|
---|
Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20134C3421997-01-27027 January 1997 Special Rept:On 970110,improper Stack Monitor Calibr Occurred.Caused by Use of Flawed Procedure.Revised Q-2 Surveillance Data Sheet ML20116D9851996-07-24024 July 1996 14 Day Rept:On 960710,non-conservative Setting for Safety Channel 2 High Voltage Sensing Circuit Occurred.Caused by Failures in Safety Channel 2 High Sensing Circuit.Performed Successful Check of Sensing Circuit Loss of Voltage Setting ML20116D9921996-07-12012 July 1996 Ro:On 960711,Safety Channel 2 High Voltage Sensing Circuit Failed.Allowed Reactor to Sit Over Weekend & Planned to Restart ML20107L7481996-04-25025 April 1996 Ro:On 960404,failures in Safety Channel 2 High Voltage Sensing Circuits Resulted in Safety 2 Trip.Stated Resistors Replaced & Safety Channel 2 High Voltage Power Supply Temporarily Replaced W/Exact Duplicate on 960412 ML20107L7601996-04-0505 April 1996 Ro:On 960404,spurious Safety Channel 2 Loss of High Voltage Trip Occurred.Caused by Previously Undetected Matl Failure. Repairs Should Be Completed by 960410 & Restart Approved Subject to Successful post-repair Checks ML20086D1041995-06-30030 June 1995 Ro:On 950609,failure of Primary Coolant Return Line Flow Sensor to Initiate Trip Occurred.Flow Sensors Checked After Debris Removal & as of 950626 Problem Considered Resolved ML20091L2891995-06-12012 June 1995 Ro:On 950609,primary Coolant Flow Line Return Sensor Failed. Caused by Debris in Line.Line Repaired ML20082D0221995-04-0303 April 1995 Ro:On 950309-13,leakage of Coolant HX Occurred After Primary Coolant Resistivity Increase Noted.Primary & Secondary Flow Secured & Shell Side of HX Drained.No Leakage Collected.Hx Returned to Primary Sys & Placed in Operation ML20099H7641992-08-10010 August 1992 Ro:On 920727,temp Recorder Point 2 Noted to Be Reading Downscale,Indicating Failure in Circuit Monitoring Water Temp at Exit of South Ctr Fuel Box 2.Caused by Blockage in Fuel Box.Planned Maint Underway.Event Not Reportable ML20086H8081991-12-0303 December 1991 Final Ro:On 911119,safety Channel 2 Meter Flickered & Dropped Out Hard Downscale (Pegged).Caused by Intermitten Fault in Fine Adjust Potentiometer of Circuit. Poteniometer Replaced & Amplifier Card Reseated ML20086G2631991-11-27027 November 1991 Ro:Unscheduled Reactor Trip Occurred While Measuring Temp Coefficient of Reactivity.Caused by Secondary Cooling Water Dropping Below 8 Gpm Min Required by Limiting Safety Sys Setting.Cooling Water Logic Placed in City Water Mode ML20086H8151991-11-20020 November 1991 Ro:On 911120,unscheduled Shutdown Conducted Due to Failure of Safety Channel 2 Circuit on 911119.Possibly Caused by Problem in Safety Channel 2 Meter Circuit.Permission to Restart Not Yet Sought ML20086G2681991-11-19019 November 1991 Ro:Reactor Tripped on Loss of Secondary Cooling Flow on City Water & Gate Valve on City Water Flow Partially Closed to Allow Operation at Higher Temp.All Safety & Control Sys Functioned Properly.Detailed Rept Will Be Submitted ML20085H4911991-10-16016 October 1991 Ro:On 911003,failure to Perform Required Surveillance of Limiting Safety Sys Setting of Loss of Secondary Coolant Pump Power Discovered.Trip Check on Loss of Pump Power Incorporated Into Q-1 Quarterly Scram Checks ML20085H5071991-10-0303 October 1991 Ro:Possibility That Tests for Operability on Loss of Secondary Coolant Well Pump Power May Not Meet Tech Spec Surveillance Requirement 3.2.2(2) Discovered.Minutes of 911007 Executive Committee Meeting Encl ML20058F4281990-10-29029 October 1990 Ro:On 901002,three Reactor Startups Occurred W/O Performing Daily Checkout or Control Blade Interlock Checks Following Previous Shutdown ML20058F3481990-10-25025 October 1990 Ro:On 901025,three Reactor Startups Performed W/O Daily Checkout Being Performed within Required Time Interval,Per SOP SOP-A.2, Reactor Startup ML20248F1081989-09-29029 September 1989 Ro:On 890915 & 18,reactor Trips Occurred When Safety Channel 1 High Voltage Power Supply Dropped to 90% or Less of Rated Voltage.Caused by Instabilities in 15-volt Dc Power Supply. Trip Relays Replaced & Bistable Adjusted ML20244D5981989-03-31031 March 1989 Final Rept Re Higher than Expected High Streaming Radiation Levels Present at Vertical Ports During Full Power Operation.Caused by Inadequate Survey of Rabbit Shield on 870120.Extra Shielding Installed on Rabbit Sys Shield ML20244A7401989-03-31031 March 1989 Ro:On 890317,reactor Trip W/High Primary Coolant Temp Indication Occurred.Caused by Failure of Specific Temp Recorder Sys Due to Dust/Corrosion Buildup on Slide Wire Causing Excessive Resistance.Buildup Cleaned Off ML20235W6951989-02-21021 February 1989 Ro:On 890221,potential Failure to Rept Significant Change in Level 1 Administration Existed,Per Tech Spec 6.6.3. Evaluation Determined No Significant Administration Oversi Oversights Involved ML20206J7841988-11-14014 November 1988 Ro:On 881104,unscheduled Reactor Shutdown Occurred Due to Failure of Temp Recorder to Indicate Properly.Caused by Failure of Microswitch.Microswitch & Vacuum Tube Replaced & Calibr Check Performed ML20150B6821988-06-23023 June 1988 Ro:On 880610,clutch Current Indication Lamp for Control Blade safety-2 Burned Out at Full Power,Dropping Control Blade from 56% Withdrawn to Fully Inserted Position.Clutch Replaced & Lamp Replacement Frequency Increased ML20196A3661988-06-23023 June 1988 Ro:On 880610,control Blade Safety 2 Clutch Indicating Lamp Burned Out.Burned Out Clutch Current Indicating Bulb Replaced to Include Necessary Control Blade Drive & Drop Time Checks ML20195H8791988-06-0909 June 1988 Final Ro:On 880409,recurrence of Safety Channel 1 Circuit to Provide Proper Power Indication Occurred After Return to Normal Operations on 880401 Following Previous Failures on 880315 & 16.Caution Memo Issued to Operators ML20151W3711988-04-25025 April 1988 Ro:On 880321,0401 & 09,safety Channel 1 Failed to Bottom Meter Stop.Cause Not Yet Identified.New Program Developed to Isolate & Correct Cause of Failure ML20151B3681988-03-28028 March 1988 Reportable Occurrence:On 880314,safety Channel 1 Circuit Failed to Provide Proper Power Indication for Several Seconds on Two Occasions.Caused by Capacitor Failure. Capacitor Replaced W/Substitute of Different Mfg ML20148E8161988-03-15015 March 1988 Ro:On 880315,failure of Safety Channel 1 Circuit Occurred. Failed Component Replacement Has Restored Safety Channel 1 to Normal ML20209G7221987-04-13013 April 1987 Ro:On 870401,reactor Experienced Safety Channel 1 Trip. Caused by Operator Error.Rapid Recovery Restart Performed by Operator.Memorandum Issued Placing Restrictions on Automatic Operation & Limiting Removal of Regulating Blade ML20207J0321986-12-19019 December 1986 Ro:On 861211,actuation of Evacuation Alarm & Evacuation Alarm/Core Vent Sys Interlocks Occurred While Stack Count Rate Approx 300 Cps,In Potential Violation of Tech Specs. Cause Not Given.Vent Will Be Secured at 10 Cps During Drill ML20132B4241985-09-17017 September 1985 Ro:On 850904,one Control Blade Failed to Drop Fully Into Core on Demand from 64% Withdrawn Position.Probably Caused by Bearings Supporting Blade/Shaft Coupling or Magnesium Shroud housing-to-blade Clearance ML20132B4521985-09-0404 September 1985 Ro:On 850904,one Reactor Control Blade Failed to Drop on Demand from 64% Removed Position.Probably Caused by Binding in Clutch S-3 Possibly Due to Moisture or Other Effect Reducing Clearance 1997-01-27
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20207C0881998-12-31031 December 1998 Rev 11 to Uftr SAR, Consisting of Change Page 12-20 ML20217M6581998-03-27027 March 1998 Updated Proposal Submitted to NRC to Meet 10CFR50.64 Requirements for Updating Scheduling of Uftr Conversion from Heu to LEU Fuel ML20203C4551997-12-0303 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 22 to License R-56 ML20216A8791997-08-31031 August 1997 Univ of Fl Training Reactor Annual Progress Rept for 960901-970813 ML20148G3561997-05-29029 May 1997 Univ of Fl Training Reactor Operator Requalification & Recertification Training Program Plan,Jul 1997-June 1999 ML20134C3421997-01-27027 January 1997 Special Rept:On 970110,improper Stack Monitor Calibr Occurred.Caused by Use of Flawed Procedure.Revised Q-2 Surveillance Data Sheet ML20137C1481996-12-31031 December 1996 195-96 Annual Progress Rept, Replacing Pages IV-6,IV-11 & IV-12 ML20128N4671996-10-10010 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 21 to License R-56 ML20135D0081996-08-31031 August 1996 Univ of Fl Training Reactor Annual Progress Rept for 950901-960831 ML20116J5791996-08-0909 August 1996 Annual Progress Rept of Univ of Florida Training Reactor 940901-950831 ML20116D9851996-07-24024 July 1996 14 Day Rept:On 960710,non-conservative Setting for Safety Channel 2 High Voltage Sensing Circuit Occurred.Caused by Failures in Safety Channel 2 High Sensing Circuit.Performed Successful Check of Sensing Circuit Loss of Voltage Setting ML20116D9921996-07-12012 July 1996 Ro:On 960711,Safety Channel 2 High Voltage Sensing Circuit Failed.Allowed Reactor to Sit Over Weekend & Planned to Restart ML20107L7481996-04-25025 April 1996 Ro:On 960404,failures in Safety Channel 2 High Voltage Sensing Circuits Resulted in Safety 2 Trip.Stated Resistors Replaced & Safety Channel 2 High Voltage Power Supply Temporarily Replaced W/Exact Duplicate on 960412 ML20107L7601996-04-0505 April 1996 Ro:On 960404,spurious Safety Channel 2 Loss of High Voltage Trip Occurred.Caused by Previously Undetected Matl Failure. Repairs Should Be Completed by 960410 & Restart Approved Subject to Successful post-repair Checks ML20101L3491996-03-27027 March 1996 Updated Proposal Submitted to NRC to Meet 10CFR50.64 Requirements for Updating Scheduling of Uftr Conversion from HEU to LEU Fuel ML20086D1041995-06-30030 June 1995 Ro:On 950609,failure of Primary Coolant Return Line Flow Sensor to Initiate Trip Occurred.Flow Sensors Checked After Debris Removal & as of 950626 Problem Considered Resolved ML20091L2891995-06-12012 June 1995 Ro:On 950609,primary Coolant Flow Line Return Sensor Failed. Caused by Debris in Line.Line Repaired ML20082D0221995-04-0303 April 1995 Ro:On 950309-13,leakage of Coolant HX Occurred After Primary Coolant Resistivity Increase Noted.Primary & Secondary Flow Secured & Shell Side of HX Drained.No Leakage Collected.Hx Returned to Primary Sys & Placed in Operation ML20115B5881994-08-31031 August 1994 Annual Progress Rept of Univ of Fl Training Reactor for Sept 1993 - Aug 1994 ML20072P7141993-08-31031 August 1993 Annual Progress Rept of Univ of Fl Training Reactor for Sept 1992 - Aug 1993 ML20044G8351993-05-28028 May 1993 Revised, Operator Requalification & Recertification Training Program Plan of Univ of Florida Training Reactor, Jul 1993 Through June 1995. ML20069D0971992-08-31031 August 1992 Annual Progress Rept of Univ of Fl Training Reactor for Period 900901-910831 ML20099H7641992-08-10010 August 1992 Ro:On 920727,temp Recorder Point 2 Noted to Be Reading Downscale,Indicating Failure in Circuit Monitoring Water Temp at Exit of South Ctr Fuel Box 2.Caused by Blockage in Fuel Box.Planned Maint Underway.Event Not Reportable ML20094S4071992-04-30030 April 1992 Rev 7 to SAR Section 5.2 Re Secondary Cooling sys,9.2.3 Re Demineralized Water Makeup sys,9.2.4 Re Purification Sys & 9.2.5 Re Potable & Sanitary Water Sys ML20091C0451992-03-26026 March 1992 Updated Proposal Submitted to NRC to Meet 10CFR50.64 Requirements for Updating Scheduling of Univ of Florida Training Reactor Conversion from HEU to LEU Fuel ML20087A0521991-12-29029 December 1991 Rev 1 to Operator Requalification & Recertification Training Program Plan of Univ of Florida Training Reactor, Jul 1991 Through June 1993 ML20086H8081991-12-0303 December 1991 Final Ro:On 911119,safety Channel 2 Meter Flickered & Dropped Out Hard Downscale (Pegged).Caused by Intermitten Fault in Fine Adjust Potentiometer of Circuit. Poteniometer Replaced & Amplifier Card Reseated ML20086G2631991-11-27027 November 1991 Ro:Unscheduled Reactor Trip Occurred While Measuring Temp Coefficient of Reactivity.Caused by Secondary Cooling Water Dropping Below 8 Gpm Min Required by Limiting Safety Sys Setting.Cooling Water Logic Placed in City Water Mode ML20086H8151991-11-20020 November 1991 Ro:On 911120,unscheduled Shutdown Conducted Due to Failure of Safety Channel 2 Circuit on 911119.Possibly Caused by Problem in Safety Channel 2 Meter Circuit.Permission to Restart Not Yet Sought ML20086G2681991-11-19019 November 1991 Ro:Reactor Tripped on Loss of Secondary Cooling Flow on City Water & Gate Valve on City Water Flow Partially Closed to Allow Operation at Higher Temp.All Safety & Control Sys Functioned Properly.Detailed Rept Will Be Submitted ML20085H4911991-10-16016 October 1991 Ro:On 911003,failure to Perform Required Surveillance of Limiting Safety Sys Setting of Loss of Secondary Coolant Pump Power Discovered.Trip Check on Loss of Pump Power Incorporated Into Q-1 Quarterly Scram Checks ML20085H5071991-10-0303 October 1991 Ro:Possibility That Tests for Operability on Loss of Secondary Coolant Well Pump Power May Not Meet Tech Spec Surveillance Requirement 3.2.2(2) Discovered.Minutes of 911007 Executive Committee Meeting Encl ML20105B3751991-08-31031 August 1991 Annual Progress Rept of Univ of Florida Training Reactor, Sept 1990 - Aug 1991 ML20070T4061991-03-27027 March 1991 Updated Proposal Submitted to NRC to Meet 10CFR50.64 Requirements for Updating Scheduling of Univ of Florida Test Reactor Conversion from High Enriched U to Low Enriched U ML20058F4281990-10-29029 October 1990 Ro:On 901002,three Reactor Startups Occurred W/O Performing Daily Checkout or Control Blade Interlock Checks Following Previous Shutdown ML20058F3481990-10-25025 October 1990 Ro:On 901025,three Reactor Startups Performed W/O Daily Checkout Being Performed within Required Time Interval,Per SOP SOP-A.2, Reactor Startup ML20072S3761990-08-31031 August 1990 Annual Progress Rept of Univ of Florida Training Reactor, for Sept 1989 - Aug 1990 ML20248F1081989-09-29029 September 1989 Ro:On 890915 & 18,reactor Trips Occurred When Safety Channel 1 High Voltage Power Supply Dropped to 90% or Less of Rated Voltage.Caused by Instabilities in 15-volt Dc Power Supply. Trip Relays Replaced & Bistable Adjusted ML20006D5491989-08-31031 August 1989 Annual Progress Rept of Univ of Florida Training Reactor, Sept 1988 - Aug 1989. W/900207 Ltr ML20244A7401989-03-31031 March 1989 Ro:On 890317,reactor Trip W/High Primary Coolant Temp Indication Occurred.Caused by Failure of Specific Temp Recorder Sys Due to Dust/Corrosion Buildup on Slide Wire Causing Excessive Resistance.Buildup Cleaned Off ML20244D5981989-03-31031 March 1989 Final Rept Re Higher than Expected High Streaming Radiation Levels Present at Vertical Ports During Full Power Operation.Caused by Inadequate Survey of Rabbit Shield on 870120.Extra Shielding Installed on Rabbit Sys Shield ML20235W6951989-02-21021 February 1989 Ro:On 890221,potential Failure to Rept Significant Change in Level 1 Administration Existed,Per Tech Spec 6.6.3. Evaluation Determined No Significant Administration Oversi Oversights Involved ML20206J7841988-11-14014 November 1988 Ro:On 881104,unscheduled Reactor Shutdown Occurred Due to Failure of Temp Recorder to Indicate Properly.Caused by Failure of Microswitch.Microswitch & Vacuum Tube Replaced & Calibr Check Performed ML20196C0821988-08-31031 August 1988 Annual Progress Rept of Univ of Florida Training Reactor, Sept 1987 - Aug 1988 ML20196A3661988-06-23023 June 1988 Ro:On 880610,control Blade Safety 2 Clutch Indicating Lamp Burned Out.Burned Out Clutch Current Indicating Bulb Replaced to Include Necessary Control Blade Drive & Drop Time Checks ML20150B6821988-06-23023 June 1988 Ro:On 880610,clutch Current Indication Lamp for Control Blade safety-2 Burned Out at Full Power,Dropping Control Blade from 56% Withdrawn to Fully Inserted Position.Clutch Replaced & Lamp Replacement Frequency Increased ML20195H8791988-06-0909 June 1988 Final Ro:On 880409,recurrence of Safety Channel 1 Circuit to Provide Proper Power Indication Occurred After Return to Normal Operations on 880401 Following Previous Failures on 880315 & 16.Caution Memo Issued to Operators ML20151W8931988-04-27027 April 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 17 to License R-56 ML20151W3711988-04-25025 April 1988 Ro:On 880321,0401 & 09,safety Channel 1 Failed to Bottom Meter Stop.Cause Not Yet Identified.New Program Developed to Isolate & Correct Cause of Failure ML20151B3681988-03-28028 March 1988 Reportable Occurrence:On 880314,safety Channel 1 Circuit Failed to Provide Proper Power Indication for Several Seconds on Two Occasions.Caused by Capacitor Failure. Capacitor Replaced W/Substitute of Different Mfg 1998-03-27
[Table view] |
Text
. _.
UNIVERSITY OF
@ FLORIDA Nuclear Reactor Facility 202 Nuclear Sciences Center Department of Nuclear Engineering Sciences P.O. Box 118300 Gainesville, Florida 32611-8300 Tel: (352) 3921429 I Fax: (352) 392-3380 l
April 25,1996 Regional Administrator, Region II 14 Day Report:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission PotentialTech Spec Violation-101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900 Failure in Safety Channel 2 Atlanta, GA 30323 High Voltage Sensing Circuit ;
Dear Sir:
Re: University of Florida Training Reactor 4 Facility License: R-56, Docket No. 50-83 Pursuant to the reporting requirements of paragraph 6.6.2 (3)(a) and (g) of the UFTR Technical Specifications, a description of a potential violation of the technical specifications was reported by telephone on April 5,1996 with a following fax (telecopy) on April 5,1996 (Attachment I) and a so-called 14 day written report is submitted with this letter including occurrence scenario, NRC notification, evaluation of consequences, corrective action and current status. The-potentially promptly reportable occurrence involved failures in the Safety Channel 2 high voltage sensing circuit which resulted in a Safety 2 trip on April 4,1996. This 14 day written report is delayed one week per agreement with Mr. Craig Bassett of Region II in a telephone conversation discussing the event and the report delay on April 17, 1996.
Scenario / Corrective Action l On March 27,1996, the Quarterly Scram Checks (Q-1) were being performed as scheduled after l last having been successfully performed on January 26,1996. Upon performance of step 6b l (Neutron Chamber High Voltage Reduction for Safety Channel 2), Safety Channel 2 failed to effect a water drop and blade drop full trip as required so the Reactor Manager was informed.
Since insufficient schematics for the High Voltage Power Supply (HVPS) Circuit were found, the circuitry was traced and evaluated under Maintenance Log Page (MLP) #96-09. While no faults were detected in the circuitry components, a downstream trip bistable for the loss of high l voltage comparator circuit required a minor adjustment. The circuitry was then retested twice to assure the trip was operable and the Q-1 Scram Checks were completed satisfactorily. Had a neutron chamber high voltage reduction occurred, a trip would have resulted at some lower value. This setpohit was evaluated to be only slightly lower since only a small adjustment to the bistable circuitry was performed. Since periodic surveillances are performed to detect and
- 9604300009 960425 E l
PDR S
ADOCK 05000083 PDR f# ,
I 4 0 ti l J O j Equal Opportunity /Afrirmative Action lastitution
(
l . .. .
i
\
. I l
l Regional Administrator, NRC Region II Page 2 i April 25,1996 l
correct such anomalies, this incident was not considered to represent any significant reduction in safety margins. In the subsequent week there were one or two spurious Safety Channel 2 trip annunciations during the night or otherwise when the reactor was not operating. At the time, this was thought to be due to power transients.
l On April 4,1996, while ascending power on a 70 second period for a laboratory exercise and following nearly 2% hours oflow power operation, a full trip at 2 watts resulted from a Safety 2
- trip annunciation. Maintenance Log Page (MLP) #96-12 was then opened and troubleshooting
! commenced. Since the " SAFETY 2" annunciator functions as an indication for the 125%
Overpower Trip as well as the Loss of High Voltage trip, the high voltage to Safety Channel 2 was verified to be correct at 841 VDC. Since the reactor was at 2 watts when the trip occurred, this was evaluated not to be an overpower trip. The comparator circuit for the Loss of High Voltage trip was then evaluated.
The comparator circuit for the HVPS compares the HVPS through a sensing circuit and a reference voltage. If the two voltage input signals are equivalent, a trip signal will result.
Voltage checks at the input to the comparator revealed the reference voltage and the HVPS l voltage signal were very close. This condition would effect a trip signal if any line voltage transients should increase the noise variations.
1 l
i The High Voltage Sensing Circuit used a bank of four 1 MD resistors and one 22.1 KO resistor to reduce the high voltage from the HVPS (841 VDC) to a much smaller value (~5 VDC), as well as a 221 KO test resistor to simulate a 10% voltage loss. Two of the 1 MD resistors had reduced in value to approximately 175 KG, which in turn placed a higher voltage on the comparator inputs. This material failure would have prevented a " normal" high voltage I reduction signal from initiating a trip. When the trip was found to be inoperable on March 27, the Loss of High Voltage trip was less conservative in that a greater than normal voltage i reduction would have been required to match the reference voltage on the comparator circuit. l This reduction in protection could have been in effect since the last performance of the Quarterly l
Scram Checks (Q-1) on January 26,1996. However, since only a slight bistable adjustment was
~
performed to correct the trip, the trip setpoint was barely lower than normal. Additionally, the Technical Specifications require a trip if the high voltage to the detector reduces by 10%, but the circuitry is normally conservatively set to trip at approximately 8.5%. Therefore, the slight
' bistable adjustment performed may have still been within tolerance. After the bistable was adjusted on March 27, the 10% trip was once again operating in the normal range (~8.5%
reduction required), although with a much higher sensitivity to line voltage transients, i
The 1 MO resistors in the voltage sensing circuit were not readily available from the original manufacturer. Under 10 CFR 50.59 #96-03, the four 1 MD resistors were replaced with equivalent resistors from an alternate manufacturer on April 9,1996. This restored the proper
Regional Administrator, NRC Region II Page 3 April 25,1996 resistances in the sensing circuit, but the difference in the comparator inputs was still very low, maintaining the high sensitivity to line voltage transients. Subsequently, the " SAFETY 2" trip '
annunciator again actuated overnight indicating the problem was not corrected. Review of the Maintenance Log Page (MLP #73-12) from the circuit installation some 23 years ago revealed the original circuitry had four 800 K0 resistors, one 22.1 KG resistor and a 221 KO test resistor to deliver a higher voltage to the comparator circuit. At some time later, the 800 KO resistors were replaced with 1 MD resistors, but the 22.1 K0 resistor and 221 KO test resistor were not changed. This placed a smaller voltage on the comparator input. Under 10 CFR 50.59 #96-04, the 22.1 KO and 221 KO resistors were replaced with 28 KO and 280 KO resistors, respectively on April 11, 1996. This restored the circuit design to the original design, while allowing a sufficient safety margin for line voltage transients rlthough the voltage on the comparator seemed somewhat low at ~40 mVDC.
Although voltage checks on the high voltage sensing circuit were satisfactory, the comparator remained unstable continuing to give spurious Safety 2 annunciations on April 12 as tests on the circuit showed intermittent noise on the bias power supply. The Safety Channel 2 high voltage power supply was temporarily replaced with an exact duplicate on April 12, 1996. Although the noise was still present, it was thought this might eliminate the spurious trips due to some intermittent fault. However, after the weekend, the " SAFETY 2" annunciator was again found to be actuated on April 15, 1996. At this point the first HVPS was replaced and verified to be giving the same voltage as before removal. Subsequently, troubleshooting on April 15 finally identified a feedback resistor on the comparator with a faulty solder joint. This resistor was soldered in place and the voltage on the comparator measured to be satisfactory at ~ 60 mVDC.
At this point the loss of high voltage sensing circuit bistable trip was adjusted and tested to be satisfactory.
It is noteworthy that the high voltage to Safety Channel 2 has been normal at every check during all this maintenance activity. It has only been the sensing and comparator circuit which became nonconservative. Additionally, it should be emphasized that the overpower trip for Safety Channel 2 has not been affected in any way by these maintenance actions or modifications.
Following successful checking of the Safety Channel 2 HVPS circuit on April 15,1996, the problem with the Safety Channel 2 HVPS sensing circuit was considered corrected. However, the system was to be allowed to sit overnight to assure the " SAFETY 2" annunciator would not actuate. In the meantime, the reactor was considered ready for restart subject to a successful daily checkout. During the daily checkout at the end of the day on April 15, 1996, however, the Safety-3 control blade would not withdraw. Under MLP #96-13, a loose connection was repaired and a successful daily checkout completed on April 16,1996 with no spurious Safety 2 actuation in the interim. Therefore, on April 16, 1996, the reactor was approved for restart.
The only operation on April 16, 1996 was a low power foil irradiation. Subsequently, the reactor has been run on a number of occasions with no problems noted.
Regional Administrator, NRC Region II Page 4 l
April 25,1996 Therefore, the source of the spurious Safety 2 trip actuations is considered corrected. In addition, the updated drawing for the Safety 2 high voltage sensing circuit has been produced and is on file to assure updated drawings are available as of April 9,1996. The inadequate drawings that were available for the HVPS sensing circuit may also be considered a potential violation of tech specs per Section 6.7.3(4) requiring that updated drawings for the facility be l
maintained, though this is considered a minor item. ,
1 NRC Notification !
1 After the Safety 2 trip occurred on April 4,1996, and initial evaluations were completed on April 5,1996, the Reactor Safety Review Subcommittee (RSRS) Executive Committee met to discuss the reportability of this event as well as the planned replacement of resistors in the I sensing circuit for the high voltage in Safety Channel 2. The trip event was reviewed as was the adjustment made on March 27 to assure proper voltage drop would initiate a trip. Because i the failure sometime between January 26 and March 27,1996 may have resulted in operation -
l with a trip setting on loss of high voltage somewhat above the 10% loss of voltage required by l technical specifications, the RSRS Executive Committee recommended prompt reporting of the event. Therefore, NRC Region II was informed of this event per a telephone conversation with Mr. Al Gooden on April 5,1996 relative to the potential violation of technical specifications.
Subsequently on April 5, the event was further discussed with Mr. Bruce Mallett and Mr. Tom Decker of NRC Region II. The event was also discussed with NRC Project Manager Ted i Michaels on April 9,1996. The independence of the 125% overpower trip in Safety Channel 2
- and the 10% loss of detector high voltage was discussed further with Mr. Craig Bassett on l April 9,1996 basically emphasizing the independence and the fact that the high voltage to l Safety 2 has been normal throughout this event. It has only been the high voltage sensing circuit which became non conservative with the Safety Channel 2 overpower trip not affected. In addition, the event was again discussed with Al Gooden of NRC Region II twice on April 11, L 1996 when he was informed of the circuit modification in progress. The complete event was l summarized for Mr. Craig Bassett when the extension was requested for the 14 day report on April 17,1996. On April 18, 1996, the sequence of repairs was again discussed with Mr.
Bassett.-
i Current Status / Consequences Following successful checking of the Safety Channel 2 HVPS circuit on April 15,1996, the system was allowed to sit for over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to assure the " SAFETY 2" annunciator would not actuate. On April 16,1996, the reactor was approved for restart. The reactor was considered ready for restart subject to a successful daily checkout. During the daily checkout, the Safety-3
- control blade failed to withdraw. Under MLP #96-13, a loose connection was repaired and a successful daily checkout was completed on April 16, 1996. The only operation on April 16, 1996 was a low power foil irradiation. Subsequently, the reactor has been run on a number of occasions with no problems noted.
i t . -.
\
. . I i
l Regional Administrator, NRC Region II
- Page 5 ~
April 25,1996 l
As indicated, the RSRS Executive Committee met on April 5,1996 to review this event and approve restart subject to successful post-repair checks. The Executive Committee essentially agreed with actions taken and with the initial staff evaluation that the occurrence did represent a potential violation of the UFTR Technical Specifications and should be treated as promptly reportable which was accomplished. The full RSRS reviewed this entire event (to its conclusion ,
l on April 16 with successful restart) at its regular meeting on April 25, 1996. Reactor I l
- Management and the RSRS agree that this occurrence is not considered to have involved any I
significant reduction in reactor safety margins and it is not considered to have involved any significant effect, potential or real, on the bealth and safety of the public. This occurrence is now considered closed.
If further information is needed, please advise.
Sincerely, ,
l
/
William G. Vernetson ,
Director of Nuclear Facilities I
! WGV/dms l Attachment Copies: U.S. NRC Document Control Desk Ted S. Michaels, NRC Project Manager Reactor Safety Review Subcommittee
! D. Simpkins, Reactor Manager i
Sworn and subscribed this AS day of April,1996.
$ 0 0. - / '$ L A --
V Notary @ic AAN MOREHOUSE MY COMMISSION # CC302416 EXPIRES WL Au0ust 27,1997
% $0NDED THAU TROY FMN WSUMNCf. WC
.