ML18320A213
| ML18320A213 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 11/16/2018 |
| From: | Omar Lopez-Santiago NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1 |
| To: | Burchfield E Duke Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| IR 2018010 | |
| Download: ML18320A213 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000269/2018010
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257
November 16, 2018
Mr. Ed Burchfield, Jr.
SVP Nuclear Operations
Oconee Nuclear Station
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
7800 Rochester Hwy
Seneca, SC 29672
SUBJECT: OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2 & 3 - NRC DESIGN BASES
ASSURANCE INSPECTION (PROGRAMS) REPORT NUMBER
05000269/2018010, 05000270/2018010 AND 05000287/2018010
Dear Mr. Burchfield:
On October 5, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection
at your Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3 and discussed the results of this inspection
with you and other members of your staff. On November 15, 2018 additional inspection results
were discussed with Mr. Paul Fisk and other members of your staff. The results of this
inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented 2 findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
These findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating these violations as
non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within
30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with
copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the
NRC resident inspector at the Oconee Nuclear Station.
E. Burchfield 2
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for
Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Omar López-Santiago, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287
License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000269/2018010,
05000270/2018010 and 05000287/2018010
cc: Distribution via ListServ
__ML 18320A213 _ SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FORM 665 ATTACHED
OFFICE RII:DRS/EB1 RIII:DRS/EB1 RII:DRS/EB1 RII:DRS/EB1
SIGNATURE MCG9 MAR1 GKO ORL
NAME M. GREENLEAF M. RILEY G. OTTENBERG O. LOPEZ-
SANTIAGO
DATE 11/ 15/2018 11/ 2 /2018 11/ 6 /2018 11/ /2018
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Number(s): 05000269, 05000270, 05000287
License Number(s): DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55
Report Number(s): 05000269/2018010, 05000270/2018010, 05000287/2018010
Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-010-0050
Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Facility: Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 & 3
Location: Seneca, South Carolina
Inspection Dates: September 18, 2018, to October 5, 2018
Inspectors: M. Greenleaf, Reactor Inspector
G. Ottenberg, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Riley, Reactor Inspector
Approved By: Omar López-Santiago, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring Duke Energy Carolinas
LLCs performance at Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3 by conducting a design bases
assurance inspection (programs) in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The
Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of
commercial nuclear power reactors.
Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC
violations are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations
Incorrect Use of Combined Qualification for Rotork Motor Operated Valve Actuator
Cornerstone Significance/Severity Cross-cutting Report Section
Aspect
Mitigating Green None 71111.21N -
Systems NCV 05000269/2018010-01 Design Bases
Closed Assurance
Inspection
(Programs)
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.49(e)(5), for the licensees failure to
appropriately include the effects of thermal aging in the qualification of the Rotork valve motor
operator. Consequently, the 1LP-104 valve motor operator was installed in the plant for longer
than the qualification had been demonstrated.
Failure to Evaluate Impact to Required Design Functions for Viking Penetrations Following
Changes to East Penetration Room Environmental Parameters
Cornerstone Significance/Severity Cross-cutting Report Section
Aspect
Mitigating Green None 71111.21N -
Systems NCV 05000269/2018010-02 Design Bases
Closed Assurance
Inspection
(Programs)
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Criterion
III of Appendix B of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, for the licensees
failure to establish measures for the selection and review for suitability of application of Viking
penetrations that is essential to the safety related functions of the penetrations.
3
INSPECTION SCOPE
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedure (IP) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,
observed activities, performed walk downs, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee
performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site
procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.21N - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs)
The inspectors evaluated environmental qualification program implementation by reviewing the
following components from September 18, 2018, to September 21, 2018, and October 1, 2018,
to October 5, 2018:
Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program Components (4 Samples)
(1) 1RX-PNEA13, Containment Penetration (Viking Type J - feedthrough assemblies and
cable assemblies)
(2) 3A High Pressure Injection Pump Motor Bushing and Connector, (Elastimold Bushing
and Connector)
(3) 2HPI-SX-TRN002, 2B Protected Service Water to High Pressure Injection Motor
Operated Transfer Switch (Nutherm International Inc. - Selector Switches and Motor
Operating Device)
(4) 2RBC-MR-0020BAHU, 2B Reactor Building Cooling Unit Fan Motor (Howden Buffalo -
Motor assembly)
EQ Program Components Inside Primary Containment (3 Samples)
(5) Instrumentation Cable in Containment (Boston Insulated Wire - various cable types
containing Bostrad 7 insulation)
(6) 1LP-104, Low Pressure Injection Loss of Coolant Accident Boron Dilution Valve (Rotork
Valve Operator (post 1978) Model NA1 Actuator)
(7) 1-RIA-58, 1A Containment High Radiation Monitor (Sorrento Electronics - Connectors)
4
INSPECTION RESULTS
Incorrect Use of Combined Qualification for Rotork Motor Operated Valve Actuator
Cornerstone Significance/Severity Cross-cutting Report Section
Aspect
Mitigating Green None 71111.21N -
Systems NCV 05000269/2018010-01 Design Bases
Closed Assurance
Inspection
(Programs)
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.49(e)(5), for the licensees failure to
appropriately include the effects of thermal aging in the qualification of the Rotork valve motor
operator. Consequently, the 1LP-104 valve motor operator was installed in the plant for longer
than the qualification had been demonstrated.
Description:
The inspectors reviewed OM 245. --0980.001, NIB-Rotork Valve Operator Nuclear
Qualification (Post 1978), which documented the qualification testing that was performed for
the post-1978 Rotork NA1 valve motor operators. The 1LP-104 valve operator, chosen for
review by the inspection team, was installed inside containment in 2005, and was considered a
replacement component which was to be qualified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49
requirements. While reviewing the qualification file, the inspectors identified that the qualified
life for the component was not appropriately demonstrated.
The Environmental Qualification Test Report / Analysis Summary included in OM 245. --
0980.001 indicated that the Qualified Life/ Replacement Interval, of 40 years was
demonstrated by Wyle Laboratories Test Report 43979-1, Qualification Test Report for Two
Valve Operators (11NAZT1 and 90NAZT1) for Rotork Controls, Inc. Rochester, New York,
Section II, and it further directed the reader to See Remarks Section Paragraph 1.
Test report 43979-1, Section II, Environmental and Mechanical Wear Aging Test, indicated
that each of the two test specimens were thermally aged at approximately 200 degrees
Fahrenheit (°F) for 400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> and were further subjected to a total of 2000 mechanical cycles.
The Remarks Section Paragraph 1 stated the following:
Aging/Qualified Life
Section II, of Report 43979-1, "Environmental and Mechanical Wear Aging Test" shows the
actuator being aged for 400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> at 200°F. This is not equivalent to 40 years at 120°F
(120°F being Duke's ambient temperature) per the Arrhenius Equation. Additional testing
by Test Report TR-3030 shows justification of the 40 year qualified life of the operator.
Reference Rotork letter dated December 27, 1985 paragraph 1C.
5
An added justification of the 40 year life is to have one actuator pulled from containment,
tested and inspected for functionability and the characteristics of the sealing material every five
years. Reference OM-245-0980, Section NA1 Nuclear Qualification, Paragraph 2.
The Rotork letter dated December 27, 1985, paragraph 1C, stated the following:
As you have determined, Test Report No. 43979-1 does not specifically address the life of the
actuator relative to thermal aging testing. Initially, let me point out that we did age the actuators
for 400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> at 200°F (Reference Section 2, Page 1, Para. 1.0). Also, note that the motor was
preaged as an individual component for 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> at 338°F. For your information, the basis of
the aging program was an early draft of IEEE-382. The motor preaging was based on the l0°C
rule. Since the time of Rotork's testing, the arrhenius equation has become accepted as the
proper method of determining the life of non-metallic components. The attached Test Report
No. TR3030 provides component life information based on the arrhenius equation. Included in
TR3030 is a bill of material for non-metallic components, activation energies for non-metallic
components, and reference to the documents used to determine the activation energies. The
lowest activation energy level found is .89ev.
Using .89ev and an ambient of 120°F (provided by Duke), a calculated qualified life
equivalent to 400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> of aging at 200°F is 2.2 years. The motor preaging of 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> at
338°F is equivalent to a qualified life of approximately 145 years. The thermal aging
conducted in TR3030 is equivalent to 221 years at 120°F (see the attached modified
version of Table 1 in TR3030).
Since the thermal aging program conducted in TR3030 was very severe (equivalent to 221
years of normal plant life) and since the actuator continued to function within acceptable
parameters, results can be applied to obtain a qualification package which shows that the
actuator will continue to function throughout its forty year life. Since the various non-
metallic materials were not significantly degraded, the operation of the actuator under
accident conditions as conducted in Test Report No's 43979-1, 43979-3 and 58364 can be
assumed.
Although the Remarks section stated that Rotork Test Report TR-3030 [16NAT1 Thermal
Aging Type Test Report] showed justification for a 40 year qualified life, the testing described
in that test report did not conform to the qualification testing methods in IEEE 323-1974, IEEE
Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, or the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. The TR-3030 testing did not perform any design basis
accident testing at elevated temperatures or pressures, did not include a chemical spray
environment, and did not include humidity or radiation environment considerations. Therefore,
absent any additional ongoing qualification activity as described in Remarks Section
Paragraph 1, or further analysis, the 40 year qualified life was inappropriately based on
separate effects testing, as test report TR-3030 only included thermal and mechanical aging
effects on the degradation of the component followed by functional testing. The qualified life
was therefore based only on a demonstration that the component would function under a
non-accident, non-irradiated condition following a period of thermal and mechanical aging.
6
Inspectors discovered that the licensee had been performing functional testing and visual
inspection of the sealing material on a five year frequency in an effort to extend the qualified
life in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49(e)(5). Specifically, OM-245-0980, Section NA1 Nuclear
Qualification, Paragraph 2, described the ongoing testing as follows:
Every year after start-up of each nuclear power plant, at least one Rotork actuator is
removed from a valve, tested on a Rotork test rig, disassembled, inspected, reassembled
and tested. We will make a Rotork engineer available to examine the unit and document a
statement on its functionability and the characteristics of the sealing material. Although it is
at the power plant's-discretion, I would suggest the selection of one actuator each year in
one of the most severe ambients would be sufficient.
Further, it was discovered that the every five year removal/test/inspect activity had been
canceled by Duke in 1997, as documented in their corrective action program in NCR 01702592
(former PIP M-97-3898).
The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to appropriately demonstrate the
qualification of the Rotork Actuator, resulted in the 1LP-104 actuator being installed in the plant
for longer than the qualification had been demonstrated.
Corrective Actions: The licensee determined the extent of condition and evaluated the
affected actuators for operability, and determined them to be operable but non-conforming.
The licensee plans to include further testing or analysis to ensure the affected components
conform to their EQ program requirements.
Corrective Action Reference: NCR 02235278
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to appropriately
include the effects of thermal aging in the qualification of the Rotork valve motor operator was
a performance deficiency.
Screening: The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it
adversely impacted the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone
objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to demonstrate
qualification calls into question the reliability, capability, and availability of the valve to perform
its safety function of post-boron dilution following a LOCA when the valve has been subjected
to the harsh environmental stressors at the end of its installed life.
Significance: The team evaluated the finding in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual
Chapter (IMC) 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, issued October 7,
2016, for Mitigating Systems, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination
Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, and determined the finding to be
of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the
qualification of a mitigating SSC, and the SSC had maintained its operability. Specifically, the
licensee evaluated the ability to operate the affected valve operators during accident
conditions, and determined the valves remained capable of performing their safety functions.
Cross Cutting Aspect: No cross cutting aspect was assigned because the team determined
the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
7
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.49(e)(5) required, in part, Equipment qualified by test must be
preconditioned by natural or artificial (accelerated) aging to its end-of-installed life condition.
Consideration must be given to all significant types of degradation which can have an effect on
the functional capability of the equipment. If preconditioning to an end-of-installed life condition
is not practicable, the equipment may be preconditioned to a shorter designated life. The
equipment must be replaced or refurbished at the end of this designated life unless ongoing
qualification demonstrates that the item has additional life.
Contrary to the above, since 1997, the specimens used in the type-test qualifying the 1LP-104
valve were not preconditioned to its end-of-installed life condition, the installed item was not
replaced or refurbished at the end of a shorter designated life, and the item was not
demonstrated to have additional life by ongoing qualification. Specifically, the licensee had not
performed ongoing qualification as originally planned to demonstrate that the item had
additional life.
Enforcement Actions: This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Evaluate Impact to Required Design Functions for Viking Penetrations Following
Changes to East Penetration Room Environmental Parameters
Cornerstone Significance/Severity Cross-cutting Report Section
Aspect
Mitigating Green None 71111.21N -
Systems NCV 05000269/2018010-02 Design Bases
Closed Assurance
Inspection
(Programs)
The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of Criterion
III of Appendix B of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, for the licensees
failure to establish measures for the selection and review for suitability of application of Viking
penetrations that is essential to the safety related functions of the penetrations.
Description:
The east penetration rooms of Oconee Nuclear Station were originally classified as mild
environments during the origination of the stations EQ Program. Following the issuance of
OSC-8104 High Energy Line Breaks in the Penetration Room, Rev. 0, the Viking penetration
1-EA-13 was required to mitigate the consequences of a Main Steam Line Break in the east
penetration room (EPR) at Oconee Nuclear Station, including temperature, pressure, and
steam conditions at the end of its installed life. The design basis environmental parameters for
the effects of the considered high energy line breaks (HELBs) in the EPR were changed
following the issuance of the calculation results, and the new results were not appropriately
considered for their impact to the design requirements of the equipment in the EPR (including
penetration 1-EA-13).
8
Qualification documentation reviewed by NRC inspectors only demonstrated qualification of
the penetration for LOCA conditions inside containment. No documentation supporting
qualification of the penetration following the harsh environment stemming from a HELB in the
EPR has been provided for the penetration in question.
Corrective Actions: The licensee determined the equipment to be operable but non-
conforming. The licensee plans restore qualification to the Viking penetrations to ensure that
they meet their qualification and design requirements.
Corrective Action Reference: NCR 02235293
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to verify the adequacy of
the design of the Viking penetrations for HELB conditions in the east penetration room was a
performance deficiency.
Screening: The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it
adversely impacted the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone
objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to demonstrate
that the penetration will be capable of performing its safety function of passing safety related
signals to and from the Reactor Protection System, Automatic Feed-water Isolation System
and Engineering Safeguards system adversely affects the ability of those systems to reliably
perform their safety functions.
Significance: The team evaluated the finding in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual
Chapter (IMC) 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, issued October 7,
2016, for Mitigating Systems, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination
Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, and determined the finding to be
of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the
qualification of a mitigating SSC, and the SSC had maintained its operability. Specifically, the
licensee inspected spare cable assemblies located in the warehouse and determined that the
cable assemblies installed were composed of shielded cables insulated with silicone. The
station determined that the silicone insulation and the spare cable assembly - as built - is
likely to survive the deleterious effects of the short-duration HELB postulated to occur in the
EPR. This determination was based on the performance of similar silicone insulated cables to
perform their function in high temperature environments coupled with the relatively short
duration of the HELB event.
Cross Cutting Aspect: No cross cutting aspect was assigned because the team determined
the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
9
Enforcement:
Violation: Criterion III of Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50 requires in part that, Measures shall
also be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts,
equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures,
systems and components. Design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the
adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or
simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.
Contrary to the above, since issuance of Rev. 0 of OSC-8104 (dated August 21, 2002), the
station did not establish measures for the selection and review for suitability of application of
equipment that is essential to the safety related functions of the SSCs. The station also did not
provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of the design of the Viking penetrations, such as
by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational
methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program to ensure that the penetrations
are suitable for their application in HELB environments in the east penetration room.
Specifically, the station did not ensure that the Viking penetrations would be qualified for HELB
environments in the east penetration room.
Enforcement Actions: This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On October 5, 2018 the inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. Paul Fisk, and
other members of the licensee staff.
- On November 15, 2018, the inspector re-characterized the inspection results in a re-exit
meeting with Mr. Paul Fisk and other members of the licensee staff.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
CORRECTIVE ACTION DOCUMENTS WRITTEN AS A RESULT OF THE INSPECTION
NCR 02231581, Oconee 2018 DBAI EQ Inspection
NCR 02231604, ONS Penetration Room FWLB Flood Level Not Listed in EQCM
NCR 02231623, Editorial Error in Design Basis Document for LPI
NCR 02231720, EQMM not updated as required per EC 110132
NCR 02231942, 2018 DBAI EQ - 1RXPNEA13 Outside Terminal Box Mounting
NCR 02232199, 2018 DBAI EQ - Pages Missing in OM-314-317.002
NCR 02232204, 2018 EQ EQCM Documentation Errors
NCR 02232258, 2018 DBAI EQ EC110961 No EQ Impact Review
NCR 02232300, 2018 DBAI EQ: OSC-6998 Did Not Address All BIW Cable Types
NCR 02232815, (ONS DBAI) Rad analysis incomplete in OSC-1521 for HPI room
NCR 02233042, 2018 DBAI EQ Document Discrepancy
NCR 02233101, 2018 EQ NRC DBAI Superseded EQ Qualification Reference
NCR 02233202, 2018 EQ DBAI Electrical Penetration Fault Calculation Review
NCR 02233324, 2018 EQ Document Discrepancy
NCR 02233739, 2018 EQ DBAI Viking EPA MSLB Temperature Qualification
NCR 02233749, 2018 DBAI EQ: RBCU Motor Documentation Requires Revision
NCR 02233927, EQ Program Documentation Inefficiencies
NCR 02234698, (2018 DBAI EQ) Evaluate 1993 Part 21 Notice 93-333 on BIW Ca
NCR 02234738, 2018 NRC EQ DBAI Elastimold Connectors on HPI MTRs Issues
NCR 02235002, 2018 DBAI EQ EQCM Document Deficiency
NCR 02235012, 2018 DBAI EQ Document Deficiency
NCR 02235141, 2018 DBAI EQ Document Discrepancy
NCR 02235165, ONS 2018 DBAI EQ - Original Plant Equipment with Unknown Pos
NCR 02235213, (2018 DBAI EQ) WO2022952 Completed Procedure Not Retrievable
NCR 02235253, 2018 DBAI EQ - EQML / EQDB list incorrect model for pent 3EE3
NCR 02235278, 2018 DBAI EQ Rotork NA1 actuator EQ testing gaps
NCR 02235293, 2018 EQ DBAI East Penetration Room MSLB Qualification
NCR 02235349, 2018 DBAI EQ Motor pH Qualification
PROCEDURES
AD-EG-ALL-1000, Conduct of Engineering, Rev. 1
AD-EG-ALL-1612, Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program, Rev. 2
AD-PI-ALL- 0400, Operating Experience Program, Rev. 7
IP/0/A/3009/017, Wire Terminal Installation, Labeling, and Termination (600V or Less), Rev. 39
MP/0/A/1840/040, PUMPS - MOTORS - MISCELLANEOUS COMPONENTS - LUBRICATION -
OIL SAMPLING - OIL CHANGE, Rev. 38
MP/0/A/3009/020 B, Motor - QA - Electric - Removal, Replacement, And Post Maintenance
Testing, Rev. 41
NSD-303, Environmental Qualification Program, Rev. 5
DRAWINGS
500722-53, Axivane Fan Model 66-30-11701585 Series 2000 Special, Rev. 7
72088, PSW System 5kV Motor Operated Transfer Switch Schematic Diagram, Rev. 1
O EE-264-10, Elementary Diagram, 600V Load Center PSWLXPX13 (2C) Feed to Manual
Transfer Switch for MCC 2XJ, Rev. 1
O-1157-W-005, Auxiliary Building Unit 2 Miscellaneous Electrical Equipment Mounting Details,
Rev. 0
Attachment
2
O-1703-C, One Line Diagram - Stat. Auxiliary Circuits 600V/208V L/C 2X4 & MCC 2XH, 2XK &
2XR, Rev. 38
O-1875-A, Reactor Building Electrical Penetrations Schedule East - EA7 thru ED3
O-6719-B, Connection Diagram HPI Pumps 2A and 2B Transfer Switches 2HPISXTRN001 &
2HPISXTRN002, Rev. 0
OEE-152-24, Elementary Diagram LP LOCA Boron Dilution System Motor Operated Valve
1LP104, Rev. 6
OM 314. --0063.001, HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION PUMP MOTOR, Rev. 14
OM 314. --0098.001, Rev. D1
OM 337.0015.001, Viking Penetration Master Types E Thru J, Rev. A
CALCULATIONS
DPC 1381.05-00-0006, Duke Power Company - Shelf Life and Storage, Rev. 2
DPC 1381.05-00-0022, Rotork MOV Shelf Life Calculation, Rev. 0
DPC 1381.05-00-0041, EQ Analysis For Annealing ROTORK MOV Switch Mechanism And
Add-On-Pak Components, Rev. 1
ONDS-351, ANALYSIS OF POSTULATED HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS (HELBs) OUTSIDE
OF CONTAINMENT, Rev. 2
OSC-10714, Environmental Qualification (EQ) Qualified Life Evaluation For Elastimold Electrical
Connectors, Rev. 0
OSC-10790, Oconee Nuclear Station Internal Flooding Analysis, Rev. 3
OSC-2059, U1, AC Power System Voltage and Fault Duty Analysis, Rev. 25
OSC-2107, Penetration Room Main Steam Line Break Analysis, Rev. 2
OSC-2784, Oconee Fouled Coolers/High Lake Temperature Equipment Qualification
Evaluation, Rev. 6
OSC-4151, Penetration Overcurrent Protection, Rev. 15
OSC-5373, FSAR Section6.2.1.4 - Steam Line Break: Reactor Building, Rev. 4
OSC-5460, Oconee MSLB/EQ Analysis, Rev. 3
OSC-6182, Main Steam Line Break {MSLB} - Event Mitigation Requirements Type III, Rev. 19
OSC-6998, Qualified Life Analysis for BIW Chlorosulfonated Polyethylene (CSPE) Cable,
Rev. 1
OSC-7068, Qualified Life Analysis for the Westinghouse Pump Motors, Rev. 0
OSC-7168, Temperature Monitoring Verification for Time Limiting Aging Analysis (TLAA),
Rev. 1
OSC-7962, Design Input Calculation for Reactor Building Cooling Unit Fan Replacement NSM
ON-X3095, Rev. 3
OSC-8064, ROTSG Long-Term Containment Response Following a Large Break LOCA,
Rev. 16
OSC-8104, High Energy Line Breaks in the Penetration Room, Rev. 3
OSC-8265, East Penetration Room Flooding from Feedwater Line Breaks, Rev. 3
OSC-8410, Impact of TSP-C Modification on Environmental Qualifications at ONS, Rev. 1
OSC-8505, Oconee HELB EQ Analysis for Penetration Rooms, Rev. 2
OSC-8671, Auxiliary Building Flood Design Values, Rev. 6
OSC-9225, Environmental Qualification (EQ) Evaluation for Revised Oconee Electrical
Penetration Configurations, Rev. 1
OSS-0274.00-00-0008, TIME-LIMITED AGING ANALYSES OF ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
FOR LICENSE RENEWAL, Rev. 1
3
CORRECTIVE ACTION DOCUMENTS
NCR 01702592 NCR 01743706 NCR 1169650 NCR 1779144
NCR 1803167 NCR 1850579 NCR 1904817 NCR 1910477
NCR 1982249 NCR 2191146 NCR 2229479
WORK ORDERS
1635989 1636315 1867257 01905493
2039536 02078637 02185871 02186232
20007103 20027984 20049949 20137036
20137520 20163412 98668452 2022952
2105522
SELF-ASSESSMENTS REPORTS
01985578, Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program Focused Self-Assessment (DEC
Program), dated 8/26/2016
022110548, Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program Readiness Self-Assessment (ONS),
dated 7/11/2018
MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS
DPS1318.00-00-0001, Motor Repair Specification, Rev. 2
EC 107282, Remove U1 Hybrid Penetrations from the EQ Program, Rev. 0
EC 110132, HPI & LPI MOTOR LUBRICANT CHANGE EQUIVALENCY AND EQMM UPDATE,
Rev. 1
EC 110961, LPI, HPI & LPSW PUMP MOTOR SPACE HEATER MODIFICATION, Rev. 0
EC 112496, HPI, LPI & LPSW PUMP MOTOR, MOTOR LEAD CABLE/STATOR -
QUALIFICATION, Rev. 0
EC 404894, CN/M/O, CGI, PQL2, VARIOUS, CONNECTOR, ELASTIMOLD, ACP/DLT/WOB,
Rev. 0
EC 405560, O, CGI, PQL2, 491933, BUSHING, ELASTIMOLD, ACP/DLT, Rev. 0
EC 94212, OE101638 - REPLACE ROTORK OPER.WITH LIMITORQUE 1LP-EV-104, Rev. 0
EQMM-1393.01-A01-00, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION MAINTENANCE MANUAL,
EQUIPMENT TYPE: Electric Motor Actuator, Rev. 12
EQMM-1393.01-F02-00, Radiation Monitor, Rev. 3
EQMM-1393.01-F02-00, RD-23A General Atomic Radiation Monitor, Rev. 3
EQMM-1393.01-G01-00, Reliance Fan Motors, Rev. 8
EQMM-1393.01-G04-00, Motors, Rev. 16
EQMM-1393.01-N10-01, PSW System 5kV Motor Operated Transfer Switch, Rev. 1
EQMM-EQML.ONS-A00-00, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION MAINTENANCE MANUAL
EQ MASTER LIST {EQML), EQUIPMENT TYPE: ACTUATORS, Rev. 7
EQMM-EQML.ONS-A00-00, Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual EQ Master List
(EQML) Equipment Type: Actuators, Rev. 7
EQMM-EQML.ONS-F00-00, Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual EQ Master List
(EQML) Equipment Type: Monitors, Rev. 1
EQMM-EQML.ONS-G00-00, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION MAINTENANCE MANUAL
EQ MASTER LIST (EQML), EQUIPMENT TYPE: Motors, Rev. 1
EQMM-EQML.ONS-G00-00, Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual EQ Master List
(EQML) Equipment Type: Motors, Rev. 1
EQMM-EQML.ONS-J00-00, Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual EQ Master List
(EQML) Equipment Type: Penetration Assemblies, Rev. 1
EQMM-EQML.ONS-N00-00, Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual EQ Master List
4
(EQML) Equipment Type: Switches, Rev. 2
EQMM-EQML.ONS-P00-00, Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual EQ Master List
(EQML) Equipment Type: Transmitters, Rev. 5
IN 93-33 Response, Potential Deficiency of Certain Class 1E Instrumentation and Control
Cables, May 12, 1993
K-011368-ANAL-0001-R00, Kinetrics, Inc., QUALIFICATION ANALYSIS FOR GENERIC
QUALIFICATION OF ROTORK NA1E SERIES ELECTRIC ACTUATORS AND IWN, IBN,
AND ISN SERIES GEARBOXES TO IEEE STD 382-1996 CASE IV QUALIFICATION LEVEL,
dated 6/10/05
Letter from Duke Power Company to NRC, Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -
287, May 19, 1983
Letter from Duke Power Company to NRC, Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -
287, May 20, 1983
Letter from Duke Power Company to NRC, Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -
287, October 26, 1984
Letter from Duke Power Company to NRC, Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -
287, IE Bulletin 79-01B, January 30, 1981
Letter from Duke Power Company to NRC, Oconee Nuclear Station, McGuire Nuclear Station,
Catawba Nuclear Station, Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287, 50-369, -370, 50-413, -414,
Response to Generic Letter 84-24, January 28, 1985
Letter from NRC to Duke Power Company, Environmental Qualification of Safety-related
Electrical Equipment, May 22, 1981
Letter from NRC to Duke Power Company, Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment
Important to Safety, March 20, 1985
Letter from NRC to Duke Power Company, Safety Evaluation for Environmental Qualification of
Safety-Related Electrical Equipment, April 11, 1983
MDS-OS-73.2, ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS RESULTING FROM POSTULATED PIPING BREAKS
OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT FOR OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1, 2 & 3, dated
4/25/73
MDS-OS-73.2, Supplement 1, ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS RESULTING FROM POSTULATED
PIPING BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT FOR OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1,
2 & 3, dated 6/22/73
MDS-OS-73.2, Supplement 2, ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS RESULTING FROM POSTULATED
PIPING BREAKS OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT FOR OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1,
2 & 3, dated 2/12/74
NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-269/88-03, 50-270/88-03, and 50-287/88-03, May 12, 1988
NUC-9, Baldor Electric Company Summary Report, Rev. 9
O-EQCM, Environmental Qualification Criteria Manual (EQCM), Rev. 0
OM 245. --0980.001, NIB-ROTORK VALVE OPERATOR NUCLEAR QUALIFICATION (POST
1978), Rev. 4
OM 245. --1931.001, I/B -TECHNICAL REPAIR GUIDE FOR ROTORK VALVE ACTUATORS
"NA" RANGE MODELS, Rev. 5
OM 274.0010.00A, I/B-Reactor Building Cooling Fan Motors Inst Book, Rev. 9
OM 314. --0099.001, I/B (VIEWABLE) HPI PUMP MOTOR T &B ELASTIMOLD
CONNECTORS, Rev. D06
OM 314. --0120.001, I/B -(VIEWABLE) LARGE AC BUFFALO MOTORS, Rev. 18
OM 314. --0317.001, NIB -(VIEWABLE) LARGE IE MOTORS ENVIR QUALI REPORT, Rev. 4
OM 314. --0317.002, WCAP 7829 FAN COOLER MOTOR UNIT TEST, dated 1/2/86
OM 314. --0317.003, I/B-MOTOR LUBRICANT QUALIFICATION INFORMATION, Rev. 2
OM 314. --0317.004, NIB - SUPPLEMENTAL QUALIFICATION INFORMATION FOR THE NSR
MOTORS, Rev. 2
5
OM 314. --0317.005, NIB* QUALIFICATION OF ROCKBESTOS RADIATION RESISTANT SR
CABLE, Rev. 1
OM 314. --0399.001, I/B -HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION PUMP MOTOR INSTRUCTION
MANUAL, Rev. 4
OM 314. --0421.004, QUALIFICATION OF WESTINGHOUSE CLASS IE PUMP MOTORS,
Rev. D4
OM 316.0050.001, Environmental Qualification Package for BIW Cable Systems Inc.
Chlorosulfonated Polyethylene (CSPE) Insulated Instrumentation Cable, Rev. 3
OM 322-0106.007, Nutherm Qualification Report for 5kV Motor Operated Manual Transfer
Switch for PSW System, dated 4/18/16
OM 322-0106.009, Nutherm Qualification Report for PSW System 5kV Motor Operated Manual
Transfer Switches P/N 72086, dated 5/27/14
OM 337.0037.001, I/B - Electrical Penetrations, Rev. 7
OM 337.0080.001, NIB - Viking Electrical Penetrations Qualification Testing Summary, Rev.
5
OM 360.0009.001, NIB-Reactor Bldg Cooling Unit Fans Environmental Qual Report, Rev. 4
OM 395.0042.001, NIB - RIA57&58 HRCM Qualification Report, dated 11/30/17
OS-0314.00-00-0066, SPARE HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION PUMP MOTOR, dated 4/27/82
OSS-0254.00-00-1001, (MECH) HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION AND PURIFICATION &
DEBORATING DEMINERALIZER SYSTEMS, Rev. 56
OSS-0254.00-00-1026, (Mech) Reactor Building Cooling System Design Basis Document, Rev.
42
OSS-0254.00-00-1028, (MECH) DESIGN BASIS SPEC FOR THE LOW PRESSURE
INJECTION AND CORE FLOOD SYSTEM (LPI), Rev. 55
OSS-0254.00-00-1053, Protected Service Water System, dated 12/5/16
OSS-0254.00-00-2023, Area Radiation Monitoring DBD, Rev. 11
OSS-0274-00-00-0008, Time-Limited Aging Analysis of Electrical Components for License
Renewal, Rev. 1
OSS-0314.00-00-0007, HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION PUMP MOTOR, Rev. 3
OSS-0314.00-00-0011, (Elect) Purchase Spec Reactor Building Cooling Unit Fan Motor
Replacement, dated 10/18/17
OSS-0314.00-00-0011, (Elect) Purchase Spec Reactor Building Cooling Unit Fan Motor
Replacement, Rev. 5
OSS-0328.00-00-003, Procurement Specification for the Design, Fabrication and Testing of the
AQ-1, PSW 5kV Motor Operated Manual Transfer Switches for the HPI System Upgrade, Rev.
4
OSS-0395.00-00-0001, High Range Radiation Monitor, dated 10/19/17
QR-8802, Report on Qualification Tests for *Rockbestos Radiation Resistant SR Generic
Nuclear Incident for Class 1E Service in Nuclear Generating Stations, Rev. 1
Summary of Meeting between Duke Power Company and NRC, Summary of Meeting on
January 31, 1984 with DPC to Review Equipment Qualification Program, February 8, 1984
Westinghouse MOTOR INCOMING REPORT # 2015-0032 Final Report, Duke Energy /
Oconee, dated 6/22/15