ML18142A057

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Proposed Tech Spec Table 4.1-2A Re Min Frequency for Equipment Tests,Deleting Requirement to Test Rod Drop Times at Cold Conditions After Refueling or Maint Requiring a Breach of RCS
ML18142A057
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 09/19/1984
From:
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18142A056 List:
References
NUDOCS 8409250323
Download: ML18142A057 (4)


Text

TABLE 4.l-2A MINIMUM FREQUENCY FOR EQUlPMENT TESTS r

FSAR SECTION DESCRIPTION TEST FREQUENCY REFERENCE

1. Control Rod Assemblies Rod drop times of all Each refueling shutdown or after full length rods at disassembly or maintenance hot conditions requiring the breach of the Reactor Coolant System integrity
2. Control Room Assemblies Partial movement of all rods Every 2 weeks 7*

e

3. Refueling Water Chemical Functional Each refueling shutdown 6 Addition Tank
4. Pressurizer Safety Valves Setpoint Each refueling shutdown 4
5. Main Steam Safety Valves Setpoint Each refueling shutdown 10
6. Containment Isolation Trip i,Functional Each refueling shutdown 5
7. Refueling System Interlocks i,Functional Prior to refueling 9.12
8. Service Water System "'*Functional Each refueling shutdown 9.9
9. Fire Protection Pump and Functional Monthly 9 .10 Power Supply
10. Primary System Leakage *Evaluate Daily 4
11. Diesel Fuel Supply *Fuel Inventory 5 days/week 8.5
12. Boric Acid Piping Heat *Operational Monthly 9.1 t-'l Tracing Circuits Cl)

~

13. Main Steam Line Trip Functional 10 I-'

I (1) Full closure (1) Each cold shutdown \0 O"'

(2) Partial closure (2) Before each startup

ATTACHMENT 2 e-

  • SAFETY EVALUATION e

The current requirement for verifying the rod drop time to be no more

. than 1.8 seconds to dashpot entry for cold conditions, after a refueling shutdown or after maintenance requiring the breach of the Reactor Coolant System integrity (Technical Specifications Table 4.1-2A), is not necessary. The assumption of a specific rod drop time at cold conditions is not incorporated into any safety analysis.

A comprehensive review of the UFSAR Chapter 14 accident analyses indicates that no transients are assumed to be mitigated by negative reactivity insertion, using control rods, unless the reactor core is at the hot, critical condition. To ensure the availability of the negative reactivity, control rod drop time verification is necessary only before the core attains criticality following reactor heatup. This requirement will be fulfilled by maintaining the Technical Specifications provision for control rod timing tests at hot shutdown. Therefore, the cold rod drop timing tests will be eliminated without compromising plant safety or any safety analysis.

This change does not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant. This change does not:

a. - Increase the probablity of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. The assumption of a specific rod drop time at cold conditions is not incorporated into any safety evaluation.

b.

Create a possibility 'for an accident or malfunction of a different J

type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report.

The verification of conservative rod drop times at hot conditions prior to criticality following a refueling shutdown or after maintenance requiring the breach of the Reactor Coolant System integrity shall continue to be required by the Technical Specifications.

c. Reduce the margin to safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The assumption of a specific rod drop time at cold conditions is not incorporated into any basis for a Technical Specification.

Therefore, we conclude that this proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration or an unreviewed safety question.