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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000369/20230042024-01-31031 January 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023004 and 05000370/2023004 ML24019A1392024-01-25025 January 2024 TSTF 505 and 50.69 Audit Summary ML24019A2002024-01-24024 January 2024 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information for NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection IR 05000369/20234022023-12-14014 December 2023 Material Control and Accounting Program Inspection Report 05000369/2023402 and 05000370/2023402 ML23317A2272023-11-17017 November 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Transmittal of Dam Inspection Report - Non-Proprietary ML23317A3462023-11-14014 November 2023 Duke Fleet - Correction Letter to License Amendment Nos. 312 & 340 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-554, Revision 1 IR 05000369/20230032023-10-24024 October 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023003 and 05000370/2023003; and Inspection Report 07200038/2023001 IR 05000369/20240102023-10-13013 October 2023 Notification of McGuire Nuclear Station Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Report 05000369, 370/2024010 IR 05000369/20230102023-10-13013 October 2023 Age Related Degradation Inspection Report 05000369/2023010 and 05000370/2023010 ML23256A0882023-09-25025 September 2023 Issuance of Alternative to Steam Generator Welds IR 05000369/20233012023-09-20020 September 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station - NRC Examination Report 05000369/2023301 and 05000370/2023301 ML23230A0652023-08-31031 August 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Relief Request Use of Later Edition of ASME Code ML23195A0782023-08-29029 August 2023 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-554, Revision 1 IR 05000369/20230052023-08-25025 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 (Report 05000369/2023005 and 05000370/2023005) IR 05000369/20230022023-07-28028 July 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023002 and 05000370/2023002 IR 05000369/20234202023-07-24024 July 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 050003692023420 and 050003702023420 ML23206A0092023-07-24024 July 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station Operator Licensing Written Examination Approval 05000369/2023301 and 05000370/2023301 ML23207A0762023-07-14014 July 2023 EN 56557 - Update to Part 21 Report Re Potential Defect with Trane External Auto/Stop Emergency Stop Relay Card Pn: XI2650728-06 ML23159A2712023-06-20020 June 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 - Relief Request Impractical Reactor System Welds ML23237A2672023-06-13013 June 2023 June 13, 2002 - Meeting Announcement - McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations 50-369, 50-370 and 50-413, 50-414 ML23159A0052023-06-0505 June 2023 56557-EN 56557 - Paragon - Redlined IR 05000369/20230012023-05-0101 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023001 and 05000370/2023001 ML23115A2122023-05-0101 May 2023 Review of the Spring 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML23118A0762023-05-0101 May 2023 Approval for Use of Specific Provision of a Later Edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI ML23094A1832023-04-18018 April 2023 Audit Plan TSTF-505, Rev. 2, RITSTF Initiative 4B & 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization & Treatment of Structures, Systems & Components for Nuclear Power Reactors (EPIDs L-2023-LLA-0021 & L-2023-LLA-0022) ML22332A4932023-03-10010 March 2023 William States Lee III 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Relocation of the Emergency Operations Facility IR 05000369/20220062023-03-0101 March 2023 Annual Assessment Letter for McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 (NRC Inspection Report 05000369/2022006 and 05000370 2022006) IR 05000369/20220042023-01-30030 January 2023 Mcguire Nuclear Station - Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2022004 and 05000370/2022004 IR 05000369/20224202023-01-11011 January 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000369/2022420 and 05000370/2022420 ML22356A0512022-12-14014 December 2022 Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division, Letter Regarding Potential Efect in a Configuration of the 11/2 Inch Quick Disconnect Connector Cable Assemblies Supplied to Duke Energy (See Attached Spreadsheet) for a Total of 460 of Connectors Only Suppl ML22347A1512022-12-13013 December 2022 William B. Mcguire Nuclear Station Notification of Licensed Operator Initial Examination 05000369/2023301 and 05000370/2023301 ML22340A6662022-12-0808 December 2022 Summary of November 30, 2022, Public Meeting with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC for McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2 Proposed LAR to Adopt TSTF-505, Rev. 2 and 10 CFR 50.69 Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems ML22290A1012022-11-29029 November 2022 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 326 and 305, Regarding Changes to Technical Specification 3.4.3, Reactor Coolant System Pressure Temperature Limits ML22096A0032022-11-18018 November 2022 McGuire Nuclear Station and Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Authorization of RA-19-0352 Regarding Use of Alternative for RPV Head Closure Stud Examinations ML22256A2532022-11-14014 November 2022 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-541, Rev. 2 IR 05000369/20220032022-10-27027 October 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2022003 and 05000370/2022003 IR 05000369/20220112022-09-29029 September 2022 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000369/2022011 and 05000370/2022011 ML22266A0782022-09-26026 September 2022 William B. Mcguire Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Relief Request ML22258A0302022-09-15015 September 2022 Evacuation Time Estimate Reports IR 07200038/20220012022-09-12012 September 2022 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Report 07200038/2022001 ML22242A0022022-09-12012 September 2022 Issuance of Amendments to Adopt TSTF 569, Revision 2, Revise Response Time Testing Definition ML22230B6132022-09-0101 September 2022 Review of the Draft Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant and McGuire Nuclear Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Decommissioning Funding Plans IR 05000369/20220052022-08-29029 August 2022 Updated Inspection Plan for McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 05000369/2022005 and 05000370/2022005 IR 05000369/20220022022-07-26026 July 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2022002 and 05000370/2022002 ML22215A2502022-07-25025 July 2022 EN 55960 - Update - Curtiss Wright ML22164A0362022-07-19019 July 2022 Mcguire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Issuance of Amendments to Revise the Conditional Exemption of the End-Of-Cycle Moderator Temperature Coefficient Measurement Methodology (EPID L-2021-LLA-0198) Public ML22175A0162022-06-24024 June 2022 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information for NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection ML22046A0222022-06-14014 June 2022 Issuance of Amendments to Adopt TSTF-439, Eliminate Second Completion Times Limiting Time from Discovery of Failure to Meet an LCO ML22111A3112022-05-16016 May 2022 Letter Issuing Exemption to McGuire IR 05000369/20224012022-05-12012 May 2022 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000369/2022401 and 05000370/2022401 2024-01-31
[Table view] Category:Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARRA-23-0154, Duke Energy - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative for Pressurizer Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)2023-07-20020 July 2023 Duke Energy - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative for Pressurizer Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) RA-23-0136, Duke Energy Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative for Steam Generator Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)2023-07-20020 July 2023 Duke Energy Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative for Steam Generator Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) RA-23-0142, Mcguire, Units 1 and 2, Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3, H. B. Robinson, Unit 2, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Restrictive Technical Specification Surveillance Require2023-07-0707 July 2023 Mcguire, Units 1 and 2, Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3, H. B. Robinson, Unit 2, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Restrictive Technical Specification Surveillance Require RA-23-0076, Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 Spring, 2022 Outage Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2023-03-16016 March 2023 Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 Spring, 2022 Outage Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report RA-23-0024, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) for Relief Request for RPV Reactor Coolant System Welds2023-02-28028 February 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) for Relief Request for RPV Reactor Coolant System Welds RA-23-0025, End of Cycle 28 (M1R28) Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)2023-02-15015 February 2023 End of Cycle 28 (M1R28) Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) RA-22-0147, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and Duke Energy Progress, LLC, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request for Relocating the Duke Energy Emergency Operations Facility2022-05-13013 May 2022 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and Duke Energy Progress, LLC, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request for Relocating the Duke Energy Emergency Operations Facility RA-22-0102, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Revision 1 of DPC-NE-1007-P, Conditional Exemption of the EOC Mtc Measurement Methodology2022-04-0707 April 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Revision 1 of DPC-NE-1007-P, Conditional Exemption of the EOC Mtc Measurement Methodology RA-22-0003, Response to Requests for Additional Information for Reactor Vessel Closure Stud Exam Extension Alternative2022-01-31031 January 2022 Response to Requests for Additional Information for Reactor Vessel Closure Stud Exam Extension Alternative RA-21-0259, Response to Request for Additional Information for Request to Use Provisions of a Later Edition and Addenda of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI for Repair/ Replacement Activities in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(42021-10-0404 October 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information for Request to Use Provisions of a Later Edition and Addenda of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI for Repair/ Replacement Activities in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4 RA-21-0063, 1, 2; Catawba Nuclear Station 1, 2; H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant 2; Mcgguire Nuclear Station 1, 2; Oconee Nuclear Station 1, 2, 3; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 1 - Response to RAI Re Amend for Emergency Plan2021-03-11011 March 2021 1, 2; Catawba Nuclear Station 1, 2; H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant 2; Mcgguire Nuclear Station 1, 2; Oconee Nuclear Station 1, 2, 3; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 1 - Response to RAI Re Amend for Emergency Plan RA-21-0032, Duke Energy - Response to Requests for Additional Info for Request to Use a Provision of Later Edition & Addenda of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI for Repair/Replacement Activities in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(42021-02-11011 February 2021 Duke Energy - Response to Requests for Additional Info for Request to Use a Provision of Later Edition & Addenda of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI for Repair/Replacement Activities in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4)( RA-21-0017, Response to Request for Additional Information Re License Amendment Request to Revise Tech Spec 3.8.1 to Reduce Emergency Diesel Generator Maximum Steady State Voltage2021-01-29029 January 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Re License Amendment Request to Revise Tech Spec 3.8.1 to Reduce Emergency Diesel Generator Maximum Steady State Voltage RA-20-0087, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Alternative in Accordance with 10CFR 50.55a(z)(1) to Delay the Update of the ASME Code of Record for the First Inspection Period2020-04-0202 April 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Alternative in Accordance with 10CFR 50.55a(z)(1) to Delay the Update of the ASME Code of Record for the First Inspection Period RA-19-0189, Supplement to Response for Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to the Technical Specifications 3.8.12019-04-0808 April 2019 Supplement to Response for Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to the Technical Specifications 3.8.1 RA-19-0004, Response to NRC for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to the Technical Specifications 3.8.1 for Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 22019-03-0707 March 2019 Response to NRC for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to the Technical Specifications 3.8.1 for Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 RA-19-0026, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Proposed Alternative to the Depth Sizing Qualification Requirement of Appendix Viii, Supplements 2 and 10 (18-GO-001)2019-02-11011 February 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Proposed Alternative to the Depth Sizing Qualification Requirement of Appendix Viii, Supplements 2 and 10 (18-GO-001) RA-19-0005, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding Review Request of the Aging Management Program and Inspection Plan for the Reactor Vessel Internals to Implement MRP-227-A2019-01-30030 January 2019 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding Review Request of the Aging Management Program and Inspection Plan for the Reactor Vessel Internals to Implement MRP-227-A RA-18-0229, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to the Technical Specification 3.8.12018-12-0303 December 2018 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to the Technical Specification 3.8.1 RA-18-0213, Response to the Second Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise the Licensing Bases for Protection from Tornado-Generated Missiles2018-11-0101 November 2018 Response to the Second Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise the Licensing Bases for Protection from Tornado-Generated Missiles ML18191A5642018-07-10010 July 2018 Attachment 3 - Response to NRC Request for Additional Information MNS-18-036, Redacted Response to the Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise the Licensing Bases for Protection from Tornado Generated Missiles2018-07-0303 July 2018 Redacted Response to the Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise the Licensing Bases for Protection from Tornado Generated Missiles ML20052D9362018-07-0303 July 2018 Response to Nrg Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding NAC Magnastor Cask Loaded to Incorrect Helium Backfill Density MNS-17-048, Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies2017-12-12012 December 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies ML17349A1572017-12-12012 December 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Temporary Changes to Technical Specifications to Address the 'A' Train Nuclear Service Water System Non-Conforming Condition RA-17-0039, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Threads in Flange Examination (17-GO-001)2017-08-0909 August 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Threads in Flange Examination (17-GO-001) RA-17-0035, Supplement to License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to Technical Specification 3.5.1, AC Sources - Operating.2017-07-20020 July 2017 Supplement to License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to Technical Specification 3.5.1, AC Sources - Operating. MNS-17-030, Response to March 12, 2012, Request for Information Enclosure 2, Recommendation 2.1, Flooding, Required Response 3, Flooding Focused Evaluation Summary Submittal2017-06-28028 June 2017 Response to March 12, 2012, Request for Information Enclosure 2, Recommendation 2.1, Flooding, Required Response 3, Flooding Focused Evaluation Summary Submittal RA-17-0030, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Reverse Technical Specifications to Adopt Multiple Technical Specification Task Force Travelers2017-06-0808 June 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Reverse Technical Specifications to Adopt Multiple Technical Specification Task Force Travelers MNS-17-023, Response to Request for Additional Information to License Amendment Request Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies2017-05-25025 May 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information to License Amendment Request Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies CNS-16-066, Stations - Supplemental Information Regarding Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Screening and Prioritization Results - Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task..2016-10-20020 October 2016 Stations - Supplemental Information Regarding Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Screening and Prioritization Results - Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task.. ML16294A2542016-10-13013 October 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Relief Request 16-MN-002, Alternative to Defect Removal Prior to Performing Repair Activities on Nuclear Service Water System Piping RA-16-0035, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Application for Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Consolidation2016-10-0303 October 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Application for Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Consolidation ML16244A0602016-08-18018 August 2016 Response to Request for Addition Information to RR 16-MN-003 MNS-16-070, Response to Request for Additional Information to Relief Request 16-MN-0032016-08-18018 August 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information to Relief Request 16-MN-003 MNS-16-060, Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2016-08-18018 August 2016 Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML16230A0062016-08-11011 August 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Technical Specification 3.6.13, Ice Condenser Doors RA-16-0027, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2016-09 Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2016-07-14014 July 2016 Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2016-09 Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations MNS-16-056, License Amendment Request, One-Time Extension of Appendix J Type a Integrated Leakage Rate Test Interval, Response to Request for Additional Information2016-06-30030 June 2016 License Amendment Request, One-Time Extension of Appendix J Type a Integrated Leakage Rate Test Interval, Response to Request for Additional Information MNS-16-023, Response to Request for Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Regarding License Amendment Request for Control Room Chilled Water System Technical Specifications2016-03-16016 March 2016 Response to Request for Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Regarding License Amendment Request for Control Room Chilled Water System Technical Specifications ML16056A2422016-02-18018 February 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request (LAR) to Change the Emergency Plan to Upgrade Emergency Action Levels Based on NEI 99-01, Revision 6 MNS-16-005, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) During January 12, 2016, NRC Teleconference Pertaining to License Amendment Request for Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension2016-02-10010 February 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) During January 12, 2016, NRC Teleconference Pertaining to License Amendment Request for Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension MNS-16-008, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Closeout, Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima..2016-02-0404 February 2016 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Closeout, Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima.. MNS-16-009, Response to NRC Letter Dated December 9, 2015, Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Exemption from Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 74.19(c)2016-02-0404 February 2016 Response to NRC Letter Dated December 9, 2015, Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Exemption from Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 74.19(c) RA-16-0006, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Application to Use Alternate Fission Gas Gap Release Fractions2016-02-0101 February 2016 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Application to Use Alternate Fission Gas Gap Release Fractions MNS-16-003, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation2016-01-0707 January 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation ML15343A0122015-12-0707 December 2015 Response to NRC Letter Dated 10/26/2015, Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request, Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension. MNS-15-093, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Regarding Residual Heat Removal System2015-11-13013 November 2015 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Regarding Residual Heat Removal System MNS-15-078, Response to NRC Letter Dated September 14, 2015, Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request, Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension2015-10-0808 October 2015 Response to NRC Letter Dated September 14, 2015, Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request, Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension MNS-15-077, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima..2015-10-0808 October 2015 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima.. 2023-07-07
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. ___ , (,DUKE --~'ENERGY Thomas D. Ray, P.E. Site Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station December 12, 2017 Serial No. MNS-17-049 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 ATIENTION:
Document Control Desk Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17 Duke Energy MGOlVP I 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078 O: 980.875.4805 f: 980.875.4809 Tom.Ray@duke-energy.com 10 CFR 50.90
Subject:
Response to the Request for Additional Information regarding the License Amendment Request for Temporary Changes to Technical Specifications to address the 'A' Train Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS) Non-Conforming Condition By letter dated September 14, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 17262A090), Duke Energy requested temporary changes to the McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specifications.
The proposed License Amendment Request (LAR) will permit the 'A' Train NSWS to be inoperable for a total of 14 days to address a non-conforming condition on the 'A' Train supply piping from the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP). This letter provides the additional information requested by the NRC staff via electronic mail from Michael Mahoney dated November 21, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 173318149).
The NRC staff's questions and Duke Energy's responses are provided in the Attachment.
The conclusions reached in the original determination that the LAR contains No Significant Hazards Considerations and the basis for the categorical exclusion from performing an Environmental Impact Statement have not changed as a result of these responses to the request for additional information.
www.duke-energy.com U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MNS-17-049 Page 2 Please contact Lee A. Hentz at 980-875-4187 if additional questions arise regarding this LAR. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 12, 2017.
- Sincerely, J;,r Thomas D. Ray Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station Attachment cc w/ Attachments:
C. Haney, Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com.mission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 A. Hutto, NRC Senior Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station M. Mahoney, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 0-8 G9A Rockville, MD 20852-2738 W. L. Cox, Ill, Section Chief North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources Division of Environmental Health Radiation Protection Section 1645 Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27699-1645 Attachment Page 1 By letter to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dated September 14, 2017 ADAMS Accession No. ML 17262A090), Duke Energy requested changes to the Technical Specifications
{TSs) for McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (McGuire).
The proposed amendment will permit the 'A' Train NSWS to be inoperable for a total of 14 days to address a non-conforming condition on the 'A' Train supply piping from the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP). In order to complete its review, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff requests the following additional information.
Please provide your response to the following requests for additional information (RAls) within 30 days of the date of this correspondence.
RAl-01 McGuire described a defense-in-depth consideration where procedures and designated operators will be available to align the 'B' Train Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) suction path to the 'A' Train Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS) pump suction following an earthquake that exceeds operating basis earthquake (OBE) or causes damage to the Cowan's Ford Dam or low level intake (LU) piping. These events would cause loss of the 1A and 2A NSWS pumps. McGuire further stated that if a failure of a 'B' Train NSWS pump occurred subsequent to the events described above, an additional defense in depth contingency would be available, i.e. procedures and designated operators will be available to align the affected unit 'A' NSWS pump to the SNSWP via the shared 'B' NSWS piping to restore NSW flow to the affected unit. McGuire has stated, in support of the contingency, the following conditions will be established before the start of activities in the LAR: *
- The 'A' train supply header crossover valve (ORN-14A) will be opened prior to the evolution and power will be removed from the valve operator.
- 'B' train supply header crossover valve (ORN-15B) will be maintained closed with the ESFAS signal from each unit blocked prior to the evolution.
Maintaining valve ORN-15B closed with power removed satisfies operability requirements for the 'B' Train NSWS. Valve ORN-15B can be opened from the control room after power is restored if conditions warrant the use of this contingency.
The NRC staff observed that until the 'A' NSWS pumps could be realigned to the 'B' NSWS header, the 1A and 2A diesel generators would not have required cooling. With the absence of cooling to the 1A and 2A diesel generators and the loss of off-site power caused by the seismic event, MOVs ORN148A,C and ORN147A,C and ORN149A may not have power available, since these MOVs have emergency power from either the 1A or 2A diesel generator.
Yet these MOV's have to be repositioned to align the 'A' NSWS pumps to the 'B' NSWS header as shown in Figures 6 and 7 of the LAR.
Attachment Page 2 With loss of cooling to the 1 A and 2A diesel generators causing the possible unavailability of these diesel generators, and the loss of offsite power caused by the seismic event: a) Describe how the licensee will affect the lineup required by Figure 7 of the LAR, including repositioning MOVs ORN148A,C and ORN147A,C and ORN149A, in order to supply the 'A' NSWS pumps from the 'B' NSWS header, which in turn would supply the 1A and 2A diesel generators.
b) With the loss of cooling to the 1A and 2A diesel generators during this event, discuss the effects on safety loads powered from the diesel generators and the effect on nuclear safety. Duke Energy Response:
RAl-01 is associated with a loss of supply to the 'A' Train NSWS pumps from Lake Norman, followed by a loss of the 'B' Train NSWS pumps. The loss of the 'A' train NSWS pumps will result in securing of the 'A' diesel generators.
With the associated loss of off-site power caused by the seismic event, 'A' train components would have no power available in this scenario.
Therefore, in order to avoid such an event, the 'A' train NSWS pumps must remain in service with adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) being provided, or must be secured. The scenario described in RAl-01 must be analyzed with two different failure mechanisms.
These mechanisms are: 1. Loss of Cowans Ford Dam 2. Piping Failure between Cowans Ford Dam and the Auxiliary Building The required response time to realign from Lake Norman to the SNSWP has the potential to be different for each of these failures, and therefore, must be independently discussed.
- 1. Loss of Cowans Ford Dam As stated in Section 3.0 of the LAR submittal, the Cowans Ford Dam is only qualified to an Operating Basis Earthquake (QBE). However, as also stated in Section 3.0, a seismic Fragility Assessment was performed for buke Energy in 2011. The conclusion from this assessment is that the damn and water supply would withstand a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). This conclusion is restated in Section 3.1 of the LAR submittal.
In the event that the Cowans Ford Dam is breached, an analysis has been performed to determine the time required .to realign the supply of the NSWS pumps from Lake Norman to the SNSWP. Duke Energy calculation titled Cowans Ford Reservoir Depletion Analysis documents an analysis that was performed*utilizing breach parameters found in the UFSAR. The conclusion of this analysis is that under worst case dam breach conditions, seventy (70) minutes are available to realign the supply of the NSWS pumps from Lake Norman to the SNSWP during a lake level decrease from Elevation 7 49 feet to Elevation 7 45 feet. The minimum allowable lake level to provide NSWS pump required NPSH is 745 feet. Additional margin exists, with respect to the required timeframe, as lake level is normally maintained at or above Elevation 754 feet and the 70 minute allowance begins at Elevation 7 49 feet.
Attachment Page 3 Based on the above analysis, there is ample time available to realign from Lake Norman to the SNSWP prior to challenging NPSH conditions of the NSWS pumps on a loss of the Cowans Ford Dam. *The realignment will occur in accordance with the Loss of NSWS Abnormal Procedures.
These procedures require realignment to the SNSWP within 60 minutes, and therefore, the realign will occur prior to lake level decreasing below Elevation 7 45 feet. There is an additional, separate 60 minute requirement, documented in the SNSWP Thermal Analysis Calculation that analyzes SNSWP depletion.
This analysis considers the alignment where the NSWS supply side has been realigned to the SNSWP, while the NSWS discharge side remains aligned to Lake Norman. The analysis determines that this alignment is acceptable for 60 minutes under worst case flow conditions without affecting SNSWP inventory in an unacceptable manner. The Abnormal Procedures require the discharge to be realigned within 60 minutes of the suction. 2. Piping Failure between Cowans Ford Dam and the Auxiliary Building Similar to the Cowans Ford Dam, the 42 inch NSWS piping between valve 1 RN-1 and the auxiliary building is not nuclear safety related nor is the piping rated for an SSE (referenced in Section 3.0 of LAR Submittal).
However, the seismic Fragility Assessment that was discussed in the Cowans Ford Dam failure evaluation above also pertains to the associated piping. The . conclusion of that assessment is that the piping will likely withstand a SSE. In addition to the seismic Fragility Assessment, an additional McGuire calculation was created to demonstrate that the NSWS piping from the Low Level Intake (LU) will remain intact and functional long enough for the 'A' train NSWS suction to be aligned to the SNSVVP before catastrophic failure of the NSWS piping occurs. This evaluation analyzed the piping for missile concerns and seismic effects. The conclusion of this calculation is that there is a high confidence that the piping will remain intact long enough for the NSWS supply to be realigned over to the SNSWP. The LU piping was also evaluated for design loads. This evaluation references a published analysis ("Seismic Design of Buried Piping" by Iqbal and Goodling) that states the most common failure modes due to earthquakes are:
- Axial compression and tension of the pipe produced by.seismic waves traveling through the soil.
- Bending of the pipe also produced by seismic waves traveling through the soil.
- Differential displacements at location of restraint such as building connections.
- Differential displacements caused by soils with dynamically different properties.
Each of the above failure modes were analyzed to ensure that the LU piping could withstand a seismic event. The conclusion of this analysis was that the LU piping had margin with respect to required wall thickness.
It is Duke Energy's judgement that the piping will not fail in such a manner that the suction of the NSWS pumps will lose communication with Lake Norman. The piping will remain sufficiently intact to provide enough time for 'A' train suction to be re-aligned to the SNSWP, if needed.
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Conclusion:==
Attachment Page4 To summarize the above discussion, there is ample time during a loss of the Cowans Ford Dam or LU piping to allow either realignment of the 'A' train NSWS pumps to the SNSWP or to secure the 'A' train diesel generators and 'A' train NSWS pumps prior to loss of adequate NPSH. The Cowans Ford Dam and LU piping have a small probability of failure, but if a failure were to occur there is ample time to secure 'A' train NSWS pumps prior to loss of suction. Securing the 'A' train NSWS pumps prior to loss of adequate NPSH will allow these pumps to be utilized later in the event, if needed. Even in the event of a failure, nuclear safety would be maintained.
The scenario would unfold as follows:
- A seismic event results in the loss of Cowans Ford Dam or a LU piping failure. The seismic event results in a loss of offsite power.
- The 18 and 28 NSWS pumps would operate from the SNSWP (18 and 28 diesel generators would also be in service).
This alignment was made prior to entering the LCO, as stated in the LAR submittal.
- The 1A and 2A NSWS pump suctions will continue to be aligned to the LU at the beginning of the event. The 1A and 2A NSWS pump discharges will be manually aligned to the SNSWP in accordance with the Abnormal Procedure associated with loss of the NSWS. This procedure will realign the discharge valves (ORN-147 AC, ORN-148AC, ORN-149A) prior to securing the 'A' train NSWS pumps and the associated diesel generators, as there will be ample time to make this alignment.
The 1A and 2A NSWS pumps would be secured prior to loss of required NPSH to ensure capability for use later in the event. The associated diesel generators would also be secured prior to the loss of cooling.
- There is an assumed failure of one '8' train NSWS pump. * 'A' train NSWS pump suction would be realigned to the '8' train SNSWP piping supply through a designated operator by opening ORN-158 and closing ORN-12AC and/or ORN-13A. These actions are in accordance with the Abnormal Procedures associated with loss of the NSWS.
- The diesel generators (1A or 2A) would be started by resetting the Emergency Stop. The applicable Emergency Procedure would start the respective
'A' train NSWS pump along with other required safety equipment.
a) Describe how the licensee will affect the lineup required by Figure 7 of the LAR, including repositioning MOVs ORN148A,C and ORN147A,C and ORN149A, in order to supply the 'A' NSWS pumps from the 'B' NSWS header, which in turn would supply the 1A and 2A diesel generators.
As discussed above, the LU piping and the Cowans Ford Dam are highly unlikely to fail, even during a SSE. However, in the event that a failure did occur, there is ample time to realign the 'A' train NSWS train discharge valves (ORN-147AC, ORN-148AC and ORN-149A) prior to securing the 'A' train NSWS pumps due to inadequate NPSH. The Abnormal Procedure Attachment Pages associated with loss *of the NSWS will align these valves within sixty (60) minutes of the start of the event. Therefore, based on the analysis of the Cowans Ford Dam and associated LU piping, there is ample time to realign these valves prior to the need to secure the 'A' train NSWS pumps. b) With the loss of cooling to the 1A and 2A diesel generators during this event, discuss the effects on safety loads powered from the diesel generators and the effect on nuclear safety. The Defense In Depth section of the LAR does describe a scenario where the 'A' train diesel generators would be secured. This would require a loss of Lake Norman (Cowans Ford Dam or LU piping) along with a subsequent loss of 'B' train NSWS pump(s). The 1A and 2A diesel generators will remain in service as long as 'A' train NSWS pumps can remain aligned to Lake Norman. The 1A and 2A diesel generators would be secured prior to securing the 1A and 2A NSWS pumps. At that time, 'A' train will remain in standby, thereby not challenging the integrity of any equipment.
'B' train equipment would be in service as a result of the loss of offsite power. In the event that one of the 'B' train NSWS pumps failed, the realignment of 'A' train NSWS suction to the SNSWP would be completed and the 'A' train equipment would be restarted with adequate cooling.*
Nuclear safety would be maintained.
RAl-02 Figure 9, "Personnel Access Manway," of the LAR, as presented in the original package provided to the NRC, is not legible.
- Please provide a legible copy of Figure 9. Duke Energy Response:
See attached an 18 inch by 24 inch copy of Drawing MC-1027-01.00, which is LAR Figure 9.