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MONTHYEARJAFP-17-0077, Mitigating Strategies Assessment (MSA) for the Reevaluated Flooding Hazards Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Regarding Recommendation 2.1: Flooding of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima..2017-07-27027 July 2017 Mitigating Strategies Assessment (MSA) for the Reevaluated Flooding Hazards Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Regarding Recommendation 2.1: Flooding of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima.. Project stage: Request ML17355A1102017-12-12012 December 2017 Submittal of Revised Mitigating Strategies Assessment Report for Flooding Project stage: Request ML17321B0402017-12-18018 December 2017 Flood Hazard Mitigation Strategies Assessment(Cac Nos. MF7919 and MF7920; EPID L-2016-JLD-0007) Project stage: Other ML18019A2692018-02-12012 February 2018 Flood Hazard Mitigation Strategies Assessment Project stage: Other ML17234A4322018-02-12012 February 2018 Flood Hazard Mitigation Strategies Assessment Project stage: Other ML18071A1692018-03-22022 March 2018 Flood Hazard Mitigation Strategies Assessment Project stage: Acceptance Review L-18-096, ISFSI, Davis-Besse, Unit 1, ISFSI, Perry, Unit 1, ISFSI - Notification of Petition for Bankruptcy2018-04-0202 April 2018 ISFSI, Davis-Besse, Unit 1, ISFSI, Perry, Unit 1, ISFSI - Notification of Petition for Bankruptcy Project stage: Request L-18-109, Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations for Beaver Valley Power Station. Unit Nos. 1 and 2. Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Unit No. 1. and Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Unit No. 12018-04-25025 April 2018 Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations for Beaver Valley Power Station. Unit Nos. 1 and 2. Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Unit No. 1. and Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Unit No. 1 Project stage: Request ML18108A6942018-05-0303 May 2018 Flood Hazard Mitigation Strategies Assessment Project stage: Other ML17249A7302018-05-0909 May 2018 Flood Hazard Mitigation Strategies Assessment Project stage: Other ML18045A0522018-06-27027 June 2018 Flood Hazard Mitigating Strategies Assessment (Public) Project stage: Other ML18275A2962018-09-26026 September 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Brunswick Flooding MSA Review Project stage: Request ML18284A3972018-10-30030 October 2018 Flood Hazard Mitigation Strategies Assessment Project stage: Other L-18-252, Request for Deferral of Actions Related to Beyond-Design-Basis External Events Flooding Actions2018-12-0707 December 2018 Request for Deferral of Actions Related to Beyond-Design-Basis External Events Flooding Actions Project stage: Request L-19-193, Resumption of Actions Related to Beyond-Design-Basis External Events Flooding Actions2019-08-30030 August 2019 Resumption of Actions Related to Beyond-Design-Basis External Events Flooding Actions Project stage: Other 2018-03-22
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000333/20230042024-02-0707 February 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000333/2023004 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection Report 07200012/2023001 ML24037A0102024-02-0606 February 2024 Requalification Program Inspection ML24018A0012024-01-18018 January 2024 Notification of Commercial Grade Dedication Inspection (05000333/2024010) and Request for Information ML24004A2302024-01-0808 January 2024 Project Manager Reassignment ML23356A0832024-01-0404 January 2024 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0058 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting)) ML23278A1292023-12-14014 December 2023 Units 1 & 2; Limerick, Units 1 & 2; Nine Mile Point, Units 1 & 2; and Peach Bottom, Units 2 & 3 -Revision to Approved Alternatives to Use Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project Guidelines JAFP-23-0065, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-529, Clarify Use and Application Rules, Revision 4, and Administrative Changes to the Technical Specifications2023-12-14014 December 2023 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-529, Clarify Use and Application Rules, Revision 4, and Administrative Changes to the Technical Specifications IR 05000333/20234012023-12-0808 December 2023 Cybersecurity Inspection Report 05000333/2023401 (Cover Letter Only) RS-23-126, Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 2.109(b)2023-12-0707 December 2023 Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 2.109(b) JAFP-23-0069, Supplemental Response to Part 73 Exemption Request Withdrawal of Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 73, Subpart B, Preemption Authority Requirements2023-12-0707 December 2023 Supplemental Response to Part 73 Exemption Request Withdrawal of Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 73, Subpart B, Preemption Authority Requirements JAFP-23-0057, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2023-11-22022 November 2023 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation JAFP-23-0064, Emergency Plan Document Revision2023-11-15015 November 2023 Emergency Plan Document Revision JAFP-23-0063, Registration of Spent Fuel Cask Use2023-11-13013 November 2023 Registration of Spent Fuel Cask Use IR 05000333/20230032023-11-13013 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000333/2023003 ML23317A1192023-11-10010 November 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - 2023 Annual Report - Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums IR 05000333/20230102023-10-26026 October 2023 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000333/2023010 JAFP-23-0059, Registration of Spent Fuel Cask Use2023-10-24024 October 2023 Registration of Spent Fuel Cask Use IR 05000333/20233012023-10-19019 October 2023 Initial Operator Licensing Examination Report 05000333/2023301 RS-23-097, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans2023-10-12012 October 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans JAFP-23-0050, Physical Security Plan, Revision 242023-08-31031 August 2023 Physical Security Plan, Revision 24 JAFP-23-0048, Supplemental Information for License Amendment Request to Update the Technical Specification Bases to Change the Fuel Handling Accident Analysis2023-08-31031 August 2023 Supplemental Information for License Amendment Request to Update the Technical Specification Bases to Change the Fuel Handling Accident Analysis IR 05000333/20230052023-08-31031 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (Report 05000333/2023005) JAFP-23-0047, Correction to the 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2023-08-30030 August 2023 Correction to the 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report ML23228A1342023-08-16016 August 2023 Licensed Operator Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test IR 05000333/20230022023-08-0707 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000333/2023002 RS-23-087, Revision to Approved Alternatives Associated with the Use of the BWRVIP Guidelines in Lieu of Specific ASME Code Requirements on Reactor2023-08-0404 August 2023 Revision to Approved Alternatives Associated with the Use of the BWRVIP Guidelines in Lieu of Specific ASME Code Requirements on Reactor JAFP-23-0040, License Amendment Request to Update the Technical Specification Bases to Change the Fuel Handling Accident Analysis2023-08-0303 August 2023 License Amendment Request to Update the Technical Specification Bases to Change the Fuel Handling Accident Analysis JAFP-23-0043, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report2023-07-31031 July 2023 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report JAFP-23-0038, License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1 Safety Relief Valves (S/Rvs) Setpoint Lower Tolerance2023-07-28028 July 2023 License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1 Safety Relief Valves (S/Rvs) Setpoint Lower Tolerance ML23208A1622023-07-27027 July 2023 Operator Licensing Examination Approval IR 05000333/20234022023-07-26026 July 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000333/2023402 IR 05000333/20230112023-07-25025 July 2023 Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal - Phase 4 Inspection Report 05000333/2023011 IR 05000333/20235012023-07-20020 July 2023 Emergency Preparedness Biennial Exercise Inspection Report 05000333/2023501 JAFP-23-0033, License Amendment Request - Technical Specifications (TS) Section 3.3.1.2, Source Range Monitors (SRM) Instrumentation2023-06-28028 June 2023 License Amendment Request - Technical Specifications (TS) Section 3.3.1.2, Source Range Monitors (SRM) Instrumentation IR 05000333/20234202023-06-26026 June 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000333 2023420 RS-23-077, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2023-06-16016 June 2023 Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML23164A0322023-06-13013 June 2023 Request for Information for a Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection; Inspection Report 05000333/2023010 ML23152A0042023-06-0101 June 2023 Information Request for the Cyber Security Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection 05000333/2023401 RS-23-042, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-580, Provide Exception from Entering Mode 4 with No Operable RHR Shutdown Cooling2023-05-25025 May 2023 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-580, Provide Exception from Entering Mode 4 with No Operable RHR Shutdown Cooling JAFP-23-0025, 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2023-05-10010 May 2023 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report IR 05000333/20230012023-05-0303 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000333/2023001 ML23117A2172023-05-0101 May 2023 Safety Evaluation for Quality Assurance Program Manual Reduction in Commitment ML23114A2522023-04-28028 April 2023 Request to Use a Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI JAFP-23-0023, 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2023-04-27027 April 2023 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report IR 05000333/20230122023-04-13013 April 2023 Quadrennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000333/2023012 ML23095A3722023-04-0505 April 2023 2023 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specification Bases and Technical Requirements Manual Changes Transmittal RS-23-049, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations2023-03-23023 March 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations IR 05000333/20220042023-03-20020 March 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000333/2022004 JAFP-23-0010, 2022 REIRS Transmittal of NRC Form 52023-03-20020 March 2023 2022 REIRS Transmittal of NRC Form 5 ML23061A1632023-03-0303 March 2023 Reassignment of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch 3 2024-02-07
[Table view] Category:Report
MONTHYEARRS-21-001, Revised Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-880 for Carbon Steel Piping2021-01-0404 January 2021 Revised Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-880 for Carbon Steel Piping ML20303A1752020-10-23023 October 2020 Proposed Relief Request from Section XI Repair/Replacement Documentation for Bolting Replacement of Pressure Retaining Bolting ML19301A5052019-08-13013 August 2019 JAF-CALC-NBI-00205 Setpoint Calculation for Vessel Lo-Lo Lvl Primary Containment Isolation Function (02-3LT-57A,B and 02-3STU-258A,B) ML18019A2692018-02-12012 February 2018 Flood Hazard Mitigation Strategies Assessment JAFP-17-0085, High Frequency Confirmation Report for March 12, 2012, Information Request Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1, Seismic2017-08-30030 August 2017 High Frequency Confirmation Report for March 12, 2012, Information Request Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1, Seismic JAFP-17-0084, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051)2017-08-29029 August 2017 Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051) JAFP-17-0078, Focused Evaluation Summary Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Regarding Recommendation 2.1: Flooding of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2017-07-27027 July 2017 Focused Evaluation Summary Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Regarding Recommendation 2.1: Flooding of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident JAFP-17-0054, James a FitzPatrick - Submittal of Stress Analysis Summary for the 24-10-130 Weld Overlay2017-05-25025 May 2017 James a FitzPatrick - Submittal of Stress Analysis Summary for the 24-10-130 Weld Overlay ML17110A2742017-04-20020 April 2017 Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI Division 1 ML16043A4112016-02-18018 February 2016 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 Section 50.54(f) Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review JAFP-15-0129, Submittal of 10 CFR 71.95 Report Involving 8-120B Cask2015-11-0606 November 2015 Submittal of 10 CFR 71.95 Report Involving 8-120B Cask JAFP-15-0036, J.A. Fitzpatrick Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report - Response to NRC Request for Information Per 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fuskushima Dai-2015-03-12012 March 2015 J.A. Fitzpatrick Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report - Response to NRC Request for Information Per 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fuskushima Dai-ichi ML15007A0902015-02-12012 February 2015 Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-13-109 (Severe Accident Capable Hardened Vents) ML15007A1502015-01-0707 January 2015 Seismic Walkdown Report Update - Entergy'S Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Re the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident. JAFP-15-0007, Seismic Walkdown Report Update - Entergy'S Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Re the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accid2015-01-0707 January 2015 Seismic Walkdown Report Update - Entergy'S Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Re the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident. JAFP-14-0143, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from The.2014-12-30030 December 2014 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from The. JAFP-14-0094, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report - Changes and Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models2014-08-0101 August 2014 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report - Changes and Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models ML14176A9612014-06-24024 June 2014 Submittal of Non-Proprietary BWROG Technical Product, BWROGTP-11-006 - ECCS Containment Walkdown Procedure, Rev 1 (January 2011), as Formally Requested During the Public Meeting Held on April 30, 2014 ML14073A1552014-04-0101 April 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML14007A6812014-02-21021 February 2014 Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049 (Mitigation Strategies) ML14043A4282014-02-15015 February 2014 Mega-Tech Services, LLC, Technical Evaluation Report Regarding the Overall Integrated Plan for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, TAC Nos.: MF1077 ML13273A6912013-08-20020 August 2013 Redacted - Letter from R. Dale Roberts 10 CFR 71.95 Report on the 8-120B Cask ML13247A0362013-08-20020 August 2013 Letter from R. Dale Roberts 10 CFR 71.95 Report on the 8-120B Cask JAFP-13-0096, James a FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report - Changes and Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models2013-08-0101 August 2013 James a FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report - Changes and Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models JAFP-12-0134, FitzPatrick - Seismic Walkdown Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Per 10 CFR 50.54 (F) Re the Seismic Aspect of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2012-11-27027 November 2012 FitzPatrick - Seismic Walkdown Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Per 10 CFR 50.54 (F) Re the Seismic Aspect of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML12342A1402012-11-27027 November 2012 Seismic Walkdown Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Per 10 CFR 50.54 (F) Re the Seismic Aspect of Recommendation 2.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident JAFP-12-0135, Flooding Walkdown Report - Entergys Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2012-11-27027 November 2012 Flooding Walkdown Report - Entergys Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident JAFP-12-0134, Engineering Report, JAF-RPT-12-00015, Rev. 0, Jaf Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic, Book 1 of 32012-11-21021 November 2012 Engineering Report, JAF-RPT-12-00015, Rev. 0, Jaf Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic, Book 1 of 3 JAFP-12-0134, Engineering Report JAF-RPT-12-00015, Rev. 0, Jaf Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic, Book 1 of 3, Attachment C, Pages 74 Through 5732012-11-21021 November 2012 Engineering Report JAF-RPT-12-00015, Rev. 0, Jaf Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic, Book 1 of 3, Attachment C, Pages 74 Through 573 ML12342A1392012-11-21021 November 2012 Engineering Report JAF-RPT-12-00015, Rev. 0, Jaf Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic, Book 1 of 3, Attachment C, Pages 74 Through 573 JAFP-12-0134, Engineering Report JAF-RPT-12-00015, Rev. 0, Jaf Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic, Book 2 of 3, Attachment C, Pages 283 Through 5732012-11-21021 November 2012 Engineering Report JAF-RPT-12-00015, Rev. 0, Jaf Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic, Book 2 of 3, Attachment C, Pages 283 Through 573 ML12342A1422012-11-21021 November 2012 Engineering Report JAF-RPT-12-00015, Rev. 0, Jaf Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic, Book 2 of 3, Attachment C, Pages 551 Through 573 ML12342A1382012-11-21021 November 2012 Engineering Report, JAF-RPT-12-00015, Rev. 0, Jaf Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Seismic, Book 1 of 3 ML13163A2662012-05-18018 May 2012 from Bhalchandra Vaidya to Samson Lee: G20120172, 2.206 Petition ML13162A6272012-02-20020 February 2012 Summary of R1 Containment Vents ML1127000692011-09-26026 September 2011 Enclosure 2, Mfn 10-245 R4, Description of the Evaluation and Surveillance Recommendations for BWR/2-5 Plants ML1125101872011-09-0808 September 2011 NRC Investigation Report Nos. 1-2009-041, 1-2010-019, and 1-2010-031 ML1024601002010-09-0202 September 2010 Enclosure 2, RA-ENO-EP1-10-135, Response to NRC Supplemental RAIs 1, 4, 5, and 6 for James a FitzPatrick Cycle 20 SLMCPR Submittal ML1012704392010-05-0505 May 2010 Y020100187 - List of Historical Leaks and Spills at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants JAFP-09-0091, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report - Changes and Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Evaluation Models2009-07-31031 July 2009 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report - Changes and Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Evaluation Models JAFP-09-0056, Summary of Plant and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Changes, Tests, and Experiments for 2007 and 2008 as Required by 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.482009-05-11011 May 2009 Summary of Plant and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Changes, Tests, and Experiments for 2007 and 2008 as Required by 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 JAFP-08-0131, Enclosure 2, Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. Calculation 0800769.311 Crack Growth Analysis for Recirculation Inlet Nozzle N-2C2008-12-0404 December 2008 Enclosure 2, Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. Calculation 0800769.311 Crack Growth Analysis for Recirculation Inlet Nozzle N-2C ML0835903392008-12-0404 December 2008 Enclosure 2, Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. Calculation 0800769.311 Crack Growth Analysis for Recirculation Inlet Nozzle N-2C JAFP-08-0131, Enclosure 3, Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. Calculation 0800769.316 Reconciliation of Recirculation Inlet N2 Nozzle-to-Safe End Weld Overlay Repair with Nozzle Stress Report2008-12-0303 December 2008 Enclosure 3, Structural Integrity Associates, Inc. Calculation 0800769.316 Reconciliation of Recirculation Inlet N2 Nozzle-to-Safe End Weld Overlay Repair with Nozzle Stress Report ML0831006632008-11-19019 November 2008 Request for Additional Information Third 10-Year Interval Inservice Inspection Program Plan Relief Request RR-CRV-01 JAFP-08-0103, Certificate of Compliance Not Met During Receipt of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Shipment at Barnwell, Sc Disposal Facility2008-10-0202 October 2008 Certificate of Compliance Not Met During Receipt of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Shipment at Barnwell, Sc Disposal Facility ML0810102772008-09-0808 September 2008 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 / Appendix C - Additional Conditions ML0821900132008-08-0707 August 2008 Monthly Operating Reports Second Quarter 2008 JAFP-08-0067, BWR Vessels and Internals Project, Lntegrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Data for FitzPatrick (Excerpted from BWRVIP-135, Revision 1)2008-07-31031 July 2008 BWR Vessels and Internals Project, Lntegrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Data for FitzPatrick (Excerpted from BWRVIP-135, Revision 1) ML0821004582008-07-31031 July 2008 BWR Vessels and Internals Project, Lntegrated Surveillance Program (ISP) Data for FitzPatrick (Excerpted from BWRVIP-135, Revision 1) 2021-01-04
[Table view] Category:Miscellaneous
MONTHYEARML20303A1752020-10-23023 October 2020 Proposed Relief Request from Section XI Repair/Replacement Documentation for Bolting Replacement of Pressure Retaining Bolting ML18019A2692018-02-12012 February 2018 Flood Hazard Mitigation Strategies Assessment JAFP-17-0084, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051)2017-08-29029 August 2017 Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Order Number EA-12-051) ML17110A2742017-04-20020 April 2017 Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Case N-513-4, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI Division 1 ML16043A4112016-02-18018 February 2016 Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50 Section 50.54(f) Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review JAFP-15-0129, Submittal of 10 CFR 71.95 Report Involving 8-120B Cask2015-11-0606 November 2015 Submittal of 10 CFR 71.95 Report Involving 8-120B Cask ML15007A0902015-02-12012 February 2015 Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-13-109 (Severe Accident Capable Hardened Vents) JAFP-14-0143, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from The.2014-12-30030 December 2014 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from The. JAFP-14-0094, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report - Changes and Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models2014-08-0101 August 2014 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report - Changes and Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models ML14073A1552014-04-0101 April 2014 Staff Assessment of the Seismic Walkdown Report Supporting Implementation of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 Related to the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident ML13247A0362013-08-20020 August 2013 Letter from R. Dale Roberts 10 CFR 71.95 Report on the 8-120B Cask ML13273A6912013-08-20020 August 2013 Redacted - Letter from R. Dale Roberts 10 CFR 71.95 Report on the 8-120B Cask JAFP-13-0096, James a FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report - Changes and Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models2013-08-0101 August 2013 James a FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report - Changes and Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models JAFP-12-0135, Flooding Walkdown Report - Entergys Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2012-11-27027 November 2012 Flooding Walkdown Report - Entergys Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Flooding Aspects of Recommendation 2.3 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML13162A6272012-02-20020 February 2012 Summary of R1 Containment Vents ML1127000692011-09-26026 September 2011 Enclosure 2, Mfn 10-245 R4, Description of the Evaluation and Surveillance Recommendations for BWR/2-5 Plants ML1125101872011-09-0808 September 2011 NRC Investigation Report Nos. 1-2009-041, 1-2010-019, and 1-2010-031 ML1012704392010-05-0505 May 2010 Y020100187 - List of Historical Leaks and Spills at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants JAFP-09-0091, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report - Changes and Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Evaluation Models2009-07-31031 July 2009 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report - Changes and Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Evaluation Models JAFP-09-0056, Summary of Plant and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Changes, Tests, and Experiments for 2007 and 2008 as Required by 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.482009-05-11011 May 2009 Summary of Plant and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Changes, Tests, and Experiments for 2007 and 2008 as Required by 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 ML0831006632008-11-19019 November 2008 Request for Additional Information Third 10-Year Interval Inservice Inspection Program Plan Relief Request RR-CRV-01 JAFP-08-0103, Certificate of Compliance Not Met During Receipt of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Shipment at Barnwell, Sc Disposal Facility2008-10-0202 October 2008 Certificate of Compliance Not Met During Receipt of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Shipment at Barnwell, Sc Disposal Facility ML0810102772008-09-0808 September 2008 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 / Appendix C - Additional Conditions ML0805905802008-02-15015 February 2008 List of Requesters Fitzpatrick ML0805905792008-02-14014 February 2008 Foia/Pa Cases Received from 02/12/07 to 02/12/08 ML0711601862007-05-21021 May 2007 Biological Assessment for Species Under the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service - James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal Review ML0710004922007-03-26026 March 2007 Usfws Threatened and Endangered Species System (Tess) - New York ENOC-07-00002, Units 1, 2 & 3; Pilgrim and Vermont - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July 2006 - December 20062007-02-28028 February 2007 Units 1, 2 & 3; Pilgrim and Vermont - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July 2006 - December 2006 JAFP-07-0013, License Renewal Application, Amendment 4, Response to Request for Additional Information2007-01-29029 January 2007 License Renewal Application, Amendment 4, Response to Request for Additional Information ML0704704712007-01-0101 January 2007 Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway - Ballast Water ML0704704322007-01-0101 January 2007 Oswego Industrial Directory JAFP-06-0179, JAFNPP - Site Audit Requests - (24) November and December 2006 Monthly Discharge Monitoring Reports2006-12-21021 December 2006 JAFNPP - Site Audit Requests - (24) November and December 2006 Monthly Discharge Monitoring Reports ENOC-06-00018, Stations - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period January 2006 - June 20062006-08-29029 August 2006 Stations - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period January 2006 - June 2006 CNRO-2006-00034, Supplement to Request for Use of Delta Protection Mururoa V4F1 R Supplied Air Suits; Arkansas Nuclear One, Indian Point, Grand Gulf, Waterford, FitzPatrick, River Bend, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee2006-07-13013 July 2006 Supplement to Request for Use of Delta Protection Mururoa V4F1 R Supplied Air Suits; Arkansas Nuclear One, Indian Point, Grand Gulf, Waterford, FitzPatrick, River Bend, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee BVY 06-016, Entergy Nuclear Northeast - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July 2005 - December 20052006-02-27027 February 2006 Entergy Nuclear Northeast - Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July 2005 - December 2005 ML0704704112006-01-0101 January 2006 Fws Hydroelectric Licensing BVY 05-089, Entergy Nuclear Northeast - Proof of Financial Protection2005-09-28028 September 2005 Entergy Nuclear Northeast - Proof of Financial Protection ML0636201702005-09-27027 September 2005 JAFNPP Er Ref 8-5 FHA User Guidelines BVY 05-078, Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period January - June 20052005-08-29029 August 2005 Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period January - June 2005 JAFP-05-0126, Annual Report - Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Evaluation Models2005-08-17017 August 2005 Annual Report - Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Evaluation Models BVY 05-018, Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July - December 20042005-02-28028 February 2005 Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July - December 2004 ML0727008492005-01-31031 January 2005 Caldon Experience in Nuclear Feedwater Flow Measurement JAFP-04-0159, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., NRC Generic Letter 2003-01, Control Room Habitability, Initial Summary Actions Report2004-09-27027 September 2004 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., NRC Generic Letter 2003-01, Control Room Habitability, Initial Summary Actions Report ML0703905852004-09-0101 September 2004 International Joint Commission, 12th Biennial Report Great Lakes Water Quality ML0636201442004-01-31031 January 2004 JAFNPP Er Ref 8-16, DOE Eia Annual Energy Outlook 2004 BVY 03-069, Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for Period January - June 20032003-08-18018 August 2003 Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for Period January - June 2003 ML0701602032003-05-30030 May 2003 JAFNPP - SEIS Web Reference - Mills Et Al 2003 JPN-03-004, Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July - December 20022003-02-26026 February 2003 Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period July - December 2002 JPN-02-024, Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period January - June 20022002-08-15015 August 2002 Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Report for the Period January - June 2002 ML0702303602002-08-13013 August 2002 JAFNPP Condition Reports Bird Deaths 2020-10-23
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 12, 2018 Mr. Bryan C. Hanson Senior Vice President Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT:
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT- FLOOD HAZARD MITIGATION STRATEGIES ASSESSMENT (CAC NO. MF7927; EPID L-2016-JLD-0007)
Dear Mr. Hanson:
By letter dated March 12, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
( 10 CFR), Section 50.54(f), (hereafter referred to as the "50.54(f) letter"). The request was issued in connection with implementing lessons learned from the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, as documented in the NRC's Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) report (ADAMS Accession No. ML111861807). to the 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees reevaluate flood hazards for their sites using present-day methods and regulatory guidance used by the NRC staff when reviewing applications for early site permits and combined licenses (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A046). Concurrent with the reevaluation of flood hazards, licensees were required to develop and implement mitigating strategies in accordance with NRC Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A735). In order to proceed with implementation of Order EA-12-049, licensees used the current licensing basis flood hazard or the most recent flood hazard information, which may not be based on present-day methodologies and guidance, in the development of their mitigating strategies.
By letter dated July 27, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17208B062), Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the licensee) submitted the mitigation strategies assessment (MSA) for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick). The MSAs are intended to confirm that licensees have adequately addressed the reevaluated flooding hazard(s) within their mitigating strategies for beyond-design-basis external events. The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC's assessment of the FitzPatrick MSA.
The NRC staff has concluded that the FitzPatrick MSA was performed consistent with the guidance described in Appendix G of Nuclear Energy Institute 12-06, Revision 2, as endorsed by Japan Lessons-Learned Division (JLD) interim staff guidance (ISG) JLD-ISG-2012-01,
B. Hanson Revision 1 and that the licensee has demonstrated that the mitigation strategies, if appropriately implemented, are reasonably protected from reevaluated flood hazards conditions for beyond-design-basis external events. This closes out the NRC's efforts associated with CAC No. MF7927.
If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-1132 or by e-mail at Joseph.Sebrosky@nrc.gov.
o ph M. Sebrosky, S Pro* Manager Beyond-Design-Basis Management Branch Division of Licensing Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
Staff Assessment Related to the Mitigating Strategies for FitzPatrick Docket No: 50-333 cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv
STAFF ASSESSMENT RELATED TO THE MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR JAMES.A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AS A RESULT OF THE REEVALUATED FLOODING HAZARDS REPORT NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1- FLOODING CAC NO. MF7927
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated March 12, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status, under Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 O CFR), Section 50.54(f), (hereafter referred to as the "50.54(f) letter). The request was issued in connection with implementing lessons learned from the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, as documented in the NRC's Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) report (ADAMS Accession No. ML111861807). Enclosure 2 to the 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees reevaluate flood hazards for their sites using present-day methods and regulatory guidance used by the NRC staff when reviewing applications for early site permits and combined licenses (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A046).
Concurrent with the reevaluation of flood hazards, licensees were required to develop and implement mitigating strategies in accordance with NRC Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A735). That order requires holders of operating reactor licenses and construction permits issued under 10 CFR Part 50 to modify the plants to provide additional capabilities and defense-in-depth for responding to beyond-design-basis external events. In order to proceed with implementation of Order EA-12-049, licensees used the current licensing basis flood hazard or the most recent flood hazard information, which may not be based on present-day methodologies and guidance, in the development of their mitigating strategies.
The NRC staff and industry recognized the difficulty in developing and implementing mitigating strategies before completing the reevaluation of flood hazards. The NRC staff described this issue and provided recommendations to the Commission on integrating these related activities in COMSECY-14-0037, "Integration of Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events and the Reevaluaton of Flood Hazards," dated November 21, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14309A256). The Commission issued a staff requirements memorandum (SRM) on March 30, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15089A236), affirming that the Commission expects licensees for operating nuclear power plants to address the reevaluated flood hazards, which are considered beyond-design-basis external events, within their mitigating strategies.
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 12-06, Revision 2, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide" (ADAMS Accession No. ML16005A625), has been endorsed by the NRC as an appropriate methodology for licensees to perform assessments of the mitigating Enclosure
strategies against the reevaluated flood hazards developed in response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) letter. The guidance in NEI 12-06, Revision 2, and Appendix G in particular, supports the proposed Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events rulemaking. The NRC's endorsement of NEI 12-06, including exceptions, clarifications, and additions, is described in NRC Japan Lessons-Learned Division (JLD) interim staff guidance (ISG) JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 1, "Compliance with Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events" (ADAMS Accession No. ML15357A163). Therefore, Appendix G of NEI 12-06, Revision 2, as endorsed, describes acceptable methods for demonstrating that the reevaluated flooding hazard is addressed within the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick) mitigating strategies for beyond-design-basis external events.
2.0 BACKGROUND
By letter dated September 4, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML152388540), the NRC issued an interim staff response {ISR) letter for FitzPatrick. The ISR letter provided the reevaluated flood hazards that exceeded the current design basis (COB) for FitzPatrick and were suitable input for the mitigating strategies assessment (MSA) (i.e., the mitigating strategies flood hazard information (MSFHI) described in NEI guidance document NEI 12-06). For FitzPatrick, the mechanisms listed as not bounded by the COB in the letter {ISR flood levels) are listed below:
- Local intense precipitation (LIP) - the ISR flood level is higher than the COB level;
- Flooding in streams and rivers - the probable maximum flood (PMF) height ISR flood level exceeded the COB;
- Storm surge - the ISR flood level for a combined event coincident with the probable maximum storm surge exceeded the COB.
By letter dated July 27, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML172088062), Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon, the licensee) submitted the MSA for FitzPatrick. The MSA is intended to confirm that licensees have adequately addressed the reevaluated flooding hazards within their mitigating strategies for beyond-design-basis external events.
At FitzPatrick the licensee considered LIP, flooding in streams and rivers, and storm surge mechanisms provided in the ISR letter in the FLEX design-basis. Based on a comparison between ISR letter flood levels and the FLEX design-basis the licensee concluded that no changes to the FLEX strategy were identified.
The ISR letter also stated that NRC staff would evaluate, as applicable, the flood event duration (FED) parameters (including warning time and period of inundation) and flood-related associated effects developed by the licensee during the NRC staff's review of the MSA. This is consistent with the guidance provided in Revision 2 of NEI 12-06. Relevant information regarding the flood event duration parameters and associated effects was submitted in the MSA.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
3.1 Mitigating Strategies under Order EA-12-049 The NRC staff evaluated the FitzPatrick strategies as developed and implemented under Order EA-12-049, as described in the Final Integrated Plan (FIP) submitted by the licensee in a letter dated August 29, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17241A248). The NRC staff's safety evaluation is dated December 18, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17342A006). The safety
evaluation concluded that the licensee has developed guidance and proposed designs that, if implemented appropriately, will adequately address the requirements of Order EA-12-049.
A brief summary of FitzPatrick's FLEX strategies are listed below:
- For Phase 1, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system injects cooling water into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The condensate storage tanks (CSTs) are the initial supply for the RCIC system. Pressure control of the RPV is accomplished using the pneumatically-operated safety relief valves (SRVs). The station batteries and the Class 1E 125 volts direct current distribution system provide power to RCIC components and instrumentation. FLEX load shedding is completed 90 minutes into the event. The load shedding will extend the battery capacity to power the Phase I systems and instrumentation up to 9.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> and allow time for the FLEX diesel generator (DG) to be deployed.
- For Phase 2, core cooling is transitioned from RCIC to one of two plant diesel-driven fire pumps (DDFP) with suction from the ultimate heat sink (UHS) prior to depletion of the CSTs, which occurs by 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> after the initiation of the ELAP [extended loss of alternating current power] event. Installation of temporary pipe adapters and fire hoses, combined with completion of local valve alignments enables either one of the plant DDFPs to inject water into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The primary electrical strategy is to connect the pre-staged 600 Volts alternating current (Vac) FLEX diesel generator {located in the "N" FLEX equipment storage building (FESB)) to the Division I electrical distribution system. The 600 Vac FLEX DG is connected to a safety-related, seismic Category I motor control center (MCC).
The FLEX equipment is stored in two structures primarily to ensure sufficient ("N") FLEX equipment availability following a tornado events by providing separation. The licensee refers to the two structures as the "N" FLEX Equipment Storage Buildings (FESB) and the "N+ 1" FESB. The "N" FESB is located within the protected area close to the deployment locations of the equipment and the "N+ 1" FESB is located outside the protected area. The "N+ 1" FESB is located across Lake Road from the main FitzPatrick power block buildings, near the site wellness center, on owner-controlled property.
- For Phase 3, equipment from the National SAFER [Strategic Alliance of FLEX Emergency Response] Response Center (NSRC) will be transported to on site to continue Phase 2 strategies.
3.2 Evaluation of Current FLEX Strategies By letter dated July 27, 2017, the licensee submitted its MSA for FitzPatrick. The MSA is intended to confirm that licensees have adequately addressed the reevaluated flooding hazard(s) within their mitigating strategies for beyond-design-basis external events.
Local Intense Precipitation and Flooding in Streams and Rivers The licensee indicated in its MSA that the FLEX design-basis flood is primarily based on the plant's CDB flood, but also incorporates information found in the licensse's flooding hazard reevaluation report (FHRR) dated March 12, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15082A250).
The March 12, 2015, values for LIP and flooding in streams and rivers are consistent with the values the staff provided the license in the ISR letter dated September 4, 2015. The licensee's FHRR letter describes the LIP and the streams and rivers PMF as being the flooding events that cause inundation on the FitzPatrick site near structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety. Both the FHRR and the staff's ISR letter provide maximum values of
272.8 feet (ft.) United States Lake Survey Datum 1935 (USLS 35) for both LIP and flooding in streams and rivers PMF. As noted in the licensee's FHRR dated March 12, 2015, the site grade is approximately 272 ft. USLS 35.
The licensee stated in its MSA that the LIP and the streams and rivers PMF maximum stillwater elevation were considered when determining the outdoor FLEX storage areas and FLEX equipment deployment paths through the site. The licensee explained that the debris, hydrodynamic, and hydrostatic loads are considered negligible when based on the low flow velocity and water depths produced by the LIP and PMF events. The licensee concludes in its MSA that the FLEX design-basis flood hazard is 272.8 ft. USLS 35, such that the FLEX strategies can be implemented in accordance with Section G.3 of NEI 12-06, Revision 2. The licensee notes in its MSA that the LIP and streams and rivers PMF flood mechanisms can cause certain areas along the deployment path from the "N+ 1" storage building to become inundated. The equipment stored in the "N+ 1" storage building is not the primary equipment for a flood induced beyond-design-basis event. The primary storage location for a full "N" set of equipment is protected and deployable after an LIP or streams and rivers PMF event. The licensee concludes that the FLEX strategies relying on equipment from the "N" FESS are not affected by the LIP or PMF event and can be implemented successfully.
Section 2.7 of the licensee's August 29, 2017, FIP provides additional information regarding implementation of FLEX strategies for a LIP or streams and river PMF event. This section documents the licensee's evaluation and conclusion that plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategy, (i.e., switchgear, DDFP, fire protection connection points in the screenwell house, and Reactor Building hose connection points) were evaluated and it was determined that they are sufficiently elevated such they will not be affected under the flood elevation found in the FHRR and ISR letters associated with a LIP or streams and rivers PMF. In addition, the licensee evaluated the ability to implement FLEX strategy using the "N" FESS. This evaluation noted that the top of the concrete elevation for both FESBs are above the LIP and streams and river PMF elevations. Therefore, equipment in both locations are protected from these events.
The licensee noted that the FLEX haul path from the "N" FESS could experience about 1.2 inches of water. The licensee concluded that because equipment deployed from the "N" FESS location is small, manually deployed on carts and relatively light weight, there should not be an impediment to implementing this portion of the FLEX strategies under LIP or PMF conditions.
The licensee also noted that the cables from the "N" 600 Vac FLEX DG (located inside the "N" FESS are routed on the ground. However, these cables are designed to be used in wet conditions and submergence in the ponded water will not have an impact on the cables.
The staff finds the analysis associated with implementing the FLEX strategies under conditions associated with a LIP or streams and rivers PMF event found in the licensee's letters dated August 29, 2017, and July 27, 2017, to be based on reasonable assumptions. The staff concludes that this analysis is consistent with the guidance found in Section G.3 of NEI 12-06, Revision 2 for evaluating the ability to implement FLEX strategies during a flood height found in the ISR that is not bounded by the CDS.
Storm Surge The licensee noted in its MSA that the ISR level associated with storm surge is 4 feet below plant grade and as a result the SSCs important to safety and the FLEX strategy at FitzPatrick are not impacted. The licensee also noted that after the issuance of the its March 12, 2015, FHRR the International Joint Commission (IJC) issued new orders and directions for controlling the discharge of waters from Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. The result is an increase of 1 ft. in the stillwater elevation such that the ISR level associated with storm surge is
3 ft. below plant grade using conservative assumptions. The licensee concludes that the storm surge margin continues to be adequate under the new IJC orders.
Because the storm surge event does not inundate the site, the staff finds the licensee's conclusions that the FLEX strategies can be implemented under conditions associated with a storm surge to be reasonable and in accordance with the guidance found in Section G.3 of NEI 12-06, Revision 2.
3.2.1 Evaluation of Flood Event Duration The staff reviewed information provided by the licensee in its July 27, 2017, letter regarding the FED parameters needed to perform the MSA for flood hazards not bounded by the COB at FitzPatrick. The FED parameters for the flood-causing mechanisms not bounded by the COB are summarized in Table 3.2.1-1.
The licensee stated in its MSA that three flood-causing mechanisms, including LIP, stream and river PMF, and storm surge (a combined effects flood scenario "PMSS [probable maximum storm surge]+PMP [probable maximum precipitation]+Waves") produce site inundation and/or flood elevations higher than the respective COB. The staff determined that the licensee's selection of the three bounding flood-causing mechanism for the MSA is reasonable as this approach follows the guideline provided by Appendix G of NEI 12-06, Revision 2 for assessing flooding impacts at the site.
3.2.1.1 Local Intense Precipitation Flood Event Durations For the LIP flood-causing mechanism, the licensee reported in its MSA letter that a flood warning time is not credited or necessary for the FLEX strategy because it can be implemented following a LIP-induced flooding event. The staff notes that the licensee also has the option to use NEI 15-05, "Warning Time for Local Intense Precipitation Events," Revision 6, April 8, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18005A076), to estimate warning time for LIP.
The licensee reported in its MSA letter that, for the LIP flood-causing mechanism, the period of inundation is less than 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> for doors and less than 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> for the plant. The licensee states that the LIP recession time is provided in the March 12, 2015, FHRR and that no adverse impact to the FLEX strategies are noted in the MSA. The licensee used results from a 2-dimensional numerical model to determine these FED parameters as described in the FHRR.
The staff confirmed that the licensee's reevaluation of the FED parameters for LIP uses present-day methodologies and regulatory guidance. Based on this review, the staff determined that the licensee's FED parameters for the LIP flood-causing mechanism are reasonable for use in the MSA.
3.2.1.2 Unnamed Stream Probable Maximum Flood - Flood Event Durations For the streams and rivers flood-causing mechanism, the license reported in its MSA letter that a warning time is not credited or necessary for the FLEX strategy because it can be implemented following a PMF event. The staff determined that this approach is consistent with guidance provided by NEI 15-05 and Appendix G of NEI 12-06, Revision 2.
The licensee reported in its MSA letter that, for the streams and rivers flood-causing mechanism, the periods of inundation is less than or equal to 5.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for doors, and 49.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for the PMF event. In its FHRR, the licensee stated that inundation periods of 49.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> may be the result of localized topographic low areas with no drainage mechanism (i.e. storm drains, culverts, infiltration, etc.) included in the model analysis. The licensee states that the streams and rivers PMF recession time is provided in the FHRR and that no adverse impact to
SSCs are noted in the MSA. The licensee relied on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (USACE) Hydrologic Engineering Center's Hydrologic Modeling System (HEC-HMS) and FL0-20 computer codes to estimate the flooding elevations, as well as FED parameters. Based on its review of the licensee-provided HEC-RAS model, the staff determined that the licensee's modeling is reasonable and the reported FED parameters for this flood-causing mechanism are reasonable.
3.2.1.3 Storm Surge Flood Event Durations For the storm surge flood-causing mechanism, the license reported in its MSA letter that flood duration parameters are not pertinent to the evaluation of the FLEX strategy because the flood hazard elevation is 4 ft. below the general site grade and therefore SSCs important to safety are not impacted for this mechanism. The staff determined that this approach is consistent with guidance provided by NEI 15-05 and Appendix G of NEI 12-06, Revision 2.
3.2.1.4 Conclusions In summary, the staff determined that the licensee-provided FED parameters for the LIP, stream and river PMF and storm surge flood-causing mechanisms are reasonable for use in the MSA.
3.2.1.5 Effect on Mitigating Strategies As discussed above, the FED can impact the ability to deploy FLEX equipment from the "N+ 1" FESB, but it does not impact the implementation of FLEX strategies using FLEX equipment and connections within the plant and the use of equipment in the "N" FESB. Based on the ability to employ the FLEX strategies using the equipment in the "N" FESB the staff concludes that FLEX strategies can be implemented in accordance with Section G.3 of NEI 12-06, Revision 2 under the FED parameters assumed in their MSA.
3.2.2 Evaluation of Flood Associated Effects The staff reviewed the information provided by the licensee in the MSA regarding associated effects (AE) parameters for flood hazards not bounded by the COB. The AE parameters related to water surface elevation (i.e., stillwater elevation with wind waves and runup effects) were previously reviewed by staff, and were transmitted to the licensee via the ISR Letter dated September 4, 2015. The AE parameters not directly associated with water surface elevation are discussed below and are summarized in Table 3.2.2-1.
As discussed in the previous subsection, the licensee selected the LIP, streams and rivers and storm surge flood-causing mechanisms as bounding events for use in the MSA. Therefore, the staff's review of the AE parameters discusses only these three bounding flood-causing mechanisms.
3.2.2.1 Local Intense Precipitation Associated Effects For the LIP flood-causing mechanism, the licensee stated in its MSA that AEs for hydrodynamic loading and sediment erosion and deposition are considered minimal or not applicable due to the relatively slow water LIP velocities. Wave action associated with LIP was not considered to be credibly associated with LIP. The staff confirmed this statement by reviewing the licensee-provided LIP model input and output files. The staff found that the licensee-estimated inundation depths and water velocities are acceptable and that the modeling is reasonable for use in the MSA. The staff agrees with the licensee's conclusion that the AE parameters for the LIP flood-causing mechanism are either minimal or not applicable to the safety-related plant structures. Hydrodynamic loading was not quantitatively evaluated based on low velocities
associated with the LIP flooding hazards. Erosion and subsequent deposition were not evaluated and not anticipated to be significant based on low velocities.
3.2.2.2 Unnamed Stream Probable Maximum Flood Associated Effects For the streams and rivers flood-causing mechanism, the licensee stated in its MSA letter that hydrodynamic loading will be low (minimal) as a maximum flow velocity is low. The licensee did not specifically state in its MSA that debris loading would be similarly low due to the maximum flow velocity. In its FHRR, the licensee stated that the debris loading was not considered a credible hazard due to the relatively low velocities and shallow depths, which reduces the possibility of large debris loadings. Based on its review of the MSA and FHRR submittals, modeling, topographic maps, and setting of the plant facility, the staff determined that the AE parameters for streams and rivers flood-causing mechanism are minimal.
3.2.2.3 Storm Surge Associated Effects For the storm surge flood-causing mechanism, the licensee stated in its MSA letter that AEs are not pertinent to the evaluation of the FLEX strategy, because the flood hazard elevation is 4 ft.
below the general site grade under the conditions assumed in the FHRR and is still below grade using conservative assumptions based on the recent IJC orders change, and therefore SSCs important to safety are not impacted for this mechanism.
3.2.2.4 Conclusions In summary, the staff determined that the licensee's methods are appropriate and that the licensee-provided AE parameters for the LIP and the streams and rivers flood-causing mechanisms are reasonable for use in the MSA. These AE parameters are bounding values for these flood-causing mechanisms.
3.2.2.5 Effect on Mitigating Strategies Based on the fact that AEs for the LIP and streams and rivers PMF are minimal the staff finds that the FLEX strategies can be employed under the assumed AE conditions using FLEX equipment and connections within the plant and using equipment in the "N" FESB. Therefore, the staff concludes that FLEX strategies can be implemented in accordance with Section G.3 of NEI 12-06, Revision 2 under the AE parameters assumed in their MSA.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The NRC staff has reviewed the information provided in the FitzPatrick MSA related to the original FLEX strategies, as evaluated against the reevaluated hazards described in Section 2 of this staff assessment, and found that for the LIP flood hazard, streams and rivers PMF, and the storm surge:
- the sequence of events for the FLEX strategies is not affected by the impacts of the MSFHI (including impacts due to the environmental conditions created by the MSFHI) in such a way that the FLEX strategies cannot be implemented as currently developed, and
- the validation performed for the deployment of the FLEX strategies is not affected by the impacts of the MSFHI.
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee has demonstrated the capability to deploy the original FLEX strategies, as designed, against a postulated beyond-design-basis event for the LIP, stream and river PMF, and storm surge flood-causing mechanisms, including AEs and
FED, as requested in the COMSECY-14-0037, and affirmed in the corresponding SRM. The NRC staff has reviewed the information presented in the MSA by Exelon for FitzPatrick. The NRC staff confirmed that the licensee's flood hazard MSA was performed consistent with the guidance in Appendix G of NEI 12-06, Revision 2, as endorsed by JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 1. Based on the licensee's appropriate hazard characterization, methodology used in the MSA evaluation, and the description of its current FLEX strategy; the staff concludes that the licensee has demonstrated that the mitigation strategies, if appropriately implemented, are reasonably protected from reevaluated flood hazard conditions.
Table 3.2.1-1. Flood Event Durations for Flood-Causing Mechanisms Not Bounded by the CDB Time Available for Time for Water Flood-Causing Duration of Preparation for to Recede from Mechanism Inundation of Site Flood Event Site Local Intense Variable Precipitation and <9.0-h for doors, None credited (FHRR(3l, Associated Drainage (1) 20-h for plant Appendix A)
Streams and Rivers PMF( 1l < 5.5-h for doors, Variable (FHRR, None credited 49.5-h for this event Appendix B)
Storm Surge (2)
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Notes:
1 From Exelon letter dated July 27, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML172086062).
2 The licensee stated in its July 27, 2017, letter that FED parameters are not applicable because the storm surge flood hazard (including wave effects) is several feet below site grade.
3 The licensee's FHRR is dated March 12, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15082A250).
TABLE 3.2.2-1. ASSOCIATED EFFECTS PARAMETERS NOT DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH TOTAL WATER HEIGHT FOR FLOOD-CAUSING MECHANISMS NOT BOUNDED BY THE CDB Associated Effects Flood-causing Mechanism Factor Associated Effects Local Intense Streams and Storm Surge<3 >
Factor Precipitation<1> Rivers< 2>
Hydrodynamic loading No impact on No impact on the Not applicable at plant grade the site site identified identified Debris loading at plant No impact on No impact on the Not applicable grade the site site identified identified Sediment loading at No impact on No impact at critical Not applicable plant grade the site plant structures identified identified Sediment deposition No impact on No impact at critical Not applicable and erosion the site plant structures identified identified Concurrent conditions, None No impact from 40- Not applicable including adverse considered percent PMP weather identified Groundwater ingress Minimal Minimal Not applicable Other pertinent factors None noted None noted Not applicable (e.g., waterborne projectiles)
Note:
1 The licensee stated in its July 27, 2017, letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML17208B062), that hydrodynamic/debris loading was not quantified based on flow velocities be insufficient to create significant loading and the sediment loading near critical plant structures were below USAGE standards for paved surfaces.
2 The licensee stated in its July 27, 2017, letter that hydrodynamic/debris loading was not quantified based on flow velocities being insufficient to create significant loading and the sediment loading near critical plant structures were below USAGE standards for paved surfaces.
3 The licensee stated in its July 27, 2017, letter that AE parameters are not applicable because the storm surge flood hazard (including wave effects) is several feet below site grade.
ML18019A269 *via email OFFICE NRR/DLP/PBMB/PM NRR/DLP/PBMB/LA NRR/DLP/PBMB/PM NRR/DLP/PBEB NAME JSebrosky Slent PBamford GArmstrong*
DATE 2/1/18 1/19/18 2/1/18 1/19/18 OFFICE NRO/DSEA/RHM/BC* NRR/DLP/PBMB/BC(A) NRR/DLP/PBMB/PM NAME SDevlin-Gill* EBowman JSebrosky DATE 9/28/17 2/1/18 2/12/18