ML20005B955

Reply Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law on Emergency Planning Issues.Related Correspondence

ML20005B955
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	09/08/1981
From:	Phelps G ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUP REPRESENTING YORK
To:
References
NUDOCS 8109160183
Download: ML20005B955 (14)

Text

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5 INTERVD:CKS 9/08/81 UNITED STATES CF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULA'IDRY COMMISSION MiJATED CORRESIMT)ENCF S~/CRE THE ATCMIC SAFETY A'TD LIC7NSING ECARD In the Matter of )

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Metropolitan Edison Co. ) Docket 50-289 ,

(G.P.U. Nuclear Corporation) )

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TABLE OF 00!PrDITS 1

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l Reply to Staff Propo sed Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 l Reply to Licensee Proposed Findings.......................... 10 j Reply to Comonwealth Propo sed Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 I

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Introductien

1. Interveners sub=it reply findings herein to those of the Licensee, Staff snd Co=monvcalth en emergency planning issues.

Not c11 findings of o%er parties which Intervenors disagree W th are addressed herein, and no inference should be made that Intervenors agree with or e csent to any findiry of other parties which are not addressed specifically. Intervenors rest on their findings filed Augus~t 13, 1981, and address herein cnly those findings of other parties which grossly distort tt,e record or fail to aldress facts in the recond.

Findings of the other parties are designated with the name of that party and the paragraph nu=bar cf that finding from the August 13, 1981 proposed findings.

Reelv to the Staff Prowsed Findings

2. At Staff #21-23 and #369-374, the Staff considere the role of the Federal Eccrgency Management Agency in the hearing and addresses FEMA's interim findings and detaminations on the overall " adequacy" of TMI emergency planning off-site. The Staff has granted remarks in a speech hy President Carter on Dec. 7, 1979, the status of a

" decision" (Staff #21) and claims that a regulatory process is Mestablished" (Staff #22) by' 'p roposed rules. ' Thus; the Staff uculd have the Board entirely bass its decision on the tenuously founded MOU proceas.

Nowhere in the NRC/FD'A 10U does it say what stendards will be used to define or assess "adequacyt in interim findings, excep.t to say that zhe proposed 44 CFR 350 rules are not used- the MOU process is putside of the process proposed by 44 CFR 350. Mr. Dickey was unable to say what infomed his ""ofessional" judgement, or what standards he used other than NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP 1, which he admitted the plans did not l -

completely satisfy. The Staff glosses over areas where, in their rieu, the plans do cet Iceet NUREG C654 or the rules at 10 CFR 50 with the cl.aracterization of " administrative" or " minor." (Staff #371).

What ptrt of the plana is r.ot "ad=inistrative?" Obviously, this rubric could be used equally usefully on any portion of the planning process and is meaningless. It curtainly does not connote unim;tztance as the Staff apparently would intend. Mr. Dickey was unable to weigh the relotive ir.portance of the planning standards, finding them not equal, but not disequal either. The Staff has used the assessment of

minor" based completely on the testimony of Mr. Dickey which was devoid of probative value because he was unable to articulate his standards and lacked any de onstrated training, experience or knowledge to make infor=ed judgments of "acequacy." (Sce Int. #13-18; #40-61; #520-525)

3. The Staff gives only one three-page footnote to their assessment of licensee's compliance with I.'RC off-site emergency planning rulea (Staff #371), This cursory treatment hardly even attempts to "

answer whether the record shows that the existing off-site emergency planning can and vill protect the public in the event of an c=ergency which involves reles3es of radiar, ion off-site. Naturally, the emergency planning is sufficient for times when there is no ernergency condition or when there is no release of radiation and no projected release of radiation. The Staff makes the tacit assumption-that there vill be plenty of time during an emergency to remedy the training and the p?runing defiencies that exist now or which have sprung up during the period which elapses between an emergency and the end of the attention focused 'on TMI after this hearing is over.

1l This~ assumption is entirely

1. The Board is ausre that PEMA vill be concentrating on Susquehanna, Limerick,. Reaver Valley and Pese Bottom, andithat FDIA, according to Mr.

Dickey and others, lacks the starf to attend to all the areas it has to.

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contrary to the guidance in NUREG 0654 dich states that a release may begin within a little as a half an hour of the oncet cf emergency conditions, and contrary to the guidance tMt HXA's witness Tavlovski finds "useful" dich states that although earlier releases are possible, it is imlikely that a release vill reach populations off-site before tuo hours, but that releases are possille within a two-to-seve hour period, tA the ten-mile radius. (Tr.19,066 and 19,455) . Although the EPRI information which Mr. Pavlovski cites finds that the WASH 1/.00 projections of releases within a half hour of the onset of accident conditions are unlikely to require evacuations beyond o mile, if that, NUREG 0654 guidance does r.ot downgrade the importance of the shprter release tines. The Staff, however has totally lost teuch with the proble=s engendered by accidents in which there are releazas to populat6d areas before protective actions can be fully implemented. The Staff see=s to aseure that preparation time vill be measured in days, not hours and fractions of hours. See, for example, S d #206 footnote 48, wherein they cite Mr. Podus1's baseless assumption that any traffic outside or insido the EPZ from spontaneous evacuees would only relieve the burden during an evacuation- which assucca a very long lead time.

Or see Staff #222, d erein it is assumed that normal phone lines are adequate to notify municipal workers because this vill be completed before t.he public is notified, another unfounded assumption.

4. The Staff has still failed to say sat " adequate" overall means- can or vill the plans protect the public for major releases which start in a half hour of the tima the accident is first noticed by Licensee? Within tuo hours? Six hours? Twelve hours? Is the l Staff just going through bureaucratic motions of checking off pieces of the emergency plans, never integrating the whole to find out if the 3

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plans work, or to sao if there is indeed a range of protective actions which can and vill protect the public during the range of release tines posited by IRREG 065d The findings proposed by the Staff certainly indicate that the Staff does not consider that accidenta can or vill happen, or that protective actions must be planned in advance 'for accidents which vill release radiaden to populated areas in short periods of time. It's back to business as usual.

5 The lack of serie.is ccnsideration for the consequences of nuclear accidents ou the population is blatently expressed in Staff #206, wherein the Staff finds that the voluntary evacuation (by which they mean the evacuation by persons who had not been advised to evacuate) "was, to some extent, a matter of convenience to the evacuees." No doubt the entire THI-2 accident gives the Staff good cocktail party conversation.

6. Staff d203 is completely illogical. Gtaff argues that Dr.Erikson believes accidents involving radiation ud other contamintiens are different from natural hazards; "on the other hahd" Dr. Erikson believes accidents involving radiation are like toxic spins and other hazards involiring contamination,; therefore, non-radiological hazards are like radiological hazards and contam+vting hazards. A is like B, and both are different from C. B is like A, and both are diffatre from l

l C. Therefore, the Staff believes, C is like A and B, and A and B are

like C.

7. Staff's witness Jaske, sponsoring Er.19 (apparently refer.enecd at footnote 47, Staff #206,as Ex.18) was unfamiliar with " hyper "

or " hypo-vigiliant" behsvior, and took an artraordinarily narrow concept of " panic." The Staff has used its witness's ignorance of sociological terms to prove that Dr. Xai Erikson, Professor of Scci61ogy,2t Yale University, does not use the term panic correctly or does not understand 4

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l the concept. The problem that must be dealt with, especially for l incidents involving radiation or ecntamination, is that some people 1 vill consciously and purposefully not follow instnietions because they do not think the authorities are credible, becauae they do not, trust that the utility is competant and ,they will not rely on the authorities' judgment of " safe enough" when they cannot see or confim for themselves the nature of the hazard. Additionally, some people are more likely in this area to under-react er over-react because of stress. As Chairman Smith noted, it must be,' that in a large population such as the 200,000 personc within the EPZ, there are some who do not respond well under stress. HMA knows so little about this subject and has defined it so narrowly that Jaske was adamant in his testimony that even o.t Hiroshirn, where certainly there was no escape route and there was certainly a " highly visible and immediate threat to survival," there was no panic- those that died, " died with dignity," there was no panic.

(which may be true enough for those who died instantly). (See Tr.19,294-19,299,Snith,V.Adler,Fawlowski). Probably no situatation could be so dire as to produce what FD4A uould call panic- their definition is just not helpful to the concept which must be addressed by the Board.

FD4A's experience of necessity also only deals with ermtions of populations which are much enller than 200,000, and the only large evacuation ever from a nuclear accident was spread out over days- which is not likely to be the general case, irhiter of the Staff assumption in footnote 47, Staff #206, the Dr. Zeigler's study of TMI-2 indicates that any evacuation from TMI vould be calm and extend over a period of days.

8. At Staff #209, the Staff would have the Commission adopt '

the clearly imprudent view that, despite clear experience that 5

inadequate public information does not ucrk to effsmtively inform the public an achieve results, that there is no need to prcfessionally study the public infornation package to see that it will offcetively echieve results that rpotect the public. Billions and billions of dollars are spent annually in America to make "public infor=atien- "

generally in cor=ercials- very effective in the least amount of time.

This is not an uncharted =ystical area by any means. It is just not one that FDM or the.RAC's "public .information officers" have competance in. At Staff #114, the Staff describes Commonwealth Ex. 3 as "non-technical."

This rather generous assessment is about the best that can be said for it- The Staff does not have standards yet for the content of public information, according to Mr. Grimes, and neither does FDM. Mr. Jaske, in fact, testified that the guidance in NUPIG 0654 is not sufficient to correct the public infor=ation problems experienced during the TMI-2 accident (Tr. 22,732) .

. 9. At Staff #58, Mr. Lamison's testimony on emergency worker availability is entirely =isrepresented. In fact, it has been PDM's general atperience that workers are available in emergencies, but this was not the case during the TMI-2 accident; some workers were available, of course, but Mr. Lamison specifically pointed out that so=a professional and technical State emergency personnel were not available, and that this circumstance was unusual in PD4A's experience. (Tr.17,826).

10. Staff #59 misrepresents Dr. Erikeen's testimory. In most emergencies, the principle need for emergency verkers, especially volunteers, arises froa clean-up, rescue, relocation needs after the impact of the disaster has struck. At Buffalo Creek, for example, there was no rescue affort until after the flood. During the flood, people took care of their own families first, often feeling remorse later for 6

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not having shed their neighbors. Dr. Erikson doubted that at any great d'.saster, natural or contaminating, that real rescue work was done until after the impact, and then by people who had confirmed that their own families were not threatened. This feature of any type of disaster is complicated in radiological (or contaminating) disasters by the public's inability to determine when the threat is over; there is no "all-clear" that people can confirm with their own senses. Intervenors are not suggesting that the situation is hopeless or impossible. Surely, in 200,0CD people, (or more, in the larger area) there are enough persons who would be villing to serve during an emergency sad who have resolved their family committments, for example as Mr.

Curry has. Intervenors vould offer a guess that Mr. Curry vill attend to his job ceaselessly from the moment he is called up, and that his family concerns have been addrassed in advance to allow him to do so without worrying. Mr. Forry, Newberry Emergency Coordinator and president of his fire company, was not confident that he vould be able to attend to his job if he was ursure about his family's welfare or l during an event which developed rapidly which might appear to be out of control. Intervenors suggest that these two examples probably cover two major catagories of response, and that emergency workers, in order to have an effective plan, must be chosen who do rot have more important committments to their families than they do to their jobs. This is also all the more important for radiological accidents in the TMI area because of the large population (larger than any evacuation in American history-TMI holds the record) of an enormous area (-325 sq. mi.) in a potentially l very short period of time, according to NUREG 0654.

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11. At Staff #56, the Staff fails to acknowledge that workers I

l must not only check with their families, but will use their personal judgments about " safe" which may not comport with authorities' views.

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The Board has certainly noted the perceptions (or mie weptions) that people in the TMI area have about radiation and nuclear accidencs, and has certainly noted the concerns of the Ccemissioners, the Staff, and Rep; esentative Udall about the credibility of the uti]ity's judgrc,snt and the perceptions about the utility's competance. Whether or not the Board finds the utility did lie, or lacks competance, or allowa cheating, the Board must take into account the public perception of the utility and its credibility, and the effect that may have on an individual's believing that the authorities' " safe" or "under control" is credible. (See Int. #92-108 on emergency ucrker response.)

12. Staff #51-52 misses the point by tacitly assuming that substitute emerg;er.cy verkers can be found and trained on the spot during an em cgency. There just may not be enough time. Again at Staff #233, it is tacitly assumed there vill be a long lead time to arrange for emergency workers. Phenes might be all right at some plants because of low population density; TMI has an exceptionally high population within the EPZ.

13 In admitting FD'.A's testimony of V. Adler, Bath and Pawlowski, the Board observed that the testimony was " factual testimony explaining what the agency has done, what these people have done. It is summary type of testimony....It does not necessarily depend upon the expert opinions of the witnesses." (Smith, Tr.18,971, also to 18,975) The testimony was admitted " subject, however, to challenge as to weight, and striking where it exceeds the confidence of the individual." (Tr.18,973) The Staff has leaped from using FEMA's testimony in the way it was admitted to accepting FEMA's judgment, particularly that of V. Adler and Dickey, who completely lack skill, training, experience, education or knowledge in emergency planning, 8

about whether the plans vill erk, or whether deficiencies are important, or whether the " experience of FD!A"(an agency without adopted rules or ccdified stanclards) demonstrates a particular point.

The Ecard simply cannct rely on these judgments made by unqurdified persons under unidentifiabic criteria. Nevertheless,the Staff cites "FDM's experience" repeatedly as a catch-all for that which the Staff wishes were facte en the record. For example, at Staff

1. 349, FHC's exnerience at other test exercises is cited to " demonstrate" that enough emergency workers respond during an exercencr. A test is a test. FDG has no experience with nuclear e=erEencies other than TM1, and that experience they were almost totally silent on in reciting examples of "experieuce." Mr. Jaske relied on studies of presidentially ordered relocations (which he readily admitted thero have been none) and studies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (which he was unable to say how they were related), but noticeably failed to cite any studies of TIG-2.

While FD'.A ejis certain expertise and authorities in emergency planning, it would be a great mistake for the Board to rely too heavily on EMIA's experience as a agency (or a series of agencies) and a greater mistake to rely at all on the technical judgments of personnel who are essentially managers, not emergency planning technitions.

14. At Staff #318-322 the ample record which clearly demonstrates the complete inadequacy of livestock protections is grossly distorted by the Staff. How can measures be taken after reentry and recovery to protect dead or diseased livestock? The Staff suggests that EBS

2. Mr. V. Adler is primarily a manager, having spent more than 20 years in the field of program evaluation management. It is this skill which he regards as his primary qualification for his job at FEMA. (Tr.19,964-19, 971 V. Adler C9 serove). While this is important for his position, it provides no exp,erT,13e on which to base his proffered judgments, 9

messagee vill semehow create sheltering facilities where none exist.

(Footnote 86 at Staff #320).

Rec 1v tn the Licensee Pronceed Findines

15. Intervenors disagreecents with the Licensee are profound, and by no means are all conflicts addressed herein.

16. At Lic #1-7, The history of the developnent of Intervenors Contentions on emergency planning is misstated. Licensee's meeting of July,1o80 with Intervenors was solely for the purpose of Pr. Zahler's reading many pages of a listing of the changes in revision 2 of Licensee's plan. Tht this could have been done more conveniently and more accurately through the mail, or with revision bars inserted in the new copy as is the practice, was brushed off by Pr. Zahler because he " preferred to do it this way." It was simply a matter of putting Intervenors to a great deal of trouble to ecme to his meeting in Lancaster, and transcribe his words for the better part of the time.

L ,ansee's claim that this meeting was an effort to resolve conflict or improve communications is quite silly. The October meeting was not I

arranged at a time when Intervenors could attend, little notice was given and Licensee refused to change the time sa that Intervenors could attend. Licensee made no (Ifort at all to ascertain the nature of Interveners' concerns at later meetings, once again parties were expected to write down Pr. Zahler's comments and liste of contentions he wished dropped. Intervenors did reorganize the cententions inte NUREG 0654 catagories and served the list of those catagories. Intervenors offered, on the record, to issue a new printing of reorganized contentions and to specify the broad or detailed nature of concerns, but this offer was rejected by the Staff and Licensee as unnecessary. Without ever 10

mentiening any intention to do so, Licensee issued the contentiens in the otiginal ordering, alphabetically by party, renumbered them, and insisted on using enly its new numbers thoughout the hearing in spite of the request by Intarvenors, which was granted by the Eoa:'d, that Intervenor's numbering be used to clarify the record and to facilitate record-keeping by parties. The Licen::ee failed to address Intervenor cententions on off-site planning with testimony yet still seeks to avoid its burden of proof. The Board is well aware that the emergency plans changed several times during the hearing, including in mid-April,1981, The process traditiona317 used in 120 heerings simply was not made to encompass the changes experienced during this hearing. Licenses could have asked discovery questiens if they were unclear as to the intent of the contentions or how the Intervenort s interest was modified by new e=ergency plans. They did not.

Interveners combined their presentations voluntarily, and made every attempt to facilitate coordination in spite of the great difficulty presented by the attempt of one volunteer organization or person to be 'cesponsible for another volunteer organization or person's actions.

Additionally, Intervenors have put a great deal of thought into ways to improve the process used in lac hearings and would be glad to share these thoughts with the Board or other part of the 180.

17. Licensee's resuscilation of Dr. Dynes is baaeless. (Lic r/2-77)

Mr. Regan says the firemen respond to fires. Mr. Curry has personnal17 made plans for his own family (which shows that he thinks this could be a problet if he hadn't made palns, and that there is a " common sense" solution, offered by Intervenors, which has not been universally epplied.)

and the Licensee suddenly finds the League's "bearsay" probative evidenue. Licensee has misstated Mr. Le21 son's testimony as did the 11

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Staff, and implies that Mr. Lamison was ecmpetant to testify en j l

Missis::auca, or that he attempted to do so. Dr. Lynes' tesiimony remains of very limited value as it pertaine to the srecin] problems of events involving radiation er contamination or to the TIG area in particular. Licensee also ignores the numerous studies of TIG.

with shich Dr. Erikson is feiliar in addition to the League Study and Goldsteen's survey. (Lic. #87) Dr. Dynes did not even know the correct year that his " San Antorio" nuclear explosion occurred and could not offer any details of what happened or how he became better inform ed because of that event.

18. Licensee's attacks on Dr. Erikson's testimony are also without foundation. Dr. Dynes testified that in his view, emergency planning is emergency planning is emergency planning, and he was confident that his experiences applied to nuclear hazards. There is no stretch to see that one reading such a transcript could easily.and correctly conclude that Dr. Dynes applied his general knowledge "without reservation." Dr. Erikson gracicusly withdrov the phrase because he felt it really made no difference- the sense of the sentance is the same either way. (See Lic. #231) At Lic.#232 the Licensee would have us conclude.that Chafman Smith was also wrorg in his ,

understanding of his own concern, to which he returned at Tr. 19, 298-99 Dynes himself ad=itted that he and the Ohio Disaster research Center have tended to ignore essentially new types of agents (Tr.17,184).

It is Dynes' testimony that is contradictory and inaccurate, not Erikson's as the Licensee would have us believe at Lic. #232-233.

19. At Lic. #237, Dr. Zeigler's testimony is misinterpeted. Dr.

2eigler's study showed that when a fraction of the five-mile radius was advised to evacuate, a great proportion of the twelve-mile radius 12

left. The Licensee would hne us conclude, without basis, that if a ten-mile radius were advised to evacuate, that again, the twelve-mile radius w uld resprnd. There is no basis for su::h a supposition. If the Licensee had wished to questien Zeigler on this point, they shculd have, butithey did not and cannot nc;w sirdy draw unfounded conclusions as they wish.

20. The testimony of Ms. Reilly and others shova that shelterirg is not considered likely to work in the Consonvealthis view. EBS

=aterials simply cannot create basements or resolve ventilation problems as the Lic. #251-253 would indicate.

21 . Licensee has misstated Ms. Ccx's views on the potential for children's misuse of KI. The Con =onwealth resolved its concerns as to the toxiity of KI by testing a sample and finding that even an entire bottle would not hurt a child who was not extraordinarily sensitive to potassium. Licencee would also have us believe that KI cannot be kept at h'and by a large portion of the population, but public information pamphlets can be. (Lic.#426-427) Contrary to the statement in Lic. #420, NURm 0654 does indeed say that use of KI for the public should be considered.

22. Licensee again completely fails to address compliance with NRC emergency planning rules for off-site, just as they failed to address the issue in testimony, We observe that this is indeed a bold amission, which indicates clearly that the Licensee wishss to completely divert focus from compliance with the rules to stress Intervenor contentions on the penultimate plans. Intervenors are not applying for a license to cperate a nuclear power plant pursuant to NRC regulation. The burden of proof ramains firmly on the 1.icensee.

23 Licensee has also feil ed to assess whether pr tective actions 13

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can and vill be taken to protect the public during the range of release times posited by the 1:RC and FH'.A in !mREG 0654.

Renir to Ccmonwealth (Pa.) Proposed Fipdjns

24. At Pa. #120, the Co=monwealth offers to provide KI to farmers, cne dose per farm, during an emergency. This is certainly a good step to improve protection of the famers, but KI cannot be seen as a panacea. It rmnins the @ available protection for farmers and there is still no protection for their livestock, excepting those few farmers whose herds are so en17 that they have enouEh barn space- even those animis must be cared for. The farmer himself cannot shelter during an emergency while he is tending to his farm outdoors. The plans still fail to protect the farmers because the animals are not adequately cared for unless the farmer stays and enough of his help stayc.

Respectfully sub=itted, all B. Phelps Sept. 8,1981.

Intervenors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Licensee's counsel, Mr. Zahler, for performing the service distribution of this and our August 13, 1981, Proposed Findings. This Reply Findings was mailed Ebtpress Mail from York Pa, Sept. ,8,1981, to Chairman Smith at the NRC offices, and to Mr. Zahler at the Washington office.

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