ML17355A349

Forwards Summary of Corrective Actions Implemented by FPL Re GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions.

ML17355A349
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	06/04/1999
From:	Hovey R FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GL-96-06, GL-96-6, L-99-117, NUDOCS 9906150191
Download: ML17355A349 (7)

Text

CATEGORY REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIO YSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9906150191 DOC.DATE: 99/06/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-250 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 3, Florida Power and Light C 05000250 50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251 AUTH. NAME- AUTHOR AFFILIATION Florida Power S Light Co.

'OVEY,R.Q'.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Records, Management Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Forwards summary of corrective actions implemented by FPL re GL 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions."

DISTRIBUTION CODE: R072D TITLE: GL COPIES RECEIVED:LTR )

96-06, "Assurance of Equip Oprblty 8 ENCL L SIZE:

Contain.Integ. during Design NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL NRR/WETZEL,B. 1 1 LPD2-2 PD 1 1 JABBOUR,K 1 1 INTERN  : FILE CENTER 01 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 R/~A/M 1 1 EXTERNAL: NOAC 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 D

'E NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECZPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE.'TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPZES RECEZVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 8 ENCL 8

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JVN 0 4 1999 L-99-117 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 251 NRC Generic Letter 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity Durin Desi n Basis Accident Conditions - Closure Summa NRC Generic Letter (GL) 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions," issued on September 30, 1996, requested licensees to provide a written summary report stating the actions taken in response to the GL, the conclusions that were reached relative to susceptibility for waterhammer and two-phase flow in the containment air cooler cooling water system and overpressurization of piping that penetrated containment, the basis for continued operability, and the corrective actions implemented or planned to be implemented.

Florida Power and Light Co (FPL) provided its response to GL 96-06 by letters L-96-270, dated October 23, 1996, L-97-021, dated January 28, 1997, L-97-086, dated March 24, 1997, and L-98-240, dated September 28, 1998.

The purpose of this letter is to provide a summary of the corrective actions implemented by FPL for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. The GL 96-06 corrective actions summary is attached.

Should there be any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours, R. J. Hovey Vice President Turkey Point Plant OIH Attachment cc: L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant

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Attachment to L-99-117 Page 1 of2 Generic Letter 96-06 "Assurance of E ui ment 0 erabili and Containment Inte ri Durin Desi n Basis Accident Conditions " Closure Summa By letters L-97-021, dated January 28, 1997 and L-97-086, dated March 24, 1997, Florida Power &

Light Co. (FPL) committed to implement facility modifications providing the final resolution of GL 96-06. Implementation of the facility modifications was scheduled for the Fall 1997 Turkey Point Unit 4 Refueling Outage and the Fall 1998 Turkey Point Unit 3 Refueling Outage. FPL has completed implementation of the necessary modifications as scheduled and is requesting closure with respect to GL 96-06.

By letter L-97-021, dated January 28, 1997, FPL made the following two commitments: (1) implement long-term corrective actions to preclude voiding of the containment air coolers, and (2) submit a proposed license amendment to incorporate the methodology of Section III, Appendix F, for use in analysis of isolated piping sections in containment under post accident conditions. By FPL letter L-97-086, dated March 24, 1997, the second commitment was revised to implement modifications in lieu of submitting a proposed license amendment.

Turkey Point completed the installation of new Component Cooling Water (CCW) head tanks, the long-term corrective action to preclude voiding of the containment air coolers. The CCW head tanks provide sufficient static pressure to preclude formation of steam voids in the containment coolers under postulated accident conditions. The head tanks are installed on the containment structures at a nominal height of 144 ft and provide a minimum static pressure of 28 psig at a highest cooler elevation. This head pressure is sufficient to maintain the cooling water sub-cooled in consideration of a maximum cooler water temperature of 270'F. The installation of the head tanks was discussed in detail under FPL Letter L-98-240, dated September 28, 1998, in response to NRC Request for Additional Information - "Resolution of GL 96-06 Issues at Turkey Point 3 and 4," dated July 16, 1998.

With respect to the thermal overpressurization concern, Turkey Point has implemented modifications to eliminate the possibility of pressure boundary failure. FPL Letter L-97-021 identified twelve piping sections which were susceptible to possible thermal overpressurization. The corrective actions for these piping sections included the installation of thermal relief valves, revised valve alignments, and drilling the disc of check valves. Table 1 provides a summary of the various modifications. The relief valve installations are self-explanatory. A change in valve alignment was utilized for the Safety Injection test lines to provide an open fiowpath to an existing relief valve. The Unit 4 containment sump pump discharge check valves discs were drilled to provide for pressure relief capability. Note that the function of these check valves is to prevent recirculation through an idle pump and they do not provide containment isolation function.

The necessary modifications have been implemented in resolution of the concerns associated with GL 96-06. The new CCW head tanks preclude the possibility of steam formation in the containment air coolers, and thermal relief capability has been provided for the penetrations of concern.

Attachment to L-99-117 Page 2 of 2 Table No.1 Piping Sections provided with thermal relief capabilities Portion of Piping Between Item Location Valve s and Valves s Thermal Relief Ca ability Penetration 9-Pressurized Liquid CV-*-953 CV-*-956B Installed Thermal Relief Valves S ace Sam le Penetration 23-Containment Sump *-4692A CV-*-2822 U3 - Installed Thermal Relief Valve Discharge *-4692B U4 - Drilled Check Valve Disk Penetration 25 - RCP Seal Water Leak/off MOV-*-6386 MOV-*-381 Installed Thermal Relief Valves Excess Letdown Penetration 47-Primary Water Supply *-10-582 *-10-567 Installed Thermal Relief Valves to Wash Header Penetration 55- CV-*-955C Accumulator Sample CV-*-955D CV-*-956D Installed Thermal Relief Valves CV-*-955E Excess Letdown Pi in CV-*-387 HCV-*-137 Installed Thermal Relief Valves 7-12 Safety Injection Test CV-*-850A *-884A Line CV-*-850B *-884B Revised valve alignment to provide CV-*-850C *-884C open flowpath to existing relief CV-*-850D *-884D valve CV-*-850E *-884E CV-*-850F *-884F

• Units 3 and 4

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