Text

Proposed Tech Specs Removing Requirements for HPCS Sys Condensate Storage Tank Suction Valve & Adding Containment Isolation Requirements for Planned,New RCIC Sys Full Flow Test Line to Suppression Pool
	ML20064B570
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	10/10/1990
From:	; COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20064B569	List: ML20064B568; ML20064B570;
References
	NUDOCS 9010180111
	Download: ML20064B570 (35)
	v • d • e

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ATTACHMENT B l; ERQP_QSOD PAGE CBMfGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIQMS EOR OPERATING LICENSE NPF 11 AND NPF 18 b

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TABLE 3.3.3-1 (Continued) 5 i y, EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION IN6TRUNENTATION

? MINIMUM OPERA 8LE APPLICA8LE l;;

CHAfeIELS PER TRIP OPERATIONAL FUNCTION I *) COfGITIONS ACTION g TRIP FUNCTION i t

l [ C. DIVISION 3 TRIP SYSTEM

1. HPCS SYSTEM t

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Low, Level 2 4 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5* 35

, b. Drywell Pressure - High 4' 1, 2, 3 35

c. Reactor Vessel Water Level-H_igh,_ Level 8 2f g 1,_2._3,_4*,_S* 32 Condensate storage Tank Level-Low 1, 2, 3, 4* , 5* 36 M LE.T60 b d. ression Pool Water Level-liigit_ 2(d) 2 1,__2, 3, 4* 5* 36 3, 4#, 5*

f. T Eharge Pressur M [ (Bypass) 1 1, 2,

g. HPCS System Flow ~ Rate-Low (Permissive) 1 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5* 31 R 1/ division 3, 4*, 5*

h. Manual Initiation 1, 2, 34 T

m MINIfRM APPLICA8tE i

D. LOSS OF POWER I

TOTAL NO. INSTRtpENTS OPERABLE OPERATIONAL OF INSTRt#ENTS TO TRIP INSTRISENTSI *) COISITIONS ACTION i

1. 4.16 kw Emergency Bus Undervoltage 2/ bus 2/ bus 2/ bus 1, 2, 3, 4**, 5** 37 (Loss of Voltage) ,

2. 4.16 kw Emergency Bus Undervoltage 2/ bus 2/ bus 2/ bus 1, 2, 3, 4**, 5** 37 !

l (Degraded Voltage)

(a) A channel instrument may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months during periods of required ,

surveillance without placing the' trip system / channel / instrument in the tripped condition provided at least one i other OPERABLE channel / instrument in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.

(b) Also actuates the associated division diesel generator.

g (c) Provides signal to close HPCS pump discharge valve only on 2-out-of-2 logic. -

i

, (d) Provides signal to_HPCS pump suction valves only.

g

Applicable when the system is required to be OPERABLE per Specification 3.5.2 or 3.5.3.

' Required when ESF equipment is required to be OPERABLE. '

l c' .# Not required to be OPERABLE when reactor steam done pressure is < 122 psig.

N l w

, - -. .. .. ,- - . . _ _ .~ . _ _ _ . , .~- . . . . . _ . . . . _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ . .

1 TA8LE 3.3.3-1 (Continued) ;

i

, EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION 1

l- ACTION l ACTION 30 - With the number of OPERA 8LE channels less than required by the j Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement:

I a. With one channel inoperable, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour

or declare the associated system inoperable.

, b. With more than one channel inoperable, declare the associated

system inoperable. -

ACTION 31 - With the number of OPERA 8LE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERA 8LE channels per Trip Function, place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or declare the associated system inoperable.

i ACTION 32 - With the number of OPERA 8LE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, declare the associated ADS trip system or ECCS inoperable. 1 l

ACTION 33 - With the number of OPERA 8LE channels less than the Minimum I OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place the )

inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour. 1 ACTION 34 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERA 8LE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or declare the associated ADS trip system or ECCS inoperable.

l ACTION 35 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement

a. For one trip system, place that trip system in the tripped I condition within one hour" or declare the HPCS system I inoperable, i

b. For both trip systems, declare the HPCS system inoperable, r ~

% \

CTION 36 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the l

, Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function. requirement, place l f

f.d',8 one hour

or declare the HPCS system inoperable.at.leastoneinoper ;

ACTION 37 - With the number of OPERABLE instruments less than the Minimum Operable Instruments, place the inoperable instrument (s) in the tripped condition within l' hour

or declare the associated emergency diesel generator inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.1 or 3.8.1.2 as appropriate.

"The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

LA SALLE UNIT 1 3/4 3-27 Amendment No. 41 i

. _ . . , , , _ . _ ~ , . , . . _ _ , . . . . . _ _ , _ , . . . _ , . . , _ , - _ . ,.,-,m, , , , . _ . . .. . _ _ . . ~ ~ . , , . . _ _ . , , . . _ . ~ . ~ , - -

TABLE 3.3.3-2 (Continued)

! 5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRtSENTATION SETPOINTS ALLOWRSLE t TRIP SETPOINT VALUE

- [ TRIP FUNCTION e

C. DIVISION 3 TRIP SYSTEM

1. HPCS SYSTEM

a. Reactor Vessel ifater Level - Low Low, Level 2 >- 50 inches * >- 57 inches *

b. Drywell Pressure - High 51.69psig {l'pjpsig

c. Reactor __ Vessel tieter Level - High,_ Level 8 < 55.5 inches * $ 56 inches *

> 715'7" 1 715'3" '

- te Storage Tank Level - Low P g n .p Suppression Pool ifater Level - High < 2 inches ** < 3 inches ** }

f.

Pump Discnarge Pressure - High E120psig ['110psfg --

g. HPCS System Flow Rate - Low > 1000 gpo > 900 gpo

, NR NA g h. Manual Intiation T 0. LOSS OF POWER E

! 1. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage

' (Loss of Voltage)#

a. 4.16 kV Susags

1) Divisions 1 and 2 2625 i 131 volts with 2625 1 262 volts with 1 10 seconds time delay 1 11 seconds time delay i'

24% i 125 volts with 2496 1 250 volts with

> 4 seconds time delay

> 3 seconds time delay

-[ s 2) Division 3 2870.i 143 volts with 2870 1 287 volts with i 10 seconds time delay 's 11 seconds time delay g

5 z .

? *See Bases Figure B 3/4 3-1.

u, #These are inverse time delay voltage relays or instantaneous voltage relays with a time delay. The i

~* voltages shown are the maxieue that will not result in a' trip. Lower voltage conditions will result in

' decreased trip tiee_s.

evel is referenced to a plant elevation of 699 feet 11 inches (See Figure B 3/4.6.2-1). l 1

._._ - . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ . _ - _ . _ . . _ - . . . _ _ _ - . _ _ - _ _ . ~ _ . _ _ _ , . . . , , . . _ _ . _ _ _ -

~

TA8tE 4.3.3.1-1 (Continued) 5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUNENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS u,

?

E CHANNEL OPERATIO mL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH E-- TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED

[ C. DIVISION 3 TRIP SYSTEM

1. HPCS SYSTEM

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low Low, Level 2 NA M R 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*

. Drywell Pressure-High NA M Q 1, 2, 3 '

p . Reactor Vessel Water Level-High 9El Le_ vel 8 NA M R 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5* Q./

d.[CondensateStorageTankLevel- -

5* )j Low NA M Q 1, 2, 3, 4*,

R h Suppression Pool Water l

NA M _1,_2, 3, 4*,.5* j y f. QPump vel -uiscnarge High Pressure-High um M_

Q_

Q 1, 2, 3,'4* ,~ $*

g g. HPCS System Flow Rate-Low NA- M Q 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*

, h. Manual Initiation MA R MA 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*

. D. LOSS OF POWER i

l 1. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Under--

voltage (Loss of Voltage) NA NA R 1, 2, 3, 4**, 5**

! 2. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Under- NA NA R 1, 2, 3, 4**, 5** l

! voltage (Degraded Voltage)

Not required to be OPERABLE when reactor steam done pressure is less than or equal to 122 psig.

When the system is required to be OPERABLE after being manually realigned, as applicable, per Specification 3.5.2. .

[ ** Required _when_ESE_ equipment is required to be OPERABLE.

~ __

3

- - The specified 18-month interval may be waived for Cycle 1 provided the surveillance is performe,d during'J l [ Refuel 1, which is to commence no later than October 27, 1985. - - - -

a f

[ _

f

! j EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

(a) LPCS system to be 1 500 psig and 1 55 psig, )

respectively. ,

l

) (b) LPCI subsystems to be 1 400 psig and 1 55 1 psig, respectively. l

2) Low pressure setpoint of the HPCS system to be 1 63 1

psig.

b) Header delta P instrumentation and verifying the setpoint f I of the:

1) LPCS system and LPCI subsystems to be i 1 psid. $

2) HPCS system to be between 5 t 2.0 psid greater than -l the normal indicated AP. .

A,9 3.

f%

f Verifying that the suction.for the HPCS system is automatically 1

Y transferred from the condensate storage tank to the suppression chamber on a condensate storage tank low water level signal and n a suppression chamber high water level signal. ~. _ , . . . .

4. Visually inspecting the ECCS corner room watertight door seals and room penetration seals and verifying no abnormal degradation, damage, or obstructions,

d. For the ADS by:

1. At least once per 31 days, performing a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the accumulator backup compressed gas system low pressure alarm system.

l 2. At least once per 18 months:

I a) Performing a system functional test which includes simulated J automatic actuation of the. system throughout its emergency -.

operating sequence, but excluding actual valve actuation..

b) Manually opening each ADS valve and observing the expected change in the indicated valve position. l c) Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION o'f the accumulator backup .

compressed gas system low pressure alarm system and verifying an alarm setpoint of 500 + 40, - O psig on decreasing pressure.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 5-5 ' Amendment No. 18 i

t 4

1

, . , , , . , _ _ , _ . _ _ . . . , . _ .]

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.2 ECCS - SHUTDOWN v1 '

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. 5. 2 At least two of the following shall be OPERABLE: ,

a. The low pressure core spray (LPCS) system with a flow path capable '

of taking suction from the suppression chamber and transferring the ,

water through the spray sparger to the reactor vessel.

b. Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystem "A" of the RHR system with a flow path capable of taking suction f rom the suppression chamber upon being manually realigned and transferring the water to-the reactor vessel,

c. Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystem "B" of the RHR system with a flow path capable of taking suction from the suppression chamber upon being manually realigned and transferring the water to the reactor i vessel.

d. Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystem "C" of the RHR system with a flow path capable of taking suction from the suppression g chamber upon being manually realigned and transferring the water to g the reactor vessel. i pc.g e. The high pressure core a spray (UPCS) system with a flow path / capable of taking suction fromCone or the followina watgr_ sourcesAnd trans- v ferring the water through the spray sparger to the reactor vessel:

T From the suppression chamber, or X g

2. When the suppression pool level is less than the limit or is drained, from the condensate storage tank containing at-least 135,000 available gallons of water, equivalent to a level of ,

14.5 feet. J APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5*, :

ACTION:

a. With one of the above required subsystems / systems inoperable, restore at least two subsystems / systems to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or suspend all operations that have a potential for draining the reactor vessel. !

b. With both of the above required subsystems / systems inoperable,

suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and all operations that have a potential for draining the reactor vessel. Restore at least one subsystem /

l system to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

M e ECCS is not required to be OPERABLE provided that the reactor vessel head i is removed, the cavity is flooded, the spent fuel pool gates are removed, and water level is maintained within the limits of Specifications 3.9.8 and 3.9.9.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 5-6 L

e .

3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

i 4.5.2.1 At least the above required ECCS shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per Surveillance Requirement 4.5.1, except that the header delta P instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE.

['4.5.2.2 The HPCS system shall be determined OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifying the condensate storage tank required volume when the

\condensatestoragetankisrequiredtobeOPERABLEperSpecification3.5.2.e.] l 1

4 i

h 1

1 l

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 5-7 ,

EMERGENCY CORE C0OLING SYSTEMS i

3/4.5.3 SUPPRES$10N CHAMBER # 1

)

l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 The suppression chamber shall be OPERABLE

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3 with a contained water volume of 'l at least 128,800 fta, equivalent to a level of -4 1/2 inches.** , l j i b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5* with a contained water volume t

,.least 70 except l

( thatM,000pVFession fta, equivalent to a level chasNnevei may be ofless'thih~the

-12 feet 7 inches- lh or may j be drained in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or $* provided that: ]

1. No operations are performed that have a potential for draining )

the reactor vessel, .i

2. The reactor mode switch is locked in the Shutdown or Refuel I position,

3. The condensate storage tank contains at least 135,000 available gallons of water, equivalent to a level of 14.5 feet, and

4. The HPCS system is OPERABLE per Specification 3.5.2 with an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the condensate l storage tank and transferring the water through the spray } j sparger to the reactor vessel. __

J ;

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5*. !

3 ACTION:

)

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3 with the suppression chamber 1 water level less than the above limit, restore the water level to' .

within the limit within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 1 the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . ]

l b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5* _with the suppr.ts119.g_gheather water y level less than the th limit (or_ drained and t.he aboys_reguired TC} M as nbt:sati ,sfi suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and all operations-that have a potential draining the reactor vessel and lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position. Establish SECONDARY CONTAIPMENT INTEGRITY within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

See Specification 3.6.2.1 for pressure suppression requirements.

The suppression chamber is not required to be OPERABLE provided that the reactor vessel head is removed, the cavity is flooded or being flooded from the suppression pool, the spent fuel pool gates are removed when the cavity is flooded, and the water level is maintained within the limits of-l Specifications 3.9.8 and 3.9.9.

- Level is referenced to a plant elevation of 699 feet.11 inches (See Figure B 3/4.6.2-1).

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 5-8 Amendment No. 59 ;

i

-ww y.-,.~p -

+ e--,%---,me - - -ww-* g +e,,e y y- ,~--,..-, - * -am- a9- N v-N-*'e***w-*-*-w-e w-we't

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) j ACTION: (Continued)

c. With one suppression chamber water level instrumentation channel inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or verify the suppression chamber water level to be greater than G.' equal to -?. 1/2 inches ** or -12 feet 7 inches **, as applicable, at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by local indication,

d. With both suppression chamber water level instrumentation channels inoperable, restore at least one inoperable channel to OPERABLE-status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the.following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and verify the suppression chamber water level to be greater than or equal to -4 1/2 inches ** or -12 feet 7 inches **, as applicable, at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by local indication.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.3.1 The suppression chamber shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying:

a. The water level to be greater than or equal to, as applicable:

1

1. -4 1/2 inches ** at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

2. -12 feet 7 inches ** at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

/

b. Two suppression chamber water level instrumentation channels OPERABLE by performance of a:

1. CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , ;

2. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and

3. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months, with the low water level alarm setpoint at greater than or equal to

-3 inches.** ,

AL.,l 4.5.3.2 With the suppressj.a chamber level less than the above limit [ drained) inOPERATIONALCONDITIONf4or5*,atleastonceper12 hour.{

r Verify the required conditions of Specification 3.5.3.b. to be C(a. . g atjsfied m u ~ o v^ ^

l b. erify footnote conditions

to be satisfied.

() sv

The suppression chamber is not required to be OPERABLE provided that the reactor vessel head is removed, the cavity is flooded or being flooded from..the suppres- ,

sion pool, the spent fuel pool gates are removed when the cavity is flooded, and the water level is maintained within the limits of Specifications 3.9.8 and 3.9.9. .

4 ** Level is referenced to a plant elevation of 699 feet 11 inches (See Figure B 3/4.6.2-1).

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 5-9 Amendment No. 59

TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued) 5 PRIMARY CONTAllMENT ISOLATION VALVES y,

i.

5 r-

', I 1;

7 VALVE FUNCTION AND NUISER

!! h Other Isolation Valves (Continued)

4. Low Pressure Core Spray System l '

ii 1E21-F005 '

ii 1E21-F001 III IE21-F012 III 1E21-F011 II)

I IE21-F018(I)

IE21-F031 l)

j. 1E21-F006I ")

5. __High Pressure Core Spray System ll ,

! *: 1 1E22-F004 IE22-F015 I3)

!i e O 1E22-F023 III IE22-F012 fi)

II 1E22-F014 1E22-F005 I)

"I

6. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System j 1E51-F013 '

+

IE51-F069 i 1E51-F028 IE51-F068 g

e IE51-F040 IE51-F031 II) ,

i E. 1E51-F019 III I I 5 1E51-F065("))

1E51-F066 -

4

& 1 E51- F059 (m)

LI ESiE51-F022

- F361 ( O (j)()m) .

I E 5l-F363 (6) .

_.w. - . . - , -

w. . ,_ yvr ,, . . , , ,-.e g .w.,.w,~ w .e3-.. y ~. .c#.,m.w. , . . , . , y._. ._ , ,_, --.,, .-.

~

TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued) 5 PRIMARY CONTAINNENT ISOLATION VALVES

$ t VALVE FUNCTION AND NUpWER

! {

e Other Isolation Valves (Continued)

E 7. Fost LOCA Hydrogen Control

] ING001A, 8 M OV E_ Foovisorrs to 1HG002A, 8 1HG005A, 8 1HG006A, 8 NEW P%C- h G - $h

8. Staney Liquid Control Systen IC41-F004A, 8 IC41-F007

9. Reactor Recirculation Seal Injection ***

w 1833-F013A, B I5)

1 1833-F017A, 8 fi) i 10. Drywell Pneumatic System

% IIN018 i But > 3 seconds.

[(a") See 3pecification 3.3.2,. Table 3.3.2-1, for isolation signal (s) that operates each valve group.

b) Not included in total sum of Type 8 and C tests.

4 l((d)NotclosedbySLCSactuation.

(c) May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

(e) Not closed by Trip Functions Sa, b or c, Specification 3.3.2,_ Table 3.3.2-1.

-(f) Not closed by Trip Functions 4a, c, d, e or f of Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1.

(g) Not subject to Type C leakage test. -

(h) Opens on an isolation signal. Valves will be open during Type A test. No Type C test required.

(i) Also closed by drywell pressure-high signal.

{ (j) Hydraulic leak test at 43.6 psig.

= (k) Not subject to Type C leakage test - leakage rate tested per Specification 4.4.3.2.2.

& (1) These penetrations are provided with removable spools outboard of the outboard isolation valve.

$., ' During operation, these lines will be blind flanged using a double 0-ring and a type 8 leak test. In addition, the packing of these isolation valves will be soap-bubble tested to ensure y insignificant or no leakage at the containment test pressure each refueling outage._

"" ine specnica la-mont.n interval may be waived for Cycle I provided the surveillance is performed w during Refuel 1, which is to commence no later than October 27, 1985.

m* h-_ 4 a__ _ _ _ _ . -ma...ma__m._a . r _ _ _ _ _m_mhe a*- -

-ins-w _____-__c.__. - -

mas ___a - _ _ _ _A.a

___a_ _ . -_____8- * #+' e -m__ e _ 9-_m__-%- ____._w_ _n 'hsv'_i"

____- .____m --

s.__.____.a._ aA 2-a.___ ____--a_ _____._.a__ _ _.__m_- _nwe

1 EBlMARY NM N VALVES .

TABLE NOTATIONS Move footnotes "" and (a) through (1) from Page 3/4 6 37 to this locatlon.

m. If valves 1E51 F362 and 1E51 F363 are locked closed and acceptably leakage rate tested, valves 2E51 F059 and 2E51-F022 are not considered primary containment isolation valves and are not subject to the leakage rate testing requirements,

n. If valve 1E51 F059 is deactivated and locked closed with the line blind flanged downstream of the valve and acceptably leakage rate tested, valves 2E51-F362 and 2E51 F363 are not considered primary containment isolation valves and are not subject to leakage rate testing requirements.

LASALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 6 34a Proposed Amendment

R-TABLE 3.8.3.3-1 (Continued) V MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD-PROTECTION BYPASS DEVICE SYSTEM (S)-

VALVE NUMBER (Continuous)(Accident Conditions): AFFECTED

1. 1E32 - F001A Accident Conditions 'MSIV-LCS.

1E32 - F002A Accident Conditions 1E32 - F003A Accident Conditions 1E32 - F001E Accident Conditions 1E32 - F002E Accident Conditions 1E32 - F003E ' Accident Conditions 1E32 - F001J Accident Conditions 1E32 - F002J Accident Conditions 1E32 - F003J Accident Conditions 1E32 - F001N Accident Conditions 1E32 - F002N Accident Conditions 1E32 - F003N Accident Conditions.

1E32 - F006 Accident Conditions 1E32 - F007 Accident Conditions 1E32 - F008- Accident Conditions 1E32 - F009 Accident Conditions _

m. C E22 - F001 Accident Conditions ] HPCS system 1E22 - F004 Accident Conditions (1E22 - 7 1F Accident Conditio W L 1E22 - F011 Accident Conditions 1E22 - F012 Accident-Conditions 1E22 - F015 Accident Conditions 1E22 - F023 Accident Conditions-LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 8-30.

____J

< ~

t 1

l 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM a

j l

BASES l 3/4.5.1 and 3/4.5.2 ECCS - OPERATING and SHUTDOWN

ECCS Division 1 consists'of the low pressure core spray system, low l pressure coolant injection subsysten "A" of the RHR system, and the automatic. l depressurization systes (ADS) as actuated by ADS trip systes "A". ECCS- l Division 2 consists of low pressure coolant injection subsystems "B"and "C" '

of the RHR system and the automatic depressurization system as actuated by ADS. 4 trip systen "B".

The low pressure core spray (LPCS) system is provided to assure that the- :

core is adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant accident and provides I adequate core cooling capacity for all break sizes up to and including the . ,

double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for transients or smaller l breaks following depressurization by the' ADS.

The LPCS is a primary source of emergency core cooling after the reactor. q vessel is depressurized and a source for flooding of the core in case of:

accidental draining.-

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the LPCS system will be OPERABLE whtn required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete. functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water-hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest soment.

The low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the RHR system is' pro- l vided to assure that the core is adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant accident. Three subsystems, each with one pump, provide adequate core flooding for all break sizes up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation l line break, and for transients or small breaks following depressurization by the ADS.

[ '

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the LPCI 1 system will be OPERA 8LE when required. . Although all active components are - o t

testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest soment.'

ECCS Division 3 consists of the high pressure core spray.systes. The high pressure core spray (HPCS) system is provided to assure that the reactor core is adequately cooled to limit fuel clad temperature in the event of a small break in the reactor coolant system and loss of coolant which does not l result in rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel. The HPCS systen l permits the reactor to be shut down while maintaining sufficient reactor- l

[ vessel water level inventory until the vessel is depressurized. The HPCS l system operates over a range of 1160 psid, differential pressure between reactor vessel and HPCS suction source, to 0 psid.

The capacity of the HPCS system is selected to provide the rquired core .

)2 -

cooling. The HPCS pump is designed to deliver greater than or equalla 1621550/6200_gpa at differential pressures of 1160/1130/200 psid.fInitially, water from the condensate storage tank 1s ~usid~fn~sWidTf'fiijecting '1

_ -_~

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 29

h-i n "

u)ATER 15 TA K E t4 : TRoM Tf( E $tA ppR trs S i ObJ POOL. App WI EC TE D udT THEL. CE ACTO fE EMERGENC C0Et00C5 .

4 i

f BASES ECCS-OPERATING and SHUTDOWN (Continued)' _

the suppression pool into the reactor, but no credit'is taken in the hazards '

(analysesforthecondensatestoragetankwater.f- j With the HPCS system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the OPERABILITY of the redundant and diversified automatic depressurization system ,l and both the LPCS and LPCI systems. In addition, the reactor ~ core-isolation cooling (RCIC) system, a system for which no credit is taken in the hazards analysis, will automatically provide makeup at reactor operating pressures on a reactor low water level condition' The HPCS.out-of-service period of 14 days is based on the demonstrated OPERABILITY;of redundant and diversified' low-pressure core cooling systems.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate' assurance thattthe HPCS system will be OPERABLE when required. -Although all active components are test-able and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop !

during reactor operation, a complete t functional test with reactor vessel' injec- r tion requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full. :

to prevent water hammer damage and to provide cooling at the earliest moment.

Upon failure of the HPCS system to -function properly, if required, the.

automatic depressurization system (ADS) autc"natically causes selected safety -

4 relief valves to open, cepressurizing the reactor so that flow from the low pressure core cooling systems can enter the core .in time to limit fuel cladding temperature to less than 2200 F. ADS is conservatively required to be OPERABLE +

whenever reactor vessel pressure exceeds 122 psig even though' low pressure core cooling systems provide adequate core cooling up.to 350 psig.

~

ADS automatically controls seven selected safety-relief valves. Six valves are require- to be OPERABLE since the LOCA analysis assumes 6 ADS valves in addition'to a single fail' te. It is therefore appropriate;to permit ,

one of the required valves to be out-of-service for up to 14 days'without materially reducing system reliability. .

3/4.5.3 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER {

The suppression' chamber is also required to be OPERABLE as part of'the ECCS to ensure that a sufficient supply of water is available to the HPCS, LPCS and LPCI systems in the event of a LOCA. This. limit-on suppression chamber minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available Lto -;

permit recirculation cooling flow to the core (See Figure B 3/4.6.2-1). The.

OPERABILITY of the suppression chamber in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1,.'2 or 3 is :

required by Specification 3.6.2.1. i Repair work might require making the suppression chamber inoperable..

This specification will permit those repairs-to be made and at'the same time l give assurance that the irradiated fuel has an~ adequate coolino water supply when the suppression chamber must be made inoperablef including draining, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5.

l In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 and 5 the suppression chamber minimum required' water volume is reduced because the reactor coolant is maintained-at or below 200 F. Since pressure. suppression is not required below 212*F, the minimum water volume is based on NPSH, recirculation volume, vortex prevention plus a 2'-4" safety margin for conservatism.

LA SALLE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5 Amendment'No. 59 1

Control Suppression Plant Room / Local Chamber Level Elevation Indication I

26' 10" 700' 2" +3" High Level LCO (Volume l

i 131,900 fta) '

26' 9" 700' 1" +2" Hi h Level Alarm HPCS i

{}J ucETon Valve ransfer i i

26' 7" 699' 11" 0" Instrument Zero 26' 4" -

699' 8" -3" Low Level Alare 26' 2 1/2" 699' 6 1/2" -4 1/2" Low Level LCO Opera-tional Condition 1, 2, or 3~(Volume 128,800 ft3 )- >

14' 687' 4" -12' 7" Low Level LCO Opera-tional Condition 4 or !

5 (Volume 70,000 fts).

P l

I l

j l

SUPPRESSION POOL LEVEL SETPOINTS !

1 BASES FIGURE B 3/4.6.2-1 l LA SALLE - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3a Amendment No. 59 i

l l

1 g TABLE 3.3.3-1 (Continued)

$ EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION t P

MINIMUM OPERABLE APPLICABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP OPERATIONAL C

TRIP FUNCTION FUNCTION I *) CONDITIONS ACTION C. DIVISION 3 TRIP SYSTEM !

1. HPCS SYSTEM

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Low, Level 2 4 1, 2, 3,.4*, 5* 35

b. Drywell Pressure - High : 4 1,2,3 25 Dgif_TfD ' c. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Hich, Level 8 __

2fc) 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5* 32

d. Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low 1, 2, ,4 36

e. " Suppression Pool Water Level-Hioh 2(d 2 d) 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5* 367 w f. Tump Discharge . Pressure-High (Bypass) 1 1, z, 3, 4", 5" 31

'A g. HPCS; System Flow Rate-Low'(Permissive) 1 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*- 31 w h. Manual Initiation 1/ division 1,'2, 3, 4*, 5* 34 ro '

0. LOSS OF POWER - MINIMUM' :

TOTAL NO. INSTRU- OPERABLE. APPLICABLE

--OF INSTRU-' MENTS TO' INSTRU- OPERATIONAL-

- MENTS - TRIP MENTS(a) CONDITIONS ACTION

1. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage 2/ bus 2/ bus 2/ bus- 1,.2, 3, 4**, 5** 37 (Loss of Voltage)

2. 4.16 kV. Emergency Bus Undervoltage.- 2/ bus -2/ bus 2/ bus 1, 2, 3, 4**, 5** 37 (Degraded Voltage).

TABLE NOTATION.

5

$- .(a) A channel / instrument may be placed inlan'~ inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months during periods of. required 5 surveillance without placing the trip' system / channel / instrument in the tripped condition provided at least 5 one other OPERABLE channel / instrument in the same trip system is monitoring that' parameter.

S (b) LAlse. actuates the' associated division diesel. generator. . . .

z (c) 'Provides sionallto close HPCS pump discharge' valve only on 2-out-of-2-logic.

P Qd).-Provides^ signal:to HPC5 pump suction N ve 6 w

^

applicaoie:when i^e n 3ystem i>.. M red _te-be UPERABLE per Specification 3.5.2 or 3.5.3.

Required when ESF equipment is required-to'be 0PERABLE.

- Not' required to be OPERABLE when reactor steam dome pressure is < 122.psig.. .

~

- - - . m s_, .-

.,,__g __

, _ _ _ -. ,. ,w ...

94.-,.,-,e _e,.

.wm #

m 3

,s

_.j .yy, _

_ . _ . _ _ _ m,. _ _ .. .. s

a l .

l TABLE 3.3.3-1:(Continued) ,

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION-L ACTION i

l ACTION 30 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by:the i l Minimum OPERABLE. Channels per Trip Function requirement:

o

a. With one channel inoperable, place the inoperable channel 4 in the tripped condition within one hour" or declare the

associated system inoperable,

b. With more than one channel' inoperable.-' declare the '

associated system inoperable. -

ACTION 31 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the ,

Minimum OPERABLE channels per Trip Function,, place the . inoperable j channel in the tripped condition within one hour; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or declare the associated system inoperable. _

ACTION 32 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than' required by. 1 the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, declare'the associated ADS trip system or ECCS' inoperable.

ACTION 33 - With the number of.0PERABLE chan'nels less than'the Minimum OPERABLE Channel,s per Trip Function requirement, place the, l inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour. ;

ACTION 34 - With the number of OPERABLE. channels less than required by the

! Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, restore ,

the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within'.8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or.

declare the associated ADS trip system,or ECCS inoperable. l ACTION 35 - With the number of OPERABLE channels-less than required by'the' Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement -

a. For one trip system, place that trip system in the tripped condition within one hour *~or declare the HPCS system inoperable.

b. For_ both trip systems, declare- the.H'PCS system inoperable.

ACTION 36 - f With the number of-OPERABLE channels less than required by the-' 3 Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, place- i' at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour

or declare the HPCS system inoperable. .

ACTION 37 - With the number of OPERABLE instruments less,than the Minimum.

OPERABLE INSTRUMENTS, place the inoperable instrument (s) in the tripped condition within 1 hout* or declare the associated' '

emergency diesel generator inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.8.1.1 or 3.8.1.2.as' appropriate.

"The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable, i LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-27 Amendment No.27-

- -- + - e ..-,e - . . - -. . . . - ..-- + - - - - -r--= , re.=.5 , . ~ . -

< 0 -

TABLE 3.3.3-2 (Continued) .-

,._ EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM AC1UATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS m ALLOWABLE E TRIP FUNCTION TRIP SETPOINT VALUE E C. DIVISION 3 TRIP SYSTEM

$ 1. HPCS SYSTEM h a. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 t- 50 inches

g- 57 inches

g b. Drywell Pressure - Hiah < Id9_ psia < 1.89 psig

c. eactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 < 55.5 inches * < 56 incTss*

d Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low I 715'7" -

_F 715'3"

e. Suppression Pool Water Level - High < Z inch'es** < 3 inches **

Pump Discharge Pressure - High [120psig [110psig (Dp[ f f.

g.

h.

HPCS System Flow Rate - Low Manual Intiation 1 1000 gpm N.A.

3 900 gpm N.A.

D. LOSS OF POWER w 1. 4.16.kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage

} (Loss of Voltage)#

w a. 4.16 kV Basis 5 1) Divisions 1 and 2 2625 i 131 volts with 2625 262 volts with-5'10 second time delay <111 second time delay 2496 125 volts with 24% i 250 volts with 1 4 second time delay 1 3 second time delay

2) Division 3 '2870 i 143 volts with 2870 1 287 volts with 5 10 second time delay 5 11 second time' delay F

a TABLE NOTATIONS E *See Bases Figure B 3/4 3-1.

2 #These are inverse time delay voltage relays or instantaneous. voltage relays with a time delay. The voltages shown 5- are the maximum that will.not result in.a trip. Lower voltage conditions will result in decreased trip times.

z 4 A.-Not' Applicable vel-is referenced to a plant elevation of 699: feet 11 inches (See Figure B 3/4.6.2-1).

g _ TABLE 4.3.3.1-1 (Continued)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENIATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS r-OPERATIONAL 7 CHANNIL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONCITIONS FOR WHICH E TRIP FUNCTION CHECK IEST CAllBRATION SURVLILLANCE REQUIRED

-4 N C. DIVISION 31 RIP SYSTEM

1. HPCS SYSTEM

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level -

Low Low, Level 2 NA M R 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*

b. Drywell Pressure-High NA M Q 1,2,3

. Reactor Vessel Water Level-High D6L6Ibp Level 8 NA M R 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*

d.kondensateStorageTankLevel-T 1, 2, 3, 4 * , 5*

w Low NA M Q

e. j Suppression Pool Water w M evel - High NA M _Q _1_ , _2 ,_ ~4*

g f. Pump Discharge Pressure-High -NA M Q 1, 2, 3.. 5*

g. HPCS System flow Rate-Low NA M Q 1,' 2, 3, 4*, 5*

h. Manual Initiation NA R, NA 1, 2, 3,14*, 5*

D. ' LOSS OF~ POWER

1. 4.16 kV-Emergency. Bus Under- .NA NA -- R 1, 2, 3, 4**, 5**

voltage (Loss'of Voltage)

2. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Under- NA NA. R 1, 2,'3, 4**, 5**-

voltage.(Degraded Voltage) .

y TAFLE NOTATIONS

Not required to be OPERABLE when reactor. steam dor,a pressure is less than or equal.to 122 psig.

$. *When the system is required to be OPERABLE'arter being manually realigned,.es applicable, per

~, Specification'3.5.2.

P ** Required when ESF equipment is required to be.0PERABLE.

.w ,

.- , . . _ - . ,....~y -

%-. .-- ,.m: m c.w'- - .. -..-.x ..e.- -.m- , , ..g,. , -' .,-n. , n., . ...

.4 l

l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS I l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)-

3

2. Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the:-

a) Discharge line'" keep' filled" pressure alarm instrumentation- ,

and verifying the: ;

1) High pressure setpoint and the low pressure setpoint of the:

(a) LPCS system to be 5, 500 psig and 1.55 psig,. 'I respectively.

(b) LPCI subsystems to be 5 400 psig and 1 55 psig,--

respectively.

l2) Low pressure setpoint of the HPCS system to be 3_

63 psig. ,

b). Header delta P instrumentation .and' verifying the setpoint of the:

1) LPCS system and LPCI subsystems to~be i 1 psid.

2) HPCS system to be 5 1 2.0 psid greater.than the q normal-indicated AP.: '

96g@ 3.

I Verifying ~that the suction for the HPCS' system.is automatically transferred from the condensate storage tank to the suppressionj chamber on a condensate storage tank low water level signal and Qn a suppression chamber high water level signal. .

4. Visually inspecting.the-ECCS corner room watertight door seals:

and room penetration seals and verifying:no- abnormal degradation, .

damage, or obstructions.

d. For the ADS by: I

1. At least once per 31 days, performing a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST l of the accumulator backup compressed gas system low pressure l alarm system.

2. At least once per 18 months: 1 a) Performing a system functional; test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system throughout'its emergency l operating sequence, but excluding actual . valve actuation.

b) Manually opening each ADS valve and observing the expected change in the indicated valve position, c) Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the accumulator backup. l compressed gas system low pressure alarm system and verifying-an alarm setpoint of 500 + 40, - O psig on decreasing pressure. -

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5 i

.~. . . _ . . - - . . . _ . _ - - - . _ . - _ _ . - ..-_ ..-_._ . - - -- -. - . - _ .

,m . >

1 l

EMERGENCY C0k2 COOLING SYSTEMS ,

3/4.5.2 ECCS - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 4

3.5.2 At least two of the following shall be OPERABLE:. ;

e

a. The low pressure core spray-(LPCS) system with a flow path capable of taking suction from the suppression chamber and transferring lthe water through the spray sparger to-the reactor vessel.-

b. Low pressure coolant-injection (LPCI) subsystem "A"' of the:RHR system with.a flow path capable of taking suction from the suppression-chamber upon being manually realigned and. transferring the' water to the reactor vessel.

c. Low pressure coolant injection .(LPCI) subsystem "B" of the RHR system - ,

with a flow path capable'of taking suction from the suppression chamber

upon being manually realigned and transferring the water to;the reactor.'

vessel.

1

d. Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystem "C" of the RHR . system .

with a flow path capable of taking-suction:from the suppression '

I chamber upon being manually realigned and transferring the water-.to the reactor vessel.

I $N p \0rde. ~7 The high pressure core , spray (HPCS) system'with a' flow pat apable.

%gL. of taking suction from[one of the following water source and trans -

ferring the water through the spray- sparger to ;he reactor- vessel:

f1. From the suppression. chamber, or 7

2. When the suppression pool-level is'less -tha. the limitL or'is i drained, from the condensate storage tank containing'at least 135,000 available gallons of water, equivalent to a-level.ofe 14,5 feet. - - - - - ~ ~ - -

l '

t APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5*. 1 l'

/.CTION:

a. With one of the above required subsystems / systems inoperable,' restore d at least.two subsystems / systems to OPERABLE: status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or suspend all operations that have a potential for draining the' reactor j

j vessel. '

i

b. With both of the above required subsystems / systems inoperable,-

suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and all operations that have a potential :

for draining the reactor vessel. Restore at least one subsystem /:

l system to OPERABLE status within.4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or establish SECONDARY t

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within'the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . -

"The ECCS is not required to be OPERABLE provided that the reactor vessel head is removed, the cavity is flooded, the spent fuel pool gates are removed, and I water level is maintained within the limits of Specifications 3.9.8 and 3.9.9.

I LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-6 aWf

I 4

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1

4.5.2.1 At least the above required ECCS shall be demonstrated 0PERABLE per-Surveillance Requirement 4.5.1, except .that. the header delta P instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE.-

[_ 4.5.2.2 - The HPCS system shall be determined OPERABLE at least once per :

[ 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by verifying the condensate storage tank required volume when the condensate storage tank is required to be OPERABLE per Specification .3.5.2.e.

s.

s k

I

~

1

'I

)

i l

l l

9 LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-7 k

I

" e i

C< , , - ,.

EMERGENCY CORE C00 LING' SYSTEMS -

3/4.5.3 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER #

l .

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

3.5.3 The suppression chamber shall be OPERABLE:

4

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3 with a contained water volume 'of at least 128,800 ft3 , equivalent to a level of -4 1/2 inches.** .

b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5* with a contained water volu of g l least 70 eguivalent to a level of -12 feet 7 inches w nmit@,j Uiat~tTi,000E3, suppress Ton clamber liivel may be iess tnan tne l

be drained in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5* provided that: .I

1. No operations are performed that have a potential _ for draining -

the reactor vessel, .

i

2. The reactor mode switch is locked in the Shutdown or Refuel position, 4)

3. The condensate storage tank contains at least 135,000 available- t gallons of water, equivalent to a level of 14.5 feet, and.

4. The HPCS system is OPERABLE per Specification 3.5.2 with an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the: condensate '

storage tank and transferring the water through the spray )

sparger to the reactor vessel. /

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2,.3, 4, and 5*,

ACTION:

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3 with the suppression chamb'er $

water level less than the above 1imit,. restore _ the water = level to ,

within the limit within I hour or be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within, a the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following'24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .'

l b.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or.5* with the_ suppression chamber water %

level less_than the above limit Cor drained and the above require jd- -'

onditions not satisfT@for draining the reactor vessel: and have a potentiil~ ~

lock athi reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position. . Establish SECONDARY >

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

See Specification 3.6.2.1 for pressure suppression requirements.

The suppression chamber is not required to be' OPERABLE provided-that the reactor vessel head is removed, the cavity is flooded or being flooded from the suppression pool, the spent fuel pool gates are removed when.the cavity is flooded, and the water level is maintained within th'e limits:of.

Specifications 3.9.8 and 3.9.9. .

D I

- Level is referenced to a plant elevation of 699 feet 11 inches (see Figure B 3/4.6.2-1). a I

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-8 Amendment No. 39'

--_= ._ -

,1 , .

I EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) 5 ACTION: (Continued)

c. With one suppression chamber water level instrumentation channel inoperable, restore the_ inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days or verify the suppression chamber water level to be greater than or equal to -4 1/2 inches ** or f12 feet 7: inches **, as applicable, at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by local indication,

d. With both suppression chamber. water level instrumentation channels: -l inoperable, restore at.least one-inoperable channel to OPERABLE-status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or be' in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the.next J 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUTD'0WN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and .!

verify the suppression chamber water level to be greater than 'or._ :

equal to -4 1/2 inches ** or -12 feet 7_ inches **, as applicable, cat least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months by: local indication. _,

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.3.1 The suppression chamber shall be determined'0PERABLE by verifying:

a. The water level to be greater than 'or equal to,.as applicable: '

1. -4 1/2 inches ** at least once.per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . ;

2. -12 feet 7 inches ** at'least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ,

b. Two suppression chamber water level- instrumentation channels OPERABLE >

by performance of a.

}

1. CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 24= hours, ,

2. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at11 east once per 31 days, and

3. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per-18 months, with the' low water level alarm setpoint at greater than or equal-to

-3 inches.**' i

~

4.5.3.2 With the suppre c in OPERATIONAL CONDITIO chamber. level less than the above limit (r' drain 5*,at-leastonceper12h_ourg Verify the required conditions of Specification 3.5.'3.b. t .

satisfied, or

b. footnote conditions

to be. satisfied.\

AA

The suppression chamber is not required to be OPERABLE provided that the reactor.

vessel head is removed, the cavity is flooded or being. flooded from_the suppres-sion pool, the spent fuel pool geies are removed whe7 the cavity is flooded, and- i the water level is maintained within the limits of Specifications 3.9.8.and 3.9.9. !

i

- Level is referenced to a plant elevation of 699 feet-11 inches (See '

Figure B 3/4.6.2-1). d LA SALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-9 Amendment No. 39

TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued) 5 m PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

?

E VALVE FUNCTION-AND NUMBER Other Isolation Valves (Continued)

" 4. Lc.- Pressure Core Spray System 2E21-F005(I) 2E21-F001 2E21-F012 I3) 2E21-F011 Il) 2E21-F018 I3) 2E21-F031(I3) 2E21-F006 k) w 5. High Pressure Core Spray System s

2E22-F004 T 2E22-F015 II)

M 2E22-F023 fII 2E22-F012 II)

' I 2E22-F014(3) 2E22-F005 k)

6. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 2E51-F013 2E51-F069 2E51-F028 ,

2E51-F068 2E51-F040 2E51-F031 Il}

I 2E51-F019(3) 2E51-F065 k) 2E51-F066(k) 2E51- F059(m) .

2ESI-F022 (3frn ) '

2E5i-F362 @T 2 E57 - F 3G (n)

- __ __ _. ._ _ _ ; ; ;:2. .

y TABLE 3.6.3-1 (Continued)

E PRIMARY CONTAIMENT ISOLATION VALVES h VALVE FUNCTION AND NumER b Other Isolation Valves (Continued)

I '7. Post LOCA Hydrogen Control

-z Q 2HG001A, B-

,t w 2HG002A, B 2HG005A, B 2HG006A, B

! 8. Staney Liquid Control Systee

! 2C41-F004A, B .

J 2C41-F007. .

M" O 1

9. Reactor Recirculat. ion Seal Injection w 2833-F013A,'B MEW PAGE- 3 f 4 (o - 3 7 c.

1 2833-F017A, B -

T 10. Drywell Pneumatic Valves w ~- ~-

" 21N018- . .

TABLE NOTATIONS

~

l *But.> 3 seconds.- , ..

g (a) See 5pecification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, for isolation signal (s) that operates each valve group. '

(b) Not included in total sum of Type B and C tests.

(c) May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

l (d)~-Not closed by SLCS' actuation (e) Not closed by Trip Functions Sa, b, or c. Specification 3.3.2,' Table 3.3.2-1.' .

(f) Not_ closed by Trip Functions 4a,'c, d, e, or f-of Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1.

i ' ~

f (g) Not subject to. Type C' leakage test. ~ .

4 4 (h) Opens on an isolation signal.L Valves will be open during Type A test. No' Type C test required.

Tg .. ; (i)(j) Also closedleak'testaat Hydraulic by drywell pressure-high 43.6 psig. signal.

^

[

F (k) Not subject tolType C-leakage test .-leakage rate tested per Specification 4.4.3.2.2.

, _g- -(1) These penetrations are provided with removable' spools outboard of the outboard isolation valve.

, -g -During operation, these lines will'be blind flanged using'a double 0-ring and a type B leak:

test. . In' addition, the packing of'these-isolation valves _will be soap-bubble tested to ensure j g . insignificant or no' leakage at the containment-test pressure each refueling outage.

}~ . 7. -

_ "'i____"_____'____ ___ '___<^ --

^

. 'Nw .'

'"# # _ *i _ - . u _ :._-__W_"___'.__.__._____________._..m'_ _ _ _ _ -. . _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _

--'2 -

- _e.v- r-ad

I l

1 TABLE 3.6.3-1 (continued)'

EBIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES i' l.

TABLE NOTATIONS:

I Move footnotes "*" and (a) through (I) from Page 3/4 6-34 to this location. - ,

1 i

m. If valves 2E51-F362 and 2E51-F363 are locked closed and acceptably leakage rate tested, valves 1E51 F059 and 1E51-F022 are not considered primary containment isolation valves and are not subject to the leakage rate testing requirements. - 1 1

n. If valve 2E51-F059 is deactivated and locked closed with the line blind flanged l downstream of the valve and acceptably leakage rate tested, valves 1E51 F362 I and 1E51-F363 are not considered primary containment isolation valves and are' ]

not subject to leakage rate testing requirements.

I 4

l l

i l

I LASALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-37a Proposed Amendment l

].

)

l TABLE 3.8.3.3-1 (Continued) , ;

I MOTOR OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD l.

PRDltCil0N SYSTEM (S) i BYPASS DEVICE VALVE NUMBER (Continuous)(AccidentConditions), - AFFECTED 2E32 - F003N ~ Accident Conditions i L

2E32 - F006 Accident Conditions 2E32 - F007 Accident Conditions 2E32 - F008 Accident Conditions 2E32 - F009 Accident Conditions-m,hE22-F001' Acc:Atat Conditions HPCS system:. f 2E22 - F004 Ace' dent' Conditions 2'E22 7 eI0 Accidint~C6ndFtT3Hi~ ~ 4 AccjAnnLC9adttions f 22 -

2 d __E011 F012 Acc< dent Conditions !

2E22 - F015 Accident Conditions ,

2E22'- F023 Accident Conditions-a

% . r q

t I

LASALLE - UNIT 2 3/4 8-30 ' Amendment No. 25' e -% .-y , , -, , .'+-.--i e- - = v e = r

i,.~ .

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ,

BASES 3/4.5.1 and 3/4.5.2 ECCS - OPERATING and SHUT 00WN ECCS Division 1 consists- of the low pressure core spray system, low pres-sure coolant injection subsystem "A" of the RHR system, and the automatic de-pressurizr. tion system (ADS) as actuated by. ADS trip system ."A". ECCS Division 2:

consists of low pressure coolant injection' subsystems "B"and "C" of the RHR sys-tem and the automatic depressurization system as actuated by ADS trip system B".

The low pressure core spray (LPCS) syst'em is provided'to assure that the l core is adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant accident; and provides I adequate core cooling capacity for all. break. sizes up to'and including the j double ended reactor recirculation line break, and for ~ transients'or smaller - l breaks following depressurization by the A05.. .;

<1 The LPCS is a primary source of emergency core cooling after the reactor-vessel is depressurized and a' source for flooding of the core in case of-accidental draining.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that-the LPCS sys- !

tem will be OPERABLE when required.. Although all active components are testable l and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during. L reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to preyent water hammer damage to ,

piping and to start cooling at the earliest moment.. ;

Thelowpressurecoolantinjection(LPCI)modeoftheRHRsystemispro- '[

vided to assure that the co're' is adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant 4 accident. Three subsystems, each with one pump, provide adequate core flooding-for all break sizes up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation ,

line break, and for transients or small breaks following depressurization by the l.

ADS. J The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the LPCI-system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components.are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a.testL loop during reactor operation,.a complete functional test requires reactor #

shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to piping.and to start cooling at the earliest moment.- ;

ECCS Division 3 consists of-the high pressure core spray. system. The J '

high pressure core spray (HPCS) system is provided to assure that the reactor core is adequately cooled to limit fuel clad temperature in the. event of a small break in the reactor coolant system and loss'of coolant which-does not 4 result in rapid depressurization of the reactor. vessel. The HPCS system >

permits the reactor to be shut down while maintaining sufficient reactor ,

vessel water level inventory until the vessel'is depressurized. The HPCS ,

system operates over a range of 1160 psid,. differential pressure between; i reactor vessel and HPCS suction source, to O psid.

The capacity of the HPCS system is selected to provide the required core- [ ,

t cooling.

516/1550/6200 The HPCS pump gpm at is designed differential to deliver pressures greater than oru equal of 1160/1130/200pfid Initialy ly',.

(~iTater from Virconden5Etr5torage t'ank TrV5Wiiistead of~Tnlect V ;

LA SALLE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 27 i

VJhT ER iS TA MEh! FROM TH E S DyrcS 5 t o ^t pool J ANO IN TE C TED M TO Tile. MA C TM EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS -

i BASES t

ECCS-OPERATING and SHUTDOWN (Continutd i the suppression pool into the reactor, but no credit is.taken in the hazards. !

analyses for the condensate storage tank water. f I With the HPCS system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the OPERABILITY of the redundant and diversified automatic depressurization system and both the LPCS and LPCI systems. In addition, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, a system for which no credit is taken in the hazards ,

analysis, will automatically provide makeup at reactor operating _ pressures on' H a reactor low water level condition. The HPCS out-of-service period-of 14 days is based on the demonstrated OPERABILITY of redundant and diversified low pressure core cooling systems.-

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the HPCS l system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are l testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test '

loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test with reactor vessel i injection requires reactor shutdown.- The pump-discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and'to provide cooling at!the earliest moment.

Upon failure of the HPCS system to function properly, if- required, the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automatically causes selected safety-relief valves to open, depressurizing the reactor so that-flow from the low pressure core cooling systems can enter the core in time to limit' fuel cladding temperature to less than 2200*F. ADS is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor vessel pressure exceeds 122 psig even though low pressure core cooling systems provide adequate core cooling up to 350 psig. j ADS automatically controis seven selected safety-relief valves. Six ,

valves are required to be OPERABLE since the LOCA analysis assumes 6 ADS valves in addition to a single failure.

]

It is therefore appropriate to permit ,

one of the required valves to be out-of-service for up to'14 days without i materially reducing' system reliability. !

3/4.5.3 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER l l

The suppression chamber is also required to be OPERABLE as part of the ECCS to ensure that a sufficient supply of water is available to the-HPCS, LPCS and LPCI systems in the event of a LOCA. This limit on suppression chamber minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available.to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core (See Figure B 3/4.6.2-1). The OPERABILITY of the suppression chamber in OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 or 3.is required by Specification 3.6.2.1. j Repair work might require making the suppression chamber inoperable.

This specification will permit those repairs to be made and'at the same time 4 give assurance that the irradiated fuel has an adequateJooling waterisu when the suppression chamber must be made inoperable,(including in draining)pply OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5. M ,

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 and 5 the suppression chamber minimum required-water volume is reduced because the reactor coolant is maintained at or below-200'F. Since pressure suppression is not required below 212*F, the minimum' water volume is based on NPSH, recirculation volume, vortex prevention plus a 2'-4" safety margin for conservatism.

l LA SALLE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No.'41 l

l - - - .

i 1

l Control I Suppression Plant Room / Local Chamber Level Elevation Indication l 26'-10" 700' 2" +3" High Level LCO (Volume l 131,900 ft 3)

?

26' 9" 700' 1" +2" High Level Alar HPCS puction- Va ve ransfer- ;

26' 7" 699' 11" 0" Instrument Zero- '

'(

26' 4" 699' 8" -3" Low Level Alarm =I 26' 2 1/2" 699' 6 1/2" -4 1/2" Low Level LC0 Opera-tional Condition 1, 2,- -

or 3 (Volume 128,800 fta) l

.i 14' 687' 4" -12' 7" Low-Level LCO Opera-tional Condition 4 or 5 (Volume 70,000 fta) ;

SUPPRESSION P0OL LEVEL SETPOINTS BASES FIGURE B 3/4.6.2-1 <

LA SALLE UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-3a Amendment'No. 39

/- ..

1 ATTACHMENT C SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed Technical Specification Amendment and determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. Based on the criteria for defining a significant hazards consideration established in 10 CFR 50.92, operation of LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the proposed amendment will not: -

1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because: 7 The cycled condensate system, including the CST, is not a seismically designed system .

(UFSAR Table 3.2-1) and is not requirac to function in any plant condtion except normal operating conditions. As a result the cycled condensate system has no safety.'

design basis (U -SAR Section 9.2.7.1.1) and eliminating the capability of the HPCS. -i system to access the water volume in the CST has no impact on the plant accident 4 analysis. The amendment proposal deletes from the technical specifications all-references to the HPCS system automatic suction transfer and to the related' instrumentation. The capability to transfer the HPCS system suction from the CST to -

the suppression pool was originally required to ensure that an uninterrupted supaly of -

water was available to the HPCS system under accident conditions. Since, the KPCS -

system will be permanently aligned to the suppression pool, the technical specifications related to the automatic suction transfer capability are no longer required.

During the next refuel outage for each unit the reactor core isolation cooling system will be modified to allow a full flow test capability to theool.L suppression The - p(RCI .I new full flow test line with its isolation valves will penetrate the primary containment making necessary the appilcation of technical specification controls to ensure that 3rimary containment integrity is maintained. The controls placed on the new installation n the proposed amendment are consistent with controls and testing requirements applicable to other existing containment isolation valves. The overa l primary containment leakage rate limits are not affected by this change.

Additionally, the equipment of concem is not an initiator for any accidents and therefore, -

will not affect the probability of a significant increase or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because:

, The HPCS system will be permanently isolated from the CST and aligned to the .

t suppression pool. Since, the CST does not have a safety design bases, deletion of the -

HPCS pump suction automatic transfer requirements from the technical specifications will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

The extension of existing technical specification controis to the new RCIC system full flow test line helps to ensure that primary containment integrity is maintained. The proposed amendment does not relax or alter any requirements such that the possibility.

of a new or different kind of accident is created.

i

(

i

, - . . - . . . , , , 4m. , , - - - - - ,e, . , . . . . , %,v- . . .,...,%.-..+ e..%.-~ ,~e- , ,, y -~ - - =

4 =,, 0; 1

l ATTACHMENT C -

SIGNIElCANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION ;

o L - 3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because:-

No credit has been taken for the CST water volume in the UFSAR, therefore, any - !

Impact on safety will be minimal. Permanently aligning the HPCS system to the suppression pool removes the need to have an automatic suction transfer. capability.~ -

This will have a positive affect on the margin of safety because the risk of losing the :

HPCS system during accident conditions due to a suction transfer failure will be ~ y eliminated. Any impact on safety will be minimal. ;

The technical specification changes that add the new RCIC system valves with the full flow test line to the suppression pool have no affect on the margin of safety. This is 3

- because the controls being apalled to the new valves are consistent with those placed J on other primary containment solation valves. The primary containment leakage rate' -

limits will not be changed therefore no reduction in the margin of safety is postulated. i i

Guidance has been pavided in " Final Procedures and Standards on No Significant Hazards Considerations,* nnel Rule,51 FR 7744, for the application of standards to .;

license change requests for determination of the existence of significant hazards -

considerations. This document provides examples of amendments which are and are not considered lik31y to involve significant hazards considerations. The proposed -

t amendments most closely resemble Example I.C.2.e.1, a purely administrative change.

This prowsed amendment does not involve a significant relaxation of the criteria used .

to estab ish safety limits, a significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting safety system settings or a significant relaxation of the bases for the limiting concitions for operations. Tierefore, based on the guidance provided in the Federal Register and the criteria established in 10CFR50.92(e), the proposed change does not constitute a . ,

significant hazards consideration.

I i

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ML20064B570

Text

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