RC-18-0118, (Vcsns), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-18, Request for a Temporary Non-Code Repair of a Service Water System Flange
| ML18257A298 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/2018 |
| From: | Lippard G South Carolina Electric & Gas Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RC-18-0118 | |
| Download: ML18257A298 (37) | |
Text
George A. Lippard Vice President, Nuclear Operations 803.345.4810 A SCANA COMPANY RC-18-0118 September 14, 2018 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir / Madam:
Subject:
VIRGiL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS) UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-12 RELIEF REQUEST RR-4-18, REQUEST FOR A TEMPORARY NON-CODE REPAIR OF A SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FLANGE In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 5Q.55a(z)(2), South Carolina Electric &
Gas Company (SCE&G), acting for itself and as an agent for South Carolina Public Service Authority (Santee Cooper) requests an emergency relief request for a temporary non-code repair of a through-wall leak identified in a Moderate Energy Class 3 Service Water piping flange.
SCE&G is requesting this relief until the conclusion of the VCSNS Unit 1 Fall 2018 refueling outage (RF-24). The repair will be implemented no later than the completion of RF-24 or before exceeding the temporary acceptance criteria of this relief request, whichever comes first.
On August 13, 2018, a pinhole leak was discovered on the Service Water (SW) system on the downstream flanged portion of valve XVB03121B-SW. SCE&G received NRC verbal approval for the use of Code Case N-513-3 for the analysis of this flange to allow continued operation [ML18226A359], On September 13,2018, additional degradation was observed on the flange. It has been determined that the flange no longer meets the acceptance criteria of Code Case N-513-3. Therefore, SCE&G is submitting a request for a temporary non-code repair using the guidance provided in Generic Letter 90-05.
Enclosed is the relief request.
SCE&G requests NRC approval of the proposed alternative by September 15, 2018.
V. C. Summer Nuclear Station
- P. 0. Box 88
- Jenkinsville, South Carolina
- 29065
- F (803) 941-9776
- www.sceg.com
Document Control Desk CR-18-03736 RC-18-0118 Page 2 of 2 Should you have any questions, please call Michael S. Moore at 803-345-4752.
Very truly yours, BAB/GAL/wk
Enclosures:
- 1) VCSNS Relief Request RR-4-18
- 2) Design Calculation SW050/03 Revision 2 "Through Wall Leak Evaluation"
- 3) Service Water System Drawings c:
J.E. Addison W. M. Cherry NSRC W.K. Kissam C. Haney RTS (CR-18-03736)
J. B. Archie S. A. Williams File (810.19-2)
J.H. Hamilton NRC Resident Inspector PRSF (RC-18-0118)
G.J. Lindamood K. M. Sutton
Document Control Desk CR-18-03736 RC-18-0118 Page 1 of 7 South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (SCE&G)
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1 (VCSNS)
Relief Request RR-4-18
- 1. Subject VCSNS requires relief from Section XI requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. This request is based on the hardship of performing required ASME code repair/replacement activities to the downstream weld neck flange at valve XVB03121B-SW. The pipe flange is an 8-inch Service Water (SW) discharge line from the B-Train Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) heat exchangers. This safety-related flange is classified as ASME Code Class 3 and is installed in a moderate energy system.
On August 13, 2018, a pinhole leak was discovered on the SW system on the downstream flanged portion of valve XVB03121B-SW. SCE&G received NRC verbal approval for the use of Code Case N-513-3 for the analysis of this flange to allow continued operation [ML18226A359]. On September 13-2018, additional degradation was observed on the flange. It was determined that, due to the continued degradation, the flange no longer meets the acceptance criteria of Code Case N-513-3. Therefore, SCE&G is submitting a request for a temporary non-code repair using the guidance provided in Generic Letter (GL) 90-05.
- 2. ASME Code Component(s) Affected ASME Code Class: Code Class 3, Moderate Energy Component: Service Water (SW) System 8-inch Weld Neck Flange Downstream of XVB03121B-SW Flange Material: Carbon Steel SA-105
- 3. Applicable Code Edition and Addenda ASME Code Section XI, "Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components," 2007 Edition through 2008 Addenda. The station is in its 4th 10 year interval effective from January 1, 2014, through and including December 31, 2023.
- 4. Applicable Code Requirement ASME Code Section XI, 2007 Edition through 2008 Addenda, Article IWA-4000, Repair/Replacement Activities.
Document Control Desk CR-18-03736 RC-18-0118 Page 2 of 7
- 5. Reason for Request VCSNS Technical Specifications discuss the limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) of the SW System in section 3.7.4. It states that at least two independent service water loops shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The action statement requires that with only one service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
A code repair is considered a hardship without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety. A code repair would require a plant shutdown to replace the pipe flange. The flange is located between valve XVB03121B-SW and the service water pond. The flange cannot be isolated from other portions of the service water system.
This degraded condition is not in compliance with ASME Section XI, 2007 Edition through 2008 Addenda, IWA-4000.
- 6. Proposed Alternative and Basis for Use In accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4), this safety-related piping must meet the requirements applicable to components which are classified as ASME Code Class 3.
V.C. Summer proposes a relief request from ASME Code Section XI, IWA 4000 to allow the use of a non-code repair. A code repair requires shut down of VCSNS Unit 1 to replace the piping flange. Given the limited risk associated with the condition of the flange, code repair is considered a hardship without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety.
The addition of the non-code repair is not credited for structural integrity. The non-code repair will mitigate current leaks and provide additional reinforcement of the degraded region as an enhancement.
The non-code repair is planned to consist of a compression tape or a clamp with rubber gasket material to initially seal the leaks. A composite wrap impregnated with water activated resin will then be installed and allowed to cure. The repair technique is designed to conform to, and is recognized by ASME PCC-2, "Repair of Pressure Equipment and Piping".
The guidance provided in GL 90-05 for performing temporary non-code repair of ASME Code Class 3 components is used as a basis for this Relief Request. VCSNS deviates from the flaw evaluation guidance in GL 90-05, due to exceeding the maximum allowable flaw length of either 3 inches or 15 percent of the circumference. Additionally, VCSNS will not perform additional volumetric NDE as discussed in GL 90-05 since the station will perform a code repair prior to the 3 months requirement and the repair is not
Document Control Desk CR-18-03736 RC-18-0118 Page 3 of 7 conducive to Ultrasonic or Radiographic testing. In lieu of the flaw evaluation guidance provided in GL 90-05, a flaw evaluation using guidance from ASME BPVC, Section XI, 2007 Edition through 2008 Addenda determined the flaw was acceptable in its current configuration.
A compensatory action of daily walkdowns of the area will be completed to monitor for leakage. A code compliant repair will be completed during the next refueling outage which is scheduled to start on October 6, 2018. contains the evaluation of the acceptability of the through wall leak and the UT inspection results. The UT inspection results were obtained by a Quality Control inspector who was qualified as a UT Level II inspector. provides two plant drawings identifying the location of the valve XVB03121B-SW.
Further degradation is acceptable as long as the leakage from the subject leak remains below 11.5 gpm, and total 'B' Train SW System leakage remains below 61.8 GPM.
6.1 Flaw Characterization - The flaw has been characterized as degraded region of approximately 1 inch axially by 6 inches circumferentially, as determined from UT measurements and minimum wall thickness calculations. The degraded region includes 8 pinhole leaks. The degradation mechanism has been identified as cavitation erosion caused by the throttling of butterfly valve, XVB03121B-SW. The cavitation erosion is not expected to affect more than 50 percent of the flange in the circumferential direction.
This is conservative based on UT data and prior experience with cavitation of these valves. The cavitation erosion has been limited to the weld neck flange and has not propagated into the attached piping.
6.2 Structural Integrity - Per VCSNS Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 4.0.5, the structural integrity of an ASME component is determined in accordance with either the original construction code or the ASME Section XI Code, approved code cases or regulatory-approved methods of evaluation. No NRC approved methodology exists that allows for temporary acceptance of flaws for this condition.
A flaw evaluation using guidance from ASME BPVC, Section XI, 2007 Edition through 2008 Addenda determined the flaw is structurally stable in its current configuration. The flaw evaluation conservatively utilized Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics methodology based on ASME BPVC, Section XI, Appendix C-7000 to determine the maximum allowable axial and circumferential through wall flaw lengths that would ensure flaw stability. A fracture toughness of 35 ksiVin is conservatively utilized in the flaw evaluation, similar to the allowable used in GL 90-05 for carbon steels. Experimental fracture toughness data for carbon steel components is considerably higher. The
Document Control Desk CR-18-03736 RC-18-0118 Page 4 of 7 evaluation considers design loading conditions such as deadweight, pressure, thermal expansion, and seismic loads. A pressure of 65 psig was utilized for design loading, which is beyond the normal operating pressure of 16 psig. The flaw evaluation determined that a through wall flaw with an axial length of approximately 9.1 inches would retain flaw stability. An axial length of 9.1 inches is beyond the weld neck flange and into the attached piping for which no cavitation erosion is expected. The flaw evaluation also determined that a through wall circumferential flaw with a length of approximately 13.54 inches would retain flaw stability. A circumferential length of 13.54 inches represents over 50 percent of the circumference and is therefore beyond any reasonably expected cavitation erosion.
The addition of the non-code repair is not credited for structural integrity. The non-code repair will mitigate current leaks and provide additional reinforcement of the degraded region as an enhancement.
6.3 Flow Margin - The pinhole leaks are located downstream of the 'B' EDG heat exchangers downstream of the discharge valve XVB03121B-SW on the discharge line to the SW pond. Therefore, a leak at this location does not affect the ability to provide cooling water to the EDG heat exchangers. The current leakage from the pinholes is approximately than 2000 ml/minute. The proposed repair will mitigate leakage from the flaw. A conservative estimate of flow through a leak from a 0.375 inch diameter hole at 20 psig would be approximately 11.5 gpm. The SW pump is designed to supply 16,800 gpm of flow. A flow of 11.5 gpm from leakage on the 'B' Train would not have a significant effect on the performance of the pump.
There are also four separate SW pinhole leaks downstream of the A and B CCW Heat Exchanger Return Valves (XVB03123A/B-SW). The upper limit of allowable leakage for these leaks is 50.3 gpm as defined in previous operability evaluations and associated relief requests. For this flow margin evaluation, it is assumed that all 50.3 gpm of leakage is from 'B' Train. This combined with the 11.5 gpm leakage downstream of the EDG Heat Exchanger Return Valves would give a total of 61.8 gpm leakage from the SW System.
A recent routine code check valve test from STP-230.006J on the SW 'B' Train measured the total system flow to be 13,036 gpm (STTS# 1604423). The design minimum required post-accident flow for a train of SW is 12,237 gpm (SW DBD). This check valve testing alignment is comparable to the post-accident SW system alignment.
Therefore, there is a flow margin of approximately of 800 gpm. This is a conservative approach since the 61.8 gpm leak rate would be located downstream of all cooling loads and throttle valves. A postulated leakage of 61.8 gpm would not adversely affect SW system flow margin.
Document Control Desk CR-18-03736 RC-18-0118 Page 5 of 7 The SW pond contains approximately 38.5 x 106 gallons of water and has the capability of being filled by a cross-tie valve from the circulating water system if water level drops below the alarm limit. A postulated leak of 61.8 gpm would not significantly affect the SW pond level.
6.4 Spray Concerns - The current small stream coming from the pinhole leak is directed toward the wall in the diesel building 427 foot elevation and is not currently adversely affecting any surrounding equipment. The leakage is oriented toward the wall and there is no active safety-related equipment that would be adversely impacted by the leakage.
The system pressure is low at the defect location (20 psig or less), therefore, the only potential effect from the spray would be the open/close limit switches and the conduit/terminal box for the limit switches on XVB03121B-SW. The valve limit switches are only used for position indication because XVB03121B-SW is a manual valve and no position change is required for the safety-related function. The current leakage from the pinholes is approximately than 2000 ml/minute. The proposed repair will mitigate leakage from the flaw. A conservative estimate of unmitigated leakage is postulated to be 11.5 gpm. The orientation and location of the leaks would lead to the resulting spray deflecting off the wall and pooling on the flow prior to affecting any equipment in the vicinity of the valve excluding the limit switches and associated conduit/terminal box for XVB03121 B-SW. From visual observation, the closest equipment are the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps and these are approximately 15 feet away from the degraded region and on the other side of the valve. The spray would not have adequate velocity to adversely affect these components.
6.5 Flooding - Calculation DC03490-003 Rev 1 provides the DG building flooding evaluation. It assumes a 30 minute operator action and no floor drain capability or sump pump operation. The current leakage from the pinholes is approximately 2000 ml/minute. The proposed repair will mitigate leakage from the flaw. A conservative estimate of unmitigated leakage is postulated to be 11.5 gpm and would increase the calculated flood level in the 400 foot elevation from 48.1 inches to 49.0 inches after 30 minutes which continues to be an acceptable flood level. The level in the 427 foot elevation is unaffected since the curb heights limit the water level in this elevation and any water cascading above these curbs will drain to the 400 foot level.
Under normal operating conditions, the DG building sump pumps have a 40 gpm capacity each. There are two redundant 100% capacity sump pumps which can be used during normal plant operations. The water from the spray will collect at the floor near the pipe and drain to a nearby floor drain which goes to the Emergency Diesel Generator Building sump pumps. Therefore, DG building sump pumps would have sufficient capacity to prevent building flooding from the postulated 11.5 gpm leak rate.
Document Control Desk CR-18-03736 RC-18-0118 Page 6 of 7 6.6 Extent of Condition -After the initial discovery of the flaw in the flange downstream of XVB03121B-SW, 5 additional areas were inspected as required by Code Case N-513-3.
6.7 Compensatory Monitoring Plan - The guidance provided in Generic Letter 90-05 suggests that the integrity of the temporary non-code repair should be assessed at least every 3 months by a suitable NDE method. VCSNS is scheduled to begin a refueling outage on October 6, 2018. The repair is not conducive to Ultrasonic or Radiographic testing. Operations will visually monitor the degraded component every shift and will quantify the leakage at least once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> until the leak is repaired. The temporary non-code repair will not be removed because this action could result in damage to the degraded component prior to permanent code repair. The monitoring plan will remain in place until the system is removed from service and repaired. An administrative limit (leak rate increase greater than 1000 ml/min in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period) will require further evaluation to determine corrective actions.
6.8 Conclusion - Although the structural integrity of the degraded flange cannot be demonstrated in accordance with a regulatory-approved methodology, it is concluded the integrity and functional requirements of the flange will be maintained. SW will continue to be capable of providing required cooling water flow to meet the required cooling loads including the EDG heat exchangers. VCSNS will implement the compensatory monitoring plan above to ensure any growth of the flaw is identified and assessed for its impact on structural integrity. A code compliant repair will be completed during the next refueling outage which is scheduled to start on October 6, 2018.
- 7. Duration of Proposed Alternative:
A code compliant repair will be completed during the next refueling outage which is scheduled to start on October 6, 2018. Therefore, the duration of the proposed alternative is until the completion of the Fall 2018 refueling outage (RF-24).
- 8. Precedents:
References 3, 4, and 5 of this Relief Request discuss recent Service Water leaks experienced at VCSNS that required a relief request.
- 9.
References:
- 1. ASME Code Section XI, Division 1, 2007 Edition through 2008 Addenda
- 2. Generic Letter 90-05, "Guidance for Performing Temporary Non-Code Repair of ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 Piping".
Document Control Desk CR-18-03736 RC-18-0118 Page 7 of 7
- 3. Virgil C. Summer, Unit 1, Relief Request RR-4-15, Request for Alternative to Implement Code Case N-513-4, 'Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping' [ML18184A560].
- 4. Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS), Unit 1 - Relief Request RR-4-16, Request for Alternative to Implement Code Case N-513-4, 'Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws In Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping'
[ML18193B109],
- 5. Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS), Unit 1-Relief Request RR-4-17, Request to Utilize Code Case N 513-3 'Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 Or 3 Piping Section XI, Division 1' For A Service Water System Flange [ML18226A359]
Document Control Desk CR-18-03736 RC-18-0118 Page 1 of 25 VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS) UNIT 1 ENCLOSURE 2 DESIGN CALCULATION SW050/03 REVISION 2 "THROUGH WALL LEAK EVALUATION"
ES-0412 ATTACHMENT I PAGE 1 OF 2 REV SION5 Subject Code SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY 560 CALCULATION RECORD Page 1 of 5 Calculation Title Calculation Number Revision Status^i^
Through Wall Leak Evaluation SW050/03 2 Parent Document System Safety Class *Partial Calc. Revision ECR72389 SW
- NN DQR §SR *Complete Calc. Revision Originator Discipline Organization Date XREF Number N. Glunt PS SCE&G-DE 9/14/2018 N/A CALCULATION INFORMATION Content
Description:
Evaluation of the acceptability of through wall leaks in the 8" Service Water line downstream of valve XVB03121B-SW.
Affected Components/Calculations/Documents:
SW050 and DC05600-034 Piping Reconciliation Completed per QA-CAR-0089-18: QThis Revision
- Previous Revision
- N/A Contains Preliminary Data/Assumptions:
- No
- Yes, Affected Pages:
Computer Program Used:
- No
- Yes, Validated per computer program validation process (others) vendors name IE! Yes, Validated in accordance with SAP-1040 (Ref. 3.11)
- Yes, Validated [ES-0412]
- Computer Program Validation Calculation VERIFICATION
- Continued, Attachment Scope: Verify correct inputs, methodology, computations, and completeness of scope.
Verifier: B. Starbuck Assigned by: B. Brown N. Glunt Engineering Personnel /Date Owner's Acceptance Review tf/is N/A Verifier/Date Responsible Engineer/Date Required for all engineering work performed by contractor personnel not enrolled in the VCSNS Engineering Training Program RECORDS To Records Mgmt:
Approval/Date Initials/Date Distribution: Calc File (Original)
ES-0412 ATTACHMENT I PAGE 2 OF 2 REVISION 5 SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY REVISION
SUMMARY
Page 2 of 5 Calculation Number SW050/03 Revision Number. Summary Description Initial Issue to accept through pipe wall flaw utilizing ASME Code Case N-513-3.
Revised calculation to evaluate and accept increased degraded pipe area originally documented in Revision 0.
Revised calculation to evaluate increased degraded pipe area.
TECHNICAL WORK RECORD SERIAL NG46186 ENGINEER Nathan Glunt DATE 9/14/2018 PROJECT TITLE SW050/03, Rev. 2 SYSTEM sw PAGE 3 of 5 PURPOSE The purpose of this calculation is to document the evaluation of the acceptability of a through wall leak in the flanged portion of valve XVB03121B-SW.
Revision 1: CR-18-03561 identified an increase in leakage rate of the previously accepted through wall leak. The degraded area has increased from the limitations of Revision 0 of this calculation. This revision evaluates and accepts the multiple pinhole leaks within the existing degraded wear area documented in Attachment 3.
Revision 2: CR-18-03577, CR-18-03579, CR-18-03735, and CR-18-03736 identified additional through wall pinhole leaks in the areas of the previously accepted through wall leaks. The degraded area has increased from the limitations of Revision 1 of this calculation. This revision evaluates the acceptability of the multiple pinhole leaks within the existing degraded wear area documented in Attachment 4.
REFERENCES
- 4. Drawing 1MS-22-261, Rev 12
- 5. Drawing 302-222, Sheet 3, Rev 31
- 6. Calculation SW050, Rev 3.1
- 7. Calculation SW050/02, Rev 0
- 8. EIR 82492
- 9. Catalog, Ladish Fittings No. 55
- 10. EPRI TR-103198-T1, "A Method to Predict Cavitation and the Extent of Damage in Power Plant Piping"
- 11. NRC Reg. Guide 1.147, Rev 18
- 13. NRC Generic Letter 90-05 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. MATHCAD N-513-3 Evaluation - 2 pages
- 5. MATHCAD Piping Stress Calculation - 2 Pages
- 6. MATHCAD Fracture Evaluation - 5 pages COMPUTER PROGRAMS MATHCAD 14 ASSUMPTIONS None.
EVALUATION A leak was discovered in the weld neck flange downstream of valve XVB03121B-SW in the Service Water Piping System. A similar leak was previously evaluated in the weld neck flange downstream of valve XVB03121A-SW in SW050/02 (Reference 7).
The piping was reviewed for minimum pipe wall thickness using hoop stress and longitudinal stress. This is documented in EIR 82492 (Reference 8). The results of the minimum wall thickness calculation determined that the hoop stress is bounding and the minimum wall thickness is 0.019" at the weld neck
TECHNICAL WORK RECORD SERIAL NG46186 ENGINEER Nathan Glunt DATE 9/14/2018 PROJECT TITLE SWQ50/03, Rev. 2 SYSTEM sw PAGE 4 of 5 flange. The weld neck flange is tapered with the weld neck increasing in thickness towards the back facing (Reference 9). The wall thickness calculations utilize the thinner attached pipe dimensions (8" Sch. 40) with a conservative design pressure of 65 psi. The allowable stress used in the minimum wall thickness calculation is based on the piping SA106 Gr. B material which is bounding vs. the flange material of SA105. These considerations ensure the evaluation is conservative.
The flaw will be evaluated utilizing the ASME Code Case N-513-3 (Reference 2) and must fall within the scope of the requirements listed in Section 1 of N-513-3. The flaw meets the requirement of the Section 1.0 Scope of N-513-3 with the exception of (c) where the flaw is beyond the distance of (Ro*t)A0.5 from the pipe to flange weld centerline. Therefore a subsequent relief request will be required by Licensing.
Continuing forward with Section 2, "Procedure", of N-513-3 (Reference 2):
(a) The flaw geometry has been characterized and is included in Attachment 2.
(b) The flaw is classified as Non-Planar Through Wall. The degraded area is identified as several (8)
"pinhole" leaks within a localized thinned region.
(c) There is only a single degraded area identified and the remaining pipe wall.
(d) Flaw Evaluation shall be performed - See Attachment 1 (e) Frequent periodic inspections of no more than 30 day intervals shall be used to determine if the flaw is growing and determine a timeframe as which the flaw may be no longer acceptable. This method is recommended over using a flaw growth evaluation due to the nature of the erosion which is difficult to predict (Reference 10).
(f) This calculation does not include an evaluation of the effects of the water spray. That is outside of the scope of this evaluation.
(g) The results provided are the limit of the flaw size. Any further growth would have to be reanalyzed.
(h) Per the NRC stipulations for the use of N-513-3, a repair must be made at the next outage.
(i) This evaluation and the UT examination are documented in accordance with IWA-6300. Licensing is requesting an emergency relief request in order to apply the N-513-3 code case in the weld neck flange beyond the provisions of Section (1), Paragraph (c) of Code Case N-513-3.
Outside of the scope of this calculation, augmented volumetric examination or physical measurement to assess degradation of the affected system shall be performed to identify and detect other susceptible flaw locations per N-513-3.
In addition to the Code Case N-513-3 evaluation, a Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics evaluation is also performed to determine the allowable flaw length of the axial and circumferential through wall flaws. The flaws are evaluated in accordance to the acceptance criteria of ASME Section XI, Appendix C. Article C-7000 is utilized as it provides flaw evaluation for nonductile fracture using Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics criteria. The methodology used in Article C-7000 is conservative for carbon steel materials below 200F. In addition a conservative fracture toughness value of 35 ksiVin is utilized for carbon steel based on NRC GL 90-05 (Reference 13). A more realistic fracture toughness value would be approximately 90 ksiVin based on the NRC Pipe Fracture Encyclopedia. The stress intensity factors for through wall axial and circumferential flaws were calculated with the assistance of Code Case N-513-3, Appendix I.
RESULTS The multiple pinhole through wall leaks identified in CR-18-03561, CR-18-03577, CR-18-03579, CR 03735, and CR-18-03736 are bounded within the same degraded flaw area (5 7/8 inches). The degraded area was analyzed within a 6 inch diameter area requiring an average thickness of 0.125 inches, per Attachment 1. Based on the UT data provided in Attachment 4, there is insufficient thickness adjacent to the thinned region to provide the required reinforcement. Therefore, the through wall leaks in the flanged portion of valve XVB03121B-SW do not pass the requirements of Code Case N-513-3.
To support a temporary repair of the flange downstream of valve XVB03121B-SW a Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics evaluation was performed to determine the largest through wall flaw length that
TECHNICAL WORK RECORD SERIAL NG46186 ENGINEER Nathan Glunt DATE 9/14/2018 PROJECT TITLE SW050/03, Rev. 2 SYSTEM sw PAGE 5 of 5 would provide flaw stability. This evaluation is performed in Attachment 6 for through wall axial and circumferential flaws using ASME Section XI, Appendix C-7000. The results demonstrate that a through wall axial flaw with a length of 9.1 inches and a through wall circumferential flaw with a length of 13.54 inches would meet the flaw stability criteria of ASME Section XI Appendix C-7000. The degradation mechanism of the weld neck flange is erosion damage due to cavitation from the upstream throttled butterfly valve. The UT data shows that the cavitation damage is limited to the weld neck flange and does not impact the downstream piping. Therefore an allowable through wall axial flaw length of 9.1 inches conservatively envelops the current degradation in the weld neck flange as well as any further damage which is expected to remain in the weld neck flange. The cavitation damage in the circumferential direction is limited to only one side of the throttled butterfly valve. UT data shows that the opposite side of the flange is untouched by the cavitation damage. The allowable through wall circumferential flaw length of 13.54 inches is more than double the current flaw length is all pinholes are included and represents more than 50% of the circumference, which is beyond the expected circumferential extend cavitation damage. Therefore, the flaw evaluation provides reasonable assurance that flaw stability shall be maintained until a permanent repair can be performed in the next refueling outage.
The flaw stability evaluation does not include evaluation of the ability of the thinned region to hold pressure, since it is assumed that the entire thickness has degraded. To ensure stability of the thinned region and mitigate any future leakage a temporary repair should be utilized.
SW050/003, Rev 2 Attachment 1 Page 1 of 2 AS ME Code Case N-513-3 Non-Planar Flaw Evaluation
^^pipe ODpipe := B.62Sn tnom := 0.322n p := 65psi Sa:= 15ksi Rm:=
Pressure of 65 psi is used for conservatism, Normal is 16 psi and Upset is 20 psi.
Illustration of Adjusted Wall Thickness and Equivalent Hole Diameter Through-wall tmin (b) Equivalent Hole Representation ASME Code Case N-513-3 Equation 4 t . P°o min 2(5 + 0.4p) where p = maximum operating pressure at flaw location S = allowable stress at operating temperature P'ODpipe
= 0.019in 2.(Sa+0.+p)
SW050/003, Rev 2 Attachment 1 Page 2 of 2 For through-wall leakage along portion of the thinned wall:
ASME Code Case N-513-3 Equation 8 1.5 iRtacij (ta(jj tm jn) dadj $ , (8) tmin t~y!=o!T25ir] The value was selected to be greater than t_min and less than nominal.
^'*\/^m' tadj'(tadj Vin) da := 51 u.
dd = 6.16-in d_a must be greater than or equal to d_adj d<X0 = 6.16-in vs dadj:= 6-Qirj Equation 8 was iterative until d_a yielded a result greater than 6.0in. At this size, the diameter would encompass all pinhole leaks within the same degraded region shown in Attachment 4.
However, the results of the UT inspection in Attachment 4 demonstrate that the wall thickness has degraded beyond tadj around the area adjacent to the pinhole leaks and the current condition no longer meets the acceptance criteria of Code Case N513-3.
SW050/003, Rev 2 Attachment 2 Page 1 of 3 QSP-516 ATTACHMENT I PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 8 ULTRASONIC THICKNESS DETERMINATION REPORT SITE: \/r <, I WORK REQUEST#: /Y/VJ fO-oat DATE: 2 SYSTEM: DRAWING/ISO#: LOCATION: QR- */Z7 CODE/CLASS: 3 SURFACE CONDITION: AREA OF INTEREST: F/-LJ<l.
PIPE SIZE: V" NOMINAL THICKNESS: JOINT DESIGN:
BASE METAL SPECS: <bt>el MINIMUM ALLOWABLE THICKNESS:
INSTRUMENT MODEL#: 3Y Df PL< SERIAL#: COUPLANT BATCH#: tZDsyli?
CALIBRATION STANDARD #: TRANSDUCER: S/N LOCATION ACTUAL SKETCH NUMBER THICKNESS ccRoi.eive.cA,
- Per the provided acceptance criteria, this test is: SAT O UNSAT O INFO ONLY 0 REMARKS: fccsi
- Inspector:. Level: "HZT Date: Wl?/IY Inspector: Level: Date:
i 1
SW050/03, Rev. 2 Attachment 3 Page 1 of 2 QSP-516 ATTACHMENT I PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 8 ULTRASONIC THICKNESS DETERMINATION REPORT SITE: VCS 1 WORK REQUEST#: DATE: f/si/lY SYSTEM: *>U DRAWING/ISO#: ks/A LOCATION: Q&-YZ7 CODE/CLASS: 3 SURFACE CONDITION: AREA OF INTEREST: F^kulz. le<<U<
PIPE SIZE: -J?" NOMINAL THICKNESS: JOINT DESIGN:
BASE METAL SPECS: <*£.ei MINIMUM ALLOWABLE THICKNESS:
INSTRUMENT MODEL#: 33T fV. PL& SERIAL#: \-2jo<4%71oWCPUPLANT BATCH #:
CALIBRATION STANDARD TRANSDUCER: S/N £Z,lO$C LOCATION ACTUAL SKETCH NUMBER THICKNESS
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Per the provided acceptance criteria, this test is: SAT I I UNSAT CU INFO ONLY 0 REMARKS: fig&t C$Fav~h >
Inspector: Level: Date: 1?
Inspector Level: Date:
SW050/03, Rev. 2 Attachment 3 Page 2 of 2 SW050/03, Rev 2 Attachment 4 Page 1 of 3 QSP-516 ATTACHMENT I ORIGINAL PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 8 0
ULTRASONIC THICKNESS DETERMINATION REPORT SITE: VCS-UNIT 1 WORK REQUEST#: 1815886-001 DATE: 9/14/18 SYSTEM: SW DRAWING/ISO#: NA LOCATION: DG CODE/CLASS: 3 SURFACE CONDITION: AS FORGED AREA OF INTEREST: FLAW PIPE SIZE: 8" NOMINAL THICKNESS: JOINT DESIGN: FLANGE BASE METAL SPECS: CS MINIMUM ALLOWABLE THICKNESS:
INSTRUMENT MODEL #: 38DL PLUS SERIAL #.120442708 COUPLANT BATCH #: 15D018 CALIBRATION STANDARD #: UT 101 TRANSDUCER: S/N 621056 LOCATION ACTUAL SKETCH NUMBER THICKNESS FLAW#8 SEE ATTACHED SEE ATTACHED Per the provided acceptance criteria, this test is: SAT I I UNSAT \Z1 INFO ONLY IXl REMARKS: Sketch and Data Attached Inspector: Ben Newman Level: IL Date: 9/13/18 Inspector: Julian Hamilton Level: II Date: 9/13/18
SW050/03, Rev 2 Attachment 4 Page 2 of 3 QSP-516 ATTACHMENT I OB PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 8 ULTRASONIC THICKNESS DETERMINATION REPORT SITE: VL5 o>^'Al WORK REQUEST#: / 1 D A T E : f//?//?'
SYSTEM: DRAWING/ISO#: LOCATION: OA VZ.7 CODE/CLASS: SURFACE CONDITION: AREA OF INTEREST:
PIPE SIZE: __r" NOMINAL THICKNESS: JOINT DESIGN:
BASE METAL SPECS: , MINIMUM ALLOWABLE THICKNESS:
INSTRUMENT MODEL#: SERIAL#: COUPLANT BATCH #: }6DOlK CALIBRATION STANDARD #: <ST-/&Z. TRANSDUCER: S/N /Ifttftt LOCATION ACTUAL SKETCH NUMBER THICKNESS
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Per the provided acceptance criteria, this test is: SAT Q UNSAT O INFO ONLY REMARKS: fcjg&Ldt&XlL ~
Inspector: Level: -M- Date: lAj/r Inspector: Level: Date:
SW050/03, Rev 2 Attachment 4 ~ Page 3 of 3 ENGINEERS Serial TECHNICAL WORK RECORD Engineer Date Project Title PL* & & ph. Tab Page of xkx
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Verification Approval Type of Verification Verifier Signature/Date Signature/Date
SW050/03, Rev 2 Attachment 5 Page 1 of 2 Through-wall Flaw Evaluation of 8" Weld Neck Flange. This attachment is used for the calculation of stresses. Evaluation of flaw is performed in Attachment 5. Stresses are calculated for straight pipe and the increased thickness of the weld neck flange approaching the back face of the flange is conservatively ignored. Loads from SW050, Node 3.
Input nom OD * := 8.625in tnom nom := 0.322n
- ' p := 65psi Rm:=: = 4.151-in 2
MDw:= 114-ft-lbf Deadweight Moment Note:
The moments are assumed MOBE:= 466-ft lbf 9U OBE Moment to remain constant with varying wall thickness Me := 144-ft-lbf Thermal Moment*
MSSE:= 534ft"lbf 9E SSE Moment ASME Section XI, C-2500 - Definition of Pipe Stress 2
- 838-psi nom Bending combination of Mb.OBE:~ MDW + M< ;0BE= 580ft-lbf OBE and DW Mb.SSE:~ MDW + MSSE~ 648"ft-lbf Bending combination of SSE and DW
SW050/03, Rev 2 Attachment 5 Page 2 of 2
/MPWQDpipe^
°b.DW := = 81.364-psi 2-L f Mb.OBE'ODpipe
°b.OBE = 413.955-psi 2-1
^Mb.SSE"0DpipeN b.SSE = 462.488-psi 2-L (Me -0Dpipe* ^
= 102.775-psi 2-L v t y
SW050/03, Rev 2 Attachment 6 Page 1 of 5 The limiting through-wall flaw length is determined for individual axial and circumferential through-wall flaws. These allowable flaw lengths will be compared to the length of the through-wall leaks in the 8" SW weld neck flange when combined in the axial and circumferential directions. The evaluation perfomed herein is based on Linear Elactic Fracture Mechanics in ASME Section XI, Appendix C. Code Case N-513-3, Appendix I is also utilized for the calculation of through wall stress intensity factors.
The following stress inputs are based on Attachment 5 of this calculation.
Rm 4.151 in ^nom := 0-322 in cr^ := 0.838 ksi Stresses from ASME Section XI, C-2500 -
Definition of Pipe Stress. Calculated in crm := 0.435 ksi Attachment 5.
CTb Norm:= °-082 ksi Bending stress for Normal condition - Based on DW
°b Upset:= °-414 ksi Bending stress for Upset Condition - Based on OBE
°b Emer:= °-463 ksi Bending stress for Emergency Condition - Based on SSE cre := 0.103 ksi Thermal stress Kjq := 35 ksi-y/in Fracture Toughness value is conservative and based on GL 90-05. Fracture Toughness from USNRC Pipe Fracture Encyclopedia would be 92.2 ksi inA0.5.
Axial Flaw Evaluation (Nonmandatory Apprendix C, C-7400)
The allowable flaw length limit, £anow, for the stability of a through-wall flaw is defined from Kj < K c (15) where (U.S. Customary Units)
Ki Ftw cr,,(irc)2 c = /2
<rh = pRm/1 Ftw = 1 + 0.072449A + 0.64856A2 - 0.2327A3 +
0.038154A4 - 0.0023487A5
SW050/03, Rev 2 Attachment 6 Page 2 of 5 Q:= l Per N-513-3, Mandatory Appendix I c:= 4.55 in Interative until Kl<KiC SFm := 2.7 Conservative for Service Level A from C-2622 c
X := t = 3.936 7Rm-tnom F := 1 + 0.072449-X + 0.64856-X2 - 0.2327-X3 + 0.038154-X4- 0.0023487-X5 = 4.081 Kj:= SFJ^-F-ct^-^tt-c - 34.914 ksi->/in Fen§hAllow.Axial .= 2 c = 9.1 in Circumferential Flaw Evaluation (Nonmandatory Apprendix C. C-7300)
The stress intensity factor for a circumferential flaw, including the appropriate structural factor, is given by the following:
Ki = KIm + A7fc + Kjr (13) where (U.S. Customary Units)
=Klm{SFm)Fm am (m)"
=K,b +
Kjr = Kj from residual stresses at the flaw location SFm and SFh = structural factors from C-2621 SFm.A;=2.7 SFb_A:=2.3 SFm.B := 2-4 SFb_B:=2.0 Safety Factors by Service Level (C-2621)
SFm .c:=l-8 SFb_c:=1.6 SFm.D := F3 SFb.D:= F4
SW050/03, Rev 2 Attachment 6 Page 3 of 5 Normal Operating Condition cNormal:= Half flaw length replaces flaw depth for through-wall
^-3^
flaws. Value varied until Kl<K!C cNormal 0 :=
R' SFm:= SF m.A SFu := SFb.A R. f Rm \ / D V m
Aj^ := -2.02917 + 1.67763- - 0.07987- + 0.00176-y Vom J nom Rm R f R~ ^
Bm := 7.09987 - 4.42394- + 0.21036- 0.00463-k Vom J y 11U1I1 y
( R A ( Rm R.
m Cm := 7.79661 + 5.16676- - 0.24577- + 0.00541-
^nom. V ^om )
1.5 2.5 3.5 Fm:= 1 +
Vl- + V - +Cm -[-l = 5.335 Rm^ ( R m ~\
f R.m ^
Ak := -3.26543 + 1.52784- - 0.072698- + 0.0016011-nom V lnom j
( Rm ^ A t? A Rm Bk := 11.36322 - 3.91412- + 0.18619- - 0.004099-y IlUIll nom
( R m\ f Rm ^ ( Rm Cu := -3.18609 + 3.84763- - 0.18304- + 0.00403-y IlUIlly ^ *nom j V ^nom J 1.5 2.5 3.5 Fu := 1 + Ak-I - I + BK-I - I + Cb-l - l = 3.529 RIm:_ ^Fm' Fm' am'yJ n'CNormal KIb := (SFb"°b.Norm + ^e)"^^Normal The residual stresses are considered neglegible for the purposes Kir := 0 of this evaluation since the flaws are not in or connected to the weld. In addition the residual weld stresses are self limiting.
KI.Normal:= KIm + KIb + KIr = 34 959 ksiV^ RIC = 35 ksi-y/iii
SW050/03, Rev 2 Attachment 6 Page 4 of 5 Upset Operating Condition Ctj := 6.77 in Half flaw length replaces flaw depth for through-wall flaws. Value varied until K,<KIC cUpset Rrm SF_ SFb:= SFbB m :=
-= SF
^rm.B m
f R ^ Rm Am:= -2.02917 + 1.67763 * - 0.07987 + 0.00176-V'nom j ^ 'nomJ momy 2 (R lvm ^
n3 f Rvm ^ ( R \
Bm:= 7.09987 - 4.42394- + 0.21036- - 0.00463-V Vm J nomJ V '*nom j RC ( R \ Rm Cm:= 7.79661 + 5.16676- - 0.24577- + 0.00541-v'nomy 'nom j 1.5 2.5 3.5
+ + V - =4.494
( Rm ^ ( Rm A R, Ab := -3.26543 + 1.52784- - 0.072698- + 0.0016011-y 'nom j y iiuiiiy
( lvRm ^ RnP Bb := 11.36322 - 3.91412- + 0.18619- - 0.004099-V 'nomJ nomy V^'nom j 2 x3 f Rm \ f Rm ^ ( Rm \
Cb := -3.18609 + 3.84763- - 0.18304- + 0.00403-v'nomy ^ '*nomJ ^ 'nom j 1.5 2.5 3.5 Fu := 1 + Ab-l - l + B' b - l - j *%"! =3,04 KIm:- SFm" Fm' orm'-J7r" cUpset RIb CTe)-
- (^Fb'CJb.Upset + °eJ' Fb^
rb'-\/^'Hjpset Kir:=0 Residual stresses are assumed neglegible KI.UpsetKIm + KIb + KIr ~ 34-967 ksiV^ ^=35 ksi--\/7n
SW050/03, Rev 2 Attachment 6 Page 5 of 5 Emergency Operating Condition Half flaw length replaces flaw depth for through-wall "Emer := 7.36 in flaws. Value varied until Kl<K(C cEmer n
0 1=
Rm SFm:= SFm.C SFu := SF b.C f Rm \ ^ R rr ^ ( R m\
Am:= -2.02917 + 1.67763- - 0.07987- + 0.00176-V 'nom j ^ ^nom J v ^omy
( lx R \ Rm m
Bm := 7.09987 - 4.42394- f R m ] + 0.21036- - 0.00463-
^tnomy ^nom; V WmJ f R A Rm m
Cm:= 7.79661 + 5.16676- - 0.24577- R m l + 0.00541-
^nom. ^'nomy V ^om j 1.5 2.5 3.5 Fm:=1 + V- +V- +Cm"- =5-422
( Rm ^
Ak := -3.26543 + 1.52784- - 0.072698- + 0.0016011-y ^-nom j V nom V. ^-nom j f R > f Rm \ Rm m
Bu := 11.36322 - 3.91412 + 0.18619- - 0.004099-tnom v y ^nomy ^ nom y f D \ f Rvm y O
CK := -3.18609 + 3.84763- - 0.18304- + 0.00403-V 'nomJ nom ^ tnomJ 1.5 2.5 3.5 Fu := 1 + Au- - + Bu- - + Cu- - = 3.572 RIm- ^Fm' Fm' °m\J 77' cEmer RIb "= (^Fb'crb.Emer + ae)'Fb'-/^^Emer Kir;=0 Residual stresses are assumed neglegible KI.FaultKIm + KIb + KIr = 34-908 ksi-yfin K1C = 3 5 ksi-yfin Len<<hAllow.Circ := m'n(cNonnal,cUpset>>cEmer)= 13.54 Most limiting for all operating conditions. Controlled by Upset Condition.
ES-0110 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 1 OF 2 REVISION 3 VERIFICATION RECORD: CALCULATION Calculation # Revision ^
The following questions, as a minimum should be answered for calculation verification.
Yes N/A 0f 0 Have inputs, including codes, standards, regulations, requirements, procedures, data and engineering methodology been correctly selected and applied?
0" 0 Has the calculation been developed in accordance with applicable station procedures (e.g., ES-0412).
0f 0 Is the plant design basis/criteria maintained?
- 0/ Have assumptions been identified, especially those requiring later confirmation?
0^ 0 Have references been properly identified and complete?
izf
- Have the calculation, results, tables and figures been reviewed with regard to numerical accuracy, units and consistency?
0/ 0 Has the calculation been developed/revised in a clear and understandable manner as to not require recourse to the originator?
0/ 0 Is the output reasonable compared to the input?
0" 0 Do the diagrams or models depicted represent the physical situation correctly and incorporate necessary features for a correct analysis?
0/ 0 Has the calculation cover page been completed in an accurate manner?
[vf 0 Are the sign conventions used in figures and equations consistent?
0^ 0 Is consistent nomenclature used throughout the calculation (e.g., figures, tables)?
Are symbols used on figures and in the text defined?
0^ 0 Are concurrent in-process revisions been addressed and coordinated with this revision?
Ef 0 Has the Calculation Index been updated?
0 Additional considerations (see attached TWR)?
ES-0110 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 2 OF 2 REVISION 3 VERIFICATION RECORD: CALCULATION Calculation# , Revision CALCULATIONS UTILIZING COMPUTER PROGRAMS:
Yes N/A b'
- Has the program been appropriately defined, including the version?
b'
- Is the basic methodology used by the program appropriate for the calculation?
- Has the appropriate computer program been used?
- Has the calculation been performed within the known limits of the program?
ET"
- Has the computer program been verified and validated in accordance with VCS-SAP-1040?
of
- Has the program been defined, controlled, and benchmarked so that the results reported are traceable to a particular version of the program and a particular set of input data?
Have limits for the program been defined, as appropriate?
- Comments have been included and resolved.
Of' CD Is the Validation Data set for the application complete, and provide repeatable results?
Document Control Desk CR-18-03736 RC-18-0118 Page 1 of 3 VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION (VCSNS) UNIT 1 ENCLOSURE 3 Service Water System Drawings
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<TYl 14 ELt 4"433P/Pg r-<b" SECTION A-A SECTION DANIEL BILL OF MATERIAL 5W -152 SW- 152 I 8' 00° ELL La" 4-5° ELL 8" Rf. S.a I5<
8"R.F.S.O. IEo"rLG. NOTE' DETAIL. C_
>> DIA. 4'L6 STUD BOLTS DENOTES SWF SUOPWtLO HQ, SERVICE WATER- YAW Isu-sw-oi I J8>I4) 3A" HEX NUTS 1SU-SW-Q3l TOO) 150* GASKET ASHE SECT, 01, 1971 H/SUMMEX 1973 AbbEMCA m end,
- CAR&OM HUCLEAR CL. 3