ML20086L164
| ML20086L164 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/2020 |
| From: | Blanch P - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | David Skeen NRC/OIP |
| Clark T | |
| References | |
| Download: ML20086L164 (12) | |
Text
Paul M. Blanch PE Energy Consultant 23 March 2020 David Skeen United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
Dear David:
I have reviewed the following document (ML20078L380) from the NRC:
Briefing on Agency Practice and Procedure Issues:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Expert Evaluation Team on the Concerns Pertaining to Gas Transmission Lines at the Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant March 18, 2020 It appears the teams direction is to have Sandia National Laboratories preform a risk analysis. I have no problem with this approach however I question analyzing natural gas pipeline rupture phenomena and consequences as the sole guidance when there is clear federal law and regulations how to evaluate the pipelines impact on public safety. Anything less than full compliance with laws and regulations is unacceptable.
It is the clear mission that PHMSA has the sole responsibility for pipeline safety oversight similar to the NRCs role nuclear safety oversight, although past actions by both agencies actions have been questionable.
Restated PHMSA's mission is:
PHMSA's mission is to protect people and the environment by advancing the safe transportation of energy and other hazardous materials that are essential to our daily lives. To do this, the agency establishes national policy, sets and enforces standards, educates, and conducts research to prevent incidents.
And the NRCs mission is:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulates the Nations civilian use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety, to promote the common defense and security, and to protect the environment.
Both PHMSA and the NRC allegedly accomplish their missions by assuring compliance with its regulations. (10 CFR 50 and 49 CFR 192 et seq)
It is not within the NRCs jurisdiction to assure that pipelines comply with federal regulations any more than PHMSA assuring compliance with NRCs regulations.
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It is however the NRCs responsibility to assure the pipelines do not challenge its mission of providing adequate protection of the public health and safety From the enclosed direction it appears the NRC it about to charter Sandia National Laboratories to conduct yet one more risk assessment. We have had risk assessments conducted by Entergy, Algonquin, NRC, PHMSA, the State of New York and me. None of these risk assessments followed any established criteria or contained any direction or acceptance criteria. There is regulatory and industry consensus of conducting a risk assessment and that is specified in 49 CFR 192.917 and 935 and the Pipeline Safety Act of 2016. This is the only accepted methodology for conducting a risk assessment of gas lines.
While I have no issues with Sandia, they must comply with these well-established regulations, established by rulemaking and incorporated into federal regulations.
There is only one means to achieve a valid risk assessment for the pipelines and that is dictated by the Pipeline Safety Act of 2016 and 49 CFR 192. Specifically, 49 CFR 192.917 and 935 provide detailed requirements for a risk assessment and compliance It is my position that a risk assessment be conducted following the Pipeline Safety Act of 2016 and 49 CFR 192. The result must then be reviewed by Sandia Laboratory for compliance and then the NRC makes the determination of reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety PHMSA should also concur the assessment is in compliance with its regulations.
My letter of February 25, 2016 to the Inspector General outlined my concerns with the NRCs handling of the issues associated safety issues related to the gas lines at Indian Point.
I expect your team to address these significant issues. Specifically, the issues addressed in my letter to the IG as follows: (pasted from my letter to the OIG) 2
3 I expect your team to address these issues that were not addressed by the Inspector Generals report.
I have extensive experience at Millstone, Maine Yankee and Indian Point with Safety Culture and a limited knowledge of Root Cause Analysis.
If these types of culture problems were identified at an NRC licensee facility, the NRC would impose its Inspection Procedure 95003 for a total assessment of the culture problem. One vivid example of this culture is the NRCs failure to take any action against Entergy for clear violations of 10 CFR 50.5 and 50.9 related to deliberate mis-conduct and supplying the NRC with inaccurate and incomplete information.
Rather than trimming the poison ivy, the NRC needs a complete evaluation of its culture that I have personally observed over the past 30 years. My personal opinion is that the NRCs 4
safety culture is in dire need of a formal assessment, repair and can only be addressed by the imposition of an evaluation similar to IP 95003 The AIM pipeline may present a risk to the plants however I believe the risk with the most significant consequences is from the existing lines running adjacent to the Unit #3 control and switchgear rooms. These lines are located in a High Consequence Area (HCA) therefore require a risk assessment as dictated by Pipeline Safety Act of 2016 and 49 CFR 192.
A loss of the control and switchgear rooms will compromise reactor and spent fuel pool integrity with no provisions to recover, even with the post Fukushima changes.
I am in full agreement with the New York letter to the NRC Chair with the exception of we urge the NEC to require a new Part 50.59 review of all 3 pipelines. Changes, tests, and experiments. A Part 50.59 review is not appropriate at this time.
During the 3/20/20 meeting I believe I stated the plants are still operating in an unanalyzed condition, in spite of the EDOs position taken from an inapplicable, 30-year old document.
The statement by the EDO and the Chairs statement to Congress must be clarified as it provided mis-leading information by failing to consider todays failure rates and potential consequences.
My concerns with the risk analysis will only be satisfied when this analysis is conducted by an independent party such as Sandia Laboratory and reviewed the National Academy of Sciences as recommended by the New York Office of the Attorney General. This review will assure compliance with applicable United States Codes and regulations specified in 49 CFR 192.
On a directly related matter are there any plans to place the 26 line back in service in the future and if so, would the utility be obligated to conduct a new risk analysis or 50.59 evaluation prior to restoring flow in the line given that there are open questions regarding the adequacy of the previous risk assessment/ 50.59 evaluation?
From my perspective from my review of the FEIS there is more protection provided to the American bittern, pied-billed grebe, savannah sparrow, red bat, eastern cougar, ground beetle, American kestrel, eastern box turtle, eastern hognose snake, Jefferson salamander complex, pine barrens tiger beetle and human remains than for the living humans residing within the potential radius of the AIM pipeline.
For your information questions have been raised related to the applicability of various regulations of 49 CFR 192. I am enclosing Attachment 1 to this letter that are excerpts from the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) that discusses a sampling of these commitments to 49 CFR 192 designed to protect the public and the environment.
Sincerely, Paul M. Blanch 135 Hyde Rd.
West Hartford, CT 06117 860-922-3119 5
Attachment 1 49 CFR 192 statements from FEIS Note there are no discussions contained within this document for compliance with individual parts of 49 CFR 192 6
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