ML20012A249

Forwards Supplemental Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-324/89-26 & 50-325/89-26.Corrective Actions:Ncr S-89-089 Initiated on F075 Event & Involved Operations Personnel Counseled on Events

ML20012A249
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	02/28/1990
From:	Harness J CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
BSEP-90-0199, BSEP-90-199, NUDOCS 9003090073
Download: ML20012A249 (3)

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Carolina Power & Light Company 'I Brunswick Nuclear _ Project  :)

• P. 0.. Box 10429:

Southport, NC'- 28461-0429 February 28, 1990 FILE: B09-135100 10CFR2.201 SERIAL: BSEP/90-0199 3 .U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission A'ITN: Document Control Desk

.[ Washington

, DC 20555 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  :

DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324 ,a LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 I SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO INFRACTIONS OF NRC REQUIREMENTS-Gentlemen:

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The Brunswick Steam Electric Plant'(BSEP) committed in response.to Violation.B,- t

NRC. Inspection Report.50-325/89-26 and 50-324/89-26, to supplement that

• 4 response, outlining-final corrective actions necessary to ensure compliance. 1 4 This report fulfills.that. commitment.

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[- Very truly yours, t

J. L. Harness', General Manager Brunswick Nuclear Project  !

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Enclosure cc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter

-Mr. E. G. Tourigny .

-BSEP NRC Resident Office'  !

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l Supplement to IER 89-26, Violation B l l

This supplement fulfills a commitment made to finalize the response j to Violation B of Inspection Report 89-26, following completion of i the investigation of NCR S-89-124. The purpose of this supplement J is to indicate final resolution of corrective actions deemed necessary for the items identified in NCR S-89-124 and IER 89-26, ,

for-these related Control Room Reactor Turbine Generator Board I (RTGB) tag events.

As a result of the Human Performance Evaluation performed for the initial event, misplacement of a control tag-for the Unit 2 SW-F075 valve, and subsequent event investigation involving swapping of control tags for the Unit 2 B21-F022B ' and F022D Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), the following corrective actions were initiated:

1. NCR S-89-089 was initiated on the F075 event.

2. A Human Performance Evaluation was completed on the F075 event.

3. A Standing Instruction was issued directing weekly Control Board audits by the operations group for clearance placement accuracy, pending completion of necessary procedure revisions to direct continuance of these audits. Operations Instructions for Daily Surveillance Reports were subsequently revised to include these audits on a weekly basis.

4. An Operations memorandum was issued outlining the proper method to be used for correcting errors on' clearance tags as an interim measure, until procedure revisions can be made. '

5. Involved operations personnel were counseled on the L events.

6. An Operations memorandum was issued to Shift Foremen / Senior Control Operators to emphasizing detailed -

tag verification prior to their accepting clearances.

7. An NCR (S-89-124) was issued for items found on a Control Board review subsequent to the F022B/D event.

As indicated by the initial response to IER 89-26, Violation B, further corrective actions deemed necessary included:

1. Revision of the clearance procedure, AI-58 to give guidance on removal of tags for correction of errors.

2. Discrepancies were noted between the controlling 1

1 procedure and clearance tags used at BSEP in terms of information required on the clearance tags. These tag discrepancies are being corrected.

3. A review'of recommendations from the investigation of NCR 1 S-89-124, further_ evaluating the control Board clearance tag issue.

As a result'of the review of recommendations from investigations ,

of the involved events,-additional corrective actions are being -

pursued. These are:

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1. . Red caps used to designate equipment / components out of ,

service on the control board are to being-evaluated to determine the need for the use of stickers on the caps ,

which have spaces for the procedurally required information only. -

2. Reemphasize to operators and their supervision the importance of evaluating partial periodic tests to ensure that potential consequences of ommitted steps are recognized.

'3. As identified in Recommendation #12 of the Clearance Task Force Report, BSEP will evaluate the feasibility of eliminating the use of clearances to establish lineup >

control for LLRTs when equipment or personnel protection is not required.

L It is felt that these actions, in conjunction with previously committed actions from the initial response will effectively resolve the control- board tag issues involved with the events relative to IER 89-26.

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