ML20043C078

Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-369/90-04 & 50-370/90-04.Corrective Actions:Correct Procedure Adherence Reemphasized to Job Supervisor & Engineering Group Involved in Authorization for Torque Change

ML20043C078
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	05/22/1990
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9006010280
Download: ML20043C078 (4)

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%w .. . . Duke ll Iburt Company Hn B kkn .

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• PO Bar.U198 Vice President y; Charlotte, N C 8:n NuclearProduction .

. H, (104)373 4.U1 i DUKE POWER-4 1'

May 22, 1990 ,

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I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissio.:

Document Control Desh Washington,'D.C. '20555 Subj ect.: McGuire Nuclear Station Docket Nos.- 50-369,'370 Inspection Report Nos.'369, 370/90-04 i Reply to a Notice of Violation l  !

Gentlement Pursuant to 10CFR.201, please find attached Duke Power Company's response to:

Violation 50-369/90-04-03 and 50-370/90-04-03 for the McGuire Nuclear .x Station.

ll l Should there be any questions.concerning this matter, contact W. T.-Byers at

! (704) 373-6194.

l Very truly yours, g- /f< d-Ital B. Tucker :j WTB/189/lcs Attachment .

xc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter Regional Administrator, Region II U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323~

t Mr. Darl llood "

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. P. K. VanDoorn NRC Resident Inspector ,

McGuire Nuclear Station 1 9006010280 900522 FDR ADOCK 05000369 pdc

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk' May 23, 1990 OUKE POWER COMPANY l McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION ,

Response to Violation ,

Violation 369/90-04-03 t Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires written procedures to be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2,- February.

1978.

Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978, Section 9.a. L states in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly performed in accordance with written procedures.

Station Directive 4.2.1, Handling of Station Procedures, states :in part that each major change to a procedure shall be approved prior'to use and that if -

a discrepancy affects the acceptance criteria of a procedure or prevents satisfactory completion of a procedure, a deficiency exists that shall be corrected prior to signing off the procedures.

Contrary to the above, the process to make a major change-in maintenance' J procedure MP/0/A/7600/31, Limitorque HRC Gearbox for Butterfly Valves-Corrective Maintenance, was not properly followed during a modification. On >

February 24, 1990, the maintenance procedure was signed off as complete prior to the approval of a procedure change which affected the satisfactory completion of the modification. A torque value of 130 ft-lb was used to mount the gearbox to the yoke on Containment Spray Heat Exchanger. Service Water inlet isolation valve,1RN-134A, prior to having.this torque value '

approved for use in the procedure.

This is a Severity Level IV (Supplement I) violation applicable to Unit 1 ,

l only.

Response

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1) Admission or denial of the violation:

McGuire admits the violation occurred as stated.

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l UlS. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l ATTN:- Document Control Desk l May 23, 1990 l

l 2) Reason (s) for the violation:

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The violation occurred because the job supervisor failed to wait until the procedure change was completed before signing the procedure as complete. At no time, however, was the job supervisor acting in an unsafe manner as engineering approval for the torque deviation had been granted.

3) The corrective steps which have been taken:

l Correct procedure adherence was re-emphasized to the job supervisor and '

i engineering group involved in authorization for the torque change.

l Those involved now fully understand that correct engineering guidance- .

must also comply'with procedures and directives.

4) Corrective steps which will be taken:

No further actions are considered necessary.

5) The date when full compliance will be achieved: =

Corrective steps were completed March 14, 1990. McGuire is presently in full compliance.

i Violation 370/90-04-03 Technical Specification 6.8.1.h requires written-procedures to be established, implemented, and maintained covering Fire Protection Program-implementation. .

Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC), 16.9.5, Fire Barrier Penetrations, states ir, part, that all fire barrier penetrations (walls, floor / ceilings, l cable tray enclosures and other fire barriers) separating. safety-related fire areas or separating portions of redundant systems-important to safe

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shutdown within.a fire area and all. sealing devices in fire rated assembly penetrations (fire doors, fire windows, fire dampers, cable piping, and ventilation duct penetration seals) shall be operable. With one or more of the required fire barrier penetrations devices inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly, or verify the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable assembly and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

l Contrary to the above, during a field walkdown of the Unit 2 Auxiliary

l. Feedwater system on March 15, 1990, the inspectors noted fire door 601G was-l blocked open, rendering it inoperable for an undetermined period of time.

No fire watch was posted and no hourly fire watch patrol was established.

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D U;S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk May 23, 1990 1

This is a Severity Level-IV (Supplement I) violation applicable to Unit 2 only.

Response

1) Admissior or denial of the. violation:

McGuire acmits the violation occurred as stated. ,

2) Reason (s) for the violation:

The door was blocked open due to personnel insensitivity to the-requirements of SLC 16.9.5 for the seemingly short duration the door '

would be blocked open.

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3) The corrective steps which have been taken:

The event was immediately investigated by supervision responsible for j '

the work crew. A review was conducted with personnel who had CAD keyed into the area during the time frame of the violation. Each individual was interviewed and counseled regarding the commitments and. proper procedures for fire doors.

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4) Corrective steps which will be taken:  !

i McGuire management is establishing a lead group to evaluate this i problem. This group is to evaluate every aspect of the fire door problem, including the human factors aspect, and make recommendations i to management on the appropriate corrective steps to be taken. : A memorandum to all site personnel will be prepared:to re-emphasize the importance of ensuring fire doors remain closed and the proper compensatory action required'if a door is found or is to be made 1

inoperable. This memorandum will be submitted to the lead group for i evaluation prior to distribution. This group will also be responsible  ;

for establishing appropriate time frames for the completion of  !

recommended corrective steps.

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5) Date when full compliance will be achieved:

The lead group will be formed by June 6, 1990. l 1

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