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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217N8911999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station for Period of 970422-990621,IAW 10CFR50.59(b).List of Changes Effecting Fsar,Encl ML20217D3951999-10-13013 October 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Util 990806 Submittal on USI A-46, Implementation Methodology Used at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Per GL 87-02 ML20217E1581999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-05 on 990726-0905.Three Violations Noted & Being Treated as Ncvs.Violations Include Failure to Assure That Design Bases Correctly Translated Into Specifications ML20217C3151999-10-0606 October 1999 Forwards Scenario Package for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Nrc/Fema Evaluated Exercise Scheduled for 991207.Without Encl ML20217D5591999-10-0505 October 1999 Documents Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Five Yr Survey of Main Breakwater.Survey Has Determined That Pilgrim Main Breakwater Is Intact & Remains Adequately Constructed to Perform Designed Safety Function ML20217C8051999-10-0505 October 1999 Forwards Proprietary Results of Audiologic Evaluations for Jp Giar,License SOP-10061-3.Attachment Clearly Shows Requirements for Operator Hearing Ability Are Met. Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML20212J8301999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs of Completion of mid-cycle PPR of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.Staff Conducts Reviews for All Operating NPPs to Integrate Performance Info & to Plan Insp Activities at Facility Over Next Six Months ML20216J9961999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Resume of Person Identified as Acting RPM in Licensee to NRC Re Notification That Person Named in License Condition 11 of 20-07626-02,is No Longer Employed at Pilgrim Station.Resume Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20212F7871999-09-24024 September 1999 Advises That Util 990121 Application for Amend Being Treated as Withdrawn.Proposed Changes Would Have Modified Facility UFSAR Pertaining to Values for post-accident Containment Pressure Credited in Pilgrim Net Positive Head Analyses ML20212H1381999-09-23023 September 1999 Submits Info in Support of Request Filed on 990730 to Grant one-time Exemption from 10CFR50,App E,Authorizing Biennial Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise to Be Conducted in 2002 Instead of 2001 ML20212H1441999-09-23023 September 1999 Withdraws 990121 Request for License Change Re Emergency Core Cooling Sys Net Positive Suction Head,Due to Incorrect Datum Preparation ML20212C2861999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards SER Accepting Licensee 981123 Request for Relief RR-E1,RR-E5,RR-E6 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) & Request for Relief RR-E2,RR-E3 & RR-E4 Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(ii) ML20216F3451999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards Summary Rept Providing Results of ISI Conducted at PNPS on-line & Refueling Outage (RFO 12) ML20216E7111999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards License Renewal Application Including Form NRC-398 & Form NRC-396 for Jp Giar,License SOP-10061-3.Without Encls ML20216E5891999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Copy of Pilgrim Station Organization Structure. Encl Refelcts Changes in Upper Mgt Level Structure.Changes Were Effective 990901 ML20211M4501999-09-0303 September 1999 Informs That Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Plans to Conduct Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise with Commonwealth of Ma on 991207,IAW 10CFR50,App E,Section IV.F.2 ML20211M9161999-08-31031 August 1999 Submits Review & Correction of Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database (Rvid),Version 2,re Pilgrim Station ML20211J8391999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Provisional Decommissioning Trust Agreement for Plant,Changing Portions of Agreement to Permit Up to Two Distributions & Clarify Formula for Distribution ML20211H5701999-08-27027 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-04 on 990610-0725.Two Violations Identified Being Treated as non-cited Violations ML20211C3381999-08-19019 August 1999 Provides semi-annual LTP Update,Including Schedule, Commitment Descriptions,Progress Since Last Update & Summary of Changes.Rev Bars Indicate Changes in Status Since Last Submittal ML20210U7521999-08-18018 August 1999 Forwards from Massachusetts State Senator T Murray Opossing Merger Between Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Systems ML20210U6691999-08-18018 August 1999 Forwards from Massachusetts State Senator T Murray Opposing Merger Between Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Systems ML20210U5761999-08-18018 August 1999 Responds to Opposing Merger of Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Sys in Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Informs That for Sale,Nrc Responsible for Only Ensuring That Entergy Technically & Financially Qualified to Operate NPP ML20210U5151999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Notice of Withdrawal of Application for Approval of Indirect Transfer of FOL for Pilgrim in Response to .Approval No Longer Needed Since Beco Sold Interest in Pilgrim to EOI on 990713 ML20211B3841999-08-16016 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Second RAI Re Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR power-operated Gate Valves ML20210U4831999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data Sheets for Period of 990101-0630,per 10CFR26.71(d) ML20210S0891999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Amend 11 to Indemnity Agreement B-48 Signed by Boston Edison Co & Entergy Nuclear Generation Co ML20210R6251999-08-0606 August 1999 Provides Supplementary Info on USI A-46 Implementation Methodology at Pilgrim Station,To Enable NRC to Perform Evaluation & Issuance of Plant Specific SER for Plant ML20210M9411999-08-0202 August 1999 Requests That NRC Treat Pending Actions Requested by Beco Prior to 990713,as Requests Made by Entergy.Ltr Requests That Minor Administrative Changes to License Amend 182 & Associated Ser, ,reflect 990713 Transfer ML20210H8761999-07-30030 July 1999 Requests That NRC Grant Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section IV F,Which Would Authorize Rescheduling of 2001 Biennial Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise for Pilgrim Station to 2002 ML20210H8661999-07-29029 July 1999 Provides Revised Response to GL 96-06 & Addresses NRC Insp Concern for Containment Penetration X-12.Info Submitted to Facilitate NRC Review & Closeout of Subject GL for Plant ML20216E2321999-07-26026 July 1999 Discusses GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity. NRC Revised Info in Rvid & Releasing as Rvid Version 2 ML20216D4131999-07-22022 July 1999 Informs That J Conlon,License OP-11040-1,terminated Employment with Beco on 990703,per 10CFR50.74.Individual Will Not Participate in Util Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program ML20210E2231999-07-20020 July 1999 Discusses Arrangements Made by Dennis & M Santiago During 990615 Telephone Conversation for NRC to Inspect Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Pilgrim During Wk of 991004 ML20210C4151999-07-19019 July 1999 Informs That Util Intends to Submit Approx Eight Licensing Actions in FY00 & Eight in FY01,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02.Actions Are Not Expected to Generate Complex Reviews ML20210A9441999-07-14014 July 1999 Responds to Re Changes to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Physical Security Plan Identified as Issue 2,rev 14, Addendum 1,respectively.No NRC Approval Is Required IAW 10CFR54(p) ML20210F3711999-07-14014 July 1999 Informs NRC That Effective 990713,listed Pilgrim Station Security Plans Have Been Transferred from Boston Edison to Entergy & Are Still in Effect ML20209G2251999-07-0909 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-293/99-03 on 990419-0609.Five Severity Level IV Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations,Consistent with App C. Several Individual Tagging Errors Occurred ML20209C4661999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Addendum on Proposed Change in Corporate Ownership Structure Involving Entergy Nuclear Generation Co ML20209C3851999-07-0606 July 1999 Forwards Redacted Draft of Decommissioning Trust Agreement Re Transfer of PNPS & NRC Operating License & Matls License from Boston Edison Co to Entergy Nuclear Generating Co ML20209C7761999-07-0606 July 1999 Submits Annual Summary Rept of Changes Made to QAP Description as Described in QA Manual,Vol Ii.Rept Covers Period of Jul 1998 Through June 1999.No Changes Made During Period ML20196J7251999-07-0101 July 1999 Informs of Completion of Licensing Action for GL 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits, for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20209B9411999-06-30030 June 1999 Discusses Deferral of IGSCC Welds to RFO 13.Deferral of Welds to Refueling Outage 13 Does Not Impact Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety Per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i) Since Plant in Compliance W/Exam Percentage Requirements ML20209B9431999-06-30030 June 1999 Provides Formal Notification That Closing Date for Sale & Transfer of Pilgrim Station Scheduled to Occur on 990713. a Wang Will Be Verbally Notified of Time of Sale Closing ML20196H2381999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards SER Denying Licensee 980820 Request for Alternative Under PRR-13,rev 2 for Use of Code Case N-522 During Pressure Testing of Containment Penetration Piping ML20209B9791999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Rev 13A to Pilgrims COLR for Cycle 13,IAW TS 5.6.5 Requirements.Rev 13A Provides cycle-specific Limits for Operating Pilgrim During Remainder of Cycle 13 ML20209A8761999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards SER Authorizing Licensee 990317 Relief Request to Use ASME Code Case N-573 as Alternative to ASME Code Section XI Article IWA-4000 for Remainder of 10-year Interval Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20209A8701999-06-25025 June 1999 Responds to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant,Reporting Status of Facility Y2K Readiness Encl ML20210U5901999-06-25025 June 1999 Opposes Merger of Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Sys in Commonwealth of Massachusetts.Expresses Skepticism Re Claim by Companies That Consumers Will Benefit from Proposed Consolidation & four-year Freeze in Base Rates ML20209C3431999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Addendum 1,Rev 14 to Pilgrim Station Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Changes Proposed Have Been Implemented & Constitute Increase in Plant Defense Plan Commitments.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217N8911999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station for Period of 970422-990621,IAW 10CFR50.59(b).List of Changes Effecting Fsar,Encl ML20217C3151999-10-0606 October 1999 Forwards Scenario Package for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Nrc/Fema Evaluated Exercise Scheduled for 991207.Without Encl ML20217C8051999-10-0505 October 1999 Forwards Proprietary Results of Audiologic Evaluations for Jp Giar,License SOP-10061-3.Attachment Clearly Shows Requirements for Operator Hearing Ability Are Met. Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML20217D5591999-10-0505 October 1999 Documents Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Five Yr Survey of Main Breakwater.Survey Has Determined That Pilgrim Main Breakwater Is Intact & Remains Adequately Constructed to Perform Designed Safety Function ML20216J9961999-09-29029 September 1999 Forwards Resume of Person Identified as Acting RPM in Licensee to NRC Re Notification That Person Named in License Condition 11 of 20-07626-02,is No Longer Employed at Pilgrim Station.Resume Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20212H1441999-09-23023 September 1999 Withdraws 990121 Request for License Change Re Emergency Core Cooling Sys Net Positive Suction Head,Due to Incorrect Datum Preparation ML20212H1381999-09-23023 September 1999 Submits Info in Support of Request Filed on 990730 to Grant one-time Exemption from 10CFR50,App E,Authorizing Biennial Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise to Be Conducted in 2002 Instead of 2001 ML20216F3451999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards Summary Rept Providing Results of ISI Conducted at PNPS on-line & Refueling Outage (RFO 12) ML20216E7111999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards License Renewal Application Including Form NRC-398 & Form NRC-396 for Jp Giar,License SOP-10061-3.Without Encls ML20216E5891999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Copy of Pilgrim Station Organization Structure. Encl Refelcts Changes in Upper Mgt Level Structure.Changes Were Effective 990901 ML20211M4501999-09-0303 September 1999 Informs That Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Plans to Conduct Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise with Commonwealth of Ma on 991207,IAW 10CFR50,App E,Section IV.F.2 ML20211M9161999-08-31031 August 1999 Submits Review & Correction of Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database (Rvid),Version 2,re Pilgrim Station ML20211J8391999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Provisional Decommissioning Trust Agreement for Plant,Changing Portions of Agreement to Permit Up to Two Distributions & Clarify Formula for Distribution ML20211C3381999-08-19019 August 1999 Provides semi-annual LTP Update,Including Schedule, Commitment Descriptions,Progress Since Last Update & Summary of Changes.Rev Bars Indicate Changes in Status Since Last Submittal ML20211B3841999-08-16016 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC Second RAI Re Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR power-operated Gate Valves ML20210U4831999-08-13013 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data Sheets for Period of 990101-0630,per 10CFR26.71(d) ML20210S0891999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Amend 11 to Indemnity Agreement B-48 Signed by Boston Edison Co & Entergy Nuclear Generation Co ML20210R6251999-08-0606 August 1999 Provides Supplementary Info on USI A-46 Implementation Methodology at Pilgrim Station,To Enable NRC to Perform Evaluation & Issuance of Plant Specific SER for Plant ML20210M9411999-08-0202 August 1999 Requests That NRC Treat Pending Actions Requested by Beco Prior to 990713,as Requests Made by Entergy.Ltr Requests That Minor Administrative Changes to License Amend 182 & Associated Ser, ,reflect 990713 Transfer ML20210H8761999-07-30030 July 1999 Requests That NRC Grant Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section IV F,Which Would Authorize Rescheduling of 2001 Biennial Full Participation Emergency Preparedness Exercise for Pilgrim Station to 2002 ML20210H8661999-07-29029 July 1999 Provides Revised Response to GL 96-06 & Addresses NRC Insp Concern for Containment Penetration X-12.Info Submitted to Facilitate NRC Review & Closeout of Subject GL for Plant ML20216D4131999-07-22022 July 1999 Informs That J Conlon,License OP-11040-1,terminated Employment with Beco on 990703,per 10CFR50.74.Individual Will Not Participate in Util Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program ML20210C4151999-07-19019 July 1999 Informs That Util Intends to Submit Approx Eight Licensing Actions in FY00 & Eight in FY01,in Response to Administrative Ltr 99-02.Actions Are Not Expected to Generate Complex Reviews ML20210F3711999-07-14014 July 1999 Informs NRC That Effective 990713,listed Pilgrim Station Security Plans Have Been Transferred from Boston Edison to Entergy & Are Still in Effect ML20209C7761999-07-0606 July 1999 Submits Annual Summary Rept of Changes Made to QAP Description as Described in QA Manual,Vol Ii.Rept Covers Period of Jul 1998 Through June 1999.No Changes Made During Period ML20209C3851999-07-0606 July 1999 Forwards Redacted Draft of Decommissioning Trust Agreement Re Transfer of PNPS & NRC Operating License & Matls License from Boston Edison Co to Entergy Nuclear Generating Co ML20209B9431999-06-30030 June 1999 Provides Formal Notification That Closing Date for Sale & Transfer of Pilgrim Station Scheduled to Occur on 990713. a Wang Will Be Verbally Notified of Time of Sale Closing ML20209B9411999-06-30030 June 1999 Discusses Deferral of IGSCC Welds to RFO 13.Deferral of Welds to Refueling Outage 13 Does Not Impact Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety Per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i) Since Plant in Compliance W/Exam Percentage Requirements ML20209B9791999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Rev 13A to Pilgrims COLR for Cycle 13,IAW TS 5.6.5 Requirements.Rev 13A Provides cycle-specific Limits for Operating Pilgrim During Remainder of Cycle 13 ML20209A8701999-06-25025 June 1999 Responds to NRC Request for Info Re Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant,Reporting Status of Facility Y2K Readiness Encl ML20210U5901999-06-25025 June 1999 Opposes Merger of Bec Energy & Commonwealth Energy Sys in Commonwealth of Massachusetts.Expresses Skepticism Re Claim by Companies That Consumers Will Benefit from Proposed Consolidation & four-year Freeze in Base Rates ML20209C3431999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Addendum 1,Rev 14 to Pilgrim Station Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p)(2).Changes Proposed Have Been Implemented & Constitute Increase in Plant Defense Plan Commitments.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20195G3721999-06-0707 June 1999 Informs That Proposed Indicators Failed QA Assessments for Digital Verification,Validation & Control of Software. Proposed Mod Can Be Completed on-line ML20195B5021999-05-27027 May 1999 Provides Suppl Info to 990203 Request of Beco That NRC Consent to Indirect Transfer of Control of Util Interest in License DPR-35.Request Described Proposed Merger of Bec Energy with Commonwealth Energy Sys ML20207D4681999-05-24024 May 1999 Provides Addl Info to That Included in Beco Ltr 98-123 Dtd 981001,addressing NRC Concerns Described in GL 96-06, Concerning Waterhammer in Reactor Bldg Closed Cooling Water Sys ML20195B9051999-05-20020 May 1999 Forwards Completed Renewal Applications for Listed Operators.Without Encls ML20206J4901999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards Completed License Renewal Application,Including Forms NRC-398 & 396 for Sc Power,License OP-6328-3 ML20206P0711999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396, Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee, for K Walz,License SOP-10886-1.Encl Withheld IAW 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML20206D3621999-04-27027 April 1999 Informs NRC That Final Five Sys self-assessments Required to Fulfill Commitment Made in 980828 Response to Insp Rept 50-293/98-04 Were Completed on 990422.Completion Was Delayed by High Priority Refueling Outage 12 Preparatory Work ML20205R9871999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Affidavit of JW Yelverton of Entergy Nuclear Generation Co Supporting Request for Withholding Info from Rept on Audit of Financial Statements for Year Ended 971231. Pages 16 & 18 of Subj Rept Also Encl ML20207B0891999-04-20020 April 1999 Forwards e-mail Message from Constituent,J Riell Re Y2K Compliance of Nuclear Power Plant in Plymouth,Massachusetts. Copy of Article Entitled Nuke Plants May Not Be Y2K Ready Also Encl ML20206A2741999-04-16016 April 1999 Dockets Encl Ltr Which Was Sent to AL Vietti-Cook Re Condition of Approval of Transfer of License & License Condition for DPR-35.Encl Resolves Issues Between Attorney General of Commonwealth of Massachusetts & Applicants ML20205P9131999-04-16016 April 1999 Submits Applicant Consent to Listed Condition of Approval of Transfer of License & License Condition for License DPR-35 & Affirmatively Request That NRC Adopt Listed Language in Order ML20205P9271999-04-16016 April 1999 Withdraws Motion for Leave to Intervene & Petition for Summary Or,In Alternative,For Hearing.Requests That NRC Adopt Condition of Approval of Transfer of License & License Condition Agreed to Beco & Entergy Nuclear Generation Co ML20205Q9231999-04-15015 April 1999 Forwards Proprietary & non-proprietary Addl Info in Support of Request to Transfer of Plant FOL & Matls License to Entergy Nuclear Generation Co.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20205P9631999-04-15015 April 1999 Provides Attachments a & B in Support of Request for Transfer of Plant Operating License & NRC Matl License from Beco to Entergy Nuclear Generation Co as Submitted in Ref 1. Info Provided in Response to Request at 990413 Meeting ML20205H9281999-04-0707 April 1999 Requests Withdrawal of Uwua Locals 369 & 387 Unions Joint Intervention in Listed Matter ML20205F3731999-04-0202 April 1999 Submits Addl Info Provided in Support of Request for Transfer of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Operating License & Matls License.State of Ma Order Authorizing Divestiture & Copy of Financial Arrangement Encl ML20204H3771999-03-26026 March 1999 Informs That Local 387,Utility Workers Union of America,AFL- Cio Voted to Approve New Contract with Entergy Nuclear Generation Co & Voted to Accept Boston Edison Divestiture Agreement ML20205D4231999-03-24024 March 1999 Forwards Decommissioning Funding Rept for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station,In Accordance with 10CFR50.75(f)(1) 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARBECO-90-108, Forwards Anticipated Operator Licensing Exam Schedule Requested by Generic Ltr 90-07, Operator Licensing Natl Exam Schedule,1990-09-12012 September 1990 Forwards Anticipated Operator Licensing Exam Schedule Requested by Generic Ltr 90-07, Operator Licensing Natl Exam Schedule, ML20059D6641990-08-30030 August 1990 Forwards Revised Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures,Per 10CFR50,App E,Section V.W/O Encl ML20059D6791990-08-30030 August 1990 Notifies That Two Remaining Actions for Implementation of SPDS at Plant Complete,Per .Spds Procedures Modified,Identifying Sampling Panel C-19 Return Valves to Operator BECO-90-100, Advises That Valve MO-1001-50 Cannot Be Shown to Meet 30-day Mission for PASS in post-accident Environ Due to Elevated Radiation Dose Rates.Util Currently Developing Solution to Allow PASS to Meet 30-day Availability Requirement1990-08-27027 August 1990 Advises That Valve MO-1001-50 Cannot Be Shown to Meet 30-day Mission for PASS in post-accident Environ Due to Elevated Radiation Dose Rates.Util Currently Developing Solution to Allow PASS to Meet 30-day Availability Requirement BECO-90-102, Forwards Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data for Jan- June 19901990-08-23023 August 1990 Forwards Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data for Jan- June 1990 BECO-90-095, Informs That Kn Taylor Permanently Reassigned to Nuclear Training Dept as of 900717.Taylor Will Remain in Position Which Does Not Require License Certification1990-08-0808 August 1990 Informs That Kn Taylor Permanently Reassigned to Nuclear Training Dept as of 900717.Taylor Will Remain in Position Which Does Not Require License Certification BECO-90-092, Forwards, Decommissioning Funding Rept, Per 10CFR50.33(k) & 50.75(b)1990-07-26026 July 1990 Forwards, Decommissioning Funding Rept, Per 10CFR50.33(k) & 50.75(b) ML20044B3111990-07-11011 July 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 90-001, Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Mfg by Rosemount. Corrective Actions Include Replacement of Transmitters Identified in Suspect Lots & Implementation of Surveillance Program ML20044A7891990-06-19019 June 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Request for Info on Status of Licensee Implementation of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions. Table Listing Status of Each Issue Encl ML20043D7181990-05-31031 May 1990 Advises That Response to NRC 900426 Safety Evaluation Re Util 880804 & 890619 Responses to Generic Ltr 88-01 Will Be Sent on 901115 ML20043A8211990-05-15015 May 1990 Notifies of Change of Senior Operator Status for Cj Martin, Per 10CFR50.74.CJ Martin Will No Longer Participate in Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program ML20042F2211990-05-0101 May 1990 Advises That Scheduled Completion of SPDS Human Factors Validation Activities Scheduled for 900630 & Sys Availability Test by 900731 ML20043B3881990-05-0101 May 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-293/90-05. Corrective actions:82 Excess Flow Check Valves Installed & Operability of Valves Verified by Performing Surveillance Testing ML20012F5601990-04-0202 April 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-13 Re Svc Water Sys Problems Affecting safety-related Equipment.Util Instituted Biofouling Control Program in 1982 & Program Has Been Effectively Implemented at Plant & Complies W/Generic Ltr ML20012F3631990-03-30030 March 1990 Requests Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Requirements of Tech Spec Table 3.2.C-1, APRM Upscale Rod Block in Startup & Refuel Modes to Avoid Unnecessary Delay in Critical Path Surveillance Testing ML20012C6501990-03-15015 March 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-01 Re Request for Voluntary Participation in NRC Regulatory Impact Survey.Completed Questionnaire for Applicable Areas Delineated in Survey Encl ML20012D1931990-03-15015 March 1990 Forwards Proposed Scope & Objectives of Annual Exercise 90-04-B Scheduled for 900618 Per Lazarus 890609 Ltr, Emergency Exercise Objective & Scenerio Guidelines. Exercise Will Test & Evaluate Util EPIPs ML20012C7191990-03-14014 March 1990 Forwards Explanation of Errors in 890707 Application Re Corrective Action Plan & Advises That Errors Do Not Affect Technical Basis on Which Exemption Granted.Util Corrective Action Plan Remains Unchanged ML20011F5381990-02-26026 February 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-293/89-12 on 891002-1119.Corrective Actions:On 891109,operations Personnel Directed,Via Night Orders,To Be More Diligent W/ Tagout Documentation & Boundary Tagging Clarified ML20011F2301990-02-23023 February 1990 Notifies of Change in Status of Senior Licensed Operator. DW Gerlits Terminated Senior Reactor Operator License on 900201 But Will Retain Position as Senior Sys & Safety Analysis Engineer ML20006G1411990-02-23023 February 1990 Advises That Tj Mcdonough Reassigned Effective 900126. Individual Will No Longer Participate in Licensed Operator Requalification Training Program ML20011F6521990-02-21021 February 1990 Forwards Inservice Insp Plan for 1990 mid-cycle Spring Outage for Facility.Augmented Insp Will Be Performed for Three IGSCC Category a Welds Using Guidance in Generic Ltr 88-01 & Criteria in NRC Bulletin 88-08,Suppl 3 ML20011F4481990-02-20020 February 1990 Forwards Revised Operability Evaluation of Salt Svc Water Pumps for Plant.Evaluation Concludes That Salt Svc Water Pumps Operable & Requirements of Tech Spec 3.5.B.1 for Pumps Met ML20006G0051990-02-20020 February 1990 Forwards Update to long-term Plan,In Accordance W/Section V.A of Plan for Long-Term Program. Util Implementing Plant Betterment Mods & Activities ML20011E7551990-02-0909 February 1990 Requests Temporary Relief from Tech Spec 4.7.A.2.b.1.d, Limiting Condition for Operation. ML19354E7661990-01-23023 January 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-002, Stress Corrosion Cracking of High Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel Bolting in Anchor Darling.... Review Determined That No Subj Anchor Darling Swing Check Valves or Similar Valves Installed at Facility ML20011F4441990-01-19019 January 1990 Forwards Operability Evaluation Re Salt Svc Water Pumps P208 B,C,D & E,Per 900117 Telcon.Evaluation Concluded That Salt Svc Water Pumps P208 B,C,D & E Operable & Tech Spec 3.5.B.1 Requirements Met ML20006A0761990-01-15015 January 1990 Forwards Executed Amend 10 to Indemnity Agreement B-48 ML20006A2591990-01-15015 January 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-10, Safety-Related Motor- Operated Valve Testing & Surveillance. Util Will Develop Program to Enhance Maint,Analysis & Testing Already Conducted on motor-operated Valves ML20005G7701990-01-11011 January 1990 Discusses Revised Schedule for Operability & Availability of Spds,Per 891221 Notification to Nrc.Rev Necessitated by Software Problems Affecting 891231 Schedule Projected in Util 890710 Ltr ML20005G7451990-01-11011 January 1990 Provides Bases for Environ Qualification of Instrumentation Monitoring Effluent Radioactivity & Status of Standby Power Per Reg Guide 1.97,Rev 3 & Generic Ltr 82-33 ML20005G8061990-01-11011 January 1990 Advises That Commitment to Complete Enhancements of Control Panels as Part of Dcrdr,Per NUREG-0737,Item I.D.1 by Oct 1989 Not Met.All Three Panels at Simulator Enhanced & Installation of Revised Meter Scales in Progress ML20005F0761990-01-0404 January 1990 Forwards Revised Inservice Test Program in Response to Generic Ltr 89-04.List of Inservice Test Program Relief Requests Previously Submitted & Acceptable,Per Generic Ltr 89-04,encl ML20005E5601989-12-29029 December 1989 Certifies That Util Has Established Fitness for Duty Program That Meets Requirements of 10CFR26.Drug & Alcohol Level Screening Match Rule Imposition & Implementation Will Be Effective on 900103 ML20042D4821989-12-26026 December 1989 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-293/89-10. Corrective Action:Radiological Section Standing Order 89-09 Issued Allowing Only Radiological Supervisors to Exercise Locked High Radiation Area Door & Key Control ML20011D6851989-12-14014 December 1989 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 89-21, Request for Info Re Status of Implementation of USI Requirements. ML20011D1631989-12-14014 December 1989 Forwards Pilgrim Nuclear Plant Station Final Assessment Rept, Summarizing Results of self-assessments & Evaluations Conducted Throughout Implementation of Plant Restart Plan & Power Ascension Program ML19325F2751989-11-10010 November 1989 Responds to NRC Bulletin 88-010,Suppl 1, Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Breakers. Util Installed H2/02 Analyzers Procured in 1980 & Therefore Exempt from Bulletin Requirements ML19327C0911989-11-0606 November 1989 Forwards Response to Suppl 3 to NRC Bulletin 88-008, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs. Since cyclic- Thermal Heatup/Cooldown Not Present in Piping,Failure Due to Cyclic Thermal Fatigue Will Not Occur ML19325E8581989-11-0101 November 1989 Discusses Litigation Before FERC Re Plant.Util Will Undertake Review of Matls Developed by Opposing Parties in Proceedings.Required Repts Will Be Submitted to NRC After Reportability Has Been Determined ML19325E5251989-10-27027 October 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 88-20,Suppl 1,describing Plan for Completing Individual Plant Exam for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities.Performance of Level 1 PRA Based on Current Plant Design & Operation Intended ML19325E5661989-10-27027 October 1989 Response to Generic Ltr 89-04, Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Programs. Revised Inservice Testing Program Which Will Include Statement of Conformance to Technical Positions Will Be Submitted by 891215 ML19324B8191989-10-25025 October 1989 Informs That C Leonard & J Stokes Reassigned to Positions Which Do Not Require License Certification Effective 891003 & 891020,respectively ML19327B2291989-10-20020 October 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-07 Re Power Reactor Safeguards Contingency Planning for Surface Vehicle Bombs.Changes Made to Contingency Plan,Per 10CFR50.54.Plan Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML19325E0981989-10-20020 October 1989 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-293/89-07.Corrective Actions:Terminal Block Replaced, post-work Functional Test of Ref Temp Switches Performed & Procedure Tp 88-78 Revised to Correct Relay Numbers BECO-89-142, Responds to NRC Re Violations & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty from Insp Rept 50-293/89-95. Corrective Action:Two Responsible Util Operators Suspended Because Breakers Incorrectly Positioned for Test1989-09-22022 September 1989 Responds to NRC Re Violations & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty from Insp Rept 50-293/89-95. Corrective Action:Two Responsible Util Operators Suspended Because Breakers Incorrectly Positioned for Test BECO-89-144, Requests Interim Approval for Relief from Testing of RHR Sys Valves 63 & 64 Until Refueling Outage 8 Scheduled for 9103151989-09-22022 September 1989 Requests Interim Approval for Relief from Testing of RHR Sys Valves 63 & 64 Until Refueling Outage 8 Scheduled for 910315 BECO-89-135, Forwards Util Anticipated OL Exam Schedule,Per 890706 Generic Ltr 89-12 Request1989-09-11011 September 1989 Forwards Util Anticipated OL Exam Schedule,Per 890706 Generic Ltr 89-12 Request BECO-89-131, Forwards Tech Spec Figures 6.2-2 & 6.2-1,replacing Title of Director of Nuclear Engineering W/Title of Station Director & Adding New Title of Vice President of Nuclear Engineering1989-09-0505 September 1989 Forwards Tech Spec Figures 6.2-2 & 6.2-1,replacing Title of Director of Nuclear Engineering W/Title of Station Director & Adding New Title of Vice President of Nuclear Engineering BECO-89-129, Submits Addl Info Re 890707 Request for Exemption from Certain Containment Leakage Testing Requirements of 10CFR50. Plant mid-cycle Maint Outage,Previously Scheduled for Oct 1989,has Been Rescheduled for Spring 19901989-09-0101 September 1989 Submits Addl Info Re 890707 Request for Exemption from Certain Containment Leakage Testing Requirements of 10CFR50. Plant mid-cycle Maint Outage,Previously Scheduled for Oct 1989,has Been Rescheduled for Spring 1990 1990-09-12
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BOETON EDIEON COMPANY BOD BOYLSTON STattT 50sTON. MASSACHUBETTa 02199 WILLIAM D. HARRINGTON esusom viss pneesosut m3fbSAA I
June 9, 1983 BECo Letter No. 83- 145 Mr. Domenic B. Yassallo, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 License No. DPR-35 Docket No. 50-293
Subject:
Design Details of NUREG 0737 Item II.F.1.6 Containment Atmospheric Monitor.
Reference:
Telecon, K. Eccelston (NRC) and T.M. Thurston (BECo), April 11, 1983.
Dear Sir:
As requested by Mr. K. Eccelston of your office, Boston Edison is furnishing, via the Attachment, our design detail description for the subject NUREG item.
Boston Edison plans to complete this task by June 1,1984.
We trust this information is responsive to your needs. However, should you have any questions, please contact us.
Very truly yours, 9
Attachment (13 pages) l 8306150011 830613 PDR ADOCK 05000293 f /
P PDR
1 Attachment (13 pages)
Summary The H2 /02 System has been designed to provide continuous "on-line" monitoring of the hydrogen and oxygen concentrations within the Primary Containment atmosphere l (both torus and drywell). The H 2/02 System is a safety related system and is required to monitor potential combustible gas mixtures within the Primary Contain-ment following postulated loss of coolant accidents (LOCA).
Operation of the 02 portion of the system during plant operation will satisfy the Technical Specification requirements related to the monitoring of containment 02 concentration during power operation. The H 2/02 System consists of two redundant safety trains, each of which can independently fulfill the safety related functions of the system. Each safety train includes an analyzer panel, a Reagent Gas Sub-system and the necessary valves, piping, and tubing to transport the containment atmosphere sample to and from the analyzer panels. Each safety train is capable of taking samples from four locations (approximately EL 70', 67', 37', and 16' 9")
within the drywell and two locations (approximately 180' apart at EL 14' 3") with-
! in the torus. A common Calibration Sas Subsystem to both safety trains is pro-l vided for periodic calibration of the analyzers.
The analyzer panels for both trains are located on the 74' 3" elevation in the Reactor Building where local control of the system can be performed. A remote control station for each train is also provided in the Control Room in panels C-174 and C-175.
Each train of the H /022 System is capable of monitoring oxygen and hydrogen con-centrations with a maximum range of 0-20 +.2% for hydrogen and 0-25 +.5% for oxygen concentrations. Readouts are provTded locally at the analyzer panels and remotely in the Control Room at panels C-174 and C-175. High hydrogen concen-tration alarms, high oxygen concentration alarms, and strip chart recorders are 1
also displayed on the Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) panels located in the Con-trol Room (Panel C-170 and C-171).
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a SYSTEM DESIGN Detailed Design Description General The H2 /02 System has been designed to obtain, analyze, and provide indication (locally and in the Control Room) of hydrogen and oxygen concentrations within the Primary Containment. The system has been designed for operation during normal plant operation and during postulated LOCA conditions. The system pro-vides "on-line" monitoring of H /02 2 concentrations through a maximum range of 0 to 20% and 0 to 25%, respectively.
The H2 /02 System is comprised of two sample and analyzer trains. Each train consists of an analyzer panel, Calibration Gas and Reagent Gas Subsystems, and associated valves and piping for sample supply and return lines. Each train is independent, and redundant with the exception of a Calibration Gas Subsystem which is common to both trains.
NOTE: The Primary Containment penetrations utilized by the H 2/02 System are e
currently used by the existing H2 and 02 Analyzers Systems. The installa-tion of the new H2/02 System will therefore render these Ifnes inoperable for the existing H2 and 02 Analyzers.
Gas Sample Supply and Return Lines The H2 /02 System is designed to provide "in-line" analysis of the H2 and 02 con-centrations in the Primary Containment. In the analyze mode, a Primary Con-tainment atmosphere sample is drawn from the Primary Containment (either drywell and torus) and is returned to containment after passing through the analyzer panel. All sample supply lines are electrically heat traced and insulated to maintain the sample temperature greater than 275'F to prevent condensation of-i steam in the sample lines. In addition all sample supply lines are continuously sloped away from the analyzer canels to allow drainage. All sample return lines
, are sloped from the analyzers to allow condensation to drain from the analyzer
!. panels. '
l The locations of these sample supply and return lines are as follows:
- 1. Drywell Atmosphere Sample Lines s
l Each train of the H 2/02 System is capable of obtaining drywell atmosphere samples from two separate locations.
Train A of the H /02 2 System is capable of obtaining drywell atmosphere samples via existing penetrations X-29E and X-106A-b, and the associated containment isolation valves SV-5065-33A and 37A, and SV-5065-14A and 21A, respectively.
Penetration X-29E is currently the sample locatica for the existing H2 Analyzer System, and penetration X-106A-b is currently a sample location for the exist-
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ting 02 Analyzer System. The above containment isolation valves will replace existing containment isolation valves CV-5065-33 and 37, and CV-5065-14 and 21, in the H2 Analyzer and 02 Analyzer Systems, respectively.
NOTE: Penetration X-29E will provide a common drywell atmosphere sample location with the Post Accident Sampling System. The PASS will tie-in to this sample line outside the H /02 2 System containment isolation
. valves. Penetration X-106A-b will provide a common drywell atmos-phere sample location with the C-19 Panel. The C-19 Panel will tie-in to this sample line, downstream of H 2/02 System containment isolation valves.
Train B of the H 2/02 System is capable of obtaining drywell samples via pene-trations X-15E and X-50A-d and the associated containment isolation valves SV-5065-31B and 358, and SV-5065-138 and 208, respectively. Penetration X-15E is curently a sample location for the existing H2 Analyzer System, and penetration X-50A-d is currently a sample location for the existing 02 Ana-lyzer System. The above containment isolation valves will replace existing containment isolation valves, CV-5065-31 and 35, and CV-5065-13 and 20, in the H2 Analyzer and 02 Analyzer Systems, respectively.
NOTE: Penetration X-50A-d will provide a common drywell atmosphere sample location with both the PASS System and C-19 Panel. The PASS and the C-19 sample piping will tie-in to this sample line, downstream of the H2 /02 System containment isolation valves.
Torus Atmosphere Sample Lines Each train of the H /02 2 System is capable of obtaining a torus atmosphere sample at one location.
Train A of the H 2/02 System is capable of obtaining a torus atmosphere sample via penetration X-228J and containment isolation valves SV-5065-11A and 18A. Pene-tration X-228J is currently a sample location for the existing 02 Analyzer. The above containment isolation valves will replace existing containment isolation valves, CV-5065-11 and 18, in the 02 Analyzer System.
NOTE: Penetration X-228J will provide a common torus atmosphere sample location with the PASS. The PASS will tie-in to this sample line downstream of the H2 /02 System containment isolation valves.
Train B of the H 2/02 System is capable of obtaining a torus atmosphere sample via penetration X-228C, and containment isolation valves SV-5065-15B and 228. Pene-tration X-228C is currently a sample location for the existing 02 Analyzer System.
The above containment isolation valves will replace existing containment isolation valves CV-5065-15 and 22 in the 02 Analyzer System.
NOTE: Penetration X-228C will provide a common torus atmosphere sample location with the PASS System. The PASS will tie-in to this sample line, downstream of the H 2/02 System containment isolation valves, i
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Sample Return Lines Sample returns for each train of the H 2/02 system go to separate locations.
Train A returns the samples (either drywell or torus sample) to the drywell, and Train B returns to the torus.
The Train A atmosphere samples are returned to the drywell via penetration X-46F, and containment isolation valves SV-5065-24A and 26A. Penetration X-46F is currently the sample return line to the drywell for the existing 02 Analyzer System. The above containment isolation valves will replace existing containment isolation valves, CV-5065-24 and 26, in the 02 Analyzer System.
NOTE: Penetration X-46F will provide a common sample return location with the PASS System. The PASS will tie-in to this return line, upstream of the H2 /02 system containment isolation valves.
The Train B atmosphere samples are returned to the torus via penetration X-228K, and containment isolation valves SV-5065-25B and 278. Penetration X-228K is the sample return line to the torus for the existing 02 Analyzer System. The above containment isolation valves will replace existing containment isolation valves, CV-5065-25 and 27, in the 02 Analyzer System.
NOTE: Penetration X-228K will provide a common sample return location with the PASS System. The PASS will tie-in to this return line piping, upstream of the H2 /02 System containment isolation valves.
H2/02 Analyzer Panels
- 1. General Each train of the H /02 2 System is provided with an H /02 2 Analyzer Panel located on the 74' 3 elevation in the Reactor Building. The panel receives sample flow from the appropriate sample point. After analysis, the sample is returned to the Primary Containment via the sample return line. The analyzer panels for each train are functionally identical.
- 2. Analyzer Operation A. Thermal Conductivity Cell Operation The H2 /02 Analyzer takes advantage of the difference in thermal conducti-vity of various gas species to measure gas concentrations. For example, the thermal conductivity of hydrogen (at the temperatures utilized in the analyzer) is approximately seven times that of nitrogen, oxygen, and water vapor (the only gasses expected to be in the containment atmosphere in significant quantities).
To measure the thermal conductivity of the gas sample, the analyzer uses a self-heating filament within a temperature contr,11ed metal cavity.
The temperature of this filament is directly affected by the rate which heat is conducted from the filament through the sample gas to the cavity 4
wall. Because the cavity wall is maintained at a constant temperature, the filament temperature is only a function of the thermal conductivity of the sample gas. The electrical resistance of the self-heating filament is a function of its temperature; therefore, the resistance of the fila-ment is a function of the thermal conductivity of the sample gas yielding an electrical output indicative of the thermal conductivity of the gas.
B. Hydrogen Concentration Measurements Hydrogen concentration measurements are made by two thermal conductivity cells; a reference cell and a measuring cell. Both cells are essentially identical except that the reference cell includes a catalyst which causes the hydrogen in the sample stream to combine with oxygen to form water vapor.
To measure hydrogen concentrations, the sample gas passes through the measuring and reference cells. The lack of hydrogen in the reference cell (caused by the catalytic reaction within the reference cell) causes a mismatch between the electrical resistances of the self-heating fila-ments (i.e., the difference in thermal conductivity of the gases). The filaments are connected across an electrical bridge which yields an output indicative of the percentage of hydrogen gas present.
The above process assumes that sufficient oxygen is available in the air sample to assure the complete reaction of all hydrogen within the refer-ence cell. This condition may not always exist within the containment atmosphere.
Therefore, a reagent gas (essentially 100% 0 ; 2see Reagent Gas Subsystem) is added to the sample stream upstream of the analyzer cells. A suffi-cient amount of reagent gas is added to assure the complete reaction of ,
hydrogen within the reference cell over the maximum range of the analyzer, assuming no oxygen is present in the containment atmosphere.
C. Oxygen Concentration Measurements The oxygen analyzer functions essentially the same as the hydrogen ana-lyzer however in this case, the reagent gas is essentially 100% hydrogen.
The lack of oxygen in the reference cell (caused by the catalytic reac-tion) when compared to the presence of oxygen in the measuring cell yields an analyzer output indicative of the percentage of oxygen in the sample gas.
- 3. Calibration Modes The analyzer cell operation described above provides an electrical output indicative of the relative difference between the thermal conductivities in the reference and measuring cells.
To relate this relative difference in thermal conductivities to actual con-centrations of the sample being analyzed, the output of the analyzer cells must be calibrated. To calibrate the analyzers, two calibration modes are 5
provided, zero mode and span mode. Both modes utilize a calibration gas j (see Calibration Gas Subsystem) which supplies a known percentage of gas being analyzed (4% hydrogen for the hydrogen analyzer and 7% oxygen for the oxygen analyzer).
A. Zero Mode The purpose of the zero mode in calibration is to balance the outputs of .
the measuring cell and reference cell to yield a zero output when no differences in thermal conductivity exists between the cells. In this mode, only the calibration gas passes through the analyzer. Because the reagent gas is not supplied to the analyzer, no catalytic recombination will occur in the reference cell, causing both cells to measure identical thennal conductivities. This is the case when the actual sample stream contains zero percent hydrogen or zero percent oxygen for the hydrogen and oxygen analyzers, respectively. The electrical output of the ana-lyzers are therefore adjusted to indicate a zero percent concentration.
B. -Span Mode The purpose of the span mode is to adjust the electrical output of the
- analyzers to be proportional to the percentage of the gas being analyzed.
- In this mode, both the calibration and reagent gases are allowed to pass through the analyzers. Because the reagent gas is being supplied, cata-lytic recombination will occur in the reference cell yielding a difference in thermal conductivity. Because the percentage of hydrogen for the hydrogen analyzer calibration gas and the percentage of oxygen for the oxygen analyzer calibration gas is known, the electrical output of the ,
analyzers can be adjusted to indicate this known percentage.
- 4. Overall Panel Operation Train A and Train B are functionally identical. Train A will be discussed.
In the sample mode, the sample gas enters the analyzer panel, passes through an insulated line, through a bellows seal valve, and into a heated sample com-partment (hot box). A local pressure indication is provided on this line. In the hot box, the sample flows into a moisture separator. This moisture sep-arator consists of the float operated valve that shuts off flow to the ana-
- lyzer sections of the panel if the separator is unable to handle the liquid load. This condition may occur during initial system startup or after failure of the heat tracing on the sample supply lines. The condensate from the i moisture separator enters the analyzer bypass line and is returned to the containment via PCV-R2-5140A ar.d the analyzer panel sample pump. The analyzer bypass line is provided to allow the analyzer pump to be operated at essen-tially a constant flow condition. When vacuum in the line is reduced below
-11" to -13" Hg, PCV-R2-5140A opens bypassing sufficient samplo flow to allow the pump to operate at maxifnum total sample flow. Flow indicator FI-1-5127A is located on this line. Normal bypass flow is 9 to 18 scfh. Bypass flow and the return flow from the analyzer section of the panel, combine, and pass through an air cooled heat exchanger. This heat exchanger reduces sample temperature to 175*F or less to extend the life of the sample pump diaphragms.
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4 The total sample flow from the analyzer exits the sample pump, passes through l a bellows seal valve and is returned to the containment via the sample return line.
Sample flow to the analyzer section of the panel is regulated via PCV-R1-5126A. Regulator PCV-R1-5126A operates to maintain a downstream vacuum of 0" to -5" Hg. Downstream of PCV-R1-5126A, sample flow passes through the H2 and 02 thermal conductivity cells AE-1-5074A and AE-2-5035A. Some of the flow is bypassed to the sample pump to maintain the proper flow conditions through the analyzers. The bypass flow can be monitored via FI-1-5078A.
The function of both the hydrogen and oxygen analyzer legs and associated 1
calibration and reagent gas legs are identical. The following description is for the hydrogen analyzer but is typical for both analyzers, l
The Calibration and Reagent Gas Subsystems tie-in to the analyzer leg upstream of the analyzer cell. These gases enter the analyzer panel through solenoid operated valves SV-1-5065A and SV-2-5172A. These solenoid operated valves isolate the calibration and/or reagent gas supply to the analyzer leg depend-ing on the mode of operation of the panel (i.e., sample, zero, or span modes).
Pressure switches PS-1-5173A and PS-2-5172A are included on these lines.
These pressure switches are set to alarm when either gas supply drops below 20 psig. Pressure control valves (PCV-1-5129A and PCV-2-5066A), flow indicat-ing controllers (FIC-1-5310A and FIC-2-5180A), and check valves are located downstream of the solenoid operated valves.
The pressure control valves are factory adjusted and maintain a constant differential pressure of approximately 3 psid across the flow indicating controls.
4 The flow indicating controllers allow adjustment of the calibration and reagent gas flow rates. Check valves are provided in the lines to separate the calibration and reagent gas lines from the analyzer legs.
The analyzer cell is located downstream of the calibration and reagent gas
, tie-in points. Analyzer cell flow is regulated by a differential pressure regulator, PCV-R3-5075A, and a fixed orifice, F0-1-5090A. PCV-R3-5075A is factory adjusted to provide approximately 3 psid differential pressure across the fixed orifice.
The fixed orifice is sized to provide a flow of approximately 120 to 200 cc/ min through the analyzers. Flow indicator FI-2-5114A is provided down-stream to indicate analyzer flow. A vacuum switch, PS-5-5412A, is located between PCV-R3-5075A and the fixed orifice. This vacuum switch is provided to initiate an alarm in the event of fixed orifice blockage, sample pump vacuum loss, or sample exit blockage.
Reagent Gas Subsystems As described above, the H2 /02 analyzers require a reagent gas supply of essen-tially 100% 02 and H2 gas to aid in the analysis for H2 and 02 concentrations, respectively. A Reagent Gas Subsystem is provided for each train.
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. l Each Reagent Gas Subsystem consists of two compressed gas cylinders (99.9% H2 and 99.9% 20 ), a compressed gas bottle rack, pressure regulating / relief valves for each bottle, and associated manual valves and tubing to supply the reagent gas to the analyzer panels. The reagent gas bottles and associated bottle racks are located on the 74' 3" elevation within the Reactor Building. The Reagent Gas Subsystems are also provided with auxiliary fill connections located outside the Reactor Building (Secondary Containment). The auxiliary fill connections are l provided to allow recharging of the reagent gas bottles during accident conditions !
when it is assumed that the Reactor Building will be unaccessible.
Calibration Gas Subsystem The Calibration Gas Subsystem is similiar to the Reagent Gas Subsystems, except that only one train is provided common to both analyzer panels. The Calibration Gas Subsystem consists of two compressed gas bottles (4% H2 and 7%2 0 ), bottle racks (the calibration gas bottles use the sample bottle racks provided for the Reagent Gas Subsystems), pressure regulator / relief valves for each bottle, and associated valves and tubing to supply calibration gas to the analyzer panels.
As in the case of the Reagent Gas Subsystems, the Calibration Gas Subsystem is provided with auxiliary fill connections located outside the Reactor Building to allow recharging of the calibration gas bottles during accident conditions when the Reactor Building may be inaccessible.
Major Component Design H2/02 Analyzer Panel The following infomation is provided.
Panel Dimensions: LxWxH Analyzer Panel 30" x 30" x 72" Remote Panel 20 3/8" x 19" x 17 1/2" Panel Weights:
Analyzer Panel 1600 pounds Remote Panel 75 pounds Nomal Panel Environmental Limits:
Temperature 40 to 120*F Pressure 27.92" Hg to 31.92" Hg Humidity 0 to 95%
Radiation 0 to 106 Rads (total) 8
Normal Sample Environmental Limits at the Analyzer Panel:
Temperature 270 to 300"F Pressure -5 to 60 psig Humidity 0 to 100%
Radiation 0 to 106 Rads (total)
System Response Time: 60 seconds (maximum)
System Warm-up Time:
"Off" to " Analyze" position 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />
" Standby" to " Analyze" position 60 seconds Power Requirements: 120 VAC + 10%, 60 Hz, + 10%, 9A 460 VAC, 60 Hz, 3 phase, 1.70 FLA Instrumentation and Control Parameters to be Controlled and Displayed
- 1. Main Control Room Panel C-904
- 8 Drywell sample line containment isolation valves
- 4 Suppression Pool sample line containment isolation valves
- 1 Drywell sample return line containment isolation valve 2 Suppression Pool sample return lines containment isolation valves
- Valve position indication for the above valves
- Containment isolation signal Override for the above valves.
- 2. Main Control Room Panels C-170 and C-171
- Isolation Signal Override Alarm
%H2 Recorder 6
%02 Recorder Sample Location j
High H2 Alarm High 02 Alarm 9
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- 3. Main Control Room Panels C-174 and C-175 Sample controls and Indication of Sample Line being analyzed.
%H2 and % 02 Indication Alarms for High H2 and High 02
- Control for Power, local-Remote selection, function selection, Range selection, Alarm reset.
- Status Indication for Heater ON, Power ON, Span, Zero, sample, H2 Rang? 1, H2 Range 2, High H2 , 02 Range 1, 02 Range 2, High 02, Common Failure
- 4. Local H2 and 02 Analyzer Panel Local Remote Controls Function Selection
%H2 and 02 Indication Alarm Reset Status Indication: Heater ON, Span, Zero, Sample, H2 Range 1 or 2, High H,02 2 Range 1 or 2, High 02 , Power ON, Standby, Cell Failure, Low Flow, Low Temperature Low Press, and Common Failure A 4-20 MA output signal is supplied to the Main Control Room for recording of oxygen and hydrogen concentrations. An indication to identify which of the three samples is being analyzed, is shown locally and in the Control Room.
This signal has three signal levels within the span of 4-20 MA.
Analyzer Operating Range 0-10 +.2% Hydrogen
! 0-20 T.2% Hydrogen 0-10 +.2% 0xygen 1 0-25 T.5% 0xygen Electrical Power Systems The H2 /02 Systems being installed are two completely redundant H2 /02 analyzer instrument racks, identified as C-172 JJC and C-172 JJC and located at eleva-
!- tion 74' -3" of the Reactor Building (Secondary Containment). The output of each l
analyzer feeds a JJC 19" insert in the Post Accident Sampling Panels C-174 and C-175 in the Main Control Room. These inserts provide controls necessary for remote
, control of the analyzers and they also provide tranducers which are required to j drive the various devices used to monitor the H2/02 concentration. In addition, j alarm lights are located on the analyzers and the C-174/C-175 inserts. Annuncia-tion points (non-safety related) are provided on panels C-170 and C-171.
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Each analyzer requires 460 v, 3 phase and 120 v single phase power. The Division I analyzer receives its 460 y supply from safety related MMC B17A cubicle 17A13A and its 120 y power from distribution panelboard Y13 breaker #2. The Division II analyzers receive power from the redundant safety related sources MCC B18A cubicle 18A13A and panelboard Y14_ breaker 2.
Each sample and sample return line has two solenoid operated valves piped in series and located as close as po::ible to the primary containment. Electrically, the solenoids are designed to operate at 120 VAC (outboard) or 125 VDC (inboard).
The valves draw 1.5 Amps maximum at rated voltage. The valve position switches are reed type SPST with contacts rated for .5 Amps at 125 VDC. The position switches and coil pigtails are wired to terminal blocks inside a NEMA 4 enclosure where all incoming field cables are terminated.
Except for valves requiring heat tracing, the solenoids are designed to pickup and remain cnergized between 96 and 132 volts for the AC valves and 90 and 140 volts for the DC valves. Those valves requiring heat tracing have a " control box" in series with the coil of the solenoid. The " control box," which consists of a time delay relay and a voltage dropping resistor, allows the valves to be picked up at rated voltage and " held in" at reduced voltage. The reduced voltage lowers the heat generated in the solenoid housing thus reducing the total temperature around the coil and increasing the life expectancy of the valve. The " control boxes" are located in control panels located in the Main Control Room.
Each series pair of isolation valves is controlled from panel C-904 and receives power (DC inboard and AC outboard) from the same Division of Class IE Electrical Distribution System as its associated analyzer panel. Valves in the redundant sample / return lines receive power from the second independent Class IE Power Distribution System. Power to the DC valves is obtained from panelboards D36 breaker 3 (Div. I) and D37 breaker 3 (Div. II). Power required for the AC sole-noid valves is obtained from Class IE panelboards Y31 breaker 1 (Div. I) and Y41 breaker 1 (Div. II).
Each valve is closed by a containment isolation signal (low reactor water level /
high drywell pressure) obtained from multipliers of General Electric containment isolation logics. Division I isolation signals are used for inboard isolation valves and Division II signals are used for outboard valves.
The isolation signals can be overridden by the operator via operation of keylocked switches on panel C-904.
I The valve control switches are wired in-series with the isolation logic reset so l
, that the valve control switches must be in the CLOSED position before the logic
( is reset. This prevents inadvertant opening of the valves when the logic is reset.
The valve control switches (General Electric Co. type SBM) and isolation signal override switches (General Electric Co. type CR2940) were purchased as Class IE items qualified for operation in the Main Control Room. The logic relays (Agastat model EGP, Agastat model 7024, and Electroswitch series 24 lock-out relays) are all located on main control panel C-904.
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i Cables to all containment isolation valves except two are routed in the same conduit system. No other circuit is routed through these conduits. Any failure of the conduit system due to high energy pipe break or fire will not prevent
- closure of the isolation valves. Any open or short circuit in the cables will result in valve closure. A " hot short" between cables (which is extremely
. unlikely) will not prevent valve closure, since all sources of power in the con-duf t system, capable of energizing the solenoids, can be deenergized by moving all valve control switches to close.
The cables to the remaining two isolation valves are routed with other control circuits. The conduit for these valves is routed through the reactor building (at elevation 23' East, elevation 51' East to North, and elevation 74' North) in area's not subject to high energy pipe breaks. Any failure of this conduit system due to other causes (fire) resulting in cable opens or short circuits will cause the valves to close. " Hot shorts" between a 120VAC or 125VDC circuit and 4
both valve contro1' cables (extremely unlikely) could result in two series valves opening. Opening of these valves will extend primary containment into the Cate-
] gory I H2/02 piping system which is designed to withstand the effects of a design basis LOCA within the primary containment.
In general, the power supplies, isolation signals, and override functions are
- arranged to provide the capability of isolation on a LOCA and the reopening of at least one set of sample lines after a LOCA assuming a single failure. Isolation I of the sample lines is assured, in that the series valves receive isolation signals from redundant logics, the valves fail closed on loss of power, and a single failure (high voltage) of either an AC or DC supply will only prevent one valve (inboard's are DC, outboard's are AC) from closing. Reopening of at least one redundant group of isolation valves is possible assuming a single failure because of the complete independence of power supplies to the redundant subsystems
, and the availability of individual override switches for each group of isolation -
valves. A Struthers Dunn relay model No. 219CX104 provides isolation between '
Div. I power and Div. II logics and between Div. II power and Div. I logics.
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The Class IE heat tracing system has been designed, fabricated, and delivered by i Thennon Manufacturing Company in accordance with the requirements of Boston Edison Co.-Specification E-509. The heat tracing system is divided into redundant
- subsystems; one serving Division I sample lines and one serving Division II lines.
Each subsystem has a control panel (C-176/C-177) located in the electrical equipment room, with a 120/240 volt, 28 circuit distribution panelboard. Each heat trace circuit is supplied via an individual 120 volt breaker. In addition to the power distribution function, the heat trace control panels have tempera-1 and current monitoring ture control units, high and units for each heat trace circuit. low temperature 100 ohm alarm platinum units,s RTD monitor the pipe i temperature for input to the_ temperature control units which supply power to the 4
heat trace circuit as required. The power supply (120/240 VAC) to the Division I
- heat trace subsystem is from Class IE panelboard Y13 breaker 10 (Div. I). The power to the Division II subsystem is from Class IE panelboard Y14 breaker 10 l (Div. II). This heat trace system is also used to heat the PASS system atmosphere i samples lines. The total connected load is approximately 10 kva per subsystem.
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. 0 All electrical equipment has voltage and current ratings exceeding the antici-pated operating conditions. Instrumentation, control, and power cables are routed in different raceways as required by " Design Criteria for Electrical Installation."
All safety related compon?nts and associated cable / conduit are installed in Seismic Category I buildings. All safety related equipment and Class IE conduit is installed to meet the requirements Seismic Category I installations.
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