, and May 29, 1992. Information about the batteries is also contained in NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on Station Blackout (SBO) dated January 15, 1992 and NRC Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) on SB0 dated June 17, 1992.
These documents established that Waterford 3 would replace du wg refuel 5 the existing batteries 3A-S, JB-S, and 3AB-S with new batteries of s similar typ and c;pacity. Waterford 3 committed to establish by the end of refuel 3 a reduced life for the new batteries 3A-S and 38-5 to satisfy a design margin of 1.10 at an electrolyte temperature of 70*F. Waterford 3 also committed to modify the de system by the end of refuel 6 to satisfy a Jesign margin of 1.10 for battery 3AB-S. Subsequent to the issuaace of the foregoing documents, Nuclear Logistics Inc. (NLI) on July 3,1992 filed with the NRC a 10CFR Part 21 notification regarding the NCX-17 battery and cells manufactured by GNB Industrial Battery Company, formerly Gould. Testing had been performed by NLI to determine a discharge rate where the cells will consistently meet the acceptance criteria of 1.75 Volts per Cell (VPC). A one minute rate of 1165 amps to 1.75 VPC was established for the NCX-17 cells as compared with the published rating of 1306 amps to 1.75 VPC. Waterford 3 personnel were informed that additional testing was planned by GNB Industrial Battery Company and NLI. The additional testing was required in order to establish the battery performance over a range of voltages and discharge rates, kis data is used for battery sizing calculations l performed in accordance with IEEE 485. . Waterford 3 personnel performed preliminary calculations for the Design Basis Event (DBE) using extrapolated data based on the single data point of 1165 amps. The prelimin.ry calculations established that the Waterford 3 bitteries 3A-S, 38-S, and 3AB-S have sufficient capacity for a DBE. Waterford 3 had intended to replace, during refuel 5, the.
existing batteries with identical batteries. However, after careful consideration of the 10CFR21 notification and other pertinent information, Waterford 3 ascertained that the long term capabilities of the new GNB batteries were indeterminate. Accordingly, an intensive and expedited effort was impicmented to thoroughly evaluate alternatives. Waterford 3 has decided to
- obtain replacement batteries from C&D Power Systems, Inc. (C&D).
2.0 Technical and Licensino issues The various technical and licensing issues and the planned resolutions for the batteries are the following:
l 1
i L _
. ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -________________
i 2.1 HLi10CfR21 l The applicable events are a Design Basis Event (DBE) and Station Glackout (580). ;
1he design basis for Waterford 3 is an event concurrent with a lost-of-offsite power and a single failure wnich is assumed to be a loss of one diesel or one DC !
bus. The Waterfo s S 34 3 and 3B-S batteries are required for about 17 seconds for the DBE to provide power for essential equipment and to provide field flashing for the available diesel until at least one of the two 100% battery chargers is sequenced onto the available diesel. The 3AB-S battery is assumed to be connected to the failed diesel, and therefore the conservative assumption is made that the 3AB-S battery is required to supply loads on the AB bus for 31 minutes until op9rator action can be taken to connect the AB bus to the operable redundant bus. For station blackout, the batteries are required for four hours for a four hour coping plant.
The NCX-17 battery manufactured by GHB Industrial Battery Company was formerly designated NCX-1200 by Gould. Waterford 3 has two NCX-1200 and one NCX-2100 batteries supplied by Gould. While the NCX-17 battery and the NCX 1200 batteries are similar, the batteries have been manufactured under different company names, !
and the batteries may have minor dissimilarities, for example, degree of lead impurity. The 10CFR21 initial notification app'.ies strictly to the NCX-17 battery. The fact that the NCX-17 battery failed to meet the one minute published rating provided an indicator that the data which Waterford 3 useo to determine the capacity of batteries 3A-S, 3B-S, and 3AB-S may be in question.
preliminary calculations for operability were performed using data extrapolated from the single data point of 1165 amps. The preliminary calculations established that the Waterford 3 batteries 3A-S, 3B-S, and 3AB-S have sufficiera, capacity for the DBE.
The 3AB-S battery is required for 31 minutes for the DBE, and batteries 3A-S, 3B-S, and 3AB-S are required for four hours for an SB0. Thus, additional data for discharge ratings for times in excess of one minute was requested from NLI.
- Also, additional end VPC values were requested from NLI in order to establish the '
battery perro mance curve. Waterford 3 requested the foregoing data from NLI shortly after the issuance of the 10 CFR 21 notification to the NRC on July 8, 1992. Waterford 3 planned to finalize the preliminary calculations once the foregoing data was made available by NLI. Waterford 3 on August 31, 1992 received from NLI a letter conveying that no other rates were effected. The preliminary calculations were finalized by September 15, 1992.
The derating of the Gould batteries was also considered for impact on the GB0 calculations of record. Waterford 3 requested from NL1 additional data points in order to evaluate the battery performance over a four hour period. NLI.
initially indicated that the Coup de fouet effect was noticeable up to the 30 minute rating of the battery and e.vpected to change the pt;blished data for this duration. However on August 31, 1992, NLI issued letter NCR-02-30 confirming that only the 1 minute rating was affected and other rates were empirically verified to be accurate. The battery loads for SB0 and DBE are similar for the first minute. The SB0 calculations of record were not impacted beyond this mir.ut e . Accordingly, the SB0 calculations of record were net revised as NLI maintains that the battery curves have not changed and the Coup de Fouet effect affected only it.e first minute rating of the Gould batteries.
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4 2.? IkalE9me'it of Batteries 3A-5. 3D-S. and 3AB-S Batteries 3A-S, 38-S, and 3AB-S will be replaced by the end of Refuel 5 with new buturies from C&D. The three new batteries will be C&D Type LCUK 33 with 16 positive pit.tes. The ratings of the battery will be one minute rate of 2080 amps, 30 minute rate of 1472 amps, and eight hour capacity of 2320 amp-hours, all l to a final terminal voltage of 1.75 volts per cell at 77'T and specific gravity of 1.215 1 0.005 when fully charged. l The batteries and appurtenances are Class IE. The qualified life is 20 years.
Qualification testing has bec.1 performed in accordance with IEEE-323-1974. The batteries have been seismically qualified in accordance with IEEE 344-1975.
Each assembled battery has been subjected to a two hour rate battery capacity acceptance test at the factory in accordance with IEEE 450-1987. Each assembled battery is being subjected to a battery service test. The battery service test I will demonstrate the batteries meet the DBE. l One handred and twenty three (123) cells originally intended for TVA and stored at the Browns ferry Nuclear plant were shipped to Waterford 3. These cells underwent receipt inspection in accordance with the Entergy receipt inspection procedure. cells have been shipped to Waterford 3 directly from The remaining C&D. sixty three A certificate (63)liance has been obtained from C&D for of comp all cells establishing that the cells have been provided in accordance with the Entergy procurement specification.
The 3A-S and 38-S battery cells will be placed in new C&D power System two-tier battery racks, model RD-15L2-18Ep3. The 3AB-S battery cells will be placed in the existing Waterford 2 battery racks. ,
The circuit breakers for the 3A-5 and 3D S de system will be replaced. The new batteries have a higher available fault current. The existing breakers are rated at 10 kilo-amps, and those breakers in service will be replaced with breakers rated at greater than 20 kilo-amps.
2.3 [qualizina Voltagg
'The 3AB-S battery will have 62 cells to provide a better voltage profile during loss of AC power. The 62 cells affect the equalizing voltage requirements. The float voltage will remain below the maximum allowable of 137.5V. The C&D l recommended equalizing voltage range is 2.33 to' 2.38 volts per cell. The l equalizing voltage range corresponds te a minimum voltage of 139.8V for the 3A-S and 3R-S batteries and 144.5V for the 3AB-S battery. These voltage levels are above the maximum allowable system W.Lage of 137.5V, and therefore, Waterford 3 will equalize the individual cells that show weakness. Should there be a need
, to equalize individual cells, then the non-lE individual cell charging unit will
! be seismically restrained, and the unit will have adequate electrical isolation
! capabilities to ensure it does not degrade the IE batteries during a postulated I
event.
3 l
2.4. Battery Charoers The chargins requirements and capabilities of the chargers were reviewed.
Batteries 3A-S and 38-S each have two 150 amp chargers. The chargers satisfy the sizing requirement of section 5.3.4 of IEEE 308-1971 and regulatory guide 1.32, 1972. The chargers supply steady state loads during normal operation and post accident conditions. One charger can recharge the existing 3A-S or 3D-S 1200 AH battery within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The two chargers f9r the 3A-S or 3B-S DC system operating in the normal and load sharing mode can recharge the existing 3A-S or 3P.-S battery in less than five hours. One charger will take approximately 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br />, and two chargers in parallel will ake less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> to recharge the replacement 3A-S or 30-S 2320 AH battery.
The replacement battery is essentially equivalent in size to the existing battery, and the recharge time is not significan#1y impacted. The existing 200 amp battery charger will take less that, 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />, and two parallel normally operating chargers will take approximately seven hours 40 recharge the fully '
discharged 3AB-S battery.
The recharge time is a function of the tolerable downtime of the battery and the preferred slow trickle charge time which are competing objectives. High discharge currents can lead- to excessive heat-up of the batteries, and a slow charging may take unnecessarily long to equalize the batteries. The discharging ,
load which is applied to the 3A-S or 3B-S batterics for 17 seconds during a DBE concurrent with a loss of offsite power will drain the batteries less than 0.5%
of their capacity.
A total discharge of the batteries will occur during the perforreance test. This test will be carefully planned and executed during plant outages to mintuize the '
shutdown risks associated with the unavailability of any of the DC equipment.
2.5 offected Commitments ,
The affected commitments and the impact or resolution is the following:
All620_ ud A20015 These commitments resulted from the Electrical _ Distribution System Functional Inspection (EDSFI). The commitments apply to the Elrar SUPS 3A-S and 38-5 and SCI SUPS 3MA, 3MB, 3MC, and 3MD and require considera 'on for lowering the trip setpoint-to a value below 105V DC and verification of the ability of the SUPS to provide regulated output current at the lower input voltage of 101 V DC. The new 3A-S and 3B-S battery systems will h ve a significantly increased battery capacity. The increased capacity will ensure that the terminal voltage at the SUPS is maintained at or above 105V during all postulated events. There is no longer a aecessity to consider operation of the SUPS at voltages below the design value of 105V. Waterford 3 will test by the- end of refuel 5 the shutdown ,
features of SUPS 3A-S and 3B-S at_105V. Waterford 3 will test, by the end.of 4
i
Refuel 5, the alarm features of SUPS 3MA, 3MB, 3MC, and 3HD. The commitments for lowering of the setpoint no longer apply, and they will be closed.
A17962. A17992. and A20046 These commitments require replacement of batteries 3A-5, 3B-S, and 3AB-S; establishment of a reduced life for batteries 3A-S and 30-3; development of approach for ascertaining early rep 1xement; revision of calculations of record to reflect a design mergin of 1.10 for batteries 3A-S and 3B-S and the available design margin for battery 3AB-S; and modification of 3AB-S system by refue' 6 te satisfy a design margin of 1.10. The commitments, regarding the establishment of a reduced life and the development of an approach for ascertaining early repiscement are no longer applicable, and they will be closed. New commitments will be established to reflect the replacement of the existing batteries with the new C&D batteries with the 3A-S and 38-S C&D batteries having a design margin of 1.10 and an aging factor of 1.25. The 3AB-S de system will be modificd by the end of refuel 6 to satisfy a design margin of 1.10.
A17960. A17961. and A20049 These commitments resulted from the EDSF1 and require the FSAR to be changed to document the battery DBE and SB0 load profiles for batteries 3A-S, 3B-S, and 3AB-S. These commitments still apply, however, the information cannot be processed for incorporation in the FSAR until the batteries hava been installed, tested, and the design change documentation is closed. Therefore, these commitments will be changed to reflect a schedule for the information bJing incorporated not in the 1992 FSAR update but ir. the next scheduled FSAR update.
2.6 Technical Specification Surveillance Reauirements 4.8.2.1.e. and f Technical Specification section 4.8.2.1, paragraphs e and f, discusses the performance test requirements t'or batteries approaching E0% capacity or
. indicating sudden degradatio1. This section is based on the premise that battery performance is predictable up to 80% capacity. Typically, batteries show a ;
tendency to have sharper degradation below 80% capacity or towards the end of useful life. Hence, the intent of this section is to ensure that the available b3ttery capacity between successive tests is adecuate for coping with the design basis event. The replacement 3AB-S battery w< 11 be at 100%. However, the replacement battery is not sized to m6et design requirements up to 80% capacity.
The replacement 3AB-S battery has to have approximately 91% capacity to satisfy SB0 and DBE requirements. This battery has had a two hour battery acceptance test to ensure 100% capacity is available. After installation, a service test will be performed to DBE requirements. This new battery is expected to reniain at (or above) 100% for greater than 10 years. The higher capacity requirements are necessary for 1 fuel cycle only. During Refuel 6, the 3AB-S DC system will be modified to ensure that the design margin requirements are-eatisfied.- The intent of technical specification section 4.8.2.1 is satisfied through cycle 6.
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9 2.7 SER and SSER on Station Blackout Waterford 3 has reviewed the SER and the SSER as well as the Waterford 3 SB0 documentation on SBO, and we believe the evaluations and conclusions in the SER and SSER are still applicable and valid. Waterford 3 will replace by the end of refuel 5 the 3A-S, 38-S, and 3AB-S batteries with new C&D batteries.
Calculations will be finalized by the end of Refuel 5 verifying the new 3A-S,3B-S, and 3AB-S batteries have sufficient capacity for a DBE and SB0. The calculations of record, by the end of Refuel 5, will be based on a design margin of 1.10 and an aging factor of 1.25 for batteries 3A-S and 38-S. The calculation of record, by the end of Refuel 5. for battery 3AB-S will be based on a combined design margin and aging factor of 1.05 or greater. The de system for battery 3AB-S will be modified by the end of refuel 6 to satisfy a design margin of 1.10, and the aging factor will be established once the final modification is determined. Load shedding of the batteries will be impicmented as documented in Waterford 3 letter W3F192-0079 and NRC SSER. The calculations of record will be based on an electrolyte temperature of 70'f. The modification to the 3AB-S de system will be complet?d by the end of refuel 6 which is within the two year time period of 10CfR50.63 commencing with the date of the SSER. Accordingly, the provisicns in the SER and SSER are mot, and thus the SER and SSER are considered still applicable and valid.
3.0 (snglgsha Recent developments and new information had a bearing on Waterford 3 existing p1tas, evaluations, and commitments for the batteries. The various technical and licensing issues were identified, and an integrated approach was established to address the resolution of the various issues. The resciutions are in accordance with the provisions contained in the SER and SSER for station blackout, and thus the SER and SSER are considered still applicable and valid.
We believe this resolution of the battery issues represents an enhanced approach for the operation of Waterford 3. The 3A-S and 3B-S batteries have about twice the capacity of the existing batteries. The 3A-S and 38-S batteries, by the end of Refuel 5, will have a design margin of 1.10 and an aging factor of 1.25. The 3AB-S battery, by the end of Refuel 5, will have a combined design margin and aging factor of 1.05 or greater. The 3AB-S battery, by the end of Refuel 6,'will havc a design margin of 1.10. Although the NLI 10CFR21 notification and other pertinent information adversely impacted Waterford 3 existing evaluations and plans for the batteries, an integrated epproach was established which has minimal impact on the pinnt configuration, which preserves cxisting regulatory evaluations, and which will enhance the operation of Waterferd 3.
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