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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML20045B0641993-06-10010 June 1993 Special Rept 93-004:on 930512,fire Rated Assemblies Were Inoperable for More than 14 Days Due to Inadequate Design. LCO 1-93-2010 Initiated,Appropriate Fire Detectors Were Verified Operable & Fire Watch established.W/930610 Ltr ML20044F6101993-05-21021 May 1993 Special Rept 2-93-002:on 930430,licensed Plant Operations Declared Fire Door Inoperable.Caused by Fire Door 2L48-2R53 Blocked Open.Fire Door 2L48-2R53 Restored to Operable Status & LCO 2-93-238 Terminated ML20044D0831993-05-0303 May 1993 Special Rept 1-93-003:on 930322 & 0405,discovered That Fire Wrap Matl Not Installed on Several safety-related Cable Trays & Trays Not Installed Properly Following Breach on 930301.Maint Work Order Issued to Make Repairs ML20043A9861990-05-21021 May 1990 Special Rept 90-002:on 900328,portions of Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Set Room Wall Declared Inoperable.On 900327,electrical Raceways Declared Inoperable Due to Damaged Fire Wrapping.Hourly Fire Watch Initiated ML20042F9531990-05-0707 May 1990 Special Rept 90-003:on 900329,20 Smoke Detectors on Working Floor of Control Bldg Inoperable.Caused by Damaged Power & Control Cables to Detectors Preventing Common Input Signal from Traveling to Computer.Fire Watch Patrol Established ML20012E4681990-03-26026 March 1990 Special Rept 2-90-002:on 900321,seismic Monitoring Instrument Inoperable for Longer than 30 Days.Cause Not Determined.Seismic Instrument Declared Inoperable & Tracking of Limiting Condition for Operation Established ML20005H0971990-01-16016 January 1990 Special Rept 90-001:on 900109,drywell high-range post-accident Radiation Monitor Inoperable for More than 7 Days.Caused by Monitor Spiking Due to Component Damage. Connector Repaired & Monitor Returned to Svc ML19327A8051989-10-10010 October 1989 Special Rept 89-005:on 890919,25,28 & 1002,fire Rated Assemblies Inoperable for Longer than 14 Days.Caused by Fire Rated Assemblies & Sealing Devices Breached to Support Refueling Outage Work Activities.Fire Watches Established ML20024E7601983-07-27027 July 1983 Ro:On 830722,HPCI Auto Initiated & Injected Into Reactor to Restore & Maintain Level Following Loss of Feedwater Transient.Transient Initiated When RFPT 2B Tripped for Unknown Reasons.Rfpt 2A Out of Svc Due to Fire ML20023C3051983-05-0202 May 1983 Supplemental Narrative Summary to Rev 5 to RO 50-321/1979-021.Updated Data on Tritium Levels in Groundwater Samples During First Quarter 1983 Encl.No Radionuclides Above Background Identified ML20028E2271983-01-11011 January 1983 RO 50-321/1982-04:on 821231,cooling Tower 1A Fire Protection Deluge Sys Tripped,Decreasing Fire Water Storage Tank Vol Below Acceptable Limits.Caused by Failure of Trip Alarm in Cooling Tower.Design Change Requested ML20052G4571982-04-30030 April 1982 RO 50-321/1979-021:on 820423,tritium Levels Exceeded 3.0 E4 pCi/1 Allowance for Tritium in Environ Water Samples Per Table 3.2-3 of Ets.Cause Might Be Attributed to Slight Shifts in Main Body of Tritiated Groundwater ML20052A4331982-04-0606 April 1982 Ro:On 820217,electrician Found a 125/250-volt Dc Station Svc Batteries W/Low Specific Gravity.When Batteries Placed on Charge,Voltage Went from 130 to 142-volts Dc Causing Topaz Inverter to Trip on High Voltage ML20052A3501982-02-26026 February 1982 RO Discussing Substandard Smoke Detection Installation.Mods to Affected Areas & App R Smoke Detection Additions Will Coincide W/App R Schedule to Allow for More Complete Design Review & Consolidated Smoke Detection Plan ML20041A5991982-02-0404 February 1982 RO 50-321/1979-021,Revision 5.Provides Updated Data on Tritium Levels in Groundwater Samples Taken from Locations Where Average Value Over Fourth Quarter of 1981 Exceeded Samples According to Table 3.2-3 of ETS ML20010H8311981-09-22022 September 1981 RO 50-321/1981-090:on 810921,while Performing Surveillance Procedure HNP-1-3414,switches E51-NO12A-D Found to Be Actuating Outside Tech Spec Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Switches Recalibr Per HNP-1-5279 ML20010H8491981-09-15015 September 1981 Ro:On 810909,HPCI Injection Valve Would Not Open Automatically During Reactor Level Decrease.Caused by Valve Motor Failure.Valve Opened Manually ML20010A3101981-07-30030 July 1981 RO 50-321/1979-021,Revision 5:provides Updated Data on Tritium Levels in Groundwater Samples.Quarterly Average Tritium Levels at Affected Locations Encl ML20010A0021981-07-30030 July 1981 RO 50-321/1981-081:on 810729,while Performing Review in Response to IE Bulletin 79-14,Bechtel Engineer Discovered RHR-SW Piping in Vicinity of RHR-SW Strainers Was Inadequately Supported.Caused by Inadequate Design ML20008F5081981-04-13013 April 1981 Ro:On 810411,following Reactor Scram on Low Reactor Water Level,Hpci Auto Initiated on Low Reactor Water Level & Injected Into Reactor Vessel.Caused by Loss of Feedwater. Reactor Water Level Was Restored to Normal ML20008E6711981-02-26026 February 1981 Special Rept:On 810221,following Reactor Scram on Low Reactor Water Level Due to Loss of Condensate Booster Pump, HPCI Was Manually Initiated & Injected Into Reactor Vessel. HPCI Was Secured After Water Level Was Restored to Normal ML19351G2981981-02-12012 February 1981 Ro:On 810113,spray/sprinkler Sys Providing Protection to Hcpi Room Discovered to Be Inoperable for 14 Days.Mod Work & Functional Test Expected to Be Complete Before End of Refueling Outage ML19340E1481980-12-31031 December 1980 Special Rept 1-sp-80-3:on 801206,during Routine Survey of Waste Oil Drums,Several Areas on Ground Were Found to Be Contaminated.Caused by Storage of Previous Waste Oil Drums. Addl Controls Re Release of Contaminated Oil Under Review ML19340D8251980-12-19019 December 1980 Ro:On 801213,sprinkler Sys Providing Protection for Reactor Bldg Heating,Ventilation & Air Conditioning Had Been Inoperative for 14 Days.Caused by Implementation of Design Mods to Bring Sys Into NFPA Code Compliance ML19347C7251980-12-19019 December 1980 Ro:On 801213,sprinkler Sys Providing Protection for Reactor Bldg Heating,Ventilation & Air Conditioning Room Had Been Inoperable for 14 Days.Sys Isolated to Implement Mods for Corrective Action to Open Item in IE Rept 50-321/80-02 ML19340D1681980-12-0404 December 1980 Ro:On 801031,at 1400-h It Was Determined That Smoke Detectors Were Not Installed Per NFPA Code 72D.Cause Not Stated.Analysis Being Made of All Detection Sys & Design Work for Affected Sys Initiated ML19338F9851980-10-21021 October 1980 Ro:On 801009,following Reactor Scram on Low Reactor Water Level Due to Loss of Feedwater,Hpci Tripped on High Reactor Water Level.Caused by HPCI Auto Initiating on Low Reactor Water Level & Injecting Into Reactor ML19338D4821980-09-15015 September 1980 Ro:On 800908,following Reactor Scram,Hpci Auto Initiated & Injected Due to Low Reactor Water Level.Caused by MSIV Closure,Which Caused Reactor Scram,Loss of RFPT & Increased Reactor Pressure.Hpci Returned Water Level to Normal ML19330B5471980-07-29029 July 1980 Ro:On 800521 & 0711,following Reactor Scram HPCI Auto Initiated & Injected.Hpci Allowed to Return Reactor Level to 58 Inches.Msiv Closed Rendering Reactor Feed Pump Turbine Unavailable for Injection.Hpci Started Manually & Injected ML19320D4541980-07-14014 July 1980 Ro:On 800711,Unit 1 LPCI Inverter Tripped & Unit 2 4-kV Bus 2F Supply Breaker & HPCI Tripped.Supply Breaker Trip Caused by Jumper Missing from Neutral Leg.Motor Valve on HPCI Replaced Making It Operable.Events Submitted Per Ieb 80-17 ML19329F9241980-07-0202 July 1980 RO 50-321/80-076:while Reviewing as-builts Submitted Per IE Bulletin 79-14,util Discovered Hangers 1E11-RHRH-196 & 1E11-RHRH-313 Would Not Adequately Support Loads During Dbe. Caused by Faulty Design in Incorrect Valve Weights ML19329F9221980-07-0202 July 1980 RO 50-366/1980-100:on 800702,while Performing Surveillance Procedures HNP-2-3002 & HNP-2-3172M,high Drywell Pressure Switches 2C71-N002A Through D & 2E11-N011A Through D Found Out of Tolerance.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Switches Recalibr ML19329F8841980-06-27027 June 1980 RO 50-321/1980-069:on 800626,following Auto Initiation Signal,Hpci Failed to Inject to Reactor Pressure Vessel Due to Isolating on Steam Line High Dp Isolation Signal.Cause Under Investigation.Reset Isolation & Opened Inboard Valve ML19326D7421980-06-25025 June 1980 Ro:On 800522,licensee Reviewed Kinemetrics,Inc 800513 Calibr Rept Re Seismic Instrumentation.Triaxial Time-History Accelerograph 2L51-NO21 Calibr Indicates Excessive Change in Longitudinal Channel Characteristics ML19329F8731980-06-23023 June 1980 RO-50-321/1980-61:on 800622,while Preparing to Run RHR Sys, B RHR Loop Min Flow Manual Valves Were Discovered Closed. Caused by Failure to Return to Open Position After Loop Was Taken Out of Shutdown Cooling Mode.Valves Locked Open ML19318A6511980-06-12012 June 1980 RO 50-321/1980-062:on 800612,w/facility in Cold Shutdown, Investigation Began to Determine Cause of Pavement Deflection Which Occurred Beneath Crane Outrigger Pad at Intake Structure.Cause of Fill Separation from Pipe Unknown ML19318A6321980-06-0202 June 1980 RO 50-321/1980-055:on 800531,snubber 36 on X32-1F7,1-inch Instrument Line from Recirculation a Loop,Appeared Locked Up During Visual Insp.Caused by Snubber Corrosion.Snubbers Failing Surveillance Test Will Be Replaced Prior to Startup ML19318A6491980-05-30030 May 1980 RO 50-321/1980-054:on 800530,nondivisional Cables H21-P173-C010 & H21-P173-C013 Found Routed W/Div I & II Type Cables/Raceways.Caused by Design & Installation Error.Design Change Request 80-166 Submitted for Cable Rerouting ML19318A6431980-05-27027 May 1980 RO 50-321/1980-053:on 800524,discovered That Loss of Essential Motor Control Ctr 1B(R24-S011) or Loss of Diesel Generator 1A During Loss of Offsite Power Will Cause RHR & Core Spray a Loops to Be Inoperable.Caused by Faulty Valve ML19323E3101980-04-30030 April 1980 Supplemental Narrative Summary to RO 50-321/79-021,Revision 5:updates Tritium Levels in Ground Water Samples.Any Releases to Unrestricted Areas Are Miniscule & Result in Insignificant Doses to Public ML19309G0441980-04-24024 April 1980 Ro:On 800206,HPCI Was Manually Started & Injected Into Reactor Vessel to Maintain Reactor Vessel Water Inventory Following Trip of Reactor Feed Pump.Caused by Loss of Reactor Feed Pump Loop Seal.Hpci Was Shut Down ML19309F1351980-04-0707 April 1980 RO 50-366/1980-045:on 800405,during Cold Shutdown,Leak Rate Test on Automatic Depressurization Sys Valve Air Supply Accumulator Check Valves Indicated Unacceptable Leakage Rates.Cause Under Investigation.No Immediate Action Taken ML19290E6311980-03-0303 March 1980 Suppl to RO 50-321/1979-021,Revision 5 Providing Data on Tritium Levels in Ground Water ML19296D1711980-02-18018 February 1980 Supplemental Narrative Summary to RO 50-321/1979-021, Revision 5:on 791202,tritium Levels in Groundwater Samples Exceeded Limits.Caused by Leakage from Blown Seal on Condensate Transfer Pump.Pumps Temporarily Confined ML19210F0301979-11-0606 November 1979 RO-79-089:on 791106,while Evaluating as-built Seismic Piping & Supports,Head Vent Line Portion of RHR Head Spray Piping & Bypass to Condenser Valve Chest Found Unsupported.Caused by Omission of Supports from Design ML19209C6511979-10-11011 October 1979 RO 50-366/79-112:on 791011,during Shutdown for Maint,Found That Intermediate Range Monitor Had Been Removed & Was Not in Control Rod Driveline Cavity of Drywell.Caused by Removal for Clean Up Operation ML19249E1021979-09-11011 September 1979 RO 50-321/1979-OB1:on 790910,LOCA Conditions Discovered Capable of Causing Several Primary Containment & Inserting Valves to Overtravel During Closure.Caused by Differential Pressure Across Valves & Loss of Seating Ability ML19249C8911979-09-10010 September 1979 Ro:On 790908,Unit 1 Was in Run Position & Unit 2 Was in Hot shutdown,E11-C001A,B & D Pumps Failed to Meet Operability Procedure HNP-1-3167 Due to Formula Errors in Pump Discharge Pressure Calculations.Units Shut Down & Formulas Reviewed ML19249C8791979-09-0404 September 1979 RO-50-366/79-98:on 790902,NSSS Supplier Contacted Plant Mgt About Possible Cable Separation Irregularities within HPCI Sys.Caused by Design Error.Proposed Design Change in Process ML19249C9061979-08-29029 August 1979 Ro:On 790812,RHR Pump Suction Torus Isolation Valve E11-F004B Leaked Back Toward Containment.Local Leak Rate Test Performed.Leakage Less than Acceptance Criteria. LER Not Required.Valve Tightened & Tested Satisfactorily 1993-06-10
[Table view] Category:LER)
MONTHYEARML20045B0641993-06-10010 June 1993 Special Rept 93-004:on 930512,fire Rated Assemblies Were Inoperable for More than 14 Days Due to Inadequate Design. LCO 1-93-2010 Initiated,Appropriate Fire Detectors Were Verified Operable & Fire Watch established.W/930610 Ltr ML20044F6101993-05-21021 May 1993 Special Rept 2-93-002:on 930430,licensed Plant Operations Declared Fire Door Inoperable.Caused by Fire Door 2L48-2R53 Blocked Open.Fire Door 2L48-2R53 Restored to Operable Status & LCO 2-93-238 Terminated ML20044D0831993-05-0303 May 1993 Special Rept 1-93-003:on 930322 & 0405,discovered That Fire Wrap Matl Not Installed on Several safety-related Cable Trays & Trays Not Installed Properly Following Breach on 930301.Maint Work Order Issued to Make Repairs ML20043A9861990-05-21021 May 1990 Special Rept 90-002:on 900328,portions of Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Set Room Wall Declared Inoperable.On 900327,electrical Raceways Declared Inoperable Due to Damaged Fire Wrapping.Hourly Fire Watch Initiated ML20042F9531990-05-0707 May 1990 Special Rept 90-003:on 900329,20 Smoke Detectors on Working Floor of Control Bldg Inoperable.Caused by Damaged Power & Control Cables to Detectors Preventing Common Input Signal from Traveling to Computer.Fire Watch Patrol Established ML20012E4681990-03-26026 March 1990 Special Rept 2-90-002:on 900321,seismic Monitoring Instrument Inoperable for Longer than 30 Days.Cause Not Determined.Seismic Instrument Declared Inoperable & Tracking of Limiting Condition for Operation Established ML20005H0971990-01-16016 January 1990 Special Rept 90-001:on 900109,drywell high-range post-accident Radiation Monitor Inoperable for More than 7 Days.Caused by Monitor Spiking Due to Component Damage. Connector Repaired & Monitor Returned to Svc ML19327A8051989-10-10010 October 1989 Special Rept 89-005:on 890919,25,28 & 1002,fire Rated Assemblies Inoperable for Longer than 14 Days.Caused by Fire Rated Assemblies & Sealing Devices Breached to Support Refueling Outage Work Activities.Fire Watches Established ML20024E7601983-07-27027 July 1983 Ro:On 830722,HPCI Auto Initiated & Injected Into Reactor to Restore & Maintain Level Following Loss of Feedwater Transient.Transient Initiated When RFPT 2B Tripped for Unknown Reasons.Rfpt 2A Out of Svc Due to Fire ML20023C3051983-05-0202 May 1983 Supplemental Narrative Summary to Rev 5 to RO 50-321/1979-021.Updated Data on Tritium Levels in Groundwater Samples During First Quarter 1983 Encl.No Radionuclides Above Background Identified ML20028E2271983-01-11011 January 1983 RO 50-321/1982-04:on 821231,cooling Tower 1A Fire Protection Deluge Sys Tripped,Decreasing Fire Water Storage Tank Vol Below Acceptable Limits.Caused by Failure of Trip Alarm in Cooling Tower.Design Change Requested ML20052G4571982-04-30030 April 1982 RO 50-321/1979-021:on 820423,tritium Levels Exceeded 3.0 E4 pCi/1 Allowance for Tritium in Environ Water Samples Per Table 3.2-3 of Ets.Cause Might Be Attributed to Slight Shifts in Main Body of Tritiated Groundwater ML20052A4331982-04-0606 April 1982 Ro:On 820217,electrician Found a 125/250-volt Dc Station Svc Batteries W/Low Specific Gravity.When Batteries Placed on Charge,Voltage Went from 130 to 142-volts Dc Causing Topaz Inverter to Trip on High Voltage ML20052A3501982-02-26026 February 1982 RO Discussing Substandard Smoke Detection Installation.Mods to Affected Areas & App R Smoke Detection Additions Will Coincide W/App R Schedule to Allow for More Complete Design Review & Consolidated Smoke Detection Plan ML20041A5991982-02-0404 February 1982 RO 50-321/1979-021,Revision 5.Provides Updated Data on Tritium Levels in Groundwater Samples Taken from Locations Where Average Value Over Fourth Quarter of 1981 Exceeded Samples According to Table 3.2-3 of ETS ML20010H8311981-09-22022 September 1981 RO 50-321/1981-090:on 810921,while Performing Surveillance Procedure HNP-1-3414,switches E51-NO12A-D Found to Be Actuating Outside Tech Spec Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Switches Recalibr Per HNP-1-5279 ML20010H8491981-09-15015 September 1981 Ro:On 810909,HPCI Injection Valve Would Not Open Automatically During Reactor Level Decrease.Caused by Valve Motor Failure.Valve Opened Manually ML20010A3101981-07-30030 July 1981 RO 50-321/1979-021,Revision 5:provides Updated Data on Tritium Levels in Groundwater Samples.Quarterly Average Tritium Levels at Affected Locations Encl ML20010A0021981-07-30030 July 1981 RO 50-321/1981-081:on 810729,while Performing Review in Response to IE Bulletin 79-14,Bechtel Engineer Discovered RHR-SW Piping in Vicinity of RHR-SW Strainers Was Inadequately Supported.Caused by Inadequate Design ML20008F5081981-04-13013 April 1981 Ro:On 810411,following Reactor Scram on Low Reactor Water Level,Hpci Auto Initiated on Low Reactor Water Level & Injected Into Reactor Vessel.Caused by Loss of Feedwater. Reactor Water Level Was Restored to Normal ML20008E6711981-02-26026 February 1981 Special Rept:On 810221,following Reactor Scram on Low Reactor Water Level Due to Loss of Condensate Booster Pump, HPCI Was Manually Initiated & Injected Into Reactor Vessel. HPCI Was Secured After Water Level Was Restored to Normal ML19351G2981981-02-12012 February 1981 Ro:On 810113,spray/sprinkler Sys Providing Protection to Hcpi Room Discovered to Be Inoperable for 14 Days.Mod Work & Functional Test Expected to Be Complete Before End of Refueling Outage ML19340E1481980-12-31031 December 1980 Special Rept 1-sp-80-3:on 801206,during Routine Survey of Waste Oil Drums,Several Areas on Ground Were Found to Be Contaminated.Caused by Storage of Previous Waste Oil Drums. Addl Controls Re Release of Contaminated Oil Under Review ML19340D8251980-12-19019 December 1980 Ro:On 801213,sprinkler Sys Providing Protection for Reactor Bldg Heating,Ventilation & Air Conditioning Had Been Inoperative for 14 Days.Caused by Implementation of Design Mods to Bring Sys Into NFPA Code Compliance ML19347C7251980-12-19019 December 1980 Ro:On 801213,sprinkler Sys Providing Protection for Reactor Bldg Heating,Ventilation & Air Conditioning Room Had Been Inoperable for 14 Days.Sys Isolated to Implement Mods for Corrective Action to Open Item in IE Rept 50-321/80-02 ML19340D1681980-12-0404 December 1980 Ro:On 801031,at 1400-h It Was Determined That Smoke Detectors Were Not Installed Per NFPA Code 72D.Cause Not Stated.Analysis Being Made of All Detection Sys & Design Work for Affected Sys Initiated ML19338F9851980-10-21021 October 1980 Ro:On 801009,following Reactor Scram on Low Reactor Water Level Due to Loss of Feedwater,Hpci Tripped on High Reactor Water Level.Caused by HPCI Auto Initiating on Low Reactor Water Level & Injecting Into Reactor ML19338D4821980-09-15015 September 1980 Ro:On 800908,following Reactor Scram,Hpci Auto Initiated & Injected Due to Low Reactor Water Level.Caused by MSIV Closure,Which Caused Reactor Scram,Loss of RFPT & Increased Reactor Pressure.Hpci Returned Water Level to Normal ML19330B5471980-07-29029 July 1980 Ro:On 800521 & 0711,following Reactor Scram HPCI Auto Initiated & Injected.Hpci Allowed to Return Reactor Level to 58 Inches.Msiv Closed Rendering Reactor Feed Pump Turbine Unavailable for Injection.Hpci Started Manually & Injected ML19320D4541980-07-14014 July 1980 Ro:On 800711,Unit 1 LPCI Inverter Tripped & Unit 2 4-kV Bus 2F Supply Breaker & HPCI Tripped.Supply Breaker Trip Caused by Jumper Missing from Neutral Leg.Motor Valve on HPCI Replaced Making It Operable.Events Submitted Per Ieb 80-17 ML19329F9241980-07-0202 July 1980 RO 50-321/80-076:while Reviewing as-builts Submitted Per IE Bulletin 79-14,util Discovered Hangers 1E11-RHRH-196 & 1E11-RHRH-313 Would Not Adequately Support Loads During Dbe. Caused by Faulty Design in Incorrect Valve Weights ML19329F9221980-07-0202 July 1980 RO 50-366/1980-100:on 800702,while Performing Surveillance Procedures HNP-2-3002 & HNP-2-3172M,high Drywell Pressure Switches 2C71-N002A Through D & 2E11-N011A Through D Found Out of Tolerance.Caused by Setpoint Drift.Switches Recalibr ML19329F8841980-06-27027 June 1980 RO 50-321/1980-069:on 800626,following Auto Initiation Signal,Hpci Failed to Inject to Reactor Pressure Vessel Due to Isolating on Steam Line High Dp Isolation Signal.Cause Under Investigation.Reset Isolation & Opened Inboard Valve ML19326D7421980-06-25025 June 1980 Ro:On 800522,licensee Reviewed Kinemetrics,Inc 800513 Calibr Rept Re Seismic Instrumentation.Triaxial Time-History Accelerograph 2L51-NO21 Calibr Indicates Excessive Change in Longitudinal Channel Characteristics ML19329F8731980-06-23023 June 1980 RO-50-321/1980-61:on 800622,while Preparing to Run RHR Sys, B RHR Loop Min Flow Manual Valves Were Discovered Closed. Caused by Failure to Return to Open Position After Loop Was Taken Out of Shutdown Cooling Mode.Valves Locked Open ML19318A6511980-06-12012 June 1980 RO 50-321/1980-062:on 800612,w/facility in Cold Shutdown, Investigation Began to Determine Cause of Pavement Deflection Which Occurred Beneath Crane Outrigger Pad at Intake Structure.Cause of Fill Separation from Pipe Unknown ML19318A6321980-06-0202 June 1980 RO 50-321/1980-055:on 800531,snubber 36 on X32-1F7,1-inch Instrument Line from Recirculation a Loop,Appeared Locked Up During Visual Insp.Caused by Snubber Corrosion.Snubbers Failing Surveillance Test Will Be Replaced Prior to Startup ML19318A6491980-05-30030 May 1980 RO 50-321/1980-054:on 800530,nondivisional Cables H21-P173-C010 & H21-P173-C013 Found Routed W/Div I & II Type Cables/Raceways.Caused by Design & Installation Error.Design Change Request 80-166 Submitted for Cable Rerouting ML19318A6431980-05-27027 May 1980 RO 50-321/1980-053:on 800524,discovered That Loss of Essential Motor Control Ctr 1B(R24-S011) or Loss of Diesel Generator 1A During Loss of Offsite Power Will Cause RHR & Core Spray a Loops to Be Inoperable.Caused by Faulty Valve ML19323E3101980-04-30030 April 1980 Supplemental Narrative Summary to RO 50-321/79-021,Revision 5:updates Tritium Levels in Ground Water Samples.Any Releases to Unrestricted Areas Are Miniscule & Result in Insignificant Doses to Public ML19309G0441980-04-24024 April 1980 Ro:On 800206,HPCI Was Manually Started & Injected Into Reactor Vessel to Maintain Reactor Vessel Water Inventory Following Trip of Reactor Feed Pump.Caused by Loss of Reactor Feed Pump Loop Seal.Hpci Was Shut Down ML19309F1351980-04-0707 April 1980 RO 50-366/1980-045:on 800405,during Cold Shutdown,Leak Rate Test on Automatic Depressurization Sys Valve Air Supply Accumulator Check Valves Indicated Unacceptable Leakage Rates.Cause Under Investigation.No Immediate Action Taken ML19290E6311980-03-0303 March 1980 Suppl to RO 50-321/1979-021,Revision 5 Providing Data on Tritium Levels in Ground Water ML19296D1711980-02-18018 February 1980 Supplemental Narrative Summary to RO 50-321/1979-021, Revision 5:on 791202,tritium Levels in Groundwater Samples Exceeded Limits.Caused by Leakage from Blown Seal on Condensate Transfer Pump.Pumps Temporarily Confined ML19210F0301979-11-0606 November 1979 RO-79-089:on 791106,while Evaluating as-built Seismic Piping & Supports,Head Vent Line Portion of RHR Head Spray Piping & Bypass to Condenser Valve Chest Found Unsupported.Caused by Omission of Supports from Design ML19209C6511979-10-11011 October 1979 RO 50-366/79-112:on 791011,during Shutdown for Maint,Found That Intermediate Range Monitor Had Been Removed & Was Not in Control Rod Driveline Cavity of Drywell.Caused by Removal for Clean Up Operation ML19249E1021979-09-11011 September 1979 RO 50-321/1979-OB1:on 790910,LOCA Conditions Discovered Capable of Causing Several Primary Containment & Inserting Valves to Overtravel During Closure.Caused by Differential Pressure Across Valves & Loss of Seating Ability ML19249C8911979-09-10010 September 1979 Ro:On 790908,Unit 1 Was in Run Position & Unit 2 Was in Hot shutdown,E11-C001A,B & D Pumps Failed to Meet Operability Procedure HNP-1-3167 Due to Formula Errors in Pump Discharge Pressure Calculations.Units Shut Down & Formulas Reviewed ML19249C8791979-09-0404 September 1979 RO-50-366/79-98:on 790902,NSSS Supplier Contacted Plant Mgt About Possible Cable Separation Irregularities within HPCI Sys.Caused by Design Error.Proposed Design Change in Process ML19249C9061979-08-29029 August 1979 Ro:On 790812,RHR Pump Suction Torus Isolation Valve E11-F004B Leaked Back Toward Containment.Local Leak Rate Test Performed.Leakage Less than Acceptance Criteria. LER Not Required.Valve Tightened & Tested Satisfactorily 1993-06-10
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217D3061999-10-13013 October 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Changes to Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Classification Scheme to Add Emergency Action Levels Related to Operation of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation HL-5845, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant.With ML20217A1691999-09-22022 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Engine Sys,Inc Controllers,Manufactured Between Dec 1997 & May 1999,that May Have Questionable Soldering Workmanship.Caused by Inadequate Personnel Training.Sent Rept to All Nuclear Customers ML20212A6641999-09-13013 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Relief Request RR-V-16 for Third 10 Yr Interval Inservice Testing Program HL-5836, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant.With ML20210J9631999-08-0202 August 1999 SER Finding That Licensee Established Acceptable Program to Verify Periodically design-basis Capability of safety-related MOVs at Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20210J9271999-08-0202 August 1999 SER Finds That Licensee Performed Appropriate Evaluations of Operational Configurations of safety-related power-operated Gate Valves to Identify Valves at Plant,Susceptible to Pressure Locking or Thermal Binding HL-5818, Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With HL-5805, Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20207E7631999-06-0303 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Proposed Alternative to Use Code Case N-509 Contained in RR-4 Provides Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety.Considers Rev 2 to RR-4 & RR-6 Acceptable HL-5795, Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Ehnp Units 1 & 2. with1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Ehnp Units 1 & 2. with ML20206G1691999-05-0404 May 1999 SER Approving Requirements of Istb 4.6.2(b) Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) HL-5784, Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With HL-5766, Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20207M1891999-03-11011 March 1999 SER Accepting Relief Request for Authorization of Alternative Reactor Pressure Vessel Exam for Circumferential Weld HL-5755, Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20206P6981999-01-0707 January 1999 Ehnp Intake Structure Licensing Rept HL-5726, Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20196J4931998-12-0707 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternatives in Relief Requests RR-V-12,RR-V-15,RR-P-15,RR-V-7,RR-V-12,RR-V-14 & RR-V-15 HL-5714, Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With HL-5706, Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2.With ML20155B6121998-10-28028 October 1998 Safety Evaluation of TR SNCH-9501, BWR Steady State & Transient Analysis Methods Benchmarking Topical Rept. Rept Acceptable HL-5691, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20153G2481998-09-24024 September 1998 SE Concluding That Licensee Implementation Program to Resolve USI A-46 at Plant Adequately Addressed Purpose of 10CFR50.54(f) Request ML20239A2531998-09-0303 September 1998 SER Accepting Licensee Request for Relief Numbers RR-17 & RR-18 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2.Technical Ltr Rept on Third 10-year Interval ISI Request for Reliefs for Plant,Units 1 & 2 Encl HL-5675, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20238F7131998-08-31031 August 1998 9,change 2 to QAP 1.0, Organization HL-5667, Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 HL-5657, Ro:On 980626,noted That Pami Channels Had Been Inoperable for More than Thirty Days.Cause Indeterminate.Licensee Will Replace Automatic Function W/Five Other Qualified Pamis of Like Kind in Drywell & Revised Procedures1998-07-30030 July 1998 Ro:On 980626,noted That Pami Channels Had Been Inoperable for More than Thirty Days.Cause Indeterminate.Licensee Will Replace Automatic Function W/Five Other Qualified Pamis of Like Kind in Drywell & Revised Procedures ML20236W3441998-07-30030 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Relief Requests for Second 10-yr ISI for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20236V5191998-07-28028 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed License Amend Power Uprate Review ML20236N6751998-07-0909 July 1998 Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Notification of Potential Safety Hazard from Breakage of Cast Iron Suction Heads in Apkd Type Pumps.Caused by Migration of Suction Head Journal Sleeve Along Lower End of Pump Shaft.Will Inspect Pumps ML20236L1821998-07-0707 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting 980428 Proposed Alternative to ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Repair & Replacement Requirements Under 10CFR50.55a(a)(3) HL-5653, Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 HL-5640, Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20248B8651998-05-15015 May 1998 Quadrennial Simulator Certification Rept HL-5628, Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant1998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant HL-5604, Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20216B2711998-02-28028 February 1998 Extended Power Uprate Safety Analysis Rept for Ei Hatch Plant,Units 1 & 2 HL-5585, Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1998 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 HL-5571, Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1998 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Unit 11998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1998 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Unit 1 HL-5551, Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1997 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1997 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20199B0561997-12-31031 December 1997 Rev 0 GE-NE-B13-01869-122, Jet Pump Riser Weld Flaw Evaluation Handbook for Hatch Unit 1 HL-5581, Annual Operating Rept for 1997, for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 21997-12-31031 December 1997 Annual Operating Rept for 1997, for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2 HL-5533, Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1997 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1997 for Ei Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 HL-5514, Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1997 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 21997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1997 for Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20212A1981997-10-16016 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee Request for Relief from Implementation of 10CFR50.55a Requirements Re Use of 1992 Edition of ASME Code Section XI for ISI of Containments ML20211M6491997-10-0808 October 1997 Addenda 1 to Part 21 Rept Re Weldments on Opposed Piston & Coltec-Pielstick Emergency stand-by Diesel gen-set lube-oil & Jacket Water Piping Sys.Revised List of Potentially Affected Utils to Include Asterisked Utils,Submitted ML20211H5311997-10-0101 October 1997 Rev 2 to Unit 1,Cycle 17 Colr ML20211H5251997-10-0101 October 1997 Rev 3 to Unit 1,Cycle 17 Colr 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
w-Georgia Power Company
- Go inverness Canter Parkaay Post Offcce Box 1295
. Birmingham. Alabama 35201 Telephone 205 877-7279 m
J. T. Beckham, Jr. ' tOrgia Power Woe Pre %nt - Nuclear Hatch projed A" ("" (' f CN2" May 3, 1993 Docket Nos. 50-321 HL-3270 50-366 005315 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Special Report 1-93-003 Fire Rated Assemblies Inoperable for Greater Than 14 Days Result in Special Report as Reauired by Fire Hazards Analysis Gentlemen:
In accordance with the requirements of the Unit I and Unit 2 Technical Specifications and Fire Hazards Analysis, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Special Report concerning an event wherein a fire rated assembly was inoperable for longer than 14 days.
If you have any questions in this regard, please call this office.
Sincerely, cb h J. T. Beckham, Jr.
JKB/cr
Enclosure:
Special Report 1-93-003 cc: Georoia Power Company Mr. H. L. Sumner, Geaeral Manager - Nuclear Plant NORMS U.S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission. Washinoton. D.C.
Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch U.S. Nuclear Reoulatory Commission. Reoion II Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. L. D. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch PDR 9305170202 930503 ADOCK 05000321
,/ pp
/ g S PDR
Enclosure f
, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Special Report 1-93-003 ,
Fire Rated Assemblies Inoperable for Greater Than 14 Days Result in Snecial Report as Reouired by Fire Hazards Analysis A. Reouirement for Report This report is required by the Plant Hatch Technical Specifications, section 6.9.2, and the Plant Hatch Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA),
appendix B, section 1.1.1. Technical Specifications section 6.9.2 ,
requires that special reports for fire protection equipment operating and surveillance requirements be submitted as required by the' FHA and its '
appendix B. FHA, appendix B, section 1.1.1, states that fire rated assemblies separating portions of safety related fire areas or separating redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area shall be operable. Action Statement (a) of section 1.1.1 allows a fire rated i assembly to be inoperable for up to 14 days provided the appropriate fire watch is established. Action Statement (b) requires that a special report be prepared and submitted to the NRC within 30 days if the fire i rated assembly is not restored to an operable status within the allowed 14-day time limit. ,
On 3/22/93, the nominal one hour fire barrier assemblies (i.e., fire wrap ;
material) installed to reduce the combustible loading in the unit common :
River Intake Structure were determined to be inoperable during the performance of plant surveillance procedure 42SV-FPX-007-05, " Cable Tray Surveillance - Kaowool Material." On 4/5/93, at the end of the allowed 14-day time limit, some of the fire rated assemblies had not been restored to an operable condition. Additionally, it was discovered on 4/5/93 that the fire rated assemblies on several River Intake Structure ;
cable trays, breached on 3/1/93 to pull cables per Design Change Request i 92-144, had not been restored properly on 3/12/93. Therefore, these fire i
rated assemblies had been inoperable for greater than the allowed 14 i days. ;
B. Unit Status at Time of Events ;
l On 4/5/93, Unit I was in a scheduled refueling outage with the core j unloaded and Unit 2 was in the Startup Mode. ;
C. Description of Events ;
i On 3/22/93, plant Quality Control personnel were inspecting the fire ;
resistive assemblies (i.e., fire wrap material) installed to reduce the t combustible loading in the River Intake Structure per plant surveillance (
HL-3270 005315 E-1 i
i Enclosure i Special Report 1-93-003 ;
procedure 42SV-FPX-007-OS, " Cable Tray Surveillance - Kaowool Material."
This procedure is performed at a frequency of once per 18 months to meet L the surveillance requirements of the FHA, appendix B, section 2.1.1.a. -
Inspection personnel discovered the fire wrap material was not installed on the cable trays as required by plant design drawing H-40234, " Intake Structure - EL 111' 0" Appendix 'R' - Fire Protection Kaowool Installation - Plan & Details," and plant procedure 42FP-FPX-011-OS, ;
" Cable Tray / Conduit Fire Protection Material Installation and Repair."
Specifically, gaps were found between sections of the fire wrap material '
such that portions of the cable tray were visible. The design drawing -
requires that the butt joints of each successive layer of the fire wrap material be separated by at least 18 inches to prevent any gaps at the joints from forming a direct path for fire to reach the cable tray.
Additionally, personnel found the ends of the cable trays were not wrapped in the configuration shown on the design drawing. The edges of I the section of fire wrap material on the ends of the cable trays were '
- found to overlap the wrap on the main run of the cable trays whereas the design drawing requires exactly the opposite configuration. It appears ,
at least some of these deficient conditions, which compromised the '
nominal one hour fire barrier rating of the material, have existed since the fire rated assemblies were installed on the River Intake Structure cable trays in 1984. ;
i
. As required by the surveillance procedure, Quality Control personnel i initiated a Deficiency Card documenting these conditions. On 3/22/93, l licensed Operations personnel, upon receipt of the Deficiency Card, i declared the fire rated assemblies in the River Intake Structure inoperable. Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 1-93-272 was ;
initiated as required by plant administrative control procedures and an hourly fire watch was established as required by the FRA, appendix B, section 1.1.1. On 4/5/93, some of the fire rated assemblies in the River .
Intake Structure had not been restored to an operable status due to a ;
shortage of the necessary fire wrap material.
On 4/5/93, personnel repairing deficient fire rated assemblies in the i
River Intake Structure discovered that the fire wrap material on several safety related cable trays had not been restored properly following their '
breach on 3/1/93 to pull cables per Design Change Request 92-144. ,
Specifically, only half of the required fire wrap material had been r placed around the cable trays on 3/12/93 when the fire rated assemblies .
were restored following completion of design change work activities.
t i 6
, i HL-3270 005315 E-2
l Enclosure l Special Report 1-93-003 i Drawing H-40234 and procedure 42FP-FPX-011-05 require four, 1/2-inch thick layers (or, alternatively, two, one-inch thick layers) of the fire wrap to be used to wrap the cable trays in the River Intake Structure.
Two inches of the fire wrap material are necessary to achieve the necessary fire resistive barrier. Instead, personnel replacing the fire rated assemblies on 4/5/93 found that only two,1/2-inch thick layers of the fire wrap had been used when the fire rated assembly had been restored on several cable trays on 3/12/93. Consequently, the fire rated assemblies on these cable trays had not been restored to an opertble status on 3/12/93 and, when discovered on 4/5/93, had exceeded the allowed 14-day time limit for restoration. Furthermore, the required hourly fire watch was not performed from 3/12/93 to 3/22/93 as the fire rated assemblies were thought to have been restored to an operable status. A fire watch was established as a result of the deficiencies found during the performance of surveillance procedure 42SV-FPX-00?-05.
Upon discovery of the improperly wrapped River Intake Structure cable trays, personnel initiated a Deficiency Card as required by plant administrative control procedures. Since, in effect, all safety related River Intake Structure cable tray fire rated assemblies had been declared inoperable on 3/22/93 and an hourly fire watch established as required by the FHA, no further actions were required in response to these deficient conditions.
D. Cause of Events These events were caused by inadequate fire wrap installation procedures and personnel error. Untimely discovery of these deficient conditions was the result of personnel error.
The River Intake Structure cable tray fire rated assemblies were deficient as a result of an inadequate installation procedure and personnel error. Plant procedure HNP-6908, " Installation and Repair of Fire Breaks & Penetrations: Fire Barriers and Seals," used to install the original River Intake Structure cable tray fire rated assemblies in 1984, was deficient in that it did not provide instructions on how to wrap the ends of the cable trays. It also was deficient in that it required no post-installation inspection of the wrapped cable trays even though one was required for the installation of other fire rated assemblies (e.g., penetration seals, cable tray fire breaks, Nelson Frames) covered by the procedure. Personnel installing the fire rated assemblies failed to follow the requirements of the installation procedure in that they did not separate the butt joints of each successive layer of the fire wrap by the distance specified in the HL-3270 005315 E-3
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En:.losure Special Report 1-93-003 i
l procedure. As a result of these procedural and personnel deficiencies, the fire rated assemblies were installed and placed into service with gaps between sections and the ends of the cable tray not wrapped properly. These deficiencies rendered the fire rated assemblies inoperable.
The deficiencies associated with the improperly wrapped caw e tray ends should have been discovered during previous 18-month inspections of these fire rated assemblies. Although the inspection would not have prevented these deficiencies, it should have resulted in their discovery and repair in a more timely manner. However, due to personnel error and less than sufficiently detailed procedures, these deficiencies were not noted during previous inspections. Similar problems with the performance of fire protection equipment surveillances resulted in the recent transfer of the responsibility for their performance to Quality Control personnel as a corrective action associated with Special Report 1-91-007. This was the first performance of surveillance procedure 42SV-FPX-007-OS using Quality Control personnel.
The River Intake Structure cable trays were improperly wrapped on 3/12/93 as a result of personnel error. Contributing to this event was a less -
than adequate installation procedure. Personnel restoring the fire wrap material on these cable trays failed to follow the requirements of plant ;
procedure 42FP-FPX-Oll-05. This procedure required the cable trays to be ;
wrapped with four, 1/2-inch thick layers of the fire wrap material.
However, personnel erroneously used only two,1/2-inch thick layers to 1 wrap the cable trays. The installation procedure was less than adequate in that it did not require any inspections during installation of the fire wrap. Although the procedure did require a post-installation inspection to be performed by Quality Control personnel, a post-installation inspection can not determine if the proper number of layers has been installed. Consequently, the procedure should have required inspections to be performed during, as well as following, the installation of the fire wrap material to ensure the correct amount of material had been installed.
E. Analysis of Event The safety-related equipment contained in the intake structure consists ,
of the Plant Service Water (PSW) pump motors, the Residual Heat Removal l Service Water (RHRSW) pump motors, the standby PSW pump motor, and the >
associated circuitry, piping, valves, and supports for the above components. The PSW pump motors are required to supply cooling water to ensure the operation of specific safety-related equipment in the event of HL-3270 005315 E-4 1
1
Enclosure Special Report 1-93-003 a design basis accident or transient. The PSW system supplies cooling water to safety-related equipment such as the diesel generators, residual heat removal (RHR) pump coolers, and emergency core cooling system equipment room coolers which are required for a safe reactor snutdown following a design basis accident or transient. The PSW system also supplies cooling water to non-safety related equipment during normal operation. During a design basis accident, the non-safety related equipment is designed to be isolated from the PSW system, and cooling water is supplied only to safety-related equipment.
The RHRSW system is required to provide cooling water to the RHR system heat exchangers and is required to operate for a safe reactor shutdown following a design basis accident or transient. The RHRSW system is required to operate whenever the RHR heat exchangers are required to operate in the shutdown cooling mode or in the suppression pool cooling and spray mode of the RHR system. In the shutdown cooling mode, the RHRSW system provides cooling water to the RHR system to ensure decay heat removal from the reactor core. The RHRSW system removes heat from the suppression pool to limit the suppression pocl temperature and primary containment pressure following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
In this event, the nominal one-hour fire barrier assemblies (i.e.,
Kaowool fire wrap material) was found to be degraded. Upon discovery of this deficiency, an hourly fire watch was established for the area in accordance with the FHA, appendix B, section 1.1.1.
The fire loading in the river intake structure is not significant and the design basis fire duration is less than 15 minutes. The primary combustibles located in this area are the lubricating oil in the PSW and RHRSW pump motors and cable insulation. Active protection for this area is provided by a thermal detection system and each of the PSW and RHRSW pump motors is provided with a fixed wet pipe automatic water spray system. The Kaowool fire wrap material was installed on the cable trays to reduce the combustible loading as part of the 10 CFR 50.48, Appendix R modifications. The Kaowool installation allowed an exemption from the requirements on Paragraph III.G.2 to the extent that an area wide automatic fire suppression system was not required for the entire River Intake Structure. The degraded condition of the Kaowool fire wrap due the defects in installation and material condition would not have resulted in a significant increase in the combustible loading for this area.
HL-3270 005315 E-5
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. i Enclosure Special Report 1-93-003 l l
In considering the permanent combustible materials, a fire, if one should l occur, would most likely be associated with a PSW or RHRSW pump motor.
- While ignition of the lubricating oil in the closed sumps is extremely ;
unlikely, the automatic water spray system is designed to quickly extinguish such a fire. Previous evaluations have shown that the water spray will not adversely affect the remaining pump motors. The most likely occurrence of a fire in this area is associated with transient i combustibles, such as that involved in changing the lubricating oil in i the pump motors. However, current administrative controls require a !;
continuous fire watch to be established when transient combustibles are in the area. Portable carbon dioxide and dry chemical fire i extinguishers, along with hose stations, are provided for manual fire i fighting. Consequently, if a fire involving transient combustibles l
, should occur, it would be immediately detected and promptly extinguished. !
- Based on the abova information, it is concluded that this event had no l l adverse effect on nuclear safety.
F. Corrective Actions l On 3/22/93, the fire rated assemblies in the River Intake Structure were !
declared inoperable, LCO l-93-272 was initiated, and an hourly fire watch of the affected areas was established as required by plant procedures and i the Plant Hatch FHA. ,
Maintenance Work Order 1-93-1230 was written to repair the deficient fire '
rated assemblies. Work was initiated on 4/1/93, but could not be completed by 4/5/93 because of a shortage of the necessary fire wrap -
material. Additional material has been received on-site and repairs of the fire rated assemblies in the River Intake Structure will be completed !
by 5/7/93. '
i Procedure HNP-6908 was deleted and replaced in part with procedure ;
42FP-FPX-Oll-OS in 1985. However, procedure 42FP-FPX-011-0S is in itself '
1 deficient in that it does not provide instructions on how to wrap the ,
ends of cable trays, and some of its instructions do not match the !
installation details on design drawing H-40234. Therefore, procedure ,
42FP-FPX-Oll-OS will be revised by 6/30/93 to correct these deficiencies :
and to require quality control inspections to be conducted at various steps during the installation of fire wrap material on River intake Structure cable trays. The current repair of fire rated assemblies on the cable trays in the River Intake Structure is being performed per the !
requirements of design drawing H-40234. !
4 h
HL-3270 005315 E-6 .
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- l Enclosure Special Report 1-93-003 Responsibility for the performance of surveillance procedure l
, 42SV-FPX-007-OS, and similar fire protection equipment inspections, has ,
been transferred to Quality Control personnel as part of an internal i improvement program.
Personnel responsible for restoring the fire rated assemblies on River i Intake Structure cable trays on 3/12/93 have been counseled regarding the ,
need to read, understand, and follow all procedural requirements >
governing their work activities.
Personnel !
responsible for inadequate performance of surveillance procedure 42SV-FPX-007-0S have been subjected to disciplinary action i under GPC's positive discipline program.
An expanded assessment will be performed by 7/31/93 to determine if (:
further enhancements or corrective actions are warranted in the fire protection surveillance program. This assessment will be performed by an [
- independent, third party evaluator knowledgeable in fire protection ;
programs. j
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