ML20079H457

New Contentions & Amended Deferred Contentions,In Response to NRC SER

ML20079H457
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	01/17/1984
From:	Eddleman W EDDLEMAN, W.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20079H440	List: ML20079H436 ML20079H457
References
82-468-01-OL, 82-468-1-OL, ALAB-444, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8401230443
Download: ML20079H457 (10)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA M If January 1981t NUCLEAR REGULATOBY COMMISSION BEFORE THE A1OMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Glenn Dr. James O. Bri H.ght Carpenter James L. Kelley, Chairman In the Matter of CAB 0 LINA POWER AND LIGHT CO. et al. )

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, )

Units i ani 2) ) ASLE7 ro. 82-1468-01

) OL Wells Eddleman's New Contentions cno Amended Deferred Contentions in Resnonse to Staff SER On 16 December 1983 I received the Staff's "' Safety Eveluation Report" (SER) for the Harris nuclear nlaht. Today being 30 days from that date I hereby file new and anended (Jan. 15 boing a nunday), jbsp dcy eg/MrcMOk'dM6 y BwA (CML M(CHL) contentions based on new information in the SER; the problems caused for Eddleman 107 (deferred, 9/22/82 Board order at 66-67) by the Staff'e failure to comply with ALAB-Itl4h (requiring the Staff to set forth its " perception of the nature and extent of the relationship between each significant unresolved generic safety question and the eventual operation of the reactor under scrutiny" in the "SER itself --

,4 without the need to resort to extrinsic documents", are addressed in a separkte motion filed today.

88E Tne five factors ( 2 . 7 111 of 10 CFR) for contention 107 andtthose O'

o SM a

denending en it are basically the same as those filed 7-24-83[(2d or my n8 DES contentions. Under the Board's 9-22-82 order deferring contention Y 107 to the SER stage, I'm allowed to file now, and that's good cause.

oi<

Under the Board's 3-10-83 Order (P.15) I can revise the contention ELO in the light of the SER, and that's also good cause. No one else is pursuing generic unresolved safety issues contentions, so no one else

can r;pr2sont my intGrocts on thoso mattors (ditto for othat matteva raised in new contentions based on the SER), nor are there other means whereby my interests on any of these matters "will be represented."'

~

Eddleman 107 wan raised at the outset of this proceeding so it cannot broaden the issues; admitting any of the new cententions at this t*me is not likely to significantly delay the proceedinF since these are safety issues, and discovery on safety issues (other than those Auplicants may eeel: summary disposition on) has only just beg,un.

Without a contention on these issues, there is no record, and without a record there is no sound record. Issues imnortant to safety, which the Staff SE9 has inadeouately addresced, should be resolved to provide a sound record. My carticination will include discovery and cross-examination on these issue s , which I hnve demon-strated the ability to conduct, and possibly witnesses, subject to their availability and my finances.

As to new contentions, good cause fo" filing now, what's new in the SER, why it couldn't be filed earlier, and any other matters where the 5 factors or other reouired justificatien for admittinF such contentions now may differ from the above, will be discussed after the contention (s) involved. The timinF issue (delay of proceeding), the contribution to a sound record, and the pursuit of such contentions by other earties and availability of othen means to protect my interests, for new contentions herein, are the same as shown above, with cerhans a few details to add after the contention (s).

CONTEUTION 107 .T: Hprris SED Annendix C fails to ecmply with ALAB-khh's reouirement to make clear from the SED itself --

without reference to extrinsic documents -- the Staff's nosition on the relationship of generic unresolved safety issues to Harris.

E.g. on Task A-h0 (p.C-11) they reference the FSAM. For Task A-3, NUREG-1014 (D. C-9) For task A-1, the Stnff gives no calculatior.s nor shows any of its A-1 analysis to suoport the nrobability of

r csfoty-cignificant water hamnar baing low. For tnsk A-17, ther reference Sa ndia studies but don't tell how these relate to Harris.

Contention 107-Y: The same noncbmpliance with ALAB-hhh alleged in Contentien 107-X also applies to the Staff's discussion of task A-h3 (citing NU9EG-OS97 and MUDEG-0869 and a draf t vegulatory guide); A-kh (staff review not to be ccrplete until some t$ me before fuel load, p.C-13); A-h5 (reference to "certain actions" required per NUVFG-0Ch5, not snecifying any of them, n.C-16);

A-h7 noting that " detailed" studies to support this belief"have not been performed" (p.0-18) and that " additional information is required for the resolution of this issue; A-h9, reference to Guthrie formula in SECT 82-h65 section 3 3.

107-Z:

Staff omits the Maine Yankee water h amner evedior early 1983 (reported to Congress as a significant safety oroblen, 1983, by N9C, NUDEG-0090) in discussion of Task A-1, Waterhammer, pp 0-7/8 of SE9 Nor is there discussion there of the Westinghouse D stean generator "fix" which requires 128% of feedwater going thru the AFW nozzle, relates to causation or effects of waterhanners at Harris.

This analysis is inadequate to assure that safety-related waterhammers will not occur at Harris and that cooling the core and DCS boundary integrity will be adequate with waterhanners.

New contention 173: The SER (section 8.2.1 op 8-1/8-2) fails to analyze conmon causes of failure of all power lines supplying Harris such as earthquakes, tornadovs, ice storns, hurricanes, extraordinary winds, terrorism or transforner fires in the Harris . switchyard.

CP&L admitted to the ACRS 1-12-84 that they have only analyzed tornados amona_cornon causes_of_ failure of 211 7. lines . .

to Harris. Terrorism or earthquake in earticular could also disable the Harris diesels and knock batteries out of their racks, removing both backun power sources, leavinF the niant uncoolable.

(

-h-WHAT's NEWS Uttor failura of Stsff to considor these common-nodo failures in the SER, plus CP&L's 1-12-8h admission that thev have only considered one of them (tornados). The SER should leave as open items those matters not adequately taken care of by Applicants (or by Staff analysis to date), but the SE9 han no open iten on this. The SER's Loss of Offsite Power u.alysis (p. C-13) depends on the accuracy of analysis in Section 8.2 of the SEM. That analysis is faulty.

WHY COULDN'T FIIE EARLIER: The basis of the cohtention, ie the faulty analysis in the SFR and CP&L's adnission of not having analyzed common-cause Tsilure of power lines (other than torr. ados ,

probabil$ty estimated at 2 x 16b) were not available. Without this information, a contention fornulated earlier would likely have been rejected for lack of basis, and nerhans for lack of specificity also. (Cf. 9/22/62 Order of this Board at 5). Staff's actualfailure to carry out its responsibilities in safety evaluation for Harris was not available information until the SFa was in my hands.

5 factors (as they differ from those listed on p.2 and discussed on 1-2 above): This contention does broaden the issues, but only a little since there are any safety questions already at issue.

Good cause for failure to file on time is in the naragranh directly above.

Discovery is just beginning on safety issues, so adnistion of this contention will not result in significant delay. On balance, the other factors outweigh the minor nossible delay and miner broadenfng ,

of issues that admitting contention 173 now would encail.

4 Contention 174: 10 CF9100 App. A part V says "The ; vibratory ground motion at the rite should be determined by assuming that the . , ... locations of highest intensity of the earthquakes are situated at the point on ... the tectonic urovinces nearest the site"'(cf.10 CPR 100 App A, V(1)(iii)). SE9 Annendix F shows that i

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tho 1886 Charicston quako j (parcalli X) la in a sinilar tectonic province to the location of the Harris plant, not associated with particular geologic features at Charleston. SER fails to analyze an MM X quake occuring at the SH site or closer than Charleston, aminiax ukan nthatx Ma mrisma nzmx 6thstandnanxfB2E : non-comoliance with 10 CFR 100.

Contention 175: In light of the US Geological Survey position taken in SER Appendix F, occurrence of a nodified Mercalli intensity X earthquake (like that at Charleston in 1886) at or near the Harris site is possible. USGS usays tectonic featuro9 of the Charleston region are sinilar to those in other regions of the Eastern seaboard.

10 CPR 100 App. A V makes no reference to the nrobability of quakes to be analyzed, but requires an SSE equal to the most severe historic quake, at the point in the tectonic province nearest the plant.

Without an SSE of MM X or close to it, the SER doesn't conuly with 10 CFR 100 Appendix A, V (1)(iii).

Contention 176: In liF ht of the US Geological Survey position taken in SER Appendix F, the Harris operating basis earthquake (OBE) analyzed in the SE9 is not severe enough. 10 CFR 100 Apoendix A V (2) requires that the OBEK have at least half the vibratory ground notion of the SSE (Safe Shutdown Farthquake), which in light of the USGS letter is Modified Mercalli X at or near the Harris plant site. The SE9 fails to analyze such an OBy for Harris or show that the plant can safely withstand it.

Contention 177: The SER fails to establish that Harris can withstand safely an SSE consisting of a Modified Mercalli X earthquake at or near the Harris site, which it what cono11ance with 10 CFR 100 App V 1(iii) requiree in light of the US Geological I

Survey position in SER Appendix F. USGS shows that the same tectonic province that includes Harris include 3 the 1886 Charleston quake which is not related to

sp0cific g;olcgic structurcs th3 rain. Withstanding en SSE is n3cosFary for Harris to be saro against severe nuclear accidsnts,o.g. nultinio pipebreaks with RCP's breaking loose, inoperable, with containment failure.

NOTE: I've tried ny best to hold these under 100 words, but things like"'10 CFR 100 Apoendix V(1)(iii)"' are necessarily long and need to be quoted for snecificity.

5 feetors for contentions 17h thru 177 as they differ fren those on pp 1-2 above): These contentions do broaden the issues now being litigated, tho the earthquake issue was raised at the outset in narts' of rejected contentions. Adnf ssinn of these, since they are safety issues, will not significantly delay the proceeding since discovery on safety issues has just been opened.

Good cause for failure to file on time is that the basis , the SER's violating the analysis recyf rements of 10 CFD 100 as cited in the contentions 17h-177, did not exist until the SE9 cane out, It would he.ve reouired extraordinary clairvoyance to foresee not i

only the USGS letter (10-1982) but also the SER's failure to use 10 CPR 100's requirements in addressing it, in May 1982 when contentions were due for this case.

WHAT's NEW: SER fs11ure to comnly with 10 CFD 100 App. A nart V requirements for SSE or OBF.

WHY COULDN'T FILE EARLIE9: Basis did tot exist. How was I to know that the Staff would ignore NRC regulations? The rules

' do not ' 3ay anything about probabilities, just the most severe earthquake associAtedwiththetectonicurovinceHarris is in. The Cnarleston quake is the most severe quake associated with the tectonic nrovince which, according to the USGS letter in SER Apnendix F, comor13es the US Eastern seaboard. Thus it should have been used at the Harris site (nearest point of that province to Harris) to set the SSF and OBE.

Without the SE9 its' elf, no valid basis

.A

.. -7 existed to show that the Staff would screw up in this way. Such a contention formulated before the SER could thus have been rejected as mere speculation. The Harris plant being designed for a recurrence of the Charleston quake at Charleston (in terns of seismic design),

a closer quake can clearly datage it severely, so the Staff is logietily required by 10 CFR 100 to analyze this event in its Harris SER.

When they failed to do so, contentions 17h thru 177 become possible to specify with basis. Also, the specificity er the fa" lure alleged in each of these contentions by the Staff, derends directly on the SER and Appendix F's use of rationalizations and probabilistic argunents as te why the Staff doesn't look at more intense quakes as they affect the Harris design. But 10 CFR 100 Apcendix A V does not depend on orebability. This specific failure, which is included in soecifying each of the contentions 17h thru 177, could not have been predicted in advance of the SER, and certainly not with adequate basis until the SE9 came out.

O,4-H Contention 176: The SER fails to shou that the pettern of QA failures, violations and deficiencies, inadecur.te dynamic analysic (e.g. inprouer forcing functions), cracking of cylinder or heads and/of crankpins, and use of inadequate materials and work in Transamerica DeLaval Inc diesel generators at Harris will not make the diesels unable to operate when needed for energency power (e.g. af ter connen-mode AC powerline failures caused by ice, wind, tornado, earthquake), thua depriving the Harris plant of long-term energency poucr, beyond approx 5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> battery life. No power, no safety injection or coolant pumping: risk of severe accident without mitigation.

WHAT'S NEW: SER failure to analyze these fa'. lures and show they won't have imeacnt on Harris.

WHY COULDN'T FILE EARLIER: Basis in SER did not exist.

K 5 factors as they differ from those on op 1-2: Wont broaden issues much since so many safety Droblens are already at issue.

Was raised earlier (ciontention 13h) as general diesel construction ecs w . frbrae y et hcs W u d Basis' in TDI 5'* -81 and operation problem, rejected for lack of .

A failure record was not known 5-14-82; until I received Thonas M. Novak N90's letter (rec'd Dec 19 '83, dated Dec.1) to Clinton S. Matthews of TDI with Harris service list attached, I had no solid basis to relate the TDI failure pattern directly to Havvis.

Those are th e reasons x this content $ on wasn't filed on t$ ne and couldn't be with accentable basis and snecificity. Again, since safety contention discovery is just beginning, such a contention being admitted would not significantly delay the Droceeding. On balance, the 5 factors favor admission of Fddlenan 178.

Contention 179: Based on NUC's letter to Transanerica Delaval (rec 'd 12-19-83, dated 12-01-83), TDI's record of CA cailures, violations and deficiencies, use of inadequate and defective materials and inadequate dynannic analysis in and for its diesel generators, apolies to the Harris diesels. GDC 17,18, 33,3h,35,38 and GDC 1 and Appendix B of 10 CFR 50 require reliable operation of energency

/cr diesel generators. In light of TDI's massive failures and/kRC's concerns about then, Harris daiesels aren't shown to connly with the abbve N90 rux regulations, needed to keer the core cooled, ,

containment imingr sealed, and meet 10 CFR Anp. B III,V,X,XI and ITV requirements.

Note: This contention does not denend on the SER but on the letter I received 12-19, less than 30 days ago. WEAT'S NFW:

NRC letter (cited in top naragreth this page) showing NRC concern re TDI's failures applies to Harris, see Enclosaure to that letter.

WHY COULDN'T FILE EA9 LIED: Basis, cited above, did not exist in my hands until less than 30 days ago. 5 factors: cood cause for

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-9 not filing on time, basis did not exist, see end of nage 8 nreceding.

No other parties nursue this issue or will renresent my $nterests on it (Staff cannot make it a contention); there are no other means whereby my interest will be urotected. I can assist in developing a sound record (1) by ensuring there is a recond on this issue (2) by technical cross-examination and by discovery (3) possibly by retaining exnert witnesses or witness.

This will broaden the issues now, though diesel concevns (not based on TDI's record) were raised at the outset in rejected centention 13h, which lakked basis. The Board rejected it for lack of specificity, but the TDI failures concerning the NRC in the basis for contention 179 now could not have been snecified 5-lh-82 (this case 's filing deadline) because the infornation was not available, especially not the letter received 12-19-83 which relates these fa5lu=es to Harris. This contention will not significantly delay the proceeding as safety contention discovery is only now beginning. It will not significantly broaden the issues since so many safety is sues awe

.already admitted. On balance these 5 factors wei E h in favor of admitting contention 179 now, as adequacy of diesel generato=s is vital to clant safety (and thus assessing it is vital to a sound record), and the snecific basis of this content

• cn was not in my hands before 30 days ago.

SED contention 180: SED 15.6.3 shows that dbe ability of steam generators to isolate in the event of stean tube runtures within 30 minutes is not established. That leaves Table 15.5 a forest of blank spaces. The need for such isolatnion is clear in light of the Ginna accident, which released +c dioactivity to the public. The SER fails to document that similar accidents or failures to control radiation release through stean generator tube ruutures are a reasonably assured not to hannen at Harris.

WHAT's NEW: SER fails to provide needed informat!on to assure safety of the public in view of possible stean tube rauntures.

x There is no good reason why the SE9 should not do so, ercept that Applicants have failed to orovide the needed $ nformation.

WHY COULDN'T FILE EA9 LIER: How could I know that CP&L would file deficient resnonse to an open item and Staff wouldn't get the information to sunnort a proper safety analysis of stean generator tube ruuture and the S.G. isolat!on needed in case of a rupture, before the SER cane out and docunented it? Basis did not exist earlier, i.e. Staff not having the needed $ nfo by the time of issuing the SER. SER should have resolved safety issues like this, and I had no basis to prove with snecificity that it would not on this issue until it cane out.

5 factors: Sane as those on pp 1-2 as nodified by th ose discussed for contention 173 on nage k. Since they are the sane I won't reneat them here, but incornorate then by reference, as if here.

Contention 181: The SE9, page 18-2 (top) shows that Staff has not comnleted its review of control room design recuirenents; This is due to Applicants' not providing a progran plan showing how each DC9DR activity was acconn11shed (n.18-1) and to failure to address several areas and itens (n.18-2) in violat! on of NURrG-0737, supplement l's recuirements for docunentat!on. NoC ident$fies 3 open items including items not reviewed and cor"ective actions for ErDs.

Until all requirenents of NUDEG-07237 Supplement 1 are completed, Applicants and the SER fail to assure adeouate hunan factors design innlementation at Harris.

WHAT'S NEW: SER specification of Applicants' failures to comnly with NRC documentation recuirements, and Staff's analysis being ince. lete -

existed.

Wh. COULDN'T FILE EA9 LIER: No snecific bas $s azzita 5 factors: same as for contention 180 above.

I