ML17342A364

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Enclosure 2, Handouts and Presentations Discussed During the November 16, 2017 ROP Working Group Public Meeting
ML17342A364
Person / Time
Site: Watts Bar, Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 12/08/2017
From:
NRC/NRR/DIRS/IRAB, Nuclear Energy Institute
To:
Bridges J,NRR/DIRS, 301-415-4052
Shared Package
ML17342A333 List:
References
NEI 09-07
Download: ML17342A364 (27)
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Text

Enclosure 2 Handouts and Presentations Discussed during the November 16, 2017 ROP WG Public Meeting Dated December 8, 2017

Licensee Event Report -

Online Data Collection November 2017

Licensee Event Report System

  • Result of the TMI lessons learned
  • 10 CFR 50.73 is NRCs systematic way of collecting event data from operating power reactors

- Reactor events and problems believed to be significant and useful to the NRC in its effort to identify and resolve threats to public safety

- Designed to provide information necessary for

  • Engineering studies of operational anomalies
  • Trends and patterns analysis of operational occurrences
  • Other analysis to aid in identifying accident precursors
  • Davis-Besse lessons learned emphasized the importance of continuously collecting and evaluating this information

End Users of LER Data

  • Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

- Mitigating Systems Performance Index

- Operating Experience Clearinghouse

- System and component studies

- Human factors studies

- Communication (e.g., Regional and other staff requests, Information Notices)

  • Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES)

- SPAR Model development

- Accident Sequence Precursor Program

- System and component studies (e.g., initiating events, LOOP, Scrams)

End Users of LER Data (cont.)

  • External Stakeholders (e.g. Public)

- Research and reference material

  • LER Search
  • Component and system studies generated from LER review
  • Regions

- Significance Determination Process

- Event review

Current LER Workflow

  • Licensees submit reports pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 requirements

- Submitted in accordance with §50.4

  • Sent to the DCD or
  • By electronic submission (e.g., by EIE)

- Either method generally results in report getting printed out and scanned before being added to ADAMS

  • Resulting in loss of data quality
  • NUREG 1022 provides guidance on filling out Form 366, which includes structured fields

Current LER Workflow (cont.)

  • Licensees fill out structured form fields, but structure is lost upon scanning and ADAMS processing
  • NRC staff screens and reviews all LERs, but further analysis is limited because of the time commitment for data extraction

Proposed LER Workflow

  • Voluntary online report submittal tool

- Licensees would use a web interface to enter the same information that is currently collected via the DCD and EIE.

- Tool will generate an LER to be added to ADAMS

  • Provide appropriate interfaces to be used for NRC needs (NRR, RES, Regions, Public Search tool)

LER Online Submittal Benefits

  • Increased information quality

- Data automatically separated into fields that populate tables

- 100% of data captured

- Data is easily searchable from initial entry

- Consistent document quality

  • Increased accessibility of LER information for all stakeholders
  • Streamline process to reduce cost and burden to licensees and NRC

Next Steps

  • Develop schedule

- Perform cost analysis

- Develop application

  • Consider expanding to other reports

- 50.72

- Part 21

Demonstration UPDATE ON NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE MONITORING November 16, 2017

OUR OBJECTIVES

1. Update the NRC on the status of industrys initiative to monitor nuclear safety culture
2. Discuss typical approaches employed today
3. Answer any questions the NRC may have 2

TOPICS

1. Timeline of NSCM developments
2. NEI 09-07, Rev. 1 Options
3. Survey of Current Approaches
4. Path Forward 3

TIMELINE

1. Dec. 2010 - NSCM initiative approved
2. Oct. 2011 - Initiative/NEI 09-07 implemented
3. Mar. 2014 - NEI 09-07 R1 published
4. Dec. 2015 - DNP IO RE-012 mentions potential elimination of NSCMP
5. Jul. 2016 - DNPSC retains NSCMP
6. Sep. 2016 - ROPTF briefing on NSCM
7. Dec. 2016 - DNP publishes EB to streamline oversight 4

NEI 09-07 R1 OPTIONS

1. Nominal Process - NSCMP feeding SLT
2. Combined Meeting - NSCMP/SLT meet as one
3. Line Departments Lead
4. SLT Subcommittee
5. Other Bodies Lead 5

NEI 09-07 R1 OPTION 1 6

NEI 09-07 R1 OPTION 2 External Review Fleet/Corporate (e.g., NSRB) Review Site Response Policies Communication Program Modifications Internal Actions Site Leadership Team Training Regulator Assessments External Benchmarking Nuclear Safety Culture Confidentiality Regulatory Oversight Monitoring Panel Combined Meeting Employee Workforce Concerns Issues (including IP 71152 PI&R)

Corrective Action Program Nuclear Safety Industry QA/Self Assessment/

CAP Trends Culture Self Evaluations Benchmarking Assessment NRC Inspection Performance Operating Results Trends Experience 7 Typical Inputs

NEI 09-07 R1 OPTION 3 External Review Fleet/Corporate (e.g., NSRB) Review Site Response Policies Communication Program Modifications Internal Actions Site Leadership Team Training Regulator Regulatory Oversight Assessments External Human Resources Benchmarking Other Input Human (including IP 71152 PI&R)

Sources Performance Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Data Performance Improvement Industrial Safety Chemistry &

Operations Maintenance Security Radiation Protection Support Support Functions Functions (Typical)

(Typical)

Line Line Departments Departments (Typical)

(Typical) 8

NEI 09-07 R1 OPTION 4 9

NEI 09-07 R1 OPTION 5 10

SURVEY OF CURRENT PRACTICES

  • Informal survey of three basic questions
  • Which of the five options are you following?
  • How do you do nuclear safety culture assessments?
  • Responses from
  • Fleets: Entergy, Exelon, Duke, Dominion, NextEra, Southern, Xcel
  • Single site operators: AEP, Ameren, DTE, Energy NW, Luminant, PGE, SCANA, STPNOC, WCNOC 11

SURVEY RESULTS

  • Option 1 (separate NSCMP and SLT) and Option 2 (combined NSCMP/SLT meeting) predominate
  • Option 3 (line department lead) is favored by Duke and Energy NW
  • Option 4 (SLT subcommittee) forthcoming at STP 12

LESSONS LEARNED

1. The Cultural Landscape Has Changed -

a) Awareness of safety culture concepts, language and implications is widespread now b) Many processes touch on culture (e.g., OR, PI, NSRB, INPO) c) We talk about it; we train on it; we practice it

2. The Conversational Landscape Has Changed -

a) Conversations relevant to culture monitoring and management take place in a variety of routine and ad hoc meetings and assessments.

b) These catch culturally significant information upstream and outside the designated culture monitoring process.

13

LESSONS LEARNED

3. Our Approach Has Changed -

a) Cognitive analysis (i.e., team and management conversations about cultural implications of events and observations) is our tool of choice.

b) Conversations have proven more effective than quantitative analysis as a means of recognizing culturally important events and trends.

4. Our Appreciation for Culture Has Changed -

a) Cultural health is recognized as a critical attribute of a high functioning organization b) Discussions about cultural health help the management team to bond on this important attribute

5. As a Result, Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring -

a) Provides an added layer of oversight and influence b) Substantiates nascent observations arising elsewhere, and ensures they are recognized.

14

PATH FORWARD

  • Industry sees the value of culture monitoring and management, using NEI 09-07 as guidance, and remains committed to doing so.
  • Industry will continue to experiment with different approaches and benchmark one another to improve effectiveness and efficiency of culture monitoring processes, and guard against getting complacent 15

Questions?

NEI

Contact:

James Slider, jes@nei.org (202) 739-8015

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