ML20012B592

Forwards Listing of Changes,Tests & Experiments Computed During Month of Feb 1990 for Plant

ML20012B592
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	03/02/1990
From:	Robey R COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
0027H-0061Z, 27H-61Z, RAR-90-25, NUDOCS 9003150377
Download: ML20012B592 (10)

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Commonwealth Edison-Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station

' 22710 206 Avenue Ncrth -

• i..  : Corcova, Illinois 61242

• Telephone 309/654-2241'

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RAR-90-25 +

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.t March-2', 1990  :

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Director of Nuclear Reactor Ragulations U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l'

Mail-Station Pl-137 Hashington,.D. C. 20555 Enclosed please' find a listing of those changes, tests, and experiments '

. completed during the month'of February 1990, for Quad-Cities' Station Units:-) and 2,;DPR-29 and DPR-30. A summary of the' safety evaluations-are being reported.in compliance with 10CFR50.59 and 10CFR50.71(e).

q EThirty-nine: copies are provided for your use.

Respectfully, l 1

COMMONHEALTH EDISON. COMPANY-QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

. R.f.h.

A, Robey.

Technical. Superintendent ,

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Enclosure 1 cc: -R.'Stols~

T. Watts /J. Galligan i e

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0027H/0061 Z

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Safety Evaluation l#86-26  ;

-High~ Purity; Stainless Steel Control Blade Inspection' ',

'Special Test 1-119 ,

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A Description

"  ? Special Test No. 1-119 was completed and results'were satisfactorily- '

approved 1on February-27, 1990.. The purpose of this test was to administrative 1y.

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control:the' retrieval of absorbar tubes from up to:eight (8).high purity stain- ,

y s less steel.contro11 blades. The purpose of this retrieval is to verify the 't

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, improved-resistance of high purity stainless steel absorber tubes to radiation 4, induced stress corrosion cracking. i Evaluation 1

, 1. The probability of an. occurrence or the consequence of an accident, . ,

or malfunction of equipment.important to safety as previously evaluated 1 in the~ Final Safety Analysis Report is not. increased because the control

. blades to be inspected have been removed from the core, have reached . 1 their end-of-life and no longer perform any safety function or function' e related to the, operation-of the reactor. In addition, theLloads to _

g be lifted in the spent fuel pool'are bounded'by previous analyses. [

2. The possibility forfan accident or malfunction of a different type than.any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report has '

been created because the control-blades to be inspected are no longer in service and no longer perform any safety function or function. .

relatedito.the operation of the reactor..

3. .The margin of. safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication is not reduced because the' control blades to be inspected have reached their end-of-life, have been removed from the'reector .

-"E .and no longer-perform any safety f-unction. In addition, the loada  ;

to be lifted:in the spent fuel pool'are bounded by previous analyses. .l t -

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- - Procedure Change.QCP 600-9, Revision 13 l Determination of Sodium Pentaborate' k[' This change' utilized a different titration endpoint 2 -dilution technique, jg, .+, . and titrant in order to make the analysis morelaccurate.-  !

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or:malfe.netion of_ equipment-important to safety _as previouslyJevaluated-

~1n the; Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased _because the change.

c in methods.of-analyzing SBLC does not change the requirements for SBLC.

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not croated because this change will-not' create any possibilities-not i

. ;##j HI' to FSAR. ,

i; s fr 30 The margin uf safety..as_ defined in the basis-for any Technical Speci- ,

(* fication, is not reduced because this change will allow-the sodium t V2 pentatorate concentration in the SBLC tank :o be determined more e- <

accurstely. Therefore. we can be better assured that Tech. Spec. limits  !

. are met. .

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- ProcedureiChange QIS 39-ll. Revision'5'

' Loss of EHC Fluid Pressure Calibration 41

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-Theicorrection of sound powered phone jacks and specific: people-in operations to' contact' prior to. test.

.1. The' probability.of an' occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment 1mportant to safety as previously: evaluated

-:in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not, increased because these y y ,

changes do not affect the-method used to do the calibration.

L2. 'The-possibility;for an accident or malfunction of a different type- k

.than any previously evaluated in the Final-Safety Analysis Report is: -;

-not' created because the changes do not affect the method used toido-the' calibration.

3.; The margin of safety, as defined in the basis,for any Technical Speci- I o fication,;is not reduced because the method of testing is not mentioned-  ;

in Tech'. Specs.  ?

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Procedure Changes'QOP 6900-15 Revision 1

[- and-QOP 6900-16.- Revision 1 250.VDC Bus Transfer MCC IB Feed From MCC 2'(1) to MCC 1(2)

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l' 1This procedure provides guidance on swapping the feed for MCC 1B. The L -breakers forLRCIC will be de-energized for a short period of time during the F swap.

1. ' The probability of an' occurrence or. consequence of-an accident, or malfunction =of: equipment important to' safety as previously evaluated in1the Final Safety Analysis Report is not' increased because of the short time it takes to perform the evolution and because it is being

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l , , performed.with; operators present to restore power. The consequences of an accident are not-increased.-

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E-- 2. The-possibility for an accident or-malfunction of a different type than any,previously evaluated in the' Final 1 Safety Analysis Report is not created-because this is a routine power' swap similar to other evolutions already evaluated.

'3; .The margin of safety, as. defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-

> fication, is not reduced because the Technical-Specification bases n .. for RCIC state that RCIC is provided to supply continuous makeup water to the reactor when the reactor is isolated from the turbine and when feedwater is isolated'RCIC is still capable of performing:this-function.

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'", . Procedure Change QOS 250-4, Revision 9-f ,

MSIV Closure. Timing.

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LAdministrative changes to~ procedure,to-add additional data to be collected.

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Tj li TheLprobab'111ty of.an occurrence or the con'equenceLof s an-accident,

{?-\' or malfunctionLof equipment.-importantlto safety as previously evaluated

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Lin the Final Safety Analysis Report'is not increased'because'the pro-

-cedure change adds additional data to be collected during performance-of-the procedure. The FSAR is'not'affected.

['i 2.; The possibility'for an accident or malfunction of a'_different type

"; 'than any-previously evaluated in the-Final-Safety Analysis Report.is

?not created.because the:FSAR is not affected by'this procedure change.

13.- The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical'Sp'eci-fication.-is not reduced because this procedure'does not-affect or

, alter the. Technical Specifications.-

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' Procedure Changes' QTS 110-1, Revision 13-6 and. QTS 110-3, Revision 13 g_ .ECCS-Simulated Automatic Actuation and DC Surveillance This procedure has been changed to enhance performance. The changes include l 1. -Remove.the requirement to time the HPC1 4 and 5 and RCIC 16 and 17 valves.

2. Running.RHRSW pumps during surveillances to prevent contaminating the RHR heat exchanger.

b ~3. Placing ADS to inhibit to prevent inadvertent relief valve actuation.

f Place a block to prevent the 1/2 DG from starting during Division 11 portion

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of the test rather than placing the-control switch to stop.

?S. Provide guidance concerning DG run times.

1. The probability.of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the h probability of an accident is not altered by the performance of this surveillance test. This surveillance test ensures the availability of ECCS during a-Design Base Accident. l 2._ The possibility for an accident.or malfunction of a different type. I than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because, except for Item 4, the evolutions have been evaluated for different plant conditions. Item:4 does not change the possibility of an accident on the unit being tested land Item 4 reduces

+ the consequences of an accident on the unit not being tested.-

• 3. . The margin of safety, as-defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-s fication, is not reduced because the margin of safety-.is not affected

'for Items 1, 2, 3 and 5. The margin of safety is increased concer 'ng  !'

the 1/2 DG.~since the. block will-allow the 1/2 DG to'be operable on the unit not being tested.

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e -_ Safety Evaluation #90-46

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'0D-1 Computer Program Revision ki R:

?c "This evaluation ~ corrected a formatting error on the fuel' control rod edit

~of OD-1.--

R-k 1. : LThe' probability;of'an occurrence or the consequence of an~ accident..-

.,; or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated; in'the Final Safety Analysis Report.is'not increased because this program gy -

has no' control over any equipment and, therefore, cannot increase the:

probability ofian occurrence or-the consequences-of an' accident.

2. 'Th'e possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different tppe p than any-previously evaluated in the Final Safety. Analysis Report is

?( not created'because this revision corrects the program to give the U correct' control rod pattern in= the final edit, and could: not cause-an accident or malfunction of any type.

3. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because the portion of-the program.being. revised,-

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7, the. control rod pattern final edit', is'not used in any calculation and. therefore, does not affect any margin of safety.

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h Safety Evaluation #90-47 ~

o. OD-76: Computer ~ Program Revision n

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f _ OD-76 was revised to include an alarm when above 80% FCL and below 45%

rated core flow, an alarm when the_FCL is greater than.the FCL limit, and allow-

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the OD-76. calculation during-increased core-flow.-

f 1. ' The_ probability of.an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or. malfunction of equipment important_to safety as previously evaluated

.in the' Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the computer has no control over any. equipment and.is used only-to' provide-additional information to'the operator.

2.>4The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type s :than any previously evaluated in the Final" Safety Analysis Report is not created because this revision provides an alarm when the unit j

e moves into the region of:possible instability, and when the FCL is

, igreater than the FCL limit which will provide additional _information l

[ , to help reduce the possibility of events not described in the FSAR.  ;

3. :The margin of safety, as defined in the basis-for any Technical Speci-  ;

fication,' is not reduced because this program does no calculation ,

regarding any.of safety limits or margins of safety contained in Tech-nical. Specifications.

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? . 7, , /1 Safety. Evaluation #90-58

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Modification M-4-1/2-87-220 Swing' Diesel Redundant Control and Indication Installation Installation of duplicate meters (VARS, WATTS, HERTZ, VOLTS.-AMPS) on 902-8 to display the swing diesel parameters. Installation ~of duplicate control switches

. (governor and voltage regulator) on 902-8 for control of the swing diesel. . Cables p pulled as part of partial modification M-4-1/2-87-22A were terminated as part of this partial modifciation.

1. .The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident,.

or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the new L control switches and meters added to 902-8 will not significantly change the structional capabilities of 902-8. All new meters and control switches are Class IE components. This-partial modification-includes cable terminations. Therefore, no Single Failure Event (SFE) nor Design Basis Accident (DBA), as evaluated in the FSAR, is affected by this partial modification.

g 2. Thc possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not created because interfaces with the existing swing DG voltage regu-lator and governor control circuits are created by this partial modifi- q cation. Interactions with the swing DG differential overcurrent relay are created by the addition of the new meters to the relay 'PT' circuit.

The new meters and switches are mounted near existing safety-related equipment. .These interactions are mitigated through the-procurement of Class lE equipment and the seismic. mounting of this equipment.

3. .The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication,'is not reduced because the new meters on 902-8-are procured-safety-related and are of.the same type as the existing swing DG meters:

on 901-8.- The new control switches provide the same control capabilities .l to the Unit 2 operator as those that are already available to the Unit 1 operator. Therefore, the margin of safety defined in the basis for Tech Specs Section 3.9 is not reduced. No other systems discussed t in the Quad Cities Tech Specs are affected by this partial modification.  !

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