ML19311C536
| ML19311C536 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 11/07/2019 |
| From: | Kenneth Riemer NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2019003 | |
| Download: ML19311C536 (24) | |
See also: IR 05000373/2019003
Text
November 7, 2019
Mr. Bryan C. Hanson
Senior VP, Exelon Generation Company, LLC
President and CNO, Exelon Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: LASALLE COUNTY STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000373/2019003 AND 05000374/2019003
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On September 30, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2. On October 9, 2019, the NRC inspectors
discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Phil Hansett, Plant Manager, and other
members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of
these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as
non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance or severity of the violations documented in this
inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection
report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional
Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector
at LaSalle.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your
disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the
NRC Resident Inspector at LaSalle.
B. Hanson -2-
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for
Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000373 and 05000374
License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18
Enclosure:
As stated
cc: Distribution via LISTSERV
x Non-Sensitive x Publicly Available
x SUNSI Review
Sensitive Non-Publicly Available
OFFICE RIII
NAME KRiemer:bw
DATE 11/7/2019
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers: 05000373 and 05000374
License Numbers: NPF-11 and NPF-18
Report Numbers: 05000373/2019003 and 05000374/2019003
Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-003-0069
Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
Location: Marseilles, IL
Inspection Dates: July 01, 2019 to September 30, 2019
Inspectors: M. Garza, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
J. Havertape, Resident Inspector
C. Phillips, Project Engineer
D. Sargis, Resident Inspector
W. Schaup, Senior Resident Inspector
C. St. Peters, Reactor Engineer
R. Zuffa, Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Approved By: Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
performance by conducting an integrated inspection at LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 in
accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Comply with National Fire Protection Association 13, "Standard for the Installation of
Sprinkler Systems," Requirements During Installation of the Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room
Preaction Fire System
Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report
Aspect Section
Mitigating Green [P.1] - 71111.05Q
Systems NCV 05000373,05000374/2019003-01 Identification
Open/Closed
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated
non-cited violation of the Unit 1 License Condition C.25, and Unit 2 License Condition C.15,
Fire Protection Program, for the failure to install the cable spreading room preaction fire
suppression system in accordance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 13,
Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 1976 Edition. Specifically, the licensee
failed to provide a preaction fire suppression system that complied with Section 3-10.2.1 of
NFPA 13. The inspectors determined that the written instructions to drain the preaction fire
protection piping allowed water to remain in the system for prolonged periods. Water
remaining in the system led to a thru-wall leak rending the fire suppression system in the
cable spreading room inoperable for 9 days during repairs.
Failure to Implement the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program for Traversing
Incore Probes System Containment Isolation Valve 2C51-J004C
Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report
Aspect Section
Barrier Integrity Green [H.6] - Design 71152
NCV 05000374/2019003-02 Margins
Open/Closed
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated
non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.5.13, Primary Containment Leakage Rate
Testing Program, for the licensee's failure to perform a cause determination and identify
corrective actions that focus on those activities that can eliminate the identified cause of a
failure with appropriate steps to eliminate recurrence for a failed Type C leak rate test.
Specifically, after repeated Type C leak rate failures of the traversing incore probe system 2C
isolation valve 2C51-J004C, the licensee neither performed a cause determination nor
took corrective actions.
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Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status
LER 05000374/2018-001-00 LER 2018-001-00 For 71153 Closed
LaSalle County Station, Unit
due to Main Condenser
Vacuum Degradation
LER 05000374/2018-001-01 LER 2018-001-01 for 71153 Closed
LaSalle County Station, Unit
due to Main Condenser
Vacuum Degradation
LER 05000373/2017-007-00 Low Pressure Core Spray 71153 Closed
System Inoperable Due to
Loss of Cooling
3
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On September 14, 2019, the unit
was down powered to approximately 77 percent to support various surveillance tests and a rod
pattern adjustment. The unit was returned to rated thermal power on September 15, 2019, and
remained at or near rated thermal power for the reminder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On July 24, 2019, in response to
receiving a half close signal to the 2C main steam isolation valve, the unit was down powered to
85 percent to mitigate the transient to the plant if the valve received the other close signal. On
July 25, 2019, while troubleshooting the 2C main steam isolation valve, the valve closed and the
licensee further down powered the unit to 75 percent to meet requirements in the station's
Technical Specifications. Later the same day, the unit was further down powered to 40 percent
to perform repairs on the 2C main steam isolation valve. The unit was returned to full power on
July 26, 2019. On September 7, 2019, the unit was down powered to approximately 75 percent
to support various surveillance tests and a rod pattern adjustment. The unit was returned to
rated thermal power on September 8, 2019, and remained at or near rated thermal power for
the reminder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in
IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem
Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,
observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance
with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Summer Readiness Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1) The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating
current (AC) power systems.
71111.04Q - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following
systems/trains:
(1) Unit 1 standby liquid control system on July 17, 2019
(2) Unit 2 Division 3 emergency diesel generator on August 9, 2019
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(3) Unit 1 Division 2 emergency diesel generator during maintenance on the Division 1
emergency diesel generator on September 12, 2019
71111.04S - Equipment Alignment
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the
Unit 1 high pressure core spray system on September 30, 2019.
71111.05Q - Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected
areas:
(1) Fire Zone 4D1, auxiliary building, elevation 749', Unit 1 cable spreading room on
July 5, 2019
(2) Fire Zone 2E, reactor building, elevation 761', Unit 1 general area and reactor water
cleanup pump cubicle on July 5, 2019
(3) Fire Zone 4D2, auxiliary building, elevation 749', Unit 2 cable spreading room on
July 9, 2019
(4) Fire Zone 4E3, auxiliary building, elevation 731', Unit 1 Division 2 switchgear room on
July 31, 2019
(5) Fire Zone 4E2, auxiliary building, elevation 731', Unit 1 auxiliary electrical equipment
room on July 31, 2019
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 02.02a.) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
(1) Unit 1 cable spreading room and auxiliary electric equipment room
71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
(1) Unit 1 high pressure core spray diesel generator heat exchanger
5
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)
(2 Samples)
(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control
room during unexpected closure of the 2C main steam isolation valve on
July 25, 2019.
(2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control
room during a rod sequence exchange and main steam line isolation testing on
September 7, 2019.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated out of the box examination ESG 126 on
August 6, 2019.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with
the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
(1) Unit 1 high pressure core spray on July 1, 2019
(2) Unit 2 reactor recirculation system following identification of flow control valve bearing
degradation in L2R17
(3) Unit 2 control rod drive system
(4) Unit 1 scoping of safety-related valves into the Generic Letters 89-10 and 96-05
program
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work
activities:
(1) risk assessment performed for crane near offsite power lines, Units 1 and 2
containment structures and Units 1 and 2 hardened vents on August 12, 2019
(2) planned online Yellow risk on both Units 1 and 2 during maintenance to the unit
common diesel generator on September 9, 2019
(3) planned online Yellow risk during maintenance on the high pressure core spray diesel
generator on September 23, 2019
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71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality
assessments:
(1) operability of 1B21-F065A and 1B21-F065B, Unit 1 feedwater primary containment
isolation valves, with a leak on line 1FW011A, Unit 1 reactor water cleanup return line
(2) operability of Unit 2 reactor water cleanup leak detection system due to high
temperature alarm in the 'A' reactor water cleanup heat exchanger room
(3) operability of the Unit 2A flow control valve and recirculation loop with the flow control
valve locked up for hydraulic system maintenance
(4) operability of Divisions 1 and 2 diesel generators with heat gain from the diesel
engine and the diesel generator
(5) environmental qualification of 1G33-F040, Unit 1 reactor water cleanup return primary
containment isolation valve
(6) operability of the Unit 2 cable spreading room preaction fire system with a thru-wall
leak
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)
(2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
(1) Unit 1 Division 3 emergency core cooling system room cooler replacement under
(2) Unit 1 reactor water cleanup system feedwater return line leak repair and addition of
drain ports under IT-7000-M-PP-04B
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
(1) Unit 1 reactor water cleanup system following class 2 piping repair of feedwater return
line, 1FW11A, on July, 29, 2019
(2) Unit 1 reactor core isolation cooling pump after maintenance September 5, 2019
(3) common diesel generator following cooling water maintenance window on
September 12, 2019
(4) Unit 1 high pressure core spray diesel generator heat exchanger on
September 26, 2019
(5) Unit 1 Division 3 diesel generator on September 27, 2019
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71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(1) Unit 0 common diesel generator operability test attachment 0-Idle on August 14, 2019
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1) Unit 2A residual heat removal pump biennial comprehensive in-service test on
August 15, 2019
(2) Unit 1 standby gas treatment system operability and in-service test on
September 7, 2019
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
(1) The inspectors evaluated the following submitted Emergency Action Level and
Emergency Plan changes:
- Evaluation 18-45, Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological Emergency
Plan, Revision 30
This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (2 Samples)
(1) Unit 1 (07/01/2018 - 06/30/2019)
(2) Unit 2 (07/01/2018 - 06/30/2019)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
(1) Unit 1 (07/01/2018 - 06/30/2019)
(2) Unit 2 (07/01/2018 - 06/30/2019)
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (2 Samples)
(1) Unit 1 (07/01/2018 - 06/30/2019)
(2) Unit 2 (07/01/2018 - 06/30/2019)
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71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program
(CAP) related to the following issues:
(1) Action Request 1136071, Potential Non-Conservative Technical Specification for
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil
(2) Action Request 4223654, 2C51-J004C Repair Scope Add
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
(1) LER 05000373/2017-007-00, Low Pressure Core Spray System Inoperable Due to
Loss of Cooling (ADAMS Accession: ML17230A288)
The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause
discussed in the LER therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The
inspectors also concluded that no violation of NRC requirements occurred.
(2) LER 05000374/2018-001-00 and LER 05000374/2018-001-01, Manual Reactor Scram Due to Main Condenser Vacuum Degradation (ADAMS Accession:
The circumstances surrounding this LER are documented in report Section 71153.
This LER was closed as a finding (05000374/2019001-02) in NRC Integrated
Inspection Report 2019001.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
60855.1 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants
Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants (1 Sample)
(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees operation of the independent spent fuel
storage installation from July 8 to July 12, 2019. Specifically, the inspectors
evaluated:
- the material, and radiological condition of the ISFSI and loaded storage casks
through reviewing periodic structural evaluation, and performing and reviewing
independent and the licensees radiological surveys on July 11, 2019
- a heavy lift of the loaded transfer cask from the spent fuel pool to the cask
processing area on July 9, 2019
shell weld on July 10, 2019
- non-destructive evaluations, including helium leak testing, of the lid to shell
and port cover welds for MPC No.68-598 on July 9-11, 2019
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removal of bulk water, drying using forced helium dehydration, and backfill
with helium
- changes to the 72.212 report and changes screened and evaluated using
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Comply with National Fire Protection Association 13, Standard for the Installation
of Sprinkler Systems, Requirements During Installation of the Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room
Preaction Fire System
Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report
Aspect Section
Mitigating Green [P.1] - 71111.05Q
Systems NCV 05000373,05000374/2019003-01 Identification
Open/Closed
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated
non-cited violation of the Unit 1 License Condition C.25, and Unit 2 License Condition C.15,
Fire Protection Program, for the failure to install the cable spreading room preaction fire
suppression system in accordance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 13,
Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 1976 Edition. Specifically, the licensee
failed to provide a preaction fire suppression system that complied with Section 3-10.2.1 of
NFPA 13. The inspectors determined that the written instructions to drain the preaction fire
protection piping allowed water to remain in the system for prolonged periods. Water
remaining in the system led to a thru-wall leak rending the fire suppression system in the
cable spreading room inoperable for 9 days during repairs.
Description:
On July 1, 2019, the main control room received a fire alarm for the Unit 1 cable spreading
room starting both diesel driven fire pumps. Equipment operators dispatched to the cable
spreading room determined that the fire alarm was invalid but discovered a leak from the
cable spreading room preaction fire suppression system. The cable spreading room
preaction suppression system was isolated to stop the leak. The licensee entered the
appropriate fire impairments for the cable spreading room preaction fire suppression system
being out of service and instituted the required fire watch. The licensee documented this in
the corrective action program as Action Request (AR) 4261004.
The licensee determined that a faulty detector caused the spurious fire alarm. By design, the
alarm charged the preaction fire suppression piping, normally dry, with water resulting in the
discovery of the thru-wall leak in the piping. To address the faulty detector, the licensee
replaced the detector and attempted to drain the fire suppression system using the NFPA
code-required system main drain located near the deluge valve. The licensee determined the
leak was a 3/8-inch hole caused by corrosion through the 4-inch diameter main supply
header that is made of carbon steel. The licensee replaced the affected piping along with an
additional 6 feet of corroded piping identified during extent of condition inspections. During
replacement of the piping, the piping showed evidence that standing water had been in
the lower half of the piping for a significant length of time. The licensee restored the cable
spreading room preaction fire system to service and exited all applicable Technical
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Requirements Manual actions. Additionally, the licensee determined that the thru-wall leak in
the pipe would not have impacted the ability of the fire protection system to perform its
function.
The inspectors reviewed operating experience associated with spurious actuation and
inadequate draining of preaction fire systems. The inspectors noted that Information Notice 2013-06 discussed a previous issue at LaSalle station pertaining to inadequate
draining of the preaction fire system in the chemistry overlab area. The draining location
used during the flow surveillance was such that portions of the system were not properly
drained. This condition lead to the piping corroding excessively and sediment build up
that clogged the sprinkler piping and spray nozzles.
The inspectors discussed fire protection system restoration and post-maintenance testing
with the shift manager. Following completion of detector and piping repairs, the licensee
intended to perform a 30 psi system leak tightness check using the deluge supervisory air
compressor as the pressure source. The inspectors raised a concern that because the main
supply header dropped in elevation upon entering the cable spreading room and was lower in
elevation than the system drain valve, the system could not have been completely drained
following system reset from the spurious actuation. The inspectors expressed that, as
documented in Information Notice 2013-06, standing water in preaction piping may lead to
significant corrosion. The licensee documented the inspectors' concerns in the corrective
action program as AR 4261784. In response to the discussion with the inspectors, the
licensee used an alternate method to drain the system by removing low point pipe caps on
the 3/4-inch nozzle spray lines to completely drain all portions of the system.
Additionally, the inspectors walked down the Unit 2 cable spreading room fire suppression
systems and noted evidence of thru-wall leak in the Unit 2 cable spreading room fire
suppression system piping. The licensee documented in the corrective action program as
AR 4262877. The licensee performed an operability evaluation and determined that the
thru-wall leak in the pipe would not have impacted the ability of the fire protection system
to perform its function.
The inspectors reviewed licensee's commitments in their fire protection report and
determined that the licensee was committed to NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of
Sprinkler Systems, 1976 Edition. The inspectors noted that Section 3-10.2 System or Main
Drain Connections and Drain Valves, Part 3-10.2.1 required that Provisions shall be made
to properly drain all parts of the system. Contrary to this requirement, the inspectors noted
that operating procedures used to reset the cable spreading room preaction system following
a spurious actuation, as well as procedures to functionally test the system, directed the
operators to use the main drain valve to remove water from the system. The inspectors
determined that these procedures would not drain all the preaction piping and would lead to
corrosion consistent with that seen on the removed sections of fire protection supply header.
The inspectors discussed their findings with the licensee who documented them in the
corrective action program as AR 4262090.
Corrective Actions: The licensee planned to revise station procedures to ensure adequate
draining of the preaction fire system piping.
Corrective Action Reference: AR 4261784
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Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to provide a preaction
fire suppression system that complied with Section 3 -10.2.1 of NFPA-13 was a performance
deficiency. Specifically, written instructions were such that water remained in the system for
prolonged periods resulting in a thru-wall leak due to excessive corrosion.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the
Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure
the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent
undesirable consequences. The failure to comply with NFPA 13 provisions for preaction
sprinkler installation led to standing water in a dry pipe fire system and a thru-wall leak.
Therefore, there was an adverse effect on the protection against external factors cornerstone
attribute.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, Fire
Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The inspectors determined that the finding
category was Fixed Fire Protection Systems, and the cable spreading room preaction fire
system does not comply with NFPA 13, Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 1976 Edition.
Specifically, the cable spreading room preaction fire system supply piping does not comply
with Section 3-10.1.3 in that the system could not be drained to comply with the requirements
of Section 3-10.2. The fire protection piping leak did not result in a loss of function; therefore,
it meets the definition of low degradation per IMC 0609 App F, Attachment 2, resulting in the
finding screening as having very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.1 - Identification: The organization implements a corrective action
program with a low threshold for identifying issues. Individuals identify issues completely,
accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the program. Specifically, operations
personnel routinely drained the preaction fire system with the deluge valve without identifying
that the system could not be completely drained due to the piping configuration.
Enforcement:
Violation: License Conditions 2.C(25) and 2.C(15) for Units 1 and 2, respectively, required
the licensee to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection
program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report and as approved through Safety
Evaluation Reports. Appendix H, Fire Hazards Analysis, of the Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report, stated that the appendix had to be relocated to the LaSalle County Station
Fire Protection Report (FPR). Section H.3.4.8, Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room - Fire Zone
4D1 and Section H.3.4.9, Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room - Fire Zone 4D2 of the FPR stated
that a preaction suppression system was provided. The FPR listed NFPA 13, Installation of
Sprinkler Systems, 1976 Edition, as the code of record. National Fire Protection Association
13, Section 3-10.2.1 requires that provisions shall be made to properly drain all parts of the
system.
Contrary to the above, as of July 5, 2019, the licensee did not comply with License Conditions
2.C(25) and 2.C(15) for Units 1 and 2, by failing to provide provisions to drain all parts of the
preaction fire protection system in Fire Zones 4D1 and 4D2, which was required by NFPA 13,
Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 1976 Edition, Section 3-10.2.1. Specifically, written
instructions were such that water remained in the system for prolonged periods resulting in a
thru-wall leak due to excessive corrosion.
12
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Implement the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program for Traversing
Incore Probes System Containment Isolation Valve 2C51-J004C
Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report
Aspect Section
Barrier Integrity Green [H.6] - Design 71152
NCV 05000374/2019003-02 Margins
Open/Closed
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated
non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.5.13, Primary Containment Leakage Rate
Testing Program, for the licensee's failure to perform a cause determination and identify
corrective actions that focus on those activities that can eliminate the identified cause of a
failure with appropriate steps to eliminate recurrence for a failed Type C leak rate test.
Specifically, after repeated Type C leak rate failures of the traversing incore probe system 2C
isolation valve 2C51-J004C, the licensee neither performed a cause determination nor took
corrective actions.
Description:
On February 23, 2019, the licensee performed a local leak rate test (Type C) of the 2C
traversing incore probe system (TIP) primary containment isolation valve 2C51-J004C in
accordance with station procedure LTS-100-42. The leakage past the valve was determined
to be 24.3 standard cubic feet per hour (SCFH). This value exceeded the administrative
limit of 10 SCFH defined in procedure LTS-100-42. The licensee documented the issue in
AR 4222980. The AR documented previous failures to meet the administrative limit of
10 SCFH. Additionally, the AR documented that the primary containment was operable
since the additional leakage identified did not exceed 0.6 La. The AR also generated a
work request for operations and maintenance to troubleshoot, repair or replace the valve.
The inspectors reviewed the testing history and corrective action documentation for
2C51-J004C and determined the following:
On February 22, 2015, the licensee performed a local leak rate test of the 2C TIP primary
containment isolation valve 2C51-J004C in accordance with station procedure LTS-100-42.
The leakage past the valve was determined to be 15.53 SCFH. This value exceeded the
administrative limit of 10 SCFH defined in procedure LTS-100-42. The licensee documented
the issue in AR 2457086. The AR documented that the primary containment was operable
since the additional leakage identified did not exceed 0.6 La. No further actions were taken.
On February 23, 2017, the licensee performed a local leak rate test of the 2C TIP primary
containment isolation valve 2C51-J004C in accordance with station procedure LTS-100-42.
The leakage past the valve was determined to be 18.97 SCFH. This value exceeded the
administrative limit of 10 SCFH defined in procedure LTS-100-42. The licensee documented
the issue in AR 3977735. The AR documented that the primary containment was operable
since the additional leakage identified did not exceed 0.6 La. No further actions were taken.
The inspectors then reviewed the licensees primary containment leakage rate testing
program as described in Technical Specification 5.5.13, that states in part, this program shall
13
establish the leakage rate testing of the primary containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o)
and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemption. This program
shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 94-01,
Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J,
Revision 3-A, dated July 2012. Additionally, the licensee implements the program in
accordance with station procedure ER-AA-380, Primary Containment Leakrate Testing
Program.
During the inspectors review they noted the following, Section 10.2.3 of NEI 94-01, Revision
3-A addresses Type C test interval and more specifically Section 10.2.3.4 addresses
corrective action and states in part, if Type C test results are not acceptable, a cause
determination shall be performed and corrective actions identified that focus on those
activities that can eliminate the identified cause of a failure with appropriate steps to eliminate
recurrence. A failure in this context is exceeding an administrative limit and not the total
failure of the valve. Additionally, station procedure ER-AA-380, Revisions 10 and 11, Steps
4.11.4 and 4.11.4.2 required that, if leakage from any component exceeds its administrative
limit perform a cause determination and take corrective actions to eliminate the identified
cause, with appropriate steps to eliminate recurrence.
The inspectors requested the evaluations and corrective actions for the failed leakrate tests
performed on 2C51-J004C in 2015 and 2017 and the licensee did not have them. The
licensee documented this in AR 4270252.
Corrective Actions: The valve was replaced and successfully passed leak rate testing with
results below the administrative limits during Refueling Outage L2R17 completed in 2019.
Corrective Action References: ARs 2457086, 3977735, 4222980, 4223654 and 4270252
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that failing to perform a cause
determination and identifying corrective actions that focus on those activities that can
eliminate the identified cause of a failure with appropriate steps to eliminate recurrence in
accordance with station procedure ER-AA-380 was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
because it was associated with the SSC and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier
Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable
assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused
by accidents or events. Specifically, despite a degrading trend of valve performance with
respect to leakage rate, the licensee repeatedly took no actions to identify and eliminate the
cause of the test failures.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The
Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors screened
the issue against the Barrier integrity questions and determined that the finding was of very
low safety significance (Green) since it did not represent an actual open pathway in the
physical integrity of the reactor containment, containment isolation system and heat removal
components or a reduction of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.6 - Design Margins: The organization operates and maintains
equipment within design margins. Margins are carefully guarded and changed only through a
14
systematic and rigorous process. Special attention is placed on maintaining fission product
barriers, defense-in-depth, and safety related equipment. Specifically, AR documents only
addressed why overall containment leakage was acceptable and did not identify the reduction
in margin to acceptable containment leakage and take actions to carefully guard and maintain
the margin.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification Section 5.5.13 requires, in part, that the primary
containment leakage rate testing program shall be established, implemented, and maintained
in accordance with the guidelines contained in NEI 94-01, Industry Guideline for
Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Revision 3-A, dated
July 2012.
Nuclear Energy Institute 94-01, Revision 3-A, Section 10.2.3 addresses, Type C Test
Interval and Section 12.2.3.4, Corrective Action addresses If Type C test results are not
acceptable, a cause determination shall be performed and corrective actions identified that
focus on those activities that can eliminate the identified cause of a failure with appropriate
steps to eliminate recurrence.
The licensee established Procedure ER-AA-380, Primary Containment Leakrate Testing
Program, Revisions 10 and 11 to address the primary containment leakrate testing program.
Procedure ER-AA-380, Revisions 10 and 11, Steps 4.11.4 and 4.11.4.2 require that if
leakage from any component exceeds it administrative limit perform a cause determination
and take corrective actions to eliminate the identified cause, with appropriate steps to
eliminate recurrence.
Contrary to the above, on February 22, 2015, and on February 23, 2017, the licensee failed
to implement the primary containment leakage rate program in accordance with Technical
Specification 5.5.13, in that steps 4.11.4 and 4.11.4.2 of procedure ER-AA-380, Primary
Containment Leakrate Testing Program, Revisions 10 and 11, which implement the
guidance contained in NEI 94-01, Industry Guidelines for Implementing Performance-Based
Option of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Revision 3-A, dated July 2012, were not followed.
Specifically, when the TIP isolation valve 2C51-J004C exceeded its administrative leakage
rate limit, the licensee failed to perform a cause determination and take corrective actions to
eliminate the identified cause with appropriate steps to eliminate recurrence.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 9, 2019, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to
Mr. P. Hansett, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 3, 2019, the inspectors presented the Exit Meeting for EP Inspection per
IP 71114, Attachment 4 inspection results to Mr. L. Baker, EP Fleet Programs Manager,
and other members of the licensee staff.
15
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
60855.1 Corrective Action Selected Corrective Action Reports generated since
Documents August 2017
Corrective Action AR 04262886 NRC Identified Steps Not Circled/Slashed in Procedure 07/09/2019
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Engineering EC 0000620032 Design Analysis Re-Qualifying ISFSI Pad for 90 Casks 11/20/2017
Changes EC 0000622967 Refuel Floor Area Cooling for FHD Skid 05/20/2019
EC 0000623793 Forced Helium Dehydration (FHD) Reactor Building Impacts 04/12/2019
EC 000062987 LaSalle 2019 Dry Cask Storage Fuel Selection Packages - 04/17/2019
Miscellaneous DCS Bi-Annual Walkdown Per OU-AA-630-101 04/10/2019
Selected 72.48 Evaluations Completed Since August 2016
LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 72.212 Evaluation 7
Report
2018 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report 05/14/2019
Physical Inventory Report Post-Loading Cask Varification 07/09/2019
L-004290 Fuel Selection Packages for LAS-0036 through LAS-0043 03/11/2019
for the 2019 ISFSI Campaign
L-004294 LaSalle CoC 1014 Amendment 8, Revision 1 Cask Model 02/28/2019
with 4 Individual Group Limits
LTS-800-01 Annual Inspection of ISFSI Pad and Casks 07/05/2019
LTS-800-01 Annual Inspection of the ISFSI Pad and Casks 06/14/2017
NDE Reports Report Number Report of Nondestructive Examination of Lid to Shell Weld - 07/09/2019
914603-598-01 Root Layer
Report Number Report of Nondestructive Examination of Lid to Shell Weld - 07/09/2019
914603-598-02 First Layer
Report Number Report of Nondestructive Examination of Lid to Shell Weld - 07/09/2019
914603-598-03 Final Layer
Report Number Report of Nondestructive Examination of Lid to Shell Weld - 07/10/2019
914603-598-04 Post Hydro-static Test
Procedures GQP - 9.2 High Temperature Liquid Penetrant Examination and 10
16
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Acceptance Standards for Welds., Base Materials and
Cladding
GQP - 9.6 Visual Examination of Welds 18
LFP-800-69 Hi-TRAC Movement within the Reactor Building 22
MA-AA-716-021 Rigging and Lifting Program 30
MA-AA-716-022 Control of Heavy Loads 3
OU-MW-671-200 MPC Processing Forced Helium Dehydration (FHD) for 4
PI-CNSTR-OP- Closure Welding of Holtec Multi-Purpose Canisters at Exelon 20
EXE-01 Facilities
Radiation LaSalle Hi-STORM Radiation Survey 06/27/2019
Surveys ISFSI Monthly Pad Survey 05/29/2019
Self-Assessments 2019 LaSalle Spent Fuel Loading Campaign (SFLC) 04/18/2019
Readiness Assessment
NOSA-LAS-18-10 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Audit Report 11/14/2018
Work Orders WO 04706829-01 Annual Reactor Building Crane Inspection 09/17/2018
WO 04722199 01 Dry Cask Storage Hi-STORM Lift Bracket Inspection 07/30/2018
WO 04722200 Dry Cask Storage Lift Yoke Assembly Inspection 07/30/2018
WO 04722201 01 Dry Cask Storage Lift Cleat Inspection 07/30/2018
WO 04722202 01 Dry Cask Storage Hi-TRAC Trunnion Inspection 07/30/2019
WO 04914343-01 Monthly Reactor Building Crane, Beam and Hoist Inspection 05/01/2019
71111.04Q Drawings M-99 Standby Liquid Control System AD
Procedures LOP-SC-01E Unit 1 Standby Liquid Control System Electrical Checklist 10
LOP-SC-01M Unit 1 Standby Liquid Control System Mechanical Checklist 12
71111.05Q Corrective Action AR 4261004 Fire Alarms and Both DFPs Auto Started Due to FP Leak 07/01/2019
Documents AR 4261866 Unexpected Alarm 1PM10J-B303 Division 2 SWGR Fire 07/04/2019
Alarm
AR 4261996 U1 RT Fire Detector Replacement 07/05/2019
AR 4262877 NRC Identified: U2 CSR FP Piping Corrosion 07/09/2019
AR 4263741 Extent of Condition Walkdown of Pre-Action FP Piping 07/12/2019
Corrective Action AR 4261784 NRC Question: Draining of Fire Protection Piping Following 07/03/2019
Documents Deluge Actuation
Resulting from AR 4262090 NRC ID - Dry Pipe FP Lines not Sloped per NFPA 13 07/05/2019
17
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Inspection AR 4262093 IEMA ID - U1 CSR FP Piping Penetration not Shown on 07/05/2019
Drawing
AR 4262899 NRC Identified: Floor Drains Covered in U1 Cable Spreading 07/09/2019
Room
Miscellaneous LaSalle Fire An Analysis of the Effects of Initiation of Fire Suppression 8
Protection Report Systems on Safe Shutdown Equipment at LaSalle County
Station
LOP-FP-03 Operating Department Procedure, Viking Automatic Deluge 29
Valve Actuation and Reset
LOS-FP-R6 Operating Department Surveillance, Preaction Spray 16
Systems Functional Test
Work Orders WO 1528878 U1 Cable Spreading Room Sprinkler Functional Test, 11/08/2013
Section E.1 of LOS-FP-R6
WO 1947942 Unit 1 Fire Protection Spray and Sprinkler Systems Integrity 08/01/2018
Inspection, Attachment B of LOS-FP-SR3.
WO 4592876 U1 Cable Spreading Room Sprinkler Functional Test, 07/30/2018
Section E.1 of LOS-FP-R6
71111.06 Corrective Action 4261004 Fire Alarms and Both DFPS [diesel fire pumps] Auto Started 07/01/2019
Documents Due To FP [fire protection] Leak
4261891 Floor Drain Leaking Water Onto 1PA02J In U1 AEER 07/04/2019
[auxiliary electric equipment room]
Engineering LaSalle Fire An Analysis of the Effects of Initiation of Fire Suppression 8
Evaluations Protection Report Systems on Safe Shutdown Equipment At LaSalle County
Station
Miscellaneous NFPA 92M Waterproofing and Draining of Floors 1972
71111.07A Procedures ER-AA-340-1002, Heat Exchanger Inspection Report for 1E22-S001 09/23/2019
Attachment 1
71111.12 Corrective Action AR 4193090 (A)(1) Determination for MR Function LAS-2-FUEL-02 11/08/2018
Documents AR 4223642 2G33-F004 MOV Diagnostics Identified Anomalies 02/25/2019
AR 4224174 New Valve Disc Required for 2G33-F004 02/27/2019
AR 4228789 Review of MODs Video ID'd Foreign Material in Jet Pump 03/12/2019
Riser
Drawings VPF-5521-225 Control Ball Valve F
Engineering AR 4169154 Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Evaluation 11/06/2018
18
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Evaluations LAS-1-PCIS-PC- Unit 1 Maintenance Rule Function Evaluation for Primary 09/13/2019
03 Containment Isolation Valve ASME XI Leak Rate Testing
LAS-1-PCIS-PC- Unit 1 Maintenance Rule Function Evaluation for Primary 09/13/2019
04 Containment Isolation Valve ASME XI Stroke Time Testing
LAS-1-PCIS-PC- Unit 1 Maintenance Rule Function Evaluation for the Reactor 09/13/2019
05 Coolant System Pressure Boundary and Primary
Containment Integrity Function
Procedures ER-AA-302-1006 Motor-Operated Valve Maintenance and Testing Guidelines 19
ER-AA-310-1005 (a)(1) Action Plan Development and Action Plan (Monitoring) 7
Goal Setting Template
Work Orders WO 1223498 Measure Flow Control Shaft Lift of 2B33-F040A 03/05/2011
WO 1450948 Measure Flow Control Shaft Lift of 2B33-F040A 02/28/2013
WO 1629132 Measure Flow Control Shaft Lift of 2B33-F040A 02/22/2015
WO 1814692 Measure Flow Control Shaft Lift of 2B33-F040A 03/04/2017
WO 4627480 Work Request for Gate Valve - Part 21 02/27/2019
WO 4633640 Measure Flow Control Shaft Lift of 2B33-F040A 03/07/2019
71111.13 Corrective Action AR 4277865 License Renewal (LR) Coating Inspection for 0DG01A HX 09/09/2019
Documents
Procedures WC-AA-104-F-01 Disassemble and Inspect the Heat Exchanger 0DG01A 0
WC_AA_104-F- Risk Screening/Mitigation Plan for FHD Scaffolding Removal 07/18/2019
01
Work Orders WO 4624753 LRA Disassemble and Inspect 0DG01A DG Cooling Water 000
71111.15 Corrective Action AR 289539 Provisions for Liquid Tight Jacket Repair 01/11/2005
Documents AR 4191997 3A1 FW Drn Clr Drain Outlet 11/05/2018
AR 4262877 NRC Identified: U2 CSR FP Piping Corrosion 07/09/2019
AR 4266338 Discovery, Work Performed, Lessons Learned 07/22/2019
Drawings Drawing M-139, P&ID Nuclear Boiler and Reactor Recirculating AT
Sheet No. 1
Drawing M-139, P&ID Nuclear Boiler & Reactor Recirculating 2B33-D003A H
Sheet No. 8
Miscellaneous NE-11-32-1 Cable and Connection Inspection Summary Report, Peach 1
Bottom
OU-AA-101-1007 Outage Execution Scope Add Sheet 12
19
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Tagout 02-B33- Lock Up Both RR HPUs per LOP-RR-07 Limitation D.4 08/14/2019
Operability OpEval 19-002 Diesel Generator Ventilation (VD) 000
Evaluations
Procedures LAP-1600-15 Administrative Procedure, Regulatory Guide 1.97 8
Instruments
71111.18 Corrective Action AR 4251021 Review Code Requirements for Replacement VY Cooling 05/22/2019
Documents Coils
AR 4252624 Code Non-Conformance Identified for VY Coolers 05/29/2019
1(2)VY03A
AR 4257982 1VY02C Air Flowrate Below Required Value 06/19/2019
AR 4267302 Discrepancy in Pipe Sch of Installed Pipe and Design Info 07/24/2019
AR 4267597 Radiography Reject on Line #1FW11A-4 Weld #4 07/28/2019
Drawings Drawing IT-7000- Prequalified Hydrolazing Port Details for Class 2, Class 3, B
M-PP-04B and ANSI B31.1 Piping System
Drawing M-87 P&ID Core Standby Cooling System, Equipment Cooling BR
Water System
LTS-100-10 Feedwater Valve LLRT Quick Reference Diagram 25
Miscellaneous CC-AA-201 Plant Barrier Impairment Permit 12
Tagout 01-E22- Replace 1VY02A Cooler 06/17/2019
00150330-001
Work Orders WO 4633535 Replace both cooler coils and replace the 2-1/2 inlet outlet 12/13/2018
piping. All work will be IAW EC 622556.
WO 4633536 Replace both cooler coils and replace the 2-1/2 inlet outlet 01/31/2018
piping including the 4 90 degree elbows, 4x2-1/2 reducer
and possibly a short piece of the 4 piping after the elbow.
WO 4677534 Replace both cooler coils and replace the 2-1/2 inlet outlet 03/20/2019
piping. Also replace portions of the 4 piping in the
overhead. All work will be IAW EC 622652.
71111.19 Corrective Action AR 4278495 Corrosion of 0DG01A Flange Connections 09/12/2019
Documents AR 4278613 0DG01A Floating End Cover Leak 09/12/2019
Work Orders WO 4662368 In-service Testing Comprehensive Pump Test for 1E12- 09/05/2019
C002B
WO 4899832 LOS-DG-M1 0DG Fast Start 09/12/2019
20
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.22 Miscellaneous STI LA-18-01 Change the Control Room Emergency Makeup Unit 2
Operability Test from a 31-day (1 month) Frequency to an
Annual Frequency
STI LA-18-01 Change the control room emergency makeup unit operability 1
test from a 31-day (1 month) frequency to an annual
frequency.
Work Orders WO 4675852 In-service Testing Comprehensive Pump Test for 1E12- 08/15/2019
C002A
WO 4940210 Unit Common Diesel Generator Idle Start 08/15/2019
71114.04 Miscellaneous Evaluation 18-45 Exelon Nuclear Standardized Radiological Emergency Plan, 02/14/2019
Revision 30
71152 Corrective Action AR 1422001 LaSalle EP Staffing Assessment 10/03/2012
Documents AR 2457086 2C51-J004C Tip Ball Valve LTS-100-42 As Found Failure 02/22/2015
AR 3977735 LLRT - L2R16, 2C51-J004C Tested Above Alarm Limit 02/23/2017
AR 4223654 L2R17 - 2C51-J004C Repair Scope Add 02/25/2019
AR 4270252 Historical 2C51-J004C App J Leakage Evaluations Not 08/07/2019
Found
AR 4276516 WHR Violation 09/03/2019
Miscellaneous NEI 94-01 Industry Guidelines for Implementing Performance-Based 3A
Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J
Procedures ER-AA-380 Primary Containment Leakrate Testing Program 12
ER-AA-380 Primary Containment Leakrate Testing Program 11
OP-AA-106-101- Event Response Guidelines 31
1001
OP-LA-101-111- On-Shift Staffing Requirements 9
1001
Work Orders WO 1435953 LLRT, 'C' Tip Ball Valve 2C51-J004C 02/22/2015
WO 1809824 2C51-J004C Tip Ball Valve LTS-100-42 As Found Failure- 03/05/2019
Repair
WO 1809884 LLRT, 'C' Tip Ball Valve 2C51-J004C 02/23/2017
WO 4604994 LLRT, 'C' Tip Ball Valve 2C51-J004C 02/23/2019
21