ML20071P298

Supplemental Comments on Immediate Effectiveness of Partial Initial Decisions Re Mgt Issues,In Response to Commission 830523 Order Soliciting Comments on Commission 830524 Briefing.Issues Must Be Investigated.W/Certificate of Svc

ML20071P298
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	06/02/1983
From:	Adler R PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:
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ML20071N901	List: ML20071N897 ML20071N907 ML20071P298
References
NUDOCS 8306070407
Download: ML20071P298 (12)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR PEUIA'IORY 00lEISSION BEFORE THE CCNMISSION In the Matter of:

METBOPOLITAN EISON OCNPANY, )

) Docket No. 50-289

('Ihree Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart)

Station, Unit No.1) )

COm0NWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA'S SUPPIIMENTAL CONENTS ON THE IIHEDIATE mu;nVENESS OF PARTIAL INITIAL DECISIONS REARDING MANAGDIENT ISSUES This document is sutmitted in response to the Ccumission's May 23, 1983 Order soliciting ccmnents on the May 24, 1983 Ccomission briefing.

Since the Comnonwealth believes that the open issues nised by the Staff in the May 24 briefing and in the May 19, 1983 menorandum frcm William J. Dircks to the Conmission have a direct bearing on the restart management issues currently pending before the Atcmic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, the cmments are respectfully sutmitted as supplenental innvlinte effectiveness ccuments for the Ccnmission's consideration.

The Ccomonwealth urges herein that the Ccmnission defer consideration of the inmvlinte effectiveness of the Licensing Board's management decisions pending a ecmplete review by the Appeal Board of the open issues raised by the Staff.

On August 20, 1982, the Cmnonwealth filed canments.regarding the imnediate effectiveness of the ASLB Partial Initial Decision (PID) on operator cheating issues (Reopened Proceeding) (dated July 27, 1982).

These ccanents argued that the integrity of those responsible for the i

. operation of 'IMI-l was critical to plant safety, and that individuals with a demonstrated lack of integrity should not be permitted to operate 8306070407 830602 PDR ADOCK 05000289 G PM

.. s the plant. The Conmonwealth's emments also argued that a decision on restart nust be predicated upon reasonable assurances regarding the adequacy of GPU's operator training program. Issues raisr.d recently by the Staff renew these concerns and pose additional uncertainties regarding the ability of GPU to operate 'IMI-l safely, bbst importantly, the Staff states that it "can draw no conclusion regarding management integrity at this time." The Canonwealth's argument that integrity is critical to plant safety is particularly capelling with respect to the Licensee's top management officials, who have the ultimate responsibility in the GPU organization for ensuring that public health and safety is protected. The Connonwalth will not support the restart of 'IMI-l until it receives adequate assurances frcm the Conmission that the management of GPU Nuclear Corporation is willing and able to operate the plant in a safe and cmpetent manner.' The public deserves no less.

The nexus of the five issues raised by the Staff to nntters that are currently pending in the restart proceeding is addressed below.

1. The veracity of the Hartman allegations. The PID on management issues addressed the Hartman leak rate allegations briefly, at 11504-505. Based on the limited information available to the Board in Supplements to the Staff's Restart Evaluation Report, the Board conclwh1 that there was "no basis to conclude that resbirt should not be permitted until the DOJ investigation is conplete." Id. 1505.

However, the Staff Restart Evaluation Report only stated, that it had identified "a number of apparent problems related to procedure adherence." Id.1504, quoting Staff Ex.13 (Restalt Evaluation Report, Supplement 2), at 9-10. In fact, as reported to the Camission in the

May 24, 1983 briefing, the Staff had concluded by April of 1980 that Licensee's personnel had falsified leak rate data prior to the 'IMI-2 accident. Tr.13-16 (Martin) . The significance of potential evidence regarding the intentional falsification of safety-related test data is far greater than " apparent problems related to procedure adherence," as reported by the Staff in the Restart Evaluation Report and relied upon by th3 Licensing Board in the PID. There is also reason to question the Staff's conclusion, as quoted and relied upon by the Licensing Board, that "there appears to be no direct connection with the Unit 2 accident." Id. 1504. First, falsification of test data by Licensee personnel goes directly to the issue of management integrity, which as argued above, is critical to plant safety. Second, it is apparent frcm 'c he GPU v. B & W court proceeding that at least B&W's attorneys felt that the leak rate falsification issue provided evidence that the 'aII-2 accident resulted, in part, frcm GPU management deficiencies. Third, the leak rate issue is relevant to GPU's maintenance practices, which were liti-gated before the ASLB. The general issue of GPU's failure to correct plant I

safety-related maintenance problems was addressed squarely in the Restart Proceeding. The Licensing Board's decision on these issues was clearly based on incmplete eviderce. The Staff's treatment of the Hartman evidence may have materially affected the Licensing Board's decision in the cam. Therefore, the PID should not be made imwvlintely effective until these issues are resolved.

2. Statements on the record of the GPU v. B&W court procervling.

l l Although the Staff's references to the B&W transcript are somewhat vague, it is clear that at least part of the information under review by the Staff is relevant to issues in the Restart Proceeding. Page 2, note 1 of the Dircks memorandum indicates that the Staff is reviewing information relevant to the integrity of Licensee's program for the l _

requalification of licensed operators. The adequacy of Licensee's operator training and , retraining propcuns was nMressed in the original managment PID (11163-276), the April 28, 1982 Report of the Special Master (11238-251) and the July 27, 1982 PID (Reopened Proceeding (152321-47)). The new information alluded to by the Staff is clearly relevant to these decisions, and to the overall question of whether there is reasonable assurance that GPU's licensed operators are adequately trained to operate 'INI-l safely. Until these questions are adequately resolved, neither the August 27, 1981, nor the July 27, 1982 PID slDuld becme innvhtely effective.

3. The Parks and King allegations. Short-term order item 6 of the Cammission's August 9,1979 Order and Notice of Hearing required the Licensee to "dmonstrate his managerial capability and resources to cperate Unit 1 while maintaining Unit 2 in a safe configuration and carrying out the planned decontamination and/or restoration activities..."

l Thus, the managment cmpetence and integrity of the Licensee to operate l

l Unit 1 safely are clearly linked in the Restart Proceeding to management capabilities at Unit 2. The issues raised in the polar crane affidavits, in turn, plainly challenge both the management integrity and ccupetence of the Licensee to conduct the Unit 2 clean-up. The following broad allegations in the Parks and Gischel affidavits are particularly disturbing:

"I am subnitting this ctatment to express my personal knowledge and concerns that the managment ofIhree Mile Island-Unit 2 ('IMI) has sacrificed its own system of safety-related checks and balances for 'IMI cleanup activities in order to meet unrealistic time schedules and i

in the process equignent has been nodified and snap judgments made without proper engineering l

analysis, quality assurance (QA) steps have intentionally been skipped and totally circumvented, rules and documents have been changed aftdr the fact to justify QA violations, and those who have defended the normal system of nuclear industry checks and balances have faced pressure, intimidation and retaliation which stripped them of the authority to function as viable mernbers of the managenent team. I am among those who have suffered this fate.

Quality Assurance violations include many other issues of which I am aware but do not have personal knowledge."

(Parks) .

" Based on my obmrvations, I believe that the M-2 accident was due to a " people" problem that must have begun before the accident, and still exists... The present mentality at the Island enphasizes shortcuts, expediency and disdain for professional standzt@."

(Gischel).

Although the issues raised in the Parks and Gischel affidavits relate solely to 'IMI-2, the generic managenent issues are precisely the same as those raised in the Festart Proceeding. In the Restart Proceeding, GPU argued that deficiencies in its Quality Assurance / Quality Control procedures and attitudes have been corrected through the use of new management structures and procedures. Evidence that these new procedures may not have worked at 'IMI-2 is certainly pertinent to a detennination of whether or not the procedures are working and will work at TMI-l in the event of a restart.

Substantial plant modifications have been made to support restart, all of which require the application of QA/QC procedures.

The polar crane allegations are relevant to the Restart Proceeding for a number of additional issues. The Conmission clearly linked GPU's

O \

management capabilities and resources to operate Unit 1 safely to their capability and resources to conduct the decontamination at Unit 2.

GPU's primary resoonse to this criteria was an acknowledgment that it lacked sufficient technical capabilities and resources to conduct the Unit 2 decontamination simultaneously with a safe restart of Unit 1.

'Ib meet this deficiency, GPU argued that it had sployed the significant technical resources of Bechtel. The recent evidence regarding Unit 2 indicates that the Bechtel-GPU interface is far frun adequate and calls into question GPU's arguments in the context of the Restart Proceeding.

Mareover, the new evidence tends to indicate that GPU is devoting superior talent and resources to its restart managment than to its cleanup management. This is inconsistent with the Comnonwealth's position that a safe and expeditious cleanup at Unit 2 is paramount, and that Unit 1 restart should be permitted only if consistent with this primary goal.

Second, it is inportant to note that there are significant conmon managment links betw3en 'IMI-l and 'IMI-2. Both organizations report directly to the Office of the President of GPU Nuclear Corporation (Robert Arnold). Both the Parks and Gischel affidavits allege that Mr.

Arnold and other mmbers of his office were directly involved in the allegedly improper management activities, including alleged nanagement harassment and intimidation of dissenters within the ccmpany. Moreover, the technical allegations raised in the affidavits relate primarily to quality assurance and quality control. Again, QA/QC deficiencies were a significant issue in the Restart Proceeding. GPU's evidentiary response was that it had centralized its technical and engineering QA/QC resources above the levels of individual plant nunagement. Groups such as the General Office Review Board (GORB) and the Division of Nuclear L

. s Assurance, both of which bear the fundamental GA/QC review responsibilities within the corporation, function independent of the onsite Unit 1 and Unit 2 organizations and are supposed to regulate OA/QC at both units.

Breakdowns in OA/QC procedures at Unit 2 are therefore related to potential deficiencies at Unit 1. (There are nany other examples of technical resources camon to both units and which have an indirect responsibility for quality assurance, such as the Division of Technical Services in the GPU Nuclear Corporation.)

Third, GPU presented evidence during the Restart Proceeding that quality assurance deficiencies would be remedied by new onsite procedures.

Although different personnel may serve these functions at Unit 1 and Unit 2, evidence of breakdowns in the procedures at Unit 2 indicate that GPU's new managenent structure has not necessarily resolved management difficulties at the Island. One example is the Plant Operations Review Ccmnittee (PORC), which is intended to serve as a day-to-day quality assurance review ccmnittee at the Island. The effectiveness of the Unit 2 POBC was challenged strongly in the Parks affidavit. Another example is the "ernhiaan" procedure, which was established to ensure that concerned cmpany enployees have an uppuri. unity to resolve safety-related problems without fears of reprisals or intimidation by ccxnpany management. It is evident that the ombiden procedure did not work, or was not allowed to work, at Unit 2.

The Connonwealth does not wish to inply that any firm conclusions can be drawn at this time on the basis of the affidavits. The natives l

of the individuals bringing the charges and the veracity of their allegations have not been challenged. Nor has GPU been given a proper j

i opportunity to rebut these claims. Iknever, the issues raised have

.. s extremely important potential ramifications regarding the overall managment integrity and ccupetence of GPU Nuclear Corporation. These issues should be fully aired prior to restart. The Licensing Board's managment PID cannot be given immvlinte effectiveness under these circumstances.

4. Concerns raised by the BETA and RHR reports. A large number of issues and open questions in the GPU consultants' reports relate to issues before the Appeal Board, and contradict or qualify many of the conclusions reached in the management PID. Altinugh it would be inpossible to catalog the nexus between each itm in them reports to the Restart Proceeding at this time, deferral of the Ocnnission's immvlinte effectiveness decision on the management PID is warranted pending an in-depth review of these issues by the Staff, the parties, and the Appeal Board. The Conmonwealth is particularly concerned with allegations in the BEIA report regarding plant maintenance, quality assurance, and operator training, all of which are critical to plant safety.

5. Failure to Notify the Comnission or Appeal Board of Relevant and Material Information. The Connonwealth is perhaps nost concerned by the Staff's allegation regarding the Licensee's failure to prmptly notify the NBC of potentially relevant and material information. It is a fundamental principle of NBC regulatory policy that Licensee's have an affinnative duty to come forward with all

potentially relevant information. Duke Power Co. (William B. htGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), AIAB-143, 6 AIC 623 (1973); Georcia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant, Unita 1 & 2), AIAB-291, 2 NRC 404, 408 (1975); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), AIAB-355, 4 NRC 397, 406 at n.26 (1976); Constrners Ibwer Co. (Mkiland Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-74-3, 7 NBC 7,11 (1974); Petition for Energency and Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400, 418 (1978); Virginia Electric and Power Co. (? brth Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-22, 4 NIC 480 (1976), aff'd sub. ncrn. Virginia Electric and Ibwer Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Ccanission, 571 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir.1978) . A ootential failure by Licensee's upper managenent to cmply with this fundamental principle of NRC law and policy would bear grave consequences in tenns of Licensee's managernent integrity. Again, this issue warrants a cmplete investigation prior to any final decision on the irmediate effectiveness of the Licensing Board's managenent PID.

CONCLUSICN For the foregoing reasons, the (bmnonwealth urges the Comnission l not to grant imrediate effectiveness to the Licensing Board's nanagenent i

I PIDs until the five issues raised in the May 24, 1983 Cm mission briefing l and the May 19, 1983 Dircks Memorandum are fully investigated, on the i

record of the Restart Prevvw14mg.

Respectfully sutmitted, l

N '

ICBBKr W. ADLER Assistant Counsel Comtonwealth of Pennsylvania Dated: June 2, 1983 i

UNITS STATES OF AME:RICA NUCLEAR RU3UIA'IORY CCM4ISSION BEFORE THE COMiISSION In the Matter of:

METfBOPOLITPN EDISCE COMPANY, )

) Docket No. 50-289

('Ihree Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart)

Station, Unit No. 1) )

Ct;KruICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the Ccanonwealth's letter to the Secretary of the Ocmnission, with attachments, were served on the persons on the attached service list this 2nd day of June, 1983.

Persons identified by an asterisk were served by Federal Express.

All other persons were served by deposit in the U. S. Fail, first class, postage prepaid.

]

Robert W. Adler

i,.

• UNITED STATES OF AtERICA t;UCLEAR REGULATORY GXMISS10ti BEFORE TIE ATOIIC SAFETY Al'D LICEIE11U BOARD In the Matter of:

IEIROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, )

) Docket !b. 50-289 (Three Mile Island Ibclear ) (Restart)

Station, thit Ib.1) )

SERVICE LIST Docketing and Service Section Henry D. Hukill,' Vice-President Office of the Secretary GPU Ibclear Corporation U.S. Ibclear Regulatory Comission P.O. Box 480 Washington, D.C. 20555 liiddletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Ivan W. Smith, Esquire, Chairman Ms. Ihrjorie M. Aanedt '

Atomic Safety' and Licensing Board Panel R.D. #5 U.S. I'bclear Regulatory Comission Coatesville, Pennsylvania 19320 Washington, D.C. 20555 Ms. Gail Bradford

• Dr. Walter H. Jordan Anti-lhelear Group Representing York Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 245 West Philadelphia Street 881 West Outer Drive .

York, Pennsylvania 17404 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Dr. Chauncey Kepford & Judith Johnsrud Dr. Linda W. Little Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 433 Orlando Avenue 5000 Hermitage Drive State College, Pennsylvania 16801 Raleigh, Ibrth Carolina 27612 Mr. Steven C. Sholly George F. Trowbridge, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Union of Concerned Scientists 1800 M Street, N.W. 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006 Dupont Circle Building, Suite 1101 Washington, D.C. 20036 James A. Tourtellotte, Esquire lis. Inuise Bradford Office of the Executive Legal Director TMI Alert U.S. thclear Regulatory Comission 315 Peffer Street Washington, D.C. 20555 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102 Ellyn R. Weiss John A. Levin, Esquire Harmon & Weiss Assistant Counsel 1725 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 506 Washington, D.C. 20006 Pennsylvania Public Utility Comission P.O. Box 3265 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Karin P. Sheldon, Esquire (PAIE)

Harnen & Weiss 1725 Eye Street, N.W. , Suite 506 Jordan D. Cunningham, Esquire l

Washington, D.C. 20006 Attorney for Newberry Tomship T.M.I. Steering Comittee 2320 Ibrth Second Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110

Judge Gary J. Edles, Chaiman Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Ibclear Regulatorf Cocmission Wshington, D.C. 20555 Judge John H. Buck Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Ibclear Regulatory Cocmission Wshington, D.C. 20555 Judge Christine H. Kohl Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board ,

U.S. thclear Regulatory Conmission Wshington, D.C. 20555 Judge Reginald L. Gotchy Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. thclear Regulatory Cocmission Washington, D.C. 20555

• Nunzio L. Falladino, Chaiman i

U.S. Nuclear Regulatorf Cor. mission

i. W shington, D.C. 20555

• John F. Ahearne, Conrissioner U.S. thclear Regulato:.y Consission Wshington, D.C. 20555

• Thomas M. Roberts, Conmissioner U.S. thclear Regulatory Cbcmission Wshington, D.C. 20555

, Victor Gilinsky, Conmissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Wshington, D.C. 20555 James K. Asselstine, Consissioner U.S. tbclear Regulatory Consission Wshington, D.C. 20555 Professor Gary Milhollin 1815 Jefferson Street Madison, Wisconsin 53711

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