ML20090H299

Response Opposing W Eddleman 831010 Proposed Rev to Contention 161 Re Safety Shutdown Sys Failure.Rev Fails to Specify Defects in Original Circuit Breaker Design. Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20090H299
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	10/25/1983
From:	Oneill J CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8310280051
Download: ML20090H299 (14)

Text

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a October 25, 1983 00CKETED USNRC T3 MT 27 N1:55 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIOdh[S,I[l[*

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) 50-401 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )

)

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )

Plant, Units 1 and 2) )

APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO INTERVENOR EDDLEMAN'S PROPOSED REVISED CONTENTION 161 (SAFETY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM FAILURE)

By a pleading dated October 10, 1983, Intervenor Wells Eddleman has proposed a revised Content.lon 161. Applicants Carolina Power & Light Company ("CP&L") and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency hereby oppose the admission of revised Contention 161 for the reasons set forth in detail below.

I. BACKGROUND In a pleading dated May 7, 1983, as suppleme.sted on May 14, 1983, Mr. Eddleman proposed a new contention 161 wb*ch alleged ar, follows:

Applicants have not demonstrated that the Harris nuclear reactors can be safely shutdown when shut-down is required, because of defects and possible malfunction of We.vtinghouse DS-416 circuit breakers used in the safocy related shutdown systems at Harris.

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. Applicants, in their " Response to Intervenor Eddleman Proposed contention 161 (DS-416 Circuit Breakers) ," dated May 31, 1983

("May 31 Response") , opposed admission of Contention 161 because of Mr. Eddlemads failure to state sufficient basis for the allega-tions made. Alternatively, Applicants preposed that the Board defer ruling on Contention 161 to allow Mr. Eddleman a period of time within which to review the recent design change to the DS-416 reactor trip switchgear 'andervoltage (UV) attachments, and there-after to amend, modify or withdraw his proposed Contention 161.-1/

In itP Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Wells Eddleman's Proposed Contention 161) , dated September 7,1983, the Board adopted Applicants' alternative to outright rejection of Contention 161.

The Board noted:

Proposed Contention 161 is quite broad and does not identify any specific defects in the original circuit breaker design. The Applicants' proposal would serve the useful purpose of giving Mr. Eddleman the opportunity to formulate the con-tention (if he still chooses to do so) on the basis of more complete information now available.

The Board granted Mr. Eddleman thirty days from the date of its Order to revise or withdraw Proposed Contention 161 in light of the information contained in Applicants' May 31 Response.

1/ The NRC Staff initially did not oppose admission of proposed Contention 161. "NRC Staff Response to Wells Eddleman's Proposed Contention #161," dated May 31, 1983.

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. The information which Applicants provided to Mr. Eddleman and the Board regarding the DS-416 reactor trip switchgear identified a design problem and the proposed actions to correct the problem.

This information was set forth in four letters attached to the May 31 Response:

(1) Letter from E. P. Rahe, Manager, Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Department, To R. C. DeYoung, Director, Division of NRC Inspection and Enforcement, dated March 31, 1983 (Attachment A to the May 31 Response) (informing the NRC of the potential for intermittent malfunction of the UV attachment to the DS-416 reactor trip switchgear).

(2) Letter from R. L. Whitney, Westinghouse, to L. I. Loflin, CP&L, dated April 12, 1983 (Attachment B to the May 31 Response ) (informing the Harris Project Staff of the identified prob-lem).

(3) Letter from R. L. Whitney, Westinghouse, to L. I. Loflin, CP&L, dated April 21, 1983 (Attachment C to the May 31 Response) (identi-fying the design discrepancy in the UV attachment to the DS-416 reactor trip switchgear and committine to replace the defective UV attachments with com-ponents that have been modifiad to correct the problem).

(4) Letter from R. M. Parsons, CP&L, Harris Project General Manager, to J. P. O'Reilly, NRC Region II, dated May 26, 1983 (Attachment D to the May 31 Response) (enclosing a report on the DS-416 reactor trip switchgear problem and the proposed corrective action).

The design discrepancy was identified as an improper tolerance between the UV attachment pivot shaft and a retaining ring. The groove in the shaft receiving the retaining ring was not increased in width to be consistent with an earlier retaining ring design change. The new retaining ring is wider than the original design and does not properly seat in the existing grooves. Westinghouse committed to 1

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replace the UV attachments on DS-416 reactor trip switchgears.

The new UV attachments have modified (widened) grooves to accommodate the new retaining ring. Furthermore, Westinghouse is developing and will implement a procedure for installation of the new UV attachments, which will ensure proper alignment and interface of the UV attachment with the breaker trip shaft.

On May 26, 1983, Applicants committed to the NRC to implement DS-416 design change to correct the identified design deficiency.

Applicants also indicated they were considering the implementation of another design change, then undergoing industry review, which would provide redundant actuation of an undervoltage trip signal by activation of both the UV attachment and the shunt coil attachment on the DS-416 reactor trip switch gear. Applicants have

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since committed to install this second design change as well.

Revised Contention 161 alleges as followsi Applicants have not demonstrated the ability of the Harris automatic shutdown system (OCRAM system) to avoid ATWS events in light of (1) similar events caused by improper maintenance and/or excessive wear due to added cycling of the automatic SCRAM (Federal Register Notice 7590-01, 9/22/83), and (2) improper tolerances and parts design in Westing-house DS-416 undervoltage trip devices for 2/ On June 14, 1983, the Westinghouse owner's Group (of which CP&L Is a member) submitted to the NRC a proposed design change to the Westinghouse reactor protection systems to accommodate the addition of an automatic reactor trip by way of the reactor trip switchgcar shunt coil trip attachment. This will provide a backup to the existing UV trip mechanism for tripping the reactor breaker. By letter dated October 21, 1983, from M. A. McDuffie, Senior Vice-President of CP&L, to H. P. Denton, Director, NRR, Applicants committed to implement (footnote continued on next page)

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- -S-4 Harris. By using identical relays, undervoltage attachments and other devices in both trains of its shutdown systems, the Harris Plant also violates General Design Criterion 22 (10 CFR 50 '

Appendix A) requiring " functional diversity or diversity in component design . . . "

II. ARGUMENT The Board previously agreed with Applicants that Contention 161, as. originally drafted, was "quite broad." September 7 Order at 3.- Revised Contention 161 is even more sweeping in scope.

Mr. Eddleman previously failed to identify any specific defects in the original circuit breaker design. Revised Contention 161. offers

no additional specificity. In this regard, Mr. Eddleman simply

' ignored the information provided by Applicants which described the modifications that would be made to the UV attachment to the DS-416 i reactor trip switchgear to ensure the design problem identified by Westinghouse'would be corrected. As such, revised Contention 161 fails to meet.the requirements of adequate basis with requisite specificity.

l In addition, Mr. Eddleman attempts to bootstrap an entirely new con-i tention to the issue originally raised in Contention 161. This new allegation misconstrues and misapplies General Design Criterion 22 and is not supported by arguments addressing the five lateness criteria of 10 C.F.R. S 2.714 (a) (1) .

(continued) the shunt co11 design modification. The NRC Staff has completed its review of the shunt coil trip of the reactor trip breaker and issued'a Safety Evaluation Report on August 10, 1983. With the addition of the shunt amil trip, each reactor trip switchgear will be provided two independent mechanisms, either of which could re-sult in a trip of the breaker upon a signal from the reactor pro-tection system.

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A. WHERE INTERVENOR EDDLEMAN HAS FAILED TO ADDRESS APPLICANTS'-DISCUSSION OF THE CORRECTIVE ACTION AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES TO CORRECT THE DESIGN DEFECT IN THE UV ATTACHMENT TO THE DS-416 REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR, REVISED CONTENTION 161, WHICH DOES NO MORE THAN GENERALLY ALLEGE DEFECTS IN TOLERANCE AND PARTS D3 SIGN, MUST BE REJECTED FOR LACK OF A SPECIFIC BASIS.

The Board afforded Mr. Eddleman an opportunity to address the information provided to the NRC by Applicants regarding measures to correct the defect detected by Westinghouse in the manufacture of the UV attachment to the DS-416 reactor trip switchgear. However, I Mr. Eddleman failed to address the corrective and preventive action detailed by Applicants in their May 26, 1983 letter to the NRC which resolves the problem identified by Westinghouse in the UV attachment to the DS-416 reactor trip switchgear. See Attachment D to the May 31 Responsa. The Board has previously ruled that where Mr. Eddleman had failed to address Applicants' treatment of a subject as set forth in the FSAR or ER, a contention on that subject must be rejected for lack of a specific basis. Memorandum and Order (Reflecting Decisions Made Following Prehearing Conference), September 22, 1982, at 56. This ruling is' clearly applicable here as well.-3/

Applicants'have no way of knowing what, if any, aspect of their proposed corrective action Mr. Eddleman finds wanting. He simply _

alleges " improper tolerances and parts design in Westingbouse DS-416 undervoltage trip devices." In light of Applicants' commitment to replace defective UV attachments with devices that include a 3/ See Duke Power Company, et al. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 an3^2), CLI-83-19, 17 N.R.C. (June 30, 1983) (slip op. at 11)

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. " pivot shaft with wider grooves to accommodate the new retaining ring," coupled with Westinghouse's " revised manufacturing drawings and quality control procedures to assure that critical design dimensions are maintained during manufacture," it is difficult to speculate as to the specific concern now being advanced by Mr. Eddleman.

Applicants submit that the issue raised in revised Contention 161 regarding the DS-416 reactor trip switchgear must be rejected for lack of basis with requisite specificity.

B. INTERVENOR EDDLEMAN'S GENERALIZED REFERENCE TO A FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE REPORTING ON AN

" ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE" AT SALEM UNIT 1 DUE TO THE FAILURE OF WESTINGHOUSE DB-50 REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS AT THAT AND OTHER PLANTS DOES NOT SUPPORT A BROADLY WORDED ATTACK ON THE HARRIS REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM, ESPECIALLY WHERE THE HARRIS SYSTEM DOES NOT UTILIZE WESTINGHOUSE DB-50 REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS Mr. Eddleman has attempted to expand Contention 161 to a generalized allegation regarding Applicants' ability to " avoid ATWS events."~4/In addition to the allegations regarding the DS-416 (continued)

(intervenors are required "to diligenR'_y uncover and apply all publicly available.information to the prompt formulation of con-tentions"); Washington Public Power Supply Systems, et al (WPPSS, Nuclear Project No. 3), Docket No. 50-508, Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Proposed Contentions) (September 27, 1983) (slip opinion at 11) (rejecting bases for a contention because petitioner failed specifically to address treatment of the issue in the CESSAR and FSAR).

4/ The Board has previously rejected a contention proposed by Mr. Eddleman concerning Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) . This generic issue is currently the subject of an ongoing rulemaking. September 22, 1902 Order at 68 -69.

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8-t UV attachment,.Mr. Eddleman cites to "similar events caused by improper maintenance and/or excessive wear due to added cycling of the automatic SCRAM (Federal Register Notice 7590-01, 9/22/83)."- The Federal Register Notice citation is to an " Abnormal Occurrence" report by the NRC relating to the February 25, 1983 event at Salem Unit 1.-6/ Mr. Eddleman fails to share with the Board and Applicants what specific information found in the Federal _ Register notice he finds applicable to the Harris Plant

-design. This is particularly important since the Harris Plant does not incorporate the DB-50 breaker design which failed at Salem Unit 1. The Abnormal Occurronce report discusses the I

actions taken by licensees and vendors to prevent a recurrence of the event at Salem Unit 1. 48 Fed. Reg. at 44,298. Mr. Eddleman i fails to address these actions and to state with specificity what

-he finds inadequate.

Again, this. aspect of revised Contention 161 provides no

l. statement of a contention with adequate-specificity and basis to put~ Applicants on notice of a litigable issue. At a minimum, Mr. Eddleman is required to detail the specific information in the lengthy Federal Register notice which he believes is relevant to the Harris Plant design and to state why the proposed corrective 6/ The correct citation to the Federal Register is 48 Fed. Reg.

44,287 ~(September 28, 1983). This was confirmed in a telephone conversation with Mr. Eddleman.

7/ There is a discussion in the Federal Register notice regarding (footnote continued on next page) i.

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l actions are not, in his view, adequate to resolve the identified problem (to the extent the problem is relevant) . I C. THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FULLY COMPORTS WITH GENERAL DESIGN CRITERION 22; MR. EDDLEMAN'S CONTENTION TO THE CONTRARY IS UNTIMELY, MISPLACED AND MISSTATED Mr. Eddleman raises for the first time the allegation that "by using idettical relays, undervoltage attachments and other devices in both trains of its shutdown systems, the Harris plant also violates General Design criterion 22 (10 CFR Appendix A) requiring ' functional diversity or diversity in component design.'"

This issue need not be considered by the Board because the i

allegation is clearly new and untimely. Mr. Eddleman has not addressed the five factors for a late-filed contention. Applicants' compliance with General Design Criterion 22 is discussed in the FSAR, S 3.1.18. The Reactor Protection System is discussed in FSAR, Chapter 7. Independence of redundant safety-related systems is discussed at FSAR,5 7.1.2.2. Mr. Eddleman has failed to demonstrate good cause for a late-filed contention addressing Applicants' com-pliance with General Design Criterion 22. Mr. Eddleman may not advance this new aspect of proposed revised contention 161 without complying with 10 C.F.R. S 2.714 (a) (1) (i)-(v) .

(continued) the potential deficiencies involving clearance and dimensional problems with the DS type breakers. 48 Fed. Reg. at 44,288. This discussion adds nothing to the information previously provided by Applicants on the problems widi D&416 UV attachments.

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t Mr. Eddleman misstates the requirements of General Design Criterion 22, in any event, which reads in its entirety:-

Criterion 22-Protection system independence.

The protection system shall be designed to assure that the effects.of natural phenomena, and of normal. operating, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions on redundant channels do not result in loss of the protection function, or shall be demonstrated to be accept-able on some other defined basis. Design tech-niques, such as functional diversity or diversity in component design and. principles of operation, shall be used to the extent practical to prevent loss of the protection function.

There is a significant difference between " requiring functional diversity or diversity in component design" (as stated by Mr.

Eddleman) and the full statement of Design Criterion 22, in context; " Design techniques, such as functional diversity or

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be used to the extent practicable to prevent loss of the protection function." (emphasis added).

Finally, as demonstrated in the FSAR, Applicants clearly meet

General Design Criterion 22. The modification that Applicants have

, committed to ' install in the DS-416 reactor trip switchgear -- which provides a redundant shunt coil trip in addition to the UV trip --

! will afford even greater diversity and redundancy.

For all of these reasons, the last allegation set forth in revised Contention 161 must be rejected.

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a III.~ CONCLUSION For all of the reasons set forth in detail above, revised Contention 161 must be rejected.

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I Thomds A. Baxter, P.C. I

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John 3. O'Neill, Jr. (,1 H PITTMAN, POTTS & TR3WBRIDGE 1 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20035 (202) 822-1000 Richard E. Jones Samantha Francis Flynn CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY P.O. Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 (919) 836-7707 Counsel for Applicants Dated: October 25, 1983 n

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I DOLKETED WN'3C UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSI b kbkkb NIbb 0FFICE OF SEtii t ,i 00CKETING & SEif vu.i BRANCH In the Matter of )

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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) 50-401 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )

)

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )

Plant, Units 1 and 2) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Applicants' Response To Intervenor Eddlaman's Proposed Revised Contention 161 (Safety Shutdown Syste.n Failure)" and " Applicants' Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Joint Intervenors (Fifth Set)" were served this 25th day of October, 1983 by deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the parties on the attached Service List.

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Johnq.O'Neill,Jr.

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\ l Dated: October 25, 1983

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t UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

CAPOLINA POWER & LICHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-400 OL and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) 50-401 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )

)

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )

Plant, Units 1 and 2) )

SERVICE LIST James L. Kelley, Esquire John D. Runkle, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Conservation Council of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission North Carolina Waehington, D.C. 20555 307 Granville Road Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Mr. Glenn O. Bright Atomic Safety and Licensing Board M. Travis Payne, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Edelstein and Payne Washington, D.C. 20555 Post Office Box 12607 Raleigh, North Carolina 27605 Dr. James H. Carpenter Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Dr. Richard D. Wilson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 729 Hunter Street Washington, D.C. 20555 Apex, North Carolina 27502 Charles A. Barth, Esquire (4) Mr. Wells Eddleman Myron Karman, Esquire 718-A Iredell Street Office of the Executive Legal Director Durham, North Carolina 27705 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Richard E. Jones, Esquire Vice President and Senior Counsel Docketing and Service Section (3) Carolina Power & Light Company Office of the Secretary Post Office Box 1551 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Phyllis Lotchin Mr. Daniel F. Read, President 108 Bridle Run CHANGE /ELP Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 5707 Waycross Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27606 Dr. Linda Little Governor's Waste Management Board 513 Albemarle Building 325 North Salisbury Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27611

d- ~Sorvice List Page Two Bradley W.-Jones, 3 squire

-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory. Commission Region II.

101 Marrietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Ruthanne G. . Miller, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-

, Washington, D.C. 20555.

Robert.P. Gruber Executive Director ,

Public Staff - NCUC Post Office Box 991 Raleigh,-North Carolina 27602 o

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