JAFP-96-0064, Submits Evaluation Results for GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves

Submits Evaluation Results for GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves

ML20100F907
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	02/13/1996
From:	Harry Salmon POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GL-95-07, GL-95-7, JAFP-96-0064, JAFP-96-64, NUDOCS 9602220239
Download: ML20100F907 (27)

Text

-__ ., _ - . _ . _ . ._ .

1 at Power P.O. Dox 41 1

Lycoming, New York 13003 315 342.3840 1 ,

j s

#> New York Power Harry P. Salmon, Jr.

W Authority Site Executive Officer i

February 13, 1996

, JAFP-96-0064 4

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4 Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station P1-137 i Washington, D.C. 20555 I

SUBJBCT James A. PitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket 50-333

. Evaluation Results for Generic Letter 95-07

. Pressure Looking and Thermal Binding of safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves i

Reference:

1. NRC Generic Letter 95-07, " Pressure Locking i and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves", dated August 17, 1995 1

l

Dear Sir:

i. The Power Authority has completed a screening review of safety-j related power-operated gate valves and has evaluated those found j potentially susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding

! (PLTB), as requested in Generic Letter 95-07 (Reference 1) . The i screening criteria and evaluation results are summarized in Attachment I.

! The screening review identified two safety-related gate valves with pneumatic actuators. The evaluation concluded that PLTB is not a concern for these valves. A review of safety-related motor-operated gate valves, previously evaluated as part of our Generic Letter 89-10 Program, was also performed. Attachment I includes the results of the updated screening review and evaluation. The-basis for operability for each of these valves was documented and the evaluation concludes that these valves are capable of performing their intended safety function.

4 The Authority will modify five (5) additional valves to reduce or eliminate the potential for PLTB. Our goal will be to complete these modifications during the next refueling outage. However, because-of the limited amount of time for engineering and i

scheduling, two of the five modifications may have to be deferred

. to the following outage. At least three of the five valves will be modified during the next refueling outage currently scheduled 2 ) 3 9602220239 960213 n 8;

PDR ADOCK 05000333 ~

' """ ~

lh^{b &059yy7908

)

? - j U2ited StatOO Nuclear Reguint:ry CommiO0ica i Document Control Desk

. Evaluation Results for Generic Letter 95-07 Page )

i RCIC turbine steam isolation inlet valve (13MOV-131), currently a gate valve, will be replaced with a globe valve. Seating thrust on the core spray Inboard isolation valves (14MOV-12A and 12B) 1 will be re-evaluated and adjusted to further reduce the potential )

for thermal binding. These three modifications will be completed during the Fall 1996 outage.

Bonnet venting will be installed on the RCIC pump discharge to

reactor inboard isolation valve (13MOV-21) and the HPCI pump discharge to reactor inboard isolation valve (23MOV-19) to eliminate the potential for pressure locking no later than the 1998 refuel outage.

Motor-operated safety-related gate valves susceptible to PLTB were previously evaluated by the Authority in response to Generic Letter 89-10, Supplement 6, and numerous valves have been modified with a bonnet vent path to prevent pressure locking.

Attachment II contains the commitments made by the Authority in this letter. If you have any questions, please contact Mr.

Arthur Zaremba at (315) 349-6365.

Very truly yours,

/

Harry P. Salmon, r.

Site Executive Officer 4

HPS: RAP:las cc: Next Pege STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF OSWEGO Subscribed and sworn to before me this /3 day of February 1996 l' W OY W' v,waMGRP h/ )/Onw$knb M N6 tar p ublic U I' 4 % : 425 % ~" i j

Attachments:

I- Evaluation of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves for 1 Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding II - List of Commitments

cct' Regional Administrator

- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406' l Office of the Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 136 Lycoming, NY 13093

, Mr. C. E. Carpenter, Project Manager b Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects-I/II i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .

. Mail Stop OWFN 14B2 Washington, D.C. 20555 i

8 i

5 4

4 5

f 8

I 4

4 1

4

-- - - - -. . - _ ~ .-

t ATTACHMENT I .

i

. New York Power Authority James A. PitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Evaluation of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves for Pressure Looking and Thermal Binding 1.O PURPOSE AND SCOPE This document includes the evaluations and actions implemented at the FitzPatrick Plant to address Generic Letter 95-07 (Reference 1). A comprehensive review of safety-related power-operated gate valves installed at the .

. FitzPatrick Plant has been performed to determine if any are susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding (PLTB) i phenomena. The scope of valves evaluated for pressure locking are listed in Table 1 and the valves evaluated for thermal binding are listed in Table 2. For valves identified as susceptible, recommended corrective actions 4

have been made. With the completion of this evaluation and any corrective actions, the requirements of Generic Letter 95-07 will be met.

2.0 INITIAL SCREENING The following assumptions were conservatively applied to both pressure locking and thermal binding:

1. Power-operated gate valves are assumed to be

susceptible to Pressure Locking / Thermal Binding (PL/TB).

2. Check valves are assumed to allow back leakage.

l

3. For pressure locking only, fluid is assumed to become

entrapped in the bonnet cavity of flexible wedge and

+ double disc gate valves in two ways. Fluid either leaks into the bonnet while the valve is closed, or

becomes entrapped during closing. The bonnet cavity is

assumed to be leak tight, precluding gradual depressurization.

f Pressure Locking The following methodology was used to identify power-

! operated gate valves potentially susceptible to pressure locking: ,

a. Flexible wedge and parallel double disc gate valves are considered potentially susceptible to pressure locking.

Solid wedge gate valves are not susceptible to pressure locking.

1 l

ATTACHMENT I

• New York Power Authority James A. PitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Evaluation of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves for Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding

b. Valves with bleed holes or bonnet vent lines which equalize bonnet pressure to upstream or downstream conditions are not susceptible.

c. Valves with no open safety function are excluded from potentially susceptible valves.

Thermal Binding i The following methodology was used to identify power-operated gate valves potentially susceptible to Thermal Binding:

a. Flexible and solid wedge gate valves are considered potentially susceptible to thermal binding.

b. Valves whose maximum fluid temperature does not exceed 200*F (threshold temperature) are excluded from the scope of potentially susceptible (see Reference 3).

i

c. Valves whose temperature change (AT) is less than 100*F

for flexible wedge and 50*F for solid wedge may be j excluded from the scope of potentially susceptible (see !

Reference 3). l

d. Valves with no open safety function are excluded from l potentially susceptible valves.

3.0 DETAILED RVALUATION After the valves were screened using the criteria in Section 2.0, the valves requiring additional evaluation were examined individually for PLTB susceptibility.

i l

2 i

! 3 ATTACHMENT I i* New York Power Authority

- James A. PitsPatrick Nucitar Power Plant Evaluation of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves for Pressure Looking and Thermal Binding 3.1 Pressure Lockina Evaluation i As discussed in NUREG-1275, Vol. 9 (Reference 2)

! pressure locking may be caused by two different phenomena. High pressure fluid may be trapped in a i valve bonnet from an external source such as pump shut-I off. This is referred to as pressure transient '

i pressure locking. Low presstra water trapped in a

- valve bonnet and then heated by system or external heat 4

sources causes expansion and increased pressure. This is referred to as thermally induced pressure locking.

1. 10MOV-16A and 10MOV-16B RER Loop A and B Ninimum Plow

{ Isolation Valves PRA Rank: Low These normally open MOVs automatically open to L

ensure that RHR pump minimum flow is available.

There is no potential for pressure transient pressure locking because the RHR pump would be

running, providing an upstream pressure greater than, or equal to, any potentially trapped bonnet

pressure. Thermally induced pressure locking from g heat conductior. will not occur because of the i relatively long length of small diameter (2" and

3") pipe frem the RHR pump discharge piping

(possible hsat source). Thermally induced  !

pressure 3ccking from external heating will not i j occur because these valves are normally open.

Their safety function to re-open only occurs when i RHR flow reduces to the minimum flow setpoint j (when minimum flow required for pump protection).

The limiting environmental qualification (EQ) accident event (RCIC HELB) has a relatively low

peak accident temperature (-139 *F) and short

, duration (temperature less than 125 *F within 100

'- seconds). Thus heating of the fluid in the bonnet

< will not occur because there is not sufficient 4

time and temperature difference and RCIC HELB coincident with RHR pump operation would be

' unlikely.

3 a

3 i

.. _ ___~ __ ___ . . . _ _ __ _ _ _ - _ __ _ _ _ . _ _

i

! r .

ATTACHMENT I i

- New York Power Authority James n. PitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

- Evaluation of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate. Valves for Pressure Looking and Thermal Binding

2. 10MOV-89A and 10MOV-89B RER Esat Exchanger A and B service Water Outlet Isolation Valves

! PRA Rankt High l These normally closed MOVs open to place RHR 4,

Service Water in the Containment Cooling Mode.

There is no potential for pressure transient

pressure locking because plant procedures require the RHR Service Water pump be started prior to 4

throttle opening this valve. As a result, l upstream pressure would be equal or greater than any potentially trapped bonnet pressure. A I potential for thermally induced pressure locking could exist because of the accident temperature profile for 10MOV-89AEB. This accident l temperature profile is based upon a high energy j line break (HELB) of the RHR steam condensing l line. Operability Assessment JSEM-94-024 (Reference 4), showed that 10MOV-89B is not required to be manipulated during, or in response to, the analyzed HELB event, eliminating the possibility of thermally induced pressure locking.

This is also true for 10MOV-89A. .

t

3. 13MOV-21 RCIC Pump Discharge to Reactor '

j Inboard Isolation Valve PRA Rankt Medium f

l Calculation JAF-CALC-RCIC-02190 (Reference 5),

i showed that 13MOV-21 has sufficient torque and j thrust capability to overcome pressure transient

induced pressure locking conditions. A proposed

modification to install bonnet pressure relief is being planned, with completion no later than Refuel Outage 13 (scheduled for fall 1998). The accident temperature profile for 13MOV-21 shows a 4

maximum temperature approximating normal operating conditions. The lack of elevated temperature 4

conditions precludes thermally induced pressure locking.

4 e

4 4

ATTACHMENT I ,

- New York Power Authority James A. PitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Evaluation of safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves for Pressure Looking and Thermal Binding

4. 13MOV-131 RCIC Turbine Steam Inlet Isolation Valve PRA Rank: Medium Calculation JAF-CALC-RCIC-02193 (Reference 6),

t showed that 13MOV-131 has sufficient torque and thrust capability to overcome pressure transient induced pressure locking conditions. Due to the j

presence of a drain pot on the upstream side of

13MOV-131, there is no potential for water (due to i condensed steam) to collect and become trapped in the valve bonnet. Therefore, the entrapment, and subsequent heatup, of water in the bonnet of 4

13MOV-131 need not be considered. This prevents j thermally induced pressure locking.

' Modification M1-94-031 (currently planned for Refuel Outage 12, fall 1996) will replace the gate 4

valve installed for 13MOV-131 with a globe valve which will eliminate the potential for pressure locking.

i b

1 l

l d

i  !

l t 5

i t

• 4 ATTACHMENT I

- New York Power Authority James A. PitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Evaluation of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves for Pressure Looking and Thermal Binding I

5. 14MOV-5A Core Spray Pump A Minimum Plow I Isolation valve

$ PRA Rank: Low i This normally open MoV automatically opens to i i ensure that core spray pump minimum flow is available.. There is no potential for pressure

transient pressure locking ~because the core spray pump would be running, providing an upstream pressure greater than, or aquel to, any potentially trapped bonnet pressure. Thermally J

induced pressure locking from heat conduction will not occur'because of the relatively long length of small diameter (3") pipe from the core spray pump discharge piping (possible heat source).

Thermally induced pressure locking from external heating will not occur because this valve is normally open. Its safety function to re-open l

, only occurs when core spray flow reduces to the ,

I minimum flow setpoint (when minimum flow required  !

for pump protection). The limiting environmental qualification (EQ) accident event (RCIC HELB) has a relatively low peak accident temperature (-139 i- *F) and short duration (temperature less than 125

'F within 100 seconds). Thus heating of the fluid in the bonnet will not occur because there is not sufficient time and temperature difference and RCIC HELB coincident with core spray pump  ;

operation would be unlikely.

i

. i l

l l

< l l

1

'I i

}

S i-

ATTACHMENT I

- New York Power Authority James A. FitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

' Evaluation of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves for Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding

6. 23MOV-19 HPCI Pump Discharge to Reactor j Inboard Isolation Valve PRA Ranks High Calculation JAF-CALC-RCIC-02194 (Reference 7),

showed that 23MOV-19 has sufficient torque and thrust capability to overcome pressure transient

induced pressure locking conditions. A proposed l

modification to install bonnet pressure relief is 4 being planned, with completion no later than Refuel Outage 13 (scheduled for fall 1998).

Thermally induced pressure locking due to post-accident ambient temperature increases (which j could transfer heat to the water entrapped in the bonnet) need not be considered for the following reasons:

a. Design Basis LOCA---the Torus Room EQ accident temperature profile for 23MOV-19 shows a maximum long term EQ temperature of i ~209 'F for a design basis LOCA. However, i

thermally induced pressure locking would not be of concern because the HPCI system would not be available due to low reactor pressure.

l b. RCIC HELB---the next limiting Torus Room EQ temperature profile specifies a maximum

! temperature of -163 'F for a RCIC steam line l HELB. The HPCI System does not have a safety-related function in response to a RCIC l HELB.

c. HPCI HELB---the next limiting Torus Room EQ temperature profile specifies a maximum temperature of -120 'F for a HPCI steam line i HELB, in which case HPCI would not be available.

a i

7

)

. - _ _ _ . _ . . .- - -..-~-. .. - . . - . . - . . _ . -. - - . . _ .

ATTACHMENT I j

• New York Power Authority James A. PitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

i Evaluation of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves for Pressure Looking and Thermal Binding i  !

Small Break LOCA---No Torus Room EQ

d. '

i temperature profile exists for a small break l LOCA since they are all bounded by the design j basis LOCA. However, GE Report GE-NE-T23-4 00725-01 (Reference 8), addresses 0.01 ft 2,

, 0.1 ft and 0.75 ft small 2 2 break LOCAs of the l

! main steamline. For these three breaks, the

! HPCI system starts within 30 seconds, 8 of the seconds, initiatingand 1 second, event. For the respectively, 0.01 ft break, the corresponding wetwell air sample temperature (at 30 seconds) is approximately 110*F. Therefore, for all cases, HPCI initiates before heat can transfer from the I

wetwell, to the torus room, to the valve i bonnet.

! 7. 46KOV-101A and 46MOV-101B Emergency Service 1 Water Loop A and B 2 Supply Meader Isolation valves

! PRA Ranks Low e

} These normally closed MOVs open to provide backup

, cooling water to the safety-related Service Water cooled components downstream. There is no

" potential for pressure transient pressure locking .

because plant procedures require the pump to be running prior to opening the MOV, providing an

{ upstream pressure greater than, or equal to, any i potentially trapped bonnet pressure. All analyses show that 46MOV-101A&B are not subject to elevated ambient temperatures. Therefore, thermally induced pressure locking is precluded.

4

)

s a

8

ATTACHMENT I

• New York Power Authority l James A. FitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Bvaluation of safety-Related Power-operated j:

Gate Valves for Pressure Looking and Thermal Binding 1

3.2 Thermal Bindina Evaluation 4

1

1. 10MOV-25A and 10NOV-25B RER A and B LPCI Inboard Injection valves ]

PRA Ranks Eigh 10MOV-25AEB may be excluded from the list of l valves potentially susceptible to thermal binding for the following reasons:

1 l

a. As part of his presentation for the NRC l l

Workshop on Gate Valve Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding (2/4/94) (Reference 9), D. W.

! Wright (Research Engineer) of A/D Valve Co.

j stated, "[t]hermal binding occurs as a result of differential contraction between the valve body and the valve disc as the system cools.

The differential contraction can cause the disc to become tightly pinched in the valve

seats, rendering the valve inoperable". Mr.

l Wright's criteria for identifying MOVs 4

potentially susceptible to thermal binding

• included the identification of " wedge-type gate valves having dissimilar body and disc base materials (i.e. carbon steel vs.

stainless steel)". The body and disc

materials of 10MOV-25A(B) are both the same I

, material. l

- l

b. The assumed temperature (250*F) for 10MOV-25A(B) comes from the line designation table l maximum operating temperature for line 24"-  !

W20-902-14A(B). During normal operation ]

+

10MOV-25A(B) is closed with a dead water leg i

downstream to the recirculation pump i discharge line. Heating of 10MOV-25A(B) may l occur due to conduction along this dead leg j and from slight leakage or pressure equalization flow during surveillance testing. Whatever heating and temperature change which may occur during normal surveillance testing would be essentially the same as for design basis operation (valve would not cool appreciably between accident depressurization and when signalled to open).

Thus if thermal binding does not occur for surveillance it will not occur for design basis conditions.

f

. 9 i

I

l ATTACHMENT I

• New York Power Authority l James A. PitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant  !

d Evaluation of safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves for Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding '

i c. A review of maintenance history data has identified no previous thermal binding events for 10MOV-25A or 10MOV-25B.

2. 10MOV-39A RER A Torus Cooling Isolation valve PRA Rankt High 10MOV-39A may be excluded from the list of valves

potentially susceptible to thermal binding for the following reasons

a. The body and. disc materials of 10MOV-39A are both the same material.

b. The assumed temperature (250*F) for 10MOV-39A comes from the line designation table maximum operating temperature for line 16"-W20-302-15A. 10MOV-39A is normally closed and opened

to provide a return path to the suppression pool for test, torus cooling and containment

- cooling. The maximum EQ temperature is 139'F (Reference 10) which is effectively the

. maximum temperature to open. The Generic Letter 89-10 evaluation noted that the i required close function occurs with

realignment for LPCI from torus cooling (torus water temperature <110*F). Thus for both opening and closing that maximum valve temperature will be less than the 200*F i threshold temperature for thermal binding  !

(Reference 3).

A review of maintenance history data has  !

c.

identified no previous thermal binding events for 10MOV-39A.

10 l

! l

6 ATTACHMENT I ,

i 4

' New York Power Authority James A. PitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Evaluation of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves for Pressure Looking and Thermal Binding 4

i 3. 13MOV-131 RCIC Turbine Steam Inlet Isolation valve PRA Rankt Medium  ;

This normally closed MOV automatically opens for l

! RCIC initiation. The body and disc of 13MOV-131 are comprised of different materials. However, the RCIC steam supply containment isolation valves are normally open, providing steam pressure and temperature to the upstream side of 13MOV-131.

13MOV-131 is never opened cold to initiate RCIC and, therefore, may be excluded from the list of MOVs potentially susceptible to thermal binding.

In addition, a review of maintenance history data has identified no previous thermal binding events J

for 13MOV-131.

Modification M1-94-031 (currently planned for i RO12, fall 1996) will replace the gate valve

! installed for 13MOV-131 with a globe valve which will eliminate the potential for thermal binding.

4. 14MOV-12A and 14MOV-12B Core Spray Loop A and B Inboard i Isolation valves

PRA Ranks Low a

14MOV-12A&B may be excluded from the list of valves potentially susceptible to thermal binding

- for the following reason:

i

) Although the body and disc of 14MOV-12A(B) are i

comprised of different materials, the following

provides the basis that the MOV is not susceptible to thermal binding:

a. 14MOV12A(B) is normally closed, and has a safety function to open to initiate Core Spray. Under normal operating conditions,

with the assumption of leakage past inboard

check valve 14AOV-13A(B), the temperature of

14MOV-12A(B) is potentially subject to increased operating temperature. This MOV may be closed while at full power (during surveillance testing), and then be required to open to provide Core Spray injection following a DBA LOCA. Under this scenario, 11

b ATTACHMENT I

' New York Power Authority James A. FitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

! Rvaluation of safety-Related Power-Operated '

Gate valves for Pressure Looking and Thermal Binding the temperature of 14MOV-12A(B) achieves a

relatively steady state thermal equilibrium due to Core Spray system water on the outboard side of the valve, and temperature '

conduction against the inboard side of the valve. JAF-CALC-CSP-02264 (Reference 11) calculated the conduction heating potential end showed with conservative modeling that the steady state temperature decays to the assumed drywell ambient temperature (165'F) well before reaching 14MOV-12A(B). Therefore ,

the valve temperature does not exceed the i threshold temperature of 200*F.

b. Memorandum JTS-94-0601, Rev. 1, dated 4

10/20/94 (Reference 12), evaluated a 9/12/94

pressure increase in the Core Spray "A"

' header, and concluded that inboard check valve 14AOV-13A was " leaking by". Therefore, 14MOV-12A was subjected to, and closed

against (during surveillance testing), an increased operating temperature resulting from the 14AOV-13A leakage. After the start j of the 1995 refuel outage, 14MOV-12A was j

successfully stroked open on 1/27/95 during

> as-found LLRT. Therefore, 14MOV-12A

' successfully stroked open after having cooled

+ down (while in the closed position) from the increased operating temperature, to a

. temperature approaching ambient. Therefore, 4

there is reasonable assurance that 14MOV-12A is capable of opening under conditions

! conducive to thermal binding. Because of the design similarities between 14MOV-12A and 14MOV-12B, the same conclusion can be drawn for both MOVs.

1 l

l 1

l i

12 f'

1

l. ATTACHMENT I

!' New York Power Authority James A. FitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant ,

Evaluation of safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves for Pressure Looking and Thermal Binding

c. The assumed temperature (560*F) for 14MOV-12A(B) comes from the line designation table maximum operating temperature for line'10"-

W23-902-5A(B). During normal operation 14MOV-12A(B) is closed with a dead water leg i downstream to the recirculation pump discharge line. Heating of 14MOV-12A(B) may occur due to conduction along this dead leg

and from slight leakage or pressure equalization flow during surveillance testing. Whatever heating and temperature change which may occur during normal

• surveillance testing would be essentially the same as for design basis operation (valve

would not cool appreciably between accident

depressurization and when signalled to open).

Thus if thermal binding does not occur for surveillance it will not occur during design i basis conditions.

j d. A review of maintenance history data has identified no previous thermal binding events for 14MOV-12A or 14MOV-12B.

Although available evidence indicates that 14MOV-4 12A(B) are not susceptible to thermal binding, the following actions will be performed during

Refueling Outage 12 to provide additional f assurance that thermal binding of 14MOV-12A and 14MOV-12B will not occur

i l a. 14MOV-12A Perform baseline in order to obtain improved pullout thrust data, and reduce seating thrust in order to minimize pullout thrust.

4

b. 14MOV-12B Perform baseline in order to obtain improved pullout thrust data, and reduce seating thrust in order to i minimize pullout thrust.

4 13 J

l

\ y -

l ATTACHMENT I l ' New York Power Authority James A. PitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Evaluation of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves for Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Authority has determined that the safety-related power-operated gate valves at FitzPatrick are not susceptible to PLTB which would prevent the valves from performing their safety-related function. However, to provide additional operating margin 4 corrective actions are planned during Refueling Outage 12 and 13 as detailed in Attachment II.

5.0 REFERENCES

1. Generic Letter 95-07, " Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves",

August 17, 1995.

2. NUREG-1275, Vol. 9, " Operating Experience Feedback Report - Pressurs Locking and Thermal Binding of Gate Valves", March 1993.

3. Westinghouse Owners' Group letter ESBU/WOG-95-387, Generic Temperature and Pressure Screening Criteria for Valves Susceptible to PLTB (MUHP-6050) , dated Dec. 6, 1995.

4. JSEM-94-024, " Operability Assessment of AC Powered MOVs Under Elevated Ambient Temperature Conditions".

5. JAF-CALC-RCIC-02190, Rev. 1, " Pressure Locking Analysis for 13MOV-21".

6. JAF-CALC-RCIC-02193, Rev. O, "Prcssure Locking Analysis for 13MOV-131".

7. JAF-CALC-HPCI-02194, Rev. O, " Pressure Locking Analysis for 23MOV-19".

8. GE Report GE-NE-T23-00725-01, "LOCA Drywell Temperature Analysis at Power Uprate Conditions", March 1995.

9. NUREG/CP-0146, " Workshop on Gate Valve Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding", July 1995.

10. EQ Temperature Profiles of 10MOV-39A(OP), 10MOV-89A(OP), 10MOV-89B(OP), 13MOV-21(OP), and 23MOV-19(OP).

14 1

ATTACHMENT I

• - New York Power Authority 4 James A. PitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant l Evaluation of safety-Related Power-Operated

, Gate Valves for Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding

11. JAF-CALC-CSP-02264, Rev. O, " Conduction Temperature

Analysis for 14MOV-12A and 14MOV-12B".

12. JTS-94-0601 Rev. 1, dated 10/20/94, from T. Dewees to WR 94-07851-00, " Pressure Increase in Core Spray Header

'A'".

i 3

'f f

j i

1 6

1 Q

d a

15 1

e  :

New York Power Authority Tcble 1 - Pressure Locking Screen Evaluation .

GL 95-07 Analysis Page 1 of 4 Attachment i Valve Gate Open Safety Adessemal Valve No. Tyse Fumetsam? Hele er Vent? Sukiert to PL? Actisms Ree'd? C-Double 02MOV-53A Disc N N N N Double 02MOV-53B Dine N N N N Double 02-2AOV-39 Disc N Y N N Double 02-2AOV-40 Disc N Y N N Solid 10MOV-13A Wedge N N N N solid 10MOV-13B Wedge N N N N Solid 10MOV-13C Wedge N N N N solid 10MOV-13D Wedge N N N N I Double l 10MOV-16A Disc Y N Y N See section 3.1 l Double 10MOV-16B Disc Y N Y N See Section 3.1 Do.bie 10MOV-17 Disc N Y N N Vers inwalled.

Double 10MOV-18 Disc N Y N N Vers installed.

Flex 10MOV-25A Wedge Y Y N N Vent installed.

Flex 10MOV-25B Wedge Y Y N N Vent installed.

Double 10MOV-26A Disc Y Y N N Hole drilled in disc.

Double l

10MOV-26B Disc Y Y N N Hole drilled in disc.

l l

__ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ . - . _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ -_ __m _

e , 1 New York Power Authority Tcble 1 - Pressure Locking Screen Evaluation GL 95-07 Analysis Page 2 of 4 Attachment i Valve Gate Open Safety Addiesmal Valve No. Tyse Fumetsam? Hele er Vet? Subst to FL? Actsems Eme'd? C m Solid 10MOV-39A Wedge Y N N N Double 10MOV-39B Disc Y Y N N Vemiam.n a Flex 10MOV-89A Wedge Y N Y N See Section 3.1 Flex 10MOV-89B Wedge Y N Y N See Section 3.1 Double 12MOV-15 Dine N Y N N Vem installed Double 12MOV-18 Disc N Y N N Vem installM.

Double 12MOV49 Disc N Y N N Vem installed Double 13MOV-15 Disc N Y N N Vem instaBed.

Double 13MOV-16 Disc N Y N N Vem installed Solid 13MOV 18 Wedge N N N N Rex See Section 3.1 and calculation JAF-Calf-RCIC-02190. Bonnet 13MOV-21 Wedge Y N Y Y vent snod. planned for RO12 to be cornpleted no later than RO13.

Solid 13MOV-39 Wedge Y N N N Solid 13MOV-41 Wedge Y N N N Flex See Section 3.1 and calculation JAF-Calf-RCIC42193. Mod.

13MOV-131 Wedge Y N Y Y M1-94431 to replace witin globe, planned for Roll.

Rex 14MOV-5A Wedge Y N Y N See Section 3.1 Solid 14MOV-5B Wedge Y N N N 5 Ed 14MOV-7A Wedge N N N N e__.._ ._ _____-.._______---_______-_____.___.____________n_-___._.--______. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - -- - ~.

New York Power Authority Table 1 - Pressure Locking Screen Evaluation .

GL 95-07 Analysis Page 3 of 4 Attachment i Vahe Gate Oyam Safety Addensual Vahe No. Tyne Functmem? Hele er Vest? Sabeert to PT,? Aceous Bee'd? Commets Solid 14MOV-7B Wedge N N N N Rex 14MOV-II A Wedge N N N N Rex 14MOV-11B Wedge N N N N Rex 14MOV-12A Wedge Y Y N N Vem installed Flex 14MOV-12B Wedge Y Y N N Vem installed Double 20MOV-82 Disc N Y N N Vem installed Double 20MOV-94 Disc N N N N Double 23MOV-14 Dine Y Y N N Hole drilled in disc.

Double 23MOV-15 Disc N Y N N Vem installed Double 23MOV-16 Disc Y Y N N Hole drilled in disc.

Solid 23MOV-17 Wedge N N N N Rex See Sectica 3.1 and calculation JAF-CAIr-HPCIM194. Bonnet 23MOV-19 Wedge Y N Y Y vent rood. planned for RO12 to be completed no later than RO13.

Solid 23MOV-57 Wedge Y N N N Solid 23MOV-58 Wedge Y N N N Double 29MOV-74 Dine N Y N N Vera installed Double 29MOV-77 Disc N Y N N Hole drilled in disc.

Flex g46MOV-101A Wedge Y N Y N See Secuon 3.1

1 IIi\ll r

c t

r o

1 d

a u s e

3 n

o l m i a e 1r v n u S e

E m o e e

n C S e  ?

e r

d

'm c e S4 N N N i

gf no hR Aa c e

m m

_ k 4 A ce og  ?

L La P

_ o eP r

t t

r Y N N u e n

s d s S e

r  ?

P t s

e V

1 r N N N e

l e l e

_ b H a

c T

ty?

fe m a s Si t Y N N n r a e

ph P O

- t e

a Gep e y e e g

e g

g l vT xd e e xd e e

rd e e a _

V FW l

FW l l F W -

y t

i r o B A B o N 1 2 2 h

t e 0 1

0 1

0 1

v u l a V V- V-A s V O O O ri es M 6

M 6

M 6

wly e 4 4 oa Pni At kr7 e n o0m -

Y5h c w9 eLt a

t NGA Iilll ,l

. i 2

3 2

3 2

3

_ n o

n o -

_ i i W_

t t

c c n

_ e e S S _

_ o e e e

_ d S e

S e

S e

e C l

u  ?

d

_ a v 'e e

E N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N n

e e

hR a

s s

e n

t c

r A -

c  ?

S4f B T

go o n

i1 t t

N N N N N N N N N N N N Y Y N N Y

_ r d e ne ig b s

u

_ Ba S l P >

a y m

r m

m e

_ e T F' Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y

_ h d0 Y Y Y T i u0

- H2 -

x 2 a l

e M -

b y -

c te ?

f s T a e Si t N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y Y r N N N N N N N neu e _

pF _

O dl iu M )F 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 e

m (e s n 5

2 5

2 5

2 2 8 8 8 8 8 8 2 5 4 4 5

5 2

5 2

6 1

6 1

5 2

i 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 _

l me _

sT a -

Me I

t a

y Gp e e e e e e t e e e e e e e e l l e g

e g l k g g lb l

i e y l l l l g g g b b b b d r b b b b d d uc c o hT u c u c u c u c d i d d d i d d i u c uc u c u cs xd 1 d oi s s id e h

t V

a DD oi s DD oi s DD oi s DD oi s l

sWo e l o

sW e

o lsW e il e o

sW DD oi s DD oi s DD oi s oi DD e

WW WW e

DD MiD low S

u A s .

ri o es N A B 9 0 A B C D A B A B A B A 6 6 9 wly V 3 3 3 4- 3 3 3 3 1

6 1

6 1

7 1

8 1

5 2-5 2- 2- 2- 3 oa O 5-V 5-V V V O

1 V-1 V

1 V

V V

V V

V V V V V V Pni At M O O O

A A O O O O O O O O O O O O O kr7 e n M M 2- 2- M M M M M M M M M M M M M 0

2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o0m 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 01 01 1 1 1 1 1 Y5h-w9c eLt t a

NGA

,llllllll '

j ll 1ll l!ljIl' j 1 l

< ~

de n

n l

a

. p e,

b o

lg ht i

w

_ e c

l a

_ p e

r t

o 1

3 0-4 9-1 M.

_ d o

M 2

3 w 2 1

n

- hOR i

o e o r t e

_ a r Sf l

u  ?

d a 'e v e -

E N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N _

hR -

s n n e

e At m -

e r A c

c  ? _

S4f B go n

i2 T

t o

N N N N N N N N N N N N Y N N N N - _

d e n

h ig Ba l P >

- a p m

r s

s e?

e TF Y Y Y Y i N N N Y N N N N h d0 Y N N Y t T iu0 l 2

- f 2 x a

_ l e M

_ b y a t  ?

s T Lier Y Y Y Y Y Y N N t

Y Y Y N N N N N N ne e u pF -

O idu nF) -

e n (y 0 5 9 9 2 3

2 3

5 3

0 6

0 6

0 0

0 4

0 4

0 4

0 6

0 5

0 5

0 5

0 5

une n 2 8 8 5 5 4 5 5 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 xT a

M _

t y

t e

a Gp e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e i

r o l e y vT l

b uc oi s xd e e g

xd e e g i b

ue oi s lb u c oi s l

b u

oi s c

l b

u cs l

b u cs d ed i

l g

xd e e g

d d i

l g

e d d i

g e

xd e e g

xd e

g e

d de i

g g ad e d i d g

e -

h t

V a

DD FW l

FW l

DpDD DD DD oi DD oi SoW lF W S oW low S FW l

FW l

low S wW low S

u A s .

ri o es N B A B 1 A B A B wly V 9 9 9 5 s 9 5 6 8 1

1 2-9 3-1 4-3 1 5- 5- 7- 7-oa O 3

V 8-V 8

V 1

V i

V 4-V 1

V 1

V V

V V V V V V V V PnI At n M O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O _

kr7 e M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M o0m Y5h- c 0

1 0

1 0

1 2

1 2

1 2

1 3

1 3

1 3

1 3

1 3

1 3

1 3

1 41 4

1 41 4

1 w9 eLt a

t NGA l(llIl lj

! .. .i New Yosk Power Authority Table 2 - Thennel Binding Screen Evaluation GL 95-07 Analysis Page 3 of 4

• Attachment i Vahe Geee Max Line Haid Opm Sekty Max Fhed Tommy > A min ===I MOV No. Tyse Teams (D Nuties? 200 F? Smhiert to TB? Areams Ree'd? Commmets Flex 14MOV-II A Wedge 560 N Y N N Flex 14MOV-IIB Wedge 560 N Y N N

, see Section 3.2; Although a&htional actions are not respured, I

seating thrust will be lowemi during the %RFO in order to Flex prtmde additional assurance that thermal tmhng will not c ur.

14MOV-12A Wedge 560 Y Y Y N Conduction heated teng. cakulated as <200'F.

See Section 3.2; Ahhough additional actions are not required, seating thrust will be lowered during the %RFO in order to Flex prtmde additional assurnace that thermal beding will not occur.

14MOV-128 Wedge 560 Y Y Y N Conduction heated seinp. calculated as <200*F.

Double 20MOV-82 Disc 140 N N N N Double 20MOV-94 Disc 180 N N N N Double 23MOV-14 Dise 560 Y Y N N Double 23MOV-15 Dise 560 N Y N N Double 23MOV-16 Dise 560 Y Y N N Solid 23MOV-17 Wedge 100 N N N N Flex 23MOV-19 Wedge 100 Y N N N _ _ _

Solid 23MOV-57 Wedge 140 Y N N N Solid 23MOV-58 Wedge 140 Y N N N Double 29MOV-74 Disc 545 N Y N N Double 29MOV-77 Dise 545 N Y N N

.. - . . . . . _ - . . . . . = . . . . . -. . . . . . ... - =-. -

t..t New York Power Authority Table 2 - Thermal Bindro Screen Evaluedon GL 95-07 Analysis Page 4 of 4 '

l Attachment l l

l Valve Gateman Line Fluid Open Safety Max Muid Temp > Adi Amal MOV No. Tyne Tems(F) Fumreen? 2M F? Setswt to TB? Act ams Ree'd? Comunemes Flex l MMOV-101A Wedge 77 Y N N N l mx 46MOV-101B Wedge 77 Y N N N Flex MMOV-102A Wedge 77 N N N N Flex MMOV-102B Wedge 77 N N N N i

i t

, ATTACHMENT II New York Power Authority James A. FitsPatrick Nuclear Power Plant List of commitments

, Comunitment # Commitment Due Date JAFP-96-0064-01 Replace 13MOV-131 with a Globe Valve Refuel Outage (Mod. M1-94-031) 12 Scheduled for Fall 1996 JAFP-96-0064-02 Lower Seating Thrust for 14MOV-12A Refuel Outage (12B) (Work Requests 95-05322 and 95- 12 Scheduled 01319) for Fall 1996 JAFP-96-0064-03 Provide Bonnet Venting for 13MOV-21 No Later Than Refuel Outage 13 Scheduled for Fall 1998

, JAFP-96-0064-04 Provide Bonnet Venting for 23MOV-19 No Later Than Refuel Outage 13 Scheduled

' for Fall 1998 4

f i

i u

.i 4

l I

1

- , 1