ML18033B310

Responds to NRC 900417 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-05,50-260/90-05 & 50-296/90-05.Corrective Action: Senior Reactor Operator Assigned to Fire Protection Staff for day-to-day Supervision of Fire Protection Program

ML18033B310
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	05/18/1990
From:	Medford M TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9005240023
Download: ML18033B310 (13)

Text

..ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTPWTION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRXBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

SSION NBR:9005240023 DOC.DATE: 90/05/18 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET ir FACIL:50-259 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Tennessee 05000259 50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee 05000260 50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, Tennessee 05000296 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MEDFORD,M.O. Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Responds 50 259/90 to NRC 900417 05i50 260/90 ltr 05 6 re violations 50 296/90 05 noted in Insp Repts D CODE: D030D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL

'ISTRIBUTION SXZE:

TITLE: TVA Facilities Routine Correspondence

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D NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

TAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 16 ENCL 14

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 6N 38A Lookout Place IiiAY 18 ISO U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Hashington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-259 Tennessee Valley Authority 50-260 50-296 BRONNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOs. 50-259/90-05, 50-260/90-05, AND 50-296/90-05 RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS This letter provides TVA's response to the letter from B. A. Nilson to

0. D. Kingsley, Jr., dated April 17, 1990, which transmitted the subject report. The report cited TVA with two violations. The first violation involved failure to follow procedures during the performance of 480V/240V AC electrical system operating instructions. The second violation concerned a failure to maintain operable fire hose stations. TVA.',s- response. to these two.

violations is provided in the enclosure. arear'owever, TVA recognizes that several violations and licensee reportable events have occurred during the past two years in the fire protection TVA considers that management control is now in place to ensure proper implementation of the fire protection program. Additionally, BFN's Operations staff has been counseled to be more knowledgeable of the fire protection compensatory measures that are in place at all times.

Please refer any questions concerning this submittal to Patrick P. Carier, BFN, Site Licensing, (205) 729-3570.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Mark 0. Medford, Vice Pres i dent Nuclear Technology and Licensing Enclosure cc: See page 2 9005240023 900 ia PDR ADOCK 050002<+

9 An Equal Opportunity Employer ago

(( I

H U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MAY 18 $ 90 cc (Enclosure):

Ms. S. C. Black, Assistant Director for Projects TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35609-2000 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Assistant. Director for Inspection Programs TVA Projects Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

ENCLOSURE RESPONSE BRONNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)

NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-259/90-05, 50-260/90-05, AND 50-296/90-05 Letter From B. A. Nilson to O. D. Kingsley, Jr.

Dated April 17, 1990 During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on February 16 March 16, 1990, two violations of NRC requirements were identified. Violation A involved failure to follow procedures, and Violation B concerned failure to establish compensatory fire protection measures.

Violation A Technical Specification (TS) Section 6.8.1.'la requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33 includes operating procedures for onsite AC power sources and the reactor protection system as recommended procedures.

Site Directors Standard Practice 2.1, Site Procedures and Instructions, requires that the site be operated and maintained in accordance with written, approved procedures and instructions which have been formally issued and distributed for use.

Contrary to the above, on March 1, 1990 during the performance of Procedure O-OI-578, 480V/240V AC Electrical System Operating Instructions, procedures were not properly implemented in that the operator failed to check the normal feeder breaker AC vol.ts greater than 450 volts as required by 0-OI-57B step 8.6.3 prior to transferring 480 volt power sources.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement 1) applicable to all three units.

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l. Admission or Denial of the Alle ed Violation TVA admits the violation.

2. Reasons for the Violation The root cause of this violation was personnel error. The Assistant Shift Operations Supervisor (ASOS) failed to adequately follow procedures before transferring 480 volt shutdown board 3A from its alternate electrical source to its normal electrical source, During his review of the operating

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Page 2 of 4 instruction on the 480V/240V AC electrical system, the ASOS overlooked the step which instructs the user to check that the normal feeder breaker AC voltage is greater than 450 volts before transferring the board.

Additionally, the voltage indicators on the 480 volt shutdown board 3A indicate when the normal electrical supply is available. This indication should have been examined by the ASOS before attempting the power transfer.

Contributing to this violation, the operations personnel on February 28, 1990 did not follow the procedure in verifying that the 4KV shutdown board 3EA had been restored to the configuration as required in the 4KV electrical system operating instructions following preventive maintenance on the 3A diesel generator and the 4160 volt and 480 volt circuit breaker. As a result, the feeder breaker on the 4KV shutdown board 3EA which provides normal electrical power to the 480 volt shutdown board 3A was left open.

Corrective Ste s Which have been Taken and Results Achieved The immediate corrective action was to close the 4KV feeder breaker to the 480 volt shutdown board 3A, and reenergize the shutdown board (the board was reenergized on March 1, 1990 at 0016 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />). Additionally, operations instruction on 480V/240V AC electrical system has been revised to make more noticeable (with a caution and by underlining) the step which instructs the user to verify that the AC voltage across the emergency (normal) feeder breaker is greater than 450 volts.

The ASOS involved in the incident received appropriate disciplinary action and was individually counseled concerning use of plant procedures and attention to detail. Additionally, a human performance evaluation report has been completed, which reinforced the original conclusion of personnel error as the root cause for this violation.

Operations personnel have reviewed a description of this event, and those operations personnel involved in restoring the 4KV shutdown board configuration have been counseled concerning compliance to plant manager' instruction on system status control.

Corrective Ste s Which will be Taken to Avoid Further Violation No further corrective steps are required.

Date When Full Com liance will be Achieved Full compliance has been achieved.

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Page 3 of 4 Violation 8 TS 3.11.E requires that the fire hose stations shown in Table 3.ll.c shall be operable whenever equipment in the areas protected by the fire hose stations is required to be operable. Nhen a fire hose station is inoperable, a gated wye shall be connected to the nearest operable hose station. One outlet of the wye shall be connected to a length of hose sufficient to provide coverage for the area left unprotected by the inoperable hose station.

Contrary to the above, this requirement was not met for the following two examples:

l. On March 1, 1990, a NRC inspector identified that inoperable hose stations for both Units 1 and 2, on reactor building elevations 639, 621, 593, and 565, were protected by a single gated wye connection connected to a single 50 foot roll of hose from operable hose stations at each station in Unit

3. The length of connected hose was insufficient to provide coverage for Units 1 and 2. The combined length of the reactor buildings is 425 feet.

2. After reviewing the inspector's concerns in example one, the licensee determined that the hold order (0-90-60) which was issued to isolate the Unit 1 and 2 fire protection systems for a system outage had been expanded t

on March 1, 1990, to include Unit 3. This resulted in the removal from service of all hose stations within all three reactor buildings. This condition remained until the Unit 3 hose stations were returned to service on March 5, 1990.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement 1) applicable to all three units.

TVA's Res onse

1. Admission or Denial of the Violation TVA admits this violation.

2. Reason for the Violation The root cause of this violation was personnel error. The SOS did not perform a sufficiently in-depth review of TSs and other existing fire protection impairments to determine if the compensatory measures met TS 3.11.E.

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3. Corrective Ste s Which Have Been Taken and Results Achieved As a result of the problem identified by this violation, corrective maintenance was performed to the sectionalizing valves that would allow restoration of the Unit 3 turbine building fire protection. Compensatory measures were then established utilizing the Unit 3 fire protection hose stations.

The plant manager discussed this event with Operations, Work Control, Technical Support, and Maintenance Management personnel. The plant operations manager and operations superintendent met with SOS, ASOS, and cognizant fire protection personnel and discussed with them the need for TS compliance.

The personnel involved in the event received appropriate disciplinary action and were counseled on meeting the letter of TS as well as the intent. Operations and Fire Protection personnel were required to review the Final Event Report for lessons learned from the error that led to this violation.

A senior reactor operator has been assigned to the fire protection staff for day-to-day supervision, direction, implementation of the fire protection program, and coordination with the shift SOS. The shift SOS has assumed direct supervision of the shift fire brigade and is now involved in the fire system impairment permit process. In so doing, the SOS has the responsibility of ensuring all TS requirements are met prior to implementation of perm)ts.

4. Corrective Ste s Which Will be Taken to Avoid Further Violations No further corrective steps are required.

5. Date When Full Com liance will be Achieved Full Compliance has been achieved.

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