ML18312A074
| ML18312A074 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/2018 |
| From: | Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18312A093 | List: |
| References | |
| NL-18-1299 | |
| Download: ML18312A074 (775) | |
Text
FNP-FSAR-8
8.0 ELECTRIC
POWER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
8-i REV 21 5/08
8.1 INTRODUCTION
......................................................................................................8.1-1
8.1.1 Description
of Utility Grid.......................................................................8.1-1
8.1.2 Description
of Onsite Electric System....................................................8.1-1
8.1.3 Identification
of Safety Loads and Functions.........................................8.1-2
8.1.4 Design
Basis..........................................................................................8.1-2
8.2 OFFSITE
POWER SYSTEM....................................................................................8.2-1
8.2.1 System
Description................................................................................8.2-1
8.2.1.1 Offsite Power Sources...........................................................................8.2-1 8.2.1.2 Switchyard.............................................................................................8.2-2 8.2.1.3 Offsite Power Supply to Plant................................................................8.2-3 8.2.1.4 Summary................................................................................................8.2-4
8.2.2 Analysis..................................................................................................8.2-4
8.2.2.1 Loss of Either Farley Unit No. 1 or No. 2 or Largest Unit (Gaston No. 5) (Effect on Offsite Power)........................................................................8.2-4 8.2.2.2 Farley Plant Transient Stability..............................................................8.2-4 8.2.2.3 Grid Availability .....................................................................................8.2-5 8.2.2.4 Offsite Power System Operating Voltage Range...................................8.2-5
8.3 ONSITE
POWER SYSTEMS....................................................................................8.3-1 8.3.1 AC Power Systems................................................................................8.3-1
8.3.1.1 Description.............................................................................................8.3-1 8.3.1.2 Analysis................................................................................................8.3-19 8.3.1.3 Conformance with Appropriate Quality Assurance Standards.............8.3-25 8.3.1.4 Independence of Redundant Systems.................................................8.3-26 8.3.1.5 Physical Identification of Equipment and Associated Cables..............8.3-34
8.3.2 DC Power System................................................................................8.3-35
8.3.2.1 Description...........................................................................................8.3-35 8.3.2.2 Analysis................................................................................................8.3-41
FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE OF CONTENTS
8-ii REV 21 5/08 8.3.3 AC and DC Uninterruptible Power Supply for the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump..........................................8.3-43
8.3.3.1 Design Basis........................................................................................8.3-43 8.3.3.2 System Description..............................................................................8.3-43 8.3.3.3 Analysis................................................................................................8.3-45
FNP-FSAR-8 LIST OF TABLES
8-iii REV 21 5/08 8.1-1 Safety Loads and Functions
8.2-1 Summary of 230-kV and 500-kV Line Construction
8.2-2 Summary of 115-kV through 500-kV Transmission Line Failures
8.2-3 Deleted
8.3-1 4160-V Emergency Buses Estimate of Minimum Loading Requirements
8.3-2 Diesel Generator Alignments for Design Basis Events
8.3-2A Diesel Generator Alignments for Station Blackout
8.3-3 Diesel Generator Ratings and Maximum Estimated Load
8.3-4 Classification of Raceways by Voltage
8.3-5 Classification of Cables and Raceways by Safety Trains
8.3-6 Safety-Related dc Loads
FNP-FSAR-8 LIST OF FIGURES
8-iv REV 21 5/08 8.1-1 Alabama Power Company Electric System - 1983
8.2-1 Switchyard Arrangement One-Line Diagram
8.2-2 Transmission Line Separation
8.2-3 230-kV Transmission Line Separation
8.2-4 500-kV Transmission Line Separation
8.2-5 Switchyard Arrangement
8.2-6 Typical Interface Between Underground and Overhead Transmission at Substation
8.2-7 Typical Interface Between Underground and Overhead Transmission at Transformer
8.3-1 Schematic Arrangement Diesel Generators and 4160-V Emergency
8.3-2 Tray and Conduit Layout Electric al Penetration Room Above el 139
8.3-3 Tray and Conduit Layout Auxiliary Building el 121
8.3-4 Tray and Conduit Layout Auxiliary Building Above el 121 SWGR Room
8.3-5 Wireway Installation Layout Auxilia ry Building Above el 155 Control Room
8.3-6 Voltage Drop Calculations Using Computer
8.3-7 Voltage Drop Calculations Using Computer
8.3-8 Voltage Drop Calculations Using Computer
FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.1-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
SAFETY LOADS AND FUNCTIONS
Safety Loads Safety Function Power REV 21 5/08 Residual heat removal/ L.H.
safety injection pumps Emergency core cooling for post-LOCA
operation.
ac, dc Charging/H.H. safety injection
pumps Provide makeup reactor coolant system
emergency core cooling for post-LOCA
operation.
ac, dc Auxiliary feedwater pumps (motor
driven) Supply feedwater to steam generators
during emergency conditions.
Containment spray pumps Provide cooling spray in containment during LOCA.
ac, dc Component cooling water pumps Provide cooling water for safety-related components.
ac, dc Containment cooler fan For cooling containment after LOCA. ac, dc Spent fuel pool coolant pumps Cool spent-fuel assemblies in the spent-fuel pool.
ac, dc Hydrogen recombiners, post-
LOCA mixing fans and reactor
cavity hydrogen dilution fans Maintain a safe level of hydrogen in
containment vessel after LOCA.
ac, dc Control room air conditioners and
fans Maintain proper air temperature and
habitability of control room.
ac Battery chargers Provide dc power for control and power loads. ac FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.1-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Safety Loads Safety Function Power REV 21 5/08 Service water pumps Satisfy cooling water requirements for:
(1) Component cooling water heat exchanger. (2) Containment air coolers.
(3) Diesel generator heat exchangers. (4) Various room coolers for rooms containing safety-related
equipment (see table 9.2-3 for
more information).
ac Loads off motor control centers A, B, F, G, K, L, N, P, S, T, U, V, CC, and DD Provide power for M.O.V., small motors, fans, heaters, vital instrument buses, and
small pumps associated with safety-
related equipment.
ac Inverters/Constant Voltage
Transformers Supply power to the 120 V-ac vital
instrumentation distribution panels.
dc, ac Safety feature actuation system
solenoid valves Control flow of the NSSS (pneumatic
valves with solenoid actuators).
ac, dc Distribution panel Supplies power to emergency lighting and protective relay panel.
ac, dc ESS sequencers Provide starting signals to safety loads
following a safety injection signal.
dc Reactor trip switchgear Remove power from the rod cabinets to shut down the reactor.
ac, dc Emergency diesel generators Provide power to ESF loads due to a loss of offsite power along with a LOCA.
dc, ac REV 21 5/08 ALABAMA POWER COMPANY ELECTRIC SYSTEM - 1983 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 8.1-1
FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.2-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
SUMMARY
OF 230-kV AND 500-kV LINE CONSTRUCTION
Farley Webb Farley Pinckard Farley S. Bainbridge Farley Raccoon
Creek Farley Snowdoun Farley Sinai Cemetary
REV 21 5/08 Operating voltage 230 kV 230 kV 230 kV 500 kV 500 kV 230 kV Tower design Guyed aluminum delta Guyed aluminum
delta Guyed steel pole
H-frame Self-supported
latticed Self-supported
latticed H-frame Conductor 2-1351 ACSR 2-1033 ACSR 1-1351 ACSR 3-1113 ACSR 3-1033 ACSR 3-1351 ACSS/A R/W width 125 ft 125 ft 125 ft 150 ft 200 ft 100 ft Location of line on R/W C/L C/L C/L C/L C/L C/L Line length 10 miles 35 miles 46 miles 62 miles 97 miles 47 miles Terrain Flat to rolling Flat to rolling Flat to rolling Flat to rolling Flat to rolling Flat to rolling Isokeraunic level 70 70 60-70 60-70 60-70 70-75 Phase/phase clearance 24 ft 24 ft 20 ft 28.5 ft 31 ft 20 ft Phase/ground clearance at maximum operating condition 30 ft 30 ft 27 ft 33 ft 33 ft 30 ft Remote line termination Webb transmission substation Pinckard T. W. South Bainbridge Service Station Raccoon Creek Snowdoun substation Sinai Cemetery substation Unusual operating condition None None None None None None FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.2-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Farley Webb Farley Pinckard Farley S. Bainbridge Farley Raccoon
Creek Farley Snowdoun Farley Sinai Cemetary
REV 21 5/08 Major transmission line
crossing (a) None 115-kV Webb-Scholtz 115-kV Pinckard-Dothan #2 115-kV Pinckard-Columbia 500-kV Raccoon Creek on plant site 500-kV Snowdoun 115-kV Blakeley Cedar Springs 115-kV East Bainbridge-Donalsonville 115-kV Colquitt- Donalsonville 115-kV Mitchell-Moultrie 230-kV Mitchell- Thomasville 115-kV Blakely-East Bainbridge 230-kV South Bainbridge on
plant site 115-kV Blakeley- Cedar Springs 230-kV Montgomery-Pinckard (3 crossings) 115-kV Union Springs-Pinckard 115-kV Troy-Union Springs 230-kV South Bainbridge on
plant site 115-kV Pinckard Columbia 115-kV Webb-Eufaula 115-kV Scholtz- Marianna
_____________________ a. Includes 115 kV and above.
FNP-FSAR-8
REV 21 5/08
[HISTORICAL]
[TABLE 8.2-2
SUMMARY
OF 115-kV THROUGH 500-kV TRANSMISSION LINE FAILURES Type of Failure Number Cause of Failure Number Pole/tower 12 Lightning 5 Crossarm 18 High wind 12 Insulator 4 Tree 6 Arrester 0 Cold weather 5 Shield wire 10 Others(b) 51 Span 13
Sleeve 2 Jumper 1 Other(a) 19 Total Failures 79 79 Voltage Class Structure Miles(c) Number of
Failures Failures Per 100
Miles of Line
500 kV 192.14 5 2.60 230 kV 1,307.70 18 1.38 161 kV 295.08 5 1.69 115 kV 3,712.20 51 1.37 Total 5,507.12 79 1.43
__________________
- a. Includes conductor shorted toge ther, foreign matter on lines, li ne switch failures, etc., and unknown causes.
- b. Includes vandals, autos, trucks, ai rplanes, etc., and unknown causes.
- c. Structure miles as of December 31, 1982.
]
REV 21 5/08 TRANSMISSION LINE SEPARATION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 8.2-2
REV 21 5/08 230 kV TRANSMISSION LINE SEPARATION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 8.2-3
REV 21 5/08 500 kV TRANSMISSION LINE SEPARATION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 8.2-4
REV 21 5/08 TYPICAL INTERFACE BETWEEN UNDERGROUND AND OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION AT SUBSTATION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 8.2-6
REV 21 5/08 TYPICAL INTERFACE BETWEEN UNDERGROUND AND OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION AT TRANSFORMER JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 8.2-7
FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-1 (SHEET 1 OF 4) 4160-V EMERGENCY BUSES ESTIMATE OFMINIMUM LOADING REQUIREMENTS 0 to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1 hour to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Beyond 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Seq. Step Loads Motor Rating (hp) Max. Motor Demand (hp) No. of Pumps Run'g Demand No. of Pumps Run'g Demand No. of Pumps Run'g Demand Remarks hp kW hp kW hp kW REV 23 5/11 A. LOSP LOADS 4-kV Buses 1F & 1K, 2F & 2K, 1G & 1L, or 2G & 2L 1 Charging pump 900 840 1 600 473 1 600 473 1 600 473
2 Service water pump 600 600 1 600 487 1 600 487 1 600 487 (583) (583) (462) (583) (462)
(583) (462) Values in parentheses apply to Unit 2 buses.
2 CRDM cooler fan 100 84.5 1 100 78 1 100 78 1 100 78 3 Service water pump 600 600 1 600 487 1 600 487 1 600 487 (583) (583) (462) (583) (462)
(583) (462) Values in parentheses apply to Unit 2 buses.
4 CCW pump 400 350 1 350 282 1 350 282 1 350 282 4 Ctmt. coolers-low speed 125 79 1 54 43 1 54 43 1 54 43
5 Aux. feedwater pump 450 450 1 450 361 1 450 361 1 450 361 6 Battery charger 120 kVA 60 - - 60 6 Station air compressor 1C/2C 200 200 1 200 160 1 200 160 1 200 160 Values apply to 4-kV buses 1F and 1K and 2F and 2K only.
6 Ltg. xfmr.1B 225 kVA - - -
70 - - 70 Applies to 4-kV buses 1F and 1K only. Load connected when 600V L/C 1A energized.
6 Ltg. xfmr.2B 225 kVA - - -
65 - - 65 Applies to 4-kV buses 2F and 2K only. Load connected when 600V L/C 2A energized.
(a) Spent-fuel pool pump 100 100 1 100 81 1 100 81 1 100 81 Manually loaded.
FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-1 (SHEET 2 OF 4) 0 to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1 hour to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Beyond 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Seq. Step Loads Motor Rating (hp) Max. Motor Demand (hp) No. of Pumps Run'g Demand No. of Pumps Run'g Demand No. of Pumps Run'g Demand Remarks hp kW hp kW hp kW REV 23 5/11 (a) Emergency ac lighting - - - -
40 - - 40 Manually loaded.
(a) Pressurizer heaters 270 kW - - - - - - 270 - - 270 Manually loaded.
(b) Auto sequenced load total excluding miscellaneous loads-kW 2507 2507 2507 Values apply to 4-kV buses 1F and 1K only.
2277 2277 2277 Values apply to 4-kV buses 1G and 1L only.
2452 2452 2452 Values apply to 4-kV buses 2F and 2K only.
2227 2227 2227 Values apply to 4-kV buses 2G and 2L only.
B. ESS LOADS 4-kV Buses 1F & 1K, 2F & 2K, 1G & 1L, or 2G & 2L 1 Charging pump 900 840 1 900 709 1 900 709 1 900 709 2 RHR pump 400 400 1 400 324 1 400 324 1 400 324 400 hp envelopes Units 1 and 2 RHR pump loads.
2 Ctmt. spray pump 400 450 1 450 359 1 450 359 1 450 359
3 Service water pump 600 600 2 1200 974 2 1200 974 2 1200 974 (583) (1166) (924) (1166) (924)
(1166) (924) Values in parentheses apply to Unit 2 buses.
4 CCW pump 400 350 1 350 282 1 350 282 1 350 282 4 Ctmt. coolers-low speed 125 79 2 250 202 2 250 202 2 250 202
[1] [125] [101] [1] [125] [101] [1] [125] [101] Values in brackets apply to LOSP/SI events only. 5 Aux. feedwater pump 450 450 1 450 361 - - - - - -
FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-1 (SHEET 3 OF 4) 0 to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1 hour to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Beyond 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Seq. Step Loads Motor Rating (hp) Max. Motor Demand (hp) No. of Pumps Run'g Demand No. of Pumps Run'g Demand No. of Pumps Run'g Demand Remarks hp kW hp kW hp kW REV 23 5/11 5 Reac. cav. H2 dil. fan 25 25 1 25 22 1 25 22 1 25 22 Load included as a misc load in Unit 2. 6 Battery charger 120 kVA 60 1 - 60 1 - 60 6 Station air compressor 1C/2C 200 200 1 200 160 1 200 160 1 200 160 Values apply to 4-kV buses 1F and 1K and 2F and 2K LOSP/SI events only.
6 Ltg. xfmr. 1B 225 kVA - - -
70 - - 70 Applies to 4-kV buses 1F and 1K LOSP/SI events only. Load connected when 600V L/C 1A energized.
6 Ltg. xfmr. 2B 225 kVA - - -
65 - - 65 Applies to 4-kV buses 2F and 2K LOSP/SI events only. Load connected when 600V L/C 2A energized.
(a) Spent-fuel pool pump 100 100 1 100 81 1 100 81 1 100 81 Manually loaded.
(a) Emergency ac lighting - - - -
40 - - 40 Manually loaded.
(a) H2 recombiner 75 kW - - -
75 - - 75 Manually loaded.
(b) Auto sequenced load total excluding miscellaneous loads-kW 3293 2932 2932 Values apply to Unit 1 buses only. (3221) (2860) (2860) Values in parentheses apply to Unit 2 buses.
3403 3042 3042 Values apply to LOSP/SI events for 4-kV buses 1F and 1K only. 3173 2812 2812 Valves apply to LOSP/SI events for 4-kV buses 1G and 1L only.
FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-1 (SHEET 4 OF 4) 0 to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1 hour to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Beyond 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Seq. Step Loads Motor Rating (hp) Max. Motor Demand (hp) No. of Pumps Run'g Demand No. of Pumps Run'g Demand No. of Pumps Run'g Demand Remarks hp kW hp kW hp kW REV 23 5/11 3345 2984 2984 Values apply to LOSP/SI events for 4-kV buses 2F and 2K. 3120 2759 2759 Values apply to LOSP/SI events for 4-kV buses 2G and 2L only. C. Emergency LOADS 4-kV Buses 1H, 2H, IJ, or
2J.
(a) Station air comp. 125 125 1 125 104 1 125 104 1 125 104 Manually loaded for 4-kV buses 1J and 2J only.
(a) Water treatment plant - - - - - - - - - 150 125 Manually loaded (90% eff.
assumed).
(a) 600-V load (turb. aux.) - - - 200 166 - 200 166 - 200 166 Manually loaded (90% eff.
assumed).
(b) Miscellaneous loads
___________________________ a. Prior to any manual loading, the operator must check the available capacity of the diesel generators.
- b. Miscellaneous loads that are not shed are shown on table 8.3-2.
FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-2 (SHEET 1 OF 7)
DIESEL GENERATOR ALIGNMENTS FOR DESIGN BASIS EVENTS REV 21 5/08 FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-2 (SHEET 2 OF 7)
REV 21 5/08
FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-2 (SHEET 3 OF 7)
REV 21 5/08 FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-2 (SHEET 4 OF 7)
REV 21 5/08 FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-2 (SHEET 5 OF 7)
REV 21 5/08 FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-2 (SHEET 6 OF 7)
REV 21 5/08 FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-2 (SHEET 7 OF 7)
REV 21 5/08
FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-2A (SHEET 1 OF 4)
DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING ALIGNMENTS FOR STATION BLACKOUT REV 21 5/08 FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-2A (SHEET 2 OF 4)
REV 21 5/08 FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-2A (SHEET 3 OF 4)
REV 21 5/08 FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-2A (SHEET 4 OF 4)
REV 21 5/08
FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-3 DIESEL GENERATOR RATINGS AND MAXIMUM CALCULATED LOAD
REV 21 5/08 Ratings-kW Diesel Generators Continuous Rating 2000 h per Year(e) 300 h per Year 30 min in 24-h Period Maximum Calculated Automatic-Sequence Loads-kW(a) 1-2A,1B, and 2B 4075 4353 4474 4881 1-2A <4075(b) 1B <4075(b) 2B <4075(b) 1C and 2C 2850 3100 3250 3500 1C >2850 (c) 2C >2850(d) _____________________ a. Maximum diesel generator steady state loading for design basis and SBO is maintained by Calculation E-42.
- b. Diesel generators 1-2A, 1B and 2B steady state loading for design basis and SBO events is calculated to be below the continuous ratings.
- c. Diesel generator 1C steady state loading in some design basis scenarios and in SBO events is calculated to be above the continuous rating by less than 5% but below the 2000-hour rating.
- d. Diesel generator 2C is the dedicated SBO diesel and its steady state loading in SBO events is calculated to be above the continuous rating by less than 5% but below the 2000-hour rating.
- e. The diesel generators are subject to more than normal mechanical wear and tear when the intercooler water temperature exceeds 120
°F without altering the electrical output at a specific electrical load rating. Operating the diesels above the intercooler temperature limit of 120
°F may cause a major inspection/overhaul to be prematurely required. In order to keep the intercooler temperatures within limitations, the allowable kW output of the diesel should be manually reduced for a specific load rating (i.e., the diesel should be manually derated). Manual derating of the diesels for post-accident required automatic sequenced loads is not necessary. However, operations may desire to manually add load to cope with certain post accident scenarios. At service water temperature conditions above 97.3
°F, the allowable kW for diesel generators 1-2A, 1B and 2B should be 4279 kW and the allowable kW for diesel generators 1C and 2C, the small OP diesels, should be 3044 kW for their respective 2000-hour ratings.
FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-4 CLASSIFICATION OF RACEWAYS BY VOLTAGE
REV 21 5/08 D 4160-V power cables.
E 600-V heavy power cables requiring maintained spacing (1/0 AWG and larger).
480-V heavy power cables requiring maintained spacing (1/0 AWG and larger).
277-V heavy power cables requiring maintained spacing (1/0 AWG and larger).
125 V-dc heavy power cables requiring maintained spacing (1/0 AWG and larger).
F (a) 600-V low power cables not requiring maintained spacing (No. 2 AWG and smaller).
480-V low power cables not requiring maintained spacing (No. 2 AWG and smaller).
277-V low power cables not requiring maintained spacing (No. 2 AWG and smaller).
125 V-dc low power cables not requiring maintained spacing (No. 2 AWG and smaller).
G & H 208-V power.
120 V-ac control.
250 V-dc power.
125 V-dc control.
High-level instrumentation.
I Low-level instrumentation.
P Plate, penetration, conduit, etc., in main control room floor (access device only, not voltage related).
_________________
- a. Letter F is used for cable trays only. Level F cable trays carry low power cables that do not require maintained spacing. Conduits containing low power cables use voltage letter E. All voltage level letters except F can apply to any type of raceway (i.e., conduits, cable trays, channels).
FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-5 CLASSIFICATION OF CABLES AND RACEWAYS BY SAFETY TRAINS
REV 21 5/08 N Nonsafeguard or normal.
A Train A 1 train of the ESS or RPS 2-train redundant systems.
B Train B Mutually redundant train to Train A.
C Train AB Train assigned to those cables capable of being operated in either Train A or Train B at different times.
1 - Channel 1 2 - Channel 2 3 - Channel 3 4 - Channel 4 Channels 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively, of the ESS, RPS, and NIS 3- and 4-channel systems.
X - Nonsafeguard cable associated with (routed through) A train system.
Y - Nonsafeguard cable associated with (routed through) B train system.
Z - Nonsafeguard cable routed separate from all other trains.
FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-6 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
UNIT 1 SAFETY-RELATED dc LOAD
REV 21 5/08 A. Loads supplied from 125 V-dc switchgear bus 1A: 1. Inverters 1A, 1B, and 1F.
- 2. Diesel control panels 1-2A and 1C.
- 3. Emergency lighting in the control room.
- 4. Auxiliary relay rack A associated with reactor protection system and engineered safety features system. 5. Annunciator system.
- 6. Supply to safety feature actuation system solenoid valves.
- 7. 4160-V switchgear buses 1F and 1H.
- 8. 600-V load center buses 1A, 1D, and 1R. 9. Reactor trip switchgear. 10. Emergency lighting.
B. Loads supplied from 125 V-dc switchgear bus 1B:
- 1. Inverters 1C, 1D, and 1G. 2. Diesel control panel 1B and 2C. 3. Emergency lighting in control room.
- 4. Auxiliary relay rack B associated with reactor protection system and engineered safety features system. 5. Annunciator system. 6. Supply to safety feature actuation system solenoid valves. 7. 4160-V switchgear buses 1G and 1J.
- 8. 600-V lead center buses 1C, 1E, and 1S.
- 9. Reactor trip switchgear.
- 10. Emergency lighting.
FNP-FSAR-8 TABLE 8.3-6 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
UNIT 2 SAFETY-RELATED dc LOAD
REV 21 5/08 A. Loads supplied from 125 V-dc switchgear bus 2A: 1. Inverters 2A, 2B, and 2F.
- 2. Diesel control panels 1-2A and 1C.
- 3. Emergency lighting in the control room.
- 4. Auxiliary relay rack A associated with reactor protection system and engineered safety features system. 5. Annunciator system.
- 6. Supply to safety feature actuation system solenoid valves.
- 7. 4160-V switchgear buses 2F and 2H.
- 8. 600-V load center buses 2A, 2D, and 2R. 9. Reactor trip switchgear. 10. Emergency lighting.
B. Loads supplied from 125 V-dc switchgear bus 2B:
- 1. Inverters 2C, 2D, and 2G. 2. Diesel control panel 2B and 2C. 3. Emergency lighting in control room.
- 4. Auxiliary relay rack B associated with reactor protection system and engineered safety features system. 5. Annunciator system. 6. Supply to safety feature actuation system solenoid valves. 7. 4160-V switchgear buses 2G and 2J.
- 8. 600-V lead center buses 2C, 2E, and 1S.
- 9. Reactor trip switchgear.
- 10. Emergency lighting.
REV 21 5/08 SCHEMATIC ARRANGEMENT DIESEL GENERATORS AND 4160-V EMERGENCY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 8.3-1
REV 21 5/08 TRAY AND CONDUIT LAYOUT ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ROOM ABOVE el 139 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 8.3-2
REV 21 5/08 TRAY AND CONDUIT LAYOUT AUXILIARY BUILDING el 121 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 8.3-3
REV 21 5/08 TRAY AND CONDUIT LAYOUT AUXILIARY BUILDING ABOVE el 121 SWGR ROOM JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 8.3-4
REV 21 5/08 WIREWAY INSTALLATION LAYOUT AUXILIARY BUILDING ABOVE el 155 CONTROL ROOM JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 8.3-5
REV 21 5/08 VOLTAGE DROP CALCULATIONS USING COMPUTER JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 8.3-6
REV 21 5/08 VOLTAGE DROP CALCULATIONS USING COMPUTER JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 8.3-7
REV 21 5/08 VOLTAGE DROP CALCULATIONS USING COMPUTER JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 8.3-8
FNP-FSAR-9
9.0 AUXILIARY
SYSTEMS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
9-i REV 22 8/09 9.1 FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING.........................................................................9.1-1
9.1.1 New Fuel Storage................................................................................9.1-1
9.1.1.1 Design Bases......................................................................................9.1-1 9.1.1.2 Facilities Description............................................................................9.1-1 9.1.1.3 Safety Evaluation.................................................................................9.1-1
9.1.2 Wet Spent-Fuel Storage......................................................................9.1-2
9.1.2.1 Design Bases......................................................................................9.1-2 9.1.2.2 Facilities Description............................................................................9.1-3 9.1.2.3 Safety Evaluation.................................................................................9.1-3
9.1.3 Spent-Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System...................................9.1-4
9.1.3.1 Design Bases......................................................................................9.1-4 9.1.3.2 System Description..............................................................................9.1-5 9.1.3.3 Safety Evaluation.................................................................................9.1-9 9.1.3.4 Tests and Inspections........................................................................9.1-10
9.1.4 Fuel Handling System........................................................................9.1-11
9.1.4.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.1-11 9.1.4.2 System Description............................................................................9.1-11 9.1.4.3 Design Evaluation..............................................................................9.1-23 9.1.4.4 Tests and Inspections........................................................................9.1-37
9.1.5 Spent-Fuel Leak Detection................................................................9.1-39
9.1.5.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.1-39 9.1.5.2 System Description............................................................................9.1-41 9.1.5.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.1-42
9.1.6 Dry Spent-Fuel Storage.....................................................................9.1-43
9.1.6.1 Spent-Fuel Cask................................................................................9.1-43 9.1.6.2 Spent-Fuel Cask Lift Yoke.................................................................9.1-44
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS
9-ii REV 22 8/09 9.1.7 Heavy Loads......................................................................................9.1-48 9.1.7.1 Heavy Loads Safe Loads Path..........................................................9.1-48 9.1.7.2 Load Handling Procedures................................................................9.1-49 9.1.7.3 Implementation of Standards.............................................................9.1-50 9.1.7.4 Load Drop Analysis............................................................................9.1-51
9.2 WATER
SYSTEMS..................................................................................................9.2-1
9.2.1 Station
Cooling Water System (River Water, Service Water, and Circulating Water Systems).................................................................9.2-1 9.2.1.1 Design Bases......................................................................................9.2-1 9.2.1.2 System Description..............................................................................9.2-2 9.2.1.3 Safety Evaluation.................................................................................9.2-7 9.2.1.4 Tests and Inspections........................................................................9.2-12 9.2.1.5 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................9.2-12 9.2.1.6 Service Water Treatment Systems....................................................9.2-13
9.2.2 Cooling
System for Reactor Auxiliaries.............................................9.2-13
9.2.2.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.2-13 9.2.2.2 System Description............................................................................9.2-14 9.2.2.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.2-16 9.2.2.4 Tests and Inspection.........................................................................9.2-18 9.2.2.5 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................9.2-18
9.2.3 Demineralized
Water Makeup System..............................................9.2-19
9.2.3.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.2-19 9.2.3.2 System Description............................................................................9.2-19 9.2.3.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.2-20 9.2.3.4 Tests and Inspections........................................................................9.2-21 9.2.3.5 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................9.2-21
9.2.4 Potable
and Sanitary Water System..................................................9.2-21
9.2.4.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.2-21 9.2.4.2 System Description............................................................................9.2-21 9.2.4.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.2-21 9.2.4.4 Tests and Inspections........................................................................9.2-22 9.2.4.5 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................9.2-22 FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS
9-iii REV 22 8/09 9.2.5 Ultimate Heat Sink.............................................................................9.2-22
9.2.5.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.2-22 9.2.5.2 System Description............................................................................9.2-23 9.2.5.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.2-23 9.2.5.4 Description of Analysis Method and Summary of Results.................9.2-27 9.2.5.5 Tests and Inspections........................................................................9.2-30 9.2.5.6 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................9.2-30
9.2.6 Condensate
Storage Facilities...........................................................9.2-30
9.2.6.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.2-30 9.2.6.2 System Description............................................................................9.2-30 9.2.6.3 Safety Considerations........................................................................9.2-30 9.2.6.4 Tests and Inspections........................................................................9.2-31 9.2.6.5 Storage Tank Fill...............................................................................9.2-31 9.2.6.6 Flooding Due to Storage Tank Rupture.............................................9.2-31
9.2.7 Reactor
Makeup Water System.........................................................9.2-32
9.2.7.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.2-32 9.2.7.2 System Description............................................................................9.2-32 9.2.7.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.2-34 9.2.7.4 Tests and Inspections........................................................................9.2-34 9.2.7.5 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................9.2-34
9.2.8 Plant
Water Treatment System..........................................................9.2-34
9.2.8.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.2-34 9.2.8.2 System Description............................................................................9.2-35 9.2.8.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.2-38 9.2.8.4 Tests and Inspections........................................................................9.2-38 9.2.8.5 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................9.2-39
9.2.9 Well Water System............................................................................9.2-39
9.2.9.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.2-39 9.2.9.2 System Description............................................................................9.2-39 9.2.9.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.2-39 9.2.9.4 Tests and Inspections........................................................................9.2-40 9.2.9.5 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................9.2-40
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS
9-iv REV 22 8/09 9.3 PROCESS AUXILIARIES.........................................................................................9.3-1
9.3.1 Compressed
Air System......................................................................9.3-1
9.3.1.1 Design Bases......................................................................................9.3-1 9.3.1.2 System Description..............................................................................9.3-1 9.3.1.3 Safety Evaluation.................................................................................9.3-2 9.3.1.4 Tests and Inspections..........................................................................9.3-3 9.3.1.5 Instrumentation Applications...............................................................9.3-3
9.3.2 Process
Sampling Systems.................................................................9.3-4
9.3.2.1 Design Bases......................................................................................9.3-4 9.3.2.2 System Description..............................................................................9.3-4
9.3.3 Equipment
and Floor Drainage System...............................................9.3-7
9.3.3.1 Design Bases......................................................................................9.3-7 9.3.3.2 System Description..............................................................................9.3-7 9.3.3.3 Design Evaluation................................................................................9.3-8 9.3.3.4 Tests and Inspections..........................................................................9.3-9 9.3.3.5 Instrumentation and Control................................................................9.3-9 9.3.3.6 Nonradioactive Auxiliary Building Sump Transfer................................9.3-9
9.3.4 Chemical
and Volume Control System and Liquid Poison System...9.3-10
9.3.4.1 Chemical and Volume Control System..............................................9.3-10 9.3.4.2 Boron Thermal Regeneration System...............................................9.3-38
9.3.5 Failed
Fuel Detection System............................................................9.3-44
9.3.5.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.3-44 9.3.5.2 System Description............................................................................9.3-44 9.3.5.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.3-45 9.3.5.4 Tests and Inspections........................................................................9.3-45 9.3.5.5 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................9.3-45
9.4 AIR CONDITIONING, HEATING, COOLING, AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS.......9.4-1
9.4.1 Control
Room.......................................................................................9.4-1
9.4.1.1 Design Bases......................................................................................9.4-1 9.4.1.2 System Description..............................................................................9.4-2 9.4.1.3 Safety Evaluation.................................................................................9.4-3 FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS
9-v REV 22 8/09 9.4.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements.................................................9.4-6 9.4.1.5 Instrumentation....................................................................................9.4-7 9.4.1.6 Analysis of Site Boundary, Low Population Zone (LPZ) Boundary, and Control Room Operator Dose Following a LOCA.........................9.4-8
9.4.2 Auxiliary
Building.................................................................................9.4-9
9.4.2.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.4-10 9.4.2.2 System Description............................................................................9.4-14 9.4.2.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.4-23 9.4.2.4 Tests and Inspections........................................................................9.4-25 9.4.2.5 Instrumentation Application...............................................................9.4-27 9.4.2.6 Materials............................................................................................9.4-29
9.4.3 Radwaste
Area..................................................................................9.4-29
9.4.3.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.4-29 9.4.3.2 System Description............................................................................9.4-30 9.4.3.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.4-31 9.4.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements...............................................9.4-32 9.4.3.5 Instrumentation Application...............................................................9.4-33
9.4.4 Turbine
Building.................................................................................9.4-33
9.4.4.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.4-33 9.4.4.2 System Description............................................................................9.4-34 9.4.4.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.4-37 9.4.4.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements...............................................9.4-37 9.4.4.5 Instrumentation Application...............................................................9.4-38
9.4.5 Service
Water Intake Structure..........................................................9.4-39
9.4.5.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.4-39 9.4.5.2 System Description............................................................................9.4-40 9.4.5.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.4-43 9.4.5.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements...............................................9.4-43
9.4.6 River
Water Intake Structure.............................................................9.4-43
9.4.6.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.4-43 9.4.6.2 System Description............................................................................9.4-44 9.4.6.3 Inspection and Testing Requirements...............................................9.4-46
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS
9-vi REV 22 8/09 9.4.7 Diesel Generator Building..................................................................9.4-46
9.4.7.1 Design Bases....................................................................................9.4-47 9.4.7.2 System Description............................................................................9.4-48 9.4.7.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.4-51 9.4.7.4 Testing and Inspection Requirements...............................................9.4-56
9.5 OTHER
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS...............................................................................9.5-1
9.5.1 Fire Protection System........................................................................9.5-1
9.5.1.1 Design Basis........................................................................................9.5-1 9.5.1.2 System Description..............................................................................9.5-1 9.5.1.3 Design Summary.................................................................................9.5-1 9.5.1.4 Test and Inspection.............................................................................9.5-1
9.5.2 Communication
Systems.....................................................................9.5-2
9.5.2.1 Design Bases......................................................................................9.5-2 9.5.2.2 Description...........................................................................................9.5-2 9.5.2.3 Inspection and Tests...........................................................................9.5-3 9.5.2.4 Safety Evaluation.................................................................................9.5-3
9.5.3 Lighting
Systems.................................................................................9.5-4
9.5.3.1 Normal Lighting....................................................................................9.5-4 9.5.3.2 Essential Lighting................................................................................9.5-4 9.5.3.3 Emergency Lighting.............................................................................9.5-5
9.5.4 Diesel
Generator Fuel Oil System.......................................................9.5-5
9.5.4.1 Design Bases......................................................................................9.5-5 9.5.4.2 Description...........................................................................................9.5-7 9.5.4.3 Evaluation............................................................................................9.5-8 9.5.4.4 Tests and Inspections..........................................................................9.5-9 9.5.4.5 Instrumentation Application.................................................................9.5-9
9.5.5 Diesel
Generator Cooling Water System.............................................9.5-9
9.5.5.1 Design Bases......................................................................................9.5-9 9.5.5.2 Description.........................................................................................9.5-10 9.5.5.3 Evaluation..........................................................................................9.5-10
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE OF CONTENTS
9-vii REV 22 8/09 9.5.6 Diesel Generator Starting System.....................................................9.5-11
9.5.6.1 Design Basis......................................................................................9.5-11 9.5.6.2 Description.........................................................................................9.5-11 9.5.6.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.5-12
9.5.7 Diesel
Generator Lubrication System................................................9.5-12
9.5.7.1 Design Basis......................................................................................9.5-12 9.5.7.2 Description of External Oil System....................................................9.5-12 9.5.7.3 Description of Internal Oil System 38TD8-1/8 Engines 1C and 2C...9.5-13 9.5.7.4 Description of Internal Oil System PC-2 Engines 1-2A, 1B, and 2B..9.5-13 9.5.7.5 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................9.5-14
APPENDIX 9A ULTIMATE HEAT SINK EVALUATION - RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT..9A-1
APPENDIX 9B FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM........................................................9B-1
FNP-FSAR-9 LIST OF TABLES
9-viii REV 22 8/09 9.1-1 Spent-Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Design Parameters
9.1-2 Spent-Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Design and Operating Parameters
9.1-3 Spent Fuel Cask Crane Data
9.2-1 River Water System Component Data
9.2-2 Number of Pumps Required per Unit to Provide Adequate Cooling
9.2-3 Service Water System Design Flowrates
9.2-4 Deleted
9.2-5 Single Failure Analysis Service Water System
9.2-6 Component Cooling Water System Design Flowrates
9.2-7 Component Cooling Water System Heat Loads
9.2-8 Component Cooling Water/Service Water Temperatures
9.2-9 Component Cooling System Component Data
9.2-10 Component Cooling System Code Requirements
9.2-11 Component Cooling System Failure Analysis
9.2-12 Service Water System Heat Load: One Unit LOCA with Maximum ESF, One Unit Shutdown/Cooldown
9.2-13 Service Water System Heat Load: LOCA With Maximum ESF
9.2-14 Service Water System Heat Load:
Normal Shutdown With 50°F/h Cooldown
9.2-15 Service Water System Heat Load:
Normal Shutdown With 16-h Cooldown
9.3-1 Safety-Related Air-Operated Valves
9.3-2 Primary Sample System Sample Point Design Data
9.3-3 Local Grab Samples
9.3-4 Turbine Plant Analyzer Sampling Section Sample Point Design Data
FNP-FSAR-9 LIST OF TABLES
9-ix REV 22 8/09 9.3-5 Chemical and Volume Control System Design Parameters
9.3-6 Principal Component Data Summary
9.3-7 Boron Thermal Regeneration System Component Data
9.3-8 Valve Positions for Operating Modes of Boron Thermal Regeneration System
9.4-1 Control Room Air Conditioning and F iltration System - Component Description
9.4-2 Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 0, Applicability for the Control Room Filtration System
9.4-3 Control Room Air Conditioning and Filtration System - Single Failure Analysis
9.4-4 Time Calculations for Various Chlorine Concentrations
9.4-5 (Deleted)
9.4-6 Auxiliary Building Ventilation, Air Conditioning, and Filtration System Design Parameters
9.4-6A Auxiliary Building Room Temper atures for Post-Accident Heat Loads
9.4-7 Battery Room Exhaust, Battery Charger Room, Motor Control Centers, and 600-V Load Centers and Engineered Safety Features Pump Room Cooling Systems -
Single Failure Analysis
9.4-8 Unit 1 Radwaste Area Heating, Ventilating, and Filtration Systems Design Parameters
9.4-9 Unit 2 Radwaste Area Heating, Ventilating, and Filtration Systems Design Parameters
9.4-10 Radwaste Heating, Ventilation, and Filtration System Failure Analysis
9.4-11 Turbine Building Heating, Cooling, and Steam Jet Air Ejector Filtration Systems Component Design Parameters
9.4-12 Description of Cases Evaluated in Safety Evaluation of the Diesel Generator Building
9.4-13 Recirculation of Exhaust Gas to Intakes - Assumptions
9.4-14 Concentration of Carbon Dioxide at Diesel Air Intake from Ventilators
FNP-FSAR-9 LIST OF TABLES
9-x REV 22 8/09 9.4-15 Conformance to ASME N510-1989 Cont rol Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) Filtration Filter Units
9.4-16 Conformance to ASME N510-1989 Cont rol Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) Pressurization Filter Units
9.4-17 Conformance to ASME N510-1989 Cont rol Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) Recirculation Filter Units
9.4-18 Conformance to ASME N510-1989 Penetration Room Filtration (PRF) System Filter Units 9.4-19 (Deleted)
9.4-20 Conformance to ASME N510-1989 Post-Accident Purge Filtration System
9.5-1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System
9.5-2 Single Failure Analysis Diesel Generator Cooling Water
9.5-3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Sy stem Heat Exchanger Tube Bundle Replacement
FNP-FSAR-9 LIST OF FIGURES
9-xi REV 22 8/09 9.1-1 New Fuel Storage Racks
9.1-2 Spent Fuel Rack Module
9.1-3 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Return Line Piping Arrangement
9.1-4 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Return Line Piping Arrangement
9.1-5 Manipulator Crane
9.1-6 Spent Fuel Pool Bridge
9.1-7 Spent Fuel Cask Crane Front Elevation
9.1-8 Spent Fuel Cask Crane End Elevation
9.1-9 Spent Fuel Cask Crane Trolley Plan View
9.1-10 Spent Fuel Cask Crane Trolley End Elevation
9.1-11 Spent Fuel Cask Crane Main Hoist 16-Part, 2-Rope Reeving Sketch
9.1-12 Rod Cluster Control Changing Fixture
9.1-13 Reactor Vessel Head Lifting Device
9.1-14 Reactor Internals Lifting Device
9.1-15 Typical Stud Tensioner
9.1-16 Spent Fuel Cask Handling Procedure
9.1-17 Spent Fuel Cask Crane Fleet Angles
9.1-18 Heavy Load Restrictions for Auxiliary Hook - Auxiliary Building Roof, Hatch "A" Only 9.1-19 Heavy Load Restrictions for Auxiliary H ook - Auxiliary Building Roof Area and Hatch "B" 9.1-20 Heavy Load Restrictions for Auxiliary Hook - Auxiliary Building Roof Hatch "C"
9.2-1(sh 1) Service Water System
9.2-1(sh 2) Major Service Water Supply and Discharge Piping FNP-FSAR-9 LIST OF FIGURES
9-xii REV 22 8/09 9.2-1(sh 3) Major Service Water Supply and Discharge Piping
9.2-2 Emergency Cooling Pond Estimated Area and Volume Following 40 Years of Service
9.2-3 Ultimate Heat Sink, Heat Input vs. Time, LOCA With Maximum ESF and Normal Shutdown With 50°F/h Cooldown
9.2-4 Ultimate Heat Sink, Heat Input vs. Time, LOCA With Maximum ESF and Normal Shutdown With 16-h Cooldown
9.2-5 Ultimate Heat Sink, Integrated Heat Load, LOCA With Maximum ESF and Normal Shutdown With 50°F/h Cooldown
9.2-6 Ultimate Heat Sink, Integrated Heat Load, LOCA With Maximum ESF and Normal Shutdown With 16-h Cooldown
9.2-7 Ultimate Heat Sink, Service Water Inlet Temperature vs. Time
9.2-8 Ultimate Heat Sink, Pond Configuration as Modeled in the UHS Evaluation
9.2-9 Round Jet from a 20-ft 2 Ruptured Hole
9.2-10 Plan View of the Condensate Storage Tank and Its Surrounding Facilities
9.2-11 Plant Water Treatment System
9.3-1 Reactor Coolant Sampling System
9.3-2 Gross Failed Fuel Detector Flow Diagram
9.3-3 Gross Failed Fuel Detector Electronics Diagram
9.4-1 Concentration of Chlorine in Control Room after Onsite Chlorine Release - Case A (Small Scale), Case A (Large Scale), Case B (Small Scale), Case B (Large Scale);
Halon 1301 Concentration in Control Room
9.4-2 Units 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Building Equipment Location on Roof
9.4-3 Chlorine Concentration versus Time Diesel Generator
9.5-1 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System Physical Layout
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.1-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
SPENT-FUEL POOL COOLING AND CLEANUP SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS
Spent-fuel pool storage capacity Number of cores 8.96 Number of assemblies 1407 Nominal boron concentration of the 2300 spent-fuel pool water (ppm)
Cooling characteristics Partial-core offload refueling case 50% of core plus 8.90 previous cores Time after reactor shutdown 150 to start core offload (h)
Number of cooling trains operable 1 Heat exchanger tube plugging level (%)
10 Decay heat production (Btu/h) 22.1 x 10 6 Spent-fuel pool water temperature 150 with one cooling train in operation
(°F) Beginning of Cycle (BOC) Emergency full-core 100% of offload case core plus 8.40 previous cores Time after reactor shutdown 150 to start core offload (h)
Number of cooling trains operable 1 Heat exchanger tube plugging level (%)
10 Decay heat production (Btu/h) 37.0 x 10 6
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.1-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Spent-fuel pool water temperature 180 with one cooling train in operation
(°F) End of cycle (EOC) full-core offload case 100% of core plus 8.40 previous cores cores Time after reactor shutdown 150 to start core offload (h)
Decay heat production (Btu/h) 36.5 x 10 6 Spent-fuel pool water temperatures with 180 one cooling train in operation (°F) "Best Estimate" full-core offload case 100% of core plus 8.40 previous cores Time after reactor shutdown 150 to start core offload (h)
Decay heat production (Btu/h) 30.3 x 10 6 Spent-fuel pool water temperature 180 (a) with one cooling train in operation (°F)
_____________ a. Bounded by the emergency full-core offload case.
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.1-3 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
SPENT-FUEL CASK CRANE DATA
Bridge Runway length of Units 1 and 2 (ft) 280 Bridge weight (lb) 330,000 Bridge span (ft-in.)
91-0 Bridge motor 2 at 10 hp Number of wheels 8 (30-in.) Maximum speed (ft/min) 30 Minimum incremental distance (in.)
0.10 Type of controls Rev. plugging Type of brake 1 (8-in. ac)
Type of bumper Spring Trolley Length of trolley travel (ft) 76 Trolley weight (lb) 140,000 Trolley gauge (ft-in.)
19-6 Trolley drive motor 5 hp Number of wheels 4 (24-in.) Maximum speed (ft/min) 25 Inching speed (in./min) 10 Type of controls Rev. plugging Type of brake 1 (6-in. ac)
Type of bumper Spring
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.1-3 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Hoists Main Auxiliary Lifting capacity (tons) 125 15 Drum diameter (in.)
49.25 17 Rope type 6 x 37 6 x 37 IWRC IWRC Rope size diameter (in.)
1 1/8 1/2 Sheave diameter or pitch circle 27,30,33 12 diameter (in.)
Hook material ASTM-235 AISI-4130 Hook test load (tons) 250 30 Maximum hook travel (ft-in.)
96-6 102-0 Maximum hoist speed (ft/min) 8 30 Line speed (ft/min) 64 - Inching speed (in./min) 6 - Minimum incremental distance 0.03 0.1 (in.) Number parts rope 16 8 Block clearance in highest position 7-6 11-5 (ft-in.)
Type load brake Eddy Eddy current current Type holding brake 2 (16-in.) 2 (13-in.)
Type controls Magnetic Magnetic
REV 21 5/08 NEW FUEL STORAGE RACKS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-1
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL RACK MODULE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-2 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL RACK MODULE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-2 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM RETURN LINE PIPING ARRANGEMENT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-3
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEM RETURN LINE PIPING ARRANGEMENT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-4
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL POOL BRIDGE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-6
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL CASK CRANE FRONT ELEVATION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-7
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL CASK CRANE END ELEVATION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-8
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL CASK CRANE TROLLEY PLAN VIEW JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-9
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL CASK CRANE TROLLEY END ELEVATION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-10
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL CASK CRANE MAIN HOIST 16-PART, 2-ROPE REEVING SKETCH JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-11
REV 21 5/08 ROD CLUSTER CONTROL CHANGING FIXTURE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-12
REV 21 5/08 REACTOR VESSEL HEAD LIFTING DEVICE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-13
REV 21 5/08 REACTOR INTERNALS LIFTING DEVICE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-14
REV 21 5/08 TYPICAL STUD TENSIONER JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-15
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL CASK HANDLING PROCEDURE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-16
REV 21 5/08 SPENT FUEL CASK CRANE FLEET ANGLES JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-17
FOR HATCH "A" ONLY NOTE: HATCH "A" is documented in drawing D-176007 for Unit 1 and D-206007 for Unit 2.
REV 22 8/09 HEAVY LOAD RESTRICTIONS FOR AUXILIARY HOOK - AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOF, HATCH "A" ONLY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-18
- For irregularly shaped objects, use equivalent diameter for a circle with the same contact or circumscribed contact area.
NOTE: HATCH "B" is documented in drawing D-176007 for Unit 1 and D-206007 for Unit 2.
REV 22 8/09 HEAVY LOAD RESTRICTIONS FOR AUXILIARY HOOK - AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOF AREA AND HATCH "B" JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-19
NOTE: HATCH "C" is documented in drawing D-176007 for Unit 1 and D-206007 for Unit 2.
REV 22 8/09 HEAVY LOAD RESTRICTIONS FOR AUXILIARY HOOK - AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOF HATCH "C" JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.1-20
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 23 5/11
[HISTORICAL]
[TABLE 9.2-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
RIVER WATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA
River water pumps installed with Unit 1
Quantity 5 Manufacturer Byron Jackson Type One-stage vertical circulator Rated capacity (gal/min) 9750 Rated heat (ft) 175 Motor horsepower 600 Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 125
River water pumps installed with Unit 2
Quantity 5 Manufacturer Johnston Type Two-stage vertical circulator Rated capacity (gal/min) 9750 Rated head (ft) 175 Motor horsepower 600 Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 125
River water piping and valves
Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 125 ]
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 23 5/11 TABLE 9.2-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA
Service water pumps (Unit 1)
Quantity 5 Manufacturer Sulzer Type Two-stage vertical circulator Rated capacity (gal/min) 9000 Rated head (ft) 210 Motor horsepower 600 Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 125 Service water pumps (Unit 2)
Quantity 5 Manufacturer Johnston Type Two-stage vertical circulator Rated capacity (gal/min) 9000 Rated head (ft) 210 Motor horsepower 600 Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 125 Service water piping and valves Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 125
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-2 NUMBER OF PUMPS REQUIRED PER UNIT TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE COOLING
River Water Service Water Condition Pumps (a) Pumps Safe cold shutdown (normal) 0 4 Loss of offsite power 0 2 LOCA (minimum safeguards) 0 2 Probable maximum flood 0 4 (b)
- a. River water is available during normal operating conditions for use as makeup to the service water storage pond, which serves as the ultimate heat sink.
However, river water is not required for any of the conditions listed in this table. When river water is not available, the se rvice water system can be recirculated to the pond to minimi ze the pond's inventory losses.
- b. At the probable maximum flood, the river water pump structure will be flooded; therefore, the service water pump flow will be supplied from storage pond volume. The number of pumps required (four) assumes a normal safe cold shutdown condition, re circulating the cooling water to the storage pond.
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-4
(This Table Intentionally Deleted)
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-5 SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS SERVICE WATER SYSTEM
Effect on Safety-Related Component Malfunction Systems Comments Service water pump Pump failure No effect Pump trip will be alarmed in the control room. Two pumps are the minimum required for post-LOCA operation. The failed pump will be isolated and repaired. The spare pump may be manually started to replace the failed pump.
Service water pump Header break No effect Low pressure will be alarmed discharge header in the control room. The header is valved so that failure of the header will not result in less than two pumps supplying water. Service water supply Line break No effe ct Low pressure will be alarmed in line the control room. Redundant supply line will be used to supply the full flow required.
Isolation valve Valve failure No effect Valves are arranged so that no single failure will render less than two pumps available.
Emergency recirculation Line break No effect Redundant line available.
line to pond
- a. Analysis given above is for one pump, one valve, one line, etc. Analysis is similar for all other components. Analysis gi ven is for one unit.
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-6 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM DESIGN FLOWRATES [Note a] (For Each Plant Unit, gal/min)
Normal Hot LOCA [Note b] LOCA [Note b]
Operation Shutdown Cooldown [Note c] (Injection) (Recirculation)
Charging Pump(s)
Lube Oil Cooler(s) 20 (2) 20 (2) 20 (2) 20 (2) 20 (2) Gear Oil Cooler(s) 16/10 (2) [Note d, h] 16/10 (2) [Note d, h] 16/10 (2) [Note d, h] 16/10 (2) [Note d, h] 16/10 (2) [Note d, h] Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger [Note j]
(230 gal/min during startup only)
Hydrogen Recombiner(s) 20 (2) 20 (2) N/A N/A N/A Letdown Heat Exchanger [Note k]
240 [Note f]
530 [Note f]
240 N/A N/A Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Heat Exchanger
[Note j] 230 230 N/A N/A N/A Reactor Coolant Pump(s) 585 (3) 585 (3) 585 585 (3) [Note g]
N/A Recycle Evaporator Package [Note j]
780 780 780 N/A N/A RHR Heat Exchanger(s)
N/A N/A 5600 5600 5600 RHR Pump(s)
5 5 5 5 5 Sample System [Note j]
50 50 50 N/A N/A Seal Water Heat Exchanger 200 200 200 N/A N/A Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger(s) 3000 3000 3000 3000 [Note i]
3000 [Note i]
Waste Evaporator Package [Note j]
780 [Note e]
780 [Note e]
780 [Note e]
N/A N/A Waste Gas Compressor(s) [Note j]
100 (2) 100 (2) 100 (2) N/A N/A ( ) Number of components if more than one
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-6 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
[a] These values are design flowrates for the components listed.
Actual flowrates to individual components will vary depending on component operational conditions.
[b] Only one train of components are assumed in service following a LOCA.
[c] This column denotes components in operation during a single trai n cooldown. Both trains of CCW are normally placed in serv ice during the cooldown period. However, only one train of CCW is required to operate during this cooldown period.
[d] Unit 1 flow given first (Unit 1/Unit 2).
[e] The waste evaporator is not currently used.
[f] With maximum purification, the flow requirement is 530 gpm.
[g] CCW flow to the RCPs is terminated on a Phase B isolation signal.
[h] Two charging pumps are normally aligned to the on-service train of CCW.
[i] The original CCW system design criter ia assumed the Spent Fuel Pool Heat Ex changers were isolated during the initial phase of LOCA Recirculation. However, the current alignment would allow the on-service Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger to receive CCW flow du ring LOCA Recirculation. When a Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger and an RHR heat exchanger are aligned to the same train, as they cou ld be during LOCA Recirculation, the CCW flow available to the Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger will decrease.
(j) CCW flow to these components is isolated by a failed clos ed air-operated valve following a loss of offsite power (LOSP).
(k) Even though letdown flow to the letdown heat exchanger is isolated following a loss of offsite power (LOSP), CCW flow to t his component could increase as the air operator flow control valve fails open.
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-7 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEAT LOADS (For Each Plant Unit, 10 6 Btu/h)
Normal Hot LOCA LOCA Operation [Note l] Shutdown Cooldown [Note h] (Injection) (Recirculation)
CCW Pump(s) 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 Charging Pump(s) [Note g]
Lube Oil Cooler(s) 0.096 (2) 0.096 (2) 0.096 (2) 0.096 (2) 0.096 (2) Gear Oil Cooler(s) 0.045 (2) 0.045 (2) 0.045 (2) 0.045 (2) 0.045 (2) Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger [Note j]
(4.9 x 10 6 Btu/h during startup only)
Hydrogen Recombiner(s) 0.14 (2) 0.07 N/A N/A N/A Letdown Heat Exchanger [Note k] 5.37 [Note a] 11.67 [Note a] 4.8 [Note a] N/A N/A Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Heat Exchanger
[Note j] 2.23 2.23 N/A N/A N/A Reactor Coolant Pump(s) 2.34 (3) 2.34 (3) 0.78 N/A N/A Recycle Evaporator Package [Note j]
8.8 8.8 8.8 [Note d] N/A N/A RHR Heat Exchanger(s)
N/A N/A 91.8 [Note b] N/A 108.9 [Note i, m]
RHR Pump(s)
N/A N/A 0.035 0.035 0.035 Sample System [Note j] 1.06 [Note e] 1.06 [Note e] 1.06 [Note e] N/A N/A Seal Water Heat Exchanger 1.4 1.4 1.4 N/A N/A Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger(s) 15.4 [Note c] 15.4 [Note c]
15.4 [Note c]
15.4 [Note c]
[Note c, m]
Waste Evaporator Package [Note j]
N/A [Note f]
N/A [Note f] N/A [Note f] N/A N/A Waste Gas Compressor(s) [Note j]
0.27 (2) 0.135 0.27 (2) N/A N/A
( ).No. of components if more than one.
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-7 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
[a] With normal purification, the heat load is 5.37 x 10 6 Btu/hr. With maximum purification, the heat load is 11.67 x 10 6 Btu/hr. During cooldown, the heat load is 4.8 x 106 Btu/hr. [b] Initial RHR heat load for a single train cooldown.
[c] The spent fuel pool heat load is based on a 79 assembly per cycle discharge schedule with 25 days decay time for the last discharge and was calculated using the NRC's uncertainty factors.
[d] The evaporator is not required to operate during the cooldown period. If it is necessary to reduce the heat load on the component cooling water system, the evaporator can be shut down and the cooling flow terminated.
[e] Maximum calculated heat load assuming that the Gross Failed Fuel Detector (GFFD), the Fine Cooling Chiller, and 9 sample coolers are in operation.
[f] The waste evaporator is not currently used. Therefore, t he Waste Evaporator's heat load of 8.8 MBtu/Hr is not listed.
[g] Two charging pumps are normally ali gned to the on-service train of CCW.
[h] This column denotes components in operation during a single train cooldown. Both trains of CCW are normally placed in service during the cooldown period. However, only one train of CCW is required to operate during the cooldown period.
[i] Initial RHR heat load for a single train cooldown for LOCA re circulation mode.
[j] CCW flow to these components is isolated by a failed closed air-operated valve following a loss of offsite power (LOSP). T herefore, should a LOSP occur, these heat loads would not be transferred to the CCW system.
[k] Letdown flow to the letdown heat exchanger is isolated following a loss of offsite power (LOSP). Therefore, should a LOSP occur, the letdown heat exchanger heat load would not be transferred to the CCW system.
[l] Represents "start-up" and "at-power" operation.
[m] The heat loads on the RHR and spent fuel pool (SFP) heat exchangers (HXs) vary during the LOCA recirculation event with a resultant heatup of the SFP. The combined heat loads do not exceed 115.3 MBTU/hr. The maximum RHR HX heat load occurs at the start of re circulation phase, and the maxim um SFP HX heat load occurs after the peak SFP temperature is reached and SFP cooldow n commences. The maximum SFP heat removal rate slightly exceeds the assumed decay heat load of 15.4 MBTU/hr.
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-8 COMPONENT COOLING WATER/SERVICE WATER TEMPERATURES (°F)
CCW Heat Normal Hot Normal(c)(d) Abnormal(c)(e) LOCA(c)(f) LOCA(c)(g) Exchanger Nozzle Operation(a) Shutdown(b) Cooldown Cooldown Injection Recirculation Component cooling 118.8 118.8 155.4 163.2 109.0 167.1 water inlet Component cooling 105.0 105.0 128.9 132.8 101.9 134.5 water outlet Service water 95.0 95.0 97.3(h) 97.3(h) 97.3 97.3 inlet Service water 104.1 105.0 116.9 119.5 100.6 120.7 outlet
- a. With maximum purification. Temperatures based on 6,600 gal/min CCW flow and 10,000 gal/min service water flow.
- b. Temperatures based on 6,400 gal/min CCW flow and 8,340 gal/min service water flow.
- c. All temperatures listed are based on 0.0028 hr. ft 2 °F/Btu overall fouling and 5% tube plugging (118) tubes for the CCW heat exchanger. Additionally, the CCW heat exchanger heat transfer area is assumed to be reduced from 13,052 ft 2 to 12,841 ft 2 due to the 12-inch Plasticor coating on the inside inlet tube end.
- d. Temperatures based on 7,500 gal/min CCW flow and 10,000 gal/min service water flow.
- e. Temperatures based on 7,419 gal/min CCW flow and 10,000 gal/min service water flow.
- f. Temperatures based on 4,643 gal/min CCW flow and 10,000 gal/min service water flow.
- g. Temperatures based on 7,299 gal/min CCW flow and 10,000 gal/min service water flow.
°F to 97.3°F.
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-9 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA
Component cooling pumps Quantity 3 Type Horizontal, centrifugal Rated capacity (gal/min) 6700 Rated head (ft) 175 Motor horsepower 400 Casing material Cast steel Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 200 Component cooling heat exchangers (per exchanger)
Quantity 3 Type Shell and straight tube Heat transferred (Btu/h) 45.6 x 10 6 (normal operation with maximum letdown)
Shell side (component cooling water)
Inlet temperature (°F) 118.8 Outlet temperature (°F) 105 Design flowrate (lb/h) 3.28 x 10 6 Design temperature (°F) 200 Design pressure (psig) 150 Material Carbon steel Tube side (service water)
Inlet temperature (°F) 95 Outlet temperature (°F) 104.1 Design flowrate (lb/h) 4.96 x 10 6 Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 200 Material Admiralty
Note: An epoxy coating has been applied to the tubesheet s, the first 12" of the tubes on the inlet end, channel head, channel head gasket surface, cover plate, and first 12" of the service water inlet piping for erosion/corrosion protection.
Component cooling surge tank
Quantity 1 Volume (gal) 2000 Design pressure (psig) 14 Design temperature (°F) 200 Construction material Carbon steel
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-9 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Component cooling loop piping and valves Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 200
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-10 COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM CODE REQUIREMENTS
Component cooling pumps ASME Pump and Valve Code Component cooling heat exchangers ASME Section VIII (Unit 1)
Component cooling heat exchangers ASME Section III (Unit 2)
Component cooling surge tank API 620 Component cooling piping ASME Section III
Component cooling valves:
Nuclear class valves, ASME Pump and Valve Code 2 1/2 in. and larger Nuclear class valves, ASME Section III 2 in. and smaller
Butterfly valves ASME Section III
Nuclear control valves ASME Section III
Nuclear relief valves ASME Section III
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-11 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS
Component Malfunction Comments and Consequences Component cooling Fails to Three pumps are provided. One pump start pump required for normal, hot shutdown or post-LOCA heat removal.
Motor-operated Unable to open Two valves and heat exchangers valve on RHR post-LOCA are provided. One heat exchanger exchanger inlet is required to operate post- LOCA.
Component cooling Tube leakage Each unit was hydrostatically heat exchanger tested and freon leak-tested prior to shipment. Leakage is detected by change in surge tank level. Each unit is isolable.
Component cooling Failure The system is always valved system pressure resulting in into two separate flow trains, boundary abnormal each of which meets minimum leakage of safeguard requirements.
component Leakage cannot affect both cooling water trains. Low operating pressures make ruptures improbable.
Component cooling Manual valve This will be prevented by pumps on a pump prestartup and operational suction or check. Further, during normal discharge operation, each pump will be line closed checked on a periodic basis which would indicate if a valve were closed. Annuncia-tion in the control room for low flow for certain equipment cooled by CCW.
Component cooling Left open This will be prevented by system vent or prestartup and operational drain valve checks. On the operating train such a situation will readily be assessed by makeup requirements to system. On the second train, such a situation will be ascertained by surge tank level alarms.
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-11 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Component Malfunction Comments and Consequences Demineralized Stick open The check valve will be backed water makeup up by the motor-operated valve.
line check valve Valve will normally be closed.
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-12 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM HEAT LOAD: (e) ONE UNIT LOCA WITH MAXIMUM ESF, (a)ONE UNIT SHUTDOWN/COOLDOWN All heat loads are in 10 6 Btu/h Single Unit:
Two Units: LOCA + Shutdown Shutdown + Margin LOCA 50°F/h(b) 16-h(b) 50°F/h(b) 16-h(b) Time(s) Unit (b) Cooldown Cooldown Margin (c) Cooldown Cooldown 1 0 179 179 10 189 189 32 443 179 179 10 632 632 50 443 179 179 10 632 632
100 447 179 179 10 636 636 150 448 179 179 10 637 637 200 446 179 179 10 635 635 250 440 179 179 10 629 629 300 429 179 179 10 618 618 350 420 179 179 10 609 609 400 409 179 179 10 598 598 450 400 179 179 10 589 589 500 390 179 179 10 580 580 700 361 179 179 10 550 550
1.0 x 10 3 306 179 179 10 495 495 1.50- x 10 3 214 179 179 10 403 403 1.50+ x 10 3 405 179 179 10 594 594 2.0 x 10 3 350 179 179 10 539 539 3.0 x 10 3 340 179 179 10 529 529 5.0 x 10 3 321 179 179 10 510 510 7.0 x 10 3 289 179 179 10 478 478 7.20- x 10 3 287 179 179 10 476 476 7.20+ x 10 3 287 199 199 10 496 496 1.0 x 10 4 252 187 187 10 450 450 1.5 x 10 4 206 169 169 10 385 385 2.0 x 10 4 183 155 155 10 348 348 2.16- x 10 4 178 149 149 10 337 337 2.16+ x 10 4 178 364 296 10 552 484 3.0 x 10 4 161 346 279 10 517 450 3.67- x 10 4 156 332 265 10 498 431 3.67+ x 10 4 156 189 265 10 355 431 5.0 x 10 4 146 172 247 10 328 403 7.0 x 10 4 137 146 221 10 293 368 7.92- x 10 4 134 134 209 10 278 353 7.92+ x 10 4 134 134 134 10 278 278 1.0 x 10 5 129 118 118 10 257 257 1.5 x 10 5 122 113 113 10 245 245 2.0 x 10 5 117 109 109 10 236 236 3.0 x 10 5 112 101 101 10 223 223 5.0 x 10 5 104 96 96 10 210 210 7.0 x 10 5 99 92 92 10 201 201 1.0 x 10 6 95 86 86 10 191 191 2.59 x 106(d) 95 86 86 10 191 191
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-12 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
- a. Maximum ESF indicates that two RHR heat exchangers, two containment spray pumps, and four containment coolers are in service.
- b. The heat load on the service water system from the shutdown/ cooldown of a unit that has experienced a LOCA is described in more detail in table 9.2-13.
The heat load on the service water system from the unit that is undergoing a shutdown/cooldown with a 50
°F/h cooldown is described in more detail in table 9.2-14. 50
°F/h cooldown refers to the rate of the cooldown of the RCS from 350
°F to 140°F. This is the temperature range through which the RHRS operates.
The heat load on the service water system from the unit that is undergoing a shutdown/cooldown with a 16-h cooldown is described in more detail in table 9.2-15. Sixteen-hour cooldown refers to the length of time required to cool the RCS from 350°F to 140°F. This is the temperature range through which the RHRS operates. Sixteen hours is the normal time required to provide this cooldown using one train of RHR; however, to maximize heat input to the service water pond, this analysis assumes both trains of RHR are operating during the 16-h cooldown.
- c. The UHS analysis includes a 10 million Btu/h heat load as a margin for possible future additional service water system heat loads.
- d. The value of 2.59 x 10 6 s equals 30 days.
- e. The heat loads rejected by individual components into the SWS were reevaluated to assess the impact of power uprating both FNP units on the projected maximum SW pond (UHS) tem perature. While some component heat loads increase as a result of power uprate, many others decrease for reasons other than uprate. These include the reduction in the heat load from Diesel Generator 2C (SBO diesel which does not start on LOSP), from the Waste Evaporator Package (no longer in use at FNP), and from the control room air conditioner (no longer cooled by service water). The net of these changes to the overall UHS heat load, including changes related to power uprating and those unrelated to power uprating, is a decrease in the heat load beginning on the second day of the 30-day period of evaluation and continuing through the end of the 30-day period. As the reevaluated overall heat load into the UHS is lower than that described in the current
UHS evaluation, the UHS remains capable of performing its safety-related function and the peak supply temperature from the service water pond will be below the current design basis value of 106.2
°F.
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-13 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM HEAT LOAD (e) LOCA WITH MAXIMUM ESF (a) Sensible Heat + Decay Heat (b) RHR HXs Ctmt. Coolers Aux. Loads (c) Total Load Time(s) (10 6 Btu/h) (10 6 Btu/h) (10 6 Btu/h) (10 6 Btu/h) 1 0 0 0 0 32 0 368 75 443 50 0 368 75 443 100 0 372 75 447 150 0 374 75 448 200 0 371 75 446 250 0 365 75 440 300 0 355 75 429 350 0 345 75 420 400 0 334 75 409 450 0 325 75 400 500 0 316 75 390 700 0 286 75 361 1.0 x 10 3 0 232 75 306 1.50 x 10 3(b) 0 139 75 214 1.50+ x 10 3(b) 191 139 75 405 2.0 x 10 3 177 98 75 350 3.0 x 10 3 149 106 75 340 5.0 x 10 3 142 105 75 321 7.0 x 10 3 127 87 75 289 1.0 x 10 4 107 70 75 252 1.5 x 10 4 80 51 75 206 2.0 x 10 4 66 41 75 183 3.0 x 10 4 54 33 75 161 5.0 x 10 4 45 26 75 146 7.0 x 10 4 39 23 75 137 1.0 x 10 5 34 19 75 129 1.5 x 10 5 31 16 75 122 2.0 x 10 5 28 14 75 117 3.0 x 10 5 25 12 75 112 5.0 x 10 5 20 9 75 104 7.0 x 10 5 17 7 75 99 1.0 x 10 6 15 5 75 95 2.59 x 10 6(d) 15 5 75 95 FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.2-13 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
- a. Maximum ESF indicates that two RHR heat ex changers, two containment spray pumps, and four containment coolers are in service.
- b. Sensible and decay heat loads are the sum of the heat loads of the RHR heat exchanger, the containment air coolers, and containment heat sinks. The RHRS begins operating in the recirculation mode at t = 1.50 x 10 3 s after the LOCA.
- c. Auxiliary Loads:
Heat Load Component (10 6 Btu/h) ESF pump room coolers
1.4 Control
room ac condensers**
1.2** Other auxiliary building room coolers and air conditioning units
0.4 Loads
Spent-fuel pool heat exchanger 11.9 RHR pump seal cooler (2 pumps)
0.2 Charging
pump seal cooler, gear oil cooler and bearing cooler (3 pumps)
0.9 Service
water pumps (4 pumps)
6.1 Diesel
generators (5 diesels) 52.6 Total auxiliary loads:
74.7 x 10 6 Btu/h
- d. The value of 2.59 x 10 6 s equals 30 days.
- e. The heat loads rejected by individual component s into the SWS were reevaluated to assess the impact of power uprating both FNP units on the pr ojected maximum SW pond (UHS) temperature.
While some component heat loads increase as a resu lt of power uprate, many others decrease for reasons other than uprate. These include the reduc tion in the heat load from Diesel Generator 2C (SBO diesel which does not star t on LOSP), from the Waste Evapor ator Package (no longer in use at FNP), and from the control room air conditioner (no longer cooled by service water). The net of these changes to the overall UHS heat load, incl uding changes related to power uprating and those unrelated to power uprating, is a decrease in the heat load beginning on the second day of the 30-day period of evaluation and continuing through the end of the 30-day period. As the reevaluated overall heat load into the UHS is lower than that described in the current UHS evaluation, the UHS remains capable of performing its safety-related function and the peak supply temperature from the service water pond will be below the current design basis value of 106.2
°F.
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 25 4/14 TABLE 9.2-14 (SHEET 1 OF 4)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM HEAT LOAD (f) SHUTDOWN WITH 50°F/h COOLDOWN (a)
Time RHR HXs (b) Other CCW (d) Auxiliary Loads (e) Total Load (s) (10 6 Btu/h) (10 6 Btu/h)
(10 6 Btu/h)
(10 6 Btu/h) 1 0 49 130 179 30 0 49 130 179 50 0 49 130 179 100 0 49 130 179 150 0 49 130 179 200 0 49 130 179 250 0 49 130 179 300 0 49 130 179 350 0 49 130 179 400 0 49 130 179 450 0 49 130 179 500 0 49 130 179 700 0 49 130 179 1.0 x 10 3 0 49 130 179 1.5 x 10 3 0 49 130 179 2.0 x 10 3 0 49 130 179 3.0 x 10 3 0 49 130 179 5.0 x 10 3 0 49 130 179 7.20 x 10 3(c) 0 49 130 179 7.20+ x 10 3(c) 0 49 150 199 1.0 X 10 4 0 49 138 187 1.5 X 10 4 0 49 120 169 2.0 X 10 4 0 49 106 155 2.16 x 10 4(c) 0 49 100 149 2.16+ x 10 4(c) 218 50 96 364 3.0 x 10 4 208 50 88 346 3.67 x 10 4(c) 199 50 83 332 3.67+ x 10 4(c) 80 30 79 189 5.0 x 10 4 74 30 68 172 7.0 x 10 4 64 30 52 146 1.0 x 10 5 56 30 32 118 1.5 x 10 5 51 30 32 113 2.0 x 10 5 47 30 32 109 3.0 x 10 5 39 30 32 101 5.0 x 10 5 34 30 32 96 7.0 x 10 5 30 30 32 92 1.0 x 10 6 24 30 32 86 2.59 x 10 6(c) 24 30 32 86 FNP-FSAR-9 REV 25 4/14 TABLE 9.2-14 (SHEET 2 OF 4)
- a. 50°F/h cooldown refers to the rate of the cooldown of the RCS from 350
°F/h to 140
°F/h. This is the temperature range through which the RHRS operates.
- b. The RHRS removes reactor sensible and decay heat loads. The heat load due to the reactor coolant pumps is included in the sensible heat load value. In or der to be conservative, it is assumed that all three RCPs are operating until the RCS temperature is 140
°F.
- c. The analysis assumes the unit is tripped from 100-per cent power at time t =
0 s. Reactor power is reduced from 100-percent power to 0-percent power in 2 h (at t = 7200 s). Based on a 50
°F/h cooldown from 547°F to 350°F, the unit is in hot shutdown and the RHRS is placed in service 4 h following attaining 0-percent power (at t = 21,600 s). With a 50
°F cooldown rate, the unit is in cold shutdown 4.2 h later (at t = 36,720 s) when the RCS temperature has decreased to 140
°F. The UHS analysis models a period of 30 days (2.59 x 10 6 s equals 30 days).
Heat Loads in 10 6 Btu/h Trip HSD Component to HSD to CSD CSD Spent-fuel pool heat exchanger 11.911.9 11.9 Letdown heat exchanger 12.014.3 0 RCP thermal barrier 3.63.6 0 Seal water heat exchanger 1.31.3 0 Recycle evaporator 8.88.8 8.8 Reactor coolant drain tank HX 1.70 0 Waste evaporator* 8.88.8 8.8 Waste gas compressor 0.30.3 0.1 RHR pump seal cooler (2 pumps) 00.2 0.2 Sample HX 0.30.3 0.3 Catalytic H 2 Recombiner 0.10 0 Charging pump seal HX, gear oil HX, and bearing HX (2 pumps) 0.6 0.6 0 Total other CCW loads (x 10 6 Btu/h) 49.450.1 30.1
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 25 4/14 TABLE 9.2-14 (SHEET 3 OF 4)
- Though the waste evaporator package is not current ly in use, its design heat load of 8.8 x 10 6 Btu/h is included as a conservatism.
- e. Auxiliary Loads:
Heat Loads in 10 6 Btu/h Trip HSD Component to HSD to CSD CSD Reactor coolant pump air coolers 4.0 4.0 0 BTRS chillers (Note 4) 4.5 0 0 Containment coolers 7.4 7.4 7.4 ESF pump room coolers 1.4 1.4 1.4 Other auxiliary building room coolers 0.4 0.4 0.4 and air conditioning units Blowdown heat exchanger Note 2 Service water pumps (4 pumps) 6.1 6.1 6.1 Diesel generators Note 1 Turbine building loads Note 3 Total Auxiliary Loads 23.8 19.3 15.3 (x 10 6 Btu/h) (+ Steam generator blowdown + turbine building heat loads)
Notes:
- 1. The heat load of these components is incl uded in the heat loads for the unit that has experienced a LOCA.
- 2. The blowdown heat exchanger is in operation for 4 h following 0-percent reactor power.
It is assumed that 0-percent r eactor power is reached 2 h followi ng the trip. From the trip until 0-percent power, the blowdown heat ex changer sees a blowdown flowrate of 75 gal/min and a heat load of 18.0 x 10 6 Btu/h. In the period from 2 h (t = 7200 s) to 6 h (t = 21,600 s) following the trip, the blowdown rate is increased to 200 gal/min. The heat load initially increases to 37.6 x 10 6 Btu/h due to the increased blowdown flowrate but then decreases with the decreasing RCS tem perature. Blowdown is isolated when the RCS temperature reaches 140
°F (at t = 21,600 s).
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 25 4/14 TABLE 9.2-14 (SHEET 4 OF 4)
- 3. It is assumed that the serv ice water system sees the design turbine building heat load of 87.8 x 10 6 for the 2-h period from the trip until r eactor power is reduced to 0 percent (at t = 7200 s). The turbine building heat load then drops linearly over a period of 24 h to 16.8 x 10 6 Btu/h (at t = 93,600 s). It then remains at 16.8 x 10 6 Btu/h for the remainder of the 30-day period.
- 4. The BTRS chillers have been retired in place and are no longer in use. The BTRS chiller heat load of 4.5 x 10 6 Btu/h is included to maintain margin.
- f. The heat loads rejected by individual components into the SWS were reevaluated to assess the impact of power uprating both FNP units on the projected maximum SW pond (UHS) temperature. While some component heat loads increase as a result of power uprate, many others decrease for reasons other than uprate.
These include the reduction in the heat load from Diesel Generator 2C (SBO diesel which does not start on LOSP), from the Waste Evaporator Package (no longer in use at FNP), and from the control room air conditioner (no longer cooled by service water). The net of these changes to the overall UHS heat load, including changes related to power uprating and those unrelated to power uprating, is a decrease in the heat load
beginning on the second day of the 30-day period of evaluation and continuing through the end of the 30-day period. As the reeval uated overall heat load into the UHS is lower than that described in the current UHS evaluation, the UHS remains capable of perform ing its safety-related function and the peak supply temperature from the serv ice water pond will be below the current design basis value of 106.2
°F.
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 25 4/14 TABLE 9.2-15 (SHEET 1 OF 4)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM HEAT LOAD (f) NORMAL SHUTDOWN WITH 16-h COOLDOWN (a)
Time RHR HXs (b) Other CCW (d) Auxiliary Loads (e) Total Load (s) (10 6 Btu/h) (10 6 Btu/h)
(10 6 Btu/h)
(10 6 Btu/h) 1 0 49 130 17930 0 49 130 17950 0 49 130 179 100 0 49 130 179150 0 49 130 179200 0 49 130 179250 0 49 130 179300 0 49 130 179350 0 49 130 179400 0 49 130 179450 0 49 130 179500 0 49 130 179700 0 49 130 179 1.0 x 10 3 0 49 130 179 1.5 x 10 3 0 49 130 179 2.0 x 10 3 0 49 130 179 3.0 x 10 3 0 49 130 179 5.0 x 10 3 0 49 130 179 7.20 x 10 3(c) 0 49 130 179 7.20+ x 10 3(c) 0 49 150 199 1.0 X 10 4 0 49 138 187 1.5 X 10 4 0 49 120 169 2.0 X 10 4 0 49 106 155 2.16 x 10 4(c) 0 49 100 149 2.16+ x 10 4(c) 151 50 96 296 3.0 x 10 4 140 50 88 279 5.0 x 10 4 125 50 68 247 7.0 x 10 4 116 50 52 221 7.92 x 10 4 111 50 48 209 7.92+ x 10 4 60 30 44 134 1.0 x 10 5 56 30 32 118 1.5 x 10 5 51 30 32 113 2.0 x 10 5 47 30 32 109 3.0 x 10 5 39 30 32 101 5.0 x 10 5 34 30 32 96 7.0 x 10 5 30 30 32 92 1.0 x 10 6 24 30 32 86 2.59 x 10 6(c) 24 30 32 86 FNP-FSAR-9
REV 25 4/14 TABLE 9.2-15 (SHEET 2 OF 4)
- a. Sixteen-hour cooldown refers to the length of time required to cool the RCS from 350
°F to 140°F. This is the temperature range through which t he RHRS operates. Sixteen hours is the normal time required to provide this cooldown using one train of RHR; however, to maximize heat input to the service water pond, this analysis assumes both trains of RHR are operating during the 16-h cooldown.
- b. The RHRS removes reactor sensible and decay heat loads. The heat load due to the reactor coolant pumps is included in the sensible heat load value.
In order to be conserva tive, it is assumed that all three reactor coolant pumps are oper ating until the RCS temperature is 140
°F.
- c. The analysis assumes the unit is tripped from 100-percent power at time t = 0 s. Reactor power is reduced from 100-percent power to 0-percent power in 2 h (at t = 7200 s). Based on a 50
°F/h cooldown from 547
°F to 350°F, the unit is in hot shutdown and the RHRS is placed in service 4 h following attaining 0-percent power (at t = 21,600 s). The unit is then in cold shutdown 16 h (at t = 70,200
s) when the RCS temperature has decreased to 140
°F. The UHS analysis models a period of 30 days (2.59 x 10 6 s equal 30 days).
Heat Loads in 10 6 Btu/h Trip HSD Component to HSD to CSD CSD Spent-fuel pool heat exchanger 11.911.9 11.9 Letdown heat exchanger 12.014.3 0 RCP thermal barrier 3.63.6 0 Seal water heat exchanger 1.31.3 0 Recycle evaporator 8.88.8 8.8 Reactor coolant drain tank HX 1.70 0 Waste evaporator* 8.88.8 8.8 Waste gas compressor 0.30.3 0.1 RHR pump seal cooler (2 pumps) 00.2 0.2 Sample HX 0.30.3 0.3 Catalytic H 2 Recombiner 0.10 0 Charging pump seal HX, gear oil HX, and bearing HX (2 pumps) 0.6 0.6 0 Total other CCW Loads (x 10 6 Btu/h) 49.450.1 30.1
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 25 4/14 TABLE 9.2-15 (SHEET 3 OF 4)
- Though the waste evaporator package is not current ly in use, its design heat load of 8.8 x 106 Btu/h is included as a conservatism.
- e. Auxiliary Loads:
Heat Loads in 10 6 Btu/h Trip HSD Component to HSD to CSD CSD Reactor coolant pump air coolers 4.0 4.5 0 BTRS chillers (Note 4) 4.5 0 0 Containment coolers 7.4 7.4 7.4 ESF pump room coolers 1.4 1.4 1.4 Other auxiliary building room coolers 0.4 0.4 0.4 and air conditioning units Blowdown heat exchanger Note 2 Service water pumps (4 pumps) 6.1 6.1 6.1 Diesel generators Note 1 Turbine building loads Note 3 Total Auxiliary Loads 23.8 19.3 15.3 (x 10 6 Btu/h) (+ Steam generator blowdown + turbine building heat loads)
Notes:
- 1. The heat load of these components is incl uded in the heat loads for the unit that has experienced a LOCA.
- 2. The blowdown heat exchanger is in operation for 4 h following 0-percent reactor power.
It is assumed that 0-percent r eactor power is reached 2 h followi ng the trip. From the trip until 0-percent power, the blowdown heat ex changer sees a blowdown flowrate of 75 gal/min and a heat load of 18.0 x 10 6 Btu/h. In the period from 2 h (t = 7200 s) to 6 h (t = 21,600 s) following the trip, the blowdown rate is increased to 200 gal/min. The heat load initially increases to 37.6 x 10 6 Btu/h due to the increased blowdown flowrate, but then decreases with the decreasing RCS tem perature. Blowdown is isolated when the RCS temperature reaches 140
°F (at t = 21,600 s).
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 25 4/14 TABLE 9.2-15 (SHEET 4 OF 4)
- 3. It is assumed that the service water system sees the design turbine building heat load of 87.8 x 10 6 for the 2-h period from the trip until r eactor power is reduced to 0 percent (at t = 7200 s). The turbine building heat load then drops linearly over a period of 24 h to 16.8 x 10 6 Btu/h (at t = 93,600 s). It then remains at 16.8 x 10 6 Btu/h for the remainder of the 30-day period.
- 4. The BTRS chillers have been retired in place and are no longer in use. The BTRS chiller heat load of 4.5 x 10 6 Btu/h is included to maintain margin.
- f. The heat loads rejected by individual components into the SWS were reevaluated to assess the impact of power uprating both FNP units on the projected maximum SW pond (UHS) temperature. While some component heat loads increase as a result of power uprate, many others decrease for reasons other than uprate.
These include the reduction in the heat load from Diesel Generator 2C (SBO diesel which does not start on LOSP), from the Waste Evaporator Package (no longer in use at FNP), and from the control room air conditioner (no longer cooled by service water). The net of these changes to the overall UHS heat load, including changes related to power uprating and those unrelated to power uprating, is a decrease in the heat load
beginning on the second day of the 30-day period of evaluation and continuing through the end of the 30-day period. As the reevaluated overall heat load into the UHS is lower than that described in the current UHS evaluation, the UHS remains capable of perform ing its safety-related function and the peak supply temperature from the serv ice water pond will be below the current design basis value of 106.2
°F.
REV 21 5/08 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-1 (SHEET 1 OF 3)
REV 25 4/14 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 MAJOR SERVICE WATER SUPPLY AND DISCHARGE PIPING FIGURE 9.2-1 (SHEET 2 OF 3)
REV 21 5/08 MAJOR SERVICE WATER SUPPLY AND DISCHARGE PIPING JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-1 (SHEET 3 OF 3)
REV 21 5/08 EMERGENCY COOLING POND ESTIMATED AREA AND VOLUME FOLLOWING 40 YEARS OF SERVICE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-2
REV 21 5/08 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK, HEAT INPUT VERSUS TIME, LOCA WITH MAXIMUM ESF AND NORMAL SHUTDOWN WITH 50
° F/h COOLDOWN JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-3
REV 21 5/08 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK, HEAT INPUT VERSUS TIME, LOCA WITH MAXIMUM ESF AND NORMAL SHUTDOWN WITH 16-h COOLDOWN JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-4
REV 21 5/08 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK, INTEGRATED HEAT LOAD, LOCA WITH MAXIMUM ESF AND NORMAL SHUTDOWN WITH 50
°F/h COOLDOWN JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-5
REV 21 5/08 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK, INTEGRATED HEAT LOAD, LOCA WITH MAXIMUM ESF AND NORMAL SHUTDOWN WITH 16-h COOLDOWN JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-6
REV 21 5/08 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK SERVICE WATER INLET TEMPERATURE VERSUS TIME JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-7
REV 21 5/08 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK, POND CONFIGURATION AS MODELED IN THE UHS EVALUATION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-8
REV 21 5/08 ROUND JET FROM A 20-FT 2 RUPTURED HOLE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-9
REV 21 5/08 PLAN VIEW OF THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK AND ITS SURROUNDING FACILITIES JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-10
REV 22 8/09 PLANT WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.2-11
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-1 REV 25 4/14 9.3 PROCESS AUXILIARIES
The process auxiliaries consist of those auxiliary systems associated with the reactor process
system. These systems include the compressed air system, process sampling systems, equipment and floor drainage system, chemical and volume control system (CVCS), and failed fuel detection systems. The evaluations of radiological considerations are presented in
chapter 12. Only the CVCS is necessary for safe shutdown of the plant.
9.3.1 COMPRESSED
AIR SYSTEM The compressed air system, as shown in drawings D-170131, sheets 1 and 2; D-200019, sheets 1 and 2; D-175035, sheet 1; D-205035; D-175034, sheets 1 through 3; and D-205034, sheets 1 through 4, provides all plant compressed air requirements for pneumatic instruments
and valves and for service air outlets located throughout the plant. There are two primary trains
of air compressors per unit with each unit having a spare air compressor which is arranged so
that it may be used for either unit. The compressed air system is not required for the safe
shutdown of the plant. The following subdivisions provide information on design bases, system
descriptions, safety evaluation, tests and inspections, and instrumentation applications for the compressed air system.
9.3.1.1 Design Bases The two primary trains of air compressors provided in the system are sized to furnish the total
average instrument air requirements plus an a llowance for service air use. Two parallel instrument air filtering and drying trains are provided to treat the normal maximum quantity of air
required for instrument air and service air requi rements and to deliver dry air having a dewpoint of -40°F or less at 100 psig. One filtering and drying train has sufficient capacity to
accommodate normal operation of all three air compressors simultaneously.
The compressed air piping system which furnishes air inside the containment is equipped with containment isolation valving in accordance with the criteria for containment isolation systems
as discussed in subsection 6.2.4.
All parts of the system located within the auxiliary building and containment, with the exception
of the containment penetrations, are designed to meet Seismic Category II requirements. The
air receivers and instrument air dryers were designed and fabricated in accordance with
Section VIII of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code. System piping, with the exception of the containment penetrations, was
fabricated and installed in accordance with American National Standards Institute (ANSI) B31.1, Code for Pressure Piping. The containment penetration piping was fabricated and installed in
accordance with Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
9.3.1.2 System Description The compressed air system consists of three compressors, three aftercoolers, four air receivers, and instrument air filtering and drying equipment. The cooling water for aftercoolers and FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-2 REV 25 4/14 compressors is supplied from the service wate r system. The air receivers are connected to a common compressed air header that serves both instrument air and service air.
Each air header supplies branch lines which supply instrument air and service air to all parts of
the plant. All instrument air lines penetrating the containment have isolation valves located
outside the containment which are installed in series with check valves located inside the
containment. All service air lines penetrating the containment have one locked closed globe
valve on both sides of the containment penetration.
The three Unit 1 compressors and two of the Unit 2 compressors are two-stage, water-cooled, rotary screw compressors with a capacity of 800 scfm at 110-psig discharge pressure. Each of
these compressors is equipped with an intercooler and aftercooler and discharge compressed
air to a 150-ft 3-capacity air receiver tank. One of the Unit 2 compressors is a two-stage, water-cooled, rotary screw compressor with 789 scfm at 100-psig discharge pressure. This
compressor is equipped with an intercooler and aftercooler and discharges compressed air to
an 89-ft 3 air receiver tank. Each compressor takes suction from inside the turbine building through an air filter.
The compressor controls are designed to permit continuous operation of any number of the
compressor motors with the compressors automatically loaded and unloaded in response to
system pressure or automatic start and stop oper ation of any number of the compressor motors in response to system pressure. During normal plant operation, one of the compressors is
selected for continuous motor operation, while the other compressors serve as standbys and
start automatically if the continuously operat ing compressor cannot meet system demand.
Compressed air normally passes through one or two parallel filtering and drying trains before
being distributed to the instrument air and servic e air piping systems. One filtering and drying train is sufficient to accommodate the normal operation of both the instrument air and service air
systems. The arrangement of the filtering and drying equipment allows cleaning or changing of
filters while the unit is in operation by diverting the airflow through the other parallel train. Each
air dryer has two independent drying chambers connected in parallel. The air dryer
automatically alternates airflow through each of the chambers to permit automatic drying of the
desiccant in one chamber while the other chamber is in service.
9.3.1.3 Safety Evaluation The compressed air system is required for normal operation and startup of the plant; however, all pneumatically operated devices in the plant essential for safe shutdown are designed to
operate to the safe position upon loss of air pressure. Therefore, a supply of compressed air is
not essential for safe shutdown of the plant, and the compressed air system is, accordingly, not
designed to meet the single failure criterion. All pneumatically operated valves essential for
safe shutdown and not used for containment isolation are listed in table 9.3-1. Those valves
necessary for containment isolation are listed in table 6.2-31.
The isolation valves installed in the instrument air containment penetrations will prevent
releases from the containment in the event of failure of the compressed air system pressure
boundary inside the containment. The air-operated isolation valves automatically operate to the FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-3 REV 25 4/14 closed position upon initiation of a containment isolation signal and are designed to operate to
the closed position upon failure of air pressure or electrical power to the valves.
Required air cleanliness is maintained by the following features:
A. Filters installed at the inlets to the compressors.
B. Filters at each end of the air dryer elements. The afterfilters are designed to remove particulates down to .9
µm absolute.
C. Filters installed in all lines to instruments and valves essential for safe shutdown.
The compressors and the air dryer units are designed for full capacity operation
over the full range of environmental tem perature and humidity conditions that can occur in the turbine building.
9.3.1.4 Tests and Inspections The compressed air system will be tested in accordance with written procedures during the
initial testing and operation program. All engineer ed safety features systems will be tested for
performance capability under conditions of loss of instrument air as outlined in chapter 14.
9.3.1.5 Instrumentation Applications For each operating unit, the air compressors can be controlled either by sequence control logic integrated into one air compressor or by remote hand switches located in the control room. The sequence control logic will make one compressor the master and the others will be slaves. The sequence control logic will load and unload the selected air compressors based on header pressure. Each compressor can be deselected from sequence control in order to be controlled by its remote hand switch. The hand switch can be placed in "off" or "auto". When the switch is in the "auto" position the compressor will load and unload based on the compressor's discharge pressure.
The following pressure switches (drawings D-170131, sheets 1 and 2; D-200019, sheets 1 and
2; D-175035, sheet 1; D-205035; D-175034, sheets 1 through 3; and D-205034, sheets 1
through 4) located in the system allow for an order of priority in removal of various compressed
air loads in the event of a system failure:
Actuation Switch Point Function N1P19PS503 80 psig decreasing Closes N1P18V901; isolates service air header; must be manually reset N1P19PS504 70 psig decreasing Opens N1P19V902; bypasses air dryers and filters; must be manually reset
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-4 REV 25 4/14 Actuation Switch Point Function N1P19PS506 55 psig decreasing Closes N1P19V904; isolates nonessential air header; must be manually
reset N1P19PS505A 45 psig decreasing 2/3 logic to close N1P19V903; N1P19PS505B
N1P19PS505C 45 psig decreasing 45 psig
decreasing isolates essential air header; must be
manually reset
9.3.2 PROCESS
SAMPLING SYSTEMS 9.3.2.1 Design Bases The sampling systems are designed to permit liquid and gaseous sampling for analysis and
chemistry control, both primary and secondary, of the plant primary and secondary fluids.
Samples are used to provide information for monitoring the operational performance of plant
equipment and for making operational decisions. The following description is for Unit l; the
second unit is a separate but identical system, except as noted.
9.3.2.2 System Description The sampling system is divided into two secti ons, the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) sampling section and the turbine plant analyzer sampling section.
9.3.2.2.1 Nuclear Steam Supply System Sampling Stations The NSSS sampling station, located in the auxiliary building sample room, provides sample
streams for grab samples or collection in sample bombs as listed in table 9.3-2. Chemical and
radiochemical analyses are performed on these samples, as appropriate, to determine boron
concentration, fission and corrosion product concentration, and pH and conductivity levels.
Analytical results are then used to regulate boron concentration, to evaluate fuel rod integrity, to
evaluate ion exchanges and filter performance, and to specify chemical additions to related
systems. The system is designed to permit remote collection of selected samples during all
modes of operation, from full power to cold shutdown, without requiring access to the
containment. Administrative procedures will ensure that precollection purging, sample
collection time, and sample volume will provide representative samples for analysis.
Sample point locations have been selected to ensure that representative samples are obtained.
Also included in the design are provisions for local grab samples of liquid and gaseous fluid
streams. These points, though not considered part of the sampling system, are listed in
table 9.3-3.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-5 REV 25 4/14 At the NSSS sampling station, all radioactive and potentially radioactive sample streams are
routed to a sampling facility contained within an exhaust ventilated, hooded enclosure. Process fluids at temperatures greater than 140
°F will be cooled to < 100
°F before being routed to sample pressure vessels or grab sample points.
From the sample station, purge recirculation, with appropriate pressure reduction, is routed to
the volume control tank (VCT) for all points except the VCT gas sample. When operating
conditions preclude purge recirculation to the VCT, i.e., CVCS system out-of-service, grab
samples are obtained by directing sample system flush water to the waste holdup tank. The
VCT gas sample is returned to the suction of the waste processing system gas compressor.
The sample lines are shielded to reduce radiation exposure to personnel in the sample room.
Shielding is designed to reduce the radiation level to 15 mrem/h or less. Additional personnel
protection is provided by an exhaust ventilation hood, sample coolers, pressure relief valves, and an area radiation monitor with high alarm.
A sample system control panel is provided and located inside the primary chemistry lab for
Unit 1 and sample room for Unit 2. Control switches are provided on the panel for control of the
sample isolation valves shown in drawings D-175009, sheets 1 through 3 and D-205009, sheets 1 through 3. The panel is designed to meet the requirements of Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers 279, 323, 344, and Seismic Category I criteria.
A remotely operated postaccident sample panel and shielded pass through (figure 9.3-1) have
been added to obtain samples of highly radioactive reactor coolant. This system has the
capability for taking a pressurized reactor coolant system (RCS) sample from the RCS hot leg
and pressurizer and unpressurized samples from the residual heat exchangers. The
postaccident sample system was installed to meet the requirements of NUREG 0578. Based on
the results of the shielding design study, with subsequent modification and time studies from
drawing postaccident samples, the estimated whol e body or extremities radiation doses to any individual will not exceed 3 rem and 18 3/4 rem, respectively. The postaccident sample has
both local and remote control panels independent of other sample system control panels. The
postaccident sample panel is shown in drawing D-175009, sheet 3, with sample system
connection points shown in sheet 1.
As documented in NRC SERs (1)(2)(3), postaccident sampling of reactor coolant either conforms to NRC acceptance criteria contained in NUREG-0578, NUREG-0737, and Regulatory Guide 1.97
or deviations have been justified.
Amendments 156 and 148 to the Facility Operating Licenses for Units 1 and 2, respectively, removed the PASS and related administrative controls from the Technical Specifications. The
associated NRC SER (4) states that issuance of these amendments supersedes the PASS-specific requirements imposed by post-TMI confirmatory orders.
In addition to the enclosed sample station, there is also a sample station for process streams
that will not contain radioactive materials. As shown in drawings D-175009, sheets 1 through 3
and D-205009, sheets 1 through 3, these streams include the steam line sample process
streams and the steam generator sample streams.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-6 REV 25 4/14 Because of the potential for radioactively contaminated samples being drawn from the steam
generators, the steam generator sample streams are routed to the enclosed sample station
before being routed to the open sample station. These sample streams are continuously
monitored for radioactivity by a scintillation c ounter and holdup tank assembly. Upon reaching a high radiation level, the isolation valves between the hooded and unhooded sample stations are
automatically closed. Each steam generator is then individually sampled, within the hooded
station, to determine the source of radioactivity. This procedure will minimize the amount of
liquid containing radioactivity that is released to the environment through the steam generator
blowdown treatment systems.
Steam generator sample temperature control is accomplished by two stages of cooling. The
first stage of cooling is through roughing coolers, followed by a second stage of cooling in a
refrigerator compressor condensing unit. The refrigerator compressor condenser rejects its
heat through a closed cooling system to the component cooling water system.
All process sample lines penetrating the containment boundary are protected by automatic
valves that close on the receipt of a high radiation signal on any one of the three steam
generator blowdown sample lines. The valves are capable of remote closure from the control
room.
Portions of the sample system as shown on drawings D-175009, sheets 1 through 3 and
D-205009, sheets 1 through 3 are safety-related, Seismic Category I to provide for containment
isolation and to interface with other safety-related systems. The remainder of the sample
system is nonsafety related, nonseismic. The boundaries are specified on drawings D-175009, sheets 1 through 3 and D-205009, sheets 1 through 3. The safety-related portions of the
sample system were designed to the following codes and standards:
Piping, tubing, and fittings ASME III Valves ASME III The nonsafety-related portions were designed to the following codes and standards:
Sample pressure vessels ASME VIII Piping, tubing, and fittings ANSI B31.1 Valves ANSI B31.1
The sample coolers are located in the nonsafety-related portion of the system. The design
requirements for the sample coolers are identified in table 3.2-1.
The postaccident sampling system is nonseismic.
The NSSS sampling system is not necessary to ensure either the integrity of the reactor coolant
pressure boundary or the capability to shut down the reactor.
The process sampling system is proved operable by its use during normal plant operation.
Grab samples are taken to verify the proper operation of the continuous samplers. Portions of
the system normally closed to flow can be tested to ensure the operability and integrity of the system.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-7 REV 25 4/14 Local temperature indicators after the high temperature and high pressure sample heat
exchangers determine the sample temperature before a sample is drawn in a sample sink.
Local pressure indicators after the high temperature and high pressure sample heat exchangers
guide the adjustment of any throttling valves. Pr essure reduction valves are provided to protect the equipment and operators.
9.3.2.2.2 Turbine Plant Analyzer Sampling Section The turbine plant analyzer sampling section draws continuous samples from the turbine cycle
for automatic or manual water quality analysis. Sample inlet conditions are listed in table 9.3-4.
The turbine plant analyzer station is located in the turbine building. This station contains
sample pressure reducing and cooling equipment including valves, pressure regulators, pressure indicators, flow regulators, piping grab sample sinks, and continuous analyzers for
conductivity, dissolved oxygen, and pH. Recorders, indicators, and an annunciator to alarm
abnormal conditions are also located at this station.
9.3.3 EQUIPMENT
AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM 9.3.3.1 Design Bases The equipment and floor drainage system ensures that waste liquids, valve and pump leakoffs, tank drains, etc., are directed to the proper area for processing or disposal. The drains are
separated according to their activity and quality. Drains containing tritiated water are collected
and deposited in the waste processing system. Drains containing nontritiated water and
nontritiated, chromated water are also collected and recycled or disposed of, according to the
needs of the water system.
The system piping is designed to transport fluids during normal and abnormal conditions. Drain
headers are large enough to accommodate the normal drain flow and minimize the possibility of
fouling. Lower elevation sumps are sized to collect excess floor drainages; the sump pumps
then transfer drainage to the waste processing system. An evaluation of radiological
considerations of this system during normal operation is presented in chapter 11.
9.3.3.2 System Description Each floor of the auxiliary building and containment (drawings D-175005; D-175004, sheets 1
and 2; and D-205004, sheets 1 and 2) is supplied with a separate drain header for the tritiated
water drains and for the nontritiated water drains found on that level. The floor drain header
and equipment drain header are provided with runni ng traps to provide loop seals to prevent spreading of radioactive gasses in the auxiliary building. This gas migration can be further
reduced by exhausting the equipment drain and the floor drain running traps located in the
chemical drain tank room via negative pressure uni ts to the radwaste area ventilation system. A maximum of three drain headers for each level are installed. The lower floor of the auxiliary FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-8 REV 25 4/14 building has two drain collection tanks, the floor drain tank and the waste holdup tank, which
collect most of the drains from the floors above. Some drains are routed to sumps which pump
to one or both of the drain collection tanks for processing. The sump contents are then pumped
to the waste processing system. Drains in the containment flow to the reactor coolant drain
tank or to the containment sump. They are then pumped to the waste processing system.
9.3.3.3 Design Evaluation The equipment and floor drainage system accommodat es the auxiliary building and containment drains during each normal mode of plant operation. It is mainly a passive system required to
function at all times. Because the drain headers are not pressurized, a line rupture is unlikely.
Plugging of the header is minimized by installing main headers large enough to accommodate
more than the design flow and by making the flow path as straight as possible. Main headers
are at least 4 in. in diameter.
The volume of the floor drain tank is 10,000 gal.
[HISTORICAL] [
Under normal operation it is expected that 51,000 gal/year of liquid wastes will be processed through the tank for a single unit. This
consists of the following flows:
Decontamination water 15,000 gal/year Laboratory equipment rinses 16,000 gal/year Nonrecyclable reactor coolant 7000 gal/year Nonreactor grade leaks 13,000 gal/year
This corresponds to a daily average flowrate of ~140 ga l/day. With a single unit feeding the floor drain tank, and assuming filling for 30 days, the tank will be about half full at processing.
In addition to the above, consideration was also given to fabrication, standardization, and layout criteria in finally sizing the tank.
] Sumps and sump pumps in the auxiliary building lower elevations collect drainage from the floor
drain system and discharge to the waste proce ssing system. Each of the low-head safety injection pump rooms, the containment spray pump rooms, and the high-head safety injection pump rooms is watertight and is protected by an individual sump containing two nonsafety-related sump pumps which are powered from the same electrical train as the pumps they are
protecting. Each sump receives only drainage from the individual pump room that it is
protecting.
Each sump pump has a design flowrate of 100 gal/min. Each sump is equipped with a
mechanical alternator and high level alarm. When the level in the sump rises to within 13 in. of
the cover, the leading pump is started. An indicator light on the control board signifies that one
pump is running. If the leading pump cannot handle the full flow of incoming liquid and the level
rises to within 12 in. of the cover, the lagging pump starts and an indicator light on the control
board signifies that both pumps are running. If both pumps are unable to handle the load and
the level rises to within 6 in. of the cover, an alarm is sounded in the control room. If the leading
pump alone is able to reduce the level in the sump to the pump cutoff point, the mechanical
alternator will then cause the lagging pump to become the leading pump for the next required
operation. The liquid in these sumps is pumped to the waste processing system.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-9 REV 25 4/14 The watertight rooms protect each pump from flooding from outside the room. Frequency of
sump pump operation, one-pump versus two-pump operation, and sump high level alarms will
indicate leaks within the individual pump rooms and will provide the operator with a gross
indication of the magnitude of the leak.
9.3.3.4 Tests and Inspections
[HISTORICAL] [
Each drain header is flushed and inspected with regard to leaktightness, flow capacity, and flow path. Pumps and level switches are tested fo r start and stop at the proper sump levels. Piping
and valves are inspected for leaktightn ess, flow paths, and mechanical operability.
] 9.3.3.5 Instrumentation and Control Level switches and indicators are provided in the control room to control stopping and starting of
pumps and to indicate a flood condition of a residual heat removal pump or containment spray system pump compartment. The waste processing system radiation monitor (R-18) is described
in paragraph 11.4.2.2.11.
9.3.3.6 Nonradioactive Auxiliary Building Sump Transfer A manual mode of operation exists which a llows nonradioactive drainage in the auxiliary building sumps to be transferred to the turbine building sumps. This mode also allows for
transfer of service water from containment components to the turbine building sump to support
component maintenance during an outage. The transfer path to the nonradioactive sump is
established using a CTMT service penetration under administrative controls. To accomplish a
transfer, the handswitches for the nonradioactive auxiliary building sump pumps are placed in
the "pull-to-lock" position. This overrides the automatic sump pump operation described in
paragraph 9.3.3.3 and allows these sumps to be selectively aligned with turbine building sumps.
In order to align the auxiliary building nonradioactive sumps to the turbine building sumps, cross-connect valve N1G21V325/ N2G21V320 must be unlocked and opened. Subsequent to
opening this cross-connect valve, the handswitch for the desired pump may be removed from
the "pull-to-lock" position and started as required. After the nonradioactive drainage has been
pumped to the turbine building sump, the pump is stopped and the handswitch returned to the "pull-to-lock" position. Cross-connect valve N1G21V325/N2G21V320 is then closed and locked
to ensure that no fluid is unintentionally transferred to the turbine building sumps.
9.3.4 CHEMICAL
AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM AND LIQUID POISON SYSTEM 9.3.4.1 Chemical and Volume Control System The CVCS shown in drawings D-175039, sheets 1 through 7 and D-205039, sheets 1 through 5
is designed to provide the following services to the RCS:
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-10 REV 25 4/14 A. Maintenance of programmed water level in the pressurizer, i.e., maintain required water inventory in the RCS.
B. Maintenance of seal water injection flow to the reactor coolant pumps.
C. Control of water chemistry conditions, activity level, soluble chemical neutron absorber concentration, and makeup.
D. Processing of effluent reactor coolant to effect recovery and reuse of soluble chemical neutron absorber and makeup water.
E. Emergency core coolant [part of the system is shared with the emergency core cooling system (ECCS)].
9.3.4.1.1 Design Bases Quantitative design bases are given in table 9.3-5 with qualitative descriptions given below.
A. Reactivity Control
The CVCS regulates the concentration of chemical neutron absorber in the reactor coolant to control reactivity changes resulting from the change in reactor
coolant temperature between cold shutdown and hot full power operation, burnup
of fuel and burnable poisons, and xenon transients.
Reactor makeup control is as follows:
- 1. The CVCS is capable of borating the RCS through any of three flow paths and from any of three boric acid sources.
- 2. The amount of boric acid stored in the CVCS always exceeds that amount required to borate the RCS to cold shutdown concentration, assuming that the control assembly with the highest reactivity worth is
stuck in its fully withdrawn position. This amount of boric acid also
exceeds the amount required to bring the reactor to hot shutdown and to
compensate for subsequent xenon decay.
- 3. The CVCS is capable of counteracting inadvertent positive reactivity insertion caused by the maximum boron dilution accident (chapter 15).
B. Regulation of Reactor Coolant Inventory
The CVCS maintains the coolant inventory in the RCS within the allowable pressurizer level range for all normal modes of operation including startup from
cold shutdown, full power operation, and plant cooldown. This system also has
sufficient makeup capacity to maintain the minimum required inventory in the
event of minor RCS leaks. (See the plant Technical Specifications for a
discussion of maximum allowable RCS leakage.)
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-11 REV 25 4/14 The CVCS flowrate is based on the requirement that it permit the RCS to be heated to or cooled from hot standby condition at the design rate and maintain
pressurizer level within the limits of the operating band.
C. Reactor Coolant Purification
The CVCS removes fission and activation products (other than tritium) from the reactor coolant during operation of the reactor. The CVCS can also remove
excess lithium from the reactor coolant, keeping the lithium concentration within
the desired limits for pH control. (See table 5.2-22.)
Tritium is produced within the fuel by ternary fission and from neutron reactions with the soluble boron, the lithium used for the pH control, and naturally occurring
deuterium within the coolant. The lithium concentration is maintained within the
desired range by the addition of Li 7 OH and by a cation or mixed-bed demineralizer that will remove any excess of lithium produced by the B 10 (n,)Li 7 reaction. The Li 6 (n,)T reaction is controlled by limiting the Li 6 impurity to 0.1 atomic percent. The contributions from these sources are slight, as indicated in
appendix 11A. As can be seen, the primary sources of tritium in the coolant are from ternary fission and the B 10 (n,2)T reaction with the boron in the coolant.
Once the tritium is in the coolant, the only method of controlling the concentration is by dilution of the primary coolant. There is a letdown from the primary coolant
system to the CVCS of 135 gal/min (m aximum). Thus tritium is distributed throughout the recycle holdup tanks, the boric acid tanks, and the reactor
makeup water storage tank. During refueling operations some water is
exchanged between the RCS and the refueling water storage tank. There is also
some exchange of water with the spent-fuel pool. Without exchange of any of
this water with the environment (complete holdup of tritium) the coolant
concentration would reach the levels given in appendix 11A.1.5. Actual tritium
concentrations will depend on plant operating parameters, such as leakage (requiring makeup) and planned releases of tritiated water.
The CVCS is capable of removing fission and activation products, in ionic form or as particulates, from the reactor coolant in order to provide access to those
process lines carrying reactor coolant during operation and to reduce activity
releases due to leaks.
D. Chemical Additions for Corrosion Control
The CVCS provides a means for adding chemicals (batch addition) to the RCS which control the pH of the coolant during initial startup and subsequent
operation, scavenge oxygen from the coolant during startup, and control the
oxygen level of the reactor coolant due to radiolysis during all operations
subsequent to startup.
Chemicals may also be added on a continuous basis to control stress corrosion cracking in Alloy 600 materials and to reduce RCS radiation levels.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-12 REV 25 4/14 The CVCS is capable of maintaining the oxygen content and pH of the reactor coolant within limits specified in table 5.2-22.
The dilution effect of chemical addition (both batch and continuous) must be compensated for in selecting the proper reactor makeup boron concentration as
discussed in paragraph 9.3.4.1.1A.
E. Seal Water Injection
The CVCS is able to supply filtered water continuously to each reactor coolant pump seal, as required by the reactor coolant pump design.
F. Emergency Core Cooling
The centrifugal charging pumps in the CVCS also serve as the high-head safety injection pumps in the ECCS. Other than the centrifugal charging pumps and
associated piping and valves, the CVCS is not required to function during a
loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). During a LOCA, the CVCS is isolated except
for the centrifugal charging pumps and the piping in the safety injection path.
9.3.4.1.2 System Description The CVCS is shown in drawings D-175039, sheets 1 through 7 and D-205039, sheets 1 through
5, with design parameters listed in table 9.3-5. The CVCS consists of several subsystems: the
charging, letdown, and seal water system; the chemical control, purification, and makeup
system; and the boron recycle system.
9.3.4.1.2.1 Charging, Letdown, and Seal Water System.
The charging and letdown functions of the CVCS are employed to maintain a programmed water level in the RCS pressurizer, thus maintaining proper reactor coolant inventory during all phases of plant
operation. This is achieved by means of a continuous feed and bleed process, during which the
feed rate is automatically controlled on the basis of pressurizer water level. The bleed rate can
be chosen to suit various plant operational requirements by selecting the proper combination of
letdown orifices in the letdown flow path. This selection is made through remote manual
operation of valves located in the parallel orificed paths as discussed in paragraph 9.3.4.1.2.2.4.
Reactor coolant is discharged to the CVCS from the reactor coolant loop piping upstream of the
reactor coolant pump; it then flows through the shell side of the regenerative heat exchanger, where its temperature is reduced by heat transfer to the charging flow passing through the
tubes. The coolant then experiences a large pressure reduction as it passes through a letdown
orifice and flows through the tube side of the letdown heat exchanger, where its temperature is further reduced to the operating temperature of the mixed-bed demineralizers (140
°F). Downstream of the letdown heat exchanger a second pressure reduction occurs. This second pressure reduction is performed by the low-pressure letdown valve, the function of which is to
maintain upstream pressure which prevents flashing downstream of the letdown orifices.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-13 REV 25 4/14 The coolant then flows through one of the mixed-bed demineralizers. The flow may then pass
through the cation bed demineralizer, which is used intermittently when additional purification of
the reactor coolant is required. The cation bed demineralizer flow is limited to a maximum of
60 gal/min.
During boric acid storage and release operations, especially during load follow, part or all of the
letdown flow leaving the demineralizers is di rected to the boron thermal regeneration system (BTRS), discussed in paragraph 9.3.4.2. The coolant then flows through the reactor coolant
filter and into the volume control tank through a spray nozzle in the top of the tank. The gas
space in the volume control tank may be continuously purged with hydrogen. Subsection 11.3.4
contains descriptions of operation with and without continuous purge. The partial pressure of
hydrogen in the volume control tank determines the concentration of hydrogen dissolved in the
reactor coolant.
The charging pumps normally take suction from the volume control tank and return the cooled, purified reactor coolant to the RCS through the charging line. Normal charging flow is handled
by one of the three charging pumps. The bulk of the charging flow is pumped back to the RCS
through the tube side of the regenerative heat exchanger. The letdown flow in the shell side of
the regenerative heat exchanger raises the charging flow to a temperature approaching the
reactor coolant temperature. The flow is then injected into a cold leg of the RCS. Two charging paths are provided from a point downstream of the regenerative heat exchanger. A flow path is
also provided from the regenerative heat exchanger outlet to the pressurizer spray line. An
air-operated valve in the spray line is employed to provide auxiliary spray to the vapor space of the pressurizer during plant cooldown. This provides a means of cooling the pressurizer near
the end of plant cooldown, when the reactor coolant pumps are not operating.
A portion of the charging flow (nominally 8 gal/min per reactor coolant pump) is directed to the reactor coolant pumps through a seal water injection filter. It is directed down to a point
between the pump shaft bearing and the thermal barrier cooling coil. Here the flow splits and a
portion (nominally 5 gal/min per pump) enters the RCS through the labyrinth seals and thermal
barrier. The remainder of the flow is directed up the pump shaft, cooling the lower bearing, and
to the No. 1 seal leakoff. The No. 1 seal leakoff flow discharges to a common manifold, exits
from the containment, and then passes through the seal water return filter and the seal water
heat exchanger to the suction side of the charging pumps, or by alternate path to the volume
control tank. A check valve in the spool piece between the reactor coolant pumps and the No. 1
seal leakoff line prevents reverse flow through the seal. A very small portion of the seal flow
leaks through to the No. 2 seal. A No. 3 seal provides a final barrier to leakage to containment
atmosphere. The No. 2 seal leakoff flow is discharged to the reactor coolant drain found in the
waste processing system, and the No. 3 seal leakoff flow is discharged to the containment
sump.
An alternate letdown path from the RCS is provided in the event that the normal letdown path is
inoperable. Reactor coolant can be discharged from a cold leg and flows through the tube side
of the excess letdown heat exchanger, where it is cooled by component cooling water flowing
through the shell side. Downstream of the heat exchanger, a remote manual control valve
controls the excess letdown flow. The flow normally joins the No. 1 seal discharge manifold and
passes through the seal water return filter and heat exchanger to the suction side of the
charging pumps. The excess letdown flow can also be directed to the reactor coolant drain
tank. When the normal letdown line is not available, the normal purification path is also not in FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-14 REV 25 4/14 operation. Therefore, this alternate condition would allow continued power operation for limited
periods of time dependent on RCS chemistry and activity. The excess letdown flow path is also
used to provide additional letdown capability during the final stages of plant heatup. This path
removes some of the excess reactor coolant due to expansion of the system as a result of the
RCS temperature increase. In this case, the excess letdown is diverted to the reactor coolant
drain tank.
Surges in RCS inventory due to load changes are accommodated for the most part in the
pressurizer. The volume control tank provides surge capacity for reactor coolant expansion not
accommodated by the pressurizer. If the water level in the volume control tank exceeds the
normal operating range, a proportional controller modulates a three-way valve downstream of
the reactor coolant filter to divert a portion of the letdown to the recycle holdup tanks in the
boron recycle system. If the high level limit in the volume control tank is reached, an alarm is
actuated in the control room and the letdown is completely diverted to the recycle holdup tanks.
The boron recycle system (paragraph 9.3.4.1.2.3) can be used to receive and process reactor coolant effluent for reuse of the boric acid and purified water. The system decontaminates the
effluent by means of demineralization and gas stripping and uses evaporation to separate and
recover the boric acid and reactor makeup water.
Low level in the volume control tank initiates makeup from the reactor makeup control system.
If the reactor makeup control system does not supply sufficient makeup to keep the volume
control tank level from falling to a lower level, an emergency low level signal causes the suction
of the charging pumps to be transferred to the refueling water storage tank.
9.3.4.1.2.2 Chemical Control, Purification, and Makeup System.
The pH control, oxygen control, reactor coolant purification, and chemical shim and reactor coolant makeup of this system are discussed below.
9.3.4.1.2.2.1 The pH Control.
The pH control chemical employed is lithium hydroxide. This chemical is chosen for its compatibility with the materials and water chemistry of borated water/stainless steel/zirconium/inconel systems. In addition, Li 7 is produced in the core region due to irradiation of the dissolved boron in the coolant.
The concentration of Li 7 in the RCS is maintained in the range specified for pH control (table 5.2-22). If the concentration exceeds this range, as it may during the early stages of core
life, the cation bed demineralizer is employed in the letdown line in series operation with a
mixed bed demineralizer. Since the amount of lithium to be removed is small and its buildup
can be readily calculated, the flow through the cation bed demineralizer is not required to be full
letdown flow. As an alternate, a nonlithiated mixed-bed demineralizer may be used to remove
the lithium. If the concentration of Li 7 is below the specified limits, lithium hydroxide can be introduced into the RCS via the charging flow. The solution is prepared in the laboratory and
poured into the chemical mixing tank. Reactor makeup water is then used to flush the solution
to the suction manifold of the charging pumps.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-15 REV 25 4/14 9.3.4.1.2.2.2 Oxygen Control.
During reactor startup from the cold condition, hydrazine is employed as an oxygen scavenging agent. The hydraz ine solution is introduced into the RCS in the same manner as described above for the pH control agent. Hydrazine is not employed at any time other than startup from the cold shutdown state.
Dissolved hydrogen is employed to control and scavenge oxygen produced due to radiolysis of
water in the core region. Sufficient partial pressure of hydrogen is maintained in the volume
control tank so that the specified equilibrium concentration of hydrogen is maintained in the
reactor coolant. A pressure control valve maintains a minimum pressure in the vapor space of
the volume control tank. This valve can be adjusted to provide the correct equilibrium hydrogen
concentration (25 to 50 cm 3 hydrogen at STP/kg water for power operation). If operating without continuous VCT purge as described in subsection 11.3.4, the pressure control valve
may be isolated and hydrogen pressure controlled by manual operation as necessary to
maintain the required partial pressure of hydrogen.
9.3.4.1.2.2.3 Reactor Coolant Purification.
Mixed-bed demineralizers are provided in the letdown line to provide cleanup of the letdown flow. The demineralizers remove ionic corrosion products and certain fission products. One demineralizer is in continuous service and can be
supplemented intermittently by the cation bed demineralizer, if necessary, for additional purification. The cation resin removes principally cesium and lithium isotopes from the purification flow. The second mixed-bed demineralizer serves as a standby unit for use if the
operating demineralizer becomes exhausted during operation.
A further cleanup feature is provided for use during cold shutdown and residual heat removal.
A remotely operated valve admits a bypass flow fr om the residual heat removal system into the letdown line upstream of the letdown heat exchanger. The flow passes through the heat
exchanger, through a mixed-bed demineralizer and the reactor coolant filter to the volume
control tank. The fluid is then returned to the RCS via the normal charging route.
Filters are provided at various locations to ensure filtration of particulate and resin fines and to
protect the seals on the reactor coolant pumps.
Fission gases can be removed from the system by purging the volume control tank gas space
with hydrogen to the gaseous waste processing system.
9.3.4.1.2.2.4 Chemical Shim and Reactor Coolant Makeup.
The soluble neutron absorber (boric acid) concentration is controlled by the BTRS and by the reactor makeup control system.
The reactor makeup control system is also used to maintain proper reactor coolant inventory.
For emergency boration and makeup, the capability exists to provide refueling water or 4-wt-
percent boric acid to the suction of the charging pump.
The boric acid is stored in two boric acid tanks. Two boric acid transfer pumps are provided, with one pump normally aligned to provide boric acid to the boric acid blender and the second
pump in reserve. On a demand signal by the r eactor makeup control system, the pump starts and delivers boric acid to the boric acid blender. The pump can also be used to recirculate the
boric acid tank fluid.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-16 REV 25 4/14 The reactor makeup water pumps, taking suction from the reactor makeup water storage tank, are employed for various makeup and flushing operations throughout the systems. One of
these pumps also starts on demand from the reac tor makeup control system and provides flow to the boric acid blender. For a description of the reactor makeup water system see
subsection 9.2.7.
The flow from the boric acid blender is directed to either the suction manifold of the charging
pumps or the volume control tank through the letdown line and spray nozzle.
During reactor operation, changes are made in the reactor coolant boron concentration for the
following conditions:
A. Reactor startup - Boron concentration must be decreased from shutdown concentration to achieve criticality.
B. Load follow - Boron concentration must be either increased or decreased to compensate for the xenon transient following a change in load.
C. Fuel burnup - Boron concentration must be decreased to compensate for fuel burnup, except as offset by (E) below.
D. Cold shutdown - Boron concentration must be increased to the cold shutdown concentration.
E. Burnable poison depletion - Boron concentration must be increased to compensate for burned poison depletion.
The BTRS is used to control boron concentration to compensate for xenon transients during
load follow operations. Boron thermal regeneration can also be used during dilution operations
to reduce the amount of effluent to be process ed by the boron recycle system portion of the CVCS.
The reactor makeup control system consists of a group of instruments arranged to provide a
manually preselected makeup composition to the charging F1-6 pump suction header or the
volume control tank. The makeup control functions are those of maintaining desired operating
fluid inventory in the volume control tank and adjusting reactor coolant boron concentration for
reactivity control.
A. Automatic Makeup (F1)
The automatic makeup mode of operation of the reactor makeup control system provides boric acid solution preset to match the boron concentration in the RCS.
The automatic makeup compensates for minor leakage of reactor coolant without
causing significant changes in the coolant boron concentration.
Under normal plant operating conditions, the mode selector switch and makeup stop valves are set in the automatic makeup position. A present low level signal
from the volume control tank level controller causes the automatic makeup
control action to start a reactor makeup water pump, start a boric acid transfer FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-17 REV 25 4/14 pump, open the makeup stop valve to the charging pump suction, open the
concentrated boric acid control valve, and open the reactor makeup water control
valve. The flow controllers then blend the makeup stream according to the
preset concentration. Makeup addition to the charging pump suction header
causes the water level in the volume control tank to rise. At a preset high level
point, the makeup is stopped, the reactor makeup water pump stops, the reactor
makeup water control valve closes, the boric acid transfer pump stops, the
concentrated boric acid control valve closes, and the makeup stop valve to
charging pump suction closes.
If the automatic makeup fails or is not aligned for operation and the tank level continues to decrease, a low-level alarm is actuated. Manual action may correct
the situation, or, if the level continues to decrease, an emergency low level signal
from both channels opens the stop valves in the refueling water supply line to the
charging pumps and closes the stop valves in the volume control tank outlet line.
B. Dilution (F2)
The dilute mode of operation permits the addition of a preselected quantity of reactor makeup water at a preselected flowrate to the RCS. The operator sets
the mode selector switch to dilute, the reactor makeup water flow controller
setpoint to the desired flowrate, and the reactor makeup water batch integrator to
the desired quantity, and he then initiates system start. This opens the reactor
makeup water control valve to the volume control tank and starts a reactor
makeup water pump which will deliver water to the volume control tank. From
here the water goes to the charging pump suction header. Excessive rise of the
volume control tank water level is prevented by automatic actuation (by the tank
level controller) of a three-way diversion valve which routes the reactor coolant
letdown flow to the recycle holdup tanks. When the preselected quantity of water
has been added, the batch integrator causes the pump to stop and the control
valve to close.
Dilution can also be accomplished by operating the BTRS in the boron storage mode.
C. Alternate Dilution (F3)
The alternate dilute mode of operation is similar to the dilute mode, except that a portion of the dilution water flows directly to the charging pump suction and a
portion flows into the volume control tank via the spray nozzle and then flows to
the charging pump suction. Dilution water can be directed entirely to the
charging pump suction, if desired, by manually closing the makeup water control
valve to the VCT.
D. Boration (F4)
The borate mode of operation permits the addition of a preselected flowrate to the RCS. The operator sets the mode selection switch to borate, the
concentrated boric acid flow controller setpoint to the desired flowrate, and the FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-18 REV 25 4/14 concentrated boric acid batch integrator to the desired quantity, and he then
initiates system start. This opens the makeup stop valve to the charging pumps
suction and starts the boric acid solution to the charging pumps suction header.
The total quantity added in most cases is so small that it has only a minor effect
on the volume control tank level. When the preset quantity of concentrated boric
acid solution is added, the batch integrator stops the boric acid transfer pump
and closes the makeup stop valve to the suction of the charging pumps.
Boration can also be accomplished by operating the BTRS in the boron release mode.
E. Manual (F5)
The manual mode of operation permits the addition of a preselected quantity and blend of boric acid solution to the refueling water storage tank, the spent-fuel
pool, or the recycle holdup tanks in the boron recycle system. While it is in the
manual mode of operation, automatic makeup to the RCS is precluded. The
discharge flow path must be prepared by opening manual valves in the desired
path.
The operator then sets the mode selector switch to manual, the boric acid and reactor makeup water flow controllers to the desired flowrates, and the boric acid
and reactor makeup water batch integrators to the desired quantities, and he
then actuates the makeup start switch. The start switch actuates the boric acid
flow control valve and the reactor makeup water flow control valve to the boric
acid blender and starts the preselected reactor makeup water pump and the
boric acid transfer pump.
When the preset quantities of boric acid and reactor makeup water have been added, the pumps stop and the boric acid and reactor makeup water flow control
valves close. This operation may be stopped manually by actuating the makeup
stop switch.
If either batch integrator is satisfied before the other has recorded its required total, the pump and valve associated with the integrator that has been satisfied
will terminate flow. The flow controlled by the other integrator will continue until
that integrator is satisfied.
F. Alarm Functions (F6)
The reactor makeup control is provided with alarm functions to call the operator's attention to the following conditions:
- 1. Deviation of reactor makeup water flowrate from the control setpoint.
- 2. Deviation of concentrated boric acid flowrate from control setpoint.
- 3. High level in the volume control tank. This alarm indicates that the level in the tank is approaching high level and a resulting 100-percent diversion FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-19 REV 25 4/14 of the letdown stream to the recycle holdup tanks in the boron recycle system.
- 4. Low level in the volume control tank. This alarm indicates that the level in the tank is approaching emergency low level and resulting realignment of
charging pump suction to the refueling water storage tank.
9.3.4.1.2.3 Boron Recycle System.
The boron recycle system can be used to receive and recycles reactor coolant effluent for reuse of the boric acid and makeup water. The system decontaminates the effluent by means of demineralization and gas stripping and uses
evaporation to separate and recover the boric acid and makeup water.
The system is designed to collect the excess reactor coolant that results from the following plant
operation during one core cycle (approximately 1 year):
A. Dilution for core burnup from approximately 1200-ppm boron at beginning of a core cycle to approximately 100 ppm near the end of a core cycle (dilution from 100- to 10-ppm boron is handled by the thermal regeneration demineralizers in
the BTRS).
B. Hot shutdowns and startups. Four hot shutdowns are assumed to take place during a core cycle.
C. Cold shutdowns and startups. Three cold shutdowns are assumed to take place during a core cycle.
D. Refueling shutdown and startup.
The boron recycle system is designed to process the total volume of water collected during a
core cycle as well as short term surges. The design surge is that produced by a cold shutdown
and subsequent startup during the latter part of a core cycle.
Water is also collected from the following sources:
A. Volume control tank pressure relief (CVCS).
B. Boric acid blender (CVCS) - Provides storage of boric acid if a boric acid tank must be emptied for maintenance. The boric acid solution is stored in a recycle
holdup tank after first being diluted with reactor makeup water by the blender.
The boric acid concentration is reduced to ensure against precipitation of the
boric acid in the unheated recycle holdup tank.
C. ECCS flush - Accepts flush water from safety injection lines.
D. Waste processing system - Provides capability for using the recycle evaporator as a waste evaporator and vice versa.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-20 REV 25 4/14 E. Spent-fuel pool pumps (spent-fuel pool cooling and cleanup system) - Provide a means of storing the fuel transfer canal water in case maintenance is required on
the transfer equipment.
F. Valve leakoffs and equipment drains.
The water collected by the boron recycle system contains dissolved gases, boric acid, and suspended solids. Based on reactor operations with 1 percent of the rated core thermal power
being generated by fuel elements with defective cladding, the boron recycle system is designed
to provide sufficient cleanup of the water to satisfy the chemistry requirements of the recycled
reactor makeup water and 4-wt-percent boric acid solution.
The maximum radioactivity concentration buildup in the boron recycle system components is
based on operation of the reactor at its engineered safeguards design rating, with defective fuel
rods generating 1 percent of the rated core thermal power. For each component, the shielding
design considers the maximum buildup on an isot opic basis including only those isotopes which are present in significant amounts. Filtration, demineralization, and evaporation are the means by which the activity concentrations are controlled.
All portions of the boron recycle system that contain concentrated boric acid solution are located within a heated area in order to maintain solution temperature at 65°F. This is 10
°F above the solubility limit for the nominal 4 wt percent boric acid solution. If a portion of the system which normally contains concentrated boric acid solution is not located in a heated area, it must be provided with some other means (e.g., heat tracing) to maintain solution temperature at 65°F. The boron recycle system is manually operated with the exception of a few automatic protection functions. These automatic functions protect t he recycle evaporator feed demineralizers from a high inlet temperature and a high differential pre ssure, prevent a high vacuum from being drawn on the recycle holdup tank, and prevent high acti vity recycle evaporator condensate from being sent to the reactor makeup water storage tank. The boron recycle system has sufficient
instrumentation readouts and alarms to provide the operator information to ensure proper
system operation.
A. Evaporation
When water is directed to the boron recycle system for reprocessing, the flow passes first through the recycle evaporator feed demineralizers and filter and
then into the recycle holdup tanks. The recycle evaporator feed pumps can be
used to transfer liquid from one recycle holdup tank to the other, if desired.
When sufficient water is accumulated to warrant evaporator operation, the
recycle evaporator feed pumps take su ction from the selected recycle holdup tank. The fluid then flows through the recycle evaporator package. Here
hydrogen, nitrogen, and residual fission gases are removed in the stripping
column before the liquid enters the evaporator shell.
These gases are directed to the gas portion of the waste processing system.
During evaporator operation, distillate from the evaporator flows continuously to the reactor makeup water storage tank. Also located in this flow path are the FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-21 REV 25 4/14 recycle evaporator condensate demineralizer and the recycle evaporator
condensate filter.
The evaporator concentrates the boric acid solution until a 4-wt-percent solution is obtained. The accumulated batch is normally transferred directly to the boric
acid tanks through the recycle evaporator concentrates filter. If, for some reason, this batch cannot be discharged to the boric acid tanks, it can be diverted back to
the recycle holdup tanks or to the waste processing system.
Connections are provided so that, if necessary, the recycle evaporator can be used as a waste evaporator and vice versa.
B. Recycle Holdup Tank Venting
Because hydrogen is dissolved in the reactor coolant at approximately one atmosphere overpressure, a portion of the hydrogen along with fission gases will
come out of solution in the recycle holdup tank under the diaphragm. The
hydrogen and fission gases are vented to the waste processing system (gas
portion) or the plant vent stack (via a portable pump) and the radwaste ventilation
system as required. The total integrated flow of hydrogen-bearing water to the
recycle holdup tanks is monitored. An alarm indicates when a sufficient amount
of water has passed to the recycle holdup tanks to require venting of the
accumulated gases.
C. Maintenance Drains
When large amounts of water must be drained from the RCS or the spent-fuel pool (or fuel transfer canal) to the boron recycle system, a recycle holdup tank is
drained of water and vented to the waste processing system. The water can
then be stored in this tank until maintenance is completed and, after checking the
chemistry, returned. After returning the water, the recycle holdup tank is again
vented to the waste processing system.
D. Reactor Makeup Water Cleanup
If the reactor makeup water requires purification, it can be recirculated through the recycle evaporator condensate demineralizer until its chemistry is within
specifications. If further processing is necessary, water from the reactor makeup
water storage tank can be directed through the recycle evaporator condensate
demineralizer and into the recycle holdup tank for reevaporation. Alternatively, reactor makeup water can be directed to the recycle evaporator through its flush
line, bypassing the demineralizer and holdup tank, provided that the reactor
makeup water storage tank is maintained above established minimum level.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-22 REV 25 4/14 E. Waste Processing with the Recycle Evaporator
The recycle evaporator can be used to perform the function of the waste evaporator except that, since heat tracing is not provided for the recycle
evaporator, the boric acid would be concentrated to no more than 4 wt%.
After using the recycle evaporator to process water from the waste processing system, it is thoroughly rinsed out. During initial recycle processing, the
condensate is directed to the waste condensate tank for analysis prior to transfer
to the reactor makeup water storage tank. Depending upon the purity of the
evaporator bottoms, the concentrated boric acid can be transferred to the boric
acid tanks or it can be drummed.
9.3.4.1.2.4 Layout.
The volume control tank is located above the charging pumps to provide sufficient net positive suction head. A ll parts of the charging and letdown system are shielded as necessary to limit dose rates during operation with 1-percent fuel defects assumed.
The regenerative heat exchanger, excess letdown heat exchanger, letdown orifices, and seal
bypass orifices are located within the reacto r containment. All other system equipment is located inside the auxiliary building.
9.3.4.1.2.5 Component Description.
A summary of principal component design parameters is given in table 9.3-6, and safety classifications and design codes are given in section 3.2.
All CVCS piping that handles radioactive liquid is austenitic stainless steel. All piping joints and
connections are welded, except where flanged connections are required to facilitate equipment
removal for maintenance and hydrostatic testing.
9.3.4.1.2.5.1 Charging Pumps.
Three charging pumps are supplied to inject coolant into the RCS. The charging pumps are all of the horizontal, multistage, centrifugal type. All parts in contact with the reactor coolant are fabricated of austenitic stainless steel or other material of
adequate corrosion resistance. There is a minimum flow recirculation line to protect the
centrifugal charging pumps from a closed discharge valve condition.
Charging flowrate is determined from a pressurizer level signal. Charging flow control is
accomplished by a modulating valve on the discharge side of the centrifugal pumps. The
centrifugal charging pumps also serve as high head safety injection pumps in the ECCS.
Only one charging pump will be operable at RCS temperatures below 180°F, except during
pump swap operations. The remaining two chargi ng pumps will have power removed from the pump. This procedure will reduce the likelihood of overpressurizing the RCS due to inadvertent operation of the charging pumps.
9.3.4.1.2.5.2 Boric Acid Transfer Pumps.
Two horizontal, centrifugal pumps are supplied.
One pump is normally aligned to supply boric acid to the boric acid blender, while the second FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-23 REV 25 4/14 serves as a standby. Manual or automatic initia tion of the reactor coolant makeup system will start a pump to provide normal makeup of boric acid solution through the boric acid blender.
Emergency boration, supplying 4-wt-percent boric acid solution directly to the suction of the charging pumps, can be accomplished by manually starting either pump. The transfer pumps
also function to transfer boric acid solution from the batching tank to the boric acid tanks.
The pumps are located in a heated area to prevent crystallization of the boric acid solution. All
parts in contact with the solution are of austenitic stainless steel.
9.3.4.1.2.5.3 Recycle Evaporator Feed Pumps.
Two centrifugal pumps supply feed to the recycle evaporator package from the recycle holdup tanks. Two pumps are supplied for redundancy. A cross-connect pipe is provided between the pumps of Units 1 and 2. The cross-connect allows the pumps to be used to transfer liquid from one holdup tank to either
unit's holdup tanks, to either unit's spent-fuel pool, and to either unit's charging pumps for
transfer into the RCS. The pumps can also be used to recirculate water from the recycle holdup
tanks through the recycle evaporator feed demineralizers for cleanup if required.
9.3.4.1.2.5.4 Regenerative Heat Exchanger.
The regenerative heat exchanger is designed to recover heat from the letdown flow by reheating the charging flow, which reduces thermal shock on the charging penetrations into the reactor coolant loop piping.
The letdown stream flows through the she ll of the regenerative heat exchanger, and the
charging stream flows through the tubes. The unit is constructed of austenitic stainless steel
and is of all welded construction.
The temperatures of both outlet streams from t he heat exchanger are monitored with indication
given in the control room. A high temperature alarm is given on the main control board if the
temperature of the letdown stream exceeds desired limits.
9.3.4.1.2.5.5 Letdown Heat Exchanger.
The letdown heat exchanger cools the letdown stream to the operating temperature of the mi xed-bed demineralizers. Reactor coolant flows through the tube side of the exchanger, while component cooling water flows through the shell side. All surfaces in contact with the reactor coolant are austenitic stainless steel; the shell is
carbon steel.
The low-pressure letdown valve, located downstream of the letdown heat exchanger, maintains
the pressure of the letdown flow, upstream of the heat exchanger, in a range sufficiently high to
prevent two-phase flow.
The letdown temperature control indicates and controls the temperature of the letdown flow
exiting from the letdown heat exchanger. The tem perature sensor, which is part of the CVCS, provides input to the controller in the com ponent cooling system. The exit temperature is controlled by regulating the component cooling water flow through the letdown heat exchanger
by using the control valve located in the component cooling water discharge line. Temperature
indication is provided on the main control board. If the temperature of the letdown stream FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-24 REV 25 4/14 exceeds approximately 140
°F, the flow is diverted to the volume control tank in order to avoid damaging the resin in the mixed bed demineralizer.
9.3.4.1.2.5.6 Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger.
The excess letdown heat exchanger cools reactor coolant letdown flow at a rate which is equivalent to the nominal seal injection flow, which flows downward through the reactor coolant pump labyrinth seals.
The excess letdown heat exchanger can be em ployed either when normal letdown is temporarily out of service to maintain the reactor in operation or when it can be used to
supplement maximum letdown during the final stages of heatup. The letdown flows through the
tube side of the unit, and component cooling water is circulated through the shell. All surfaces
in contact with reactor coolant are austenitic stainless steel, and the shell is carbon steel. All
tube joints are welded.
A temperature detector measures temperature of excess letdown downstream of the excess letdown heat exchanger. Temperature indicati on and high temperature alarm are provided on the main control board.
A pressure sensor indicates the pressure of the excess letdown flow downstream of the excess letdown heat exchanger and excess letdown control valve. Pressure indication is provided on the main control board.
9.3.4.1.2.5.7 Seal Water Heat Exchanger.
The seal water heat exchanger is designed to cool fluid from three sources: reactor coolant pump seal water returning to the CVCS, reactor coolant discharged from the excess letdown heat exchanger, and centrifugal charging pump
bypass flow. Reactor coolant flows through the tube side of the heat exchanger, and
component cooling water is circulated through the shell. The design flowrate is equal to the
sum of the excess letdown flow, maximum design reactor coolant pump seal leakage, and
bypass flow from one centrifugal charging pump.
The unit is designed to cool the above flow to the temperature normally maintained in the volume control tank. All surfaces in contact with
reactor coolant are austenitic stainless steel; the shell is carbon steel.
9.3.4.1.2.5.8 Volume Control Tank.
The volume control tank provides surge capacity for part of the reactor coolant expansion volume not accommodated by the pressurizer. When the level in the tank reaches the high-level setpoint, the remainder of the expansion volume is
accommodated by diversion of the letdown stream to the recycle holdup tanks. It also provides a means for introducing hydrogen into the coolant to maintain the required equilibrium
concentration of 25 to 50 cm 3 hydrogen (at STP/kg water) for power operations, is used for degassing the reactor coolant, and serves as a head tank for the charging pumps.
A spray nozzle located inside the tank on the letdown line nozzle provides liquid to gas contact
between the incoming fluid and the hydrogen atmosphere in the tank.
A remotely operated vent valve, discharging to the gaseous waste processing system, permits removal of gaseous fission products, which are stripped from the reactor coolant and collected
in the gas space of this tank. Relief protection, gas space sampling, and nitrogen purge FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-25 REV 25 4/14 connections are also provided. The tank can also accept the seal water return flow from the
reactor coolant pumps, although this flow normally goes directly to the suction of the charging
pumps.
Volume control tank pressure and temperature are monitored with indication given in the control
room. Alarm is given in the control room for high and low pressure conditions and for high
temperature.
Two level channels govern the water inventory in the volume control tank. These channels
provide local and remote level indication, level alarms, level control, makeup control, and
emergency makeup control.
If the volume control tank level rises above the normal operating range, one channel provides
an analog signal to a proportional controller which modulates the three-way valve downstream
of the reactor coolant filter to maintain the volume control tank level within the normal operating
band. The three-way valve can split letdown flow so that a portion goes to the recycle holdup
tanks and a portion to the volume control tank. The controller would operate in this fashion
during a dilution operation, when reactor makeup water is being fed to the volume control tank
from the reactor makeup control system.
If the modulating function of the channel fails and the volume control tank level continues to
rise, the high level alarm will alert the operator to the malfunction and the letdown flow can be
manually diverted to the holdup tanks. If no action is taken by the operator and the tank level
continues to rise, the full letdown flow will be automatically diverted.
During normal power operation, a low level in the volume control tank initiates automatic
makeup which injects a preselected blend of boron and water into the charging pump suction
header. When the volume control tank is restored to normal, automatic makeup stops.
If the automatic makeup fails or is not aligned for operation and the tank level continues to
decrease, a low-level alarm is actuated. Manual action may correct the situation or, if the level
continues to decrease, an emergency low-level signal from both channels opens the stop valves
in the refueling water supply line and closes the stop valves in the volume control tank outlet
line.
9.3.4.1.2.5.9 Boric Acid Tanks.
The combined boric acid tank capacity is sized to store sufficient boric acid solution for a cold shutdown from full-power operation immediately following refueling with the most reactive control rod not inserted, plus operating margins.
The concentration of boric acid solution in storage is maintained between 4- and 4.4-wt-percent.
Periodic manual sampling and corrective action, if necessary, ensure that these limits are
maintained. As a consequence, measured amounts of boric acid solution can be delivered to
the reactor coolant to control the concentration. The boron concentration limits are specified in
the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM).
A temperature sensor provides temperature m easurement of each tank's contents. Local temperature indication is provided, as well as high and low temperature alarms which are FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-26 REV 25 4/14 indicated on the main control board. The minimum solution temperature is specified in the
TRM.
Two level detectors indicate the level in each boric acid tank. Level indication with high-, low-,
and low-low-level alarms is provided on the main control board. The low-low alarm is set to
indicate the minimum level of boric acid in the tank to ensure sufficient boric acid to provide for
a cold shutdown with one stuck rod. The minimum contained borated water volume is specified
in the TRM.
9.3.4.1.2.5.10 Batching Tank.
The batching tank is used for mixing a makeup supply of boric acid solution for transfer to the boric acid tanks. The tank may also be used for solution storage.
A local sampling point is provided for verifying the solution concentration prior to transferring it
out of the tank. The tank is provided with an agitator to improve mixing during batching
operations and a steam jacket for heating the boric acid solution.
9.3.4.1.2.5.11 Chemical Mixing Tank.
The primary use of the chemical mixing tank is in the preparation of caustic solutions for pH control and hydrazine solution for oxygen scavenging.
9.3.4.1.2.5.12 Recycle Holdup Tanks.
Three recycle holdup tanks provide storage of excess reactor effluents for future reuse, disposal, or processing by the recycle evaporator package.
Each tank has a diaphragm which prevents air fr om dissolving in the tank liquid and prevents
the hydrogen and fission gases under the diaphragm from mixing with the air. The air space in
the tank above the diaphragm is vented to the plant vent.
9.3.4.1.2.5.13 Recycle Evaporator Reagent Tank.
This tank provides a means of adding chemicals to the recycle evaporator package, e.g., for cleanup.
9.3.4.1.2.5.14 Mixed-Bed Demineralizers.
Two flushable, mixed-bed demineralizers assist in maintaining reactor coolant purity. A lithium or hydrogen form cation resin and hydroxyl form anion resin are charged into the demineralizers. Each form of resin removes fission and
corrosion products. The resin bed is designed to reduce the concentration of ionic isotopes in
the purification stream, except for cesium, yttr ium, and molybdenum, by a minimum factor of 10.
In preparation for an outage and during an outage where a release of particulate and soluble
corrosion products is anticipated, a specialty resin, such as a coated weak acid cation resin, may be added to a mixed-bed demineralizer for removal of particulate radio-cobalt and
particulate nickel.
This demineralizer may be used during power operations for reactor coolant Lithium control
during periods when the cation demineralizer or alternate mixed-bed demineralizer are not
available for this purpose.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-27 REV 25 4/14 Each demineralizer has sufficient capacity for approximately one core cycle with 1-percent failed
fuel. One demineralizer serves as a standby uni t for use if the operating demineralizer becomes exhausted during operation.
A temperature sensor measures temperature of the letdown flow downstream of the letdown
heat exchanger and controls the letdown flow to the mixed-bed demineralizers by means of a three-way valve. If the letdown temperature ex ceeds the allowable resin operating temperature, the flow is automatically bypassed around the demineralizers. Temperature indication and high alarm are provided on the main control board. The air-operated, three-way valve failure mode
directs flow to the volume control tank.
9.3.4.1.2.5.15 Cation Bed Demineralizer.
A flushable cation resin bed in the hydrogen form is located downstream of the mixed-bed demineralizer s and is used intermittently to control the concentration of Li 7 which builds up in the coolant from the B 10 (n,)Li 7 reaction. The demineralizer also has sufficient capacity to maintain the cesium-137 concentration in the coolant below 1.0
µCi/cm 3 with 1-percent failed fuel. The resin bed is designed to reduce the concentration of ionic isotopes, particularly cesium, yttrium, and molybdenum, by a minimum factor of 10.
The cation bed demineralizer has sufficient capacity for approximately one core cycle with 1-
percent failed fuel.
9.3.4.1.2.5.16 Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizers.
Two flushable, mixed bed demineralizers remove fission products from the fluid directed to the recycle holdup tanks. The demineralizers also provide a means of cleaning the recycle holdup tank contents via
recirculation.
9.3.4.1.2.5.17 Recycle Evaporator Condensate Demineralizer.
A sluicable, mixed-bed resin demineralizer is used to remove any boric acid, other anionic impurities such as chloride and fluoride, cationic impurities such as sodium, calcium, magnesium, and aluminum and also any particulate activity carryover contained in the evaporator condensate. The mixed-bed resin provides the system with the capability to remove a wide range of chemical and radiochemical
contaminants resulting in high quality water for plant operations. Although the bed may become
saturated with boron at the normally low concentration (< 10 ppm) leaving the evaporator, it will
still remove most of the boron if the concentration increases because of an evaporator upset.
The demineralizer also provides a means of cleanup of the reactor makeup water storage tank
contents.
9.3.4.1.2.5.18 Reactor Coolant Filter.
The reactor coolant filter is located on the letdown line upstream of the volume control tank. The filter collects resin fines and particulates from the letdown stream. The nominal flow capacity of the filter is greater than the maximum purification
flowrate.
Two local pressure indicators are provided to show the pressures upstream and downstream of the reactor coolant filter and thus provide filter differential pressure.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-28 REV 25 4/14 9.3.4.1.2.5.19 Seal Water Injection Filters.
Two seal water injection filters are located in parallel in a common line to the reactor coolant pump seals; they collect particulate matter that
could be harmful to the seal faces. Each filter is sized to accept flow in excess of the normal
seal water flow requirements.
A differential pressure indicator monitors the pressure drop across each seal water injection
filter and gives local indication with high differential pressure alarm on the main control board.
9.3.4.1.2.5.20 Seal Water Return Filter.
The filter collects particulates from the reactor coolant pump seal water return and from the excess letdown flow. The filter is designed to pass flow in excess of the sum of the excess letdown flow and the maximum design leakage from the
reactor coolant pump seals.
Two local pressure indicators are provided to show the pressures upstream and downstream of the filter and thus provide differential pressure across the filter.
9.3.4.1.2.5.21 Boric Acid Filter.
The boric acid filter collects particulates from the boric acid solution being pumped from the boric acid tanks. The filter is designed to pass the design flow of two boric acid transfer pumps operating simultaneously.
Local pressure indicators indicate the pressure upstream and downstream of the boric acid filter
and thus provide filter differential pressure.
9.3.4.1.2.5.22 Recycle Evaporator Feed Filter.
This filter collects resin fines and particles from the fluid entering the recycle holdup tanks.
9.3.4.1.2.5.23 Recycle Evaporator Condensate Filter.
This filter collects particulates from the boric acid evaporator condensate stream.
9.3.4.1.2.5.24 Recycle Evaporator Concentrates Filter.
This filter removes particulates from the evaporator concentrate as it leaves the evaporator.
9.3.4.1.2.5.25 Boric Acid Blender.
The boric acid blender promotes thorough mixing of boric acid solution and reactor makeup water for the reactor coolant makeup circuit. The blender consists of a conventional pipe tee fitted with a perforated tube insert. The blender decreases
the pipe length required to homogenize the mixture for taking a representative local sample. A
sample point is provided in the piping just downstream of the blender.
9.3.4.1.2.5.26 Letdown Orifices.
The three letdown orifices are arranged in parallel and serve to reduce the pressure of the letdown stream to a value compatible with the letdown heat exchanger design. Two of the three are sized so that either can pass normal letdown flow of
60 gal/min; the third can pass 45 gal/min. One or both standby orifices may be used with the FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-29 REV 25 4/14 normally operating orifice in order to increase letdown flow, such as during reactor heatup
operations and maximum purification. This arrangement also provides a full standby capacity
for control of letdown flow. Orifices are placed in and taken out of service by remote manual
operation of their respective isolation valves.
A flow monitor provides indication in the control room of the letdown flowrate. A high flow alarm
is provided to indicate flowrates exceeding 140 gal/min.
A low pressure letdown controller controls the pressure downstream of the letdown heat
exchanger to prevent flashing of the letdown liquid. Pressure indication and high pressure
alarm are provided on the main control board.
9.3.4.1.2.5.27 Recycle Evaporator Package.
The recycle evaporator package processes dilute boric acid and produces distillate and approximately 4-wt-percent boric acid stripped of hydrogen, nitrogen, and radioactive gases.
A boric acid solution is fed from the recycl e holdup tanks to the evaporator by the recycle evaporator feed pumps. The feed first passes through a heat exchanger where condensing
steam raises its temperature. The feed then passes into the top of the stripping column. Gases
are stripped off as the feed passes over the packing in the tower in contraflow to stripping steam
from the evaporator. After stripping, the feed is introduced into the evaporator as makeup. The
vapors leaving the boiling pool are stripped of entrained liquid and volatile boron carryover.
Pure vapors are then condensed in the condenser section and pumped from the system. When the desired concentration is reached in the boiling pool, the concentrates are pumped from the system.
Radioactive gases and other noncondensables are discharged from the system into the waste
gas vent header.
The recycle and waste evaporators are identical units and are interconnected so that they serve
as standbys for each other under abnormal conditions.
9.3.4.1.2.5.28 Recycle Holdup Tank Vent Eductor.
The eductor is designed to pull gases from under the diaphragm in the recycle holdup tank. Nitrogen, provided by the waste gas compressor, provides the motive force.
9.3.4.1.2.5.29 Valves.
Valves, other than diaphragm valves, that perform a modulating function are equipped with a stuffing box containing two sets of packing and an intermediate leakoff connection. Valves are normally installed so that, when closed, the high pressure is not on the
packing. Basic material of construction is stainless steel for all valves that handle radioactive
liquid or boric acid solutions.
Isolation valves are provided for all lines entering the reactor containment. These valves are
discussed in detail in subsection 6.2.4.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-30 REV 25 4/14 Relief valves are provided for lines and components that might be pressurized above design
pressure by improper operation or component malfunction.
A. Charging Line Downstream of Regenerative Heat Exchanger
If the charging side of the regenerative heat exchanger is isolated while the hot letdown flow continues at its maximum rate, the volumetric expansion of coolant
on the charging side of the heat exchanger is relieved to the RCS through a
spring-loaded check valve.
The spring in the valve is designed to permit the check valve to open in the event that the differential pressure exceeds the design pressure differential.
B. Letdown Line Downstream of Letdown Orifices
The pressure relief valve downstream of the letdown orifices protects the low-pressure piping and the letdown heat exchanger from overpressure when the
low-pressure piping is isolated. The capacity of the relief valve exceeds the
maximum flowrate through all letdown orifices. The valve set pressure is equal
to the design pressure of the letdown heat exchanger tube side.
C. Letdown Line Downstream of Low Pressure Letdown Valve
The pressure relief valve downstream of the low pressure letdown valve protects the low-pressure piping, demineralizers, and filter from overpressure when this section of the system is isolated. The overpressure may result from leakage
through the low-pressure letdown valve. The capacity of the relief valve exceeds
the maximum flowrate through all letdown orifices. The valve set pressure is
equal to the design pressure of the demineralizers.
D. Volume Control Tank
The relief valve on the volume control tank permits the tank to be designed for a lower pressure than the upstream equipment. This valve has a capacity greater
than the summation of the following items: maximum letdown, maximum seal
water return, excess letdown, and nominal flow from one reactor makeup water
pump. The valve set pressure equals the design pressure of the volume control
tank.
E. Charging Pump Suction
A relief valve on the charging pump suction header relieves pressure that may build up if the suction line isolation valves are closed or if the system is
overpressurized. The valve set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the
associated piping and equipment.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-31 REV 25 4/14 F. Seal Water Return Line (Inside Containment)
This relief valve is designed to relieve overpressurization in the seal water return piping inside the containment if the motor-operated isolation valve is closed. The
valve is designed to relieve the total leakoff flow from the No. 1 seals of the
reactor coolant pumps plus the design excess letdown flow. The valve is set to
relieve at the design pressure of the piping.
G. Seal Water Return Line (Charging Pumps Bypass Flow)
This relief valve protects the seal water heat exchanger and its associated piping from overpressurization. If either of the isolation valves for the heat exchanger is
closed and if the bypass line is closed, the piping could be overpressurized by
the bypass flow from the centrifugal charging pumps. The valve is sized to
handle full bypass flow with all centrifugal pumps running. The valve is set to
relieve at the design pressure of the heat exchanger.
H. Steam Line to Batching Tank
The relief valve on the steam line to the batching tank protects the low-pressure piping and batching tank heating jacket from overpressure when the condensate
return line is isolated. The capacity of the relief valve equals the maximum
expected steam inlet flow. The set pressure equals the design pressure of the
heating jacket.
9.3.4.1.2.5.30 Piping.
All CVCS piping handling radioactive liquid is austenitic stainless steel.
All piping joints and connections are welded, except where flanged connections are required to facilitate equipment removal for maintenance and hydrostatic testing.
9.3.4.1.2.6 System Operation.
The reactor startup, power generation and hot standby operation, and reactor shutdown of the CVCS are discussed below.
9.3.4.1.2.6.1 Reactor Startup.
Reactor startup is defined as the operations which bring the reactor from cold shutdown to normal operating temperature and pressure. It is assumed that:
A. Normal residual heat removal is in progress.
B. The RCS boron concentration is at the cold shutdown concentration.
C. The reactor makeup control system is set to provide makeup at the cold shutdown concentration.
D. The RCS is either water solid or drained to minimum level for the purpose of refueling or maintenance. If the RCS is water solid, system pressure is
controlled by letdown through the residual heat removal system and through the
low pressure letdown valve in the letdown line.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-32 REV 25 4/14 E. The charging and letdown lines of the CVCS are filled with coolant at the cold shutdown boron concentration. The letdown orifice isolation valves are closed.
If the RCS requires filling via dynamic venting, the procedure is as follows:
A. One charging pump is started, which provides blended flow from the reactor makeup control system at the cold shutdown boron concentration. Charging and
letdown flows and seal injection flow to reactor coolant pumps are established.
B. The vents on the head of the reactor vessel and pressurizer are opened.
C. The RCS is filled and the vents closed.
The system pressure is raised using the charging pump and controlled by the low-pressure
letdown valve. When the system pressure is adequate for operation of the reactor coolant
pumps, seal water leakage flow from the pumps is verified and the pumps are operated and vented sequentially until all gases are cleared from the system. Final venting takes place at the
pressurizer.
If the RCS requires filling and venting via use of the reactor coolant vacuum refill system (RCVRS), the procedure is as follows:
Air is removed from the RCS by the RCVRS via a connection to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT) inlet line. Initial conditions are as follows: the RCS level is at midloop and the PRT level
is below the sparging header. The vacuum pump skid suction hose is connected to the PRT
inlet line connection. The RHR flow is adjusted to prevent vortexing and to ensure adequate net
positive suction head (NPSH). The air evacuation path is established by opening the reactor
vessel head vent valves, the pressurizer spray valves, the power-operated relief valve (PORV)
block valves and the PORVs.
After the filling and venting operations are completed, all pressurizer heaters are energized, and
the reactor coolant pumps are employed to heat up the system. After the reactor coolant pumps
are started, pressure control via the residual heat removal system and the low pressure letdown
line is continued as the pressurizer steam bubble is formed. At this point, steam formation in
the pressurizer is accomplished by manual control of the charging flow and automatic pressure
control of the letdown flow. When the pressurizer water level reaches the no-load programmed
setpoint, the pressurizer level control is shifted to control the charging flow to maintain
programmed level. The residual heat removal system is then isolated from the RCS.
The reactor coolant boron concentration is now reduced either by operating the reactor makeup
control system in the dilute mode or by operating the BTRS in the boron storage mode and, when the resin beds are saturated, washing off the beds to the recycle holdup tanks. The
reactor coolant boron concentration is corrected to the point where the control rods may be
withdrawn and criticality achieved. Nuclear heatup may then proceed, with corresponding
manual adjustment of the reactor coolant boron concentration to balance the temperature
coefficient effects and maintain the control rods within their operating range. During heatup, the
appropriate combination of letdown orifices is used to provide necessary letdown flow.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-33 REV 25 4/14 Prior to or during the heating process, the CVCS is employed to obtain the correct chemical
properties in the RCS. The reactor makeup control is operated on a continuing basis to ensure
correct control rod position. Chemicals are added through the chemical mixing tank, as
required, to control reactor coolant chemistry such as pH and dissolved oxygen content.
Hydrogen overpressure is established in the volume control tank to ensure the appropriate
hydrogen concentration in the reactor coolant.
9.3.4.1.2.6.2 Power Generation and Hot Standby Operation.
Base load, load follow, and hot shutdown of this operation are discussed below.
A. Base Load
At a constant power level, the rates of charging and letdown are dictated by the requirements for seal water to the reactor coolant pumps and the normal
purification of the RCS. One charging pump is employed, and charging flow is
controlled automatically from pressurizer level. The only necessary adjustments
in boron concentration are those to compensate for core burnup. These
adjustments are made at infrequent intervals to maintain the control groups
within their allowable limits. Rapid variations in power demand are
accommodated automatically by control rod movement. If variations in power
level occur and the new power level is sustained for long periods, some
adjustment in boron concentration may be necessary to maintain the control
groups within their maneuvering band.
During normal operation, normal letdown flow is maintained and one mixed-bed demineralizer is in service. Reactor coolant samples are taken periodically to
check boron concentration, water quality, pH, and activity level. The charging
pump flow to the RCS is controlled automatically by the pressurizer level control
signal through the discharge header flow control valve.
B. Load Follow
A power reduction will initially cause a xenon buildup followed by xenon decay to a new, lower equilibrium value. The reverse occurs if the power level decreases
and then increases to a new and higher equilibrium value associated with the
amount of the power level change.
The BTRS is normally used to vary the reactor coolant boron concentration to compensate for xenon transients occurring when reactor power level is changed.
The reactor makeup control system may also be used to vary the boron
concentration in the reactor coolant.
The most important intelligence available to the plant operator, enabling him to determine whether dilution or boration of the RCS is necessary, is the position of
the control rods within the maneuvering band. If, for example, the control rods
are moving down into the core and are approaching the bottom of the
maneuvering band, the operator must borate the reactor coolant to bring the rods
outward. If not, the control rods may move into the core beyond the shutdown FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-34 REV 25 4/14 limit. If, on the other hand, the rods are moving out of the core, the operator
dilutes the reactor coolant to keep the rods from moving above the top of the
maneuvering band. Keeping the control rods at the top of the maneuvering band
ensures the capability of immediate return to full power. However, violation of
the upper limit of the maneuvering band is not safety related and is allowed.
With the control rods above the top of the maneuvering band the reactor cannot return to full power immediately; it can return to some rate determined by the
During periods of plant loading, the reactor coolant expands as its temperature rises. The pressurizer absorbs most of this expansion as the level controller
raises the level setpoint to the increased level associated with the new power
level. The remainder of the excess coolant is let down and is stored in the
volume control tank. During this period, the flow through the letdown orifice
remains constant and the charging flow is reduced by the pressurizer level
control signal, resulting in an increased temperature at the regenerative heat
exchanger outlet. The temperature contro ller downstream from the letdown heat exchanger increases the component cooling water flow to maintain the desired
letdown temperature.
During periods of plant unloading, the charging flow is increased to make up for the coolant contraction not accommodated by the programmed reduction in pressurizer level.
C. Hot Standby and Hot Shutdown
When the reactor is shutdown and the RCS temperature is 350°F, the plant is in the Hot Standby operational mode. When the reactor is shutdown and the
RCS temperature is > 200
°F and < 350
°F, the plant is in the Hot Shutdown operational mode. RCS temperature is normally the result of RCP heat and decay heat additions. Normally RCS tem perature is controlled by the steam dumps or atmospheric relief valves when at higher temperatures. When at lower
temperatures, the RHR system is normally used to control RCS temperature.
Technical Specifications provide additional details regarding plant operational
modes.
Following a normal reactor shutdown or reactor trip, for a finite period of time, the reactor can be returned to some power using only the control rods. Through
design, procedural reactivity management requirements, and Technical
Specification requirements, the reactor maintains a minimum shutdown margin of 1.77% k/k. The shutdown reactivity (assuming no-load Tavg and no change in RCS boron) immediately following a normal reactor shutdown or reactor trip is a result of control rod and shutdown rod insertions, while also accounting for the
reactivity associated with the pre-shutdown power. Subsequently, xenon buildup
following reactor shutdown adds additional shutdown reactivity for approximately
8 h, returns to the initial post trip value in approximately 24 h, and then reduces
shutdown reactivity over the next approximately 72 h. RCS boron
additions/deletions can compensate for the effects of xenon decay/buildup and FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-35 REV 25 4/14 reduction in RCS temperature. The magnitude of xenon effects vary with
pre-shutdown power history status and the operating cycle fuel characteristics.
The core specific Nuclear Design and Core Management manuals should be
referred to for specific information regarding reactivity effects associated with
various plant operational modes.
9.3.4.1.2.6.3 Reactor Shutdown.
Reactor shutdown is defined as the operations that bring the reactor to cold shutdown.
Before initiating a cold shutdown, the RCS hydrogen concentration is reduced by replacing the
volume control tank hydrogen atmosphere with nitrogen by purging to the gaseous waste
processing system. An alternate method of reducing the hydrogen concentration in the RCS is
chemical degassing. Both methods are explained in detail in paragraph 11.3.4.1
Before cooldown and depressurization of the reactor plant is initiated, the reactor coolant boron
concentration is increased to the cold shutdown value. The operator sets the reactor makeup
control to borate, selects the volume of concentrated boric acid solution necessary to perform
the boration, selects the desired flowrate, and actuates makeup start. After the boration is
completed and reactor coolant samples verify that the concentration is correct, the operator
resets the reactor makeup control system for leakage makeup and system contraction at the
shutdown reactor coolant boron concentration.
Contraction of the coolant during cooldown of the RCS results in actuation of the pressurizer
level control to maintain normal pressurizer water level. The charging flow is increased, relative
to letdown flow, and results in a decreasing volume control tank level. The volume control tank
level controller automatically initiates makeup to maintain the inventory.
After the residual heat removal system is placed in service and the reactor coolant pumps are
shut down, further cooling of the pressurizer liquid is accomplished by charging through the
auxiliary spray line. Coincident with plant cooldown, a portion of the reactor coolant flow may be
diverted from the residual heat removal system to the CVCS for cleanup. Demineralization of
ionic radioactive impurities and stripping of fission gases reduce the reactor coolant activity level
sufficiently to permit personnel access for refueling or maintenance operations.
9.3.4.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.3.4.1.3.1 Reactivity Control.
Any time that the plant is at power, the quantity of boric acid retained and ready for injection always exceeds that quantity required for the normal cold shutdown, assuming that the control assembly of greatest worth is in its fully withdrawn position.
This quantity always exceeds the quantity of boric acid required to bring the reactor to hot
shutdown and to compensate for subsequent xenon decay. An adequate quantity of boric acid
is also available in the refueling water storage tank to achieve cold shutdown.
When the reactor is subcritical (i.e., during cold or hot shutdown, refueling, and approach to
criticality), the neutron source multiplication is continuously monitored and indicated. Any
appreciable increase in the neutron source multiplication, including that caused by the FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-36 REV 25 4/14 maximum physical boron dilution rate, is slow enough to give ample time to start a corrective
action (boron dilution stop and boration) to prevent the core from becoming critical.
Two separate and independent flow paths are available for reactor coolant boration, i.e., the
charging line and the reactor coolant pump seal injection. A single failure does not result in the
inability to borate the RCS.
As backup to the normal boric acid supply, the operator can align the refueling water storage
tank outlet to the suction of the charging pumps, thus injecting 2300-ppm boron solution (minimum) into the RCS.
In Mode 6, with any valve used to isolate an unborated water source not secured in the closed
position, the TRM ensures that at least one flow path is available for boron injection. When the
unborated water source isolation valves are secured in the closed position in Mode 6, a boron
dilution accident is precluded. In this case, plant procedures ensure the availability of at least
one boron injection flow path.
In Mode 5, the TRM ensures that at least one flow path is available for boron injection and that
the capability of such injection is adequate to ensure that cold shutdown can be maintained.
In Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 the TRM ensures that redundant boration capability is available in
quantity sufficient to ensure shutdown to cold conditions.
An upper limit to the boric acid tank boron concentration and a lower limit to the temperature for
the tank and for flow paths from the tank are specified in order to ensure that solution solubility
is maintained.
Since inoperability of a single component does not impair ability to meet boron injection
requirements, plant operating procedures allow co mponents to be temporarily out of service for repairs. However, with an inoperable component, the ability to tolerate additional component
failure is limited. Therefore, operating procedures require immediate action to effect repairs of
an inoperable component, restrict permissible repair time, and require demonstration of the
operability of the redundant component.
9.3.4.1.3.2 Reactor Coolant Purification.
The CVCS is capable of reducing the concentration of ionic isotopes in the purification stream as required in the design basis. This is accomplished by passing the letdown flow through the mixed-bed demineralizers that remove
ionic isotopes, except those of cesium, molybdenum, and yttrium, with a minimum
decontamination factor of 10. Through occasional use of the cation bed demineralizer, the concentration of cesium can be maintained below 1.0
µCi/cm 3 , assuming 1 percent of the rated core thermal power is being produced by fuel with defective cladding. The cation bed demineralizer is capable of passing the normal letdown flow, though only a portion of this
capacity is normally utilized. Each mixed-bed demineralizer is capable of processing the
maximum letdown flowrate. If the normally operating mixed-bed demineralizer's resin has
become exhausted, the second demineralizer can be placed in service. Each demineralizer is designed, however, to operate for one core cycle with 1-percent defective fuel.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-37 REV 25 4/14 9.3.4.1.3.3 Seal Water Injection.
Flow to the reactor coolant pumps' seals is ensured by the fact that there are three charging pumps, any one of which is capable of supplying the
normal charging line flow plus the nominal seal water flow.
9.3.4.1.3.4 Leakage Provisions.
The CVCS components, valves, and piping that see radioactive service are designed to limit leakage to the atmosphere. Leakage to the atmosphere is limited through: welding of all piping joints and connections except where flanged
connections are provided to facilitate maintenanc e and hydrostatic testing, extensive use of leakoffs to collect leakage, and use of diaphragm valves where conditions permit.
The volume control tank in the CVCS provides an inferential measurement of leakage from the
system as well as the RCS. Low level in the volume control tank actuates makeup at the
prevailing reactor coolant boron concentration.
The amount of leakage can be inferred from the amount of makeup added by the reactor
makeup control system.
9.3.4.1.3.5 Ability to Meet the Safeguards Function.
A failure analysis of the portion of the CVCS which is safety related (used as part of the ECCS) is included as part of the ECCS failure analysis presented in appendix 6A.
9.3.4.1.4 Tests and Inspections As part of plant operation, periodic tests, surveillance inspections, and instrument calibrations
are made to monitor equipment condition and performance. Most components are in use
regularly; therefore, assurance of the av ailability and performance of the systems and
equipment is provided by control room and/or local indication.
The plant Technical Specifications and requirements in the TRM have been established
concerning calibration, checking, and sampling of the CVCS.
9.3.4.1.5 Instrumentation Application Process control instrumentation is provided to acquire data concerning key parameters about
the CVCS. The location of the instrumentation is shown in drawings D-175039, sheet 1 through
7 and D-205039, sheets 1 through 5. The instrumentation furnishes input signals for monitoring
and/or alarming purposes. Indications and/or alarms are provided for the following parameters:
temperature, pressure, flow, water level, and radiation.
The instrumentation also supplies input signals for control purposes. Some specific control
functions are:
A. Letdown flow is diverted to the volume control tank upon high temperature indication upstream of the mixed-bed demineralizers.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-38 REV 25 4/14 B. Pressure downstream of the letdown heat exchangers is controlled to prevent flashing of the letdown liquid.
C. Charging flowrate is controlled during charging pump operation.
D. Water level is controlled in the volume control tank.
E. Temperature of the boric acid solution in the batching tank is maintained.
F. Reactor makeup is controlled.
G. DELETED
9.3.4.2 Boron Thermal Regeneration System The BTRS varies the RCS boron concentration to compensate for xenon transients and other
reactivity changes which occur when the reactor power level is changed.
9.3.4.2.1 Design Basis The BTRS is designed to accommodate the changes in boron concentration required by the
design load cycle without requiring makeup for either boration or dilution.
9.3.4.2.2 System Description During normal operation of the CVCS, the letdown flow from the RCS passes through the regenerative heat exchanger, letdown heat exchanger, mixed-bed demineralizers, reactor
coolant filter, and volume control tank. The charging pumps then take suction from the volume
control tank and return the purified reactor coolant to the RCS.
An alternate letdown path is provided which allows part or all of the letdown flow to pass
through the BTRS (shown in drawings D-175040 and D-205040) when boron concentration
changes are made to follow plant load. The letdown flow is directed to the BTRS from a point
downstream of the mixed-bed demineralizers.
After processing by the BTRS, the flow is
returned to the CVCS at a point upstream of the reactor coolant filter.
Storage and release of boron during load follow operation is determined by the temperature of
the fluid entering the thermal regeneration demineralizers. A group of heat exchangers is
employed to provide the desired fluid temperatures at the demineralizer inlet for either storage or release operation of the system.
The flow path through the BTRS is different for boron storage and release operations. During
boron storage, the letdown stream enters the moderating heat exchanger and from there it passes through the letdown chiller heat exchanger. The moderating heat exchanger cools the
letdown stream prior to its entering the demi neralizers. The letdown reheat heat exchanger is
valved out on the tube side and performs no function during boron storage operations. After FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-39 REV 25 4/14 passing through the demineralizers, the letdow n enters the moderating heat exchanger shell side, where it is heated by the incoming letdown stream before going to the volume control tank.
Therefore, for boron storage, a decrease in the boric acid concentration in the reactor coolant is
accomplished by sending the letdown flow at relatively low temperatures to the thermal
regeneration demineralizers. The resin, which was depleted of boron at high temperature
during a prior boron release operation, is now capable of storing boric acid from the low
temperature letdown stream. Reactor coolant with a decreased concentration of boric acid
leaves the demineralizers and is directed to the CVCS. Procedures are also available to
decrease the concentration of boric acid in the reactor coolant using BTRS demineralizers
without using BTRS chillers.
During the boron release operation, the letdown stream enters the moderating heat exchanger
tube side, bypasses the letdown chiller heat exchanger, and passes through the shell side of
the letdown reheat heat exchanger. The moderating and letdown reheat heat exchangers heat
the letdown stream prior to its entering the resin beds. The temperature of the letdown at the
point of entry to the demineralizers is controll ed automatically by the temperature control valve which controls the flowrate on the tube side of the letdown reheat heat exchanger. After
passing through the demineralizers, the letdown st ream enters the shell side of the moderating heat exchanger, passes through the tube side of the letdown chiller heat exchanger, and then
goes to the volume control tank. Thus, for boron release, an increase in the boric acid
concentration in the reactor coolant is accomplished by sending the letdown flow at relatively
high temperatures to the thermal regeneration demineralizers. The water flowing through the
demineralizers now releases boron that was stored by the resin at low temperature during a
previous boron storage operation. The boron-enriched reactor coolant is returned to the RCS
via the CVCS.
Although the BTRS is primarily designed to compensate for xenon transients occurring during
load follow, it can also be used to handle boron swings far in excess of the design capacity of
the demineralizers. During startup dilution, for example, the resin beds are first saturated, then
washed off to the recycle holdup tanks in the CVCS, and then again saturated and washed off.
This operation continues until the desired dilution in the RCS is obtained.
As an additional function, a thermal regeneration demineralizer can be used as a deborating
demineralizer, which would be used to dilute the RCS down to very low boron concentrations
toward the end of core life. To make such a bed effective, the effluent concentration from the
bed must be kept very low, close to 0-ppm boron. This low effluent concentration can be
achieved by using fresh resin. When RCS boron concentrations are low during the end of a
core cycle, the four BTRS demineralizers are evaluated for boron removal capability. The boron
removal efficiency of each demineralizer resin will determine when the demineralizer will be
placed in service, and when the resin will be replaced with fresh resin.
A. Component Description
Component safety classifications and design codes are given in section 3.2, and a summary of principal component design parameters is given in table 9.3-7.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-40 REV 25 4/14 1. Chiller Pumps (ABANDONED)
These centrifugal pumps circulate the water through the chilled-water loop. One pump is supplied for each chiller.
- 2. Moderating Heat Exchanger
The moderating heat exchanger operates as a regenerative heat exchanger between incoming and outgoing streams to and from the
thermal regeneration demineralizers.
The incoming flow enters the tube side of the moderating heat exchanger.
The shell-side fluid, which comes directly from the demineralizers, enters
at low temperature during boron storage and enters at high temperature
during boron release.
- 3. Letdown Chiller Heat Exchanger
During the boron storage operation, the process stream enters the tube side of the letdown chiller heat exchanger after leaving the moderating
heat exchanger.
- 4. Letdown Reheat Heat Exchanger
The letdown reheat heat exchanger is used only during boron release operations and it is then used to heat the process stream. Water used for
heating is diverted from the letdown line upstream of the letdown heat
exchanger in the CVCS, passed through the tube side of the letdown
reheat heat exchanger, and then returned to the letdown stream
upstream of the letdown heat exchanger.
- 5. Chiller Surge Tank (ABANDONED)
The chiller surge tank handles the thermal expansion and contraction of the water in the chiller loop. The surge volume in the tank also acts as a
thermal buffer for the chiller.
- 6. Thermal Regeneration Demineralizers
The function of the thermal regeneration demineralizers is to store the total amount of boron that must be removed from the RCS to accomplish
the required dilution during a load cycle in order to compensate for xenon
buildup resulting from a decreased power level. Furthermore, the
demineralizers must be able to release the previously stored boron to
accomplish the required boration of the reactor coolant during the load
cycle in order to compensate for a decrease in xenon concentration
resulting from an increased power level.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-41 REV 25 4/14 The demineralizers are of the type that can accept flow in either direction.
The flow direction during boron storage is therefore always opposite to
that during release. This provides much faster response when the beds
are switched from storage to release, and vice versa, than would be the
case if the demineralizers could accept flow in only one direction.
- 7. Chillers (ABANDONED)
The chillers are located in a chilled-water loop containing a surge tank, chiller pumps, the letdown chiller heat exchanger, piping, valves, and
controls. The purpose of the chillers is twofold: to cool down the process
stream during storage of boron on the resin and to maintain an outlet temperature from the BTRS at or below 115
°F during release of boron.
B. System Operation
A master switch is provided which places the system in either the boron release or boron storage mode of operation or turns the system off. The operational
modes determined by the thermal regeneration selector switch are boration, dilution, and off.
When the switch is set on off, the BTRS is isolated from the letdown line and the chiller and chiller pumps are stopped. Valve 1-8547 opens to permit normal
letdown flow directly to the volume control tank. With the switch set for dilution (boron storage), the following alignments occur:
- 1. Proper flow path to BTRS is established.
- 2. Tube side flow (hot letdown) of the letdown reheat heat exchanger is isolated.
- 3. The BTRS bypass valve (1-8547) diverts all letdown flow into the BTRS.
The chiller heat exchanger shell flow control valve (TCV-386) is set to control the temperature of the water leaving the tube side and going to the BTRS
demineralizers. Valve 1-HCV-387 is adjusted to control the amount of water that
flows through the demineralizer beds.
When the selector switch is set for boration (boron release), the system automatically:
- 1. Aligns the proper flow path in the BTRS.
- 2. Controls the temperature leaving the shell side and going to the BTRS demineralizers via the letdown reheat heat exchanger tube flow control
valve (TCV-381).
- 3. Directs all letdown flow into the BTRS via bypass valve 1-8547.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-42 REV 25 4/14 The chiller heat exchanger flow control valve (TCV-386) is set to control the temperature of the water leaving the tube side and going to the volume control
tank. Valve 1-HCV-387 is adjusted to control the amount of water that flows
through the demineralizer beds.
After the mode of operation has been selected and the system prepared for operation by
actuation of the master switch, flow is admitted to the BTRS by throttling back on the diversion
valve in the letdown line. The flowrate through the BTRS is dictated by the desired reactor
coolant dilution (boration) rate.
When the boron concentration of the reactor coolant reaches the desired level, the BTRS is
shut down by placing the master switch in the off position.
Table 9.3-8 shows certain values associated with operation of the BTRS and their position in
each operating mode.
9.3.4.2.3 Safety Evaluation Any partial or total malfunction of the BTRS would result only in loss of plant load following
capability. This system is nonsafety related. The postulated full power dilution accident
considered in chapter 15 is not influenced by dilution with this system. The dilution flow
depends solely upon the delivery capability of the charging pumps, which remains unchanged
with or without BTRS operability.
9.3.4.2.4 Tests and Inspections The BTRS is in intermittent use throughout normal reactor operation. Periodic visual inspection
and preventive maintenance are conducted using normal industry practice.
9.3.4.2.5 Instrumentation Application A. Temperature
Instrumentation is provided to monitor the chiller outlet temperature and to control chiller operation. Instrumentation is also provided to monitor the chiller
surge tank temperature. Readout for both sets of instrumentation is located on
the main control board.
Instrumentation is provided to control the temperature of the letdown flow passing through the demineralizers. During dilution, it controls a valve which
throttles the letdown chiller heat exchanger shell-side flow. During boration, it
controls the valves which throttle the letdown reheat heat exchanger tube side
flow. Readout and a high temperature alarm are provided on the main control
board.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-43 REV 25 4/14 Protection of the thermal regeneration demineralizer resins from high temperature flow is provided by instrumentation which, upon reaching the high
temperature setpoint, operates a three-way valve in the letdown line upstream of
the mixed-bed demineralizers in the CVCS in order to divert the letdown flow to
the volume control tank. Readout is provided on the main control board.
Instrumentation is provided to monitor the temperature of the flow leaving the demineralizers. Temperature indication is provided on the main control board.
The temperature of the flow leaving the BTRS during boration (boron release) operations is controlled by instrumentation controlling a valve which throttles the
letdown chiller heat exchanger shell-side flow. Thus the temperature of the fluid
being routed to the volume control tank is prevented from becoming too high.
B. Pressure
Instrumentation is provided which monitors and gives local indication of the pressure at each chiller pump suction and discharge and at the inlet and outlet to
the bank of demineralizers.
C. Flow
Instrumentation on the return line to the chiller surge tank maintains chiller loop flow at a constant value by controlling the valve which adjusts the amount of flow
bypassing the letdown chiller heat exchanger. Thus, if the shell-side flow in the heat exchanger is restricted by the temperature controlled valve, the bypass
valve is automatically adjusted to maintain full flow in the chiller loop.
Instrumentation is provided to monitor the flowrate through the BTRS. Indication is on the main control board.
D. Level
Instrumentation is provided to measure the fluid level in the chiller surge tank.
Level readout and high and low level alarms are provided on the main control
board.
9.3.5 FAILED
FUEL DETECTION SYSTEM 9.3.5.1 Design Bases The gross failed fuel detection system consists of equipment designed to detect gross fuel
failure by the measurement of delayed neutron activity in the reactor coolant.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-44 REV 25 4/14 9.3.5.2 System Description
The gross failed fuel detector is connected to the hot leg of a primary coolant loop (figure 9.3-2).
The coolant sample passes through a cooler and then into a coil containing a neutron detector
and moderator, after which it flows back into the volume control tank. The sample delay time to
the neutron detector is adjusted by means of a flow controller. The delay time also depends on
the length of tubing used. Once set, the flow is kept relatively constant by the automatic flow control valve. A transmitting flowmeter is installed for periodic checks of the flowrate. A sensor
monitors the temperature within the neutron coil.
Figure 9.3-3 shows the block diagram of the gross failed fuel detector channel. The detector, preamplifier, sample cooler, and associated flow controls are located outside the containment.
The signal processing equipment and readout are mounted in a rack located in the control
room. The delayed neutron signal of the detector is displayed on a recorder located in the rack.
The response time for the gross failed fuel detector is on the order of 60 s.
9.3.5.3 Safety Evaluation The gross failed fuel detection system does not perform a safety-related function and is not
designed to satisfy any specific safety criteria. As shown in figure 9.3-2, the gross failed fuel
detector is outside the containment and is installed in the primary coolant hot leg sample line. It
is isolated from the containment by means of t he sample system isolation valves. The safety evaluation of the sampling system, including the isolation valves, is discussed in
subsection 9.3.2.
9.3.5.4 Tests and Inspections The gross failed fuel detection system is equipped with a test oscillator in the preamplifier and a
test oscillator in the electronics drawer, each of which can be used to test the proper operation
of the signal processing circuitry. Routine tests and inspections will be performed in
accordance with procedures described in section 13.5.
9.3.5.5 Instrument Applications Instrumentation associated with the gross failed fuel detection system is described in
paragraph 9.3.5.2.
FNP-FSAR-9
9.3-45 REV 25 4/14
REFERENCES:
- 1. NRC Safety Evaluation Report, J. M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2, NUREG-0117 Supplement No. 5 to NUREG-75/034, dated March 1981.
- 2. Letter from NRC, dated March 26, 1985, and enclosed SER related to the Post-Accident Sampling System.
- 3. Letter from NRC, dated January 7, 1987, and enclosed SER related to Regulatory Guide 1.97.
- 4. Letter from NRC, dated May 22, 2002, and enclosed SER related to FOL amendments 156 and 148 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.3-2 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
PRIMARY SAMPLE SYSTEM SAMPLE POINT DESIGN DATA Sample Conditions Design/ Design/ Sample Service Service Point Sample Point Name (psig) (°F) XE-3101 Reactor coolant hot 2458/2235 650/600 leg, loop 2 XE-3102 Reactor coolant hot 2485/2235 650/600 leg, loop 3 XE-3103 Pressurizer liquid 2485/2235 680/653 XE-3104 Pressurizer steam 2485/2235 680/650 XE-3105 Discharge residual 600/400 400/350 heat exchanger 1 XE-3106 Discharge residual 600/400 400/350 heat exchanger 2 XE-3117 Volume control tank 150/60 500/120 gas space XE-3162 Accumulator tank 1 700/650 650/150 XE-3163 Accumulator tank 2 700/650 650/150 XE-3164 Accumulator tank 3 700/650 650/150 XE-3127 Discharge letdown 370/200 650/127 heat exchanger XE-3151 Discharge mixed bed 370/150 650/127 demineralizers XE-3179A Steam generator 1A, 1085/775 600/517 bottom
XE-3180A Steam generator 1B, 1085/775 600/517 bottom
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.3-2 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Sample Conditions Design/ Design/
Sample Service Service Point Sample Point Name (psig) (°F) XE-3181A Steam generator 1C, 1085/775 600/517 bottom
XE-3182A Main steam line 1A 1085/775 600/517 XE-3182B Main steam line 1B 1085/775 600/517 XE-3182C Main steam line 1C 1085/775 600/517
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.3-3 (SHEET 1 OF 3)
LOCAL GRAB SAMPLES Sample Conditions Design/ Design/ Service Service Sample Point Name (psig) (°F) Boric acid blender discharge to volume ATM/ATM 300/165 control tank Boric acid tank 1 ATM/ATM 200/60-80 Boric acid tank 2 ATM/ATM 200/60-80 Boric acid batching tank ATM/ATM 300/165 Discharge recycle evaporator feed 150/75 200/115 demineralizer 1 Discharge recycle evaporator feed 150/75 200/115 demineralizer 2 Recycle holdup tank 1 (bottom of ATM/ATM 200/120 diaphragm)
Recycle holdup tank 2 (bottom of ATM/ATM 200/120 diaphragm)
Recycle holdup tank 3 (bottom of ATM/ATM 200/120 diaphragm)
Discharge recycle evaporator feed pumps 150/140 200/120 Discharge recycle evaporator condensate 150/100 200/115 demineralizer Recycle evaporator package concentrates 150/135 500/120 sample Recycle evaporator package distillates 150/135 500/120 sample Recycle holdup tanks to WPS gas ATM/ATM 200/120 compressor
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.3-3 (SHEET 2 OF 3)
Sample Conditions Design/ Design/ Service Service Sample Point Name (psig) (°F) Floor drain tank pump discharge 150/110 200/120 Gas decay tanks (gas sample) 50/20 150/140 Water from spent fuel pool pump 1 150/30 200/120 Refuel water from demineralizer to spent 200/120 150/60 fuel pool Discharge residual heat removal pump 1 600/400 400/350 Discharge residual heat removal pump 2 600/400 400/350 Discharge thermal regenerative heat 250/200 150/140 exchanger to modified heat exchanger Letdown chiller heat exchanger 25/100 150/100 discharge to chiller surge tank Reactor coolant drain tank discharge 150/100 250/100 Vent from reactor coolant drain tank 100/10 200/100 to WPS Waste evaporator condensate from waste 150/100 200/120 evaporator condition tank or demineralizer Waste evaporator feed pump discharge 150/110 200/120 to waste evaporator filter Waste evaporator demineralizer discharge 150/110 200/120 to waste evaporator condition tank Waste condensate pump discharge 150/110 200/120 Waste evaporator concentrate sample 150/135 500/120
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.3-3 (SHEET 3 OF 3)
Sample Conditions Design/ Design/ Service Service Sample Point Name (psig) (°F) Waste evaporator distillate sample 150/135 500/120 Spent resin storage tank sluice filter 150/110 200/120 discharge Chemical drain tank pump discharge 150/110 200/120 Laundry and hot shower pump discharge 150/110 200/120 Discharge of waste monitor tank 150/110 200/120 discharge pumps 1 and 2 to environment Component cooling heat exchanger A 150/100 200/120 (component cooling water)
Component cooling heat exchanger B 150/100 200/120 Component cooling heat exchanger C 150/100 200/120 Component cooling heat exchanger A 150/100 200/120 (service water)
Component cooling heat exchanger B 150/100 200/120 Component cooling heat exchanger C 150/100 200/120 Reactor makeup water tank ATM/ATM 200/120 Demineralized water tank ATM/ATM 200/120 Boric acid transfer pump A discharge 150/120 500/80 Boric acid transfer pump B discharge 150/120 500/80
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.3-4 TURBINE PLANT ANALYZER SAMPLING SECTION SAMPLE POINT DESIGN DATA Sample Conditions Design/ Design/ Service Service Sample Point Name (psig) (°F) Makeup to condenser 50/35 150/121 Condensate pump discharge 550/466 300/121 Steam generator feedwater 550/466 470/121 pump suction Steam generator inlet 1180/775 470/442 Steam generator outlet 1 1085/775 600/517 Steam generator outlet 2 1085/775 600/517
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.3-5 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS General Features Parameter Seal water supply flowrate for three reactor 24 coolant pumps, nominal (gal/min)
Seal water return flowrate for three reactor 9 coolant pumps, nominal (gal/min)
Letdown flow (gal/min)
Normal 60 Maximum 135 Charging flow, excluding seal water (gal/min)
Normal 45 Maximum 105 (a) Temperature of letdown reactor coolant 543.5 entering system (°F) Temperature of charging flow directed to 485 reactor coolant system (°F) Centrifugal charging pump bypass flow, 60 each (gal/min)
Amount of 4 percent boric acid solution 11,300 required to meet cold shutdown requirements shortly after full power operation (gal)
- a. The original design value of 105 gal/min has been reevaluated for a flow controller limit
increase to 130 gal/min and has been found acceptable.
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.3-7 (SHEET 1 OF 3)
BORON THERMAL REGENERATION SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA Chiller Pumps Number 2 Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (°F) 200 Design flow (gal/min) 500 Design head (ft) 150 Material Carbon steel Moderating Heat Exchanger Number 1
Design heat transfer 2.53 x 10 6 (Btu/h)
Shell Tube Design pressure (psig) 300 300 Design temperature (°F) 200 200 Design flow (lb/h) 59,640 59,640 Design inlet 50 115 temperature, boron storage mode (°F) Design outlet 92.4 72.6 temperature, boron storage mode (°F) Inlet temperature, boron 140 115 release mode (°F) Outlet temperature, 123.7 131.3 boron release mode (°F) Fluid circulated Reactor Reactor coolant coolant Material Stainless Stainless steel steel
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.3-7 (SHEET 2 OF 3)
Letdown Chiller Heat Exchanger Number 1 Design heat transfer 1.65 x 10 6 (Btu/h)
Shell Tube Design pressure (psig) 150 300 Design temperature (°F) 200 200 Design flow (lb/h) 175,000 59,640 Design inlet 39 72.6 temperature, boron storage mode (°F) Design outlet 48.4 45 temperature, boron storage mode (°F) Inlet temperature, 90 123.7 boron release mode
(°F) Outlet temperature, 99.4 96.1 boron release mode
(°F) Fluid circulated Chromated Reactor water coolant Material Carbon Stainless steel steel Letdown Reheat Heat Exchanger
Number 1 Design heat transfer 1.49 x 10 6 (Btu/h)
Shell Tube Design pressure (psig) 300 600 Design temperature (°F) 200 400 Design flow (lb/h) 59,640 44,730 Inlet temperature (°F) 115 280 Outlet temperature (°F) 140 246.7 Fluid circulated Reactor Reactor coolant coolant Material Stainless Stainless steel steel FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.3-7 (SHEET 3 OF 3)
Chiller Surge Tank Number 1 Volume (gal) 400 Design pressure (psig)
Atmospheric Design temperature (°F) 200 Material Carbon steel
Thermal Regeneration Demineralizers
Number 4 Design pressure (psig) 300 Design temperature (°F) 250 Design flow (gal/min) 120 Resin volume (ft
- 3) 70 Material Stainless steel
Chillers
Number 2 Capacity (Btu/h) 1.66 x 10 6 Design flow (gal/min) 352 Inlet temperature (°F) 48.4 Outlet temperature (°F) 39
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REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.3-8 VALVE POSITIONS FOR OPERATING MODES OF BORON THERMAL REGENERATION SYSTEM Valve Dilute Off Borate 7054 Open Closed Open 7002A Open Closed Closed 7002B Open Closed Closed 7022 Open Closed Closed 7040 Closed Open Open 7041 Closed Open Open 7045 Open Open Closed 7046 Closed Closed Open TCV-381A Closed Closed (a)
TCV-381B Open Open (a)
TCV-386 (a) Closed (a)
HCV-387 (3-way) (a) Open (a) 8547 Closed Open Closed
- a. Limit switch indication not available, since position varies.
REV 21 5/08 REACTOR COOLANT SAMPLING SYSTEM JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.3-1
REV 21 5/08 GROSS FAILED FUEL DETECTOR FLOW DIAGRAM JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.3-2
REV 21 5/08 GROSS FAILED FUEL DETECTOR ELECTRONICS DIAGRAM JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.3-3
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REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-1 (SHEET 1 OF 4)
CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING AND FILTRATION SYSTEM - COMPONENT DESCRIPTION
Air Conditioning Units Fans Type Centrifugal Quantity (100 percent capacity) 2 Capacity (ft 3/min each) 21,000 Total static pressure (in. WG)
3.5 Drive
Belt Motor (hp) 20 Condensing unit Condenser Type Air-cooled Quantity per train 2 (100% capacity)
Total cooling (Btu/h each) 600,000 Compressor Type Refrigerant, scroll Quantity per condensing unit 4 (100 percent capacity)
Drive Direct Exhaust Fans Type Vane axial Quantity (100 percent capacity) 2 Capacity (ft 3/min each) 7200 Total static pressure (in. WG)
2.5 Drive
Direct Motor (hp) 7.5
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REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-1 (SHEET 2 OF 4)
Control Room Filtration Units (1000 ft 3/min) Fans Type Centrifugal Quantity (100 percent capacity) 2 Capacity (ft 3/min each) 1000 Total static pressure (in. WG)
4.8 Drive
Direct Motor (hp) 1.5 HEPA filters Type High efficiency, dry Media Glass fiber (water-proof, fire retardant) Design Efficiency, removal of 0.3 ~m DOP 99.97 smoke (percent)
Efficiency, 0.3
µm DOP smoke 99.5 removal credit allowed by the NRC (percent)
Pressure drop, clean (in. WG)
1.0 Charcoal
filters Type 2-in. tray Media Activated, impreg-nated carbon Design Efficiency, elemental iodine 99.9 (percent)
Testing Efficiency, methyl iodide 97.5 (percent) Efficiency, elemental and organic 94.5 iodine removal credit allowed by the NRC (percent)
Pressure drop, clean (in. WG) 1.1
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-1 (SHEET 3 OF 4)
Control Room Recirculation Filtration Units (2000 ft 3/min) Fans Type Vane axial Quantity (100 percent capacity) 2 Capacity (ft 3/min each) 2000 Total static pressure (in. WG) 8 Drive Direct Motor (hp) 7.5 HEPA filters Type High efficiency, dry Media Glass fiber (water-proof, fire retardant) Design efficiency, removal of 0.3 ~m DOP 99.97 smoke (percent)
Efficiency, 0.3 mm DOP smoke removal 99.5 credit allowed by the NRC (percent)
Pressure drop, clean (in. WG)
1.0 Charcoal
filters Type 2-in. HECA TM Media Activated, impreg-nated carbon Design efficiency, elemental iodine 99.9 (percent)
Testing efficiency, methyl iodide 97.5 (percent) Efficiency, elemental and organic 94.5 iodine removal credit allowed by the NRC (percent)
Pressure drop, clean (in. WG) 1.25
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-1 (SHEET 4 OF 4)
Control Room Filtration Units (Air Pressurization System)
Fans Type Centrifugal Quantity (100 percent capacity) 2 Capacity (ft 3/min each) 300 Total static pressure (in. WG) 9 Drive Direct Motor (hp) 1.5 HEPA filters Type High efficency, dry Media Glass fiber (water-proof, fire retardant)
Design efficiency, removal of 0.3
µm DOP 99.97 smoke (percent)
Efficiency, 0.3
µm DOP smoke removal 99.5 credit allowed by the NRC (percent)
Pressure drop, clean (in. WG)
1.0 Charcoal
filters Type 6-in. deep bed, HECA TM Media Activated, impreg-nated carbon Design efficiency, elemental iodine 99.9 (percent)
Testing efficiency, methyl iodide 99.5 (percent) Efficiency, elemental and organic 98.5 iodine removal credit allowed by the NRC (percent)
Pressure drop, clean (in. WG)
2.7 Electric
heater Type Finned tube Capacity (kW) 2.5
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 1 OF 9)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, REV. 0 APPLICABILITY FOR THE CONTROL ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM (PRESSURIZATION)
Reg. Applicability Reg. Applicability Guide to This Note Guide to This Note Section System Index Section System Index C.1.a Yes 1 C.3.h Yes 9 C.1.b Yes - C.3.i Yes -
C.1.c Yes - C.3.j No 10 C.1.d Yes - C.3.k Yes -
C.1.e Yes - C.3.l Yes 11 C.2.a No 2 C.3.m Yes 12 C.2.b No 3 C.3.n Yes - C.2.c Yes - C.4.a Yes -
C.2.d Yes - C.4.b Yes -
C.2.e Yes - C.4.c Yes 13 C.2.f Yes - C.4.d Yes - C.2.g Yes 4 C.4.e Yes -
C.2.h No 5 C.4.f Yes - C.2.i Yes - C.4.g Yes - C.2.j No 6 C.4.h Yes 14 C.2.k Yes - C.4.i Yes -
C.2.l Yes - C.4.j Yes - C.2.m Yes - C.4.k Yes -
C.3.a No 7 C.4.l Yes - C.3.b Yes - C.4.m Yes -
C.3.c Yes - C.5.a Yes -
C.3.d Yes - C.5.b Yes 15 C.3.e Yes 8 C.5.c Yes 15 C.3.f Yes - C.6.a Yes - C.3.g Yes - C.6.b Yes -
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 2 OF 9)
NOTES 1. The design basis accident is the postulated LOCA.
- 2. No demister is provided because the unit is located outside the containment and no entrained water droplets are anticipated. No HEPA filters are provided downstream of
the charcoals, since radioactive fines carryover is very unlikely. This is true because the
charcoal trays are pressure tested at high velocity in the manufacturer's shop prior to
delivery, thereby removing fines. Also, during system operation, air is passing through
the charcoal at a very low velocity.
- 3. No physical separation is provided, since these units are located in a room where no missiles are postulated.
- 4. Pressure drops across the prefilters, HEPA, and charcoal filters are instrumented to indicate in the equipment room. Pressure drops across the HEPA and charcoal filters
are instrumented to alarm in the control room. No recording of these signals is provided.
Fan loss of flow is also instrumented to signal in the equipment room and alarm in the
control room.
- 5. Fan motors and motor-operated valves installed outside containment and in a nonradioactive area are not in conformance with IEEE 323.
- 6. The size of the engineered safety feature filtration units precludes replacement as a single unit. The unit components are replaced individually.
- 7. Demisters are not provided.
- 8. Mounting frames for filter and charcoals are constructed of carbon steel coated with an inorganic nuclear grade paint.
- 9. Internal welds are carbon steel coated with an inorganic nuclear grade paint.
- 10. The deluge and drain system has been eliminated due to recurring problems experienced at other facilities associated with inadvertent wetting of the absorber.
Temperature gauges have been installed to monitor any heat rise in the filter housing.
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 3 OF 9)
- 11. Environmental conditions for systems considered are those specified under outside containment and nonradioactive area.
- 12. Duct construction guidelines follow SMACNA, in addition to ORNL-NSIC-65.
- 13. Vacuum breakers are not used. This pr events the probability of system leakage from pressure relieving device leakage or failure.
- 14. Test probes are not manifolded and are located in readily accessible locations with minimum piping.
- 15. Periodic testing to confirm a penetration of less than 0.5% at rated flow.
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 4 OF 9)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, REV. 0 APPLICABILITY FOR THE CONTROL ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM (RECIRCULATION)
Reg. Applicability Reg. Applicability Guide to This Note Guide to This Note Section System Index Section System Index C.1.a Yes 1 C.3.h Yes 9C.1.b Yes - C.3.i Yes -
C.1.c Yes - C.3.j No 10 C.1.d Yes - C.3.k Yes -
C.1.e Yes - C.3.l Yes 11 C.2.a No 2 C.3.m Yes 12C.2.b No 3 C.3.n Yes -C.2.c Yes - C.4.a Yes -
C.2.d Yes - C.4.b Yes -
C.2.e Yes - C.4.c Yes 13 C.2.f Yes - C.4.d Yes -C.2.g Yes 4 C.4.e Yes -
C.2.h No 5 C.4.f Yes -C.2.i Yes - C.4.g Yes -C.2.j No 6 C.4.h Yes 14C.2.k Yes - C.4.i Yes -
C.2.l Yes - C.4.j Yes -C.2.m Yes - C.4.k Yes -
C.3.a No 7 C.4.l Yes -C.3.b No - C.4.m Yes -C.3.c Yes - C.5.a Yes -
C.3.d Yes - C.5.b Yes 15 C.3.e Yes 8 C.5.c Yes 15 C.3.f Yes - C.6.a Yes -C.3.g Yes - C.6.b Yes -
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 5 OF 9)
NOTES 1. The design basis accident is the postulated LOCA.
- 2. No demister is provided because the unit is located outside the containment and no entrained water droplets are anticipated. No HEPA filters are provided downstream of
the charcoals, since radioactive fines carryover is very unlikely. This is true because the
charcoal trays are pressure tested at high velocity in the manufacturer's shop prior to
delivery, thereby removing fines. Also, during system operation, air is passing through
the charcoal at a very low velocity.
- 3. No physical separation is provided, since these units are located in a room where no missiles are postulated.
- 4. Pressure drops across the prefilters, HEPA, and charcoal filters are instrumented to indicate in the equipment room. Pressure drops across the HEPA and charcoal filters
are instrumented to alarm in the control room. No recording of these signals is provided.
Fan loss of flow is also instrumented to signal in the equipment room and alarm in the
control room.
- 5. Fan motors and motor-operated valves installed outside containment and in a nonradioactive area are not in conformance with IEEE 323.
- 6. The size of the engineered safety feature filtration units precludes replacement as a single unit. The unit components are replaced individually.
- 7. Demisters are not provided.
- 8. Mounting frames for filter and charcoals are constructed of carbon steel coated with an inorganic nuclear grade paint.
- 9. Internal welds are carbon steel coated with an inorganic nuclear grade paint.
- 10. The deluge and drain system has been eliminated due to recurring problems experienced at other facilities associated with inadvertent wetting of the absorber.
Temperature gauges have been installed to monitor any heat rise in the filter housing.
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 6 OF 9)
- 11. Environmental conditions for systems considered are those specified under outside containment and nonradioactive area.
- 12. Duct construction guidelines follow SMACNA, in addition to ORNL-NSIC-65.
- 13. Vacuum breakers are not used. This pr events the probability of system leakage from pressure relieving device leakage or failure.
- 14. Test probes are not manifolded and are located in readily accessible locations with minimum piping.
- 15. Periodic testing to confirm a penetration of less than 0.5% at rated flow.
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 7 OF 9)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52, REV. 0 APPLICABILITY FOR THE CONTROL ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM (FILTRATION)
Reg. Applicability Reg. Applicability Guide to This Note Guide to This Note Section System Index Section System Index C.1.a Yes 1 C.3.h Yes 9C.1.b Yes - C.3.i Yes -
C.1.c Yes - C.3.j No 10 C.1.d Yes - C.3.k Yes -
C.1.e Yes - C.3.l Yes 11 C.2.a No 2 C.3.m Yes 12C.2.b No 3 C.3.n Yes -C.2.c Yes - C.4.a Yes -
C.2.d Yes - C.4.b Yes -
C.2.e Yes - C.4.c Yes 13 C.2.f Yes - C.4.d Yes -C.2.g Yes 4 C.4.e Yes -
C.2.h No 5 C.4.f Yes -C.2.i Yes - C.4.g Yes -C.2.j No 6 C.4.h Yes 14C.2.k Yes - C.4.i Yes -
C.2.l Yes - C.4.j Yes -C.2.m Yes - C.4.k Yes -
C.3.a No 7 C.4.l Yes -C.3.b No - C.4.m Yes -C.3.c Yes - C.5.a Yes -
C.3.d Yes - C.5.b Yes 15 C.3.e Yes 8 C.5.c Yes 15 C.3.f Yes - C.6.a Yes -C.3.g Yes - C.6.b Yes -
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 8 OF 9)
NOTES 1. The design basis accident is the postulated LOCA.
- 2. No demister is provided because the unit is located outside the containment and no entrained water droplets are anticipated. No HEPA filters are provided downstream of
the charcoals, since radioactive fines carryover is very unlikely. This is true because the
charcoal trays are pressure tested at high velocity in the manufacturer's shop prior to
delivery, thereby removing fines. Also, during system operation, air is passing through
the charcoal at a very low velocity.
- 3. No physical separation is provided, since these units are located in a room where no missiles are postulated.
- 4. Pressure drops across the prefilters, HEPA, and charcoal filters are instrumented to indicate in the equipment room. Pressure drops across the HEPA and charcoal filters
are instrumented to alarm in the control room. No recording of these signals is provided.
Fan loss of flow is also instrumented to signal in the equipment room and alarm in the
control room.
- 5. Fan motors and motor-operated valves installed outside containment and in a nonradioactive area are not in conformance with IEEE 323.
- 6. The size of the engineered safety feature filtration units precludes replacement as a single unit. The unit components are replaced individually.
- 7. Demisters are not provided.
- 8. Mounting frames for filter and charcoals are constructed of carbon steel coated with an inorganic nuclear grade paint.
- 9. Internal welds are carbon steel coated with an inorganic nuclear grade paint.
- 10. The deluge and drain system has been eliminated due to recurring problems experienced at other facilities associated with inadvertent wetting of the absorber.
Temperature gauges have been installed to monitor any heat rise in the filter housing.
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-2 (SHEET 9 OF 9)
- 11. Environmental conditions for systems considered are those specified under outside containment and nonradioactive area.
- 12. Duct construction guidelines follow SMACNA, in addition to ORNL-NSIC-65.
- 13. Access doors are not used.
- 14. Test probes are not manifolded and are located in readily accessible locations with minimum piping.
- 15. Periodic testing to confirm a penetration of less than 0.5% at rated flow.
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-3 CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING AND FILTRATION SYSTEM - SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS Component Malfunction Comments and Consequences Air handling Component failure Two units provided; unit operation of one required Condensing unit Component failure Four units provided; operation of one required Filter train Failure resulting in Two filter trains pro-high differential vided; operation of pressure across the one required train Isolation valve, Fails to close after Two valves in series; fresh air supply high radiation signal, operation of one required and utility safety injection for isolation exhaust signal, containment isolation signal, or smoke detection signal Duct system Failure resulting in Two full capacity loss of air recircu-systems provided; lation operation of one required Outside air Fails to open Two provided; operation supply valve of one required Isolation valve, N/A Single isolation valves smoke purge are maintained in closed exhaust position during normal operation to provide control room isolation boundary (passive component)
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-4 TIME CALCULATIONS FOR VARIOUS CHLORINE CONCENTRATIONS Time Required to Reach Maximum the Following Cl 2 Concentration (s)
Concentration (ppm by Case 15 ppm 30 ppm 45 ppm 60 ppm Maximum volume)
A 264.5 268.25 271 273.61 9392 368.8 B 134.0 137.0 139.5 143 9254 184.4 C 274 286 2736 6451 9433 70.3 D 455 7377 -- -- 9318 33.5
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-5 (SHEETS 1 THROUGH 3)
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.52 APPLICABILITY FOR THE SPENT FUEL POOL FILTRATION SYSTEM
(This Table has been deleted.)
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-6A AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM TEMPERATURES FOR POST-ACCIDENT HEAT LOADS Rm. Temp.(a)(b) Room No. Room Description at end of post-accident period 173/174/181 (2173/2174/2181) CH/HH Safety Inject. Pump Rms.
119°F 129/131 (2129/2131) RHR/LH Injection Pump Rms.
129°F 111/125 (2111/2125) Containment Spray Pump Rms.
122°F 185 (2185) Component Cooling Pump Room 126°F 191/192 (2191/2192) Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Rms.
116°F 224/226 (2224/2226) Battery Charger Rooms (A & B) 114°F 225 (2225) Battery Charger Rooms (C) 114°F 332 (2332)
MCC 1A (2A) Areas 121°F 209 MCC 1B Area 131°F 2209 MCC 2B Area 129°F 229/335 (2229/2335) 600 V Load Center 1D, 2D, 1E, & 2E Area 130°F
(a) The room and area temperatures listed are based on assumptions of design service water flow rates, design air flow rates
and design fouling factor for the associated air coolers.
(b) The room temperatures listed in this column are at the end of a 30 day accident and are based on service water temperature of 106.2°F, equipment in operation and loss of normal non-safety related HVAC for all 30 days.
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 22 8/09 TABLE 9.4-7 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST, BATTERY CHARGER ROOM, MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS, AND 600-V LOAD CENTERS AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES PUMP ROOM COOLING SYSTEMS - SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS Component Malfunction Comments and Consequences
Battery room Fan failure One exhaust fan is provided exhaust fan for each battery room; one battery is required during post-LOCA operation The failed exhaust fan will be isolated and repaired
Battery room Duct failure Low flow will be alarmed exhaust duct locally The failed exhaust fan will be isolated and repaired
Battery charger Component failure One cooler is provided for
room cooler each battery charger; two battery chargers operate and one is spare during post-LOCA operation The failed cooler will be isolated and repaired; the spare battery charger will be started, including the associated cooler Battery charger Duct failure Low differential pressure room cooling will be alarmed locally system duct The failed duct will be isolated and repaired; the spare cooler will be started
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 22 8/09 TABLE 9.4-7 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Component Malfunction Comments and Consequences Engineered safety Component failure One cooler is provided for features pump each charging high head, room coolers residual heat removal, containment spray, and auxiliary feedwater pump; two coolers for three component cooling pumps; each spare pump has its own spare pump room cooler The failed cooler will be isolated and repaired; the spare pump and cooler will be started Motor control Component failure One cooler each is provided center cooler for motor control center 1A, 2A and 2B and two coolers are provided for motor control center 1B; each of the coolers operates during post-LOCA operation The failed cooler will be isolated; the ambient temperature in the room being served by the failed cooler will rise but not exceed the design basis temperature of the service equipment 600-V load Component failure One cooler each is provided center cooler for 600-V load center 1D and 1E; both 600-V load centers operate The failed cooler will be isolated; the room ambient temperature associated with the failed cooler will rise until the cooler is repaired and reenergized
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-8 RADWASTE AREA HEATING, VENTILATING, AND FILTRATION SYSTEMS DESIGN PARAMETERS Item Radwaste Area Air handling unit (supply)
Type Horizontal, drawthrough, floor-mounted Number 1 Flowrate (sf 3/min) 50,000 Static head (in. WG)
4.5 Heating
capacity (Btu/h) 2.16 x 10 6 Motor hp, each 75 Exhaust fan Type Vaneaxial
Number 2 Flowrate, each (sf 3/min) 50,000 Static head (in. WG)
6.5 Motor
hp, each 75 Filtration unit Type Composite prefilter, HEPA charcoal Number 1 Prefilter media Dry, cartridge Prefilter efficiency 85, NIST dust spot (percent)
HEPA media Dry, extended HEPA efficiency 99.97, DPO at 0.3 m (percent)
Charcoal media Coconut, activated, impregnated
Charcoal efficiency 99.9 - I 2; 99.0 - CH 3 I (percent)
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-9 UNIT 2 RADWASTE AREA HEATING, VENTILATING, AND FILTRATION SYSTEMS DESIGN PARAMETERS Waste Gas Area Item Filtration Unit (a) Air handling unit (supply)
None Exhaust fan Type Centrifugal
Number 1 Flowrate, each (sf 3/min) 3000 Static head (in. WG)
4.0 Motor
hp, each 10.0 Filtration unit Type HEPA, charcoal filter, totally enclosed, refillable
Number 2 Prefilter media Dry cartridge Prefilter efficiency (percent) 85, NIST discoloration HEPA media - HEPA efficiency (percent) - Charcoal media Coconut, activated, impregnated charcoal Charcoal efficiency (percent) 99.9 - I 2; 99.0 - CH 3 I
- a. Exhaust airflow from the chemical and laundr y drain tank room, waste monitor tank room, and the waste gas area processing area.
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-10 RADWASTE HEATING, VENTILATION, AND FILTRATION SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS
Component Malfunction Comments and Consequences
Air handling Failure of fan, Loss of airflow actuates an unit supply resulting in loss annunciation system until corrective fan of airflow action is taken Ventilation Failure of fans, Loss of airflow actuates an exhaust fans resulting in loss annunciation system; after 10 s of airflow have elapsed, standby fan will auto- matically start Radwaste area Filter overload, Increase in filter pressure drop has -
filter unit resulting in in-no sudden effect on system capability; creased air filter local filter pressure drop display pressure drop provides alarm for corrective action Instrumentation Instrumentation Control actuators assume fail-safe power failure position until corrective action is taken Ventilation Failure of or leak-Decreased or loss of airflow indicates supply duct age from exhaust low pressure; system loss of or duct, resulting in decrease in air capacity actuates an decreased or loss annunciation system; after 10 s have of airflow elapsed, standby will automatically start
Ventilation Failure of or leak-Decrease or loss of airflow indicates exhaust duct age from exhaust low pr essure; system loss of or duct, resulting in decrease in air capacity actuates an decreased or loss annunciation system; after 10 s have of airflow elapsed, standby fan will automatically start
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-12 (SHEET 1 OF 4)
DESCRIPTION OF CASES EVALUATED IN SAFETY EVALUATION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING Case Location and Event Assumptions Intakes Maximum Concentration
[HISTORICAL]
[1 Chlorine spill, 2 tons at Wind speed 0.5 mps, Large 1684 ppm or 5 mg/m 3 circulating water house direction toward intake, about 900 ft NNW of Pasquill F stability generator building 2 Chlorine spill, 2 tons at Wind speed 0.5 mps, Large 81,969 ppm or 242 mg/m 3 circulating water house direction toward intake, about 200 ft NE of genera- Pasquill F stability tor building
] 3 Combustion products due to Wind speed 10 mph, direc- Nearest Insigni ficant, plume rise fire at underground fuel tion toward intakes is about 192 ft in the distance storage tanks, 8000-gal between fire and intake; intake spill from a tank truck is at 22 ft above ground and resulting fire 4 Heat or air temperature due Wind speed 10 mph, Nearest Insignific ant, plume rise is to fire at underground fuel direction toward intakes about 192 ft in the distance storage tanks, 8000-gal between fire and intake; intake spill from a tank truck is at 22 ft above ground and resulting fire
[5 Same as case 1 Same as case 1 Small 1684 ppm or 5 mg/m 3 6 Same as case 2 Same as case 2 Small 80,929 ppm or 239 mg/m 3 ] 7 Combustion products con-Wind speed 5 m/s, di-Both large CO 2 at large intake - 793 mg/m 3 sidering effect of diesel rection from nearest and small CO 2 at small intake - 903 mg/m 3 exhaust pipes exhaust to intakes H 2 O at large intake - 297 mg/m 3 H 2 O at small intake - 338 mg/m 3 SO 2 at large intake - 1.2 mg/m 3 SO 2 at small intake - 1.3 mg/m 3 N 2 at large intake - 3246 mg/m 3 N 2 at small intake - 3697 mg/m 3
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-12 (SHEET 2 OF 4)
Case Location and Event Assumptions Intakes Maximum Concentration 8 Air temperature rise Same as case 7, except Both large T rise at large intake - 8°F considering effect of ambient outside temperature and small T rise at small intake - 5°F diesel exhaust pipes 90°F 9 Actuation of CO 2 fire Ventilators, doors, louvers Large 11,280 ppm protection system in the etc., operate normally, wind large diesel generator speed 10 mph, direction room, 2800 lb CO 2 re- toward intake leased in 1 min 10 Same as case 9 Same as case 9, except Large 15,412 ppm roof ventilators fail to turn off 11 Same as case 9 Same as case 9, except Large 2807 ppm failure of fire doors (behind louvers) to close 12 Same as case 9 Same as case 9, except Large 13,495 ppm failure of louvers to close 13 Actuation of CO 2 fire Same as case 9 Small 22,157 ppm protection system in the small diesel generator room, 2800 lb CO 2 released in 1 min 14 Same as case 13 Same as case 9, except Small 18,469 ppm roof ventilators fail to turn off 15 Same as case 13 Same as case 9, except Small 12,877 ppm failure of fire doors (behind louvers) to close 16 Same as case 13 Same as case 9, except Small 22,167 ppm failure of the louvers in fire door to close
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-12 (SHEET 3 OF 4)
Case Location and Event Assumptions Intakes Maximum Concentration 17 Actuation of the CO 2 fire Wind speed 10 mph, direc-Large 2150 ppm protection system in the tion toward intake, rest large oil storage room of system operates normally releases 136 lb CO 2 in 1 min 18 Case as case 17 Same as case 17, except roof Large 8169 ppm ventilators fail to turn off 19 Same as case 17 Same as case 17, except Large 1308 ppm failure of fire door (behind louvers) to close 20 Same as case 17 Same as case 17, except Large 2139 ppm failure of louvers in fire door to close 21 Actuation of the CO 2 Wind speed 10 mph, direc-Small 1433 ppm fire protection system tion toward intake, rest in the small oil storage of system operates normally room; release 136 lb CO 2 in 1 min 22 Same as case 21 Same as case 21, except roof Small 8876 ppm ventilators fail to close 23 Same as case 21 Same as case 2, except Small 876 ppm failure of fire door (behind louvers) to close 24 Same as case 21 Same as case 21, except Small 1433 ppm failure of louvers in fire door to close 25 Actuation of the CO 2 fire Wind speed 10 mph, Large 6281 ppm protection system in the direction toward nearest large diesel generator intake room, 10,000 lb CO 2 released in 3.65 min
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-12 (SHEET 4 OF 4)
Case Location and Event Assumptions Intakes Maximum Concentration 26 Actuation of the CO 2 fire Same as case 25 Small 17,995 ppm protection system in the small diesel generator room, 10,000 lb CO 2 released in 3.65 min 27 Actuation of the CO 2 fire Same as case 25 Large 2515 ppm protection system in the large oil storage room, 10,000 lb CO 2 released in 33.9 min 28 Actuation of the CO 2 fire Same as case 25 Small 6824 ppm protection system in the small oil storage room, 10,000 lb of CO 2 released in 33.9 min
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-13 RECIRCULATION OF EXHAUST GAS TO INTAKES - ASSUMPTIONS Wind speed of 5 m/s
Wind direction from closest exhaust directly to diesel air intake
Complete combustion of fuel
Vertical thermal jet
Final Plume rise calculated by
h = 1.6 F 1/3 (3.5x)2/3 (u)-1 Where:
X = Distance to final rise (m)
U = Wind speed (m/s)
F = Buoyancy Flux (m 4/s 3)
Plume rise at diesel intake is calculated by:
1/3 2 u x u F 2 2b 3 u x u m F m 2 b 3h+= Where:
m = Entrainment Coefficient (Momentum)
= Entrainment Coefficient (Buoyancy)
F m = Momentum Flux (m 4/s 2)
F = Buoyancy Flux (m 4/s 3) u = wind speed (m/s)
x = Distance between Exhaust and Intake (m)
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-14 CONCENTRATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE AT DIESEL AIR INTAKE FROM VENTILATORS Maximum Concentration at Air Intake No. of Times Amount from Case Fan Vents Open Duration (s)
Vent (ppm) 9 4 4 11,280 10 Stay open -- 15,412 11 0 0 0 12 5 18 13,495 13 5 8 22,157 14 Stay open -- 18,469 15 0 0 0 16 5 8 22,167 17 1 6 2150 18 Stay open -- 8169 19 1 6 1308 20 1 6 2139 21 1 2 1433 22 Stay open -- 8876 23 1 2 876 24 1 2 1433 25 3 30 6281 26 3 15 614 27 (a) ~1900 2515 28 (a) ~2000 6824
- a. The ventilators have stayed closed all the time.
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 1 OF 14)
CONFORMANCE TO ASME N510-1989 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM (CREFS)
FILTRATION FILTER UNITS Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5 VISUAL INSPECTION
5.5.1 Guidance
for Visual Inspection 5.5.1.1(a) Adequate access to housing.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(b)* Adequate space for personnel and equipment for maintenance and testing.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(c)* Doors of rigid construction to resist unacceptable flexure under operating conditions. Note: The design does not include this feature.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(d) Adequate seal between door and casing. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(e) Gasket joints are dovetail type with seating surface suitable for accommodating a knife edge sealing device.
Note: The design does not include this feature. Gaskets will be inspected when housing is disassembled.
No (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(f)* Provision for opening doors from inside and outside of housing. Note: The design does not include this feature.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(g) Adequate number and acceptable condition of operable latches on access doors to achieve
uniform seating. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(h)* Provision for locking doors. Note: The design does not include this feature.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 2 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.1(i)* Adequate structural rigidity of housing to resist unacceptable flexure during operating conditions.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(j)* Access to upper tiers, (above the 7 ft level), provided with permanent ladders and platforms. Note: The design does not include this feature.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(k)* At least 3 ft clearance between banks of components for maintenance and testing. Note: The design does not include this feature throughout the
housing. No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(l)* Door provided on each side, (upstream and downstream), of each component bank. Note: The design does not include this feature.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(m)* No back-to-back installation of components. Note: Inspection only with filter housing disassembled.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(n) Sample ports located and labeled upstream and downstream of each HEPA filter and adsorber
bank. Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(o) Challenge injection ports located and labeled.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(p) Sample and injection ports equipped with leak-tight caps or plugged.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(q) Housekeeping in and around housing adequate for maintenance, testing, and operation.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(r) Adequate guards provided on fans for personnel safety. Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(s) Condition of flexible connection between housing and fan located external to housing adequate to
prevent leakage of untreated air.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(t) Fan-shaft seals installed where required.
Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 3 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.1(u) Airtight seals for conduits, electrical connections, plumbing, drains, or other conditions that could
result in bypassing of the housing or any
component therein.
Note: Inspect accessible/visibl e items. Air tightness of components that could cause bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(v) No sealant or caulking of any type on/in housings or component frames. Caulking on/in ducts may
be permissible depending on project
specifications. Note: Inspect only external to ducts and housing where
accessible during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(w) Loop seals have adequate water level. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(x) Satisfactory condition of fire protection components (if provided). Note: The design does not include this feature. No fire
protection provided for t he filtration unit filter.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.2 Local Instrumentation 5.5.1.2(a) No unacceptable damage to instrumentation (e.g., gages, manometers, thermometers, etc.).
Yes Yes 5.5.1.2(b) All connections complete.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.3 Lighting, Housing 5.5.1.3(a) Adequate lighting provided for visual inspection of housing and components. Note: The design does not include this feature. Temporary lighting utilized, as necessary, to perform internal, visual inspections.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 4 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.3(b)* Flush mounted fixtures serviceable from outside the housing. Note: The design does not include this feature.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.4 Mounting Frames for Filters and Moisture Separators 5.5.1.4(a)* Continuous seal weld between members or frames and between frame and housing. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place
testing. No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.4(b)* Adequate structural rigidity for supporting internal components during operating conditions without
flexure. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.4(c) No unacceptable damage to the frames that may interfere with proper seating of components. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place
testing. No (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.4(d) Sample canisters installed and unused connections capped or plugged leak-tight.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.4(e) No penetrations of the mounting frame except for test canisters. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled.
No (See note)
Yes 5.5.1.4(f) No sealant or caulking of any type. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled.
No (See note)
Yes (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 5 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.5 Filter Clamping Devices 5.5.1.5(a) Sufficient number of devices of adequate size to assure specified gasket compression. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place
testing. No (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.5(b)* Individual clamping of filters and adsorbers. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place
testing. No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.5(c) All clamping hardware complete and in good condition. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place
testing. No (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.5(d)* Adequate clearances provided between filter and adsorber units in same bank to tighten clamping
devices. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.6 Moisture Separators 5.5.1.6(a) No unacceptable damage to media, frame, or gaskets. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.6(b) No dirt or debris loading which creates higher than the specified pressure drop across the bank of components at the design airflow rate. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.6(c) Proper installation of moisture separators. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 6 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.7 Air Heating Coils - Inside Housing 5.5.1.7(a) No unacceptable damage to coils which may affect operability of the heaters. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.7(b) No unacceptable dirt or debris on or between coils. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.8 Prefilters 5.5.1.8(a) No damage to media, frame, or gaskets which may affect operability of prefilters. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled.
No (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.8(b) No dirt or debris loading which creates higher than the specified pressure drop across the filter
bank at the design flow rate. Note: Pressure drop will be checked by installed gauges.
No (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.8(c) Proper installation of prefilters. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled.
No (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.9 HEPA Filters 5.5.1.9(a) No unacceptable damage to filter media. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place
testing. No (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.9(b) Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with at least 50% compression. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place
testing. No (See note)
Yes (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 7 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.9(c) No dirt or debris loading which creates higher than the specified pressure drop across the filter
bank at the design flow rate. Note: Pressure Drop will be checked by installed pressure
gauges. No (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.9(d) No sealant or caulking of any type. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled.
No (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.9(e) Filters are properly installed with pleats vertical. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled.
No (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.10 Adsorbers 5.5.1.10(a) No unacceptable damage to adsorbers or adsorbent beds. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place
testing. No (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.10(b) Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with at least 50 % compression. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place
testing. No (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.10(c) No through bolts on Type II adsorbers or other structure that could cause bypass in an adsorber
bank where visible. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled.
No (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.10(d) No sealant or caulking of any type. Note: Not Accessible. Inspection only with filter housing disassembled.
No (See note)
Yes (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 8 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.11 Dampers - Housing and Associated Bypass Duct 5.5.1.11(a) No unacceptable damage to or distortion of frame or blades. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(b) No missing seats or blade edging.
Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(c) No unacceptable damage to shaft, pivot pins, operator linkages, operators, or packing. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(d) Linkage connected and free from obstruction. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(e) No unacceptable damage to gaskets. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.12 Manifolds 5.5.1.12(a) No unacceptable damage to test manifolds. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.12(b) Adequate clearance between permanent manifolds and filters. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 6.0 DUCT AND HOUSING LEAK AND STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY TESTS 6.5 Duct and Housing Leak and Structural Capability Tests - Procedure 6.5.1* Structural Capability Test Note: Testing to be conduct ed only on affected components.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 9 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 6.5.2* Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Constant Pressure Method) Note: This test will be performed only following major
modification or repair and conducted on affected components
only. Either constant pressu re method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 6.5.3* Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Pressure Decay Method) Note: This test will be performed only following major
modification or repair and conducted on affected components
only. Either constant pressu re method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 6.5.4 Bubble Leak Location Method Note: This method is not a te st but rather a leak detection method typically used for i dentifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohi bit the use of other detection methods. No (Not required)
No (See note) 6.5.5 Audible Leak Location Method Note: This method is not a te st but rather a leak detection method typically used for i dentifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohi bit the use of other detection methods. No (Not required)
No (See note)
6.6 Acceptance
Criteria 6.6.1 Structural Capability Test. Meets the requirements of ASME N509, test program, and project specifications.
Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for testing following major modification or repair based on the extent of the work sc ope and the system functional requirements.
No (Not required)
No (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 10 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 6.6.2 Duct and Housing Leak Test. Meets the requirements of ASME N509, test program, and
project specifications.
Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for testing following major modification or repair based on the extent of the work sc ope and the system functional requirements.
No (See notes for 6.5.2 and 6.5.3)
No (See note)
7.0 Mounting
Frame Pressure Leak Test (Optional)
No (Optional)
No (Optional)
8 AIRFLOW CAPACITY AND DISTRIBUTION TESTS
8.5.1. Airflow
Capacity Test Procedure 8.5.1.1 Start system fan and verify stable (no surging) fan operation for 15 min.
Yes Yes 8.5.1.2 Measure system airflow in accordance with 2.2 or equivalent. Note: Reference 2.2 "Industrial Ventilation: A Manual of Recommended Practice (20th Edition)" excluding figure 9-5.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 8.5.1.3* Clean System Airflow. With the new housing components installed, or simulated, operate at the
clean differential pressure and compare
measured flow rate (using methods of para.
8.5.1.2) with the value specified by the test
program or project specification. If the specified
value cannot be achieved, report to owner.
No (Not required)
Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 11 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 8.5.1.4* Maximum Housing Component Pressure Drop Airflow. After successful completion of Para.
8.5.1.3, increase housing component resistance (artificially by blanking off portions of the filter
bank or by adjusting throttling dampers) until the
maximum housing component pressure drop for
the system (as specified in the test program or
project specifications) is achieved. Measure flow
rate per para. 8.5.1.2. If the maximum housing
component pressure drop airflow cannot be
achieved, report to owner.
No (Not required)
Yes 8.5.1.5* Return system to "clean" condition.
No (Not required)
Yes 8.5.2 Airflow Distribution Test Procedure NOTE: Airflow distribution tests are not required for a filter bank containing a single HEPA filter. 8.5.2.1* Airflow Distribution Through HEPA Filter Banks.
The minimum number of velocity measurements
shall be one in the center of each filter. All
measurements should be made an equal distance
away from the filters. Velocity measurements
should be made downstream of the filters to take
advantage of the airflow distribution dampening
effects of the HEPA filters. Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA
filter is present.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 12 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 8.5.2.2* Airflow Distribution Through Adsorber Banks. For banks containing Type I adsorbers, the air
distribution test shall follow the same procedures
specified for HEPA filter banks in para. 8.5.2.1.
For banks containing Type II modular trays, the
air distribution test shall follow the same
procedure specified for filter banks in para.
8.5.2.1, except that all velocity measurements
shall be made in the plane of the face of the air
channels, in the center of every open channel and
an equal distance away from the adsorbers. For
type III adsorbers, velocity measurements shall
be made in the plane of the face of the air
channels. These measurements shall be made in
centers of equal area that cover the entire open
face, not in excess of 12 in. between points on a
channel, and an equal distance away from the
adsorber. Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA
filter is present.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 8.5.2.3* Calculate the average of the velocity readings (Section 3) Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA
filter is present.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 8.5.2.4* Note the highest and lowest velocity readings and calculate the percentage they vary from the
average found in para. 8.5.2.3. If acceptance
criteria are exceeded, notify owner. Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA
filter is present.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 13 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08
8.6.0 Acceptance
Criteria 8.6.1 Acceptance Criteria for Airflow Capacity Test.
Airflow shall be within +
10% of the value specified in the test program or project specifications. Maximum housing component
pressure drop airflows shall be +
10% of the value specified in the test program or project
specifications with the pressure drop greater than
or equal to the maximum housing component
pressure drop. For systems with carbon
adsorbers, the maximum velocity of air through
the carbon beds shall be limited to that value
specified in the laboratory test (Section 15).
Notes:
(1) Applies only to se ctions 8.5.1.
1 and 8.5.1.2.
(2) Maximum housing component pressure drops will be based on those that result in the system maintaining the TS
flowrate +
10%. Yes (See note 1)
Yes (See note 2) 8.6.2* Airflow Distribution Test. No velocity readings shall exceed +
20% of the calculated average.
For system with carbon adsorbers, maximum
velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be
limited to that value specified in the laboratory
test. (Section 15) Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA
filter is present.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 9.0 AIR-AEROSOL MIXING UNIFORMITY TEST Note: This is a single HEPA system and this test does not
apply. N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 10.0 HEPA FILTER BANK IN-PLACE TEST Yes Yes 11.0 ADSORBER BANK IN-PLACE LEAK TEST Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-15 (SHEET 14 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 12.0 DUCT DAMPER BYPASS TEST Note: System design does not include bypass damper.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 13.0 SYSTEM BYPASS TEST Note: Tests performed per Sect ion 10 satisfy Section 13 test requirements.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 14.0 Air Heater Performance Test Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 15.0 LABORATORY TESTING OF ADSORBENT Note: Laboratory testing will be performed in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note)
- ASME N510-1989 clearly delineates these steps are intended for acceptance tests performed after any major system modification or major repair.
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 1 OF 14)
CONFORMANCE TO ASME N510-1989 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM (CREFS)
PRESSURIZATION FILTER UNITS Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5 VISUAL INSPECTION
5.5.1 Guidance
for Visual Inspection 5.5.1.1(a) Adequate access to housing.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(b)* Adequate space for personnel and equipment for maintenance and testing.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(c)* Doors of rigid construction to resist unacceptable flexure under operating conditions. Note: The pressurization unit has bolted access panels. No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(d) Adequate seal between door and casing. Note: The pressurization unit has bolted access panels.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(e) Gasket joints are dovetail type with seating surface suitable for accommodating a knife edge sealing device. Note: Gaskets are not dovetail type. The pressurization unit has bolted access panels with flat gaskets with flat surface seal on filter housing.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(f)* Provision for opening doors from inside and outside of housing. Note: The design does not include this feature. The pressurization unit has bolted access panels.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(g) Adequate number and acceptable condition of operable latches on access doors to achieve
uniform seating. Note: The design does not include this feature. The pressurization unit has bolted access panels.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 2 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.1(h)* Provision for locking doors. Note: The design does not include this feature. The pressurization unit has bolted access panels.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(i)* Adequate structural rigidity of housing to resist unacceptable flexure during operating conditions.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(j)* Access to upper tiers, (above the 7 ft level), provided with permanent ladders and platforms. Note: The design does not include this feature.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(k)* At least 3 ft clearance between banks of components for maintenance and testing. Note: The pressurization units have less than 3 feet between
some banks by design.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(l)* Door provided on each side, (upstream and downstream), of each component bank. Note: The pressurization unit has bolted access panels.
There is no door downstream of the HEPA filter.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(m)* No back-to-back installation of components.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(n) Sample ports located and labeled upstream and downstream of each HEPA filter and adsorber
bank. Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(o) Challenge injection ports located and labeled.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(p) Sample and injection ports equipped with leak-tight caps or plugged.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(q) Housekeeping in and around housing adequate for maintenance, testing, and operation.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(r) Adequate guards provided on fans for personnel safety. Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 3 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.1(s) Condition of flexible connection between housing and fan located external to housing adequate to
prevent leakage of untreated air. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(t) Fan-shaft seals installed where required.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(u) Airtight seals for conduits, electrical connections, plumbing, drains, or other conditions that could
result in bypassing of the housing or any
component therein.
Note: Inspect accessible/visibl e items. Air tightness of components that could cause bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(v) No sealant or caulking of any type on/in housings or component frames. Caulking on/in ducts may
be permissible depending on project
specifications. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(w) Loop seals have adequate water level. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(x) Satisfactory condition of fire protection components (if provided). Note: The design does not include this feature. No fire
protection provided for the pressurization unit filter.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.2 Local Instrumentation 5.5.1.2(a) No unacceptable damage to instrumentation (e.g., gages, manometers, thermometers, etc.).
Yes Yes 5.5.1.2(b) All connections complete.
Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 4 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.3 Lighting, Housing 5.5.1.3(a) Adequate lighting provided for visual inspection of housing and components. Note: The design does not include this feature. Temporary lighting utilized, as necessary, to perform internal, visual inspections.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.3(b)* Flush mounted fixtures serviceable from outside the housing. Note: The design does not include this feature.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.4 Mounting Frames for Filters and Moisture Separators 5.5.1.4(a)* Continuous seal weld between members or frames and between frame and housing. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.4(b)* Adequate structural rigidity for supporting internal components during operating conditions without flexure. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.4(c) No unacceptable damage to the frames that may interfere with proper seating of components.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.4(d) Sample canisters installed and unused connections capped or plugged leak-tight. Note: Pressurization unit contains internal sample canisters.
Check that internal unus ed connections are sealed.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.4(e) No penetrations of the mounting frame except for test canisters.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.4(f) No sealant or caulking of any type. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 5 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.5 Filter Clamping Devices 5.5.1.5(a) Sufficient number of devices of adequate size to assure specified gasket compression.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.5(b)* Individual clamping of filters and adsorbers.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.5(c) All clamping hardware complete and in good condition.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.5(d)* Adequate clearances provided between filter and adsorber units in same bank to tighten clamping devices. No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.6 Moisture Separators 5.5.1.6(a) No unacceptable damage to media, frame, or gaskets. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.6(b) No dirt or debris loading which creates higher than the specified pressure drop across the bank of components at the design airflow rate. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.6(c) Proper installation of moisture separators. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.7 Air Heating Coils - Inside Housing 5.5.1.7(a) No unacceptable damage to coils which may affect operability of the heaters.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.7(b) No unacceptable dirt or debris on or between coils. Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 6 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.8 Prefilters 5.5.1.8(a) No damage to media, frame, or gaskets which may affect operability of prefilters Yes Yes 5.5.1.8(b) No dirt or debris loading which creates higher than the specified pressure drop across the filter bank at the design flow rate. Note: Inspect for visible loading - pressure drop will be
checked by installed gauges.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.8(c) Proper installation of prefilters.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.9 HEPA Filters 5.5.1.9(a) No unacceptable damage to filter media.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.9(b) Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with at least 50% compression. Note: HEPAs have self adjusting clamps-inspect clamps and visually confirm that gaskets appear tight. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place leak testing.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.9(c) No dirt or debris loading which creates higher than the specified pressure drop across the filter
bank at the design flow rate.
Note: Inspect upstream side fo r visible loading - pressure drop will be checked by installed pressure gauges.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.9(d) No sealant or caulking of any type. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.9(e) Filters are properly installed with pleats vertical. Yes Yes 5.5.1.10 Adsorbers 5.5.1.10(a) No unacceptable damage to adsorbers or adsorbent beds.
Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 7 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.10(b) Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with at least 50 % compression. Note: The pressurization unit design is Type III adsorbers.
Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place leak testing.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.10(c) No through bolts on Type II adsorbers or other structure that could cause bypass in an adsorber
bank where visible. Note: The pressurization unit design does not have through-
bolts. Type III adsorbers.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.10(d) No sealant or caulking of any type. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.11 Dampers - Housing and Associated Bypass Duct 5.5.1.11(a) No unacceptable damage to or distortion of frame or blades. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(b) No missing seats or blade edging. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(c) No unacceptable damage to shaft, pivot pins, operator linkages, operators, or packing. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(d) Linkage connected and free from obstruction. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(e) No unacceptable damage to gaskets. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.12 Manifolds 5.5.1.12(a) No unacceptable damage to test manifolds. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 8 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.12(b) Adequate clearance between permanent manifolds and filters. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 6.0 DUCT AND HOUSING LEAK AND STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY TESTS 6.5.1* Structural Capability Test Note: Testing to be conduct ed only on affected components.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 6.5.2* Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Constant Pressure Method) Note: This test will be performed only following major modification or repair and conducted on affected
components only. Either const ant pressure method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 6.5.3* Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Pressure Decay Method) Note: This test will be performed only following major
modification or repair and conducted on affected
components only. Either const ant pressure method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 6.5.4 Bubble Leak Location Method Note: This method is not a te st but rather a leak detection method typically used for i dentifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohi bit the use of other detection methods. No (Not required)
No (See note) 6.5.5 Audible Leak Location Method Note: This method is not a te st but rather a leak detection method typically used for i dentifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohi bit the use of other detection methods. No (Not required)
No (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 9 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08
6.6 Acceptance
Criteria 6.6.1 Structural Capability Test. Meets the requirements of ASME N509, test program, and project specifications.
Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for testing following major modification or repair based on the extent of the work sc ope and the system functional requirements.
No (Not required)
No (See note) 6.6.2 Duct and Housing Leak Test. Meets the requirements of ASME N509, test program, and
project specifications.
Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for testing following major modification or repair based on the extent of the work sc ope and the system functional requirements.
No (See Notes for 6.5.2 and 6.5.3) No (See note)
7.0 Mounting
Frame Pressure Leak Test (Optional)
No (Optional)
No (Optional)
8.0 AIRFLOW
CAPACITY AND DISTRIBUTION TESTS
8.5.1 Airflow
Capacity Test Procedure 8.5.1.1 Start system fan and verify stable (no surging) fan operation for 15 min.
Yes Yes 8.5.1.2 Measure system airflow in accordance with 2.2 or equivalent. Note: Reference 2.2 "Industrial Ventilation: A Manual of Recommended Practice (20th Edition)" excluding figure 9-5.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 10 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 8.5.1.3* Clean System Airflow. With the new housing components installed, or simulated, operate at
the clean differential pressure and compare
measured flow rate (using methods of para.
8.5.1.2) with the value specified by the test
program or project specification. If the specified
value cannot be achieved, report to owner.
No (Not required)
Yes 8.5.1.4* Maximum Housing Component Pressure Drop Airflow. After successful completion of para.
8.5.1.3, increase housing component resistance (artificially by blanking off portions of the filter
bank or by adjusting throttling dampers) until the
maximum housing component pressure drop for
the system (as specified in the test program or
project specifications) is achieved. Measure flow
rate per para. 8.5.1.2. If the maximum housing
component pressure drop airflow cannot be
achieved, report to owner.
No (Not required)
Yes 8.5.1.5* Return system to "clean" condition.
No (Not required)
Yes 8.5.2 Airflow Distribution Test Procedure NOTE: Airflow distribution tests are not required for a filter bank containing a single HEPA filter. 8.5.2.1* Airflow Distribution Through HEPA Filter Banks.
The minimum number of velocity measurements shall be one in the center of each filter. All
measurements should be made an equal
distance away from the filters. Velocity
measurements should be made downstream of
the filters to take advantage of the airflow
distribution dampening effects of the HEPA filters. Note: This test will not be performed due to a single HEPA.
No (Not required)
N/A FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 11 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 8.5.2.2* Airflow Distribution Through Adsorber Banks. For banks containing Type I adsorbers, the air
distribution test shall follow the same procedures
specified for HEPA filter banks in para. 8.5.2.1.
For banks containing Type II modular trays, the
air distribution test shall follow the same
procedure specified for filter banks in para.
8.5.2.1, except that all velocity measurements
shall be made in the plane of the face of the air
channels, in the center of every open channel
and an equal distance away from the adsorbers.
For type III adsorbers, velocity measurements
shall be made in the plane of the face of the air
channels. These measurements shall be made in
centers of equal area that cover the entire open
face, not in excess of 12 in. between points on a
channel, and an equal distance away from the
adsorber. Note: This test will not be performed due to a single HEPA.
No (Not required)
N/A (See Note) 8.5.2.3* Calculate the average of the velocity readings (Section 3) Note: This test will not be performed due to a single HEPA.
No (Not required)
N/A (See Note) 8.5.2.4* Note the highest and lowest velocity readings and calculate the percentage they vary from the
average found in para. 8.5.2.3. If acceptance
criteria are exceeded, notify owner. Note: This test will not be performed due to a single HEPA.
No (Not required)
N/A (See Note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 12 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08
8.6.0 Acceptance
Criteria 8.6.1 Acceptance Criteria for Airflow Capacity Test.
Airflow shall be within +
10% of the value specified in the test program or project specifications. Maximum housing component
pressure drop airflows shall be +
10% of the value specified in the test program or project
specifications with the pressure drop greater than
or equal to the maximum housing component
pressure drop. For systems with carbon
adsorbers, the maximum velocity of air through
the carbon beds shall be limited to that value
specified in the laboratory test (Section 15).
Notes: (1) Applies only to secti ons 8.5.1.1 and 8.5.1.2. (2) Maximum housing component pressure drops will be based on those that result in the system maintaining the TS flowrate
+/-10%. (3) Air flow shall be within +25% to -10% of specified value.
Yes (See Notes 1 and 3) Yes (See Notes 2 and 3) 8.6.2* Airflow Distribution Test. No velocity readings shall exceed +
20% of the calculated average.
For system with carbon adsorbers, maximum velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be
limited to that value specified in the laboratory
test. (Section 15) Note: This test will not be performed due to a single HEPA No (Not required)
N/A (See Note) 9.0 AIR-AEROSOL MIXING UNIFORMITY TEST Note: This is a single HEPA system and this test is not applicable.
N/A (See Note)
N/A (See Note) 10.0 HEPA FILTER BANK IN-PLACE TEST Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 13 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 11.0 ADSORBER BANK IN-PLACE LEAK TEST Yes Yes 12.0 DUCT DAMPER BYPASS TEST Note: System design does not include bypass damper.
N/A (See Note)
N/A (See Note) 13.0 SYSTEM BYPASS TEST Note: Tests performed per Section 10 satisfy Section 13
test requirements.
N/A (See Note)
N/A (See Note) 14.0 AIR HEATER PERFORMANCE TEST
14.3 Prerequisites 14.3.1 Prerequisite: Visual inspection of the heater is completed (para. 5.5.1.7).
Yes Yes 14.3.2 Prerequisite: Electrical control and feed power is available and all safety interlocks have been checked. Yes Yes 14.5 Procedure 14.5.1 With power on, and system operating at rated flow, measure the voltage and current of all power circuits.
Yes Yes 14.5.2 With heater energized and system operating at rated airflow, measure the temperature of the
entering and leaving air. A sufficient number of
measurements shall be taken to determine
average entering and leaving temperatures.
Yes Yes 14.5.3 If measured values do not meet acceptance criteria, notify the owner.
Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-16 (SHEET 14 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 14.6 Acceptance Criteria 14.6.1 Operating currents, voltages and change in temperature shall be within the limits of test program or project specifications.
Yes Yes 15.0 LABORATORY TESTING OF ADSORBENT Note: Laboratory testing will be performed in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note)
- ASME N510-1989 clearly delineates these steps are intended for acceptance tests performed after any major system modification or major repair.
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 1 OF 13)
CONFORMANCE TO ASME N510-1989 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM (CREFS)
RECIRCULATION FILTER UNITS Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5 VISUAL INSPECTION
5.5.1 Guidance
for Visual Inspection 5.5.1.1(a) Adequate access to housing.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(b)* Adequate space for personnel and equipment for maintenance and testing.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(c)* Doors of rigid construction to resist unacceptable flexure under operating conditions.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(d) Adequate seal between door and casing.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(e) Gasket joints are dovetail type with seating surface suitable for accommodating a knife
edge sealing device.
Note: Gaskets are not dovetail type - inspect gaskets for
seating surface.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(f)* Provision for opening doors from inside and outside of housing.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(g) Adequate number and acceptable condition of operable latches on access doors to achieve
uniform seating.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(h)* Provision for locking doors.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(i)* Adequate structural rigidity of housing to resist unacceptable flexure during operating
conditions.
No (Not required)
Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 2 OF 13)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.1(j)* Access to upper tiers, (above the 7 ft level), provided with permanent ladders and platforms. Note: The design does not include this feature.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(k)* At least 3 ft clearance between banks of components for maintenance and testing.
Note: Units have less than 3 feet between some banks by design. No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(l)* Door provided on each side, (upstream and downstream), of each component bank.
Note: No door upstream of prefilter.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(m)* No back-to-back installation of components.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(n) Sample ports located and labeled upstream and downstream of each HEPA filter and
adsorber bank.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(o) Challenge injection ports located and labeled. Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(p) Sample and injection ports equipped with leak-tight caps or plugged.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(q) Housekeeping in and around housing adequate for maintenance, testing, and operation.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(r) Adequate guards provided on fans for personnel safety. Note: The design does not include this feature (direct drive vane axial fan).
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(s) Condition of flexible connection between housing and fan located external to housing
adequate to prevent leakage of untreated air. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(t) Fan-shaft seals installed where required.
Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 3 OF 13)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.1(u) Airtight seals for conduits, electrical connections, plumbing, drains, or other
conditions that could result in bypassing of the
housing or any component therein.
Note: Inspect accessible/visibl e items. Air tightness of components that could cause bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(v) No sealant or caulking of any type on/in housings or component frames. Caulking on/in
ducts may be permissible depending on project
specifications. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(w) Loop seals have adequate water level. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(x) Satisfactory condition of fire protection components (if provided). Note: The design does not include this feature. No fire
protection provided.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.2 Local Instrumentation 5.5.1.2(a) No unacceptable damage to instrumentation (e.g., gages, manometers, thermometers, etc.).
Yes Yes 5.5.1.2(b) All connections complete.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.3 Lighting, Housing 5.5.1.3(a) Adequate lighting provided for visual inspection of housing and components.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.3(b)* Flush mounted fixtures serviceable from outside the housing.
No (Not required)
Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 4 OF 13)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.4 Mounting Frames for Filters and Moisture Separators 5.5.1.4(a)* Continuous seal weld between members or frames and between frame and housing. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.4(b)* Adequate structural rigidity for supporting internal components during operating conditions without flexure. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.4(c) No unacceptable damage to the frames that may interfere with proper seating of
components.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.4(d) Sample canisters installed and unused connections capped or plugged leak-tight. Note: Filter unit contains internal sample canisters.
Check that unused connections are sealed.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.4(e) No penetrations of the mounting frame except for test canisters.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.4(f) No sealant or caulking of any type. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.5 Filter Clamping Devices 5.5.1.5(a) Sufficient number of devices of adequate size to assure specified gasket compression.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.5(b)* Individual clamping of filters and adsorbers.
Note: Adsorber is type III filter.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.5(c) All clamping hardware complete and in good condition.
Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 5 OF 13)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.5(d)* Adequate clearances provided between filter and adsorber units in same bank to tighten
clamping devices.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.6 Moisture Separators 5.5.1.6(a) No unacceptable damage to media, frame, or gaskets. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.6(b) No dirt or debris loading which creates higher than the specified pressure drop across the bank of components at the design airflow rate. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.6(c) Proper installation of moisture separators. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.7 Air Heating Coils - Inside Housing 5.5.1.7(a) No unacceptable damage to coils which may affect operability of the heaters. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.7(b) No unacceptable dirt or debris on or between coils. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.8 Prefilters 5.5.1.8(a) No damage to media, frame, or gaskets which may affect operability of prefilters.
Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 6 OF 13)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.8(b) No dirt or debris loading which creates higher than the specified pressure drop across the
filter bank at the design flow rate. Note: Inspect for visible loading - pressure drop will be
checked by installed gauges.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.8(c) Proper installation of prefilters.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.9 HEPA Filters 5.5.1.9(a) No unacceptable damage to filter media.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.9(b) Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with at least 50% compression.
Note: Visually confirm that gaskets appear tight. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.9(c) No dirt or debris loading which creates higher than the specified pressure drop across the
filter bank at the design flow rate.
Note: Inspect upstream side fo r visible loading - pressure drop will be checked by installed pressure gauges.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.9(d) No sealant or caulking of any type. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.9(e) Filters are properly installed with pleats vertical. Yes Yes 5.5.1.10 Adsorbers 5.5.1.10(a) No unacceptable damage to adsorbers or adsorbent beds.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.10(b) Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with at least 50 % compression.
Note: Adsorber is Type III. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 7 OF 13)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.10(c) No through bolts on Type II adsorbers or other structure that could cause bypass in an
adsorber bank where visible.
Note: Adsorber is type III.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.10(d) No sealant or caulking of any type. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.11 Dampers - Housing and Associated Bypass Duct 5.5.1.11(a) No unacceptable damage to or distortion of frame or blades. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(b) No missing seats or blade edging. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(c) No unacceptable damage to shaft, pivot pins, operator linkages, operators, or packing. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(d) Linkage connected and free from obstruction. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(e) No unacceptable damage to gaskets. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.12 Manifolds 5.5.1.12(a) No unacceptable damage to test manifolds. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.12(b) Adequate clearance between permanent manifolds and filters. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 8 OF 13)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 6.0 DUCT AND HOUSING LEAK AND STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY TESTS 6.5 Duct And Housing Leak And Structural Capability Tests - Procedure 6.5.1* Structural Capability Test Note: Testing to be conducted only on affected components.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 6.5.2* Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Constant Pressure Method) Note: This test will be performed only following major
modification or repair and conducted on affected
components only. Either c onstant pressure method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 6.5.3* Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Pressure Decay Method) Note: This test will be performed only following major
modification or repair and conducted on affected
components only. Either c onstant pressure method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 6.5.4 Bubble Leak Location Method Note: This method is not a te st but rather a leak detection method typically used for i dentifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohibit the use of other detection methods.
No (Not required)
No (See note) 6.5.5 Audible Leak Location Method Note: This method is not a te st but rather a leak detection method typically used for i dentifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohibit the use of other detection methods.
No (Not required)
No (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 9 OF 13)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08
6.6 Acceptance
Criteria 6.6.1 Structural Capability Test. Meets the requirements of ASME N509, test program, and project specifications.
Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for testing following major modification or repair based on the extent of the work sc ope and the system functional requirements.
No (Not required)
No (See note) 6.6.2 Duct and Housing Leak Test. Meets the requirements of ASME N509, test program, and project specifications.
Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for testing following major modification or repair based on the extent of the work sc ope and the system functional requirements.
No (See notes for 6.5.2 and 6.5.3) No (See note)
7.0 MOUNTING
FRAME PRESSURE LEAK TEST (OPTIONAL)
No (Optional)
No (Optional) 8 AIRFLOW CAPACITY AND DISTRIBUTION TESTS
8.5.1 Airflow
Capacity Test Procedure 8.5.1.1 Start system fan and verify stable (no surging) fan operation for 15 min.
Yes Yes 8.5.1.2 Measure system airflow in accordance with 2.2 or equivalent. Note: Reference 2.2 "Industrial Ventilation: A Manual of Recommended Practice (20th Edition)" excluding
figure 9-5.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 8.5.1.3* Clean System Airflow. With the new housing components installed, or simulated, operate at
the clean differential pressure and compare
measured flow rate (using methods of para.
No (Not required)
Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 10 OF 13)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 8.5.1.2) with the value specified by the test
program or project specification. If the
specified value cannot be achieved, report to
owner. 8.5.1.4* Maximum Housing Component Pressure Drop Airflow. After successful completion of para.
8.5.1.3, increase housing component
resistance (artificially by blanking off portions of
the filter bank or by adjusting throttling
dampers) until the maximum housing
component pressure drop for the system (as
specified in the test program or project
specifications) is achieved. Measure flow rate
per para. 8.5.1.2. If the maximum housing
component pressure drop airflow cannot be
achieved, report to owner.
No (Not required)
Yes 8.5.1.5* Return system to "clean" condition.
No (Not required)
Yes 8.5.2 Airflow Distribution Test Procedure NOTE: Airflow distribution tests are not requir ed for a filter bank cont aining a single HEPA filter. 8.5.2.1* Airflow Distribution Through HEPA Filter Banks. The minimum number of velocity measurements shall be one in the center of
each filter. All measurements should be made
an equal distance away from the filters.
Velocity measurements should be made
downstream of the filters to take advantage of
the airflow distribution dampening effects of the
HEPA filters.
No (Not required)
Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 11 OF 13)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 8.5.2.2* Airflow Distribution Through Adsorber Banks.
For banks containing Type I adsorbers, the air
distribution test shall follow the same
procedures specified for HEPA filter banks in
para. 8.5.2.1. For banks containing Type II
modular trays, the air distribution test shall
follow the same procedure specified for filter
banks in para. 8.5.2.1, except that all velocity
measurements shall be made in the plane of
the face of the air channels, in the center of
every open channel and an equal distance
away from the adsorbers. For type III
adsorbers, velocity measurements shall be
made in the plane of the face of the air
channels. These measurements shall be made
in centers of equal area that cover the entire
open face, not in excess of 12 in. between
points on a channel, and an equal distance
away from the adsorber.
No (Not required)
Yes 8.5.2.3* Calculate the average of the velocity readings (Section 3).
No (Not required)
Yes 8.5.2.4* Note the highest and lowest velocity readings and
calculate the perc entage they vary fr om the average found in para. 8.5.2.3. If acc eptance criteria are exceeded, notify owner.
No (Not required)
Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 12 OF 13)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08
8.6.0 Acceptance
Criteria 8.6.1 Acceptance Criteria for Airflow Capacity Test.
Airflow shall be within +
10% of the value specified in the test program or project specifications. Maximum housing component
pressure drop airflows shall be +
10% of the value specified in the test program or project
specifications with the pressure drop greater
than or equal to the maximum housing
component pressure drop. For systems with
carbon adsorbers, the maximum velocity of air
through the carbon beds shall be limited to that
value specified in the laboratory test (Section
15). Notes: (1) Applies only to secti ons 8.5.1.1 and 8.5.1.2. (2) Maximum housing component pressure drops will be based on those that result in the system maintaining the TS flowrate
+/-10%. Yes (See note 1)
Yes (See note 2) 8.6.2* Airflow Distribution Test. No velocity readings shall exceed +
20% of the calculated average.
For system with carbon adsorbers, maximum velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be
limited to that value specified in the laboratory
test (Section 15).
No (Not required)
Yes 9.0 AIR-AEROSOL MIXING UNIFORMITY TEST Note: Test will be performed only following relocation of
the challenge gas injection port or upstream sample port
or major modifications or repair that may affect flow distribution.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 10.0 HEPA FILTER BANK IN-PLACE TEST Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-17 (SHEET 13 OF 13)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 11.0 ADSORBER BANK IN-PLACE LEAK TEST Yes Yes 12.0 DUCT DAMPER BYPASS TEST Note: System design does not include bypass damper.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 13.0 SYSTEM BYPASS TEST Note: Tests performed per Section 10 satisfy Section 13
test requirements.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 14 Air Heater Performance Test Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 15.0 LABORATORY TESTING OF ADSORBENT Note: Laboratory testing will be performed in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note)
- ASME N510-1989 clearly delineates these steps are intended for acceptance tests performed after any major system modification or major repair.
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 1 OF 14)
CONFORMANCE TO ASME N510-1989 PENETRATION ROOM FILTRATION (PRF)
SYSTEM FILTER UNITS Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5 VISUAL INSPECTION
5.5.1 Guidance
for Visual Inspection 5.5.1.1(a) Adequate access to housing.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(b)* Adequate space for personnel and equipment for maintenance and testing.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(c)* Doors of rigid construction to resist unacceptable flexure under operating conditions.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(d) Adequate seal between door and casing.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(e) Gasket joints are dovetail type with seating surface suitable for accommodating a knife edge sealing device.
Note: Gaskets are not dovetail type - inspect gaskets for
seating surface.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(f)* Provision for opening doors from inside and outside of housing.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(g) Adequate number and acceptable condition of operable latches on access doors to achieve
uniform seating.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(h)* Provision for locking doors.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(i)* Adequate structural rigidity of housing to resist unacceptable flexure during operating conditions.
No (Not required)
Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 2 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.1(j)* Access to upper tiers, (above the 7 ft level), provided with permanent ladders and platforms.
Note: The design does not include this feature. No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(k)* At least 3 ft clearance between banks of components for maintenance and testing. Note: PRF units have less than 3 feet between some banks
by design.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(l)* Door provided on each side, (upstream and downstream), of each component bank. Note: None provided for section between HEPA and carbon
filters. No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(m)* No back-to-back installation of components.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(n) Sample ports located and labeled upstream and downstream of each HEPA filter and adsorber
bank. Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(o) Challenge injection ports located and labeled.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(p) Sample and injection ports equipped with leak-tight caps or plugged.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(q) Housekeeping in and around housing adequate for maintenance, testing, and operation.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(r) Adequate guards provided on fans for personnel safety. Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(s) Condition of flexible connection between housing and fan located external to housing adequate to
prevent leakage of untreated air.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(t) Fan-shaft seals installed where required.
Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 3 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.1(u) Airtight seals for conduits, electrical connections, plumbing, drains, or other conditions that could
result in bypassing of the housing or any
component therein.
Note: Inspect accessible/visi ble items. Air tightness of components that could cause bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(v) No sealant or caulking of any type on/in housings or component frames. Caulking on/in ducts may
be permissible depending on project
specifications. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
Adhesive on flexible f an boot is acceptable.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(w) Loop seals have adequate water level. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(x) Satisfactory condition of fire protection components (if provided). Note: The design does not include this feature. No fire protection provided for PRF filter.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.2 Local Instrumentation 5.5.1.2(a) No unacceptable damage to instrumentation (e.g., gages, manometers, thermometers, etc.).
Yes Yes 5.5.1.2(b) All connections complete.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.3 Lighting, Housing 5.5.1.3(a) Adequate lighting provided for visual inspection of housing and components. Note: The design does not include this feature. Temporary lighting utilized, as necessary, to perform internal, visual inspections.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 4 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.3(b)* Flush mounted fixtures serviceable from outside the housing. Note: The design does not include this feature.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.4 Mounting Frames for Filters and Moisture Separators 5.5.1.4(a)* Continuous seal weld between members or frames and between frame and housing. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.4(b)* Adequate structural rigidity for supporting internal components during operating conditions without flexure. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.4(c) No unacceptable damage to the frames that may interfere with proper seating of components.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.4(d) Sample canisters installed and unused connections capped or plugged leak-tight.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.4(e) No penetrations of the mounting frame except for test canisters.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.4(f) No sealant or caulking of any type. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.5 Filter Clamping Devices 5.5.1.5(a) Sufficient number of devices of adequate size to assure specified gasket compression.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.5(b)* Individual clamping of filters and adsorbers.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.5(c) All clamping hardware complete and in good condition.
Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 5 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.5(d)* Adequate clearances provided between filter and adsorber units in same bank to tighten clamping
devices. No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.6 Moisture Separators 5.5.1.6(a) No unacceptable damage to media, frame, or gaskets. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.6(b) No dirt or debris loading which creates higher than the specified pressure drop across the bank of components at the design airflow rate. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.6(c) Proper installation of moisture separators. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.7 Air Heating Coils - Inside Housing 5.5.1.7(a) No unacceptable damage to coils which may affect operability of the heaters.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.7(b) No unacceptable dirt or debris on or between coils. Yes Yes 5.5.1.8 Prefilters 5.5.1.8(a) No damage to media, frame, or gaskets which may affect operability of prefilters.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.8(b) No dirt or debris loading which creates higher than the specified pressure drop across the filter bank at the design flow rate. Note: Inspect for visible loading - pressure drop will be
checked by installed gauges.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 6 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.8(c) Proper installation of prefilters.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.9 HEPA Filters 5.5.1.9(a) No unacceptable damage to filter media.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.9(b) Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with at least 50% compression.
Note: HEPAs have self adjusting clamps-inspect clamps and visually confirm that gaskets appear tight. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.9(c) No dirt or debris loading which creates higher than the specified pressure drop across the filter
bank at the design flow rate.
Note: Inspect upstream side fo r visible loading - pressure drop will be checked by installed pressure gauges.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.9(d) No sealant or caulking of any type. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.9(e) Filters are properly installed with pleats vertical. Yes Yes 5.5.1.10 Adsorbers 5.5.1.10(a) No unacceptable damage to adsorbers or adsorbent beds.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.10(b) Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with at least 50 % compression.
Note: Visually confirm that gaskets appear tight. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.10(c) No through bolts on Type II adsorbers or other structure that could cause bypass in an adsorber
bank where visible. Note: PRF design does not have through-bolts.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 7 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.10(d) No sealant or caulking of any type. Note: Inspect only where accessible during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.11 Dampers - Housing and Associated Bypass Duct 5.5.1.11(a) No unacceptable damage to or distortion of frame or blades. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(b) No missing seats or blade edging. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(c) No unacceptable damage to shaft, pivot pins, operator linkages, operators, or packing. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(d) Linkage connected and free from obstruction. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(e) No unacceptable damage to gaskets. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.12 Manifolds 5.5.1.12(a) No unacceptable damage to test manifolds. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.12(b) Adequate clearance between permanent manifolds and filters. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 6.0 DUCT AND HOUSING LEAK AND STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY TESTS 6.5 Duct And Housing Leak And Structural Capability Tests - Procedure FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 8 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 6.5.1* Structural Capability Test Note: Testing to be conduct ed only on affected components.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 6.5.2* Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Constant Pressure Method) Note: This test will be performed only following major
modification or repair and conducted on affected components
only. Either constant pressu re method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 6.5.3* Duct and Housing Leak Rate Test (Pressure Decay Method) Note: This test will be performed only following major
modification or repair and conducted on affected components
only. Either constant pressu re method (6.5.2) or pressure decay method (6.5.3) will be utilized.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 6.5.4 Bubble Leak Location Method Note: This method is not a te st but rather a leak detection method typically used for i dentifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohi bit the use of other detection methods. No (Not required)
No (See note) 6.5.5 Audible Leak Location Method Note: This method is not a te st but rather a leak detection method typically used for i dentifying leaks during the performance of the leak rate test of 6.5.2 or 6.5.3 or after minor repair. It does not prohi bit the use of other detection methods. No (Not required)
No (See note)
6.6 Acceptance
Criteria 6.6.1 Structural Capability Test. Meets the requirements of ASME N509, test program, and project specifications.
Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for testing following major modification or repair based on the extent of the work sc ope and the system functional requirements.
No (Not required)
No (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 9 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 6.6.2 Duct and Housing Leak Test. Meets the requirements of ASME N509, test program, and
project specifications.
Note: Specific acceptance criteria will be developed for testing following major modification or repair based on the extent of the work sc ope and the system functional requirements.
No (See notes for 6.5.2 and 6.5.3)
No (See note)
7.0 MOUNTING
FRAME PRESSURE LEAK TEST (OPTIONAL) No (Optional)
No (Optional)
8.0 AIRFLOW
CAPACITY AND DISTRIBUTION TESTS
8.5.1 Airflow
Capacity Test Procedure 8.5.1.1 Start system fan and verify stable (no surging) fan operation for 15 min.
Yes Yes 8.5.1.2 Measure system airflow in accordance with 2.2 or equivalent.
Note: Reference 2.2 "Industr ial Ventilation: A Manual of Recommended Practice (20th Edition)" excluding figure 9-5.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 8.5.1.3* Clean System Airflow. With the new housing components installed, or simulated, operate at the clean differential pressure and compare
measured flow rate (using methods of para.
8.5.1.2) with the value specified by the test
program or project specification. If the specified
value cannot be achieved, report to owner.
No (Not required)
Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 10 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 8.5.1.4* Maximum Housing Component Pressure Drop Airflow. After successful completion of para.
8.5.1.3, increase housing component resistance (artificially by blanking off portions of the filter
bank or by adjusting throttling dampers) until the
maximum housing component pressure drop for
the system (as specified in the test program or
project specifications) is achieved. Measure flow
rate per para. 8.5.1.2. If the maximum housing
component pressure drop airflow cannot be
achieved, report to owner.
No (Not required)
Yes 8.5.1.5* Return system to "clean" condition.
No (Not required)
Yes 8.5.2 Airflow Distribution Test Procedure NOTE: Airflow distribution tests are not required for a filter bank containing a single HEPA filter. 8.5.2.1* Airflow Distribution Through HEPA Filter Banks.
The minimum number of velocity measurements shall be one in the center of each filter. All
measurements should be made an equal distance
away from the filters. Velocity measurements
should be made downstream of the filters to take
advantage of the airflow distribution dampening
effects of the HEPA filters.
No (Not required)
Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 11 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 8.5.2.2* Airflow Distribution Through Adsorber Banks. For banks containing Type I adsorbers, the air
distribution test shall follow the same procedures
specified for HEPA filter banks in para. 8.5.2.1.
For banks containing Type II modular trays, the
air distribution test shall follow the same
procedure specified for filter banks in para.
8.5.2.1, except that all velocity measurements
shall be made in the plane of the face of the air
channels, in the center of every open channel and
an equal distance away from the adsorbers. For
type III adsorbers, velocity measurements shall
be made in the plane of the face of the air
channels. These measurements shall be made in
centers of equal area that cover the entire open
face, not in excess of 12 in. between points on a
channel, and an equal distance away from the
adsorber.
No (Not required)
Yes 8.5.2.3* Calculate the average of the velocity readings (Section 3).
No (Not required)
Yes 8.5.2.4* Note the highest and lowest velocity readings and calculate the percentage they vary from the
average found in para. 8.5.2.3. If acceptance
criteria are exceeded, notify owner.
No (Not required)
Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 12 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08
8.6.0 Acceptance
Criteria 8.6.1 Acceptance Criteria for Airflow Capacity Test.
Airflow shall be within +
10% of the value specified in the test program or project specifications. Maximum housing component
pressure drop airflows shall be +
10% of the value specified in the test program or project
specifications with the pressure drop greater than
or equal to the maximum housing component
pressure drop. For systems with carbon
adsorbers, the maximum velocity of air through
the carbon beds shall be limited to that value
specified in the laboratory test (Section 15).
Notes: (1) Applies only to secti ons 8.5.1.1 and 8.5.1.2. (2) Maximum housing component pressure drops will be based on those that result in the system maintaining the TS flowrate
+/-10%. Yes (See note 1)
Yes (See note
- 2) 8.6.2* Airflow Distribution Test. No velocity readings shall exceed +
20% of the calculated average.
For system with carbon adsorbers, maximum velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be
limited to that value specified in the laboratory test (Section 15).
No (Not required)
Yes 9.0 AIR-AEROSOL MIXING UNIFORMITY TEST Note: Test will be performed only following relocation of the
challenge gas injection port or upstream sample port or major
modifications or repair that may affect flow distribution.
No (Not Required)
Yes (See note) 10.0 HEPA FILTER BANK IN-PLACE TEST Yes Yes 11.0 ADSORBER BANK IN-PLACE LEAK TEST Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 13 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 12.0 DUCT DAMPER BYPASS TEST Note: System design does not include bypass damper.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 13.0 SYSTEM BYPASS TEST Note: Tests performed per Sect ion 10 satisfy Section 13 test requirements.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 14 AIR HEATER PERFORMANCE TEST
14.3 Prerequisites 14.3.1 Prerequisite: Visual inspection of the heater is completed (para. 5.5.1.7).
N/A N/A 14.3.2 Prerequisite: Electrical control and feed power is available and all safety interlocks have been checked. N/A N/A 14.5 Procedure 14.5.1 With power on, and system operating at rated flow, measure the voltage and current of all power circuits.
N/A N/A 14.5.2 With heater energized and system operating at rated airflow, measure the temperature of the
entering and leaving air. A sufficient number of
measurements shall be taken to determine
average entering and leaving temperatures.
N/A N/A 14.5.3 If measured values do not meet acceptance criteria, notify the owner.
N/A N/A FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-18 (SHEET 14 OF 14)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Major Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 14.6 Acceptance Criteria 14.6.1 Operating currents, voltages and change in temperature shall be within the limits of test program or project specifications.
N/A N/A 15.0 LABORATORY TESTING OF ADSORBENT Note: Laboratory testing will be performed in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989. Yes (See note)
Yes (See note)
- ASME N510-1989 clearly delineates these steps are intended for acceptance tests performed
after any major system modification or major repair.
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.4-19 (SHEETS 1 THROUGH 6)
CONFORMANCE TO ASME N510-1989 (SECTION 5)
CONTAINMENT PURGE EXHAUST FILTRATION (CPEF) SYSTEM FILTER UNITS
(This table has been deleted.)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 1 OF 12)
CONFORMANCE TO ASME N510-1989 POST-ACCIDENT PURGE FILTRATION SYSTEM Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5 VISUAL INSPECTION
5.5.1 Guidance
for Visual Inspection 5.5.1.1(a) Adequate access to housing.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(b)* Adequate space for personnel and equipment for maintenance and testing.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(c)* Doors of rigid construction to resist unacceptable flexure under operating conditions.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(d) Adequate seal between door and casing.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(e) Gasket joints are dovetail type with seating surface suitable for accommodating a knife edge sealing device.
Note: Gaskets are not dovetail type - inspect gaskets for seating surface only when accessible.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(f)* Provision for opening doors from inside and outside of housing. Note: The design does not include this feature.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(g) Adequate number and acceptable condition of operable latches on access doors to achieve
uniform seating.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(h)* Provision for locking doors.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(i)* Adequate structural rigidity of housing to resist unacceptable flexure during operating conditions.
No (Not required)
Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 2 OF 12)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.1(j)* Access to upper tiers, (above the 7 ft evel), provided with permanent ladders and platforms. Note: The design does not include this feature.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(k)* At least 3 ft clearance between banks of components for maintenance and testing.
Note: Units have less than 3 feet between some banks by design. No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(l)* Door provided on each side, (upstream and downstream), of each component bank.
Note: No door upstream of HEPA or charcoal filters are proved in design. (Housing is a pressure vessel with limited
access.) No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(m)* No back-to-back installation of components.
No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.1(n) Sample ports located and labeled upstream and downstream of each HEPA filter and adsorber
bank. Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(o) Challenge injection ports located and labeled.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(p) Sample and injection ports equipped with leak-tight caps or plugged.
Note: Valves may be used for the sample and injection
ports. Outlets are capped.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(q) Housekeeping in and around housing adequate for maintenance, testing, and operation.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.1(r) Adequate guards provided on fans for personnel safety. Note: The design does not in clude this feature (no fan).
N/A (See Note)
N/A (See Note) 5.5.1.1(s) Condition of flexible connection between housing and fan located external to housing adequate to
prevent leakage of untreated air. Note: The design does not in clude this feature (no fan).
N/A (See Note)
N/A (See Note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 3 OF 12)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.1(t) Fan-shaft seals installed where required. Note: The design does not in clude this feature (no fan).
N/A (See Note)
N/A (See Note) 5.5.1.1(u) Airtight seals for conduits, electrical connections, plumbing, drains, or other conditions that could
result in bypassing of the housing or any
component therein.
Note: Inspect accessible/visi ble items. Air tightness of components that could cause bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(v) No sealant or caulking of any type on/in housings or component frames. Caulking on/in ducts may
be permissible depending on project
specifications. Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without
disassembly during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.1(w) Loop seals have adequate water level. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.1(x) Satisfactory condition of fire protection components (if provided). Note: The design does not include this feature. No fire
protection provided.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.2 Local Instrumentation 5.5.1.2(a) No unacceptable damage to instrumentation (e.g., gages, manometers, thermometers, etc.).
Yes Yes 5.5.1.2(b) All connections complete.
Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 4 OF 12)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.3 Lighting, Housing 5.5.1.3(a) Adequate lighting provided for visual inspection of housing and components. Note: The design does not include this feature. Temporary lighting utilized, as necessary, to perform internal visual inspections.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.3(b)* Flush mounted fixtures serviceable from outside the housing. Note: The design does not include this feature.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.4 Mounting Frames for Filters and Moisture Separators 5.5.1.4(a)* Continuous seal weld between members or frames and between frame and housing. Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without disassembly during inspections.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.4(b)* Adequate structural rigidity for supporting internal components during operating conditions without
flexure. Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without
disassembly during inspections.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.4(c) No unacceptable damage to the frames that may interfere with proper seating of components.
Note: Not accessible. In spect only normally accessible areas without disassembly during inspections. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.4(d) Sample canisters installed and unused connections capped or plugged leak-tight. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.4(e) No penetrations of the mounting frame except for test canisters. Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without
disassembly during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 5 OF 12)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.4(f) No sealant or caulking of any type. Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without
disassembly during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.5 Filter Clamping Devices 5.5.1.5(a) Sufficient number of devices of adequate size to assure specified gasket compression.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.5(b)* Individual clamping of filters and adsorbers.
Note: Adsorber is type III Filter.
No (Not required)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.5(c) All clamping hardware complete and in good condition.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.5(d)* Adequate clearances provided between filter and adsorber units in same bank to tighten clamping devices. No (Not required)
Yes 5.5.1.6 Moisture Separators 5.5.1.6(a) No unacceptable damage to media, frame, or gaskets. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.6(b) No dirt or debris loading which creates higher than the specified pressure drop across the bank of components at the design airflow rate. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.6(c) Proper installation of moisture separators. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.7 Air Heating Coils - Inside Housing 5.5.1.7(a) No unacceptable damage to coils which may affect operability of the heaters. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 6 OF 12)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.7(b) No unacceptable dirt or debris on or between coils. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.8 Prefilters 5.5.1.8(a) No damage to media, frame, or gaskets which may affect operability of prefilters Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.8(b) No dirt or debris loading which creates higher than the specified pressure drop across the filter bank at the design flow rate. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.8(c) Proper installation of prefilters. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.9 HEPA Filters 5.5.1.9(a) No unacceptable damage to filter media.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.9(b) Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with at least 50% compression.
Note: Visually confirm that gaskets appear tight. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.9(c) No dirt or debris loading which creates higher than the specified pressure drop across the filter
bank at the design flow rate. Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without disassembly during inspections. Pressure drop will be
checked by installed pressure gauges.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.9(d) No sealant or caulking of any type. Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without
disassembly during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 7 OF 12)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.9(e) Filters are properly installed with pleats vertical. Yes Yes 5.5.1.10 Adsorbers 5.5.1.10(a) No unacceptable damage to adsorbers or adsorbent beds.
Yes Yes 5.5.1.10(b) Acceptable condition and seating of gaskets with at least 50 % compression.
Note: Visually confirm that gaskets appear tight.
Adsorber is type III. Bypass leakage will be checked by in-place testing.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.10(c) No through bolts on Type II adsorbers or other structure that could cause bypass in an adsorber
bank where visible.
Note: Adsorber is type III.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.10(d) No sealant or caulking of any type. Note: Inspect only normally accessible areas without
disassembly during inspections.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note) 5.5.1.11 Dampers - Housing and Associated Bypass Duct 5.5.1.11(a) No unacceptable damage to or distortion of frame or blades. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(b) No missing seats or blade edging. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(c) No unacceptable damage to shaft, pivot pins, operator linkages, operators, or packing. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.11(d) Linkage connected and free from obstruction. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 8 OF 12)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 5.5.1.11(e) No unacceptable damage to gaskets. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.12 Manifolds 5.5.1.12(a) No unacceptable damage to test manifolds. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 5.5.1.12(b) Adequate clearance between permanent manifolds and filters. Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 6 DUCTWORK AND HOUSING LEAK AND STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY TESTS Note: The design does not include this feature. Piping is utilized for the flow path and the filter housing is a pressure vessel.
8 AIRFLOW CAPACITY AND DISTRIBUTION TESTS
8.5.1 Airflow
Capacity Test Procedure 8.5.1.1 Start system fan and verify stable (no surging) fan operation for 15 minutes. Note: The design does not incl ude this feature (no fan).
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 8.5.1.2 Measure system airflow in accordance with 2.2 or equivalent. Note: The design does not include this feature (no field measurement points provided in piping). Air flow will be measured with in-place instrumentation and associated accuracy or with external inst rumentation in the supply line from a temporary air source.
Yes (See note)
Yes (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 9 OF 12)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 8.5.1.3* Clean System Air flow. With the new housing components installed, or simulated, operate at
the clean differential pressure and compare
measured flow rate (using methods of para.
8.5.1.2) with the value specified by the test
program or project specification. If the specified
value cannot be achieved, report to owner.
No (Not required)
Yes 8.5.1.4* Maximum Housing Component Pressure Drop Airflow. After successful completion of para.
8.5.1.3, increase housing component resistance (artificially by blanking off portions of the filter
bank or by adjusting throttling dampers) until the
maximum housing component pressure drop for
the system (as specified in the test program or
project specifications) is achieved. Measure flow
rate per para. 8.5.1.2. If the maximum housing
component pressure drop airflow cannot be
achieved, report to owner. Note: The design does not include this feature (no fan)
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 8.5.1.5* Return system to "clean" condition.
No (Not required)
N/A 8.5.2 Airflow Distribution Test Procedure Note: Airflow distribution tests are not required for a f ilter bank containing a single HEPA filter. 8.5.2.1* Airflow Distribution Through HEPA Filter Banks.
The minimum number of velocity measurements
shall be one in the center of each filter. All
measurements should be made an equal
distance away from the filters. Velocity
measurements should be made downstream of
the filters to take advantage of the airflow
distirbution dampening effects of the HEPA
filters. Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA
filter is present.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 10 OF 12)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 8.5.2.2* Airflow Distribution Through Adsorber Banks. For banks containing Type I adsorbers, the air
distribution test shall follow the same procedures
specified for HEPA filter banks in para 8.5.2.1.
For banks containing Type II modular trays, the
air distribution test shall follow the same
procedure specified for filter banks in para.
8.5.2.1, except that all velocity measurements
shall be made in the plane of the face of the air
channels, in the center of every open channel
and an equal distance away from the adsorbers.
For type III adsorbers, velocity measurements
shall be made in the plane of the face of the air
channels. These measurements shall be made
in centers of equal area that cover the entire
open face, not in excess of 12 in. between points
on a channel, and an equal distance away from
the adsorber. Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA
filter is present.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 8.5.2.3* Calculate the average of the velocity readings (Section 3). Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA
filter is present.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 8.5.2.4* Note the highest and lowest velocity readings and calculate the percentage they vary from the
average found in para. 8.5.2.3. If acceptance
criteria are exceeded, notify owner. Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA
filter is present.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note)
FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 11 OF 12)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08
8.6.0 Acceptance
Criteria
. 8.6.1 Acceptance Criteria for Airflow Capacity Test.
Airflow shall be within the values specified in the
test program or project specifications. Maximum
housing component pressure drop airflows shall
be less than or equal to the values specified in
the test program or project specifications with the
pressure drop greater than or equal to the
maximum housing component pressure drop.
For systems with carbon adsorbers, the maximum
velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be
limited to that value specified in the laboratory
test (Section 15).
Note: Applies only to section 8.5.1.2.
Yes (See note)
Yes 8.6.2* Airflow Distribution Test. No velocity readings shall exceed
+/-20% of the calculated average.
For system with carbon adsorbers, maximum
velocity of air through the carbon beds shall be
limited to that value specified in the laboratory
test (Section 15). Note: This test will not be performed since a single HEPA
filter is present.
No (Not required)
N/A (See note) 9 AIR-AEROSOL MIXING UNIFORMITY TEST Note: This is a single HEPA syst em and this test does not apply.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 10 HEPA FILTER BANK IN-PLACE TEST Note: In-place leak testing will be performed following HEPA filter replacement.
Yes Yes (See note) 11 ADSORBER BANK IN-PLACE TEST Yes Yes FNP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.4-20 (SHEET 12 OF 12)
Testing Conformance N510-1989 Paragraph Description of N510-1989 Testing Requirement Routine Surveillance Following Modification or Repair
REV 21 5/08 12 DUCT DAMPER BYPASS TEST Note: The design does not include bypass damper.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 13 SYSTEM BYPASS TEST Note: Tests performed per Section 10 satisfy Section 13 requirements.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 14 AIR HEATER PERFORMANCE TEST Note: The design does not include this feature.
N/A (See note)
N/A (See note) 15 LABORATORY TESTING OF ADSORBENT Notes: 1. Laboratory testing will be performed in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989. 2. Laboratory testing will be performed following adsorber replacement, at approximately 18-month intervals or following exposure to solvent, paints, or other organic fumes or vapors wh ich exceed the administrative limit.
Yes (See notes)
Yes (See notes)
- ASME N510-1989 clearly delineates these steps are intended for acceptance tests performed after any major system modification or repair.
REV 21 5/08
[CONCENTRATION OF CHLORINE IN CONTROL ROOM AFTER ONSITE CHLORINE RELEASE - CASE A (SMALL SCALE)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.4-1 (SHEET 1 OF 5)
]
REV 21 5/08
[CONCENTRATION OF CHLORINE IN CONTROL ROOM AFTER ONSITE CHLORINE RELEASE - CASE A (LARGE SCALE)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.4-1 (SHEET 2 OF 5)
]
REV 21 5/08
[CONCENTRATION OF CHLORINE IN CONTROL ROOM AFTER ONSITE CHLORINE RELEASE - CASE B (SMALL SCALE)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.4-1 (SHEET 3 OF 5)
]
REV 21 5/08
[CONCENTRATION OF CHLORINE IN CONTROL ROOM AFTER ONSITE CHLORINE RELEASE - CASE B (LARGE SCALE)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.4-1 (SHEET 4 OF 5)
]
REV 21 5/08 HALON 1301 CONCENTRATION IN CONTROL ROOM JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.4-1 (SHEET 5 OF 5)
REV 21 5/08 UNITS 1 AND 2 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING EQUIPMENT LOCATION ON ROOF JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.4-2 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
REV 21 5/08 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING EQUIPMENT ON ROOF (ELEVATION AS SHOWN)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.4-2 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
REV 21 5/08 CHLORINE CONCENTRATION VERSUS TIME DIESEL GENERATOR JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.4-3
FNP-FSAR-9 REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.5-1 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS OF DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM Failure Method of Items Description Function Mode Cause of Failure Effect on Subsystem Failure Detection Effect on System
- 1. Diesel oil Each tank stores 3 1/2 Leaks Crack, corrosion Loss of insignificant oil Level indicatorNone: Tanks still storage tank days supply of fuel per supply and periodic available tank for 1 diesel inspection
- 2. Transfer pump Pump fuel to day tank or No output (1) Motor fail Cannot pump fuel oil Level alarm None: Use redundant storage tanks diesel (2) Pump fail Cannot pump fuel oil Level alarm None: Use redundant diesel (3) Loss of power Cannot pump fuel oil Level alarm None: Use redundant diesel 3. Transfer line Pipe fuel to day tank Rupture Crack, corrosion Only 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of available fuelLevel alarm None: Use redundant oil to the diesel it serves diesel 4. Day tank Stores 4-hour fuel supply Rupture Crack, corrosion Loss of fuel supply to the Level alarm None: Use redundant at diesel diesel it serves diesel 5. Valve Isolate portion of line to Leaks Crack, corrosion Loss of part of oil supply Level indicatorNone: Four tanks still transfer fuel available
- 6. Valve Unisolate portion of line to Frozen in Valve disc to Cannot transfer oil supply Operator None: Use redundant transfer fuel place stem separation identified diesel
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9.5-2 SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS DIESEL GENERATOR COOLING WATER Effect on Safety-Related Component Malfunction Systems Comments Diesel generator Diesel failure No effect Redundancy of the diesel generat ors is provided.
Cooling water supply Line break No effect Failure of either cooling water train of either unit header can result in the disabling of no more than one large and one small diesel generator. One large diesel per unit is capable of furnishing the required safety-related power to its assigned unit. A total of two small and three large diesels is provided.
Supply header Header isolation No effects During two-unit operation, no single train valve fails closed supplies cooling water to more than one small diesel and one large diesel. Therefore, any train failure affects only these diesels.
During one-unit operati on, the above statement is also true. Only a total of four diesels is considered operational during one-unit operation. The large diesel assigned to the nonoperating unit will be isolated. The nonshared large diesel will be isolated from the unit not required to furnish cooling water to that diesel. Discharge header Header isolation No effects During two-unit operation, each diesel will valve fails closed have a dischar ge path to either of the units.
Therefore, this single failure will not result in loss of flow to the diesels. During one-unit operation, this failure will result in the loss of flow to the diesel of the failed cooling water train only. The remaining train will provide cooling water to the required number of diesels in that train.
FNP-FSAR-9
REV 25 4/14 TABLE 9.5-3 DIESEL GENERATOR COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGER TUBE BUNDLE REPLACEMENT The following Diesel Generator Cooling Wate r System Heat Exchanger Tube Bundles have been replaced with tube bundles procured under the provisions of NRC Generic Letter 89-09 (i.e., the replacement bundles are like-for-like replacements meeting the original ASME Section
3 requirements except for the Code Stamp):
Heat Exchanger
TPNS Number Generic Letter 89-09 Replacement Tube Bundle Installed 1-2A Lube Oil Cooler QSR43H0505
- Note 1 1-2A Jacket Water Cooler QSR43H0511 X 1B Lube Oil Cooler Q1R43H0501
- Note 1 1B Jacket Water Cooler Q1R43H0503 X 2B Lube Oil Cooler Q2R43H0501
- Note 1 2B Jacket Water Cooler Q2R43H0503 X 1C Lube Oil Cooler QSR43H0504
- Note 1 1C Inter-Cooler QSR43H0514 X 1C Jacket Water Cooler QSR43H0510 X 2C Lube Oil Cooler QSR43H0503
- Note 1 2C Inter-Cooler QSR43H0513 X 2C Jacket Water Cooler QSR43H0509 X
- Note 1: These diesel generator cooling water system heat exchanger tube bundles have been
subsequently replaced with new tube bundles which are manufactured using more erosion
resistant materials. These replacement tube bundles meet all of the ASME Section 3
requirements including the code stamp.
REV 21 5/08 DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM PHYSICAL LAYOUT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9.5-1
FNP-FSAR-9A
9A-i REV 21 5/08 APPENDIX 9A ULTIMATE HEAT SINK EVALUATION -
RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page 9A.1 RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT..........................................................................................9A-1
FNP-FSAR-9A
9A-ii REV 21 5/08 LIST OF TABLES 9A-1 Residual Decay Heat Values Used in the Updated UHS Calculations
9A-2 Deleted
FNP-FSAR-9A
9A-iii REV 21 5/08 LIST OF FIGURES 9A-1 Residual Decay Heat Finite Irradiation of Three-Region Cores
9A-2 Comparison of Westinghouse and UHS Calculation Residual Decay Heat Curves
FNP-FSAR-9A
9A-1 REV 21 5/08 APPENDIX 9A ULTIMATE HEAT SINK ELEVATION - RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT 9A.1 DECAY HEAT The decay heat generation for the Farley units is given in figure 9A-1. These curves are provided in Westinghouse Specification No. BOP-FR-8, Rev. 1, Functional Requirements and
Design Criteria-Residual Decay Heat Standard. The decay heat values for the Farley units are
taken from these curves. The finite irradiation time assumes a three-region core with equal
mass regions irradiated for 8000, 16,000, and 24,000 h (effective full power), respectively.
These data have been compared to those which result from an application of the American
Nuclear Society standard (ANS-5) for finite times using, for the contribution from fission
products, the formula:
()()[]
=+=31i itt,Po/Pt, Po/P1/3 u)+(1Po(t)/
P Where:
I = Core region of interest.
t i = Irradiation time of region i (8000 h for region 1, 16,000 h for region 2, and 24,000 h for region 3).
P/Po (t) = Decay heat fraction of initial power at time t.
P/Po (,t) = Decay heat fraction for infinite irradiation time from ANS-5 curve.
u = Recommended uncertainties per ANS-5 (20 percent t is 10 3 s, 10 percent 10 3 s < t < 10 7 s).
The result, within the accuracy of reading two values from the ANS-5 curve for infinite irradiation
and the accuracy of plotting the difference plus prescribed uncertainties, agrees with the fission
product decay curve in figure 9A-1.
The U-238 capture decay (due to U-239 and Np-239 decay) contribution shown in figure 9A-1
was calculated with equations prescribed by ANS-5 plus a 10-percent uncertainty.
The contribution from delay neutron-induced fissions is excluded from consideration by ANS-5.
A sample of the decay heat values used in the evaluation of the ultimate heat sink is given in
table 9A-1. These values are based on the residual decay heat curves provided in
NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, Revision 2, July 1981, Branch Technical Position ASB FNP-FSAR-9A
9A-2 REV 21 5/08 9-2 (pages 9.2.5-11 to 9.2.5-13). Figure 9A-2 compares the Westinghouse total decay heat
curve to the curve obtained using the total decay heat values from the updated ultimate heat
sink evaluation. The curve formed using the total residual decay heat values from the UHS
envelopes the Westinghouse curve; hence, the values used in the UHS calculation are
conservative.
NUREG-0800 was employed in the heat sink calculation because it provides an added
conservatism in the determination of residual decay heat and, subsequently, to the heat load to
the ultimate heat sink. Furthermore, in no way does the use of NUREG-0800 in the ultimate
heat sink calculation alter the existing design basis provided by the Westinghouse curves.
FNP-FSAR-9A
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 9A-1 RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT USED IN THE UPDATED UHS CALCULATION The total residual decay heat values used in the updated heat sink calculation are based on the residual decay heat curves provided in NUREG-0800 (page 9.2.5-11 to 9.2.5-13). The curves
provide residual decay heat values in terms of fractions of full power. The value for full power
that is used to determine the megawatt value of residual decay heat is 2774 MW. This MW
decay heat is then converted to Watts and, finally, to Btu/h. The decay heat values are reported
relative to the time when the reactor is shutdown.
Tshutdown (s)
Residual Decay Heat Rate (10 7 Btu/h) 14800 9.8 34800 7.7 54800 6.8 74800 5.9 92800 5.5 112800 5.3 132800 5.2 152800 5.0 172800 4.8 192800 4.7 217800 4.4 242800 4.2 267800 4.0 292800 3.8 317800 3.7 342800 3.6 392800 3.5 442800 3.4 492800 3.3 542800 3.2 592800 3.0 642800 2.9 692800 2.7 792800 2.5 992800 2.3 2584800 2.3
REV 21 5/08 RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT FINITE IRRADIATION OF THREE-REGION CORES JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9A-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
REV 21 5/08 RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT FINITE IRRADIATION OF THREE-REGION CORES JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9A-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
REV 21 5/08 COMPARISON OF WESTINGHOUSE AND UHS CALCULATION RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT CURVES JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 9A-2
FNP-FSAR-10
10-i REV 21 5/08 10.0 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page 10.1
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION......................................................................................10.1-1
10.2 TURBINE GENERATOR...........................................................................................10.2-1
10.2.1 Design Bases................................................................................................10.2-1 10.2.2 Description....................................................................................................10.2-1 10.2.3 Turbine Missiles............................................................................................10.2-4 10.2.4 Evaluation......................................................................................................10.2-5
10.3 MAIN STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM.............................................................................10.3-1
10.3.1 Design Bases................................................................................................10.3-1
10.3.1.1 Functional Requirements...................................................................10.3-1 10.3.1.2 Safety Requirements.........................................................................10.3-2 10.3.1.3 Design Data ......................................................................................10.3-3 10.3.1.4 Design Codes....................................................................................10.3-3
10.3.2 Description ...................................................................................................10.3-4
10.3.2.1 General Description...........................................................................10.3-4 10.3.2.2 Components......................................................................................10.3-5
10.3.3 Evaluation......................................................................................................10.3-5 10.3.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements...........................................................10.3-6 10.3.5 Water Chemistry............................................................................................10.3-7 10.3.6 Instrumentation Applications.........................................................................10.3-8 10.3.7 Main Steam Safety Valves............................................................................10.3-9 10.3.8 Main Steam Atmospheric Power Relief Valves.............................................10.3-9 10.3.9 Main Steam Isolation Valves.......................................................................10.3-11
10.4 OTHER FEATURES OF THE STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM..........................................................................................10.4-1
10.4.1 Main Condenser............................................................................................10.4-1
FNP-FSAR-10
10-ii REV 21 5/08 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page 10.4.1.1 Design Bases....................................................................................10.4-1 10.4.1.2 System Description............................................................................10.4-1 10.4.1.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................10.4-2 10.4.1.4 Tests and Inspections........................................................................10.4-3 10.4.1.5 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................10.4-3
10.4.2 Main Condenser Evacuation System............................................................10.4-3
10.4.2.1 Design Bases....................................................................................10.4-3 10.4.2.2 System Description............................................................................10.4-3 10.4.2.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................10.4-4 10.4.2.4 Tests and Inspections........................................................................10.4-5 10.4.2.5 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................10.4-5
10.4.3 Turbine Gland Sealing System......................................................................10.4-5
10.4.3.1 Design Bases....................................................................................10.4-5 10.4.3.2 System Description............................................................................10.4-5 10.4.3.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................10.4-6 10.4.3.4 Tests and Inspections........................................................................10.4-6 10.4.3.5 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................10.4-6
10.4.4 Turbine Bypass System.................................................................................10.4-6
10.4.4.1 Design Bases....................................................................................10.4-7 10.4.4.2 System Description............................................................................10.4-7 10.4.4.3 Safety Evaluation...............................................................................10.4-8 10.4.4.4 Tests and Inspections........................................................................10.4-8 10.4.4.5 Instrumentation Applications.............................................................10.4-8
10.4.5 Circulating Water System..............................................................................10.4-9
10.4.5.1 Design Bases....................................................................................10.4-9 10.4.5.2 System Description............................................................................10.4-9 10.4.5.3 Safety Evaluation.............................................................................10.4-10 10.4.5.4 Tests and Inspections......................................................................10.4-11 10.4.5.5 Instrumentation Application.............................................................10.4-11 10.4.5.6 Chemical Treatments.......................................................................10.4-11
FNP-FSAR-10
10-iii REV 21 5/08 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page 10.4.6 Condensate and Feedwater Recirculation and Cleanup System................10.4-12
10.4.6.1 Design Bases..................................................................................10.4-12 10.4.6.2 System Description..........................................................................10.4-12 10.4.6.3 Safety Evaluation.............................................................................10.4-13
10.4.7 Condensate and Feedwater Systems.........................................................10.4-13
10.4.7.1 Design Bases..................................................................................10.4-13 10.4.7.2 System Description..........................................................................10.4-14 10.4.7.3 Safety Evaluation.............................................................................10.4-15 10.4.7.4 Tests and Inspections......................................................................10.4-16 10.4.7.5 Instrumentation Applications...........................................................10.4-16
10.4.8 Steam Generator Blowdown Processing System........................................10.4-17
10.4.8.1 Design Bases..................................................................................10.4-18 10.4.8.2 System Description and Operation..................................................10.4-18 10.4.8.3 Design Evaluation............................................................................10.4-21 10.4.8.4 Tests and Inspections......................................................................10.4-22 10.4.8.5 Safety Evaluation.............................................................................10.4-22
APPENDIX 10A Dynamic Analysis of Main Steam Swing...........................................10A-1 Disc Trip Valve for Faulted Conditions
FNP-FSAR-10
10-iv REV 21 5/08 LIST OF TABLES
10.1-1 Major Steam and Power Conversion Equipment Summary Description
10.3-1 Main Steam Safety and Relief Valves Design Data
10.3-2 Atmospheric Power Relief Valves
10.3-3 Main Steam Isolation Valves Functional Requirements
10.3-4 Main Steam Isolation Valves Materials
FNP-FSAR-10
10-v REV 21 5/08 LIST OF FIGURES
10.1-1 Heat Balance - Normal
10.1-2 Heat Balance - Maximum
10.3-1 Main Steam Swing-Disc Trip Valve
10.3-2 Main Steam Isolation Valves
10.4-1 Steam Generator 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, and 2C Feedwater Connection
10.4-2 Steam Generator 2B Feedwater Connection
FNP-FSAR-10
10.1-1 REV 25 4/14 10.0 - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM
10.1
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION The steam and power conversion system is designed to accept steam from the nuclear steam
supply system (NSSS) and convert its thermal energy into electrical energy. It consists of the turbine-generator, main steam supply system , main condenser, turbine bypass system, condensate and feedwater system, steam gener ator blowdown system, main condenser
evacuation system, turbine gland sealing system , and circulating water system. The steam and power conversion system has a capability of 2785 MWt and 920 MWe. A flow diagram is
provided for the main steam supply system in drawings D-175033, sheet 1, D-175033, sheet 2, D-170114, sheet 1, D-170114, sheet 2, D-205033, sheet 1, D-205033, sheet 2, and D-200007.
A summary of major equipment is provided in table 10.1-1. Heat balances are shown in figures
10.1-1 and 10.1-2 for both normal and maximum volumetric flow rates, respectively.
The turbine is a Westinghouse (modified by Siemens) 1800 rpm, tandem compound, 4-flow
exhaust with 45.5-in. last-stage blades. It is equipped with an automatic stop and emergency trip system which will trip the stop and control valv es to a closed position in the event of turbine
overspeed, low bearing oil pressure, low vacuum, or thrust bearing failure. (See section 10.2.)
The main steam supply system includes the associated piping and valves required to conduct
the steam through the steam and power conversion system. Steam generated in the three
steam generators will be conducted through the containment wall in three lines. Isolation valves
and spring-loaded safety valves will be located outside of containment in each of the three
steam lines, with the safety valves being locat ed upstream of the isolation valves. Beyond the isolation valves, the three main steam lines join in a header, and downstream of the header, the
flow splits into two separate lines which both lead to the turbine. At the turbine, flow from each
of these two main steam supply lines will feed the turbine. Steam to the auxiliary feedwater
pump turbine will be taken in separate lines from two of the three main steam lines. Steam will be supplied to the steam reheaters, the gland steam sealing system , the auxiliary steam system, the steam generator feedwater pump turbine, and other components and systems. (See section 10.3.)
The main condenser serves as a heat sink for the main turbine exhaust, feed pump turbine
exhaust, turbine bypass steam, and other flows. It also provides for deaeration and storage for
the condensate. Each low-pressure turbine casing is connected by the use of a
single-convolution, stainless steel expansion joint to its condenser. (See subsection 10.4.1.)
The turbine bypass system provides a route for throttle steam to bypass the turbine and enter the condenser directly. This route is provided for the case of large turbine load reduction which
could cause an undesired magnitude of nuclear sy stem transients. The bypass system is capable of allowing a 50-percent load decrease in the turbine load without reactor trip. (See
subsection 10.4.4.)
The condensate and feedwater system is a closed cycle which serves to conduct condensed
steam from the main condenser to the steam generators located inside the containment.
FNP-FSAR-10
10.1-2 REV 25 4/14 Deaeration of the condensate is performed in the hot well of the main condenser. The
condensate is then pumped through five stages of low-pressure feedwater heaters, followed by
one stage of high-pressure feedwater headers, before entering the steam generators. (See
subsection 10.4.7.)
The steam generator blowdown system is designed to maintain the water chemistry in the
secondary coolant system at an optimum purity leve
- l. Blowdown liquid is taken off at the steam generator stage and processed with the use of ion exchange resins to remove impurities which
may have been added through leaks in the steam and power conversion syst em. This system also removes radioactive contaminants which may enter the secondary side of the steam
generator through defects in the steam generator tubing. After the contaminants have been
removed for offsite disposal, the purified blowdown liquid is recycled to the main condenser.
The main condenser evacuation system, by the use of hogging ejectors during startup and
steam jet air ejectors during normal running, creates a vacuum on the main condenser to
ensure proper flow of the condensing steam. (See subsection 10.4.2.)
The turbine gland sealing system acts to seal the turbine shaft from leakage of air into the
turbine interior or leakage of steam out of the turbine into the turbine building. (See
subsection 10.4.3.)
The circulating water system is designed to remove the waste heat from the thermal cycle. It
will also remove the heat released into the c ondenser by the steam dump system during plant startup, cooldown, or during steam dump operation following a large load reduction. (See
subsection 10.4.5.)
Portions of the main steam supply system and the condensate and feedwater system are safety related. There is an extremely small amount of radioactivity in the steam and power conversion
system during normal operation; therefore, no radiation shieldings (besides piping and housing)
are required for this system. The portion of the steam and power conversion system which is
located outside containment is continuously accessible under normal operating conditions.
FNP-FSAR-10
REV 25 4/14 TABLE 10.1-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
MAJOR STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION EQUIPMENT
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION Number of units 2 Reactor core (net MWt, each unit) 2,775 Reactor coolant pump heat input (MWt, each unit) 10 Total NSSS power (MWt, each unit) 2,785 NSSS total steam flow (lb/h, at maximum calculated, each unit) 12.26 E+06 Steam generator design pressure (psia) 1,100.0 Steam generator design temperature (°F) 600.0 NSSS steam outlet moisture (%)
0.10 NSSS inlet feedwater temperature (°F, at maximum calculated) (T) 444.0 Turbine-Generator Ratings (1,3) Number of units 2 Turbine Throttle steam pressure (psia) 739.69 Throttle steam temperature (°F) 509.3 Throttle steam moisture (%)
0.27 Throttle steam flow (lb/h, each unit) 11,855,179 Exhaust pressure (in. Hg abs)
2.2 Generator
Nameplate output (kW, each unit) 947,147 Power factor (pf) 0.85 (note 2)
FNP-FSAR-10
REV 25 4/14 TABLE 10.1-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Generator rating (kVA) 1,045,000.0 Voltage 22,000.0 H 2 pressure (psig) 75.0 Notes: (1) Ratings unchanged for power uprate. Uprate was evaluated based on the representative conditions reflected in figures 10.1-1 and 10.1-2.
(2) The Units operate near a power factor of 1.0.
(3) Nameplate output (kW, each unit) changed as a result of LP turbine replacement. Other ratings including throttle steam pressure, throttle steam temperature, throttle steam moisture, throttle steam flow, and exhaust pressure were not changed as a result of the LP turbine replacement but were revised by Siemens with the vendor manual transmittal for the LP turbine replacement.
Note: Flow conditions downstream of the LP turbine to the condenser have changed as a result of the LP turbine replacement.
REV 25 4/14 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 HEAT BALANCE - NORMAL FIGURE 10.1-1
Note: Flow conditions downstream of the LP turbine to the condenser have changed as a result of the LP turbine replacement.
REV 25 4/14 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 HEAT BALANCE - MAXIMUM FIGURE 10.1-2
FNP-FSAR-10
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 10.3-1 MAIN STEAM SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES DESIGN DATA Main Steam Safety Valves Quantity 15 (5 per steam generator)
Design pressure (psig) 1085 Design temperature (°F) 600 Capacity Each bank of 5 valves relieves 4,328,230 lb/h from 1 steam generator (105% of maximum steam flow)
Set pressure (psig) 1075 (for first valve)
Full relieving pressure (psig) 1173 (including tolerance and accumulation)
Limiting flow (per valve) (lb/h) 890,000 at 1085 psig
Applicable code ASME Section III, Class 2
Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve
Quantity 3 (1 per steam generator)
Design pressure (psig) 1085 Design temperature (°F) 600 Capacity (lb/h) 405,500 at 1025 psig 610,000 at 1085 psig
Setpoint (psig) 1025 (adjustable from control room)
Limiting flow (lb/h) 890,000 at 1085 psig
Applicable code ASME Section III, Class 2
FNP-FSAR-10
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 10.3-2 ATMOSPHERIC POWER RELIEF VALVES Valve Design Data Design pressure (psig) 1085 Design temperature (°F) 600 Nuclear Class ASME Section III, Class 2
Seismic Class I
Design flow (lb/h) 405,500 at 1025 psig 610,000 at 1085 psig
Limiting flow (lb/h) 890,000 at 1085 psig
FNP-FSAR-10
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 10.3-3 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS Valves Quantity 6 Design pressure (psig) 1085 Design temperature (°F) 600 Operator (trip valve)
Air piston Full-Load Steam Conditions (1)
Flow (per valve) (lb/h) 3.875 x 10 6 Pressure (psig) 775 Temperature (°F) 517 Steam Line Break Design Flow Conditions
Case A (dry saturated steam
flow through valve) (lb/s) 2300 Case B (4% quality steam flow
through valve) (lb/s) 7800
____________________
(1) MSIVs have been evaluated for steam flows up to 4.10 x 10 6 lb/h for power uprate.
FNP-FSAR-10
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 10.3-4 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES MATERIALS
Component Materials Body A-216 WCB Disc arm A-216 WCB Disc SA-182 Gr. 304F Cover A-515 Gr. 70 Shaft A-564 Gr. 630 Locking plate studs A-193 Gr. B7 Locking plate nuts A-194 Gr. 2H Load key A-182 Gr. F6a CL2
REV 21 5/08 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10.3-2
REV 21 5/08 STEAM GENERATOR 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, AND 2C FEEDWATER CONNECTION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10.4-1
REV 21 5/08 STEAM GENERATOR 2B FEEDWATER CONNECTION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10.4-2
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-i REV 21 5.08 APPENDIX 10A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MAIN STEAM SWING DISC TRIP VALVE FOR FAULTED CONDITIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page 10A.1 INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................10A-1
10A.2
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS............................................................................10A-3
10A.2.1 Summary of Fluid Dynamics Results.................................................10A-3 10A.2.2 Summary of Impact Analysis Results................................................10A-4 10A.2.3 Conclusions.......................................................................................10A-6
10A.3 IMPACT ANALYSIS - FAULTED CONDITIONS.......................................................10A-6
10A.3.1 Method of Analysis............................................................................10A-6 10A.3.2 Disc Model.........................................................................................10A-7 10A.3.3 Body Model........................................................................................10A-8 10A.3.4 Disc Material......................................................................................10A-9 10A.3.5 Body Material...................................................................................10A-11 10A.3.6 Initial Conditions and Boundary Conditions.....................................10A-14 10A.3.7 PISCES Solution..............................................................................10A-15
10A.4 PISCES RESULTS---------------------------.10A-16
10A.4.1 Dissipation of Kinetic Energy...........................................................10A-16 10A.4.2 Maximum Deflection of Disc............................................................10A-16 10A.4.3 Maximum Velocity in Disc................................................................10A-17 10A.4.4 Geometric Distortion........................................................................10A-17 10A.4.5 Strain History Plots..........................................................................10A-18 10A.4.6 Stress History Plots.........................................................................10A-19 10A.4.7 Distribution of Strains in the Contact Region...................................10A-19 10A.4.8 Distribution of Strains in the Central Disc Region............................10A-19 10A.4.9 Distribution of Stresses in the Central Disc Region.........................10A-20 10A.4.10 Strain Rates.....................................................................................10A-20
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-ii REV 21 5.08 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 10A.5 EVALUATION ------...................................................................................10A-20
10A.5.1 Deformation Considerations............................................................10A-21 10A.5.2 Evaluation Against Strain Criteria....................................................10A-21
10A.5.2.1 Local Strain Limits for Contact Region.....................10A-22 10A.5.2.2 Strain Limit for Central Region of Disc.....................10A-23
ATTACHMENT A Effect of Strain Rate on Stress-Strain Behavior
of Type 304 Stainless Steel
ATTACHMENT B Effect of Strain Rate on Uniform Elongation and
Reduction of Area
ATTACHMENT C Mass Simulation of Disc Arm, Post, and Nut
Determination of Translational Impact Velocity
ATTACHMENT D Fluid Dynamics Analysis
ATTACHMENT E ASME Paper No. 72-PVP-12
ATTACHMENT F Justification of Velocity Used in Valve Impact Analysis
ATTACHMENT G Conversion of Tension Test Data to True Stress-Strain Data
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-iii REV 21 5.08 LIST OF TABLES
10A-1 Nomenclature
10A-2 Tension Test Results
10A-3 Kinetic Energy in Model Versus Time
10A-4 Disc Location Versus Time
10A-5 Strain Rate at Highest-Strained Zones of Body and Discs
10A-6 Strain Rates at Centerline of Disc
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-iv REV 21 5.08 LIST OF FIGURES
10A-1 Isolation Valve in Closed Position
10A-2 Isolation Valve with Modified Disc Arm
10A-3 Section "A-A" From Figure 10A-2 Top View of Modified Disc Arm Assembly; Detail of Modified Disc Arm Assembly Showing Locking Devices Used on Studs
and Nuts 10A-4 Basic Disc Dimensions in Inches and in Centimeters
10A-5 First PISCES Model (Body Shown in Part)
10A-6 First PISCES Model (Closeup of Contact Region)
10A-7 Second PISCES Model (Body Shown in Part)
10A-8 Second PISCES Model (Closeup of Contact Region)
10A-9 Body Dimensions Assumed for PISC ES Model (in Inches and in Centimeters)
10A-10 Valve Seat Region of Isolation Valve
10A-11 Typical Stress - True Strain Diagrams for AISI 304 Stainless Steel
10A-12 Stress-Strain Diagram Used in PISCES Solution
10A-13 Typical Stress-Strain Diagrams for A-216 Grade WCB Steel (X-Direction, See Table 10A-2)
10A-14 Typical Stress-Strain Diagrams for A-216 Grade WCB Steel (Y-Direction, See Table 10A-2)
10A-15 Typical Stress-Strain Diagrams for A-216 Grade WCB Steel (Z-Direction, See Table 10A-2)
10A-16 Column and Row Numbers of Disc Region
10A-17 Column and Row Numbers of Body Region
10A-18 Kinetic Energy in Valve Versus Time Since Impact
10A-19 Axial Displacements at Centerline of Disc Versus Time Since Impact
10A-20 Axial Velocity at Centerline of Disc Versus Time Since Impact FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-v REV 21 5.08 LIST OF FIGURES
10A-21 Distorted Geometry at Time t = 300
µs 10A-22 Distorted Geometry at Time t = 700
µs 10A-23 Distorted Geometry at Time t = 1150
µs 10A-24 Shape of Model Before and After Impact
10A-25 Effective Strains in Body Versus Time Since Impact
10A-26 Effective Strains in Body Versus Time Since Impact
10A-27 through Effective Strains in Disc Versus Time Since Impact
10A-32 Axial Strains in Disc Versus Time Since Impact
10A-33 Radial Strains in Disc Versus Time Since Impact
10A-34 Hoop Strains in Disc Versus Time Since Impact
10A-35 Effective Strains in Disc Versus Time Since Impact
10A-36 Axial Strains in Disc Versus Time Since Impact
10A-37 Radial Strains in Disc Versus Time Since Impact
10A-38 Hoop Strains in Disc Versus Time Since Impact
10A-39 Effective Stresses in Disc Versus Time Since Impact
10A-40 Effective Stresses in Disc Versus Time Since Impact
10A-41 Distribution of Effective Strain at Time t = 300
µs 10A-42 Distribution of Effective Strain at Time t = 700
µs 10A-43 Distribution of Effective Strain at Time t = 1150
µs FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-vi REV 21 5.08 LIST OF FIGURES
10A-44 Distribution of Axial Strain X at Time t = 1150
µs 10A-45 Distribution of Radial Strain Y at Time t = 1150
µs 10A-46 Distribution of Hoop Strain Z at Time t = 1150
µs 10A-47 Distribution of Shear Strain XY at Time t = 1150
µs 10A-48 Distribution of Effective Strain at Time t = 300
µs 10A-49 Distribution of Effective Strain at Time t = 700
µs 10A-50 Distribution of Effective Strain at Time t = 1150
µs 10A-51 Distribution of Axial Strain X at Time t = 1150
µs 10A-52 Distribution of Radial Strain Y at Time t = 1150
µs 10A-53 Distribution of Hoop Strain Z at Time t = 1150
µs 10A-54 Distribution of Shear Strain XY at Time t = 1150
µs 10A-55 Distribution of Strains Along Centerline of Disc
10A-56 Distribution of Effective Stress at Time t = 1150
µs 10A-57 Distribution of Axial Stress X at Time t = 1150
µs 10A-58 Distribution of Radial Stress Y at Time t = 1150
µs 10A-59 Distribution of Hoop Stress Z at Time t = 1150
µs 10A-60 Distribution of Shear Stress XY at Time t = 1150
µs
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-1 REV 23 5/11 APPENDIX 10A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MAIN STEAM SWING DISC TRIP VALVE FOR FAULTED CONDITIONS 10A.1 INTRODUCTION Prior to performing the closure impact analysis described herein, Teledyne Materials Research (TMR) performed two preliminary closure impact analyses for the disc of a main steam
swing-disc trip valve intended for service in the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant. In both of the preliminary analyses, it was conservatively assumed that the valve body would remain rigid
during impact. The objective of the preliminary analyses was to demonstrate the structural
adequacy of the disc before proceeding with a more comprehensive analysis in which the valve
body would be allowed to deform. The assumption of a rigid valve seat was considered to yield
a conservative evaluation of the disc because of the implied requirement that the kinetic energy
stored in the disc and swing arm would be dissipated solely through plastic-strain energy
absorption in the disc. This report contains the final analysis in which both the disc and the
body are allowed to deform during the closure impact.
Large impact-induced strains in the disc were predicted on the basis of the conservative results
of the first preliminary analysis. This led to a dec ision to substitute a more ductile material for the disc. For this reason, the A516 Gr. 70 steel disc considered in the first preliminary analysis
was replaced by a type 304 stainless steel disc in the second preliminary analysis. The choice
of type 304 stainless steel was justified on the basis of available high-strain rate tensile test data for the temperature of interest (600
°F). Data presented in reference 2 reveals that the material had excellent ductility at strain rates as high as 100 s
-1 , both in terms of the uniform elongation at ultimate stress and the reduction of area at fracture. Therefore, this material was considered to have excellent energy absorption characteristi cs for impact conditions. Another consideration in the selection of the stainless steel was the ability to construct stress-strain diagrams for various rates of straining by means of information available from reference 3. This information
originated from the same testing program described in reference 2.
To reduce the high strains predicted in the first preliminary analysis for the disc rim region, a
disc geometry modification was introduced prior to performance of the second preliminary
analysis. The modification consisted of adding material to the backside of the disc in the rim
region. Because the material change and geometry change were made simultaneously, it was
not possible to determine to what degree the geometry change was effective toward reducing
high local strains in the contact region. However, the geometry change, if nothing more, reduced the shear strains averaged across the disc thickness. Therefore, the ability of the
redesigned disc to resist gross shearing at the internal seat diameter was improved.
The final analysis reported here is an axisymmetric simulation of the problem. That is, the
structure was modeled axisymmetrically and the swinging motion of the disc was replaced by a translational motion. The problem was solved for a disc impact velocity of 150 ft/s. This velocity was obtained by equating the kinetic energy of the translating disc to that of the swinging disc.
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-2 REV 23 5/11 A pressure of 705 psig was assumed to act on the upstream side of the disc for the duration of the impact event and the temperature of the valve was assumed to be 600
°F. The computer program used for the final analysis of the impact problem under faulted conditions
was the PISCES code. This Lagrangian finite-difference code permits the dynamic response of
a structure to be analyzed as a function of time under conditions of substantial plastic
deformation and gross geometric distortion.
Strain criteria are introduced in the report for evaluating the results of the impact analysis. On
the basis of testing the results against these criteria, it is concluded in section 10A.2 that the
valve body and disc are structurally adequate to withstand the postulated faulted-condition
event.
To acquaint the reader with the general appearance of the valve under consideration, a sketch
of the longitudinal cross-section is shown in figure 10A-1. The figure was obtained by tracing
Atwood and Morrill drawing No. 21261-H and shows the disc in the closed position. Under
normal operating conditions, the disc will be fully open and steam will flow from left to right. As
indicated on figure 10A-1, the downstream and upstream surfaces of the disc will be referred to
as the front surface and back surface, respectively.
Figure 10A-1 shows the component configurations considered for the final analysis reported
herein. With this design, the disc is subjected to a concentrated load at its center at the time of
impact. This load is due to the inertia of the disc arm, post, and nut. For the purpose of
analysis, a conservative approach was taken whereby the kinetic energy in the disc arm was
forced to be dissipated through plastic deformation of the disc and body. As discussed later, this was accomplished by adding the kinetic energy of the disc arm to the kinetic energy of the
disc through an increase in the density of the material near the center of the disc.
Following completion of the analysis reported herein, the disc arm was redesigned to the
configuration indicated in figures 10A-2 and 10A-3. For the redesigned disc arm, the kinetic
energy of the arm is transferred to the disc via four points located along the disc rim. The
modified arm design results in less severe disc loading than that presented in this report.
Consequently, the analysis performed in the original arm design (as shown in figure 10A-1) may
be viewed as a conservative evaluation for the modified disc arm design.
Table 10A-1 shows the nomenclature used in the report.
10A.2
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS The complete impact analysis of the disc required two tasks. Fluid dynamics were used to
calculate the forces on the disc and the disc closing velocity (attachment D). The impact
analysis was based on converting the angular velocity calculated in attachment D to an
equivalent uniform translational velocity and ev aluating the impact response by means of an axisymmetric representation of the disc and valve body.
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-3 REV 23 5/11 10A.2.1
SUMMARY
OF FLUID DYNAMICS RESULTS Addendum 8 to Bechtel Inquiry SS-1102-32 (reference 1) specifies the initial steam pressure
and quality for the two cases of main steam flow conditions to be considered in the swing-disc, trip-valve closure analysis. Denoting these as cases 1 and 2, the fluid flow states vary between
saturated steam in case 1, and 4-percent quality steam in case 2. The flow conditions for
case 1 and case 2 are outlined in attachment D.
The elapsed time from pipe break detection to dump valve actuation is 0.5 s, and an additional
1.0 s is required for the air cylinder to depressurize from the nominal 100-psig pressure to the disc balance pressure. During this 1.5-s delay, the 32-in. main steam line blows down and outflow is established by the upstream flow restrictor. Thus, the disc is not exposed to the initial
blowdown through the 32-in. pipe.
Atwood and Morrill weight and center of gravity data were used to compute a moment of inertia
for the disc assembly. Relations for the torques acting on the swing disc were formulated, including those due to gravity, pressure, and the closing spring. Also considered was a
constant shaft counter torque due to gland packing friction and based on Atwood and Morrill
data.
A calculation was made to determine the choking angle across the disc at which the dihedral
area between the disc plane and the plane of the valve seat is exactly equal to the flow area
across the valve seat. The choke angle was computed as 24.5 degrees, measured from the
valve seat.
In computing flow conditions across the valve, the conservative assumption was made that the
break occurs just downstream of the valve, resulting in a choked-flow condition across the valve
seat. This determined the flow velocity to which the disc was subjected. A dynamic analysis of
the disc motion was conducted for five angular segments between the normal "open" position
(65 degrees) and the closed position. The net torque acting on the disc was computed for each
included angular segment, and the results were used to solve the equations of motion. Included in each calculation were P, torque (T), , and t.
Upon onset of choking at = 24.5 degrees, a static pressure of 995 psia was taken at the back of the disc. A critical pressure ratio of 0.578 applied to this yielded a valve throat pressure of
575 psia, and a P across the disc of 419.9 psid. This pressure differential was held constant during the remaining 24.5 degrees of disc travel to impact. To account for the steam hammer
specified for cases 1 and 2, the steam hammer was averaged with P of 419.9 psid over the last 10 degrees of disc travel to impact, and the result then used in the torque calculation.
The results of the fluid flow analysis, as contained in attachment D, indicate a disc center impact
velocity of 117 ft/s for case 1 (saturated steam), and a 102.7 ft/s disc center impact velocity for case 2 (x = 4 percent). Closure times were 0.146 s and 0.158 s, respectively.
Using the more conservative case 1 disc center impact velocity, a modified disc center velocity
was determined by equating the kinetic energy for the assumed translational rotational mode (KE t) to the kinetic energy computed for the actual rotational mode (KE r). As shown in FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-4 REV 23 5/11 attachment C, this computation gives the disc center a velocity of V t = 150 ft/s used in the impact analysis. This approach to the choice of a uniform impact velocity was in accordance
with the conservative assumption that the kinetic energy must be dissipated solely through
plastic deformation of the valve body and disc.
10A.2.2
SUMMARY
OF IMPACT ANALYSIS RESULTS The dynamic solution formulated in section 10A.3 permitted the structural behavior of the valve under impact conditions to be investigated as a function of time. Both the disc and the valve
body were allowed to deform plastically. Pertinent results obtained in the investigation are
discussed in section 10A.4. Evaluation of the results against acceptance criteria is the subject
of section 10A.5. The following is a summary of key results obtained in the analysis:
A. The duration of the impact event as meas ured by dissipation of the kinetic energy in the moving parts of the valve is approximately 1300
µs (1.3 x 10
-3 s). The dynamic solution covers the first 1150
µs. Extrapolation to 1300
µs produces only minor changes in the results.
B. Following impact at 150 ft/s, the center of the disc continues to accelerate before it slows down. The highest velocity of 180 ft/s is reached 350
µs after impact.
C. Impact of the disc on the body seat results in substantial permanent geometric distortion of the valve, but not in the creation of a steam path past the disc.
Consideration of the deformed shape shows rotation of the seating surfaces of both
body and disc, as well as large-scale bending in the central portion of the disc. The
center of the disc deflects 1.84 in., which is equivalent to a displacement of half the
thickness of the disc (3.75 in.).
D. The largest value of the effective strain in the body is 15 percent. Because it is accompanied by a compressive hydrostatic stress state, an effective strain of up to
29 percent is considered acceptable. (Had the hydrostatic stress state been tensile, only 11-percent strain would have been acceptable.)
E. The largest value of the effective strain in the rim region of the disc is 17 percent.
This is a localized strain for which an effective strain of 30 percent is considered
acceptable (regardless of whether the hydrostatic stress state is tensile or compressive).
F. The largest value of the radial and hoop-bending strains in the disc which occur at the center of the front surface is 8.5 percent for both. Because of the constant
volume conditions associated with plastic deformation, the bending strains are
accompanied by a strain in the thickness direction of -17 percent. The effective
strain for this state of strain is 17 percent. An effective strain of up to 18 percent is
considered acceptable by a strain criter ion for limiting geometric distortion by bending.
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-5 REV 23 5/11 10A.
2.3 CONCLUSION
S A. The impact analysis shows that the body and disc are structurally adequate to withstand the dynamic forces produced by valve closure under the postulated
faulted conditions.
B. The axisymmetric method of solution adopted for the dynamic analysis was confirmed as an acceptable analytical approach by the results obtained. That is, a
sufficient margin exists between the imposed strain limits and maximum strains
computed for the contact region of body and disc to provide protection against any
deviations from the computed results attributable to the initially nonuniform impact
velocity along the circumference of the disc.
C. The conclusions of A and B above are not invalidated by the redesign of the disc arm which followed the investigation.
10A.3 IMPACT ANALYSIS - FAULTED CONDITIONS 10A.3.1 METHOD OF ANALYSIS The valve impact analysis reported herein is based on the method of solution incorporated in
the PISCES computer code. This code permits the solution of stress-wave propagation
problems by solving equations of motion and constitutive equations expressed in
finite-difference form. Thus, the code is especially well suited for analyzing the response of
structures to impact, and explosion and penetration conditions. Such response normally
involves both elastic-plastic deformation of the material and gross distortion of the structural geometry. A solution is generated by calculating the response at each of many small time
steps, also called cycles. The magnitude of the time step is automatically calculated within the
program by means of a criterion that controls numerical stability.
Printout of the solution is available for any of the time steps. The user of the program
preselects the times at which printout is desired. A standard output format is provided, but the
user can also develop additional output by writing his own subroutine and appending it to the
PISCES code. Because strain components, effective strain, and effective stress are not part of
the standard output, TMR developed its own subroutine for the computation and printing of
these variables. Plotting routines are available in PISCES for plotting the standard output, but
TMR adapted its own plotting routines to PISCES to facilitate plotting of standard and
nonstandard output.
References 4 through 6 are the manuals used in generating the PISCES solutions for the valve
problem. They may be consulted for additional information on the computer code.
The following units used in the PISCES solutions are needed to interpret the printed and plotted
results:
A. Unit of length = centimeter (cm).
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-6 REV 23 5/11 B. Unit of time = microsecond (µs).
C. Unit of force = 10 12 dyn.
D. Unit of pressure = mbar (1 mbar = 10 12 dyn/cm 2).
E. Unit of mass = (g).
F. Unit of energy = 10 12 dyn/cm.
Note that 1 psi is equal to 6.89 x 10
-8 mbar.
10A.3.2 DISC MODEL The overall disc dimensions used for constructing the PISCES model are given in figure 10A-4.
The dimensions are shown in inches and in centimeters, the latter in parentheses. Attention is
called to the undercut fillet at A. For reasons explained below, two fillet geometries were
investigated. Figures 10A-5 and 10A-6 show the first PISCES model analyzed. The fillet in this
model approximates the original design in that the outer radius of the fillet coincides with the
inside diameter of the body seat. This coincidence led to computational difficulties with the
PISCES code, apparently triggered by the local strain concentration in the disc resulting from
indentation of the disc corner by the body seat corner. To circumvent this problem, the fillet geometry was changed to that shown in figures 10A-7 and 10A-8. The modification consists of
increasing the outer radius of the fillet by 0.1 in. while leaving the outside diameter of the disc
unchanged. As a consequence, the radial dimension of the contact face on the disc is reduced
by the same amount, from 1.25 in. to 1.15 in.(a)
A dashed outline is used in figure 10A-4 to indicate the configuration of the original carbon steel
disc which was considered in the first preliminary analysis. It was mentioned in
section 10A.1 that when the disc material was changed from carbon steel to stainless steel, additional material was added to the disc backside to improve the shear strength of the disc.
Because the chamfer at B has little bearing on the structural behavior of the disc, it was not
included in the PISCES model.
____________________
- a. This modification has been incorporated into the design of the stainless steel disc. After
completion of the analysis reported herein, the fillet depth was increased by 0.1 in. The
rationale for this later modification is discussed in section 10A.5.
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-7 REV 23 5/11 It was mentioned in section 10A.1 that a fictitious higher-density material was assumed to
occupy the central portion of the disc. As explained in subsection 10A.3.6, the value of this
higher-density material is determined from the imposed requirement that the kinetic energy of
the disc post, nut, and disc arm be transferred to the disc on impact. In section 10A.1 it was
stated that subsequent to the performance of this analysis, the disc arm was redesigned to add
four adjustable points of attachment between the disc arm, and the disc post was redesigned to
become an integral part of the discs (figures 10A-2 and 10A-3). The modified disc arm and
postarrangement facilitates the field replacement and alignment of the stainless steel disc in the
valve body and simplifies the machining of the replacement disc. The modified disc arm design
will create a more favorable impact loading on the disc so that the impact analysis reported
herein will remain valid.
10A.3.3 BODY MODEL The valve body has a complex three-dimens ional geometry. Considerable geometric simplification was necessary to permit an axisy mmetric representation of the body. Modeling was facilitated by the massive proportions of the body relative to the disc so that it could be
predicted that plastic deformation would be confined to the immediate vicinity of the seat area.
However, even in this region, the geometry is not axisymmetric apart from the seat itself.
Therefore, the choice was made to model the body seat region in such a way that it would best
simulate the structural response at the location where the impact velocity of the disc is highest
during the swing motion.
This choice led to the body geometry seen in figures 10A-5 through 10A-8. The model
dimensions are defined in figure 10A-9.
The PISCES model of the body consists of tw o cylinders of unequal diameters but equal wall thickness separated by a transition region that contains the valve seat. The wall thickness of
the two cylinders was made equal to the valve's allowed minimum wall thickness. The most
characteristic aspect of the geometry is the feature of having the inside diameter on the
downstream side match the diameter of the seat opening. The resulting 90-degree angle
between the shell wall and the valve seat is representative of the geometry immediately
adjacent to the point of maximum impact velo city mentioned above. This will be evident by comparing the model geometry with the actual geometry sketched in figure 10A-10, obtained by tracing part of Atwood and Morrill drawing No. 21322-F.
Only part of the PISCES model is shown in figures 10A-5 through 10A-8. As indicated on figure
10A-9 the model is 200 in. long, 100 in. each way from the seating surface. This much length
was included in the model to assure that elastic stress waves reflected at the ends of the model would not return to the contact region in less than 1000
µs. Based on the preliminary analyses, it had been estimated that the conversion of kinetic energy to plastic-strain energy would, for all practical purposes, be completed in this timespan. To limit the number of zones in the model, a
transition from six zones across the wall to two zones was made 12 in. downstream and 5 in.
upstream from the seat surface. Moreover, the length of the zones was increased to 10 in.
starting at axial positions located 20 in. downstream and 10 in. upstream. At distances this far
from the impact surface, the use of zones with an aspect ratio of 10 can be justified on the
assumption of uniform wave fronts.
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-8 REV 23 5/11 10A.3.4 DISC MATERIAL The material properties employed for the disc, which are for type 304 stainless steel at 600
°F, are summarized below:
A. Elastic Constants
For Young's modulus (E), the value provided in Appendix I of ASME Section III was selected. Poisson's ratio () was assumed to be 0.3, and the shear modulus (G) and bulk modulus (K) were computed from E and . Thus,
- 1. E = 25.4 x 10 6 psi = 1.75 mbar.
- 2. = 0.3.
- 3. G = (E/2)/(1 + ) = 0.673 mbar.
- 4. K = (E/3)/(1 - 2) = 1.46 mbar.
B. Stress-Strain Diagram
The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Materials Handbook (reference 3) was the source for the stress-strain diagrams for different strain rates shown in figure
10A-11. The pertinent page of the reference cited is included as attachment A. It
provides a transcendental equation that gives, as a function of temperature and strain rate, the relationship between the true stress (t) and the true plastic strain (p). The equation is valid to 25-percent strain and strain rates from 10
-5 to 10 2 s-1. Total true strain (t) may be obtained by adding the elastic strain such that t = p + t/E. The diagram for a strain rate of 10 3 s-1 was expected to be encountered in the solution.
The PISCES code permits the use of a bilinear stress-strain diagram together with a specified maximum on stress. Figure 10A-12 defines the diagram used in the
analysis. It consists of an elastic portion, a strain-hardening elastic-plastic portion, and a perfectly-plastic portion. It is also superposed on the curves in figure
10A-11 to indicate the reasoning employed in defining figure 10A-12. That is, since
the effect of strain rate could not be modeled in the PISCES computer solution, a
diagram was selected which would approximat e high-strain behavior at large strains
and low-strain rate behavior at small strains. Because the yield strength at the
low-strain rate of 10
-5 s-1 was less than the specified minimum value in Appendix I of ASME Section III, no downward adjustment of the curve to account for minimum
properties was needed.
Denoting the yield stress (or proportional limit), true ultimate stress and tangent modulus in the strain-hardening range by y , ut and E t , respectively, the values of these parameters associated with figures 10A-11 and 10A-12 are:
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-9 REV 23 5/11 1. y = 25,000 psi = 1.72 x 10
-3 mbar. 2. ut = 80,000 psi = 5.51 x 10
-3 mbar. 3. E t = 0.314 x 10 6 psi = 0.0216 mbar.
C. Ductility Parameters
The results of the PISCES solution will be evaluated on the basis of strain criteria expressed in terms of the ductility parameters ut and f. Here, ut is the true uniform elongation (the true strain at the maximum load in a tension test) and f is the true fracture strain. If u is the measured engineering strain at maximum load, and RA is the measured reduction of area at the fracture location, then ut and f may be computed with the relations ut = ln(1+u)ut and f = ln [1/(1-RA)].
Referring to the HEDL data reported in reference 2 and reproduced in attachment B, the uniform elongation (figure B.1 of attachment B) and the reduction of area (figure B.2 of attachment B) for type 304 stainless steel at 600
°F are not very dependent on strain rate. Based on the information contained in the two diagrams, appropriate
choices for ut and RA are 30-percent and 65-percent true absolute strain, respectively. The value of RA yields f/3 = 35-percent true absolute strain.
D. Stellite Overlay
The contact surface of the disc is protected against wear by a stellite overlay. This layer of different material was not modeled as a separate material in the present
analysis. While it would have been possible to do so, omitting the layer is justifiable
on the ground that larger strains will be predicted without the stellite and that this will
lead to a conservative evaluation.
10A.3.5 BODY MATERIAL The body material is A-216, Gr. WCB steel, which is listed in Appendix I of ASME Section III as
a carbon steel for casting purposes. Because no published data were available pertaining to
the effect of strain rate on the stress-strain characteristics of material, a number of tension tests
were performed on specimens machined from a blank of the casting material (supplied to TMR
by Atwood and Morrill).
The tests furnished the information on stress-strain diagrams and ductility summarized below.
(A report on the test program will be issued separately.
- 7)
A. Elastic Constants
For Young's modulus (E), the value provided in Appendix I of ASME Section III was selected. Poisson's ratio () was assumed to be 0.3, and the shear modulus (G) and bulk modulus (K) were computed from E and . Thus, at 600 F, FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-10 REV 23 5/11 1. E = 25.4 x 10 6 psi = 1.77 mbar.
- 2. = 0.3.
- 3. G = (E/2)/(1 + ) = 0.682 mbar.
- 4. K = (E/3)/(1 - 2) = 1.48 mbar.
B. Stress-Strain Diagram
Stress-strain diagrams obtained at different strain rates and in three orthogonal directions of the test blank are shown in figures 10A-13, 10A-14, and 10A-15. The
testing conditions are summarized in table 10A-2, which gives the dimensions of the
blank as well as the nominal strain rate and the direction of loading for each of
11 test specimens. The Z-direction is the thickness direction of the cast material, whereas the x and Y directions are arbitrary inplane directions, metallographic
examination of samples normal to the three directions furnished evidence of a
uniform grain structure without a preferred orientation.
Inspection of the stress-strain diagrams in figures 10A-13 through 10A-15 reveals only a minor dependence of the results on loading direction and strain rate. The
material appears to soften slightly with increase in strain rate, but for analytical
purposes, the material can be assumed to be isotropic and strain-rate insensitive.
Also depicted in figures 10A-13 through 10A-15 is the trilinear stress-strain diagram assumed for the PISCES solution. The reader will note that the diagram is chosen
well below the measured diagrams. One reason for this choice was that the
material characterization should be conservative in view of the fact that the tests
were few in number and that strain rates as high as 1000 s-1 could not be achieved.
Here it should be recognized that lowering the stress-strain curve will lead to
increased strains. This, in turn, leads to a conservative evaluation because of the
use of criteria that place limits on strain. A second reason for lowering the
stress-strain curve was the need to compensate for a yield strength measured at
room temperature that was higher than the minimum yield strength given in
Appendix I of ASME Section III.
The assumed stress-strain diagram is also shown in figure 10A-12, where it can be compared to the diagram for the disc material. The values of y , ut , and E t for the body material are:
- 1. y = 30,000 psi = 2.07 x 10
-3 mbar. 2. ut = 62,000 psi = 4.28 x 10
-3 mbar. 3. E t = 0.320 x 10 6 psi = 0.0221 mbar.
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-11 REV 23 5/11 C. Ductility Parameters
As mentioned in the discussion of the disc material, the ductility parameters to be used in the evaluation of the PISCES solution are ut and f. Table 10A-2 furnishes the measured values of u and RA, and also the values of ut and f derived from u and RA. Inspection of the tabulated values reveals a slight tendency for increased ductility at higher strain rates. (The low value of ut for specimen No. 14 appears to be a spurious result.)
By averaging the values from all 11 tests, the following result is obtained: ut = 11-percent true absolute strain, and f = 88-percent true absolute strain. The strain criteria for the body will be based on these averages.
D. Stellite Overlay
The contact surface of the body seat is protected against wear by a stellite overlay.
This overlay was not modeled in the body as a separate material for the same
reasons that it was not in the disc.
10A.3.6 INITIAL CONDITIONS AND BOUNDARY CONDITIONS A. Initial Positions of Body and Disc
It is assumed in the PISCES solution that the moving disc will first contact the stationary body at time t = 0, the starting point of the solution. It is also assumed
that the still undeformed contact faces will at that point in time meet in the plane
defined by the axial position x = 0.
B. Constraint on Body Motion
During the impact event, axial motion of the body is rigidly constrained at the upstream end of the model (at x = 100 in.). No such constraint is imposed at the
downstream end (at x = -100 in.) so that the total length of the model is permitted to
change.
C. Initial Disc Velocity
The disc velocity at impact is 150 ft/s (4.58 cm/
µs). This velocity was determined in attachment C by matching the kinetic energy of disc translation to the kinetic energy of disc rotation. The rotational energy was known from the fluid dynamics analysis
reported in attachment D.
D. Pressure Loading
A constant pressure of 705 psig (4.86 x 10
-5 mbar) is maintained on the upstream side of the valve for the duration of the impact event.
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-12 REV 23 5/11 E. Initial Material Densities
The initial density of model materials in the PISCES code is entered as a relative density (the density relative to that of water). Hence, for the steels used in the disc and body, the relative density (s) is 7.85. In the analysis performed, the mass of the post, nut, and arm attached to the disc was accounted for by assuming that a higher-density material normally occupies the threaded hole in the center of the
disc. The density of this material was selected such that its mass was equivalent to
that of the post, nut, and arm combined. With reference to attachment C, the relative density of the equivalent material (e) is found from the relation e = 14.6 s. The equivalent material is occupied by the first five rows of zones in the disc model.
The higher density derived in attachment C pertains to the original disc arm design
reflected in figure 10A-1. As stated in section 10A-1, the redesigned disc arm
shown in figures 10A-2 and 10A-3 will result in less severe loading of the disc by the
disc arm. That is, the disc arm load is now applied in the rim region where its
contribution to disc loading is insignificant. Loading at the center of the disc has
been reduced to that due to the mass of the post, which is integral with the disc in
the modified disc arm design. The mass of the post is less than the equivalent
mass of post, arm, and nut in the original arm design so that the analysis as
performed will be conservative.
10A.3.7 PISCES SOLUTION A trial solution with the full model provided the value of the stable step between computation cycles as 0.385
µs. The initial time step was specified as 0.025
µs, a value computed by means of a formula provided in the PISCES Input Manual (reference 5). Subsequent time steps are determined internal to the code to ensure numerical stability in the computation. The stable
time step was reached in 13 cycles.
The final solution was executed for 3000 cycles. The associated elapsed time was 1150
µs. Standard computer output was printed at intervals of 200 cycles; nonstandard output was printed at intervals of 50 cycles. The nonstandard output was acquired by means of a specially-written subroutine (called EXOUT). It furnished the following results: effective strain
() , axial strain (x), radial strain (y), hoop strain (z), shear strain (xy), and effective stress
(). Effective stress and effective strain are computed from stress and strain components with the following formulas from plasticity theory:
()()()()=+++1/2 6 xy 2 yz 2 zx 2 xy 2 1/2 ()()()()=+++2/3-6 xy 2 yz 2 zx 2 xy 2 1/2 It should be noted that the geometry of the PISCES model is continually updated (following each computation cycle) so that the stress components x , y , z , and xy are true stresses and FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-13 REV 23 5/11 the strain components x , y , z , and xy are true strains. Consequently, and are also true quantities. It should further be noted that xy is the tensorial shear strain, which is twice the engineering shear strain.
10A.4 PISCES RESULTS Pertinent information extracted from the PISCES solution is presented in this section of the
report.
At this point, an introduction is needed to explain the convention employed in the PISCES code
for identifying grid points and grid zones. The grid is defined by columns and rows, indexed
I and J, respectively. Figures 10A-16 and 10A-17 show the column and row numbering
schemes adopted for the disc and body. A particular grid point in the model is defined by the
values of I and J of the row and column that intersect at that point. For instance, point 11, 31 refers to outermost point on the front face of the disc. A grid zone is bounded by two
columns, I and J + 1 and by two rows J and J + 1. A zone is defined by the values of I + 1 and
J + 1. Thus, as an example, zone 12, 31 is the outermost zone on the front side of the disc.
10A.4.1 DISSIPATION OF KINETIC ENERGY In table 10A-3, the kinetic energy in the model is tabulated versus the time elapsed since
impact. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, the kinetic energy is also given as a
percent of its initial value. The latter results furnish the curve plotted in figure 10A-18. It is
apparent from the diagram that the kinetic energy is dissipated at a rate that decreases with time from t = 0 to t = 300
µs, and again from t = 700
µs on. In the timespan from t = 300
µs to t 700 µs, the rate of energy dissipation is practically constant. At solution termination time, t = 1150 µs, 97.2 percent of the kinetic energy has been dissipated. The graphical extrapolation of the curve in figure 10A-18 indicates that for practical purposes the duration of the impact is
approximately 1300
µs. 10A.4.2 MAXIMUM DEFLECTION OF DISC The position of various points on the disc as a function of time is given in table 10A-17. The
data tabulated for the axial position of the surface points on the disc centerline yield the axial displacement curves portrayed in figure 10A-19. At the extrapolated time of 1300
µs, the displacement (U x) is 1.77 in. at the front surface and 1.84 in. at the back surface.
Also shown in figure 10A-19 is a straight line which depicts the axial displacement of the disc in
free motion (no impact). Since the computed displa cement curves are initially above the line, it is clear that following impact, the center of the disc accelerates before it slows down.
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-14 REV 23 5/11 10A.4.3 MAXIMUM VELOCITY IN DISC A plot of axial velocity versus time is shown in figure 10A-20 for the two surface points on the
centerline of the disc. The axial velocity (x) reaches a maximum value of 175 ft/s at the front
surface and 179 ft/s at the back surface.
10A.4.4 GEOMETRIC DISTORTION The progressive geometric distortion of the valve model may be observed in figures 10A-21, 10A-22, and 10A-23 where grid plots obtained at 300, 700, and 1150
µs after impact are shown.
Figure 10A-24 is a superposition of the distorted shape at the end of the solution (t = 1150
µs) on the undistorted shape (t = 0).
Inspection of the geometry plot in figure 10A-21 reveals that the disc fillet below the contact
zone has flattened out. As a consequence, the corner of the body starts to indent the zone of
the disc just opposite this corner. The PISCES code permits this to happen. Evidence of such
indentation is evident in figures 10A-22 and 10A
-23 where the body grid appears to overlap the
disc grid. The overlap is not a physical reality. It is a consequence of the plotting routine, which
is based on connecting grid points by straight lines and which does not recognize indentation of
a zone located in a contact region. The actual geometric distortion is sketched in figure 10A-24.
In the PISCES code, penetration can occur only at contact surfaces. The contact surfaces have
to be columns. The column on the stationary part of the model is usually the so-called master
column, and the column on the moving part is the slave column. Grid points on the master
column can indent the slave column, but grid points on the slave column cannot indent the
master column. An optional feature of the master slave approach in the PISCES code permits
the formation of voids between the contacting surfaces. While this option was demonstrated to
work in a preliminary computer run and then exercised in the full PISCES solution, the results
obtained produced no clear evidence that any separation between disc and body occurred in
the contact zone.
10A.4.5 STRAIN HISTORY PLOTS The accumulation of strain as time progresses is best illustrated by means of history plots. All
plots to be presented contain four curves, each portraying the strain in a given zone. The
applicable zones are identified by column and row numbers in the manner explained at the
beginning of section 10A.4.
A. Body Strains
The largest body strains occur in the two columns of zones adjacent to the contact surface. Representative history plots for this region are shown in figures
10A-25 and 10A-26. They indicate that effective strains in the body reach stable values in about 900
µs. The maximum effective strain in the body is 14.7 percent and occurs at zone 9, 17.
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-15 REV 23 5/11 B. Disc Strains
Effective strains in the rim region are largest in the four rows of zones for which the results are plotted in figures 10A-27 through 10A-30. It is seen that the strains tend
to stabilize faster than in the body, although complete stabilization again requires about 900
µs. The maximum strain in the rim region is 17.4 percent and is found at zone 13, 27.
Results for the central portion of the disc are plotted in figures 10A-31 through 10A-38. Figures 10A-31 through 10A-34 give the effective strain () , the axial strain (x), the radial strain (y), and the hoop strain (z), respectively, for four zones spaced along the front surface of the disc. Likewise, figures 10A-35 through
10A-38 give the corresponding results for the back surface. The two sets of results
show that the front surface is more severely strained than the back surface. A
comparison with the results for the rim region indicates that strains in the central
region do not begin to accumulate significantly until after most of the strain
accumulation in the rim region is over. At solution termination time, the effective
strain reaches a maximum of 14.3 percent at the center on the front side and 10.4 percent at the center on the back side. Extrapolation to time t = 1300
µs increases these values to 14.6 percent and 10.6 percent, respectively.
10A.4.6 STRESS HISTORY PLOTS Because of the severe straining of the body and disc, strains are of considerably more interest
and importance than stresses. For this reason, only two history plots were obtained. These
pertain to the effective surface stress in the central region of the disc. Figures 10A-39 and
10A-40 show the results for the front surface and the back surface. The spikes in the curves below 200
µs are due to elastic unloading and reloading. In reality, there are many more spikes in the solution, but these are not seen because the results plotted are based on computer
output saved at every 50th time step. After 200
µs, the stresses are observed to rise monotonically. Stresses remaining at the completion of the event will be the sum of the residual stresses brought about by plastic deformation, and the stresses that are in equilibrium with the
pressure load on the upstream side of the disc.
10A.4.7 DISTRIBUTION OF STRAINS IN THE CONTACT REGION The distribution of effective strain () at times of 300, 700, and 1150
µs is shown in figures 10A-41 through 10A-43. As observed in subsection 10A.4.5, strains in the contact zone of the body clearly do not rise as fast as in the contact zone of the disc. The diagrams are also
instructive in showing that large strains in the body are confined to the immediate vicinity of the body seat. Furthermore, they show that the largest strains occur at some distances below the
contact surface, a phenomenon not uncommon to contact problems.
At solution termination time, the distributions of strains x , y , z , and xy are as presented in figures 10A-44 through 10A-47. It will be noted that at the high-strain locations, the sum of x ,
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-16 REV 23 5/11 y , and z is approximately zero. This is a consequence of the constant volume condition associated with plastic deformation.
10A.4.8 DISTRIBUTION OF STRAINS IN THE CENTRAL DISC REGION Figures 10A-48 through 10A-50 provide insight into the distribution of the effective strain at times of 300, 700, and 1150
µs. Similar results, but limited to the time of 1150
µs, are shown in figures 10A-51 through 10A-54 for x , y , z , xy. Along the centerline of the disc, x , y , and z are distributed as shown in figure 10A-55. The extrapolated values at the front surface are -17, 8.5, and 8.5 percent, respectively. At the back surface they are 14.4, -7.2, and -7.2 percent. The sum of the strains is zero in each case, which
is in accordance with the constant volume condition for plastic strain, elastic strains being small
compared to the plastic strains at the two locations considered.
10A.4.9 DISTRIBUTION OF STRESSES IN THE CENTRAL DISC REGION Distributions of , x , y , z , and xy radial plane of the disc are presented in figures 10A-56 and 10A-60. The values shown are in ksi (1 ksi = 1000 psi). The diagram for is particularly useful in that it reveals the extent of plastic deformation, as yielding occurs when exceeds 25 ksi. The results are for time t = 1150
µs. 10A.4.10 STRAIN RATES A tabulation of strain rates at several key locations is presented in tables 10A-5 and 10A-6.
Table 10A-5 gives strain rates at various times for the highest strained zones in the body and
disc, namely for zones 9, 17 and 13, 27. Strain rates as high as 500 s
-1 are noted for the body, and as high as 800 s
-1 for the disc.
Table 10A-6 gives strain rates for zones 12, 2 and 19, 2, which are located at the front surface
and back surface of the disc. Strain rates as high as 300 s
-1 and 200 s-1 are noted for these locations. The peak values are reached at time t = ~ 600
µs. This observation agrees with the observation of maximum slopes in the strain time plots (figures 10A-31 through 10A-38).
10A.5 EVALUATION The impact event associated with valve closure under faulted conditions constitutes an energy
dissipation problem. Thus, valve components will deform progressively until the kinetic energy
accumulated in the disc, disc post, and disc arm during closure has been dissipated through
plastic-strain energy absorption. In the analysis described in this report, it has been assumed, conservatively, that all the kinetic energy is absorbed by the body and disc.
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-17 REV 23 5/11 Because the structure must absorb kinetic energy through plastic deformation, meaningful
acceptance criteria by which to judge the structural adequacy of the valve should consist of
limits placed on geometric distortion (to ensure proper functioning of the valve) and on strain (to
preclude fracture).
10A.5.1 DEFORMATION CONSIDERATIONS The obvious criterion for limiting deformation is that geometric distortion caused by the impact
shall not prevent the proper closure of the valve. Application of this criterion requires a
qualitative appraisal of the results of the PISCES solution.
Consideration of the deformed shape presented in figure 10A-24 shows that, in spite of
considerable geometric distortion, closure is unimpai red. In fact, as evident from the distorted grid plots in figures 10A-21 through 10A-23, the contact surface on the disc has moved radially
outward rather than inward, while the radius of the body seat opening has decreased slightly.
Figures 10A-23 and 10A-24 show that the body seat corner has indented the disc below the
stellite overlay. This condition is likely to cause higher strains than the PISCES solution is
capable of showing. However, such a condition can be circumvented by deepening of the fillet
in the disc by 0.1 in. This modification has been incorporated into the disc design. Since it is a
minor geometry change, the results of the PISCES solution will remain valid.
With reference to subsection 10A.4.2, the maximum deflection at the center of the disc is
1.84 in. Since any axial displacement of the shaft about which the disc rotates can be assumed
to be negligible, the large deflection of the disc could cause binding of the disc post in the collar
of the disc arm in the configuration analyzed. However, this concern has been eliminated by the
redesign of the disc arm mentioned earlier.
10A.5.2 EVALUATION AGAINST STRAIN CRITERIA The strain criteria presented below are intended to prevent fracture initiation caused by large
local strains in the contact region of body and disc, and excessive bending distortion in the
central portion of the disc. Each of the criteria is expressed in terms of the uniform elongation ut and the fracture strain f. Section 10A.3 furnishes the following values of these ductility parameters:
A. Disc (type 304 stainless steel) - ut = 30%, f/3 = 35%.
B. Body (type A-216 grade WCB steel) - ut = 11%, f/3 = 29%.
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-18 REV 23 5/11 10A.5.2.1 Local Strain Limits for Contact Region
The strain criteria adopted for limiting local strain are as follows:
A. Rule 1
If the hydrostatic stress component (x + y + z)/3 at the location of maximum effective strain is tensile, shall be limited to the smaller of ut and f/3. B. Rule 2
If the hydrostatic stress component (x + y + z)/3 at the location of maximum effective strain is compressive, shall be limited to the larger of ut and f/3. The first rule is justified on the basis that it would have been effective in preventing fracture in burst experiments on clamped discs which had a circumferential structural discontinuity near the
clamped edge. The results of the burst tests conducted on special disc specimens were
reported in reference 8 and analyzed in reference 9.(a) In the tests, the specimens were rigidly clamped along the rim and subjected to pressure on one face. Three materials with
different degrees of ductility were used, one of which was type 304 stainless steel. Depending
on the material and the disc dimensions, the discs failed in tension either at the rim fillet or in
the center. The rim failures resulted from strain concentration, the center failures resulted from
strain instability. By applying rule 1 to the maximum equivalent strain in the rim fillet, it was
ascertained that no rim failures would have occurred in the tests had they been interrupted when the true strain reached the lesser of u and f/3 of the materials involved.
Because fracture initiation is unlikely when the hydrostatic stress component is compressive, the second rule must be viewed as conservative from a fracture prevention point of view.
However, the rule also serves as a useful limit for preventing excessive local distortion of the
structure.
It is noted that for both the body and the disc, ut is smaller than f/3. For the body, ut = 11 percent, and f/3 = 29-percent true absolute strain; for the disc, ut = 30 percent, and f/3 = 35-percent true absolute strain.
Considering the body first, inspection of the strain distribution in figure 10A-43 shows that ut is exceeded only in three locations. At zone 9, 17, = 15 percent, and at zones 9, 16 and 10, 18, e = 12 percent. For each of these locations, the PISCES solution shows that the hydrostatic stress component is compressive, so that an effective strain as high as 29 percent is allowed.
Hence, the effective strains at the three locations are well within the limit provided by rule 2.
Therefore, the body is judged structurally adequate.
____________________
- a. A copy of reference 9 is included in the report as attachment E.
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-19 REV 23 5/11 Inspection of figure 10A-43 also shows that does not exceed ut in the rim region of the disc.
That is, the maximum value of is 17 percent, whereas ut = 30 percent. Consequently, since the disc meets the limit provided by rule 1, ex amination of the hydrostatic stress component is unnecessary.
10A.5.2.2 Strain Limit for Central Region of Disc The criterion adopted for qualifying the central portion of the disc is the following:
A. Rule 3
The value of along the surfaces of the disc shall not exceed 60 percent of ut; i.e., 0.6 ut. Basis for this criterion is the observation gleaned from reference 10 that in an internally-pressurized thin-walled sphere, the uniform circumferential strain at maximum pressure will not be less than 0.3 ut , for materials whose strain-hardening exponent (n) is less than 0.3. (The precise formula given in reference 10 states that the ratio of the circumferential strain at maximum pressure and the uniform
elongation = (2/3) n). By neglecting elastic strains as being very small, it follows that is equal to twice the circumferential strain for such a sphere. Since n is less than 0.3 for most steels, limiting to 0.6 ut would ensure that the maximum pressure in the sphere is not reached. Unstable progressive distortion is thereby prevented.
Invoking rule 3 for the disc evaluation is a conservative procedure because pressure loading of
the thin-walled sphere produces membrane loading only, while the loading mode of the disc is primarily bending. However, a conservative rule on is desirable from the viewpoint that it places an indirect limit on gross geometric distortion.
The maximum value of is found at the center of the front surface, where it is 17 percent. This is less than 0.6 ut (18 percent), so that the central portion of the disc is also structurally adequate.
FNP-FSAR-10A
10A-20 REV 23 5/11 REFERENCES
- 1. Southern Company Services, Inc
., for Alabama Power Company, "Special Conditions Main Steam Isolation Valves - Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 1,"Inquiry No. SS-1102-32, Addendum 8
," November 9, 1973.
- 2. Steichen, J. M., "High Strain Rate Mechanical Properties of Types 304 and 316 Stainless Steel," Technical Document HEDL-TMF 71-164 , Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory, November 1971.
- 3. "Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Materials Handbook," Technical Document HEDL-TMR 71-32 , Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory, Current.
- 4. "General Description of Finite-Difference Equations," Version 3, Revision 3, PISCES 2DL, Manual A , Physics International Company, 1972.
- 5. "Input Manual," Version 3, Revision 2, PISCES 2DL, Manual B , Physics International Company, 1973.
- 6. "Non-Standard Options," Version 3, Revision 3, PISCES 2DL, Manual C, Physics International Company, 1972.
- 7. "High Strain Rate Tensile Properties of SA-216, GR WCB Steel Casting and SA-182, GR. F304 Stainless Steel Forging Materials," Technical Report No. TR-1901, May 30, 1975.
- 8. Cooper, W. E., Kottcamp, E. H., and Spiering, G. A., "Experimental Effort on Bursting of Constrained Discs as Related to the Effective Utilization of Yield Strength,"
ASME 71-PVP-49 , American Society of Mechanical Engineers, May 1971.
- 9. Riccardella, P. C., "Elastic-Plastic Analysis of Constrained Disc Burst Tests," ASME 72-PVP-12 , American Society of Mechanical Engineers, June 1972.
- 10. Cooper, W. E., "The Significance of the Tensile Test of Pressure Vessel Design," Welding Journal, Research Supplement , pp 49-s s, January 1957.
FNP-FSAR-10A REV 21 5/08 TABLE 10A-1 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
NOMENCLATURE
Abbreviation or Word Letter Symbol time (from initial impact) t temperature T axial coordinate x
radial coordinate y
hoop coordinate z
velocities x*, y*
displacements U x , U y effective stress (defined as follows) effective strain (defined as follows) stresses x , y , z , xy strains x , y , z , xy strain rates *x , *y , *z , *xy Young's modulus E
shear modulus G
bulk modulus K
Poisson's ratio relative density D
pressure P kinetic energy KE Teledyne Materials Research TMR Atwood and Morrill Company A & M FNP-FSAR-10A REV 21 5/08 TABLE 10A-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Definitions
()()=++1/2 x-y 2 y-z 2 z-x 2+6 xy 2 1/2 ()()=2/3 x-y 2+yz 2+zx 2+6 2 xy 12/
FNP-FSAR-10A
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 10A-2 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
TENSION TEST RESULTS Test blank dimensions:
a = 14 in. b = 14 in.
Test temperature = 600
°F c = 2 in.
Specification Number Loading Direction
- S-1 u % ut % RA % f % 2 X 0.092 13.5 12.7 54.0 78 5 X 0.90 12.0 11.3 57.4 85 4 X 6.0 14.0 13.1 59.9 91 6 X 13.0 15.0 14.0 62.0 97 11 Y 0.097 11.0 10.4 51.7 73 13 Y 0.96 12.0 11.3 56.6 83 14 Y 6.0 9.0 8.6 59.2 90 9 Y 13.0 14.0 13.1 62.0 97 19 Z 0.11 8.5 8.2 58.9 89 20 Z 1.1 10.5 10.0 61.5 95 FNP-FSAR-10A
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 10A-2 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
Specification Number Loading Direction
- s-1 u % ut % RA % f % 15 Z 9.8 10.5 10.0 60.9 94 Average Values: - 11.8 11.2 58.6 88 Legend * = nominal strain rate (based on ram velocity of testing machine) u = uniform elongation (engineering strain at maximum load)
ut = ln(1 + u) = true uniform elongation RA = reduction of area at fracture
f = ln[1/(1 - RA)] = true fracture strain
FNP-FSAR-10A
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 10A-3 KINETIC ENERGY IN MODEL VERSUS TIME Time (t/µs) Kinetic Energy (KE(t), eu)(a) Kinetic Energy (KE(T), 10 in.
6/lb) KE(t)/KE(0) (%) 0 3.404 3.009 1.000 36 3.119 2.757 0.916 74 2.828 2.500 0.831 151 2.318 2.049 0.681 228 1.994 1.763 0.586 304 1.759 1.555 0.517 381 1.574 1.391 0.462 458 1.372 1.213 0.403 534 1.167 1.032 0.343 611 0.993 0.878 0.292 688 0.809 0.715 0.238 765 0.613 0.542 0.180 841 0.451 0.399 0.132 918 0.332 0.293 0.098 995 0.230 0.203 0.068 1072 0.155 0.137 0.046 1148 0.097 0.086 0.028
- a. 1 energy unit (eu) = 1 x 10 12 dyn/cm = 8.84 x 10 5 in/lb.
FNP-FSAR-10A
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 10A-4 DISC LOCATIONS VERSUS TIME
Time (t/µs) X A (cm) X B (cm) X C (cm) X D (cm) Y C (cm) Y D (cm) 0 -2.86 6.67 9.53 0.00 34.93 34.92 36 -3.02 6.51 9.38 -0.02 34.92 35.04 74 -3.20 6.33 9.26 -0.05 34.89 35.14 151 -3.56 5.96 9.13 -0.09 34.82 35.24 228 -3.95 5.57 9.12 -0.12 34.69 35.28 304 -4.35 5.16 9.12 -0.13 34.57 35.29 381 -4.75 4.74 9.14 -0.13 34.46 35.29 534 -5.53 3.94 9.16 -0.14 34.26 35.27 688 -6.22 3.22 9.16 -0.15 34.12 35.26 841 -6.75 2.65 9.15 -0.16 34.06 35.26 995 -7.09 2.27 9.14 -0.17 33.92 35.24 1148 -7.27 2.08 9.11 -0.20 33.89 35.24 change(cm) -4.41 -4.59 -0.42 -0.20 -1.04 0.32 change(in.) -1.74 -1.81 -0.17 -0.08 -0.41 0.13 y x D C A B FNP-FSAR-10A
REV 21 5/08 TABLE 10A-5 STRAIN RATES AT HIGHEST-STRAINED ZONES OF BODY AND DISC Time (µs) Zone I, J *x (s-1) *y (s-1) *z (s-1) *xy (s-1) 37 9, 17 -373 488 -21 123 74 -238 280 -13 79 151 -124 124 -2 52 228 -104 104 -2 53 304 -162 175 -5 128 381 -130 122 -5 117 534 -43 46 0 51 841 -43 46 -4 46 1148 3 1 -4 37 13, 27 -793 785 25 509 74 -765 746 17 602 51 -107 94 19 159 228 -19 11 5 42 304 -11 4 3 31 381 3 -1 12 534 -3 0 -3 0 841 -7 8 -2 33 1148 -2 0 0 -4
FNP-FSAR-10A TABLE 10A-6 STRAIN RATES AT CENTERLINE OF DISC
REV 21 5/08 Time (µs) Zone I, J *x (s-1) *y (s-1) *z (s-1) 37 12, 2 0 2 74 31 96 151 -76 46 44 228 -43 23 26 304 -44 13 12 381 -101 58 58 534 -232 119 117 688 -272 138 137 841 -181 92 91 1148 -55 28 28 37 19, 2 -4 5 5 74 36 93 151 133 77 228 82 -75 304 20 -18 381 88 57 534 207 -106 -105 688 187 95 841 106 53 1148 15 7
REV 21 5/08 ISOLATION VALVE IN CLOSED POSITION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-1
REV 21 5/08 ISOLATION VALVE WITH MODIFIED DISC ARM JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-2
REV 21 5/08 SECTION "A-A" FROM FIGURE 10A-2 TOP VIE W OF MODIFIED DISC ARM ASSEMBLY JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-3 (SHEET 1 OF 2)
REV 21 5/08 DETAIL OF MODIFIED DISC ARM ASSEMBLY SHOWING LOCKING DEVICES USED ON STUDS AND NUTS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-3 (SHEET 2 OF 2)
REV 21 5/08 BASIC DISC DIMENSIONS IN INCHES AND IN CENTIMETERS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-4
REV 21 5/08 FIRST PISCES MODEL (BODY SHOWN IN PART)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-5
REV 21 5/08 FIRST PISCES MODEL (CLOSEUP OF CONTACT REGION)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-6
REV 21 5/08 SECOND PISCES MODEL (BODY SHOWN IN PART)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-7
REV 21 5/08 SECOND PISCES MODEL (CLOSEUP OF CONTACT REGION)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-8
REV 21 5/08 BODY DIMENSIONS ASSUMED FOR PISCES MODEL (IN INCHES AND IN CENTIMETERS)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-9
REV 21 5/08 VALVE SEAT REGION OF ISOLATION VALVE JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-10
REV 21 5/08 TYPICAL STRESS - TRUE STRAIN DIAGRAMS FOR AISI 304 STAINLESS STEEL JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-11
REV 21 5/08 STRESS-STRAIN DIAGRAMS USED IN PISCES SOLUTION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-12
REV 21 5/08 TYPICAL STRESS-STRAIN DIAGRAMS FOR A-216 GRADE WCB STEEL (X-DIRECTION, SEE TABLE 10A-2)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-13
REV 21 5/08 TYPICAL STRESS-STRAIN DIAGRAMS FOR A-216 GRADE WCB STEEL (Y-DIRECTION, SEE TABLE 10A-2)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-14
REV 21 5/08 TYPICAL STRESS-STRAIN DIAGRAMS FOR A-216 GRADE WCB STEEL (Z-DIRECTION, SEE TABLE 10A-2)
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-15
REV 21 5/08 COLUMN AND ROW NUMBERS OF DISC REGION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-16
REV 21 5/08 COLUMN AND ROW NUMBERS OF BODY REGION JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-17
REV 21 5/08 KINETIC ENERGY IN VALVE VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-18
REV 21 5/08 AXIAL DISPLACEMENTS AT CENTERLINE OF DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-19
REV 21 5/08 AXIAL VELOCITY AT CENTERLINE OF DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-20
REV 21 5/08 DISTORTED GEOMETRY AT TIME t = 300 µS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-21
REV 21 5/08 DISTORTED GEOMETRY AT TIME t = 700 µS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-22
REV 21 5/08 DISTORTED GEOMETRY AT TIME t = 1150 µS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-23
REV 21 5/08 SHAPE OF MODEL BEFORE AND AFTER IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-24
REV 21 5/08 EFFECTIVE STRAINS IN BODY VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-25
REV 21 5/08 EFFECTIVE STRAINS IN BODY VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-26
REV 21 5/08 EFFECTIVE STRAINS IN DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-27
REV 21 5/08 EFFECTIVE STRAINS IN DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-28
REV 21 5/08 EFFECTIVE STRAINS IN DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-29
REV 21 5/08 EFFECTIVE STRAINS IN DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-30
REV 21 5/08 EFFECTIVE STRAINS IN DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-31
REV 21 5/08 AXIAL STRAINS IN DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-32
REV 21 5/08 RADIAL STRAINS IN DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-33
REV 21 5/08 HOOP STRAINS IN DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-34
REV 21 5/08 EFFECTIVE STRAINS IN DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-35
REV 21 5/08 AXIAL STRAINS IN DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-36
REV 21 5/08 RADIAL STRAINS IN DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-37
REV 21 5/08 HOOP STRAINS IN DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-38
REV 21 5/08 EFFECTIVE STRESSES IN DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-39
REV 21 5/08 EFFECTIVE STRESSES IN DISC VERSUS TIME SINCE IMPACT JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-40
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTIVE STRAIN
- AT TIME t = 300 µS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-41
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTIVE STRAIN
- AT TIME t = 700 µS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-42
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTIVE STRAIN
- AT TIME t = 1150 µS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-43
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF AXIAL STRAIN X - AT TIME t = 1150 µS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-44
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF RADIAL STRAIN y AT TIME t = 1150 S JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-45
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF HOOP STRAIN z AT TIME t = 1150 S JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-46
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF SHEAR STRAIN XY AT TIME t = 1150 S JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-47
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTIVE STRAIN
- AT TIME t = 300 S JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-48
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTIVE STRAIN
- AT TIME t = 700 S JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-49
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTIVE STRAIN
- AT TIME t = 1150 S JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-50
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF AXIAL STRAIN x AT TIME t = 1150 S JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-51
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF RADIAL STRAIN y AT TIME t = 1150 S JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-52
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF HOOP STRAIN z AT TIME t = 1150 S JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-53
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF SHEAR STRAIN XY AT TIME t = 1150 S JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-54
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF STRAINS ALONG CENTERLINE OF DISC JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-55
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTIVE STRESS - AT TIME t = 1150 µS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-56
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF AXIAL STRESS x AT TIME t = 1150 µS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-57
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF RADIAL STRESS y AT TIME t = 1150 µS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-58
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF HOOP STRESS z AT TIME t = 1150 µS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-59
REV 21 5/08 DISTRIBUTION OF SHEAR STRESS xy AT TIME t = 1150 µS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE 10A-60
FNP-FSAR-10A A-i REV 21 5/08 ATTACHMENT A EFFECT OF STRAIN RATE ON STRESS-STRAIN BEHAVIOR OF TYPE 304 STAINLESS STEEL (3)
FNP-FSAR-10A
B-i REV 21 5/08 ATTACHMENT B EFFECT OF STRAIN RATE ON UNIFORM ELONGATION AND REDUCTION OF AREA (2)
REV 21 5/08 EFFECT OF STRAIN RATE AND TEMPERATURE ON THE UNIFORM ELONGATION OF 304 SS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE B-1
REV 21 5/08 EFFECT OF STRAIN RATE AND TEMPERATURE ON THE REDUCTION OF AREA OF 304 SS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE B-2
FNP-FSAR-10A C-i REV 23 5/11 ATTACHMENT C MASS SIMULATION OF DISC ARM, POST, AND NUT DETERMINATION OF TRANSLATIONAL IMPACT VELOCITY
FNP-FSAR-10A C-4 REV 23 5/11
FNP-FSAR-10A
D-1 REV 23 5/11 D. Fluid Dynamics Impact Analysis of Main Steam Swing Disk Trip Value
The main steam swing disk trip valve, located in the main steam line outside
containment, prevents total blowdown of the steam generator following a downstream pipe rupture.
In operation, the swing disk assembly, consisting of the disk, disk post, and disk arm, is held in an open position some 65
° from its seat. Valve positioning is accomplished by means of a pneumatically actuated air cylinder. One hundred (100)-psig air applied to the air cylinder displaces a piston upward, and this motion is transmitted by linkage to
the trip valve shaft as rotary motion, raising the disk to its open position. In this position
the disk is clear of the main stream of flow through the valve. In displacing the air
cylinder upward, the pressurizing air also compresses a return spring located beneath
the air cylinder, which is coupled axially to the displaced piston.
Upon rupture of the downstream steam line, a signal is transmitted to the air cylinder
dump solenoid valves which are actuated, thereby initiating depressurization of the air
cylinder. Elapsed time from break to dump valve operation is 0.500 s. Prior to disk
motion, the 100-psig air cylinder pressure must decay to approximately 35 psig at which pressure the disk assembly is just maintained in its open position (65
°). As choked flow conditions exist at the dump valve exhaust to ambient, outflow is limited, and the
pressure decay occurs over approximately 1.0 s. Thus onset of disk motion occurs some 1.5 s following pipe rupture.
During downward motion of the disk, the disk is initially under the influence of only gravity and spring tension. After traversing an arc of 17.5
°, it enters the edge of the main steam flow and induces an ever-increasing as it swings across the final 47.5
° of arc toward closure at the valve seat.
Flow Conditions to be Analyzed
Two steam generator hot standby conditions will be evaluated for disk impact. The flow characteristics for each are summarized as follows:
Stm. Hammer Case 0 ,PSIA THROAT ,PSIA Quality,% Flow, SEC LBM PSI 1 1020 995 Dry & Sat. 2300 300 2 1020 995 4% 7800 150
FNP-FSAR-10A
D-2 REV 23 5/11 Upon rupture of the main steam line, choke flow occurs at the break and, concurrently, a pressure rarefaction wave travels upstream, at the local speed of sound, acceleration
the initially-stagnant steam toward the break. Initial steam outflow is that which occurs
from a 32-in. O.D. pipe at identical initial conditions.
As the rarefaction wave (C 0 1771 ft/s) reaches the 14-in. flow restrictor, choked flow is established at its throat, limiting steam generator outflow to those flow rates
noted above. Because the transition time to choking at the flow restrictor, 0.12 s, is considerably less than the 1.5-s delay until onset of disk motion, the closing disk will be exposed to only those choked flow rates noted, and not to the initial flow rate in the 32-in. pipe.
D.1 Swing Disk Trip Valve Characteristics
The following data describe the trip valve:
Weight: Combined weight of the disk, disk post, nut, and disk arm (excluding cyl. segment about rock shaft) is 969 LBM (per A. & M.)
Radius of Gyration, K:
The C.G. of the disk assembly is 16.0 in. from the rockshaft C L , at an angle of 29.876
° to the vertical (per A. & M.)
Moment of Inertia:
I = MK2 (8)
I = (969 LBM)(14.077 IN) 2 = 192,019 LBM-IN 2 14.077" + C L Rockshaft 29.876°*C.G. 35°Valve Seat Plane FNP-FSAR-10A
D-3 REV 23 5/11 D.2 Relations for Dynamic Analysis During Disk Swing D.2.1 Disk Equations of Motion Angular Acceleration
The angular acceleration of the disk at a given angular displacement is given:
IOPCN*= (1)
Angular Velocity:
The angular velocity of the disk at time interval (t+t) is:
W t+t = W 0 + t (2) Angular Position:
The angular position of the disk at time t is given:
= W tt + ()2t 2 t (3) The disk impact analysis will consider the following disk displacement intervals:
- 1. 65° 47.5°
- 2. 47.5° 35°
- 3. 35° 24.5° (CHOKE /< )
- 4.
- 5. 24.5° 10° 10° IMPACT } CHOKED FLOW For these intervals, average valves of , T SPRING , K, & T FR will be used.
FNP-FSAR-10A
D-4 REV 23 5/11 D.2.2 Torques Acting on Swing Disk During angular rotation from its open position (65
°) to impact on its seat, the disk is exposed to:
- 1) Gravitational Torque tending to accelerate the disk to its closed position.
- 2) Fluid Torque due to the of steam flowing past the inclining disk.
- 3) Closing-spring Torque due to compressive load on returning spring.
- 4) Frictional Torque due to rock shaft rotation within the graphite/asbestos gland packing.
The net torque for various disk angular positions is written:
65° < < 47.5° (4) T NET = I = ()()[]o g gINL,LBM M, sin ( + 29.876) + T SPRING - T fr Where: g = accel of gravity 32 SEC FT g o = gravitational constant, 32.2 2SEC LBFFTLBM L = moment arm to C.G., 16. IN T SPRING = spring load, LBF
T fr = frictional torque, 47.70 in LBF
47.5° > > 0 T NET = I = ()()[]o g gINL,LBMM, sin ( + 29.876) +
T SPRING +
- A
- L - T fr (5)
Where = pressure drop across disk A = surface area of disk MSD normal to L
Figure D-1 illustrates the variation of the closing-spring torque for disk displacement angle from its seat.
C FNP-FSAR-10A
D-5 REV 23 5/11 Choke Angle During initial descent of the disk from its open position, choked flow is assumed at the
valve seat. At some choke angle, the choke suddenly translates upstream from the
valve seat plane to that flow area described between the planes of the disk and seat.
Calculations of the choke angle are described in the sheets following.
D.2.3 CALCULATION OF ANGLE FOR ONSET OF CHOKED FLOW DURING CLOSURE OF THE SWING DISK VALVE
An attitude angle for the swing disk trip valve is computed for the onset of choked flow
across the closing valve. This condition begins at that instant when the effective orifice
area, i.e., that dihedral area between the disk plane and the plane of the valve seat, is
exactly equal to the cross-sectional area of flow across the valve seat. As we consider
the effective flow area, we must consider the elliptical surface area defined by the
intercepting "chords" as shown below.
16.5" 4" L 1 L 2 10° 0.697" 5.055" 20° 1.3892" 10.0716
" 30° 2.0706" 15.012" 25" L 2 L 1 Plane of Seat FNP-FSAR-10A
D-6 REV 23 5/11
= 10° From Seat cos 25 x 2= x = 25 cos 5
° = 24.905" A T = C x L 2 = 5.055 22 2 12.5 2 12.452 L2 22 2 6 2 ax+=x+ A T = (78.391)(5.055) = 396.26 in.
2 Now: A 3 = C x L 1 = (78.391)(0.697) = 54.639 in.
2 A 1,2,4,5 = 2in. 85.405 4 2in. 54.639 2IN 396.26= A 2+3+4 = 54.639 + 2(85.405) = 225.45 in.2 25" x = 2a x = 2a 25"2 LL 2 21 2 3 4 1 5 L 2 L 1 FNP-FSAR-10A
D-7 REV 23 5/11 20° From Seat cos 25 x 2= x = 25 cos 10
° = 24.62 A T = c x L 2 = 2 072.10 25.1231.12 2 2x+ A T = (77.945)(10.072) = 785.06 in.
2 NOW: A 3 = (77.945)(1.3892) = 108.28 in.
2 A 1,2,4,5 = 428.10806.785
= 169.194 in.
2 A 2+3+4 = 108.28 + 2(169.194) = 446.67 in.2 30° From Seat
x = 25 cos 15
° = 24.148 A T = 2 x+25.12074.12 2 2 15.012 A T = (77.213)(15.012) = 1159.123 in.
2 A 3 = C x L 1 = (77.213)(2.0706) = 159.88 in.
2 A 1,2,4,5 = 488.159123.1159
= 249.81 in.
2 A 2+3+4 = 159.88 + 2(249.81) = 659.50 in.2
FNP-FSAR-10A
D-8 REV 23 5/11
DIHEDRAL ANGLE ~ DEGREES
A seat = 0.785(25) 2 = 490.63 in 2 From the above we conclude that the choking angle is 24.5
°.
- 490.63 600 500 400 300 200 10 20 30 24.5° Area - IN 2 FNP-FSAR-10A
D-9 REV 23 5/11 D.3 Fluid Flow Equations/Dynamic Analysis D.3.1 Case 1 Initial condition is Hot Standby, zero flow in the main steam line. Valve disk is held at 65
° open-position by 100-psig cylinder air. The steam generator and 32-in. piping upstream of the valve are taken as an infinite reservoir at 1020 psia.
Steam Properties are 1:
P o = 1020 PSIA (Dry Saturated Steam)
T o = 546.95
°F W o = 0 SEC LBM h g = 1191.6 LBM BTU s g = 1.3879 2 LBM BTU g = 0.4361 LBM FT 3 = 1.13 2 Sonic Velocity:
C o = KRTg (6) C o = 460)(32.2) 6)(546.95 (1.13)(85.
+ = 1770.9 SEC FT
- 1. J.Keenan & F.Keyes, Thermodynamic Properties of Steam , John Wiley & Sons, First Edition, 31st Printing, N.Y.
FNP-FSAR-10A
D-11 REV 23 5/11 Hall and Orme 3 have investigated the flow of compressible fluid thru sudden enlargements, and the effects of friction upon M (mach no.), P, T, and m. As a
first approximation we may consider the nozzle/pipe junction a sudden
enlargement, and use the results of this analysis to establish steam flow
conditions at the valve.
Consider the following pipe configuration:
To determine flow conditions at each location, , , and , we start at the steam generator, progressing downstream toward the valve.
- 2. Ichoro Nishiwaki, " On a new theory for Adiabatic Index of Wet Steam," Proc. of 11th Japan National Congress for Appl. Mechs, 1961.
- 3. W. B. Hall, E. M. Orme, "Flow of a Compressible Fluid Through a Sudden Enlargement in a Pipe," Proc. of Inst. of Mech. Engrs., 1955, Vol. 169, No. 49, pp. 1007-1020.
14.7 PSIA AMB
. 3 2 P o = 1020 PSIA T o = 546.95
°F x = 1.0 1 100 (Assumed) (pipe) Valve Seat d = 25" A = 490.6 IN 2 = 3.41 FT 2 ` Flow Restrictor A153.8IN1.068FTd14" 22=== 32" O.D. Pipe du= 29.93 A = 703.2 IN 2 = 4.883 FT 2 Steam Generator w FNP-FSAR-10A
D-12 REV 23 5/11 Mach Numbers, M As choked flow is established across the nozzle, M 1 = 1. Using FIG 7 of ref. 3, and an area ratio, , where: pipe nozz A A = = 2 2IN 703.2IN 153.8 = 0.219 (7) we obtain M 2 = 0.2. The friction loss between sections and along the constant diameter pipe is given: F f = H dxf (8) Where f = Friction Factor - for turbulent flow conditions in 32" pipe-use 0.01 = Ratio specific heats = 1.13 x = Pipe length 100 FT d H = Hydraulic D/A = 29.93" = 2.494 Solving E Q.(2): Ff = FT 2.494FT.) 3)(100 (0.01)(1.1
= 0.453 Entering Fig 8 at M 2 = 0.2, with F f = 0.453, we obtain M 3 = 0.21.
Pressure Distribution Using M 1 , P o , and and by assuming adiabatic, frictionless flow into the nozzle we compute P 1 ( Eq. 12 )
3: 1 2 1 1 o1M 2 1 P P+= (9)
FNP-FSAR-10A
D-13 REV 23 5/11 1.7292(1)211.13 P P11.13 1.13 2 1 o=+= P 1 = 0.578 P o = 590 PSIA Using E Q.(9)3 we now compute P 2: 21)M(21)M(M2 M1 P P 2 2 2 1 1 2++= (10) Substituting:
2 1)(0.2)(1.1321)(1)(1.13 0.2 1.0 0.219 P P 2 2 1 2++= 1.13 P P 1 2= P 2 = (1.13)(.590) = 665.9 PSIA Again using E Q.(9)3 compute P 3 : ( = 1) 2 1)(0.21)(1.1321)(0.2)(1.13 0.21 0.2 1 P P 2 2 2 3++= 0.952 P P 2 3= P 3 (0.952)(665.9) = 634 PSIA For a pipe rupture in close proximity to the valve, the flow chokes at the break, flowing at local sonic velocity. The pressure at the exit plane must correspond to
the local sonic conditions.
If, in a limiting case, the break occurs downstream and adjacent to the valve
seat, the flow chokes at the valve seat, and M = 1.0, rather than 0.21 as
calculated above. In this case E Q. 11 of REF. 3 may be used to solve for the critical pressure at the seat.
FNP-FSAR-10A
D-14 REV 23 5/11 Solving:
()0 P R A W TMM 2 1 2 224=+ (11) ()()()()°°+4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 FT IN 144SEC LBFFT LBM 32.2 FT LBFP1.13RLBMLBFFT 85.6FT SEC LBM 3.41 2300R1007 21111.13 1.065 - 2 P 51974.6 = 0 P = 220.9 or 221 PSIA From steam tables, at x = 10 g = 2.096 LBM FT 3 Solving for flow velocity:
V = A Q = 2 3FT3.41 LBM FT 2.096 SEC LBM 2300 V = 1414 SEC FT This velocity is now used in calculations up thru onset of choking.
Summarizing Flow Conditions
= 221 PSIA
= 2.096 LBM FT 3 x = 1.0 FNP-FSAR-10A
D-15 REV 23 5/11 W = 2300 SEC LBM V = 1414 SEC FT Pressure Drop Across Disk Pressure drop across the closing disk varies as a function of the included angle between the disk plane and the plane of the valve seat.
For a given , pressure drop across the valve is:
= Kg v 2 2 (12) Where K = Empirical value dependent upon (per A. & M. data), Fig 3-2
= Fluid density, taken as 3 FT LBM 1.375 LBM 3 FT 0.7271 11== V = Steam velocity upstream of valve seat = 1414 SEC FT Solving E Q. (6): = K ()2 FT 2 IN 144 2SEC LBFFT LBM32.22 2 SEC FT 1414 3 FT LBM 2.096 1 = 102.9 K (13) Atwood & Morrill data for K are shown in FIG. 3-2.
- 1. 65° > > 47.5° (Free Fall w/Spring Friction)
= 0 T 1 , From E Q. (9):
FNP-FSAR-10A
D-16 REV 23 5/11 T 1 = ()()[]()°°+x29.87656.25sinFT LBM 32 2SECLBF 2 SECFT 32IN 14.077LBM 969
+ 10658 IN. LBF - 4770 IN. LBF
T 1 = 13609 + 10658 - 4770 = 19,497 IN. LBF 1: 1 = FTIN. 12 2SEC LBFFTLBM 32 2IN.LBM 192,019LBFIN. 19,497 I 1 Txx= 1 = 39.2 2 SEC RAD t 1: Since disk is accelerated from W = 0 9 by E Q.13: = 2 2 1 t 1 t 1 = ()()SEC0.125 57.3 17.5 39.2 2 1 2== W 1: W 1 = 1 t 1 W 1 = ()SEC RAD 4.90SEC 0.125 SEC RAD 39.2 2= 2. 47.5° > > 35° ("Caught in Breeze" @ = 47.5°) 1 = 39.2 2 SEC RAD , t 1 = 0.125 SEC, W 1 = 4.90 SEC RAD 2: = 102.9 K = (102.9)(1.41) = 145.1 PSI T 2: T 2 =()()[]()29.87641.25sin 32 32IN 14.077LBM 969+ ()()IN 16.5IN 490.6 IN LBF 145.1 2 2+ + 9128 IN. LBF - 4770 IN LBF FNP-FSAR-10A
D-17 REV 23 5/11
T 2 = 12,996 + 1,174,481 + 9128 - 4770 = 1,191,835 IN - LBF 2: 2 = FTIN 12 2SEC LBFFT LBM 32 2INLBM 192,019LBFIN 1,191,835 I 2 Txx= 2 = 2398 2 SEC RAD t 2: 2 = W 1t 2 + ()2 2 2t 2 2 2 2 23982t4.90 57.3 12.5 t+= Solving:
t 2 2 + 0.00409t 2 -0.00018 = 0 t 2 = ()()()20.0001814 2 0.00409 0.00409++ t 2 = 0.0116 SEC.
Disk travels thru ARC 47.5
° 35° IN. 0.0116 SEC
W: W 2 = W 1 + 2t 2 W 2 = 4.90 ()=+SEC 0.0112 2 SEC RAD 2398 SEC RAD 32.7 SEC RAD t: t = t 1 + t 2 = 0.125 + 0.0116 = 0.1364 SEC.
- 3. 35° 24.5° 2 = 2398 SEC 0.1364t SEC RAD 32.7 2 W 2 SEC RAD==
FNP-FSAR-10A
D-18 REV 23 5/11 3: 3 = 102.9 K = (102.9)(3.5) = 360.2 PSI T 3: T 3 = ()()[]()29.87629.75sin 32 32IN 14.077LBM 969+ + ()LBF IN 4770LBF IN 7IN 16.5 2IN 490.6 2 IN LBF 360.2+955 T 3 = 11,813 + 2,915,378 + 7955 - 4770 = 2,930,376 IN -LBF 3: 3 = FTIN 12 2SEC LBFFT LBM 32 2INLBM 192,019LBFIN 2,930,376 I 3 Txx= 3 = 5898 2 SEC RAD t 3: 3 = W 2t 3 + ()2 2 3t 3 2 2 3 58983t 32.7 57.3 10.5 t+= t 3 2 + 0.0111 t 3 - 0.000062 = 0 t 3 = ()()()2 0.00006214 2 0.0111 0.0111++ t 3 = 0.00409 SEC.
(35° 24.5°)
t = 0.1364 + 0.00409 = 0.1405 SEC. W 3: W 3 = W 2 + 3 t 3 W 3 = 32.7 ()SEC 0.00409 2 SEC RAD 5 SEC RAD+898 W 3 = 56.8 SEC RAD FNP-FSAR-10A
D-19 REV 23 5/11 4. 24.5° 10° Onset of choking (across the Dihedral Angle between the disk and seat) occurs at c = 24.5°. Prior to reaching c , the closing disk has caused considerable pressure regain in the line. Add. 9 to Bechtel Inquiry SS-1102-32 specifies that, for case 1, the static pressure at the valve minimum flow area, with atmospheric pressure downstream, is 995 PSIA. Since choking occurs, we conservatively compute across the disk.
CHOKE = U - 0.578 U CHOKE = 995 - 0.578 (995) = 419.9 PSID T 4: T 4 =()()[]()++29.87617.25sin 32 32IN 14.077LBM 969 ()()IN 16.5 2IN 490.6 2 IN LBF 419.9+ 6680 IN LBF - 4770 IN LBF T 4 = 9996 +3,399,049
+ 6680 - 4770 = 3,410,955 IN LBF 4: 4 = FTIN 12 2SEC LBFFT LBM 32 2INLBM 192,019LBF IN 3,410,955 I 4 Txx= 4 = 6863.9 2 SEC RAD t 4: 4 = W 3t 4 + ()2 2 4t 4 2 2 4 68634t56.8 57.3 14.5 t+= Solving:
t 4 2 + 0.0166 t 4 - 0.000074 = 0 t 4 = ()()()2 0.000067414 2 0.01660.0166-++ t 4 = 0.0036 SEC (24.5° 10°)
FNP-FSAR-10A
D-20 REV 23 5/11 t = 0.1405 + 0.0036 = 0.1441 SEC W 4 W 4 = W 3 +4 t 4 W 4 = 59.5 + (7539.6)(0.0035)
W 4 = 81.9 SEC RAD 5. 10° IMPACT As noted above, the across the disk during choke conditions is 419.9 PSID.
Addendum #8 also specifies a pressure rise due to steam hammer on the disk of +300 PSI. At the moment of impact, then, the instantaneous pressure on the
disk is: IMPACT = 419.9 + 300 = 719.9 PSI
The average during the last 10
° of motion is:
AVG = 41997199 2..+= 569.9 PSI T 5: T 5 = ()()[]()29.8765sin 32 32IN 14.077LBM 969+ + ()()LBF IN 4770LBFIN 05IN 16.5 2IN 490.6 2 IN LBF 569.9+43 T 5 = 6203 + 4,613,284 + 5430 - 4770 = 4,621,743 IN LBF 5: 5 = FT IN 12 2SEC LBFFT LBM 32 2INLBM 192,019LBF IN 4,621,743 I 5 Txx= 5 = 9,300 2 SEC RAD t 5: 5 = W 4t 5 + ()2 2 5t 5 FNP-FSAR-10A
D-21 REV 23 5/11
()()2 2 5t9,300 5 81.957.3 10+=t t 5 2 + 0.0176 t 5 - 0.0000375 =0 t 5 = ()()()2 0.000037514 2 0.0176 0.0176++ t 5 = 0.0019 SEC.
t = 0.1441 +0.0019 = 0.1460 SEC.
W 5: W 5 = W 4 + 5 t 5 W 5 = 81.9 + (9,300)(0.0019)
W 5 = 99.8 SEC RAD Summarizing, upon disk impact:
IMP = 9,300 2 SEC RAD WIMP = 99.8 SEC.RAD tIMP = 0.1460 SEC.
VIMP = SEC FT 117.0 SEC IN1404IN.0771 SECRAD 99.8===x4 D.3.2 Case 2 Case 2 differs from Case 1 in that a 4% steam-water mixture, rather than dry
saturated steam, flows at 7800 LBM/SEC. This represents a 2-phase blowdown
across the valve. In this case the initial fluid condition is taken as saturated
water at 1020 PSIA. During passage of the water through the pipe, the pressure
drop results in reduced temperature and enthalpy. The reduction in enthalpy is
manifested as latent heat of vaporization of the water, resulting in vapor
formation within the liquid. The mixture quality on crossing the valve is 4%.
FNP-FSAR-10A
D-22 REV 23 5/11 The critical pressure at the break exit plane is given by Griffith 4 as a function of pipe L/D ratio. Taking L = 100 FT, and D = 29.93 inches, we obtain:
40FT 1229.93FT 100 D L== Referring to Fig. III - 2 of Ref. 4, we obtain:
0.55 oc= c = 0.55 (1020 PSIA) = 561 PSIA.
Summarizing flow conditions:
c = 561 PSIA
T c = 479 °F x = 0.04 = f + xfg = 0.020 + (0.04)(0.8250) = 0.053 LBM 3 FT w = 7800 SEC LBM (assumed choked by flow restrictor)
Since the break location is unspecified, we may work upstream to estimate the pressure variation. Assume L = 10; D = 29.93, f = 0.011; solve for V and : V = SEC FT 84.7 2FT 4.883 LBM 3 FT 0.053 SEC LBM 7800 A Q== = f2g 2V D L (14)
- 4. P. Griffith, "Choked Two Phase Flow," Mass. Inst. of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.
Unpublished Report.
FNP-FSAR-10A
D-23 REV 23 5/11
= ()()()2 FT 2 IN 144 2SEC LBFFT LBM32.22 2 SEC FT 84.7 3FT 0.053 LBM FT 12 29.93FT 10 0.011 = 0.64 PSI (Does not include density variation)
Therefore for a short length between the break and valve, the pressure may
conservatively be taken as c of 561 PSIA.
As in Case 1, we again use the valve seat area as the representative valve flow area. V = 2FT 3.41 LBM 3 FT 0.053 SEC LBM 7800 A Q= V = 121.2 SEC FT For Case 2 we use identical relations for torques, inertia, weight, and equations of motion. E Q. (12) is used to obtain a new relation:
= 2g 2 VK = ()()2 FT 2 IN 144 2SEC LBFFTLBM32.22 2 SEC FT 121.2 3FT 0.053 LBMK = K9.29 As earlier, A. & M. data in Fig. 3-2 are used for K.
- 1. 65° > > 47.5° (Free fall w/spring, friction)
FNP-FSAR-10A
D-24 REV 23 5/11
= 0 As all disk mass, spring and friction constants are identical to those used for
Case 1, we use those results directly.
T 1 = 19,497 IN LBF 1 = 39.2 2 SEC RAD t 1 = 0.125 SEC W 1 = 4.90 SEC RAD 2. 47.5° > > 35° (Caught in "Breeze" at = 47.5°)
2: 2 = 29.9 K = (29.9)(1.41) = 42.2 PSI T 2: T 2 =()()[]()++29.87641.25sin 32 32IN 14.077LBM 969 ()()IN 16.5 2IN 490.6 2 IN LBF 42.2 + 9128 IN - LBF -
4770 IN LBF T 2 = 13,239 + 341,273 + 9128 - 4770
T 2 = 358,870 IN - LBF 2: 2 = FTIN 12 2SEC LBFFT LBM 32 192,019 358,850 I 2 Txx= 2 = 722.2 2 SEC RAD t 2: 2 = W 1 t 2 + ()2 2 2t 2 ()2 2 2t722.2 2t4.90 57.3 12.5+= Solving FNP-FSAR-10A
D-25 REV 23 5/11 t 2 2 + 0.0136 t - 0.00060 = 0 t 2 = ()()()20.0006014 2 0.0136 0.0136++ t 2 = 0.0187 SEC W 2: W 2 = W 1 + 2 t 2 W 2 = 4.90 + (722.2)(0.0187) = 18.4 SEC RAD t: t = 0.125 + 0.0187 = 0.1435 SEC
- 3. 35° 24.5° 2 = 722.2 SEC. 0.1435 2t SEC RAD 18.4 2 W 2 SEC RAD== 3: 3 = 29.9 K = (29.9)(3.5) = 104.7 PSI T 3: T 3 = ()()[]()29.87629.75sin 32 32IN 14.077LBM 969+ +()()LBF IN 4770LBF IN 7IN 16.5 2IN 490.6 2 IN LBF 104.7+955 T 3 = 12,173 + 847,131 + 7955 - 4770 = 862,489 IN LBF -4770 IN LBF 3: 3 = FTIN 12 2SEC LBFFT LBM 32 2INLBM 192,019LBF IN 862,489 I 3 Txx= 3 = 1736 2 SEC RAD t 3: 3 = W 2 t 3 + ()2 2 3t 3 FNP-FSAR-10A
D-26 REV 23 5/11
()2 2 3t1736 3t18.9 57.3 10.5+= t 3 2 + 0.02 t 3 - 0.000211 = 0 t 3 = ()()()2 0.00021114 2 0.02 0.02++ t 3 = 0.0074 SEC t = 0.1435 + 0.0074 = 0.1509 SEC W 3: W 3 = W 2 + 3 t 3 W 3 = 18.4 + (1736)(0.0074)
W 3 = 31.2 SEC RAD 4. 24.5° 10° As discussed in Case 1, onset of choking across the disk occurs at = 24.5°. Addendum 9 states (as for Case 1) that the static pressure at the valve minimum flow area, with atmospheric pressure downstream, is 995 PSIA. Repeating the Case 1 calculation with oc = 0.55 CHOKE = u - 0.55 u CHOKE = 995 - 0.55 (995) = 448 PSID 3 = 1736 SEC. 0.1509 3t SEC RAD 31.2 3 W 2 SEC RAD==
T 4 ()()[]()++=29.87617.25sin 32 32IN 14.077LBM 969T 4 ()()IN 16.5 2IN 490.6 448+ 6680 IN-LBF - 4770 IN LBF T 4 = 9996 + 3,626,515 + 6680 - 4770
T 4 = 3,638,421 IN LBF FNP-FSAR-10A
D-27 REV 23 5/11 4: 4 = FTIN 12 2SEC LBFFT LBM 32 2INLBM 192,019LBF IN 3,638,421 I T4xx= 4 = 7,321 2 SEC RAD t 4: 4 = W 3 t 4 + ()2 2 4t 4 ()()2 2 4t7 4t31.23 57.3 14.5 321+= t 4 2 + 0.0085 t 4 + 0.000069 = 0 t 4 =()()()2 0.00006914 2 0.0085 0.0085++ t 4 = 0.0051 SEC t 4 = 0.1509 + 0.0051 = 0.1560 SEC W 4: W 4 = W 3 + 4 t 4 = 31.23 + (7321)(0.0051) = 68.4 SEC RAD 5. 10° IMPACT Addendum 9 specifies a fluid hammer at disk impact of 150 PSI. At the moment
of impact the total acting on the disk is:
IMPACT = 448 + 150 = 598 PSID
The avg. during the last 10
° of motion is:
AVG = PSID 523 2598448=+
T 5: T 5 = ()()[]()++29.8765sin 32 32IN 14.077LBM 969 FNP-FSAR-10A
D-28 REV 23 5/11
()()IN 16.5 2IN 490.6 2 IN LBF 523+ 5430 IN-LBF
- 4770 IN-LBF T 5 = 7799 + 4,233,633 + 5430 - 4770
T 5 = 4,242,092 IN-LBF 5: 5 = FTIN 12 2SEC LBMFT LBM 32.2 2INLBM 192,019LBF IN 4,242,092 I 5 Txx= 5 = 8536 2 SEC RAD t 5: 5 = W 4 t 5 + ()2 2 5t 5 ()2 2 5t 5t.46 57.3 10 8536 8+= t 5 2 + 0.0160 t 5 + 0.000041 = 0 t 5 = ()()()2 0.00004114 2 0.0160 0.0160++ t 5 = 0.0022 SEC t 5 = 0.1560 + 0.0022 = 0.1582 SEC W 5: W 5 = W 4 + 5 t 5 W 5 = 68.4 + (8536)(0.0022)
W 5 = 87.5 SEC RAD Summarizing, upon disk impact:
IMP = 8536 2 SEC RAD FNP-FSAR-10A
D-29 REV 23 5/11 WIMP = 87.5 SEC RAD tIMP = 0.1582 SEC VIMP = 87.5 SEC FT 102.7 SEC IN1232IN 14.077 SEC RAD==x D.4 Impact Conditions The following summarize the disk impact conditions for Cases 1 and 2:
Case 1 Case 2 Angular acceleration - , 2 SEC RAD 9,300 8,536 Angular velocity - W, SEC RAD 99.8 87.5 Closure time SEC 0.146 0.158 Tip velocity -
()30.25"r SEC FT= 251.5 220.6 Impact energy E = LBFFT, 2 2 MAX Iw 206,254 158,759 REV 23 5/11 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 CLOSING TORQUE ON SWING DISC DUE TO COMPRESSION OF SPRING FIGURE D-1
REV 21 5/08 HEAD LOSS COEFFICIENT K VERSUS VALVE DISC ANGULAR OPENINGS JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE D-2
FNP-FSAR-10A E-i REV 21 5/08 ATTACHMENT E ASME PAPER NO. 72-PVP-12 (9)
FNP-FSAR-10A F-i REV 21 5/08 ATTACHMENT F JUSTIFICATION OF VELOCITY USED IN VALVE IMPACT ANALYSIS
FNP-FSAR-10A
REV 21 5/08 TABLE F-1 DISTRIBUTION OF KINETIC ENERGY C = tR c V c 2 2 1 2 X i = distance to c.g I II III II/III X i-R c cdKE/dx cdKE/dx R Rotation Translation Ratio
-0.940 0.0019 0.0479 0.040 -0.847 0.0063 0.0854 0.074 -0.749 0.0130 0.1076 0.121 -0.649 0.0222 0.1237 0.179 -0.549 0.0341 0.1360 0.251 -0.450 0.0485 0.1455 0.333 -0.350 0.0653 0.1526 0.428 -0.250 0.0843 0.1577 0.535 -0.150 0.1051 0.1611 0.652 -0.050 0.1274 0.1627 0.783 0.050 0.1504 0.1627 0.924 0.150 0.1737 0.1611 1.078 0.250 0.1962 0.1577 1.244 0.350 0.2169 0.1526 1.421 0.450 0.2342 0.1455 1.610 0.549 0.2463 0.1360 1.811 0.649 0.2503 0.1237 2.023 0.749 0.2417 0.1076 2.246 0.847 0.2118 0.0854 2.480 0.940 0.1297 0.0479 2.708 Sum = 2.559 Sum = 2.560
FNP-FSAR-10A G-i REV 21 5/08 ATTACHMENT G CONVERSION OF TENSION TEST DATA TO TRUE STRESS - STRAIN DATA
FNP-FSAR-10A
REV 21 5/08 TABLE G-1 Example: A-216, Grade WCB steel at 600
°F t t in/in ksi in/in ksi 0.01 37.0 0.0100 37.4 0.02 42.3 0.0198 43.1 0.03 46.6 0.0296 48.0 0.04 49.7 0.0392 51.7 0.05 52.0 0.0488 54.6 0.06 54.0 0.0583 57.2 0.07 55.4 0.0677 59.3 0.08 56.5 0.0770 61.0 0.09 57.3 0.0862 62.5 0.10 58.0 0.0953 63.8 0.11 58.3 0.1044 64.7 0.12 58.5 0.1133 65.5 0.13 58.6 0.1222 66.2 0.14 58.7 0.1310 66.9 0.15 58.6 0.1398 67.4 0.16 58.5 0.1484 67.9
REV 21 5/08 STRESS-STRAIN CURVES FOR A-216 GRADE WCB STEEL JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FIGURE G-1