ML20005H192

Requests Addl Info Re NRC Response to Author 890515 Ltr

ML20005H192
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	12/15/1989
From:	Dinan M AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Kane W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20005H187	List: ML20005H192
References
NUDOCS 9001240258
Download: ML20005H192 (1)

Text

..mns

( i , <

- r

'mwyggw m y

>;' ;q

$' , X.q 4

7 r; rr n -1 i z

j, l h?I {j- os 9

V .. n

. 4 21 Rarig e::Rosd -

!g % , :,". .y

. 3 y y:t M C N' M 97? 3 w, , -pecenh,er . $ ; 1989 ,

-[

' a n,

" b dikard .e N D$ vision cf Jeettor1ProductF

, A, -

Region 1I.U39.WNRC

> J. ' .Kinp Of'Pru niaHPh.19406 1

g g. 4 , -4 q . .c ,

Mf fcE ; 4a y ,15,,T989 letter .and subsequent. response j

?,y;f ' ,. 1

'l

Lear Mr'J en'e,

T a sm w?iting.to you to e d .fbe some additional informstion: <

regarding A .l et.ter th6t I hgnt yea, I es coM used by your 6 s . response . I- i-:autd l i kk ft a rbnd ivi t t t h e -l e t t er ' e br more in j h idepth enkwers.

m . E woul d n1 slo ~1Ike~to maka 1t ciear that I am rending you-this-lett s e an'inoivdup uend de not represent either the "f...

Luxbury Nuc l ear. Mat terF - Carnmitt ee or the Daybury -

s . EmergencyRssponse?Combitteni 'I R

g Fiecant l y ; ;J i d i schnherbd _ that, the crigina! lette thati! sent

+,

ycw = .w a s the unedited version that I pulled inadvertently

_(rom my = com;1dter . For the sake-ef continuity, I havel dr4c ided j's

~

s< To continue using-it, 1 do riope the f ormat' coes not prove

!h to ; bo .~ to d i f-f icul tL . I' Apol og ir e for my many miespellings.and

^

bl m

Lt yp i ng , errors; . I al so boui d l ike to reemph.=sare that' the I

N criginal_- l etter does not re f l ect the f ul l- Town c4 Duxbury 'I O 'N alear Matters Ccmmittee. That particul ar l etter ref l ects a the-concern ofitwo-membe o.of that committee, +;he; rest of LtheLcbmmittee has not-commented cm the reportyet.Indeed Ms.

y fl eming woul d 1 ti:e it'to be clesr that she is not a memoer

? .

_of.any committee T .hn e very. recent1 y submitted my 1etter to K f .thel Town ce Duxbury's Nuc'lesr Mattorn-Committ.ee and hope 4: -

that they will have additional cuestions sno do a more

' f orinal inquest.

p F?i ns t 1 y 3 I.have added two additicnal names to the ce. 1 ist.

{'3 i'

TneyLore'there'ar interested parties end are not p6rt of anj all egation 4 '

sf._

Y ccsil the s t,t e c h ed m

G9C9e Malles NRC lova tigatot Generals Effice

(

'e 4 - .

h g h:

T YH )

h('

new (mg m

My d. DAoD h

i I'h f $8g2ggggggggg3 s~

I

{ ,

m mu man

i TL rd l' 'COPY

, , ,j

,1 y

-.o t*4 g .

15 Jeremiah Drive Qg Duxbury Ma 02330 May 15,1989 [C ,

Wm Nane, Director O I ou .:

Division of Reactor Projects -

Region I U.S. NRC King of Prussia Pa.19406

Subject:

The Agumented Inspection Team report (AIT) RICI Low '

pressure pipang at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station and two related assues to PNPS Mr. Kane, As committee members of the Town of Duxbury 'Nucl ear Mat ters '

Committee several of us have reviewed the above report .We submitt the f ollowing quest aons f or f uther clarification and ,

comments.

i .1 . The category "off normal " . Would you please be spefac

about the regulatory status of this classification.'Is this a FECO terminolovy? If so would you please state what NRC catagory the event would be cl assif ied as? 15' this according to tech specs?

2.We are conf used as to the exact number of people invol ved in the incident . Would you pl ease tell vs who was in the controll room at the start of the incident? Who l ef t the contro11 room and went to the RICI quard? Who was the HP that arrived in t he reactor buil ding that did not have a key card time? In your enswer coJ1d you include the quelfacatlans and liscence numbers (both the NRC and L Commonweal th) . '

Also would you pleese give speciat data 215 re0Brd2ng the "

expertence and traaning of the Nuclear Watch engineer? the Nucl ear Operat ions Supervisor the Reactor Operator?The l ead I&C Technician' the two othwer IOC technicians sent to the RICI ;ogic pannels?The two operators who did the " tag outs".

Please be spefic to the type of experience on a Mark I L boiling Water reactor that these men have and how long they l .have worLed f or the Boston Eds ton Compar < ? -

3. It has been noted that this off normal event had the potential to develop into a Loss of Cool ant type scenario.

We would appreciate clarification on the actual number of incidents (no matter what the cl assification)that PNPS has had? We have been assured that a Loss of Coolant Accident is ex treml y unl ikel y. What is the statistical data that substantantes this claim ? Is the history of PNPS in these 1 matters reflected into those numbers? I l

4 Was the steam that came as the result of the RICI off I normal incident radioactivet was there any air born w f

gv _ e- ,

sk .

+

contamination during the durat ion of the incident and the subsequent anvestigation?

5. On Wednesday ,May 10,1989 a local l obst er man noticed steam comming f rom the stac6 s of P11 gam I station. Local moniters substann ated higher numbert for baciground radiat ion readings"We were tol d that PNF S was an cold shut down at that time. Was PNPS venting on that date' If nCt what was- the steam an the stack?

f' .

6.On Thursday May 11,1989 a man who f1rst killed has wife and subsquently stole a plane f rom Logan airport . He then proceeded to" Bu::" Logan and the ent ire South Shore area

' f or a number of hours . Sel ec t wom'an Al ba Thompson has

confirmed that a plane was cited in Plymouth and that the

! local Plymouth airport had been armed. Reports were that this pl ane was c a ted at the beginning of ROcley Hill Road less than 1/2 mal e f rom PNPS.

Our concern f ocuses on the security at PNPS at that time.Was the NRC not 41ed of the incident' What precautions are presently in place to deter any such maniacs?

Thaniyou for your continued interest in the PILGRIM I NUCLEAR POWER STATION saga. Your prompt written response *

(ten working days ) woul d be appreciated.

Sincerly Yours, Mary A. Dinan j Jane F'l eming (EVAC l eader) .

Iate O'Brien CC Senator Edward hennedy .

Senator John Gl enn .

Ted Kopel Peter Agnes Neil Johnson ,

\ '

i l

l l

l l

l

~

y ( ,I) yj g '

3,_ je[s* *, . m,,

UNITED sf ATE $

W  % NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

% w/ 475 ALLEN A E ROAD

, '**** KING OF PRUSSIA. PENNSYLVANIA 19406 JUN 191989 Ms. Mary Dinan JUN 141989 ,owN or. SurnuRY H

15 Jeremiah Drive CMW or gra cwgn I Duxbury, Massachusetts 02332

Dear Ms. Dinan:

I am responding to the letter of May 15, 1989, to Mr. William Kane, Director, l Division of Reactor Projects from you, Ms. Jane Fleming and Ms. Kate O'Brien.

In that letter you requested detailed information, primarily concerning an W April 12, 1989, event at the Pilgrim Station involving the reactor core isola-

! - tion corling (RCIC) system. Much of the information requested is contained in NRC Augented Inspection Team (AIT) Report Number 50-293/89-80, available in your Local Public Document Room (LPDR). A copy of the AIT report is enclosed for your convenience. I believe a careful review of this document will answer many of your questions. Since the information contained is substantial in volume and technical in nature, I will attempt to provide a brief summary in response to each_ of your six areas of interest.

1. Classification of the__ Event The licensee's emergency plan contains the criteria used to determine _ if a plant event warrYnts notif'ication of offsite agencies and the appropriate level of onsite response. The April 12, 1989, event during which the RCIC system pump suction piping was pressurized did not rneet the significance threshold which would require declaration of an Unusual Event, the lowest level of emergency plan event classification. ibis determination was sup-ported by the licensee's analysis at the time of the event, and was subse-quently confirmed by the NRC AIT. As a conservative measure the licensee maintains an internal notification procedure encompassing events of minor significance not requiring classification by the emergency plan, but of potential interest to licensee management, the NRC and other parties, In this instance the licensee determined that notification in accordance with their internal procedure was warranted, categorized the transient as an i "Of f-Normal" event , and implemented the planned notifications. No decla-ration was required by the licensee's emergency plan in this case. A complete description of this area is included in NRC AIT Report, Section 9.6.

i

2. . Licensed _ Operator Shif t Staf fingyd _ Qualifications &and Plant Technical Staff Qualifications i

The attached NRC AIT report includes a complete description of the -

relevant aspects of this event and a detailed chronology. The number of

licensed operators on shift and in the control room before, during and l-following the event was evaluated and found to be acceptable. The names and license numbers of the individuals involved is not germane to understanding of the event.

y.yw - ,; W { {Q

f , s'. s:. &

.y (JL' Ou\h El

,%[0 UNITED STATES y W ' g(

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

<, we 476 ALLEN A E ROAD

> **e** KING OF PRUSSIA. PENNSYLVANIA 19406 h JUN 191989 Ms. Mary Dinan JUN 141989 .owN W Suxnuoy 15 Jeremiah Drive 00Awoor sracntrN Duxbury, Massachusetts 02332

Dear Ms. Dinan:

I am responding to the letter of May 15, 1989, to Mr. William Kane, Director, Divi > ion of Reactor Projects from you, Ms. Jane Fleming and Ms. Kate O'Lrien, in that letter you requested detailed information, primarily concerning an April 12, 1989, event at the Pilgrim Station involving the reactor core isola-tion cooling (RC]C) system. Much of the information requested is contained in NRC Augmented Inspection Team ( AIT) Report Number 50-293/89-80, available in your Local Public Document Room (LpDR). A copy of the AIT report is enclosed for your convenience. I believe a careful review of this document will answer many of your questions. Since the information contained is substantial in volume and technical in nature, I will attempt to provide a brief summary in response to each of your six areas of interest.

1. Classification of the Event The licensee's emergency plan contains the criteria used to determine if a plant event warrTnis To_tification of of f site agencies and _ the appropriate level of onsite response. The April 12, 1989, event during which the RCIC system pump suction piping was pressurized did not meet the significance threshold which would require declaration of an unusual Event, the lowest level of emergency plan event classification. This determination was sup-ported by the licensee's anslysis at the time of the event, and was subse-quently confirmed by the NRC AIT. As a conservative measure the licensee maintains an internal notification procedure encompassing events of minor significance not requiring classification by the emergency plan, but of potential interest to licensee management, the.NRC and other parties. In this instance the licensee determined that notification in accordance with their internal procedure was warranted, categorized the transient as an "Of f-Normal" event, and implemented the planned notifications. No decla-ration was required by the licensee's emergency plan in this case. A complete description of this area is included in NRC AIT Report, Section 9.6.

2. Licensed Operator Shift Staffing _and Qualificationstand Plant Technical Staff Qualifications The attached NRC AIT report includes a complete description of the relevant aspects of this event and a detailed chronology. The number of licensed operators on shif t and in the control room before, during and following the event was evaluated and found to' be acceptable. The names and license numbers of the individuals involved is not germane to understanding of the event.

22O[ h [

4 . m ry oinaa 7 a JUN 141989

'/

The NRC has established minimum education and experience requirements for-

' licensed operators, as well as other members of the plant technical staff.

These requirements are used to screen operator license candidates prior to administration of any license exam. The qualifications and training of the plant technical staf f are routinely evaluated as part of the ongoing NRC inspection program. The level of experience and training of the licensed operators at Pilgrim was extensively reviewed during the NRC Integrated Assessment Team Inspection (IATI) prior to authorizing plant restart. This review is documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-293/88-21 and noted that the experience of the Pilgrim operating staff constitutes a significant strength. Specific aspects- of personnel training which could have contributed to the subject event were also reviewed during-the recent AIT and are discussed in the report.

3. Relative Significance of the Event, the Occurrence of Past Similar Events, and_the Probability _of Reactor Ac_cidents_i_n_ General The NRC AIT concluded that this transient was minor since several barriers-remalned intact to mitigate the ef fects of a potentiFf7itE75pstshi' Toss 'bf cTolant. 'ThTTeam also concluded that the event did not constitute an accident precursor. 'I As described in the AIT report one similar occurrence involving the high pressure coolant injection system occurred at Pilgrim during 1983. This event was evaluated in 1983, and was revisited by the recent AIT to assess the applicability of past corrective actions to the recent problem.

Potential accident sequences and their relative probabilities have been the subject of extensive NRC and industry study. This large volume of information has been used to draw generic insights regarding accident j probability, in addition, many licensees have initiated plant specific probabilistic risk studies and utilized the results to improve individual plant designs and operating practices. Boston Edison has implemented a i plant-specific study which considers existing industry experience and data, as well as the Pilgrim plant design and operating history. This analysis indicates that the probability of a significant accident I occurring at Pilgrim is extremely low. . l 1

1 I

i i

f J

,) . 's D / J . Mary ni oin.n 3 JUN 141989

/ Contamination of the RCIC Pump Room as a Result of the Steam Released to 4.

the Room During the Transient During the transient _ water was discharged from the RCIC system into the surrounding area of the reactor building. Upon discharge some of the water flashed to steam. The source of the water is the maTii Teedwater system, and as a result both the water and the steam would contain some radioactive contaminants. Release of the fluid resulted in contamination of the general area and a brief period during which airborne contamination was present. While this is not a desirable circumstance, the reactor ,

building is designed to tolerate leaks such as this without any resultant l release to the environment. Plant personnel are trained to deal with con-ditions that include potential airborne contamination, and are monitored to ensure that protective measures have prevented any significant inhala-tion of-contamination. - -----

- ~ i

5. Steam Noted by a local Citizen Emminating from the Pilgrim Plant on Kay 10, 1989 The design of a boiling water reactor such as Pilgrim does not include provisions which would allow thc release of nuclear steam to the environ-ment during normal operations. During the time period in question the plant remained in cold shutdo'wn, so no nuclear steam was being generated.

There are two small oil fueled boilers used for heating buildings, and several diesel generators located onsite. It is possible that the individual you reference may have noted steam or exhaust emissions from one of these sources.

6. Security Planning for the Pilgrim Site The NRC requires that each licensee maintain and implement a security plan. This includes a contingency plan designed to provide for security force response to potential threats. While restrictions governing the

'l control of safeguards information prohibit any detailed discussions -

in this letter, these plans do include measures addressing external L assault. The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 73 outlines the

! regulatory requirements and performance standards .used to evaluate the l- adequacy of licensee security. plans.  ;

i

, :q5 3

. xi.saryoinan 4 JUN 141989 Please review the attached AIT report, I believe it will answer many of your questions. Other reports, such as the referenced IATI report, are also readily available in the LPDR. If significant questions remain af ter reviewing this document, please contact me via telephone _at (215) 337-5146. I hope this has l

.been responsive to your request.

Sincerely, t

?i .

i-1  ;

A Ra Blough, Chie' Reactor Projects Section No. 3B  ;

Division of Reactor Projects

Attachment:

'As stated cc w/o Attachment.(but w/ Incoming Letter): l i

, .Public Document Room (PDR) '

Local Public Document Room (LPDR) l, *[ hh -f?t%l  ;

Chairman, Board of Selectmen, Carver Chairman, Board of Selectmen, Marshfield '

Chairman,. Board of Selectmen, Kingston Chairman, Board of Selectmen, Bridgewater Mayor, City.of Taunton R. Bird, Senior Vice President - Nuclear, Boston Edison Company P. Agnes, Assistant Secretary of Public' Safety, Commonwealth of Massachusetts

};

1 4

l l

. -- _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -