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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARIR 05000412/19990071999-10-21021 October 1999 Refers to Special Team Insp 50-412/99-07 Conducted from 990720-29 & Forwards Nov.Two Violations Identified.First Violation Involved Failure to Implement C/A to Prevent Biofouling of Service Water System ML20217M1591999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards NRC Rept Number 17, Requal Tracking Rept from Operator Licensing Tracking Sys.Rept Was Used by NRC to Schedule Requalification Exam for Operators & Record Requal Pass Dates L-99-143, Informs That Subsequent Review of Approval Ltrs & SE for Relief Requests 1TYP-2-B5.40-1 (Rev 0),BV1-RV-AUG (Rev 1), BV2-RV-AUG (Rev 1),BV3-IWA-1 (Rev 1) & BV3-IWA-2 (Rev 1) Identified Erroneous Statements Which Dl Wishes to Correct1999-10-11011 October 1999 Informs That Subsequent Review of Approval Ltrs & SE for Relief Requests 1TYP-2-B5.40-1 (Rev 0),BV1-RV-AUG (Rev 1), BV2-RV-AUG (Rev 1),BV3-IWA-1 (Rev 1) & BV3-IWA-2 (Rev 1) Identified Erroneous Statements Which Dl Wishes to Correct L-99-152, Submits Relief Request BV3-N-533-1,rev 0,requesting Use of ASME Approved Code Case N-553-1, Alternative Requirements for VT-2 Visual Examination of Class 1,2 & 3 Insulated Pressure Retaining Bolted Connections1999-10-11011 October 1999 Submits Relief Request BV3-N-533-1,rev 0,requesting Use of ASME Approved Code Case N-553-1, Alternative Requirements for VT-2 Visual Examination of Class 1,2 & 3 Insulated Pressure Retaining Bolted Connections ML20217C6741999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards RAI Re Licensee 970128 Response to GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions, . Response Requested within 60 Days of Receipt of Ltr L-99-151, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-412/99-07.Corrective Actions:Condition Repts Were Written for Listed Issues So That Repts Could Be Addressed Using BVPS Corrective Action Program1999-10-0707 October 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-412/99-07.Corrective Actions:Condition Repts Were Written for Listed Issues So That Repts Could Be Addressed Using BVPS Corrective Action Program ML20217E0301999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/99-06 & 50-412/99-06 on 990809-13 & 990823-27.Violation Noted Involving Failure to Correctly Translate Design Change Re Pertinent Operating Logs & Plant Equipment Labeling ML20212M2661999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards Order Approving Transfer of Licenses for Beaver Valley from Dlc to Pennsylvania Power Co & Approving Conforming Amends in Response to 990505 Application ML20212K8071999-09-30030 September 1999 Informs That on 990916,NRC Staff Completed mid-cycle Plant Performance Review (PPR) of Facility.Staff Conducted Reviews of All Operating NPPs to Integrate Performance Info & to Plan for Insp Activities at Facility ML20216J9621999-09-30030 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/99-05 & 50-412/99-05 on 990725-0904.Two Violations Noted & Being Treated as Ncvs.One Violation Re Failure to Follow Operation Manual Procedure Associated with Configuration Control Identified L-99-149, Informs NRC That Items Identified in 990629 Response to GL 98-01 Have Been Completed.Attached Table Submitted with Has Been Updated to Reflect Completion1999-09-28028 September 1999 Informs NRC That Items Identified in 990629 Response to GL 98-01 Have Been Completed.Attached Table Submitted with Has Been Updated to Reflect Completion L-99-148, Notifies NRC of License Withdrawal of M Linch,License SOP-11478 IAW 10CFR50.74.M Linch Resigned from Employment at Bvps,Effective 9908171999-09-24024 September 1999 Notifies NRC of License Withdrawal of M Linch,License SOP-11478 IAW 10CFR50.74.M Linch Resigned from Employment at Bvps,Effective 990817 ML20212G0601999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Answer of Duquesne Light Co to Petition to Waive Time Limits & Suppl Comments of Local 29, Intl Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.Copies of Answer Have Been Served to Parties & Petitioner by e-mail or Facsimile ML20212C5521999-09-21021 September 1999 Forwards for Filing,Answer to Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Co & Pennsylvania Power Co in Opposition to Petition to Waive Time Limits & Suppl Comments of Local 29 Intl Brotherhood of Electrical Workers L-99-144, Forwards NRC Form 536 Which Addresses Util Proposed Operator Licensing Exam Schedule,In Response to Administrative Ltr 99-031999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536 Which Addresses Util Proposed Operator Licensing Exam Schedule,In Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03 ML20212B3291999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards for Filing,Petition to Waive Time Limits in 10CFR2.1305 & Supplemental Comments of Local 29,Intl Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Re Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2 L-99-134, Provides Addl Info to Support 990617 LAR 127,proposing Mods to Heatup,Cooldown & Overpressure Protection Curves.Info Is Provided to Formally Docket Info Discussed During 990820 Telcon with NRC1999-09-15015 September 1999 Provides Addl Info to Support 990617 LAR 127,proposing Mods to Heatup,Cooldown & Overpressure Protection Curves.Info Is Provided to Formally Docket Info Discussed During 990820 Telcon with NRC ML20211Q3431999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That During 990903 Telcon Between L Briggs & T Kuhar,Arrangements Were Made for NRC to Inspect Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Plant,Unit 1.Insp Planned for Wk of 991115 ML20211Q5601999-09-0707 September 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-412/99-07 on 990720-29.Three Apparent Violations Noted & Being Considered for Escalated Ea. Violations Involve Failure to Implement C/As to Prevent bio- Fouling of Svc Water Sys L-99-138, Forwards Rev 37 to Issue 4 for BVPS Physical Security Plan (PSP) (Base Plan,Safeguards Contingency Plan & Training & Qualification Plan).Changes to Plan Are Listed.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(d)1999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Rev 37 to Issue 4 for BVPS Physical Security Plan (PSP) (Base Plan,Safeguards Contingency Plan & Training & Qualification Plan).Changes to Plan Are Listed.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(d) L-99-136, Forwards Data Point Library (Dpl) Changes,Iaw Provisions of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,Rev 1,Section 3.6, Administrative Implementation Requirements. Ten Listed Dpls Have Specific Setpoint Values Removed,Per Unit 2 Dpls1999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Data Point Library (Dpl) Changes,Iaw Provisions of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,Rev 1,Section 3.6, Administrative Implementation Requirements. Ten Listed Dpls Have Specific Setpoint Values Removed,Per Unit 2 Dpls L-99-098, Forwards Proposed Changes to Bvps,Units 1 & 2 Operations QA Program Description,Iaw 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii).Change Would Reduce Operations QA Program Description Commitments by Limiting Required Onsite Safety Committee Reviews of Mods1999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Proposed Changes to Bvps,Units 1 & 2 Operations QA Program Description,Iaw 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii).Change Would Reduce Operations QA Program Description Commitments by Limiting Required Onsite Safety Committee Reviews of Mods L-99-137, Forwards Issue 3,rev 3 to Bvps,Unit 1 Inservice Testing Program for Pumps & Valves. Encl 1 Provides Summary of IST Program Changes Which Have Been Incorporated Into Issue 3, Rev 31999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Issue 3,rev 3 to Bvps,Unit 1 Inservice Testing Program for Pumps & Valves. Encl 1 Provides Summary of IST Program Changes Which Have Been Incorporated Into Issue 3, Rev 3 L-99-022, Forwards Issue 2,Rev 1 to Bvps,Unit 2 Inservice Testing (IST) Program for Pumps & Valves. Summary of Changes,Encl1999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Issue 2,Rev 1 to Bvps,Unit 2 Inservice Testing (IST) Program for Pumps & Valves. Summary of Changes,Encl L-99-012, Forwards Proposed Change to Bvps,Units 1 & 2,operations QA Program Description,Per 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii),including Description of Proposed Change,Reason for Change & Basis for Concluding Revised Program Satisfy 10CFR50,App B1999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Proposed Change to Bvps,Units 1 & 2,operations QA Program Description,Per 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii),including Description of Proposed Change,Reason for Change & Basis for Concluding Revised Program Satisfy 10CFR50,App B L-99-037, Forwards Proposed Change to Bvps,Units 1 & 2 Operations QA Program Description,Iaw 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii).Attachment 1 Further Describes Proposed Change & Identifies Reason for Change1999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Proposed Change to Bvps,Units 1 & 2 Operations QA Program Description,Iaw 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii).Attachment 1 Further Describes Proposed Change & Identifies Reason for Change L-99-132, Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Six Month Rept for 990101-990630 for Bvps,Units 1 & 21999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Six Month Rept for 990101-990630 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2 05000412/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00, Forced Shutdown Due to Inoperable EDG, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Rept Is Delayed Due to Util Needing Addl Three Days to Address Event Issues on Reportability & Provide Addl Safety Implications Info1999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00, Forced Shutdown Due to Inoperable EDG, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Rept Is Delayed Due to Util Needing Addl Three Days to Address Event Issues on Reportability & Provide Addl Safety Implications Info ML20211A5111999-08-18018 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/99-04 & 50-412/99-04 on 990613- 990724.One Violation Noted & Treated as Non-Cited Violation Involved Failure to Maintain Containment Equipment Hatch Closed During Fuel Movement L-99-127, Provides Response to NRC Ltr Requesting Review & Comment of NRC Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity Database by 990901.Inconsistencies Noted in Way Data Characterizes Condition of Reactor Vessel1999-08-17017 August 1999 Provides Response to NRC Ltr Requesting Review & Comment of NRC Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity Database by 990901.Inconsistencies Noted in Way Data Characterizes Condition of Reactor Vessel L-99-124, Requests Withdrawal of Editorial Changes That Do Not Pertain to Transfer of Operating Authority or Plant Ownership That Are Proposed in LARs 269 & 144.Revised mark-up License Pages Reflecting Changes,Attached1999-07-30030 July 1999 Requests Withdrawal of Editorial Changes That Do Not Pertain to Transfer of Operating Authority or Plant Ownership That Are Proposed in LARs 269 & 144.Revised mark-up License Pages Reflecting Changes,Attached L-99-121, Submits Data Point Library (Dpl) Changes,Iaw Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,rev 1,Section 3.6, Administrative Implementation Reqiurements1999-07-28028 July 1999 Submits Data Point Library (Dpl) Changes,Iaw Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,rev 1,Section 3.6, Administrative Implementation Reqiurements L-99-118, Forwards Response to NRC AL 99-02,request for Info Re Estimate of Number of New Licensing Actions Expected to Be Submitted in Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-25025 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC AL 99-02,request for Info Re Estimate of Number of New Licensing Actions Expected to Be Submitted in Fy 2000 & 2001 L-99-120, Forwards Annual Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments for BVPS Unit 1,IAW 10CFR50.59.Rept Provides Brief Description of Each Facility & Procedure Change & Summary of Safety Evaluations1999-07-22022 July 1999 Forwards Annual Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments for BVPS Unit 1,IAW 10CFR50.59.Rept Provides Brief Description of Each Facility & Procedure Change & Summary of Safety Evaluations L-99-119, Forwards Rev 17 to UFSAR for Beaver Power Station,Unit 1. Submittal Reflects Changes to Facility & Procedures as Described in UFSAR That Were Completed During Annual Reporting Period Endinig 9901221999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Rev 17 to UFSAR for Beaver Power Station,Unit 1. Submittal Reflects Changes to Facility & Procedures as Described in UFSAR That Were Completed During Annual Reporting Period Endinig 990122 L-99-113, Forwards Final,Typed TS Pages for LARs 262 & 135,previously Submitted with Editorial Changes Identified by1999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Final,Typed TS Pages for LARs 262 & 135,previously Submitted with Editorial Changes Identified by L-99-111, Forwards Revised Final Typed Pages for LARs 109 & 115, Previously Submitted by 990615 & 28 Ltrs.Revised Pages Replace Those Previously Provided for LARs 109 & 115.With Summary of Editorial Changes1999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Revised Final Typed Pages for LARs 109 & 115, Previously Submitted by 990615 & 28 Ltrs.Revised Pages Replace Those Previously Provided for LARs 109 & 115.With Summary of Editorial Changes L-99-112, Responds to NRC Questions Made During 990518 Meeting with Util Re LARs 220 & 88,for Bvps,Units 1 & 2.Copy of Ltr DLC-99-743,which Is non-proprietary Version of DLC-96-310 & Westinghouse Technical Bulletin ESBU-TB-96-07-R0 Also Encl1999-07-14014 July 1999 Responds to NRC Questions Made During 990518 Meeting with Util Re LARs 220 & 88,for Bvps,Units 1 & 2.Copy of Ltr DLC-99-743,which Is non-proprietary Version of DLC-96-310 & Westinghouse Technical Bulletin ESBU-TB-96-07-R0 Also Encl L-99-110, Forwards Changes to ERDS for Unit 1,IAW Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,Rev 1,Section 3.61999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Changes to ERDS for Unit 1,IAW Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,Rev 1,Section 3.6 ML20209G5701999-07-12012 July 1999 Discusses Closure of TACs MA0525 & MA0526 Re Response to RAI Concerning GL 92-0,Rev 1,Suppl 1, Rv Structural Integrity. Info in Rvid Revised & Released as Ver 2 as Result of Review of Response ML20207H6621999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards RAI Re Util 981112 Response to IPEEE Evaluations for Plant,Units 1 & 2.RAI Was Discussed During 990628 Telcon in Order to Ensure Clear Consistent Understanding by All Parties of Info Needed L-99-105, Forwards Response to NRC 990420 RAI Re Previous Responses to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Power-Operated Gate Valves1999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990420 RAI Re Previous Responses to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20209D8191999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-334/99-03 & 50-412/99-03 on 990502- 0612.No Violations Noted.Program for Maintaining Occupational Exposures as Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) & for Training Personnel,Generally Effective L-99-109, Forwards Inservice Insp Ninety-Day Rept Bvps,Unit 2 Outage 7,Year 1999, IAW ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Article IWA-62301999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Inservice Insp Ninety-Day Rept Bvps,Unit 2 Outage 7,Year 1999, IAW ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Article IWA-6230 L-99-108, Requests Withdrawal of Change Proposed for TS Bases Page B 3/4 2-2 from LARs 1A-262 & 2A-135,originally Submitted by Licensee to NRC1999-07-0707 July 1999 Requests Withdrawal of Change Proposed for TS Bases Page B 3/4 2-2 from LARs 1A-262 & 2A-135,originally Submitted by Licensee to NRC L-99-104, Responds to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants. Disclosure Rept Encl1999-06-29029 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants. Disclosure Rept Encl L-99-093, Provides Response to RAI on Proposed Change to Operations QA Program Description.Attachment 2 Provides Revised Markup for Proposed Changes to Affected UFSAR Section 17.2.51999-06-25025 June 1999 Provides Response to RAI on Proposed Change to Operations QA Program Description.Attachment 2 Provides Revised Markup for Proposed Changes to Affected UFSAR Section 17.2.5 L-99-102, Forwards Typed,Final TS Pages for LARs 259 & 131.Summary of Description of Plant Editorial Changes Incorporated in Addition to Those Addressed in Previously Provided marked-up Pages,Encl1999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Typed,Final TS Pages for LARs 259 & 131.Summary of Description of Plant Editorial Changes Incorporated in Addition to Those Addressed in Previously Provided marked-up Pages,Encl L-99-101, Submits Response to NRC Oral RAI Concerning Qualifications for Senior Nuclear Executive Ref in 10CFR50.80 Submittal1999-06-22022 June 1999 Submits Response to NRC Oral RAI Concerning Qualifications for Senior Nuclear Executive Ref in 10CFR50.80 Submittal L-99-062, Forwards Final TS Pages for LARs 262 & 135,including Summary Description of Plants Editorial Changes Incorporated in Addition to Those Addressed in Previously Provided marked-up Pages1999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards Final TS Pages for LARs 262 & 135,including Summary Description of Plants Editorial Changes Incorporated in Addition to Those Addressed in Previously Provided marked-up Pages 1999-09-08
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARL-99-152, Submits Relief Request BV3-N-533-1,rev 0,requesting Use of ASME Approved Code Case N-553-1, Alternative Requirements for VT-2 Visual Examination of Class 1,2 & 3 Insulated Pressure Retaining Bolted Connections1999-10-11011 October 1999 Submits Relief Request BV3-N-533-1,rev 0,requesting Use of ASME Approved Code Case N-553-1, Alternative Requirements for VT-2 Visual Examination of Class 1,2 & 3 Insulated Pressure Retaining Bolted Connections L-99-143, Informs That Subsequent Review of Approval Ltrs & SE for Relief Requests 1TYP-2-B5.40-1 (Rev 0),BV1-RV-AUG (Rev 1), BV2-RV-AUG (Rev 1),BV3-IWA-1 (Rev 1) & BV3-IWA-2 (Rev 1) Identified Erroneous Statements Which Dl Wishes to Correct1999-10-11011 October 1999 Informs That Subsequent Review of Approval Ltrs & SE for Relief Requests 1TYP-2-B5.40-1 (Rev 0),BV1-RV-AUG (Rev 1), BV2-RV-AUG (Rev 1),BV3-IWA-1 (Rev 1) & BV3-IWA-2 (Rev 1) Identified Erroneous Statements Which Dl Wishes to Correct L-99-151, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-412/99-07.Corrective Actions:Condition Repts Were Written for Listed Issues So That Repts Could Be Addressed Using BVPS Corrective Action Program1999-10-0707 October 1999 Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-412/99-07.Corrective Actions:Condition Repts Were Written for Listed Issues So That Repts Could Be Addressed Using BVPS Corrective Action Program L-99-149, Informs NRC That Items Identified in 990629 Response to GL 98-01 Have Been Completed.Attached Table Submitted with Has Been Updated to Reflect Completion1999-09-28028 September 1999 Informs NRC That Items Identified in 990629 Response to GL 98-01 Have Been Completed.Attached Table Submitted with Has Been Updated to Reflect Completion L-99-148, Notifies NRC of License Withdrawal of M Linch,License SOP-11478 IAW 10CFR50.74.M Linch Resigned from Employment at Bvps,Effective 9908171999-09-24024 September 1999 Notifies NRC of License Withdrawal of M Linch,License SOP-11478 IAW 10CFR50.74.M Linch Resigned from Employment at Bvps,Effective 990817 ML20212G0601999-09-23023 September 1999 Forwards Answer of Duquesne Light Co to Petition to Waive Time Limits & Suppl Comments of Local 29, Intl Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.Copies of Answer Have Been Served to Parties & Petitioner by e-mail or Facsimile ML20212C5521999-09-21021 September 1999 Forwards for Filing,Answer to Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Co & Pennsylvania Power Co in Opposition to Petition to Waive Time Limits & Suppl Comments of Local 29 Intl Brotherhood of Electrical Workers L-99-144, Forwards NRC Form 536 Which Addresses Util Proposed Operator Licensing Exam Schedule,In Response to Administrative Ltr 99-031999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536 Which Addresses Util Proposed Operator Licensing Exam Schedule,In Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03 ML20212B3291999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards for Filing,Petition to Waive Time Limits in 10CFR2.1305 & Supplemental Comments of Local 29,Intl Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Re Beaver Valley Power Station,Units 1 & 2 L-99-134, Provides Addl Info to Support 990617 LAR 127,proposing Mods to Heatup,Cooldown & Overpressure Protection Curves.Info Is Provided to Formally Docket Info Discussed During 990820 Telcon with NRC1999-09-15015 September 1999 Provides Addl Info to Support 990617 LAR 127,proposing Mods to Heatup,Cooldown & Overpressure Protection Curves.Info Is Provided to Formally Docket Info Discussed During 990820 Telcon with NRC L-99-138, Forwards Rev 37 to Issue 4 for BVPS Physical Security Plan (PSP) (Base Plan,Safeguards Contingency Plan & Training & Qualification Plan).Changes to Plan Are Listed.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(d)1999-09-0303 September 1999 Forwards Rev 37 to Issue 4 for BVPS Physical Security Plan (PSP) (Base Plan,Safeguards Contingency Plan & Training & Qualification Plan).Changes to Plan Are Listed.Encls Withheld Per 10CFR2.790(d) L-99-136, Forwards Data Point Library (Dpl) Changes,Iaw Provisions of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,Rev 1,Section 3.6, Administrative Implementation Requirements. Ten Listed Dpls Have Specific Setpoint Values Removed,Per Unit 2 Dpls1999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Data Point Library (Dpl) Changes,Iaw Provisions of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,Rev 1,Section 3.6, Administrative Implementation Requirements. Ten Listed Dpls Have Specific Setpoint Values Removed,Per Unit 2 Dpls L-99-098, Forwards Proposed Changes to Bvps,Units 1 & 2 Operations QA Program Description,Iaw 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii).Change Would Reduce Operations QA Program Description Commitments by Limiting Required Onsite Safety Committee Reviews of Mods1999-09-0202 September 1999 Forwards Proposed Changes to Bvps,Units 1 & 2 Operations QA Program Description,Iaw 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii).Change Would Reduce Operations QA Program Description Commitments by Limiting Required Onsite Safety Committee Reviews of Mods L-99-137, Forwards Issue 3,rev 3 to Bvps,Unit 1 Inservice Testing Program for Pumps & Valves. Encl 1 Provides Summary of IST Program Changes Which Have Been Incorporated Into Issue 3, Rev 31999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Issue 3,rev 3 to Bvps,Unit 1 Inservice Testing Program for Pumps & Valves. Encl 1 Provides Summary of IST Program Changes Which Have Been Incorporated Into Issue 3, Rev 3 L-99-022, Forwards Issue 2,Rev 1 to Bvps,Unit 2 Inservice Testing (IST) Program for Pumps & Valves. Summary of Changes,Encl1999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Issue 2,Rev 1 to Bvps,Unit 2 Inservice Testing (IST) Program for Pumps & Valves. Summary of Changes,Encl L-99-037, Forwards Proposed Change to Bvps,Units 1 & 2 Operations QA Program Description,Iaw 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii).Attachment 1 Further Describes Proposed Change & Identifies Reason for Change1999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Proposed Change to Bvps,Units 1 & 2 Operations QA Program Description,Iaw 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii).Attachment 1 Further Describes Proposed Change & Identifies Reason for Change L-99-012, Forwards Proposed Change to Bvps,Units 1 & 2,operations QA Program Description,Per 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii),including Description of Proposed Change,Reason for Change & Basis for Concluding Revised Program Satisfy 10CFR50,App B1999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Proposed Change to Bvps,Units 1 & 2,operations QA Program Description,Per 10CFR50.54(a)(3)(ii),including Description of Proposed Change,Reason for Change & Basis for Concluding Revised Program Satisfy 10CFR50,App B L-99-132, Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Six Month Rept for 990101-990630 for Bvps,Units 1 & 21999-08-26026 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Six Month Rept for 990101-990630 for Bvps,Units 1 & 2 05000412/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00, Forced Shutdown Due to Inoperable EDG, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Rept Is Delayed Due to Util Needing Addl Three Days to Address Event Issues on Reportability & Provide Addl Safety Implications Info1999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00, Forced Shutdown Due to Inoperable EDG, Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Rept Is Delayed Due to Util Needing Addl Three Days to Address Event Issues on Reportability & Provide Addl Safety Implications Info L-99-127, Provides Response to NRC Ltr Requesting Review & Comment of NRC Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity Database by 990901.Inconsistencies Noted in Way Data Characterizes Condition of Reactor Vessel1999-08-17017 August 1999 Provides Response to NRC Ltr Requesting Review & Comment of NRC Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity Database by 990901.Inconsistencies Noted in Way Data Characterizes Condition of Reactor Vessel L-99-124, Requests Withdrawal of Editorial Changes That Do Not Pertain to Transfer of Operating Authority or Plant Ownership That Are Proposed in LARs 269 & 144.Revised mark-up License Pages Reflecting Changes,Attached1999-07-30030 July 1999 Requests Withdrawal of Editorial Changes That Do Not Pertain to Transfer of Operating Authority or Plant Ownership That Are Proposed in LARs 269 & 144.Revised mark-up License Pages Reflecting Changes,Attached L-99-121, Submits Data Point Library (Dpl) Changes,Iaw Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,rev 1,Section 3.6, Administrative Implementation Reqiurements1999-07-28028 July 1999 Submits Data Point Library (Dpl) Changes,Iaw Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,rev 1,Section 3.6, Administrative Implementation Reqiurements L-99-118, Forwards Response to NRC AL 99-02,request for Info Re Estimate of Number of New Licensing Actions Expected to Be Submitted in Fy 2000 & 20011999-07-25025 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC AL 99-02,request for Info Re Estimate of Number of New Licensing Actions Expected to Be Submitted in Fy 2000 & 2001 L-99-120, Forwards Annual Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments for BVPS Unit 1,IAW 10CFR50.59.Rept Provides Brief Description of Each Facility & Procedure Change & Summary of Safety Evaluations1999-07-22022 July 1999 Forwards Annual Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments for BVPS Unit 1,IAW 10CFR50.59.Rept Provides Brief Description of Each Facility & Procedure Change & Summary of Safety Evaluations L-99-119, Forwards Rev 17 to UFSAR for Beaver Power Station,Unit 1. Submittal Reflects Changes to Facility & Procedures as Described in UFSAR That Were Completed During Annual Reporting Period Endinig 9901221999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Rev 17 to UFSAR for Beaver Power Station,Unit 1. Submittal Reflects Changes to Facility & Procedures as Described in UFSAR That Were Completed During Annual Reporting Period Endinig 990122 L-99-111, Forwards Revised Final Typed Pages for LARs 109 & 115, Previously Submitted by 990615 & 28 Ltrs.Revised Pages Replace Those Previously Provided for LARs 109 & 115.With Summary of Editorial Changes1999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Revised Final Typed Pages for LARs 109 & 115, Previously Submitted by 990615 & 28 Ltrs.Revised Pages Replace Those Previously Provided for LARs 109 & 115.With Summary of Editorial Changes L-99-113, Forwards Final,Typed TS Pages for LARs 262 & 135,previously Submitted with Editorial Changes Identified by1999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Final,Typed TS Pages for LARs 262 & 135,previously Submitted with Editorial Changes Identified by L-99-112, Responds to NRC Questions Made During 990518 Meeting with Util Re LARs 220 & 88,for Bvps,Units 1 & 2.Copy of Ltr DLC-99-743,which Is non-proprietary Version of DLC-96-310 & Westinghouse Technical Bulletin ESBU-TB-96-07-R0 Also Encl1999-07-14014 July 1999 Responds to NRC Questions Made During 990518 Meeting with Util Re LARs 220 & 88,for Bvps,Units 1 & 2.Copy of Ltr DLC-99-743,which Is non-proprietary Version of DLC-96-310 & Westinghouse Technical Bulletin ESBU-TB-96-07-R0 Also Encl L-99-110, Forwards Changes to ERDS for Unit 1,IAW Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,Rev 1,Section 3.61999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Changes to ERDS for Unit 1,IAW Requirements of 10CFR50,App E,Section VI.3.a & NUREG-1394,Rev 1,Section 3.6 L-99-105, Forwards Response to NRC 990420 RAI Re Previous Responses to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Power-Operated Gate Valves1999-07-0808 July 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990420 RAI Re Previous Responses to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Power-Operated Gate Valves L-99-108, Requests Withdrawal of Change Proposed for TS Bases Page B 3/4 2-2 from LARs 1A-262 & 2A-135,originally Submitted by Licensee to NRC1999-07-0707 July 1999 Requests Withdrawal of Change Proposed for TS Bases Page B 3/4 2-2 from LARs 1A-262 & 2A-135,originally Submitted by Licensee to NRC L-99-109, Forwards Inservice Insp Ninety-Day Rept Bvps,Unit 2 Outage 7,Year 1999, IAW ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Article IWA-62301999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Inservice Insp Ninety-Day Rept Bvps,Unit 2 Outage 7,Year 1999, IAW ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Section Xi,Article IWA-6230 L-99-104, Responds to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants. Disclosure Rept Encl1999-06-29029 June 1999 Responds to GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants. Disclosure Rept Encl L-99-093, Provides Response to RAI on Proposed Change to Operations QA Program Description.Attachment 2 Provides Revised Markup for Proposed Changes to Affected UFSAR Section 17.2.51999-06-25025 June 1999 Provides Response to RAI on Proposed Change to Operations QA Program Description.Attachment 2 Provides Revised Markup for Proposed Changes to Affected UFSAR Section 17.2.5 L-99-102, Forwards Typed,Final TS Pages for LARs 259 & 131.Summary of Description of Plant Editorial Changes Incorporated in Addition to Those Addressed in Previously Provided marked-up Pages,Encl1999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Typed,Final TS Pages for LARs 259 & 131.Summary of Description of Plant Editorial Changes Incorporated in Addition to Those Addressed in Previously Provided marked-up Pages,Encl L-99-101, Submits Response to NRC Oral RAI Concerning Qualifications for Senior Nuclear Executive Ref in 10CFR50.80 Submittal1999-06-22022 June 1999 Submits Response to NRC Oral RAI Concerning Qualifications for Senior Nuclear Executive Ref in 10CFR50.80 Submittal L-99-062, Forwards Final TS Pages for LARs 262 & 135,including Summary Description of Plants Editorial Changes Incorporated in Addition to Those Addressed in Previously Provided marked-up Pages1999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards Final TS Pages for LARs 262 & 135,including Summary Description of Plants Editorial Changes Incorporated in Addition to Those Addressed in Previously Provided marked-up Pages ML20196A6601999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards Master Decommissioning Trust Agreements Revised After 1990 for Ohio Edison Co,Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co,Toledo Edison Co & Pennsylvania Power Co Re Bvnps,Units 1 & 2,DBNPS,Unit 1 & Perry Unit 1 ML20195H4651999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards for Filing Answer of Firstenergy Corp in Opposition to Petition for Leave to Intervene of Local 29, Intl Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Copies of Answer Have Been Served Upon Parties & Petitioner by e-mail ML20195J5221999-06-16016 June 1999 Forwards Answer of Duquesne Light Co to Petition to Intervene of Local 29,International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers in Listed Matter.With Certificate of Svc L-99-100, Forwards Typed,Final TS Pages for LAR 109 Re Rcs.Summary Description of Editorial Changes Incorporated in Addition to Those Addressed in Previously Provided marked-up Pages Is Provided in Attachment B-1091999-06-15015 June 1999 Forwards Typed,Final TS Pages for LAR 109 Re Rcs.Summary Description of Editorial Changes Incorporated in Addition to Those Addressed in Previously Provided marked-up Pages Is Provided in Attachment B-109 L-99-095, Provides Addl Info to Support LARs 262 & 135,in Response to NRC 990527 Verbal Request.Info Describes Performance of Unit 1 Rod Position Indication Sys & Provides Some Background Info Re Normal Operation of Sys1999-06-15015 June 1999 Provides Addl Info to Support LARs 262 & 135,in Response to NRC 990527 Verbal Request.Info Describes Performance of Unit 1 Rod Position Indication Sys & Provides Some Background Info Re Normal Operation of Sys L-99-099, Requests Partial Withdrawal of LAR 120,which Requested Review of USQ Due to Increased Calculated Doses for Locked Rotor Event & Use of Unapproved Methodology for Evaluating Small Break LOCA Doses Involving W Natl Safety Advisory Ltr1999-06-14014 June 1999 Requests Partial Withdrawal of LAR 120,which Requested Review of USQ Due to Increased Calculated Doses for Locked Rotor Event & Use of Unapproved Methodology for Evaluating Small Break LOCA Doses Involving W Natl Safety Advisory Ltr ML20195H3731999-06-0303 June 1999 Forwards Petition to Intervene of Local 29,Intl Brotherhood of Electrical Workers in Matter of Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Co,For Filing L-99-090, Forwards Summary Review Completed to Verify Adequacy of Design Basis Accident Thermal Overpressure Protection for BVPS Unit 2 Containment Penetrations,Per Request1999-06-0202 June 1999 Forwards Summary Review Completed to Verify Adequacy of Design Basis Accident Thermal Overpressure Protection for BVPS Unit 2 Containment Penetrations,Per Request L-99-086, Forwards Bvps,Unit 2 SG Exam Rept for Aug 1998.Rept Provided to Document Results of SG Eddy Current Exams Performed in Aug 1998.Summary of Insps Provided in Encl 11999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Bvps,Unit 2 SG Exam Rept for Aug 1998.Rept Provided to Document Results of SG Eddy Current Exams Performed in Aug 1998.Summary of Insps Provided in Encl 1 L-99-089, Forwards Annual Financial Repts,Including Certified Financial Statements,Of Dqe,Firstenergy Corp,Ohio Edison Co,Pennsylvania Power Co,Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co & Toledo Edison Co,Iaw 10CFR50.71(b)1999-05-28028 May 1999 Forwards Annual Financial Repts,Including Certified Financial Statements,Of Dqe,Firstenergy Corp,Ohio Edison Co,Pennsylvania Power Co,Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co & Toledo Edison Co,Iaw 10CFR50.71(b) L-99-084, Forwards Revised marked-up TS & UFSAR Pages to 990303 LARs 259 & 131 Which Revised Qualifications for Operations Mgt & Incorporated Generic Position Titles in Ts.Encl Pages Incorporate NRC Requested Changes,Per Recent Telcon1999-05-27027 May 1999 Forwards Revised marked-up TS & UFSAR Pages to 990303 LARs 259 & 131 Which Revised Qualifications for Operations Mgt & Incorporated Generic Position Titles in Ts.Encl Pages Incorporate NRC Requested Changes,Per Recent Telcon L-99-082, Dockets Licensee Plan for Bvps,Unit 1,safety-related Small Bore Piping Evaluation Project Discussed in NRC 990311 Public Meeting at BVPS1999-05-17017 May 1999 Dockets Licensee Plan for Bvps,Unit 1,safety-related Small Bore Piping Evaluation Project Discussed in NRC 990311 Public Meeting at BVPS L-99-071, Notifies of License Withdrawal for J Scott,License SOP-11481,due to Resignation from Employment at BVPS1999-05-12012 May 1999 Notifies of License Withdrawal for J Scott,License SOP-11481,due to Resignation from Employment at BVPS 1999-09-03
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20059L4271990-09-0707 September 1990 Requests Approval for Use of Steam Generator Tube Plugs for Both Mechanical & Welded Applications ML20059G0821990-09-0404 September 1990 Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-66,consisting of License Change Request 180,changing Section 3.3.3.2 to Reduce Required Number of Operable Incore Detector Thimbles for Remainder of Cycle 8 ML20059F7551990-08-29029 August 1990 Responds to Unresolved Item 50-334/90-16-01 Noted in Insp Rept 50-334/90-16.Corrective Actions:Initial Training for Maint Group Personnel Responsible for Maintaining Supplied Air Respirators Will Be Supplemented W/Biennial Retraining ML20059F1501990-08-29029 August 1990 Advises That Permanent Replacement Chosen for Plant Independent Safety Evaluation Group.Position Will Be Staffed Effective 900829 ML20028G8731990-08-29029 August 1990 Forwards fitness-for-duty Program Performance Data for Jan-June 1990,per 10CFR26.71 ML20059D3761990-08-24024 August 1990 Describes Cycle 3 Reload Design,Documents Util Review Per 10CFR50.59 & Provides Determination That No Tech Spec Changes or Unreviewed Safety Questions Involved.Reload Core Design Will Not Adversely Affect Safety of Plant ML20028G8881990-08-24024 August 1990 Withdraws Operator License SOP-10731 (55-60749) Issued to K Gilbert,Who Resigned 05000412/LER-1990-007, Responds to NRC Re Deviation 50-412/90-12-01 Noted in Insp Rept 50-412/90-12.Corrective Actions:Procedure OM 2.20-4.I Revised to Require Removal of Flanges Following Drain Operations & LER 90-007-00 Issued1990-08-23023 August 1990 Responds to NRC Re Deviation 50-412/90-12-01 Noted in Insp Rept 50-412/90-12.Corrective Actions:Procedure OM 2.20-4.I Revised to Require Removal of Flanges Following Drain Operations & LER 90-007-00 Issued ML20058P7651990-08-14014 August 1990 Provides Info on Acceptability of Rescheduling Response to Reg Guide 1.97 Ser,Item 4b, Neutron Flux Monitoring Instrumentation. Rescheduling of Util Response Will Be Determined on or Shortly After Meeting W/Nrc ML20059E0571990-08-10010 August 1990 Forwards Suppl 3 to Nonproprietary WCAP-12094 & Proprietary WCAP-12093, Evaluation of Pressurizer Surge Line Transients Exceeding 320 F for Beaver Valley Unit 2, for Review by 900901.Proprietary Rept Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790(b)(4)) ML20059E7631990-08-0101 August 1990 Provides Results of Util Evaluation of Licensed Operator Requalification Exam Conducted During Wks of 900709 & 16. Crew That Failed to Meet Expected Performance Level Has Been Successfully Upgraded & re-evaluated to Be Satisfactory ML20059B8141990-08-0101 August 1990 Requests Exemption from 10CFR26 Re Fitness for Duty Program & 10CFR73 Re Physical Protection of Plants & Matls Concerning Unescorted Access Requirements for Nuclear Generating Stations ML20056A3471990-07-31031 July 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 90-001.Items 1 Through 5 of Requested Actions for Operating Reactors Completed ML20056A1841990-07-27027 July 1990 Forwards Revised Methodology for Achieving Alternate Ac for Plant,Per 900720 Telcon ML20055H2581990-07-25025 July 1990 Forwards Decommissioning Rept, Per 10CFR50.33(K) & 50.75(b) ML20055F7061990-07-0909 July 1990 Responds to NRC Re Dcrdr Requirements as Specified in Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737.DCRDR Corrective Actions Implemented & Mods Determined to Be Operational Prior to Startup Following Seventh Plant Refueling Outage ML20055D3871990-07-0202 July 1990 Provides Info Re long-term Solution to Action Item 3 of NRC Bulletin 88-008,per 890714 & s.Util Will Continue to Monitor Temp in Affected Lines & Evaluate Results ML20058K5031990-06-29029 June 1990 Discusses Use of Emergency Diesel Generators as Alternate Ac Source at multi-unit Sites,Per Licensee .Emergency Diesel Generator Load Mgt Methodology Evaluated to Meet Listed Criteria ML20044A3661990-06-21021 June 1990 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-73,consisting of Tech Spec Change Request 44,changing Stroke Time to 60 for Inside Containment Letdown Isolation Valves.Change Determined Safe & Involves No Unreviewed Safety Issue ML20043G6811990-06-14014 June 1990 Forwards Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-66 & NPF-73, Revising Tech Specs Re Electrical Power Sys - Shutdown & Ac & Dc Distribution - Shutdown ML20043H9341990-06-14014 June 1990 Forwards Issue 1 to Rev 4 to Inservice Testing Program for Pumps & Valves. Issue 1 Removes Relief Requests Requiring Prior NRC Approval & Adds Certain Program Changes Permitted by ASME XI & Generic Ltr 89-04 ML20043G5981990-06-12012 June 1990 Forwards Monthly Operating Repts for May 1990 for Beaver Valley Units 1 & 2 & Revised Rept for Apr 1990 for Beaver Valley Unit 1 ML20043G6851990-06-12012 June 1990 Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-66,consisting of Proposed OL Change Request 176,revising Tech Specs to Replace Current Single Overpressure Protection Setpoint W/ Curve Based on Temp ML20043G7941990-06-12012 June 1990 Responds to NRC 900524 Request for Addl Info Re Proposed Operating License Change Request 156.Clarification of Magnitude of Confidence Level of Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology,As Specified in WCAP-11419,encl ML20043G8001990-06-11011 June 1990 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-73,consisting of Proposed Operating License Change Request 41.Amend Deletes Surveillance Requirement 4.4.9.3.1.d ML20043H0291990-06-11011 June 1990 Forwards Application for Amend to License NPF-73,consisting of Proposed OL Change Request 40,modifying Heatup & Cooldown Curves Applicable to 10 EFPYs Per WCAP-12406 Re Analysis of Capsule U from Radiation Surveillance Program ML20043F5251990-06-0707 June 1990 Requests Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Tech Spec Limiting Condition for Operation Re Operability of Containment Isolation Valves During Quarterly Slave Relay Testing.Evaluation to Support Request Encl ML20043F1361990-06-0404 June 1990 Advises That Chemistry Manual Chapter 5P1, Enhanced Primary to Secondary Leakrate Monitoring Program for Unit 1,per 880328 Request to Recommit to Item C.1 of NRC Bulletin 88-002 ML20043B5971990-05-18018 May 1990 Advises of Delay in Hiring Independent Safety Evaluation Group Replacement to Maintain Five Permanent Personnel Onsite,Per Tech Spec 6.2.3.2.Replacement Will Be Provided within 30 Days of Retirement of Engineer on 900531 ML20043B0511990-05-15015 May 1990 Responds to Telcon Request for Addl Info Re Elimination of Snubbers on Primary Component Supports.Probability of Case B/G Event Extremely Small & Does Not Represent Realisitic Scenario ML20043B1921990-05-11011 May 1990 Forwards Cycle 8 & Cycle 2 Core Operating Limits Rept,Per Tech Spec 6.9.1.14 ML20042G9761990-05-0808 May 1990 Responds to NRC 900226 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-334/89-80 & 50-412/89-80.Corrective Action:Maint Work Request Program Being Upgraded to Include Responsibilities of Nuclear Const Dept & Will Be Issued by 900601 ML20042G8541990-05-0303 May 1990 Forwards Technical Review,Audit Summary & Operability Assessments Re Potentially Invalid Leak Detection Tests Used as Alternative for Amse Section XI Hydrostatic Tests ML20042G9071990-05-0101 May 1990 Forwards Annual Financial Repts for Duquense Light Co,Ohio Edison Co,Pennsylvania Power Co,Centerior Energy Corp & Toledo Edison Co,Per 10CFR50-71(b) ML20042F1381990-04-30030 April 1990 Advises That Final SER for Implementation of USI A-46 Will Be Delayed Until Late 1990 ML20042F0991990-04-20020 April 1990 Forwards Response to Request for Addl Info Re Second 10 Yr ISI Program ML20012F5951990-04-10010 April 1990 Forwards Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1990 & Revised Operating Data Rept & Unit Shutdown & Power Reductions Sheets for Jan 1990 ML20042E1471990-04-0404 April 1990 Forwards Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-66 & NPF-73, Consisting of License Change Request 174/36,updating Staff Titles to Reflect Nuclear Group Organization ML20012F6021990-03-30030 March 1990 Submits Supplemental Response to Station Blackout Rule for Plant,Per NUMARC 900104 Ltr.Summary of Changes to Condensate Inventory of Dhr,Effects of Loss of Ventilation, Control Room HVAC & Reactor Coolant Inventory Listed ML20012E3091990-03-23023 March 1990 Forwards Response to 900308 Request for Addl Info on Reg Guide 1.97 Re Variable for Steam Generator wide-range Level Instrumentation ML20012E3451990-03-23023 March 1990 Submits Addl Info for Exemption from General Design Criteria GDC-57,including Background Info Describing Sys Operation & Addl Bases for Exemption Request.Simplified Recirculation Spray Sys Drawings Encl ML20012D6491990-03-19019 March 1990 Requests Retroactive NRC Approval of Temporary Waiver of Compliance Re Tech Spec Limiting Condition for Operation 3.8.2.1 on Ac Vital Bus Operability.Sts Will Be Followed When Inverters Not Providing Power to Vital Bus ML20012E4091990-03-16016 March 1990 Forwards Inservice Insp 90-Day Rept,Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1,Outage 7, for 880227-891221,per Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code 1983 Edition Through Summer 1983 Addenda,Section XI ML20012D6181990-03-15015 March 1990 Responds to NRC 900215 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-334/89-23 & 50-412/89-22.Corrective Actions:Safety Injection Signal Reset & Plant Returned to Presafety Injection Conditions & Crew Members Counseled ML20042D7401990-03-14014 March 1990 Forwards Corrected Annual Rept of Number of Personnel Receiving Greater than 100 Mrem & Associated Exposure by Work Function at Plant for CY89. ML20012D5801990-03-13013 March 1990 Forwards Correction to First 10-yr Inservice Insp Program, Rev 2 to Relief Request BV2-C6.10-1 Re Recirculation Spray Pump - Pump Casing Welds & Relief Request Index ML20012D6221990-03-13013 March 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 89-19, Resolution to USI A-47. Recommends All Westinghouse Plant Designs Provide Automatic Steam Generator Overfill Protection to Mitigate Main Feedwater Overfeed Events ML20012C1791990-03-0909 March 1990 Responds to NRC 900207 Ltr Re Deviations Noted in Insp Repts 50-334/89-25 & 50-412/89-23.Corrective Actions:Written Request Initiated to Identify Unit 2 post-accident Monitoring Recorders in Control Room & Recorders Labeled ML20012E0911990-03-0505 March 1990 Lists Max Primary Property Damage Insurance Coverages for Plant,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(2) ML20012B7051990-03-0202 March 1990 Responds to NRC 900131 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-334/90-05 & 50-412/90-04.Requests Withdrawal of Violation Re Stated Transport Problem & Reclassification as Noncompliance,Per 10CFR2,App C,Section G 1990-09-07
[Table view] |
Text
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1 l March 23, 1990 ,
. LI U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1
- Attn:- Document Control Desk
Reference:
' Beaver _ Valley Power- Station, : Unit No. 1 ,
4 Docket No.'50-334, License No. DPR-66 Response to R. G. 1.97
- Gentlemen: ;
This , letter is in response. to the request for additional-
-~information (RAI)- on the -Regulatory- Guide 1.97 _(R.G. 1.97).
Variable- .for steam ^ generator- wide . range (SGWR). ~ level instrumentation. The RAI was by telecon with the Region 1 and NRR.
Staff on March 8, 1990.
During ;the March 8th telecon, our response of January 31, 1990 to the R. G.. 1.97 'SGWR . level instrumentation =. deviation was
.. - discussed. It was' determined that it would be helpful if Duquesne ,
" Light . Company -provided- a detailed discussion of the alternative
- parameters and the combination of parameters"as they relate back to steam
- generator level (i.e. heat sink availability).
. Additional- information on the associated. flowpaths through the Emergency-Operating Procedures (EOPs) was also requested. j Please contact my office if there are any questions regarding .,
this' submittal. ,
very truly yours, diu
. D. Sieber Vice President Nuclear Group ,
' Attachment i
~
- cc: 'Mr. J. Beall, Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. T. T. Martin, NRC Region I Administrator Mr. P. Tam, Sr. Project Manager ,o .
Mr. C. Anderson (Region 1) 9004030195 900323 0 PDR ADOCK 05000334 ,
l P PDC 's t
-V e - s ,
ATTACHMENT 1
Steam Generator Wide Ranae Level Instrumentation ;
I Page 1 !
1 Problem Descriotion and NRC Recuest i The three wide range steam generator level channels are indicated and recorded on a single recorder. A failure of the power supply l to the recorder would result in a loss of three wide range level i indications. !
The three . wide range level channels are powered from separate ;
vital busses but are routed together in neutral cable trays from J
.the sensors to the indicating and recording device. No isolation devices are installed. Regulatory Guide 1.97 describes steam generator level as a-D1 variable.
The Duquesne Light Company (DLC) submittal of December 18, 1989 ,
discusses alternative and diverse instrumentation. A more detailed discussion of these parameters and the combination of parameters as they relate back to steam generator level (i.e. heat sink availability) is requested for NRC review. .
Additional information on the associated flowpaths through the Emergency Operating Procedure (EOPs) is also requested.
Response to NRC Reauest for Additional Information Our. response to the NRC RAI is arranged according to the following-outline:
- 1. Background -
This item summarizes the previously submitted information by DLC.
- 2. BVPS-1 Functional Design -
Specific BVPS-1 information is provided from the UFSAR and the background documents of the EOPs.
- 3. EOPL A. This item provides a discussion of the three BVPS-1 procedures beyond the design basis which utilize the SGWR level instrumentation.
B. This item provides a discussion of the other pathways in the EOPS which do not reference the SGWR level-instrumentation but addresses conditions of the secondary heat sink.
- 4. Summary and conclusions
4 f ATTACHMENT Steam Generator Wide Ranae Level Instrumentation ?
Page 2
- 1. Backaround ,
As discussed in our letter to the NRC dated January 31, 1990, we
. performed the review of and provided a resolution to the SGWR level instrumentation deviation to R. G. 1.97. Our proposed resolution is based on the following information.
- In our letter of December 18, 1989, we provided the safety implicationt based on discussions in the UFSAR and with ,
respect to the design basis events. We concluded that there are adequate diverse and independent instrumentation channels in accordance with R. G. 1.97 for accident diagnostics and mitigation of design basis events.
- In the same letter, we also addressed the issue of all three wide range indications appearing on a common recorder. We indicated that the wide range level indication is also provided to three separate computer systems which, although ,
they are not 1E, are battery backed systems. We included this information on Table 1 of the letter. The Table also listed the alternate indications on the emergency shutdown panel, locally in the auxiliary feedwater pump-rooms, and the control ,
room and provided the power supply vital bus designations. l In the same letter, we also addressed the issue of the !
operators knowing how to respond to a loss of wide range steam generator level. We noted that the procedures require maintaining auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators
.until level is in the narrow range, thereby providing adequate guidance. . This operator action provides- assurance of an adequate heat sink.
- In our letter of January 31, 1990, we provided the logic model which we developed to show that the procedures are supported by the BVPS-1 design. The model shows that additional systems are available to mitigate conditions leading to steam generator dryout. The logic model shows several success paths for supplying 350 gpm of auxiliary feedwater to any steam generator. The system is supplemented by an additional- ,
auxiliary. feedwater pump, FW-P-4, which was included to satisfy Appendix R. The 4160V electrical supply for the auxiliary feedwater system will have another power source added for Station Blackout. The model also shows the redundancy of the river water supplies. In reviewing the SGWR level instrumentation, we noted that the configuration is similar to other three-loop plants.
c; ..
,+
l-l i'= '
ATTACHMENT I
Steam Generator Wide Rance Level Instrumentation i
Page 3 a I
l l
Finally,- in our telecon with the NRC on March 8, 1990, we included. a discussion of the alternate instrumentation for i accident diagnostics. This instrumentation and discussion of i its use is provided below.
12 . BVPS-1 Instrumentation and Punctional Desian Instrumentation Figure 1 of this attachment is. a graphical view of the instrumentation provided for each steam generator. The figure can act as a reference for the discussions which follow. As j can _ be seen on the figure, there are the following '
instrumentation channels which have indication in the control room. Please refer to Table 1 of our submittal of December 18, 1989 for additional information on the auxiliary feedwater flow and the'WR and NR level instrumentation.
There is one (1) flow transmitter for each steam generator-in the line supplied by the two motor driven and one steam driven AFW pumps.
The flow from the fourth AFW pump, FWP-4, can be detected by two flow transmitters in the normal feedwater: supply line.
+
Steam Generator Steam Flow and Pressure - There are two L flow transmitters and three pressure transmitters for i each steam generator. The flow instrumentation is located upstream of the safety and relief valves as shown on the figure and the pressure transmitters are upstream of the main steam isolation-valves.
Level Transmitters - The approximate arrangement of the one WR level and three NR level transmitters are shown on the figure.
Also, not shown on the figure, radiation monitoring is provided for the air ejector and blowdown lines.
1 L UFSAR Maior Secondary System Ploe Ruoture b Included below are the functions which provide the necessary ,
protection against a steam pipe rupture !
E 1. Safety injection system actuation from any of the following:
- a. Two-out-of-three low pressurizer pressure
- b. Two-out-of-three low steamline pressure in any one loop
- c. Two-out-of-three high containment pressure 1
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ATTACHMENT Steam Generator Wide Rance Level Instrumentation i
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- 2. The' overpower reactor trips (neutron flux and T) and the ~l reactor trip occurring in conjunction with receipt of the safety injection signal. ,
- 3. Redundant' isolation' of the main feedwater lines: Sustained -
cause high feedwater flow woul'd additional cooldown.
Therefore, in addition to normal control action which will
close the main feedwater valves, a safety injection signal will' rapidly close-all feedwater control valves, trip the main feedwater pumps and close the feedwater pump discharge valves. ;
- 4. Trip. of the ' fast acting steam line stop valves (designed to close in less than 5 seconds after receipt of the signal) on:
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- a. Two-out-of-three low steam line pressure in any loop (above Permissive P-11)
- b. High-high containment pressure
- c. Two-out-of-three high steam line pressure rate in any i loop-(below Permissive P-11).
Fast-acting isolation valves are provided in each steam line-that will' fully close within 5 seconds of a large break in the steam line. For breaks downstream of the isolation valves, closure of
-all valves would completely terminate the blowdown. For any break, in any location, no more than one steam generator would blowdown under single failure criteria. l l
Steam flow. is measured by monitoring dynamic head in nozzles inside the steam pipes. The nozzles which are of considerably ;
smaller diameter than the main steam pipe are located inside the i' containment near the steam generators and also serve to limit the maximum steam flow for any break further downstream.
It should be noted that following a steam line break only one ,
steam generator blows down completely. Thus, the remaining steam =
generators are still available for dissipation of decay heat after H the initial transient is over. In the case of loss of offsite 1 power, this heat is removed to the atmosphere via the steam line !
safety valves which have been sized to cover this condition. l l
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Steam Generator Wide Ranae Level Instrumentation Page 5 Y
UFSAR Maior Runture of a Main Feedwater Pine
. Included below are the functions that provide the necessary protection against a main feedwater rupture.
1.: A reactor trip on any of the following conditions:
.o
- a. High pressurizer pressure ;
- b. Overtemperature delta-T
- c. Low-low steam generator water level in any, steam generator
- d. Low steam generator level plus steam / feed flow mismatch in any steam generator
- e. Safety injection signals from either of the following:
- 1) Low steam line pressure
, 2) High containment pressure
- 2. .LAn auxiliary feedwater-system to. provide an assured source of j feedwater to the steam generators for' decay heat removal. 1 (Refer. to Section 10 for description of the auxiliary I feedwater system.)
A' major feedwater line rupture is defined as a break in a feedwater- pipe large enough to prevent the addition of sufficient feedwater to the steam generators to. maintain shell-side fluid inventory in the steam' generators. If the break is. postulated in a feedline between the check valve and the steam generator, fluid from the steam generator may also be discharged through the break. Further, a break in this location could preclude the
- subsequent addition of auxiliary feedwater to the affected steam
- generator.
It is noted that for the main feedwater pipe rupture that the worst possible break area is assumed; i.e., one that empties the affected- steam generator and causes a reactor trip on low-low steam generator water level at the same time as the fluid inventory. in the unaffected steam generator drops to the trip point for low level coincident with steam / feed flow mismatch. It is 'also noted that the steam generator level referred to above as causing the reactor trip is the narrow range instrumentation.
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I With respect to- the above accidents, we note that the minimum 1
-requirements for the main control board indications for S. G. I level are one level channel per steam generator (either wide or l narrow range). (Reference Table 7.5-2, UFSAR.) !
EOPs The following information is taken from the background documents- 3 of the BVPS-1 EOPs. The purpose of providing this information is ,
to show: 1) what secondary information is most important to the operator for identifying a faulted steam generator and, 2) the alternate parameters useful to the operator in identifying the approach to steam generator dryout when all steam generators are faulted. It is not intended that the parameters presented below are -all inclusive of those available. Complete listings of available instrumentation are provided in Item 3 below.
- 1. Procedure E-2, " Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," provides actions to identify and isolate a faulted steam-generator.
The procedure is entered from E-0, " Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection," or E-1, " Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant,"
when any SG pressure decreases in an uncontrolled manner or any SG completely depressurizes. Other procedures have a transition to E-2 whenever a faulted SG is identified and faulted SG isolation is not verified. After taking the required actions in this procedure, the-operator is directed i to either E-1, " Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" or E-3, L " Steam Generator Tube Rupture," depending on whether a SGTR is If all SGs are determined to be faulted, the identified.
operator is directed to ECA-2.1, " Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators." Procedure E-2,
" Faulted Steam Generator . Isolation," is intended to identify
, and isolate a. loss of secondary coolant resulting from a fault L in a main steamline, main feedwater line or in any piping system that interconnects with the secondary side pressure boundary (e.g., auxiliary feedwater system, blowdown piping).
Small Secondary Break For this size break, it is not expected that an automatic reactor trip or safety injection would occur and, therefore, procedure E-2 would not be implemented.
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. . ATTACHMENT Steam Generator Wide Ranae Level Instrumentation Page'7 Intermediate Size Secondary Break An intermediate size break is lower bounded by those sizes in ,
which the normal plant control systems are. unable to maintain _
- approximate nominal plant operating conditions and upper bounded by. those sizes in which the protective functions do not occur
.within approximately five minutes following initiation of the .
event. The intermediate steamline break is categorized by a !
slowly decreasing steamline pressure in at least one loop i depending upon the location of the break. If the break occurs in the steam header, all loops will experience decreasing pressure. ,
Due to the increased steam load for which the control systems are ,
unable to compensate, a slowly decreasing steam generator water level will result and also a slowly decreasing primary average temperature. :
If the break occurs upstream of the main steamline isolation valves (MSIVs), the steam generator associated with the faulted 4 loop will blow down to atmospheric pressure. If the break occurs +
downstream ~ of the steamline isolation valves, the transient is-terminated following MSIV closure. The system process parameter.
trends that are used to identify a faulted SG are an uncontrolled- i precsure decrease in at least one steamline or a SG that is completely depressurized. Other symptoms include increased main L -feed flow to at least one steam generator, slowly decreasing L primary average temperature and slowly decreasing steam generator water level in at least one steam generator. ='
For an intermediate feedline break in which'the control systems are incapable of compensating for the loss of flow, the secondary.
side would experience a slowly decreasing steam generator water L
level in at least one steam generator. The transient is i eventually terminated by manual reactor trip or when the low or i low-low level trip setpoint is reached in any one steam L generator. This results in a reactor trip and auxiliary '
l feedwater initiation. A subsequent turbine trip occurs due to L reactor trip. If the break occurs downstream of the main feedline non-return valves, all steam generators continue to E experience a reverse blow down through the steam generator L associated with the faulted loop until a low steamline pressure setpoint is attained resulting in a safety injection initiation o and steamline and feedline isolation. The faulted steam l generator will then blow down until atmospheric pressure is reached. If the break occurs upstream of the feedline non-return valves, the feedwater spillage is terminated and the auxiljary feedwater system is sufficient to mitigate the consequences of the resultant loss of normal feedwater transient. The system parameter trends that are used to identify a faulted SG are an uncontrolled pressure decrease in at least one steamline or a SG that is completely depressurized. Other symptoms include decreasing water level in at least one steam generator and slowly rising primary system average temperature prior to reactor trip.
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For either of the above transients, if the break occurs inside l t containment, an increasing containment temperature and/or '
l pressure indication could be observed. If the break occurs outside containment, audible or visual indications may assist the operator in diagnosing the transient.
Laroe Secondary Break l
For the double-ended main steamline break, an immediate !
decrease in pressure in at least one steamline occurs l depending upon the location of the break. The low steamline )
pressure setpoint is reached (5-10 seconds) which results in safety injection initiation and steamline isolation. This yields a reactor trip, turbine trip, main feed isolation and auxiliary feedwater initiation. If the break is downstream of the MSIVs, closure of the MSIVs may terminate the blowdown to l atmospheric pressure. The important system parameter trends j for this break are an uncontrolled pressure decrease in at least one steamline or a SG that is completely depressurized, other symptoms include decreasing steam generator water level in at least one steam generator and initially decreasing primary prescure and temperature.
The double-ended main feedline break exhibits characteristics ,
quite similar to the double-ended steamline break.
The system response is characterized by a rapid decrease in steam generator water level in at least one steam generator. .
Following reactor trip, all steam generators exhibit reverse '
blowdown through the faulted feedline until the low steamline pressure setpoint is reached in any steamline resulting in steamline and feedline isolation and safety injection initiation. Following MSIV closure, one steam generator blows down to atmospheric pressure. ;
For both the double-ended steamline break and feedline break, steamline pressure in at least one steamline would be rapidly decreasing. Containment pressure and temperature increases
- would be observed if the break occurred inside containment.
Audible and visual confirmation of the break-may be possible if the break occurs outside containment. Also, for all secondary double-ended high energy line breaks, a distinct characteristic ic the closure of all main steamline isolation valves.
- 2. Loss of Secondary Heat Sink The most serious challenge to the Heat Sink Critical Safety Punction is an indication of loss of secondary heat sink. A loss of secondary heat sink occurs if decay heat removal is needed through the SGs and all feed flow capability is lost.
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l Feed flow must be re-established or an alternative heat removal mode (e.g., bleed and feed) must be established to ,
prevent core uncovery and eventually an inadequate core cooling condition. It is noted that the parameters monitored .
on the Heat sink Status Tree are SGNR Level, Feedwater Flow, and SG Pressure, j Procedure FR-H.1, " Response To Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink,"
provides guidance to address an extreme challenge (i.e., RED prierity) to the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function that results if total feed flow is below a minimum value and level ;
is belve the narrow range in all SGs at any time.
Procedure FR-H.5, " Response to Steam Generator Low Level," l provides . guidance to address a not satisfied condition (i.e., !
YELLOW priority) from low secondary system inventory that affects any $3. Procedure FR-H.S has been developed and structured to complement procedure FR-H.1, " Response to Loss of Secondary Heaf Sink," in maintaining secondary heat sink.
Whereas Procedure FR-H.1 provides guidance to maintain i adequate secondary i: eat sink (i.e., adequate inventory in at :
least one SG), proc 63ure FR-H.S provides guidance to restore j and maintain secondary inventory in the normal range (i.e., ;
narrow range level) in all nonfaulted SGs. i The objective of Procedure FR-H.1 is to maintain reactor coolant system (RCS) heat vemoval capability by establishing ,
feed flow to a SG or throug? establishing RCS bleed and feed !
heat removal. Procedure FR-H.1 is entered- at the first indication that secondary hear removal capability may be challenged. This permits maxim m time for operator action to i restore feedwater flow to at least one steam (6nerator before secondary inventory is depleted and secondary heat removal :
capability is lost. Once secondary heat removal capability is lost, RCS bleed and feed must be eatablished to minimize core uncovery and prevent an inadequate core cooling condition.
l A loss of secondary heat sink can occtr as a result of several different initiating events. It is not the intent here to investigate these events but to get to the bottom line, operator information necessary to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed Heat Removal. 1 Analyses for a high pressure plant were used to determine the conditions necessary to initiate successful bleed and feed for different PORV flow to power ratios. High 14ressure plants are those plants which have charging /HHSI pucps and, thus, can inject at pressures above the pressurize; PORV setpoint pressure. Based on the analyses, th::se plants can l successfully initiate bleed and feed heat recoval before or
- even shortly after the time of steam generator dryout if the ,
PORV flow to power ratio is greater than 140 (lbm/as)/Mwt.
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i Steam generator dryout is defined as the loss of sufficient '
secondary inventory such that the core heat load shifts to heating the primary RCS inventory. The best symptom to use for loss of heat sink would then be a direct indication of loss of secondary inventory. Wide range steam generator level :
provides a direct indication of secondary inventory and, therefore, represents the best indication for initiating bleed .
and feed for high pressure plants.
As steam generator dryout occurs, an increase in RCS pressure and temperature results in the opening of the pressurizer PORVs. Thus, for high pressure plants with a PORV flow to ;
power ratio greater than 140 (1bm/hr)Mwt, an alternative symptom for successful initiation of bleed and feed is i increasing RCS pressure and temperature or pressure greater :
than or equal to 2335 PSIG (PRZR PORV set pressure). !
Finally, the following provides concerns in using the !
identified symptoms above and identifies the alternatives.
7 For a plant with only a single wide range level channel per -
SG, the symptom is modified to ensure that a failure of one ;
channel will not prevent timely initiation of bleed and feed heat removal. Therefore, for an "N" loop plant, the symptom i is HN-1" wide range SG levels to be less than the level indicated for initiation of bleed and feed heat removal.
If the wide range SG 1evel channels are not qualified, the indications cannot be used in an adverse containment environmant. Therefore, an alternative symptom is required for the wide range SG level indication. However, BVPS Unit 1 SG wide range level transmitters are environmentally qualified.
An alternative symptom for plants with a PORV flow to power
-ratio greater than 140 (lbm/hr) Mwt is increasing RCS pressure and temperature or PRZR pressure greater than or equal to the PRZR PORV set pressure (e.g., 2335 PSIG).
- 3. EOPs This section provides the pathways through the EOPs and Punction Restoration Procedures for those steps concerned with L the condition of the secondary heat sink. The first pathways (3A) are of most interest in this submittal because they address the use of the S.G. WR instrumentation. A listing of instrumentation as it appears in the background documents is '
provided for selected steps.
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ATTACHKENT Steam Generator Wide Ranae Level Instrumentation Page 11 3A. Three Procedures Utilizing the SG WR instrumentation.
The three procedures utilizing the SGWR instrumentation aro FR-H.1, " Response To Loss of Secondary Heat Sink", FR-H.S
" Response to SG Low Level", and ECA-C 0, " Loss of All Emergency 4KV AC Power." FR-H.1 and FR-U 5 were discussed above in Section 2. They are primarily entered when required from the " Heat Sink" Status Tree F-0.3. The entry conditions are shown on Figure 2 for FR-H.1, FR-H.S and ECA-0.0.
Procedure ECA-0.0, " Loss of All 4KV Emergency AC Power,"
provides procedural guidance for loss of all emergency AC power as an initiating event or as a coincident occurrence in combination with a loss of reactor coolant, loss of secondary coolant or steam generator tube rupture. The procedure and supporting analysis are primarily structured to address the loss of all emergency AC power with or without a loss of all normal AC power as an initiating event that occurs when the plant is in the startup or power operational mode. However, the procedure has been augmented to provide appropriate guidance should a concurrent loss of reactor coolant, loss of secondary coolant or steam generator tube rupture exist.
The next most important element to the restoration of AC power in this procedure, and one that is appropriate for our purposes here, is the maintenance of plant conditions for optional recovery. This element consists of actions to mitigate deterioration of RCS conditions and establish plant conditions amenable to optimal recovery following AC power restoration. The operator is limited in actions available to mitigate deteriorating RCS conditions. By minimizing RCS inventory loss and maintaining a secondary heat sink the operator can extend the time to core uncovery.
RCS inventory loss is minimized by depressurizing the secondary system, thereby (1) roducing RCS temperature to minimize RCP seal degradation and (2) reducing RCS pressure 1 to reduce RCP seal leakage and to permit injection of SI accumulator water to partially replace the RCS inventory lost through the RCP sealo.
Secondary heat sink is maintained by controlling the turbine-driven AFW pump and the rate of steam generator steam release to maintain narrow range level in at least one intact steam generator. Actions are included to isolate a ruptured or faulted steam generator and to switch the AFW suction to an alternate water supply, if necessary.
Therefore, much of the discussion about steam generator depressurization is also applicable here. 1
ATTACHMENT Steam Generator Wide Ranae Level Instrumentation Page 12 In ECA-0.0 the SGWR level instrumentation is used in Steps 17 and 18. In FR-H.1 and FR-H.5 the level instrumentation is used in Steps 3, 10, and 21, and in Step 4, respectively. Copies of these steps and the Step descriptions are attached.
3B. Other procedures addressing the conditions of the secondary heat sink.
The primary procedure of concern here is E-2, " Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," which was discussed above in Section 2.
E-2 is entered from the following:
- 1. E-0, " Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," Step 22, with the following symptoms
- a. Any SG pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner,
- b. Any SG completely depressurized.
- 2. E-1, " Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," Step 4; E-3, " Steam Generator Tube Rupture," Step 8; ECA-3.1, "SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant -
Subcooled Recovery Desired," Step 10; ECA-3.2, "SGTR With Loss of Reactor Coolant -
Saturated Recovery Desired," Step 3, with the following symptoms and/or conditions:
- a. Any SG pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner.
- b. Any SG completely depressurized,
- c. Faulted SG isolation not verified.
- 3. FR-H.5, " Response to Steam Generator Low Level," Step 3, when the affected SG is identified as faulted.
- 4. Other procedures whenever a faulted SG is identified.
As can be seen from the above, E-2 is entered for the most part wherever required by S.G. pressure reduction.
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- 4. Summary and conclusions l
What we intended to show in this submittal is that, for the j majority of loss of heat sink accidents, as addressed in the '
BVPS-1 existing EOPs, the S.G. NR level and the SG (steam) pressure are important system parameters and that the SGWR level is typically used in conjunction with S.G. NR level. It ,
is not until entry into the function restoration procedures .
that SGWR level indication is not used in conjunction with SGNR level. Then, it is only after the loss of all AFW capability. We have shown in our previous submittal by a logic model that the BVPS-1 AFW System is a highly reliable
)
l system and includes additional design features atypical of 3 other plants.-
Also, in our previous submittal, we provided the following:
As discussed in FSAR Section 7.5.2, Tables 7.5-1 and 7.5-2, the wide range level channels, in conjunction with the narrow range level channels, are necessary for the assurance of an :
adequate heat sink. In addition, they are used as diagnostic instrumentation for steam generator tube ruptures and high energy breaks in the main steam and feedwater systems. The side range steam generator level indications are referenced in the emergency operating procedures for station blackout, low .
steam generator level and loss of heat sink. These threo !
procedures, however, are beyond the design bases for Beaver Valley 1 and would not be entered unless there were multiple failures of the emergency diesel generators and/or auxiliary feedwater system in addition to a loss of both offsite power sources. Therefore, an additional failure of the wide range level system is highly improbable.
With respect to the design bases events (steam generator tube ruptures and secondary piping failures), redundant and diverse instrumentation are available for diagnostic purposes as follows:
Steam Generator Tube Ruutures:
Three narrow range level channels per steam generator, two feedwater flow channels per steam generator, two steam flow transmitters per steam generator, three steam pressure channels per steam generator, air ejector radiation monitoring, blowdown radiation monitoring, one auxiliary feed flow channel per steam generator, containment sump level indication and alarm, containment temperatures, pressures, radiation and humidity indicators.
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Secondary Systems' PlDina Failurest one auxiliary feedwater flow channel per steam generator, ;
, three steam pressure channels per steam generator, two steam I and feed flow channels per steam generator, three narrow range ;
level channels per steam generator, containment sump, ;
pressure, temperature, humidity and radiation indication.
We also note again, that in Table 1 of our December 18, 1989 submittal, the SGWR level indication is available in the i control room, at the shutdown panel, locally in the AtW Pump ,
Room, and on three separate computer systems. In addition, we '
have provided by letter to all BVPS-1 licensed personnel, specific information on these sources of SGWR level ;
information and instructions on actions to be performed in i accordance with the EOPs in the absence of all sources of SGWR level information. Information on redundant and diverse instrumentation available for diagnostic purposes for steam generator tube _ ruptures and secondary system piping failures ,
was also provided in the letter.
Therefore, based on the above, we conclude that:
- The existing primary and secondary systems instrumentation is sufficiently qualified, redundant, and diverse to enable the operators to determine the condition of the secondary heat sink.
- The existing EOPs correctly instruct the operators on !
determining loss of heat sink (i.e. faulted steam '
generator (s)) and in coping with these conditions.
The operators are aware of the sources for, and alteratives to, SGWR Level information if they are confronted with a loss of secondary heat sink.
- The AFW System is a highly reliable system such that -
multiple failures need to be postulated to lose its function. As a corollary to this, we believe that SG dry out at BVPS-1 is an extremely low probability event. This l
low probability is assured through an additional non-i safety related diesel backed feedwater pump, diverse sources of demineralized water, diverse safety related
! sources of river water, and multiple (5) indications l available for wide range steam generator level indication l beyond the installed 3 pen indicating recorder.
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<- SECONDARY FIGURE 1 ma i RELIEF 8 888 i em 8 n 1
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@ g !
9\ / 8 FWP-4 i
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2 MOTOR DRIVEN ,
& 1 STEAM ,
DRIVEN
/ ,
S COLD LEG RCS HOT LEG t
INSIDE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT ,
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. . _ . . .. .-. -- - - . - . . . . . .. . _ - - _ - ~ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
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f ? t FIGURE 2 l
PROCEDURES USING l EOP ENTRY STEPS SGWR LEVEL i
E-0 " REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJ' I
STEP 6 ON THE INDICATION THAT ALL 4 KV AC EMERGENCY BUSES ,
ARE DEENERGlZED ECA-0.0 7 " LOSS OF ALL ;
l- EMERGENCY 4KV L
AC POWER l ECA-0.0 IS ENTERED DIRECTLY ON i LOSS OF ALL 4KV EMERGENCY ,
AC POWER 1
E-0, STEP 17, WHEN MINIMUM APW FLOW IS NOT VERIFIED .
! FR H.1 L " RESPONSE TO
- LOSS OF SECONDARY F-0.3," HEAT SINK", STATUS TREE HEAT SINK" L NR LEVEL IN AT LEAST ONE SG IS NOT GREATER THAN 5% AND TOTAL FW FLOW TO SG's IS NOT GREATER l THAN 350 GPM F-0.3, IF NR LEVEL NOT GREATER THAN 5% IN ALL SG's AND FR H.5 I l : " RESPONSE TO PRESSURE IN ALL SG's SG LOW LEVEL" LESS THAN 1075 PSIG E
l= ,
.. __ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . . . ___ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . _ . - . . - _ _ _ _ ..