ML19332E576

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Responds to NRC 891030 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-338/89-28 & 50-339/89-28.Corrective Actions:Personnel Involved in Event Reinstructed on Importance of Correct Communication & Attention to Detail When Tagging Components
ML19332E576
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 11/29/1989
From: Stewart W
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
89-784, NUDOCS 8912070404
Download: ML19332E576 (3)


Text

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l VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND power COMPANY l

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 i November 29, 1989 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No 89 784 Attn: Document Control Desk NAPS /DEQ/R3  :

Washington, D.C. 20555 Docket No. 50 338  :

50 339 License No. NPF 4 .;

NPF-7  ;

Gentlemen:. j VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY NORTH . ANNA POWER STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 INSPECTION REPORT . NOS. 50-338/89 28 AND 50 339/89-28 .

RESPONSE .TO THE NOTICE OF VIOLATION {

We have nevi 6wed your letter of October 30,1989 which referred to the inspection .

conducted at North Anna on August 23,1989 through September 25,1989 and reported in Inspection Report Nos. 50 338/89 28 aiid 50 339/89 28. Our response to the Notice of  :

Violation is attached.

5 This event was also discussed in Licensee Event Report 89 016 00 for Unit 1, dated September 8,1989.

We have no objection to this correspondence being made a matter of public record. If you ,

have any further questions, please contact us.

P Very truly yours,  !

L W. L. Stewart l Senior Vice Presidont - Nuclear Attachment <

l l' cc: U. G. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,

101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. J. L. Caldwell NRC Senior Resident inspector North Anna Power Station QOf f I L

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ftESPONSE TO THE NOTICES OF VIOLATION REPORTED DUIllNG THE NRC INSPECTION CONDUCTED BifWEEN . AUGUST 23. 1989 AND SEPTEMBER 25. 1989 lNSPECTION REPORT NOS 50 338/89 28 AND 50 339/89 28 NRC COMMENT During the Nuclear Regulatory Commisslon (NRC) inspection conducted August 22

, 'brough September 25, 1989 a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the " General $atement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendx C (1989), the violation is listed below:

A. Technical Specification 3.6.2.2 requireF, in part, that the contalnment recirculation spray system be operable with four separate and independent containment recirculation spray subsystems, each composed of a spray pump, associated heat exchanger and flow path. Allowance is given by the action statement for one containment recirculation spray subsystem to be inoperable for up to 7 days or be in hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Contrary to the above, on August 26, the license rendered two containment l

recirculation subsystems inoperable for 47 minutes. This occurred due to the j licensee's failure to correctly follow procedure 1 OP-49.6, Adjusting RSHX lsolation l MOVs to Reduce Service Wa*cr Inleakage. The service water header "A" isolation l valves,1 SW MOV-101 A and 3, were tagged closed and de energized at the same I time with the associated cross tie between the "A" and "B" service water supply headers also isolated. This resulted in two of the four containment recirculation spray subsystems being inoper&ble.

! This is a Severity Level IV (Supplement l} violation and applies to Unit 1 only.

~

l RESPONSE TO VIOLATION

1. ADMISSION OR DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION The violation is correct as stated.

l

2. REASON FOR THE VIOLATION The cause of the violation was miscommunication between the shift supervisor and personnel concerning the correct implementation of the tagout.

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. SN 89 784 NOV 50 338&339/89 28 Periodic Test 1-PT-62.2.1 is performed at least weekly to determine that the Recire

. Spray Heat Exchangers are being maintained in a dry lay up condition. The performance of the test indicated that service water was leaking past the isolation ,

valves into the heat exchangers. As a result,1 OP-49.6, " Adjusting RSHX isolation ,

MOVs to Reduce Service Water inleakage", was initiated so that proper adjustments could be made to the MOVs to terminate the in leakage. Since it was determined that the leakage was coming from the "A" service water header, the mechanical and electrical stops for the header isolation valves,1 SW MOV 101 A & 1 SW MOV-101 B had to be adjusted. The tagout was prepared to de energize both of the MOVs, -

however the procedural requirem,?qt to remove the valves from service sequentially l was not adequately communicated from the Shift Supervisor to the personnel assigned to de-energize and tagout the MOVs' electrical power supplies. Therefore, ,

both valves were removed from service concurrently and remained closed and de-energized for about 47 minutes.

3. CORRECTIVE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND THE RESULTS ACMIEVED ,

Upo:. discovering that both valves were simultaneously closed and de energized, j

power was reinstated to 1 SW MOV 101B. Personnel involved in this event were l reinstructed on the importance of correct communication and attention te detail when ,

l: tagging components, in addition, an operator was stationed in the Quench Spray Pump House basement during this event, in accordance with the Operating Procedure, to manually open the  ;

cross tie between the 'A' and 'B' SW headers in the event of a Design Basis Accident.

Opening of the cross tie between the 'A' and 'B' SW headers will allow SW flow to all .

four RSHX. ,

4. CORRECTIVE STEPS WHICH WILL BE TAKEN TO AVolD FURTHER VIOLATIONS Additional actions are not required to avoid further violations.  :
5. THE DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED Full compliance has been achieved.

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