ML17165A483

302 Draft Simulator Scenarios

ML17165A483
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	06/14/2017
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Tennessee Valley Authority
References
50-390/13-302, 50-391/13-302 50-390/OL-13, 50-391/OL-13
Download: ML17165A483 (396)

Text

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant NRC EXAM 2013302 Scenario 1

Events Number Description Page(s) 1 Complete 1-SOI-63.01, Safety Injection System, Section 8.3.1, Add Water to 7-8 CLA 1, beginning at Step 12, and return the Safety Injection system to ECCS injection mode.

2 1A-A CCP bearing seizes, causing a motor overload and pump trip. Requires 9-15 entry into and performance of 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into LCO 3.5,2, ECCS - Operating, CONDITION A, TR 3.1.4, Charging Pumps - Operating, CONDITION A.

3 A-A Lower Compartment Cooler trips due to a faulty amptector relay. Requires 16-19 the BOP to start another Lower Compartment Cooler. Requires a Tech Requirement evaluation and entry into TR 3.6.3, Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System, CONDITION A.

4 1B-B MFP shaft fails, causing loss of feedwater flow. Requires BOP to 20-26 manually trip the 1B-B MFP. Requires entry into 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4. Loss of TDMFP Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load). Requires a Tech Spec Evaluation and entry into LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference (AFD), CONDITION A.

5 Control Rods fail to insert during the runback. Requires the RO to place 1- 27-28 RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT to MAN and insert rods using 1-FLRM, ROD MOTION CONTROL. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System.

6 1-PCV-68-340, PZR PORV fails open. Requires the RO to perform 29-31 IMMEDIATE ACTION of AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control, to place 1-HS-68-333, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A in the CLOSE position. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation of PZR PORV and DNB limits.

7 A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. 32-49 Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP aligns and starts the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Critical Tasks Critical Description Page(s)

Task 1 Manually trip the reactor from the control room prior to entry into 1-FR-S.1, 36 Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

2 Perform actions of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, to place the 48 Standby Main Feedwater Pump in service and establish flow into at least one SG before wide range level in 3 of 4 SGs drops below 26%.

Attachments

---NONE---

References Number Title Revision WBN Technical Specifications Amendment 91 1-SOI-63.01 Safety Injection System 0 SOI-30.03 Containment HVAC and Pressure Control 48 1-AOI-20 Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System 2 1-AOI-16 Loss of Normal Feedwater 2 1-AOI-2 Malfunction of Reactor Control System 0 AOI-18 Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System 23 AOI-11 Loss of Condenser Vacuum 29 1-E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 0 ES-0.1 Reactor Trip Response 24 1-FR-H.1 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Scenario No. 1 Op Test No.: 302 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Run Time:

Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOL conditions. RCS boron concentration is 845 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps.

Turnover: Train A Channel I Work Week. 1A-A RHR Pump is out of service for pump bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago. EOOS Risk is GREEN. SG 1 has a stable 0.9 gpd tube leak. AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Appendix A and C have been performed. Leak rate has been stable for the last 2 weeks. TD AFW pump is aligned to SG #4 as a precautionary measure. Caution Order placed. Complete 1-SOI-63.01, Safety Injection System, Section 8.3.1, Add Water to CLA 1, beginning at Step 12 as soon as possible after assuming shift. Twenty minutes have elapsed since the 1A-A SI pump was started.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description No.

1 n/a N-RO/SRO Complete 1-SOI-63.01, Safety Injection System, Section 8.3.1, Add Water to CLA 1, beginning at Step 12.

2 cv32a C-RO 1A-A CCP bearing seizes, causing a motor overload and pump TS-SRO trip.

3 ch27a C-BOP A-A Lower Compartment Cooler trips.

TS-SRO 4 fw51b C-BOP 1B-B MFP shaft fails, causing loss of feedwater flow.

TS-SRO 5 rd09 R-RO Control Rods fail to automatically insert during the runback.

6 rx05b I-RO 1-PCV-68-340, PZR PORV fails full open.

TS-SRO 7 fw09 M-ALL A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively fw22a worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual fw22b reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor fw22c trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 1 - Summary Initial Condition 100% power, MOL conditions. RCS boron concentration is 845 ppm. Control Bank D is at 220 steps.

Turnover Train A Channel I Work Week. 1A-A RHR Pump is out of service for pump bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago. EOOS Risk is GREEN. SG 1 has a stable 0.9 gpd tube leak. AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Appendix A and C have been performed. Leak rate has been stable for the last 2 weeks. TD AFW pump is aligned to SG #4 as a precautionary measure. Caution Order placed. Complete 1-SOI-63.01, Safety Injection System, Section 8.3.1, Add Water to CLA 1, beginning at Step 12 as soon as possible after assuming shift. Twenty minutes have elapsed since the 1A-A SI pump was started.

Event Description 1 Complete 1-SOI-63.01, Safety Injection System, Section 8.3.1, Add Water to CLA 1, beginning at Step 12, and return the Safety Injection system to ECCS injection mode.

2 1A-A CCP bearing seizes, causing a motor overload and pump trip. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into LCO 3.5,2, ECCS - Operating, CONDITION A, TR 3.1.4, Charging Pumps - Operating, CONDITION A.

3 A-A Lower Compartment Cooler trips due to a faulty amptector relay. Requires the BOP to start another Lower Compartment Cooler. Requires a Tech Requirement evaluation and entry into TR 3.6.3, Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System, CONDITION A.

4 1B-B MFP shaft fails, causing loss of feedwater flow. Requires BOP to manually trip the 1B-B MFP. Requires entry into 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4. Loss of TDMFP Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load). Requires a Tech Spec Evaluation and entry into LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference (AFD), CONDITION A.

5 Control Rods fail to automatically insert during the runback. Requires the RO to place 1-RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT to MAN and insert rods using 1-FLRM, ROD MOTION CONTROL. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System.

6 1-PCV-68-340, PZR PORV fails open. Requires the RO to perform IMMEDIATE ACTION of AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control, to place 1-HS-68-333, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A in the CLOSE position. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs), CONDITION B and 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB limits) Limits, CONDITION A.

7 A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP aligns and starts the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 1 - Critical Task Summary Critical Task Description 1 Manually trip the reactor from the control room prior to entry into 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

2 Perform actions of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, to place the Standby Main Feedwater Pump in service and establish flow into at least one SG before wide range level in 3 of 4 SGs drops below 26%.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 7 of 56 Event

Description:

Complete 1-SOI-63.01, Safety Injection System, Section 8.3.1, Add Water to CLA 1, beginning at Step 12 and remove the 1A-A SI pump from service.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from 1-SOI-63.01, Safety Injection System, Section 1-SOI-63.01 8.3.1,Add Water to CLA 1.

EXAMINER: The turnover information stated that the 1A-A SI Pump has been running for 20 minutes.

[12] ENSURE SI pump has operated for greater than 20 minutes, THEN PERFORM the following (N/A pump NOT selected):

RO RO locates 1-HS-63-10A, SI PMP A (ECCS), and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the STOP position. RO observes the RED light DARK, GREEN light LIT.

If not already accomplished, the RO will enter N/A for the 1B-B SI Pump.

NOTE Step 8.3.1[13] or 8.3.1[14] may be N/Ad based on SIPs operability requirements.

[13] ENSURE the following (N/A pump NOT selected):

RO RO locates 1-HS-63-10A, SI PMP A (ECCS), and observes the handswitch is in the A-AUTO (mid position).

If not already accomplished, the RO will enter N/A for the 1B-B SI Pump.

[14] ENSURE the following (N/A pump NOT selected):

RO If not already accomplished, the RO will enter N/A for this step 2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 8 of 56 Event

Description:

Complete 1-SOI-63.01, Safety Injection System, Section 8.3.1, Add Water to CLA 1, beginning at Step 12 and remove the 1A-A SI pump from service.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[15] CHECK the shutdown pumps closing spring charged(N/A pump NOT shutdown):

RO When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to check the closing spring charged for 1-BKR-63-10, SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1A-A (1-PMP-63-10). Console Operator will report that the closing spring is charged.

If not already accomplished, the RO will enter N/A for 1-BKR-63-15.

[16] IF 1-FCV-63-152, was closed in Step 8.3.1[3], THEN OPEN 1-FCV SRO 152, SI PMP A TO CL 1-2-3-4 [1-M-6] (N/A in Mode 4, 5, 6).

RO determines that 1-FCV-63-152 was NOT closed.

[17] IF 1-FCV-63-118 was closed in Step 8.3.1[2], THEN OPEN 1-FCV SRO 118, CL ACCUM 1 OUTLET if desired.

RO determines that 1-FCV-63-118 was NOT closed.

NOTE CLA 1 press can be read on 1-PI-63-126 or 128.

[18] VERIFY CLA PRESS in desired range (Alarm 131-B, CL ACCUM 1 PRESS HI/LO, not LIT).

RO RO locates 131-B, CL ACCUM 1 PRESS HI/LO, and observes that the window is not LIT.

EXAMINER: The Chief Examiner cues the Console Operator to enter Event 2.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 9 of 56 Event

Description:

1A-A CCP bearing seizes, causing a motor overload and pump trip. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

14-D, M-1 THRU M-6 MOTOR OVERLOAD.

14-E, M-1 THRU M-6 MOTOR TRIPOUT.

108-A, CHARGING FLOW HI/LO.

RO Diagnoses and announces the trip of the 1A-A CCP.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTION of 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System, to isolate letdown.

RO locates 1-HS-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM CIV-A, and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position.

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-69, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT, and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position.

RO locates 1-HS-62-70, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT, and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position.

May dispatch an AUO to check for relay operation for the 1A-A CCP breaker at the 1A-A 6.9 KV Shutdown Board.

RO When RO contacts an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to determine relay operation for the 1A-A CCP breaker at the 1A-A 6.9 KV Shutdown Board. Console Operator reports the timed overcurrent relay is picked up.

May dispatch an AUO to locally check the 1A-A CCP.

When RO contacts an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the RO request to locally check the 1A-A CCP. Console Operator reports the 1A-A CCP motor has scorch marks, and that the pump bearings are extremely hot.

May dispatch an AUO to locally check the 1B-B CCP ready for a start.

RO When RO contacts an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to locally check the 1B-B CCP ready for a start. Console Operator reports the 1B-B CCP is ready for a start.

RO May enter and take actions of ARI 108-A, CHARGING FLOW HI/LO.

Enters and directs actions of 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level SRO Control System.

ARI 108-A The following actions are taken from 108-A, CHARGING FLOW HI/LO.

[1] IF ALL the following conditions exist:

• Any RCP Thermal Barrier Out-of-Service

• In-Service Charging pump trips RO

• RCP seal injection flow required THEN IMMEDIATELY START available charging pump to restore seal flow.

RO determines that the conditions to immediately start the 1B-B CCP DO NOT exist.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 10 of 56 Event

Description:

1A-A CCP bearing seizes, causing a motor overload and pump trip. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[2] CHECK 1-FI-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW [1-M-5] to determine if flow is high or low.

RO RO reports that charging flow is low since NO charging pumps are running.

[3] CHECK 1-LI-68-320, -335A, and -339A, PZR LEVEL [1-M-4].

RO RO reports PZR level is normal on all level indicators.

[4] IF PZR Level Control System malfunction, THEN GO TO AOI-20.

SRO SRO determines that 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System, needs to be implemented.

The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control 1-AOI-20 System.

NOTE 1 Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step.

NOTE 2 If both RCP thermal barrier cooling flow and seal injection flow lost, RCP seals may overheat rapidly.

1. CHECK charging in service.

RO RO determines that charging in NOT in service, requiring RNO actions.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF Thermal Barrier Cooling NOT in service, THEN START available charging pump.

BOP reports that thermal barrier cooling is in service.

IF charging flow NOT established, THEN ISOLATE letdown:

1) CLOSE letdown orifice(s)

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM CIV-A, and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position.

2) CLOSE 1-FCV-62-69 RO locates 1-HS-62-69, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT, and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position.

3) CLOSE 1-FCV-62-70 RO locates 1-HS-62-70, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT, and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position.

2. IF charging NOT established, THEN VERIFY Thermal Barrier Cooling in service.

BOP BOP reports that CCS flow to the RCP thermal barrier heat exchangers is NORMAL (each thermal barrier hx receiving approximately 45 gpm).

3. CHECK pzr level program signal NORMAL:

• 1-LR-68-339 RO RO observes 1-LI-68-339. PZR LEVEL - % level setpoint (blue) is indicating normal program level.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 11 of 56 Event

Description:

1A-A CCP bearing seizes, causing a motor overload and pump trip. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. ENSURE 1-XS-68-339E selected to OPERABLE channels for control and backup:

• LT-68-339 & 335 OR RO

• LT-68-320 & 335 OR

• LT-68-339 & 320 RO reports that there are NO failed level channels and 1-XS-68-339E is selected to an OPERABLE channel.

5. CHECK letdown in SERVICE

• 1-FCV-62-69 OPEN

• 1-FCV-62-70 OPEN

• 1-FCV-62-77 OPEN RO

• Letdown orifice OPEN

• Letdown flow NORMAL RO observes that 1-FCV-62-69, 1-FCV-62-70 and all of the letdown orifice isolation valves are CLOSED. Also observes that letdown flow is zero.

5. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE pzr heater banks D and C ON.

RO ensures pzr heater banks D and C on using 1-HS-68-341H and 1-HS-68-341F (1-M-4) as needed.

RO ESTABLISH charging and letdown:

• REFER TO Attachment 1 SRO N/As the rest of the RNO since 1-PCV-62-81 is not failed and Letdown can be established.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-20, Attachment 1.

NOTE This section can be used in conjunction with 1-SOI-62.01 for local control of 1-FCV-62-89, 1-PCV-62-81 or 1-FCV-62-93. Substitute local actions as appropriate for Steps 1.1A.1, 1.1A.2, 1.1A.6, 1.1D, 1.1G and 1.1E.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 12 of 56 Event

Description:

1A-A CCP bearing seizes, causing a motor overload and pump trip. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1.1 Establish Charging and Letdown A. IF charging NOT established, THEN PERFORM the following:

1. CLOSE 1-FCV-62-89, CHRG HDR-RCP SEALS FLOW CONTROL.

RO locates 1-HIC-62-89A, CHG HDR - RCP SEALS FLOW CONTROL and rotates the knob to the left to close the valve.

2. CLOSE 1-FCV-62-93, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL.

RO locates 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL, lifts the toggle switch to place the controller in MANUAL, then holds the toggle to the RIGHT to close the valve.

3. ENSURE Charging Pump running.

RO RO starts 1B-B CCP by rotating 1-HS-62-104A, CCP B-B (ECCS) to the START position. After the starting logic time delay is satisfied, the RED light on 1-HS-62-104A, CCP B-B (ECCS) will be LIT. RO will observe 1-EI-62-104A, CCP B-B AMPS and/or 1-PI-62-92A, CHARGING HDR PRESS to ensure charging is in service.

4. OPEN 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91, CHARGING LINE ISOL.

RO restores charging by rotating 1-HS-62-90A, CHARGING LINE ISOL and 1-HS-62-91, CHARGING LINE ISOL to the OPEN position.

5. ENSURE 1-FCV-62-85, NORM CHARGING TO LOOP 1, or 1-FCV-62-86, ALT CHARGING TO LOOP 4, OPEN.

RO locates 1-HS-62-86A, ALT CHARGING TO LOOP 4, and determines the valve is OPEN by observing RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

6. ADJUST 1-FCV-62-93 and 1-FCV-62-89 to maintain seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm for each RCP.

B. ENSURE letdown isol valves OPEN:

1. 1-FCV-62-69, CVCS LETDOWN ISOLATION.

RO locates 1-HS-62-69, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the OPEN position.

2. 1-FCV-62-70, CVCS LETDOWN ISOLATION RO RO locates 1-HS-62-70, RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the OPEN position.

3. 1-FCV-62-77, CVCS LP LETDOWN ISOLATION.

RO locates 1-HS-62-77, CVCS LP LETDOWN ISOLATION, and observes the RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

C. PLACE 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP 1-TCV 192 CNTL, in MANUAL at 25% OPEN.

RO 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL is placed in MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch from the AUTO position, the toggle is pushed to the right to open the valve to 25% (as read on the controller).

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 13 of 56 Event

Description:

1A-A CCP bearing seizes, causing a motor overload and pump trip. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior D. PLACE 1- HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, in MANUAL at 40-50% OPEN if using 75 gpm orifice (20-30% OPEN if using 45 gpm orifice).

RO 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL is placed in MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch from the AUTO position, the toggle is pushed to the right to open the valve to 40-50% (as read on the controller).

E. ESTABLISH 75 gpm or greater charging flow while maintaining seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm for each RCP using 1-FCV 93 and 1-FCV-62-89.

RO RO establishes 75 gpm charging flow on 1-FI-62-93A, and 8 to 13 gpm on 1-FI-62-1A, RCP 1 SEAL SUP FLOW, 1-FI-62-14A, RCP 2 SEAL SUP FLOW, 1-FI-62-27A, RCP 3 SEAL SUP FLOW, and 1-FI-62-40A, RCP 4 SEAL SUP FLOW.

NOTE Sufficient charging flow should be established prior to performing this next step.

F. OPEN letdown orifices as needed:

• 1-FCV-62-72 (45 gpm)

• 1-FCV-62-73 (75 gpm).

• 1-FCV-62-74 (75 gpm).

RO RO selects 1-HS-62-74A, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM - CIV-A, and rotates the selected handswitch to the right to the OPEN position, and holds the handswitch OPEN until the RED light is LIT and the GREEN light is DARK.

• 1-FCV-62-76 (5 gpm).

G. ADJUST 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, for desired press, (320 psig at normal letdown temp)

RO 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL toggle switch is moved to the right to close the valve and raise pressure to 320 psig. 1-HIC 81A is placed in AUTO by pushing the toggle switch down to the AUTO position.

H. PLACE 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL in AUTO.

RO 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL, is placed in AUTO by pushing the toggle switch down to the AUTO position.

I. PLACE 1-HIC-62-78A, LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP TCV-70-192 CNTL, in AUTO.

RO RO makes periodic adjustments to 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL and 1-HIC-62-89A, CHG HDR - RCP SEALS FLOW CONTROL to return PZR level to program level.

RO J. RETURN pzr level to program.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 14 of 56 Event

Description:

1A-A CCP bearing seizes, causing a motor overload and pump trip. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior K. WHEN ready to return 1-FCV-62-93 to AUTO control, THEN RO PERFORM Section 1.2 1.2 Establish AUTO Control of 1-FCV-62-93 A. RETURN 1-FCV-62-93 to AUTO.

RO 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL, is placed in AUTO once PZR level is on program if required.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System, beginning at Step 6.

6. ENSURE pzr level returning to program:

RO

• CONTROL 1-HIC-62-93A in MAN as necessary

• MAINTAIN regen hx letdown temp < 380 °F.

7. CHECK pzr heaters ENERGIZED:

a. Control Heaters D red light LIT.

RO observes handswitch 1-HS-68-341F, CONTROL HEATERS D RED light LIT.

RO b. Backup Heaters C red light LIT.

RO places handswitch 1-HS-68-341H, BACKUP HEATERS C in the OFF position, then may place the handswitch to the ON position for boron concentration control. Handswitch 1-HS-68-341H is then returned to P-AUTO position.

8. ENSURE operable channel selected for recording with 1-XS RO 339B [1-M-5]:

RO observes that 1-XS-68-339B is selected to LT-68-335.

9. CHECK 1-HIC-62-93A in AUTO.

RO RO checks that 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL, was placed in AUTO as a result of performing Attachment 1, ALIGNMENT OF CHARGING AND LETDOWN.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 15 of 56 Event

Description:

1A-A CCP bearing seizes, causing a motor overload and pump trip. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

• 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation. - not applicable

• 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation. - not applicable

• 3.4.9 Pressurizer - not applicable

• 3.5.2, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS)

LCO 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating Action A. One or more trains inoperable.

AND At least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE SRO ECCS train available, restore train(s) to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

• TR 3.1.4 Charging Pump, Operating TR 3.1.4 Charging Pumps, Operating Condition A. One required charging pump inoperable, A.1 Restore required charging pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR A.2.1 Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> AND A.2.2 Borate to a SDM equivalent to > 1% k/k at 200°F within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />. AND A.2.3 Restore required charging pump to OPERABLE status within 246 hours0.00285 days <br />0.0683 hours <br />4.06746e-4 weeks <br />9.3603e-5 months <br />.

11. NOTIFY Work Control to remove any failed channel from service.

SRO SRO determines that there are no failed channels to be removed from service.

12. INITIATE repairs to failed instrument/circuitry.

SRO When the SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back request for a troubleshooting and repair package to investigate the cause of the trip of 1A-A CCP.

SRO 13. RETURN TO instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 3, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 3.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 16 of 56 Event

Description:

A-A Lower Compartment Cooler trips due to a faulty amptector relay. Requires the BOP to start another Lower Compartment Cooler. Requires a Tech Requirement evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

138-E, PNL M9 MOTOR TRIPOUT BOP Diagnoses and announces the trip of the A-A Lower Compartment Cooler.

May dispatch an AUO to determine cause of alarm.

BOP When the BOP contacts an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to determine the cause of the A-A LWR CNTMT CLR trip. Console Operator reports back that the amptector has tripped.

SRO Enters and directs actions of ARI 138E, PNL M9 MOTOR TRIPOUT.

ARI 138-E The following actions are taken from 138-E, PNL M9 MOTOR TRIPOUT.

[1] DETERMINE which motor has tripped using Panel 1-M-9.

BOP BOP determines that 1-HS-30-74A, LWR CNTMT CLR A-A indicates the motor has tripped by the RED, GREEN and WHITE lights LIT.

[2] DISPATCH Operator to determine cause of alarm AND INITIATE corrective action.

BOP If not contacted previously, when the BOP contacts an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to determine the cause of the A-A LWR CNTMT CLR trip. Console Operator reports back that the amptector has tripped.

[3] REFER TO SOI-31.01 for troubleshooting MCR and EBR Chillers.

BOP SRO determines that this step is not applicable to the current conditions.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 17 of 56 Event

Description:

A-A Lower Compartment Cooler trips due to a faulty amptector relay. Requires the BOP to start another Lower Compartment Cooler. Requires a Tech Requirement evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The SRO may assign SOI-30.03 to the BOP to be performed using the single performer method.

The following actions are taken from SOI-30.03, Containment HVAC and Pressure SOI-30.03 Control, Section 5.4, Startup/Reserve Alignment of Lower CNTMT Coolers.

[1] ENSURE ERCW aligned to Lower CNTMT Coolers per Section 5.3.

BOP BOP refers to Section 5.3 for actions.

The following actions are taken from SOI-30.03, Containment HVAC and Pressure SOI-30.03 Control, Section 5.3, Startup/Reserve Alignment of Lower CNTMT Coolers.

[1] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler 1A-A is to be started or placed in reserve, SRO/BOP THEN SRO/BOP determines the step is not applicable.

[2] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler 1B-B is to be started or placed in reserve, SRO/BOP THEN SRO determines the step is not applicable.

[3] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler 1C-A is to be started or placed in reserve, SRO/BOP THEN SRO determines the step is not applicable.

[4] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler 1D-B is to be started or placed in reserve, THEN ENSURE the following [0-M-27A]:

A. 1-FCV-67-107, LWR CNTMT D CLRS SUP CIV, OPEN.

BOP locates 1-HS-67-107A, LWR CNTMT D CLRS SUP CIV-B, and observes the RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK indicating the valve is OPEN.

B. 1-FCV-67-113, LWR CNTMT D CLRS SUP CIV, OPEN.

BOP locates 1-HS-67-113A, LWR CNTMT D CLRS SUP CIV-B, and observes the RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK indicating the valve is OPEN.

BOP C. 1-FCV-67-111, LWR CNTMT D CLRS RET CIV, OPEN.

BOP locates 1-HS-67-111A, LWR CNTMT D CLRS RET CIV-B, and observes the RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK indicating the valve is OPEN.

D. 1-FCV-67-112, LWR CNTMT D CLRS RET CIV, OPEN.

BOP locates 1-HS-67-112A, LWR CNTMT D CLRS RET CIV-B, and observes the RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK indicating the valve is OPEN.

E. 1-HS-67-108A, LWR CNTMT CLR D OUTLET TCV, in P-AUTO.

BOP locates 1-HS-67-107A, LWR CNTMT D OUTLET TCV, and observes the handswitch is in the P AUTO position.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 18 of 56 Event

Description:

A-A Lower Compartment Cooler trips due to a faulty amptector relay. Requires the BOP to start another Lower Compartment Cooler. Requires a Tech Requirement evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from SOI-30.03, Containment HVAC and Pressure SOI-30.03 Control, Section 5.4, Startup/Reserve Alignment of Lower CNTMT Coolers.

NOTE Lower CNTMT Cooler 1A-A drains to the Pocket Sump. Condensate from the drain may cause a plant computer alarm on Pocket Sump rate of rise. If a valid alarm occurs, the Pocket Sump level monitor should be declared inoperable and the actions of LCO 3.4.15 performed.

[2] REFER TO Section 3.0, Precaution 3.0H before starting or placing SRO Lower CNTMT Coolers in reserve alignment.

SRO refers to Precaution 3.0H.

[3] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler 1A-A is to be started, THEN A. ENSURE 1-HS-30-74A, LWR CNTMT CLR A-A, in A-AUTO, AND SRO /BOP START Cooler with 1-HS-30-74A.

SRO determines the step is not applicable.

[4] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler 1B-B is to be started, THEN A. ENSURE 1-HS-30-75A, LWR CNTMT CLR B-B, in A-AUTO, AND SRO /BOP START Cooler with 1-HS-30-75A.

SRO determines the step is not applicable.

[5] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler 1C-A is to be started, THEN A. ENSURE 1-HS-30-77A, LWR CNTMT CLR C-A, in A-AUTO, AND SRO /BOP START Cooler with 1-HS-30-77A.

SRO determines the step is not applicable.

[6] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler 1D-B is to be started, THEN A. ENSURE 1-HS-30-78A, LWR CNTMT CLR D-B, in A-AUTO, AND START Cooler with 1-HS-30-78A.

BOP locates 1-HS-30-78A, LWR CNTMT CLR D-B, and determines the SRO /BOP handswitch is pushed in, and in the mid-position, A-AUTO. BOP rotates handswitch to the RIGHT to the START position.

B. ENSURE LWR CNTMT CLR D-B, RUNNING.

BOP observes 1-HS-30-78A, LWR CNTMT CLR D-B, RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

[7] IF Lower CNTMT Cooler is to be placed in reserve, THEN ENSURE the SRO /BOP following: (N/A fans in service)

SRO determines the step is not applicable.

[8] IF the ERCW to an A-train CLR was started, THEN, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> SRO /BOP SRO determines the step is not applicable.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 19 of 56 Event

Description:

A-A Lower Compartment Cooler trips due to a faulty amptector relay. Requires the BOP to start another Lower Compartment Cooler. Requires a Tech Requirement evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[9] IF the ERCW to a B train CLR was started THEN within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> RECORD the B ERCW 30 discharge header level if known:

________ inches When BOP contacts an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to observe B ERCW 30 header. Console Operator reports BOP back level is at 28 inches.

RECORD the B train 12" ERCW to AFW pumps header level:

________ inches When BOP contacts an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to observe B ERCW 12 header. Console Operator reports back level is at 11 inches.

[9.1] IF B ERCW 30 discharge header level <26 OR B train 12" ERCW to AFW pumps header <10 OR ultrasonics is not available, THEN PERFORM BOP appropriate sections of SOI-67.01, Appendix B.

SRO determines the step is not applicable.

Evaluates Tech Requirements and determines that TR 3.6.3, Lower Compartment Cooling (LCC) System is applicable.

SRO With one LCC fan inoperable, restore the LCC fan to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

When SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat SRO back the request for a troubleshooting and repair packages for the 1A Lower Compartment Cooler.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 2, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior to SRO the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 4.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 20 of 56 Event

Description:

1B-B MFP shaft fails, causing loss of feedwater flow. Requires BOP to manually trip the 1B-B MFP. Requires entry into AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load),

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: Event 4 - 1B-B MFP shaft fails, causing loss of feedwater flow. Requires BOP to manually trip the 1B-B MFP. Requires entry into 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

Indications:

58-A, MFP 1B FLOW LO.

60-C, SG 1 STM-FW FLOW MISMATCH.

61-C, SG 2 STM-FW FLOW MISMATCH.

62-C, SG 3 STM-FW FLOW MISMATCH.

63-C, SG 4 STM-FW FLOW MISMATCH.

63-F, SG LEVEL DEVIATION.

1-SI-46-20B, MFP B SPEED indicating a rising trend.

1-FI-3-84, MFWP B FLOW off-scale low.

1-PI-3-80A, MFWP B DISCH PRESS decreasing.

BOP Diagnoses and announces the failure of the 1B MFP to pump forward.

May enter ARI 58-A, MFP 1B FLOW LO and take actions to trip the 1B BOP MFP.

May dispatch an AUO to the 1B MFP to determine the cause of the loss of flow.

If/When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back BOP the request to determine the problem with the 1B MFP. Console Operator reports that the 1B MFP shaft has failed, and that there are minor oil leaks but no fire. Fire Ops and Environmental are on the scene.

SRO May direct the BOP to manually trip the B MFP.

Enters and directs the actions of AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, SRO Section 3.

ARI 58-A The following actions are taken from ARI 58-A, MFP 1B FLOW LO.

[1] CHECK MFP 1B flow on 1-FI-3-84 [1-M-3] to confirm alarm.

BOP BOP locates 1-FI-3-84, MFWP B FLOW, and determines that flow is low.

[2] IF Auto control failure, THEN:

BOP determines that the AUTO speed control circuit is functioning BOP properly and continues to the next step.

[2.1] ENSURE affected controller is in MANUAL.

[2.2] RESTORE SG levels and MFW/MS P to program.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 21 of 56 Event

Description:

1B-B MFP shaft fails, causing loss of feedwater flow. Requires BOP to manually trip the 1B-B MFP. Requires entry into AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load),

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[3] IF flow less than 1.72x106 lbs/hr, THEN:

[3.1] ENSURE 1-FCV-3-84, MAIN FW PUMP B FLOW CONTROL VLV, OPEN.

BOP locates 1-FIC-3-84, MFWP B RECIRC CONTROL and determines BOP the valve is open.

[3.2] IF both Main Feed Pumps are in service, THEN TRIP Main Feed Pump 1B.

BOP locates 1-HS-46-36A, MFPT B TRIP - RESET, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the TRIP position.

[4] REFER TO 1-AOI-16, LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER, if necessary.

SRO SRO enters and directs actions of 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater.

The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, 1-AOI-16 GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

1. () IF loss of S/G level is imminent, THEN TRIP reactor, and ** GO TO 1-BOP E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

BOP determines that loss of SG level is not imminent.

2. ENSURE failed MFPT TRIPPED.

BOP BOP manually tripped the 1B MFP earlier.

3. CHECK turbine load less than or equal to 1000 MWe (85%).

BOP BOP determines that turbine load is less than 1000 MWe.

4. PLACE tripped MFWP recirc valve controller in MANUAL, and CLOSE recirc valve.

BOP BOP locates 1-FIC-3-70, MFWP A RECIRC CONTROL, and depresses the AUTO/MAN pushbutton. The BOP observes MAN is backlit in YELLOW. BOP depresses the RAMP and << pushbuttons to close the valve.

5. CHECK turbine load less than 800 MWe (67%).

BOP BOP determines that load is greater than 800 MWe.

5. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE Standby MFWP running.

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-3-200A, STANDBY MFWP, and observes RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK indicating the pump is running.

5. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP ENSURE Standby MFWP running.

BOP had previously confirmed the Standby MFP running.

6. ENSURE MFPT speed rising to control S/G P and levels on program.

BOP BOP determines that the 1A MFWP speed rising.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 22 of 56 Event

Description:

1B-B MFP shaft fails, causing loss of feedwater flow. Requires BOP to manually trip the 1B-B MFP. Requires entry into AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load),

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION Continued load reductions below 800 MWe should be done using normal turbine controls at less than or equal to 5%/min.

NOTE Load will NOT change until VALVE POS LIMIT light is cleared.

7. MONITOR adequate feed flow for existing conditions:

BOP

• Feed flow greater than or equal to steam flow.

• S/G levels returning to program.

EXAMINER: Automatic rod control is failed, requiring the RO to insert control rods in MANUAL to maintain Tavg within 3°F of Tref.

RO 8. MONITOR Tavg trending to within 3°F of Tref.

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RO

() INSERT Control Rods in manual to match Tavg to Tref.

CAUTION Runback may result in exceeding Tech Spec 3.2.3 limits on Axial Flux Difference (AFD).

9. MAINTAIN AFD within limits.

a. () INITIATE boration as required RO 1) REFER TO ATTACHMENT 1, Manual Boration SRO directs RO to perform actions of Attachment 1, Manual Boration.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 23 of 56 Event

Description:

1B-B MFP shaft fails, causing loss of feedwater flow. Requires BOP to manually trip the 1B-B MFP. Requires entry into AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load),

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, ATTACHMENT 1, Manual Boration.

NOTE The required Boric Acid needed to compensate for a runback may be obtained from Reactivity Briefing Sheet.

EXAMINER: From the MOL TI-7.012, Reactivity Briefing Sheet - Shift Instructions, 255 gallons of boric acid are required for a runback to 960 MW (80%).

INITIATE boration of RCS to restore AFD to normal using Section 1.1 OR 1.2.

1.1 Normal Manual Boration A. INITIATE normal boration to change CB as necessary:

1. SET 1-FC-62-139, BA TO BLENDER [1-M-6], to desired flow rate.

RO RO adjusts 1-FC-62-139 to a desired value.

2. ADJUST 1-FQ-62-139, BA BATCH COUNTER [1-M-6] to ensure boration continues.

RO adjusts 1-FQ-62-139 BA BATCH COUNTER as follows:

1. Depresses and holds the black pushbutton.

RO 2. While holding the pushbutton, the applicant raises the red translucent cover.

3. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant enters 000255 in the display.

4. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant lowers the red translucent cover, and then releases the pushbutton.

3. PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE [1-M-6], to BORATE.

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE and rotates the handswitch to the right 2 positions to BOR.

4. PLACE 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL [1-M-6], to START.

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the START position.

5. VERIFY boric acid flow indicated on 1-FI-62-139.

RO RO locates 1-FI-62-139, BA TO BLENDER FLOW and flow corresponding to the setting selected on 1-FC-62-139, BA TO BLENDER.

6. WHEN adequate amount of boric acid injected, THEN CONTINUE with RO this instruction.

When boration stops, the RO performs the remaining actions.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 24 of 56 Event

Description:

1B-B MFP shaft fails, causing loss of feedwater flow. Requires BOP to manually trip the 1B-B MFP. Requires entry into AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load),

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. PLACE 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL [1-M-6], to STOP.

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the STOP position.

8. VERIFY 1-FI-62-139 Boric Acid to Blender, indicating ZERO.

RO RO locates 1-FI-62-139, BA TO BLENDER FLOW, and observes ZERO flow.

9. ENSURE 1-FC-62-142, PW TO BLENDER on 35% (70 gpm), AND Manual-Auto toggle in AUTO.

RO RO locates 1-FC-62-62-142, PW TO BLENDER FCV-62-143 CONTROL, and determines that the MANUAL - AUTO toggle switch is in the AUTO position.

10. ADJUST 1-FC-62-139, BA TO BLENDER [1-M-6] to reflect desired RCS CB.

If/When the RO contacts Chemistry, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for an RCS boron sample. Console Operator RO informs the RO that the sample will require approximately 45 minutes to process.

RO may set the dial to 100%, until the results of the RCS boron sample are received.

11. PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE, in AUTO.

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE and rotates the handswitch to the left 2 positions to AUTO.

12. TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL, to START, and VERIFY red light LIT.

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the START position.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 25 of 56 Event

Description:

1B-B MFP shaft fails, causing loss of feedwater flow. Requires BOP to manually trip the 1B-B MFP. Requires entry into AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load),

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

10. ENSURE tripped MFP turbine condenser valves CLOSED:

• Pump A, 1-FCV-2-205 and 210.

OR BOP

• Pump B, 1-FCV-2-211 and 216.

BOP locates 1-HS-2-211A, MFPT B CONDENSER INLET, and observes RED light DARK, GREEN light LIT.

BOP locates 1-HS-2-216A, MFPT B CONDENSER OUTLET, and observes RED light DARK, GREEN light LIT.

11. MONITOR reg valves controlling S/G levels on program.

BOP BOP determines that SG levels are returning to program.

12. LOCALLY MAINTAIN oil temp between 110 and 130°F on running Standby MFP using 1-THV-24-948.

BOP When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to locally maintain SBMFP oil temperature between 110 and 130°F using 1-THV-24-948. Console Operator reports that oil temperature is currently 118°F.

13. ENSURE reset of C-7:

a. CHECK C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK annunciator LIT. [66-E]

BOP will verify C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK (66-E) is LIT.

b. ENSURE steam dump valves have zero demand.

BOP BOP locates 1-XI-1-33, STEAM DUMP DEMAND and observes zero on the indicator.

c. RESET loss-of-load interlock with steam dump mode switch.

BOP locates 1-HS-1-103D, STEAM DUMP MODE, and rotates the switch to the left. BOP verifies C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK (66-E) is DARK.

14. ENSURE Condensate System Pumps in service as necessary:

• REFER TO 1-GO-4, Normal Power Operation.

BOP SRO may direct the BOP to refer to 1-GO-4, Normal Power Operation, for appropriate condensate/hotwell pump/heater drain pump alignment for current power level.

15. IF reactor power dropped by greater than or equal to 15% in one hour, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate power change sampling BOP requirements.

When contacted as Chemistry, the Console Operator repeats back the request to perform power change samples.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 26 of 56 Event

Description:

1B-B MFP shaft fails, causing loss of feedwater flow. Requires BOP to manually trip the 1B-B MFP. Requires entry into AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load),

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

16. CHECK VALVE POS LIMIT LIT.

BOP BOP determines from 1-XX-47-1000, EHC DISPLAY that the RED VALVE POS LIMIT is LIT.

17. RETURN valve position limiter to normal:

a. ENSURE TURBINE in IMP OUT.

BOP locates the IMP-OUT pushbutton on 1-XX-47-1000 and determines that the light is NOT LIT. BOP depresses the pushbutton to transfer from IMP-IN to IMP-OUT mode.

b. () REDUCE turbine load setpoint using REFERENCE CONTROL (lower) AND GO button until VALVE POS LIMIT LIGHT NOT LIT.

BOP BOP locates the REFERENCE CONTROL on 1-XX-47-1000, EHC CONTROL. BOP depresses the REFERENCE CONTROL pushbutton and reduces REFERENCE display to a value slightly less than the indicated VALVE POSITION LIMIT on 1-XX-47-2000 EHC DISPLAY.

BOP selects a load rate using the LOAD RATE % PER MIN.

c. SET valve position limiter to 95%.

After the VALVE POSITION LIMIT RED light is DARK, the BOP depresses the VALVE POSITION LIMITER pushbutton to raise the valve position limit to 95%.

18. INITIATE repairs on failed pump.

SRO When SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair packages for the 1B MFP.

SRO 19. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 27 of 56 Event

Description:

Control Rods fail to insert during the runback. Requires the RO to place 1- RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT to MAN and insert rods using 1-FLRM, ROD MOTION CONTROL. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: Event 5. Control Rods fail to insert during the runback. Requires the RO to place 1-RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT to MAN and insert rods using 1-FLRM, ROD MOTION CONTROL.

Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System.

Indications:

During secondary runback, control rods failed to insert with an active insertion demand signal present on the Passive Summer display.

Diagnoses and announces failure of control rods to insert in AUTO during RO the runback.

May dispatch an AUO to the CONTROL ROD CABINETS to determine if local alarms are lit.

RO When the RO contacts an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to go to the Rod Control cabinets to look for local alarms.

Console Operator reports that there are no local alarms.

Places 1-RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT in MAN position, and inserts rods RO using 1-FLRM, ROD MOTION CONTROL.

Enters and directs actions of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control SRO System, Section 3.6, Failure of Control Rods to Move on Demand.

The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, 1-AOI-2 Section 3.6, Failure of Control Rods to Move on Demand.

1. CHECK CONTROL ROD URGENT alarm LIT [86-A].

RO RO determines that 86-A, CONTROL ROD URGENT is DARK.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF CONTROL ROD URGENT FAILURE alarm DARK, THEN PLACE SRO control rods in MAN, AND **GO TO NOTE prior to Step 16.

Control rods may already be in MANUAL due to the previous transient.

NOTE Steps 16, 17 and 18 are to be performed for control rod problems other than Urgent Failures.

16. CHECK for the C-5 LOW TURB IMPULSE PRESS ROD BLOCK [66-A]

Alarm window DARK.

RO RO determines that 66-A, C-5 LOW TURB IMPULSE PRESS ROD BLOCK is DARK.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 28 of 56 Event

Description:

Control Rods fail to insert during the runback. Requires the RO to place 1- RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT to MAN and insert rods using 1-FLRM, ROD MOTION CONTROL. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

17. CHECK for the following rod stop alarm windows DARK:

• INTERMED RANGE HI FLUX ROD WD STOP [82-B]

RO determines that 82-B, INTERMED RANGE HI FLUX ROD WD STOP is DARK.

• POWER RANGE OVERPOWER ROD WD STOP [83-A].

RO determines that 83-A, POWER RANGE OVERPOWER ROD WD STOP is DARK.

• C-11 BANK D AUTO WITHDRAWAL BLOCKED [64-F]

RO RO determines that 64-F, C-11 BANK D AUTO WITHDRAWAL BLOCKED is DARK.

• OVERPOWER T TURB RUNBACK & C-4 ROD BLOCK [122-D]

RO determines that 122-D, OVERPOWER T TURB RUNBACK & C-4 ROD BLOCK is DARK.

• OVERTEMP T TURB RUNBACK & C-3 ROD BLOCK [123-D]

RO determines that 123-D, OVERTEMP T TURB RUNBACK & C-3 ROD BLOCK is DARK.

18. ENSURE T-ave and T-ref within 3°F:

• ADJUST turbine load RO

• ADJUST Boron concentration OR move Rods in MAN as necessary.

RO reports current T-ave/T-ref mismatch.

19. INITIATE repairs to auto rod control system.

SRO When the SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for the Rod Control circuit.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next events, Events 4 and 5, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Events 6.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 29 of 56 Event

Description:

1-PCV-68-340, PZR PORV fails open. Requires the RO to perform IMMEDIATE ACTION of AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control, to place 1-HS-68-333, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A in the CLOSE position. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation (DNB limits).

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

89-A, PZR PORV LINE TEMP HI 91-A, PZR PORV/SAFETY OPEN 90-B, PZR PRESS LO-DEVN BACKUP HTRS ON 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV 340A RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

Diagnoses and announces the failure of 1-PCV-68-340A, PZR PORV 340A RO OPEN.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTION of AOI-18 Malfunction of Pressurizer RO Pressure Control System, and closes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV 340A and 1-HS-68-333, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A.

Enters and directs actions of 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level SRO Control System, Sub section 3.2, PZR pressure drop due to failed PORV/Safety or spray valve.

The following actions are taken from AOI-18, MALFUNCTION OF PRESSURIZER AOI-18 PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM, Section 3.2, PZR Pressure Drop Due to Failed PORV/Safety or Spray Valve.

NOTE 1 Step 1 and 2 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps.

1. CHECK PZR spray valves CLOSED:

• Green indicating lights LIT RO observes GREEN light LIT on 1-XI-68-340D. PZR SPRAY LOOP 1 and 1-XI-68-334B, PZR SPRAY LOOP 2.

RO

• Pzr spray demand meters, 1-PIC-68-340B and 1-PIC-68-340D indicating ZERO [1-M-4]

RO observes position indications for 1-PIC-68-334D, PZR SPRAY LOOP 1, and 1-PIC-68-334B, PZR SPRAY LOOP 2.

2. CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• PORV indicating lights RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA RED indicating light is LIT, GREEN indicating light is DARK.

• tailpipe temperature RO RO observes elevated temperature on 1-TI-68-331, PORV 340A & 334 TAILPIPE TEMP.

• acoustic monitoring BOP may be sent to observe 1-XI-68-363, PZR VALVES ACOUSTIC MONITOR. If dispatched, the BOP observes 1-XI-68-340 indicating lights are LIT.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 30 of 56 Event

Description:

1-PCV-68-340, PZR PORV fails open. Requires the RO to perform IMMEDIATE ACTION of AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control, to place 1-HS-68-333, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A in the CLOSE position. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation (DNB limits).

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF PZR press is less than 2335, THEN CLOSE PORV OR CLOSE associated block valve.

RO Since this is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step, it is expected that 1-HS 340AA may be in the CLOSE position AND 1-HS-68-333A will be in the CLOSED position.

3. VERIFY actions taken in Steps 1 and 2 have STOPPED press drop.

RO RO observes RCS pressure on 1-PI-68-340A, 1-PI-68-334, 1-PI-68-323, 1-PI-68-322, PZR PRESS rising.

4. CHECK PZR Safeties CLOSED:

• tailpipe temperatures RO observes elevated temperature on 1-TI-68-331, PORV 340A & 334 TAILPIPE TEMP.

RO

• acoustic monitor BOP may be sent to observe 1-XI-68-363, PZR VALVES ACOUSTIC MONITOR. If dispatched, the BOP observes 1-XI-68-340 indicating lights are LIT.

5. ENSURE PZR heaters on as required:

RO

• Control Group on at 2220 psig

• Backup Groups on at 2210 psig

6. CHECK aux spray, 1-FCV-62-84, CLOSED.

SRO RO observes handswitch 1-HS-62-84, AUX SPRAY TO PZR, in the CLOSED position with the RED indicating light DARK and the GREEN indicating light LIT.

7. CHECK PZR press STABLE or RISING.

RO RO observes RCS pressure on 1-PI-68-340A, 1-PI-68-334, 1-PI-68-323, 1-PI-68-322, PZR PRESS rising.

8. WHEN pressurizer pressure stable and equipment status supports returned to normal, THEN ENSURE the following in AUTO:

RO

• PZR Master controller

• PZR spray controllers

• All heater groups 2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 31 of 56 Event

Description:

1-PCV-68-340, PZR PORV fails open. Requires the RO to perform IMMEDIATE ACTION of AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control, to place 1-HS-68-333, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A in the CLOSE position. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation (DNB limits).

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

• 3.3.1, RTS Instrumentation Not applicable

• 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation Not applicable

• 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System Not applicable

• 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits May be applicable, depending upon severity of pressure drop when the PORV opened.

• 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits Not applicable RO

• 3.4.9, Pressurizer Not applicable

• 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves Not applicable

• 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valves Condition B. One PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled.

Close associated block valve within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

AND Remove power from associated block valve within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND Restore PORV to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

11. NOTIFY Work Control to remove any failed channel from service.

When SRO contacts Work control to have power removed from 1-FCV-SRO 68-333A BLOCK VLV FOR PZR PORV 340 within one hour, and for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-PCV-68-340 repeat back request.

SRO 13. RETURN TO instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 7, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior to SRO the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 7.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 32 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

45-D, HOTWELL LEVEL HI/LO 46-C, CONDENSER VACUUM LO 1-P/TR-2-2, COND TEMP & PRESS blue pen indicating a degrading vacuum condition.

1-LR-2-12, HOTWELL LEVEL - INCHES ICS MAIN CONDENSER display indicating condenser pressure rising in all zones.

1-UDR-278-763, COMPUTER TREND, F2700A COND VAC EXH FLOW pegged high.

BOP Diagnoses and announces the loss of condenser vacuum.

BOP May enter and take actions per ARI 46-C, CONDENSER VACUUM LO.

SRO Enters and directs actions of AOI-11, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.

ARI 46-C The following actions are taken from 46-C, CONDENSER VACUUM LO.

[1] CHECK computer points P2263A (A zone), P2264A (B zone), U7987 (B zone saturated pressure), P1133A (C zone) and P2265A (C zone) to BOP validate the alarm.

BOP determines that condenser vacuum is degrading and reports vacuum loss to the SRO

[2] IF alarm is valid, THEN GO TO AOI-11, LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM.

SRO SRO enters and directs actions of AOI-11, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.

AOI-11 The following actions are taken from AOI-11, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.

CAUTION If steam dumps are lost due to condenser backpressure a turbine/reactor trip from high power may result in secondary and primary safety valve actuation.

NOTE Reference Appendix A as required for Condenser Vacuum LO-LO and LO Alarm setpoints if ICS graph from Turn On code AOI11 is NOT available.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 33 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. MONITOR condenser backpressure is, and will remain, less than 0.1 in.

below the Lo-Lo Alarm using ICS Turn On code AOI11.

Other evaluation points available:

a. ICS Pt. - P2265A (C-Zone)

b. ICS Pt. - P1133A (C-Zone)

BOP

c. ICS Pt. - P2264A (B-Zone)

d. ICS Pt. - P2263A (A-Zone)

e. Cond Back Press Rate of Rise

f. Environmental Conditions BOP observes condenser vacuum degrading rapidly.

EXAMINER: The SRO may set a trigger value for a trip that is more conservative than the value in the RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED column.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

LOWER turbine load to maintain condenser backpressure 0.1 in.

below the Lo-Lo Alarm:

REFER TO:

• AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, OR

• GO-4, Normal Power Operations SRO MAINTAIN T-avg and T-ref within 3°F.

IF condenser backpressure continues to increase OR cannot be reduced below the Lo-Lo Alarm within 5 minutes, THEN:

• IF greater than 50% power, THEN MANUALLY TRIP the Reactor AND ENTER E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

• IF less than or equal to 50% power, THEN MANUALLY TRIP the Turbine AND GO TO AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

2. ENSURE condenser vacuum breaker CLOSED.

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-6-330A, VACUUM BREAKER COND A, and observes the RED light DARK, GREEN light LIT, indicating the valve is closed.

BOP may dispatch an AOU to locally check vacuum breaker.

CAUTION If loss of vacuum is due to undesirable atmospheric conditions for cooling tower operation, then use of Supplemental Condenser Circulating Water (SCCW) or operating unit at reduced load may be required.

3. ENSURE adequate number of CCW pumps in service.

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-27-9A, 1-HS-27-19A, 1-HS-27-29A, and 1-HS-27-39A and observes that all CCW pumps are in service.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 34 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. ENSURE condenser vacuum pump in service.

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-2-176S, COND VACUUM PMP B and observes the RED light LIT GREEN light DARK, indicating that the pump is running.

SRO 5. EVALUATE use of SCCW, if time permits.

6. CHECK gland seal steam pressure approximately 115 psig, 1-PI-47-187, STEAM SEAL SUP PRESS [1-M-2].

BOP BOP locates 1-PI-47-187, STEAM SEAL SUP PRESS, and observes pressure at approximately 115 psig (120 psig.)

7. CHECK cooling tower basin level NORMAL (164-E DARK [1-M-15]).

BOP BOP observes Window 164-E, COOLING TOWER BASIN LEVEL HI is DARK.

8. CHECK condenser air in-leakage less than 30 SCFM [computer point F2700A].

BOP BOP determines that F2700A has pegged high on 1-UDR-278-763, COMPUTER TREND, F2700A COND VAC EXH FLOW.

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO LOCATE condenser in-leakage and, if possible, correct problem.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 35 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-E-0 The following actions are taken from 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection NOTE

• Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS

• Status Trees / SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

EXAMINER: The next step (E-0 Step 1) assumes the reactor is manually tripped prior to entering E-0 completing Critical Task 1. If Reactor has not been manually tripped, Critical Task 1 will be accomplished in E-0 step 1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED column, as indicated below.

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR A GREEN indicating light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR B GREEN indicating light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52BYA, BYPASS BKR A lights DARK.

RO checks 1-52BYB, BYPASS BKR B lights DARK.

RO

• RPIs at bottom of scale.

RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor 1 and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 for indication that all SHUTDOWN and CONTROL bank rods are inserted.

• Neutron flux DROPPING.

RO observes neutron flux trending down on 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER. May also observe levels decreasing on 1-NI-92-135A, CH I NEUTRON MON % PWR, and 1-NI-92-136A, CH II NEUTRON MON % PWR.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 36 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 1 Manually trip the reactor from the control room upon recognition of the failure of the automatic trip circuit prior to entry into FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

Critical 1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

Task 1 Manually TRIP reactor.

If RO rotates 1-RT-1 on 1-M-4, REACTOR TRIP to the right to the TRIP position the reactor will NOT Trip. The RO will be required to rotate 1-RT-2 on 1-M-6, REACTOR TRIP to the right to the TRIP position to trip RO the reactor.

IF reactor will NOT trip, THEN

• • GO TO FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation / ATWS.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

RO RO observes that indicating lights on 1-XX-47-1000 EHC CONTROL for individual throttle and governor valves are GREEN.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

• CSST (offsite),

OR

• D/G (blackout).

RO RO observes that 1-HS-57-41A, 1716 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1A-A FROM CSST C RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-39, 6.9 SDB 1A-A VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

RO observes that 1-HS-57-71A, 1728 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1B-B FROM CSST D RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-66, 6.9 SDB 1B-B VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO RO checks window 70-A, SI ACTUATED; 76-G SI MANUAL; 77-G IS PZR PRESS LO; SI CNTMT PRESS HI; and SI STM PRESS LO DARK.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 37 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

DETERMINE if SI required:

a. IF ANY of the following exists:

• S/G press less than 675 psig, RO observes SG pressures greater than 675 psig (stable, at approximately 1092 psig.)

OR

• RCS press less than 1870 psig, RO observes RCS pressure greater than 1870 psig (approximately RO 2235 psig.)

OR

• Cntmt press greater than 1.5 psig RO observes containment pressure less than 1.5 psig (approximately 0 psig.)

THEN ACTUATE SI manually.

RO reports that conditions do NOT require an SI actuation.

IF SI NOT required, THEN ** GO TO 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

SRO determines that SI is NOT required and transitions to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

EXAMINER: The crew may determine that a RED PATH exists on FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, and make the transition without implementing ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, actions. If the crew uses this path, FR-H.1 actions begin on page 40.

ES-0.1 The following actions are taken from ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

CAUTION Plant conditions, AFW pump start signals and flow requirements should be evaluated as time allows.

1. MONITOR SI actuation criteria:

• IF SI actuation occurs during the performance of this Instruction, THEN RO

• • GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO monitors parameters for SI actuation criteria.

2. CHECK Generator PCBs OPEN.

BOP observes that 1-HS-57-26, PCB 5044 MAIN GENERATOR 500 KV BOP BUS red INDICATING LIGHT IS DARK and GREEN INDICATING LIGHT IS lit. BOP observes 1-HS-57-24, PCB 5088 MAIN GENERATOR 500 KV BUS red INDICATING LIGHT IS DARK and GREEN INDICATING LIGHT IS lit.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 38 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. MONITOR RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F using:

• RCS Loop T-avg with any RCP running.

RO OR

• RCS Loop T-cold with RCPs out-of-service.

RO determines that RCS temperature is greater than 557°F and rising.

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF temperature is less than 557°F, THEN ENSURE steam dumps, S/G PORVs, and blowdown isolation valves CLOSED.

IF cooldown continues, THEN ENSURE total feed flow is less than or equal to 500 gpm:

• REFER TO SOI-3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System, for manual control of TDAFWP.

• MAINTAIN at least one S/G NR level greater than 29%, or total feed flow between 410 and 500 gpm for heat sink.

IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN:

BOP

• CLOSE MSIVs.

• ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

• PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

IF temperature is less than 547°F after AFW is controlled, THEN INITIATE boration:

• REFER TO AOI-34, Immediate Boration.

IF temperature is greater than 564°F, THEN ENSURE either steam dumps, or S/G PORVs OPEN.

WHEN cooldown is controlled, THEN RETURN AFW to AUTO as desired.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 39 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. ENSURE AFW operation:

a. AFW established:

• Both MD AFW pumps RUNNING.

BOP determines that 1A-A MD AFW pump is running but has no discharge flow. BOP dispatches an AUO to inspect to locally inspect the 1A-A MD AFW pump.

When dispatched as an AUO to the 1A-A MD AFW pump, Console Operator will report that the 1A-A MD AFW pump discharge piping and pump casing are very hot. If requested to vent the pump, console operator will report back that the vent valve is stuck and that assistance from Maintenance has been requested.

BOP determines that 1B-B MD AFW pump is running but has no discharge flow. BOP dispatches an AUO to inspect to locally inspect the 1B-B MD AFW pump.

BOP When dispatched as an AUO, console operator will report that the 1B-B MD AFW pump Console Operator will state that the discharge piping and pump casing are very hot. If requested to vent the pump, console operator will report back that the vent valve is stuck and that assistance from Maintenance has been requested.

• TD AFW pump RUNNING.

BOP determines that the TD AFW pump is running but has no discharge flow. BOP dispatches an AUO to inspect the TD AFW pump locally.

When dispatched as an AUO to the TD AFW pump, Console Operator will state that the discharge piping and pump casing are very hot. If requested to vent the pump, console operator will report back that the vent valve is stuck and that assistance from Maintenance has been requested.

• LCVs in AUTO or controlled in MANUAL.

4.a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP a. ESTABLISH feed flow from AFW or MFW as necessary.

SRO may direct the BOP to attempt to restore MFW.

b. Heat sink available:

BOP

• Total feed flow greater than 410 gpm, OR

• At least one S/G NR level greater than 29%.

4.b. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP b. IF heat sink can NOT be established, THEN GO TO FR-H.1, Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 40 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-FR-H.1 The following steps are taken from 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

CAUTION

• If total feed flow CAPABILITY of 410 gpm is available, this Instruction should NOT be performed.

• If an Intact S/G is available, feed flow should NOT be reestablished to any faulted S/G.

1. CHECK if secondary heat sink is required:

a. RCS pressure greater than any Intact S/G pressure.

BOP

b. RCS temperature greater than 375°F [360°F ADV].

RO determines that both of the conditions requiring a heat sink exist.

2. ENSURE at least one charging pump RUNNING.

RO RO reports that 1A-A Charging Pump is running.

CAUTION RCS bleed and feed criteria must be monitored for immediate response if the criteria is exceeded.

3. DETERMINE if RCS bleed and feed required:

a. CHECK RCS bleed and feed required:

• Any THREE S/G WR levels less than or equal to 26% [36% ADV].

RO observes 1-LI-3-43A, SG 1 WR LEVEL, 1-LI-3-56A, SG 2 WR LEVEL, 1-LI-3-98A, SG 3 WR LEVEL, and 1-LI-3-111A, SG 4 WR LEVEL and determines that all levels are greater than 26%.

RO OR

• RCS pressure greater than or equal to 2335 psig.

RO observes 1-PI-68-340A, PZR PRESS, 1-PI-68-334, PZR PRESS, 1-PI-68-323, PZR PRESS and 1-PI-68-322 PZR PRESS and determines that all pressures are less than 2335 psig.

RO reports that the conditions requiring RCS bleed and feed are NOT met.

4. ENSURE S/G blowdown ISOLATED.

BOP locates 1-HS-1-7/181, SG 1 BLOWDOWN VLVS, 1-HS-1-14/182, SG BOP 2 BLOWDOWN VLVS, 1-HS-1-25/183, SG 3 BLOWDOWN VLVS, and 1-HS-1-32/184, , SG 4 BLOWDOWN VLVS and rotates each handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSED position. RO observes GREEN lights LIT, RED lights DARK on each handswitch.

5. MONITOR CST volume greater than 200,000 gal.

BOP BOP reports CST volume is approximately 320,000 gal in CST A.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 41 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE If the use of condensate flow is anticipated, then a higher PZR level will better accommodate the level shrink from S/G cooldown and depressurization.

6. CONTROL PZR level between 29% and 63% [47% and 58% ADV].

RO RO repeats back CONTROL step.

7. ESTABLISH MD AFW pump flow:

BOP a. CHECK MD AFW pump AVAILABLE.

BOP reports that MD AFW pumps are not available.

7. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP a. ** GO TO Step 8.

SRO continues with 1-FR-H.1 actions.

8. ESTABLISH TD AFW pump flow:

BOP a. CHECK TD AFW pump AVAILABLE.

BOP reports that TD AFW pump is not available.

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO a. ** GO TO Step 9.

SRO continues with 1-FR-H.1 actions.

9. STOP all four RCPs.

RO RO stops all RCPs.

10. IF Secondary pumps will be used to feed S/Gs, THEN REFER TO Appendix A (1-FR-H.1), Establishing MFW following Reactor Trip, while BOP continuing this Instruction.

SRO directs the BOP to perform actions of 1-FR-H.1, Appendix A, Establishing MFW following Reactor Trip.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 42 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following steps are taken from 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Appendix 1-FR-H.1 A. Establishing MFW Following Reactor Trip.

CAUTIONS

1) Rx trip breakers must be cycled to allow reset of MFW when isolated by SI or HI-HI S/G level or Valve Vault Room level switches.

2) If any valid SI signal has occurred since SI reset, cycling Rx trip breakers may initiate SI actuation, if signal has NOT yet been blocked by IMs.

A. ENSURE MFW reg valves controllers in MANUAL, AND SET to ZERO demand.

BOP locates 1-FIC-3-35, SG 1-MFW REG VLV, transfers the controller to manual by depressing the AUTO/MANUAL pushbutton and BOP observing the YELLOW light for MAN LIT. The BOP depresses and holds the RAMP pushbutton and the << pushbutton simultaneously until the controller display indicates the valve is closed.

BOP locates each of the remaining Main Feed Reg valve controllers and performs the actions for each valve.

B. ENSURE bypass reg valves controllers in MANUAL, AND SET to ZERO demand.

BOP locates 1-FIC-3-35A, SG 1-MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL, transfers the controller to manual by depressing the AUTO/MANUAL pushbutton and observing the YELLOW light for MAN LIT. The BOP BOP depresses and holds the RAMP pushbutton and the << pushbutton simultaneously until the controller display indicates the valve is closed.

BOP locates each of the remaining MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL controllers and performs the actions for each valve.

C. WHEN SI signals blocked OR cleared, THEN CYCLE reactor trip breakers to allow MFW Isolation reset.

SRO determines that since no SI has occurred, the reactor trip breakers DO NOT have to be cycled to allow the MFW isolation to be RESET.

Since 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP handswitch is stuck in the neutral SRO position, if the crew attempts to cycle the reactor trip breakers, the breakers will not operate.

If contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to cycle the reactor trip breakers locally. The Console Operator will enter rpr68 using Event 24 to close the breaker, then use rpr68 to open reactor trip breaker A. The Console Operator will enter rpr69 using Event 24 to close the breaker, then use rpr69 to open reactor trip breaker B.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 43 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior D. RESET MFW isolation:

1. PLACE both MFW isolation reset switches to RESET [M-3].

BOP locates 1-HS-3-99A1, MFW ISOL ACT RESET TR-A, then rotates the handle to the right to the ACTUATION RESET position.

BOP locates 1-HS-3-99B1, MFW ISOL ACT RESET TR-B, then rotates the handle to the right to the ACTUATION RESET position.

2. ENSURE MFW isolation signal clears [M-6 Master Panel].

BOP observes 1-XX-55-6C, MASTER ISOL SIGNAL STATUS PNL BOP MFW (light 4) is DARK.

BOP observes 1-XX-55-6C, MASTER ISOL SIGNAL STATUS PNL MFW (light 4) is DARK.

3. PUSH MFW isolation reset push-buttons [M-3].

BOP locates 1-HS-3-99A2, RESET TR-A MFW ISOL, and depresses the pushbutton. The RED backlight on the pushbutton clear (be DARK) after depressing the pushbutton.

BOP locates 1-HS-3-99A2, RESET TR-B MFW ISOL, and depresses the pushbutton. The RED backlight on the pushbutton clear (be DARK) after depressing the pushbutton.

E. ENSURE MFW mode switch 1-HS-3-45 in LONG CYCLE RECIRC.

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-3-45, MFW - MODE SWITCH, and rotates the handswitch from the NORMAL position to the right to the LONG CYCLE RECIRC position.

F. ENSURE MFW bypass isolation valves OPEN.

BOP locates and observes the RED lights are LIT and the GREEN BOP lights are DARK for 1-XI-3-SG 1 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV-3-238, 1-XI 239, SG 2 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV-3-239, 1-XI-3-242, SG 3 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV-3-242, and 1-XI-3-245, SG 4 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV-3-245.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 44 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior G. ENSURE standby MFW pump RUNNING, if available, AND CONTROL S/G levels with MFW bypass reg controllers.

BOP locates 1-HS-3-200A, STANDBY MFWP, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the START position. BOP observes 1-EI-3-200, STANDBY MFWP AMPS for normal amps. BOP observes 1-PI-3-203A, STANDBY MFWP DISCH PRESS for normal discharge pressure.

BOP locates 1-FIC-3-35A, SG 1-MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL, and depresses the >> pushbutton until the feedwater flow is established to SG 1.

BOP BOP locates 1-FIC-3-48A, SG 3-MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL, and depresses the >> pushbutton until the feedwater flow is established to SG 2.

BOP locates 1-FIC-3-90A, SG 3-MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL, and depresses the >> pushbutton until the feedwater flow is established to SG 3.

BOP locates 1-FIC-3-103A, SG 4-MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL, and depresses the >> pushbutton until the feedwater flow is established to SG 4.

BOP informs the SRO that the Standby Main Feedwater Pump is running, and that flow has been established to the SGs.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 45 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-FR-H.1 The following steps are taken from 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

CAUTION

• If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal.

• If plant conditions degrade after automatic SI is blocked, manual actuation may be required.

NOTE After the low steamline pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

11. BLOCK SI signals:

a. INITIATE RCS depressurization to less than 1912 psig:

RO 1) IF letdown in service, THEN ALIGN aux spray USING Appendix B (1-FR-H.1), ALIGN AUX SPRAY.

RO reports that letdown is in service, so the AUX SPRAY is available.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 46 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

b. BLOCK auto SI actuation signals [68-B], and [69-B]:

1) NOTIFY IMs to block auto SI USING IMI-99.040, AUTO SI Block.

If/when notified as Work Control OR Instrument Maintenance to block auto SI using IMI-99.040, AUTO SI Block the Console Operator will repeat back the request.

The Console Operator insert remote functions rpr18, block train a auto si and rpr19, block train b auto si on a 10 minute time delay. When the time has elapsed, the Console Operator will report back that IMI-99.040 is complete.

2) WHEN RCS pressure is less than 1962 psig (P-11), THEN

• BLOCK low PZR pressure SI.

RO locates 1-HS-63-136A, LO PZR PRESS SI BLOCK P-11 and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the BLOCK position.

RO locates 1-HS-63-136B, LO PZR PRESS SI BLOCK P-11 and rotates RO the handswitch to the RIGHT to the BLOCK position.

RO observes Window 69-B, PZR PRESS SI BLOCKED is LIT.

• BLOCK low steam pressure SI.

RO locates 1-HS-63-135A, LO STEAM PRESS SI BLOCK P-11 and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the BLOCK position.

RO locates 1-HS-63-135B, LO STEAM PRESS SI BLOCK P-11 and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the BLOCK position.

RO observes Window 68-B, LO STM PRESS SI - BLKD STM PRESS RATE SLI -ACTIVE (P-11) is LIT.

c. ENSURE high Cntmt pressure SI signal CLEARED [78-G].

RO locates Window 78-G, SI CNTMT PRESS HI and determines the window is DARK.

d. CHECK SI actuated.

SRO determines that SI is NOT actuated and enters the RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED column.

11.d. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO d. ** GO TO Substep 11f.

SRO proceeds to Step 11.f.

f. MAINTAIN RCS pressure less than 1912 psig.

RO NOTE

• Cycling reactor trip breakers to allow MFW Isolation reset is required if SI, HI-HI S/G level, or Valve Vault Room Flooding has occurred.

• If any valid SI signal has occurred since SI reset, cycling reactor trip breakers will initiate SI.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 47 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: Actions contained in Step 12 are the same as some steps performed in Appendix A.

Establishing MFW Following Reactor Trip.

12. PREPARE for MFW startup:

a. PLACE MFW pump controllers in MANUAL, AND SET to zero.

BOP locates 1-PC-46-20, MFPT A&B MASTER SPEED CONTROL transfers the controller to manual by depressing the AUTO/MANUAL pushbutton and observing the YELLOW light for MAN LIT. The BOP depresses and holds the RAMP pushbutton and the << pushbutton simultaneously until the controller display indicates the output is zero.

BOP locates each of the individual Main Feed speed controllers and performs the actions for each pump.

b. PLACE MFW reg valve controllers in MANUAL, AND SET to zero.

BOP locates 1-FIC-3-35, SG 1-MFW REG VLV, transfers the controller to manual by depressing the AUTO/MANUAL pushbutton and observing the YELLOW light for MAN LIT. The BOP depresses and holds the RAMP pushbutton and the << pushbutton simultaneously until the controller display indicates the valve is closed.

BOP locates each of the remaining Main Feed Reg valve controllers and performs the actions for each valve.

c. PLACE MFW reg bypass valve controllers in MANUAL, AND SET to zero.

BOP locates 1-FIC-3-35A, SG 1-MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL, transfers the controller to manual by depressing the AUTO/MANUAL pushbutton and observing the YELLOW light foe MAN LIT. The BOP depresses and holds the RAMP pushbutton and the << pushbutton simultaneously until the controller display indicates the valve is closed.

BOP locates each of the remaining MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL controllers and performs the actions for each valve.

d. CHECK FW bypass isolation valves OPEN.

BOP locates and observes the RED lights are LIT and the GREEN lights are DARK for 1-XI-3-SG 1 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV-3-238, 1-XI-3-239, SG 2 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV-3-239, 1-XI-3-242, SG 3 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV 242, and 1-XI-3-245, SG 4 MFW BYP ISOL 1-FCV-3-245.

NOTE If the standby feed pump will be used, only the hotwell pumps should be started to prevent an overpressure condition.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 48 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 2 Perform actions of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, to place the Standby Main Feedwater Pump in service and establish flow into at least one SG before RCS bleed and feed is required.

Critical 13. ESTABLISH feedwater flow:

Task 2 a. START secondary plant pumps as necessary:

1) Hotwell pumps.

All hotwell pumps may be running at this point. If not, the BOP starts the remaining pumps.

2) Condensate booster pumps.

BOP determines that the Condensate booster pumps are not required since the Standby Main Feedwater Pump is available.

3) Cond DI booster pumps.

BOP determines that the Cond DI booster pumps are not required since the Standby Main Feedwater Pump is available.

b. CHECK MSIVs OPEN.

BOP observes the MSIVs are OPEN by RED lights LIT and GREEN lights BOP DARK on 1-HS-1-4A, MSIV SG 1, 1-HS-1-11A, MSIV SG 2, 1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3, 1-HS-1-29A, MSIV SG 4.

c. ESTABLISH MFW pump flow:

1) START MFW pump turbine or standby feed pump.

BOP determines that due to the previous failures of 1B-B MFW pump and the loss of condenser vacuum that the TD MFW pumps cannot be returned to service.

BOP locates 1-HS-3-200A, STANDBY MFWP, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the START position. BOP observes 1-EI 200, STANDBY MFWP AMPS for normal amps. BOP observes 1-PI 203A, STANDBY MFWP DISCH PRESS for normal discharge pressure

2) CONTROL MFW pump and bypass reg valve(s) to restore S/G level(s).

BOP throttles open the bypass reg valves to establish flow to all SGs.

14. CHECK secondary heat sink restored:

BOP a. NR level in at least one S/G greater than 29% [39% ADV].

BOP reports that ALL SG narrow range levels are less than 29%.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 1 Event # 7 Page 49 of 56 Event

Description:

A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse. Automatic reactor trip fails to occur, requiring a manual reactor trip. 1-RT-1, REACTOR TRIP, fails to cause a reactor trip, requiring the use of 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP. Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink and entry into 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. BOP will align and start the Standby Main Feedwater pump to restore flow to the steam generators.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

14. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. IF feed flow established to at least one S/G:

• S/G Wide Range level rising, BOP reports that S/G Wide Range levels are rising.

OR

• Incore T/C dropping.

RO locates an RVLIS - ICCM PLASMA DISPLAY, and reports that Incore T/C temperatures are dropping.

THEN MAINTAIN flow to restore NR level to greater than 29% [39%

ADV].

b. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

SRO determines that the instruction in effect prior to entry into FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, is ES-0.1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

END OF SCENARIO 2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 1 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

1. ENSURE Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 301 by performing the following actions:

a. Select ICManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate IC# 301.

c. Right click on IC# 301.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC# 301.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value rp01b automatic reactor trip signal failure (atws) M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active hs-74-10a-1 01230 hr pump a-a motor switch(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off On fw22b airbound afw pump 1b-b M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active fw22c airbound tdafw pump M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active hs-74-03a hs-74-03a rhr pump a-a suction sw O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 close auto hs-74-10a hs-74-10a rhr pump a-a motor sw O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 ptlock ptlock hs-74-03a-1 01110 hr pump a-a suction(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off On hs-63-72a-1 01170 rhr pmp aa suct fr cnt smp(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off On fw104b fail mech overspeed trip mfpt 1b-b M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active Page 50 of 56

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 1 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value rh01a rhr pump a trip M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active rh12 fail cnt sump to rhr pmp a fcv-63-72 to any position M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 0 fw22a airbound afw pump 1a-a M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active hs-72-40a hs-72-40a rhr spray header a isolation valve sw O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 close auto hs-72-40a-1 01150 hr spray hdr a isol vlv sw (green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off cv32a charging pump a bearing wear M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 12.5 0 ch27a oc trip lower compartment cooler a-a M 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive rpr18 block train a auto si R 22 00:10:00 00:00:00 block normal rpr19 block train b auto si R 23 00:10:00 00:00:00 block normal rpr68 HS Manual trip/close reactor trip breaker a R 24 00:00:00 00:00:00 close normal rpr69 HS Manual trip/close reactor trip breaker b R 25 00:00:00 00:00:00 close normal rd09 rods fail to move in auto M 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active fw51b main fw pump b sheared shaft M 4 00:00:02 00:00:00 Active InActive rc07a pzr level transmitter fails to position chnl 1 68-335 M 5 00:00:00 00:00:10 100 0 rprt1 rprt1 manual; reactor trip close-trip sw O 6 00:00:10 00:00:00 neutral neutral fw09 loss of vacuum M 6 00:00:00 00:00:00 5 0

5. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

6. ENSURE 1-HS-74-10A, RHR PMP A (ECCS), in the STOP, PULL-TO-LOCK position with a GREEN tag. GREEN tags are placed on 1-HS-74-3A, RHR PMP A SUCTION, 1-HS-63-72, CNTMT SUMP TO RHR PMP A SUCT, and 1-HS-72-40A, RHR SPRAY HDR A TO CNTMT. ENSURE 1-HS-74-20A, RHR PMP B (ECCS) and 1-HS-82-48, DG MODE SELECTOR is designated as PROTECTED EQUIPMENT.

7. ENSURE the Train A Week - Channel 1 sign is placed on 1-M-30.

8. Place simulator in FREEZE.

9. ENSURE Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Reactivity Briefing Book MOL (Middle Of Life) is provided to the crew as part of the Turnover Package, and that the MOL placards are on 1-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water Integrators.

10. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN.

Page 51 of 56

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 1 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

1 n/a Complete SOI-63.01, Safety Injection System, Section 8.3.1, Add Water to CLA 1, beginning at Step 12, and return the Safety Injection system to ECCS injection mode.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted, repeat back the request to check the closing spring charged for 1-BRK 10, SAFETY INJECTION PUMP 1A-A (1-PMP-63-10). Report that the closing spring is charged.

2 2 1A-A CCP bearing seizes, causing a motor overload and pump trip.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back the request to determine relay operation for the 1A-A CCP breaker at the 1A-A 6.9 KV Shutdown Board. Report the timed overcurrent relay is picked up.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back the request to locally check the 1A-A CCP. Report the 1A-A CCP motor has scorch marks, and that the pump bearings are extremely hot.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, repeat back request for a troubleshooting and repair package to investigate the cause of the trip of 1A-A CCP.

3 3 A-A Lower Compartment Cooler trips due to a faulty amptector relay.

ROLE PLAY: When BOP contacts an AUO, repeat back the request to investigate the cause of the AA Lower Compartment Cooler trip. Report back that the amptector has tripped.

ROLE PLAY: When BOP contacts an AUO, repeat back the request to observe B ERCW 30 header.

Console Operator reports back level is at 28 inches.

ROLE PLAY: When BOP contacts an AUO, repeat back the request to observe B ERCW 12 header.

Console Operator reports back level is at 11 inches.

ROLE PLAY: When SRO contacts Work Control, repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair packages for the AA Lower Compartment Cooler.

Page 52 of 56

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 1 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

4 4 1B-B MFP shaft fails, causing loss of feedwater flow.

ROLE PLAY: If/When contacted as an AUO, repeat back the request to determine the problem with the 1B MFP. Report that the 1B MFP shaft has failed, and that there are minor oil leaks but no fire. Fire Ops and Environmental are on the scene.

ROLE PLAY: If/When the RO contacts Chemistry, repeat back the request for an RCS boron sample.

Informs the RO that the sample will require approximately 45 minutes to process.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to locally maintain SBMFP oil temperature between 110 and 130°F using 1-THV-24-948. Console Operator reports that oil temperature is currently 118°F.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Chemistry, the Console Operator repeats back the request to perform power change samples.

ROLE PLAY: When SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair packages for the 1B MFP.

5 4 Automatic Rod Control circuit fails to insert control rods during secondary plant runback.

ROLE PLAY: When the RO contacts an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to go to the Rod Control cabinets to look for local alarms. Console Operator reports that there are no local alarms.

ROLE PLAY: When the SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for the Rod Control circuit.

6 5 1-PCV-68-340, PZR PORV fails open.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, repeat back request to have power removed from 1-FCV 333A BLOCK VLV FOR PZR PORV 340 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-PCV-68-340.

Page 53 of 56

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 1 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

7 6 A leak develops in the condenser, which becomes progressively worse.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back the request to locate the condenser leak. Wait 2 minutes then report that there is a leak in the northeast corner of Zone A of the Condenser. Report that the leak cannot be isolated.

ROLE PLAY: BOP may dispatch an AUO to locally check vacuum breaker.

7 n/a Auxiliary Feedwater System is steam bound, resulting in loss of secondary heat sink.

ROLE PLAY: When dispatched as an AUO to the 1A-A MD AFW pump, Console Operator will report that the 1A-A MD AFW pump discharge piping and pump casing are very hot. If requested to vent the pump, console operator will report back that the vent valve is stuck and that assistance from Maintenance has been requested.

ROLE PLAY: When dispatched as an AUO to the 1B-B MD AFW pump, Console Operator will report that the 1B-B MD AFW pump discharge piping and pump casing are very hot. If requested to vent the pump, console operator will report back that the vent valve is stuck and that assistance from Maintenance has been requested.

ROLE PLAY: When dispatched as an AUO to the TD AFW pump, Console Operator will report that the TD AFW pump discharge piping and pump casing are very hot. If requested to vent the pump, console operator will report back that the vent valve is stuck and that assistance from Maintenance has been requested.

ROLE PLAY: If contacted as an AUO, the repeat back the request to cycle the reactor trip breakers locally.

The Console Operator will enter rpr68 using Event 24 to close the breaker, then use rpr68 to open reactor trip breaker A. The Console Operator will enter rpr69 using Event 24 to close the breaker, then use rpr69 to open reactor trip breaker B.

ROLE PLAY: If/when notified as Work Control OR Instrument Maintenance to block auto SI using IMI-99.040, AUTO SI Block the Console Operator will repeat back the request.

The Console Operator insert remote functions rpr18, block train a auto si and rpr19, block train b auto si on a 10 minute time delay. When the time has elapsed, the Console Operator will report back that IMI-99.040 is complete.

Page 54 of 56

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb = 845 ppm

• Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

Train A Channel I Work Week. 1A-A RHR Pump is out of service for pump bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago. EOOS Risk is GREEN. SG 1 has a stable 0.9 gpd tube leak. AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Appendix A and C have been performed. Leak rate has been stable for the last 2 weeks. TD AFW pump is aligned to SG #4 as a precautionary measure, Caution Order tag placed. CLA #1 was filled during last shift. 1-SOI-63.01 Section 8.3.1 Step 11 is complete. Twenty minutes have elapsed since the 1A-A SI pump was started.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

None US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Train A Channel I Work Week. 100% power, MOL conditions. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. Maintain current power level.

Complete SOI-63.01, Safety Injection System, Section 8.3.1, Add Water to CLA 1, beginning at Step 12, as soon as possible after assuming shift. Twenty minutes have elapsed since the 1A-A SI pump was started.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [01-14-2011]

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb = 845 ppm

• Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

Train A Channel I Work Week. 1A-A RHR Pump is out of service for pump bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago. EOOS Risk is GREEN. SG 1 has a stable 0.9 gpd tube leak. AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Appendix A and C have been performed. Leak rate has been stable for the last 2 weeks. TD AFW pump is aligned to SG #4 as a precautionary measure, Caution Order tag placed. CLA #1 was filled during last shift. 1-SOI-63.01 Section 8.3.1 Step 11 is complete. Twenty minutes have elapsed since the 1A-A SI pump was started.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

None US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Train A Channel I Work Week. 100% power, MOL conditions. Control Bank D is at 220 steps. Maintain current power level.

Complete 1-SOI-63.01, Safety Injection System, Section 8.3.1, Add Water to CLA 1, beginning at Step 12, as soon as possible after assuming shift. Twenty minutes have elapsed since the 1A-A SI pump was started.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [12-19-2011]

Scenario 1 TURNOVER PACKAGE

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant NRC EXAM 2013302 Scenario 2

24-Events Number Description Page(s) 1 Return 1A-A CCP to service and remove 1B-B CCP from service using 7-9 SOI-62.01, CVCS - Charging and Letdown, Section 6.2, Swap CCPs.

2 Power Range N41, Detector A (UPPER) fails high. Requires entry into 10-16 and performance of 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions.

Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into multiple CONDITIONS of LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation. Failure impacts ICS calculation of AFD cursor point, but not the AFD listed values.

3 1B #3 Heater Drain Pump bearing seizes, causing a motor overload 17-23 alarm. SRO enters and directs actions of AOI-37, Turbine Runback Response, Section 3.2, #3 HDT High Level or Low Pump Flow.

4 During load reduction, 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL fails 19-20 to start when 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE is selected to the BOR position. RO opens 1-FCV-62-138, EMERG BORATE, to accomplish the required boration based on Attachment 1, MANUAL BORATION METHODS, Section 1.2, Emergency Boration.

5 1A ERCW Supply Header Break at the Intake Pumping Station. 24-28 Requires entry into 0-AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water.

During performance of 0-AOI-13, Section 3.5, Supply Header Rupture in IPS, 2-FCV-67-22, STRAINER 2A-A INLET fails to close, requiring additional compensatory actions to complete the isolation. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

6 A leak develops on RCS Loop 3. Requires entry into and performance 29-33 of AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak. When charging is isolated per AOI-6, the leak propagates, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection.

7 After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break 34-49 LOCA. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation.

This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Critical Tasks Critical Description Page(s)

Task 1 Establish the minimum required auxiliary feedwater flow rate to the 36 steam generators by manually starting the 1A-A motor driven or the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump prior to exiting from 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Step 7.

2 Establish a controlled RCS cooldown at a rate not to exceed 100°F in 49 an hour, to support the SI reduction sequence and preclude swapover to the containment sump.

Attachments Number Description 1 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendixes A and B.

2 1-AOI-43.02, Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown Boards.

3 AOI-17, Turbine Trip, Section 3.3, BOP Realignment.

4 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Appendices A through C.

5 ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation, Appendix B, ERCW Operation.

References Number Title Revision WBN Technical Specifications. Amendment 91 Fire Protection Report SOI-62.01 CVCS - Charging and Letdown. 64 1-AOI-4 Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions 0 ARI-29-35 Heaters & Drains 14 ARI-43-49 CNDS & CONDENSER 14 AOI-37 Turbine Runback Response 16 1-SOI-5&6.01 Extraction Steam, Heater Drains and Vent System 1 AOI-39 Rapid Load Reduction 15 0-AOI-13 Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water 0 AOI-6 Small Reactor Coolant System Leak 34 AOI-17 Turbine Trip 51 1-E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 0 1-E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 1 ECA-1.1 Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation 12 1-AOI-43.02 Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown Boards 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Scenario No. 2 Op Test No.: 302 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Run Time:

Initial Conditions: 100% Power, MOL conditions. Control Bank D rods are at 220 steps. RCS boron concentration is 845 ppm.

Turnover: Train A Channel I Work Week. 1A-A RHR Pump is out of service for pump bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago. EOOS Risk is GREEN. SG 1 has a stable 0.9 gpd tube leak. AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Appendix A and C have been performed. Leak rate has been stable for the last 2 weeks. Steam to TD AFW pump is aligned to SG #4 as a precautionary measure. Caution Order placed. Return 1A-A CCP to service and remove 1B-B CCP from service using SOI-62.01, CVCS - Charging and Letdown, Section 6.2, Swap CCPs.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description No.

1 n/a N-RO/SRO Return 1A-A CCP to service and remove 1B-B CCP from service using SOI-62.01, CVCS - Charging and Letdown, Section 6.2, Swap CCPs.

2 ni08a I-RO Power Range N41, Detector A (UPPER) fails high.

TS-SRO 3 fw56b C-BOP 1B #3 Heater Drain Pump bearing seizes, causing a motor TS-SRO overload alarm.

4 hs-62-140a R-RO During load reduction, 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL fails, requiring use of 1-HS-62-138A, EMERG BORATE.

5 rw14a C-BOP 1A ERCW Supply Header Break at the Intake Pumping Station.

hs-67-22a TS-SRO 2-hs-67-22a 6 th03c C-RO A leak develops on RCS Loop 3.

TS-SRO 7 th03c M-ALL After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-ed06b break LOCA. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2013-10 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 - Summary Initial Condition 100% Power, MOL conditions. Control Bank D rods are at 220 steps. RCS boron concentration is 845 ppm.

Turnover Train A Channel I Work Week. 1A-A RHR Pump is out of service for pump bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago. EOOS Risk is GREEN. SG 1 has a stable 0.9 gpd tube leak. AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Appendix A and C have been performed. Leak rate has been stable for the last 2 weeks. Steam to TD AFW pump is aligned to SG #4 as a precautionary measure. Caution Order placed. Return 1A-A CCP to service and remove 1B-B CCP from service using SOI-62.01, CVCS -

Charging and Letdown, Section 6.2, Swap CCPs.

Event Description 1 Return 1A-A CCP to service and remove 1B-B CCP from service using SOI-62.01, CVCS -

Charging and Letdown, Section 6.2, Swap CCPs.

2 Power Range N41, Detector A (UPPER) fails high. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into multiple CONDITIONS of LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.

Failure impacts ICS calculation of AFD cursor point, but not the AFD listed values.

3 1B #3 Heater Drain Pump bearing seizes, causing a motor overload alarm. Forty-five seconds later the 1B #3 HDP trips. SRO enters and directs actions of AOI-37, Turbine Runback Response, Section 3.2, #3 HDT High Level or Low Pump Flow. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference (AFD), CONDITION A.

4 During load reduction, 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL fails to start when 1-HS 140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE is selected to the BOR position. RO opens 1-FCV-62-138, EMERG BORATE, to accomplish the required boration based on Attachment 1, MANUAL BORATION METHODS, Section 1.2, Emergency Boration.

5 1A ERCW Supply Header Break at the Intake Pumping Station. Requires entry into 0-AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water. During performance of 0-AOI-13, Section 3.5, Supply Header Rupture in IPS, 2-FCV-67-22, STRAINER 2A-A INLET fails to close, requiring additional compensatory actions to complete the isolation. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into LCO 3.0.3, since ERCW trains are cross-tied.

6 A leak develops on RCS Loop 3. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak. Earlier failure of 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL prevents makeup to the VCT. Requires evaluation of and entry into LCO 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage CONDITION A. When charging is isolated per AOI-6, the leak propagates, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection.

7 After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 2 - Critical Task Summary Critical Task Description 1 Establish the minimum required auxiliary feedwater flow rate to the steam generators by manually starting the 1A-A motor driven or the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump prior to exiting from 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Step 7.

2 Establish a controlled RCS cooldown at a rate not to exceed 100°F in an hour, to support the SI reduction sequence and preclude swapover to the containment sump.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 7 of 65 Event

Description:

Return 1A-A CCP to service and remove 1B-B CCP from service using SOI-62.01, CVCS -

Charging and Letdown, Section 6.2, Swap CCPs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from SOI-62.01, CVCS - Charging and Letdown, SOI-62.01 Section 6.2, Swap CCPs.

EXAMINER: The crew will be provided a copy of SOI-62.01, CVCS - Charging and Letdown, Section 6.2, Swap CCPs, during their brief. It is expected that the steps that are pump specific will already be marked N/A where appropriate.

NOTE Radiological Protection should be notified when starting or changing ALARA concerns and to revise Radiological Protection postings.

[1] START selected CCP (N/A pump NOT started):

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-108A, CCP A-A (ECCS), and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the START position. Due to the start interlocks on the CCP, there will be a delay in the pump start. After the delay, the RO observes the RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK.

If not already performed, the RO enters N/A for the 1B-B CCP.

[2] ENSURE pump started is operating normally, THEN

[2.1] STOP CCP to be shutdown (N/A pump just started):

RO If not already performed, the RO enters N/A for the 1A-A CCP.

RO locates 1-HS-62-104A, CCP B-B (ECCS), and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the STOP position. RO observes the RED light DARK, GREEN light LIT.

[3] ENSURE the following for pump started (N/A pump STOPPED):

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-108A, CCP A-A (ECCS), and determines that the handswitch is in A-AUTO (the mid-position).

If not already performed, the RO enters N/A for the 1B-B CCP.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 8 of 65 Event

Description:

Return 1A-A CCP to service and remove 1B-B CCP from service using SOI-62.01, CVCS -

Charging and Letdown, Section 6.2, Swap CCPs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[4] IF the pump STOPPED is NOT required to be operable, THEN PERFORM the following: (N/A running pump):

RO RO enters N/A for the step, since both CCPs are to remain OPERABLE.

[5] IF required, THEN ADJUST 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, to maintain desired press/flow.

RO RO determines that letdown pressure is stable at approximately 320 psig.

[6] MONITOR 1-LI-62-129A, VCT LEVEL.

RO RO locates 1-LI-62-129A, VCT LEVEL and monitors level at approximately 36%.

[7] IF required, THEN ADJUST the following to match Charging and Letdown flows:

RO [7.1] 1-HIC-62-89A, CHARGING HDR RCP SEALS FLOW CONTROL.

[7.2] 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL.

RO determines that charging and letdown are matched.

[8] CHECK the started pumps closing spring charged(N/A pump NOT started):

RO When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to check the closing spring charged on 1-BKR-62-108, CENT CHARGING PUMP 1A-A (1-PMP-62-108). Console Operator reports back the closing spring is charged for 1-BKR-62-108, CENT CHARGING PUMP 1A-A (1-PMP-62-108).

If not already performed, the RO enters N/A for the 1B-B CCP.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 65 Event

Description:

Return 1A-A CCP to service and remove 1B-B CCP from service using SOI-62.01, CVCS -

Charging and Letdown, Section 6.2, Swap CCPs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[9] CHECK the shutdown pumps closing spring charged(N/A pump NOT shutdown):

RO If not already performed, the RO enters N/A for the 1A-A CCP.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to check the closing spring charged on 1-BKR-62-104, CENT CHARGING PUMP 1B-B (1-PMP-62-104). Console Operator reports back the closing spring is charged for 1-BKR-62-104, CENT CHARGING PUMP 1B-B (1-PMP-62-104).

[10] IF 1-HIC-62-93A was taken to manual, THEN PLACE 1-HIC-62-93A to RO AUTO when PZR level is on program, as directed by US/SM.

RO determines that the step is N/A.

[11] MONITOR Rx Power to ensure reactivity changes can be immediately RO identified and corrected.

RO monitors reactor power for changes.

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 2.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 10 of 65 Event

Description:

Power Range N41, Detector A (UPPER) fails high. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

82-F,DCS TROUBLE 83-A. POWER RANGE OVERPOWER ROD WD STOP 83-B, POWER RANGE UPR DETECTOR FLUX DEV 83-E.POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION 115-C, POWER RANGE FLUX HI 115-E. POWER RANGE FLUX RATE HI Control Rods inserting at 8 steps/minute2 1-XX-55-5, Window 47, PR FLUX HI NC43R LIT 1-XX-55-5, Window 38, PR HI RATE NC43U LIT May diagnose initially and announce as Continuous Rod Motion at RO approximately 8 steps per minute.

If diagnosed as uncontrolled rod movement, RO verifies that a secondary plant runback is NOT in progress and performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of RO 1-AOI-2 to place rod control in MANUAL. After rods are in MANUAL, the RO observes no rod motion.

If diagnosed as uncontrolled rod movement, enters and directs actions of SRO 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod Bank Movement.

RO May diagnose and announce Power Range N41 Failure.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 1-AOI-4 to place rod control in MANUAL.

RO After rods are in MANUAL, the RO observes no rod motion.

Enters and directs actions of 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation SRO Malfunctions, Section 3.4 Power Range Monitor (PRM) Failure.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 11 of 65 Event

Description:

Power Range N41, Detector A (UPPER) fails high. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control 1-AOI-2 System, Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod Bank Movement.

NOTE Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step.

1. STOP uncontrolled rod motion:

a. PLACE control rods in MAN.

b. CHECK control rod movement STOPPED.

RO RO places 1-RBSS ROD BANK SELECT in MAN.

RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor 1 and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 for indication that all rod motion has stopped.

2. MAINTAIN T-ave on PROGRAM. (Reference Attachment 1)

• () USE control rods.

RO OR

• () ADJUST turbine load.

3. CHECK loop T-ave channels NORMAL.

RO RO locates 1-TI-68-2E, LOOP 1 TAVG, 1-TI-68-25E, LOOP 2 TAVG, 1-TI-68-44E, LOOP 3 TAVG and 1-TI-68-67E, LOOP 4 TAVG and determines that the TAVG channels are NORMAL.

4. CHECK Auct T-avg NORMAL on 1-TR-68-2B.

RO RO locates 1-TR-68-2B, TREF & AUCT TAVG - °F, and determines that the GREEN pen indicating AUCT TAVG is NORMAL.

5. CHECK NIS power range channels NORMAL.

RO RO locates 1-NI-41B, PR FLUX % POWER, 1-NI-42B, PR FLUX %

POWER, 1-NI-43B, PR FLUX % POWER, 1-NI-44B, PR FLUX % POWER and determines that the NIS PR N41 has failed.

5. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO GO TO AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunction.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 12 of 65 Event

Description:

Power Range N41, Detector A (UPPER) fails high. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions, 1-AOI-4 Section 3.4 Power Range Monitor (PRM) Failure.

NOTE Steps 1and 2 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps

1. PLACE control rods in MANUAL.

RO RO places 1-RBSS ROD BANK SELECT in MAN.

2. CHECK rod motion STOPPED.

RO RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor 1 and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 for indication that all rod motion has stopped.

3. CHECK S/G levels NORMAL BOP BOP observes narrow range levels are stable on 1-FR-3-35, SG 1, 1-FR-3-48, SG 2, 1-FR-3-90, SG 3 and 1-FR-3-103, SG 4, BLUE indications.

NOTE Control rod withdrawal may NOT be possible if a PRM has failed high due to the 103% Rod Withdrawal Stop (C-2) until PRM is defeated. (Annunciator window 83-A).

4. MAINTAIN TAVG and TREF within 3°F.

RO RO determines that Tavg and Tref are within 3°F.

5. DEFEAT failed PRM functions using the appropriate attachment:

• REFER TO Attachment 1, Defeat N-41 PRM Function At NIS Rack.

SRO enters and directs actions of 1-AOI-4, Attachment 1.

RO

• REFER TO Attachment 2, Defeat N-42 PRM Function At NIS Rack.

• REFER TO Attachment 3, Defeat N-43 PRM Function At NIS Rack.

• REFER TO Attachment 4, Defeat N-44 PRM Function At NIS Rack.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions, Attachment 1, Defeat N-41 PRM Function at NIS Rack.

NOTE The following annunciators may be affected by defeating N-41 PRM channel:

• [66-C] N-41 OVERPOWER ROD STOP BYPASSED.

• [82-E] NIS CHANNEL IN TEST.

• [83-A] POWER RANGE OVERPOWER ROD WD STOP.

• [83-E] POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION.

• [115-C] POWER RANGE FLUX HI.

• [115-E] POWER RANGE FLUX RATE HI.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 13 of 65 Event

Description:

Power Range N41, Detector A (UPPER) fails high. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior A. PERFORM the following steps for N-41 PRM:

1. PLACE DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR switch for UPPER RO SECTION to PRN41.

RO locates DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR switch and rotates the switch from the NORMAL position to the right to the N41 position.

2. PLACE DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR switch for LOWER SECTION to PRN41.

RO RO locates DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR switch and rotates the switch from the NORMAL position to the right to the N41 position.

NOTE On the following step, annunciator window 83-A, POWER RANGE OVERPOWER ROD WD STOP will clear (if channel failure was high) and window 66-C, N-41 OVERPOWER ROD STOP BYPASSED, will come into alarm.

3. PLACE ROD STOP BYPASS switch to BYPASS PR N41.

RO RO locates ROD STOP BYPASS switch and rotates the switch from the mid position to the right to the N41 position.

4. PLACE POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch to BYPASS PR N41.

RO RO locates POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch and rotates the switch from the mid position to the right to the N41 position.

NOTE On the following step, annunciator window 83-E, POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION, will clear and annunciator window 82-E, NIS CHANNEL IN TEST, will come into alarm.

5. PLACE COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch to N41.

RO RO locates COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch and rotates the switch from the NORMAL position to the right to the N41 position.

NOTE On the following step, annunciator window 115-E, POWER RANGE FLUX RATE HI, will clear if the positive rate trip light is LIT.

6. IF POSITIVE RATE TRIP is LIT, THEN RESET RATE MODE switch.

RO determines that POSITIVE RATE TRIP is LIT on 1-IDWR-92-N41A, RO POWER RANGE UPPER N41A and rotates the switch to the LEFT to the RESET position. RO observes POSITIVE RATE TRIP light DARK and 115-E POWER RANGE FLUX RATE HI clear.

7. PLACE N-41 in Maintenance Bypass using DCS Operator Display:

RO performs actions using the DCS Operator Display trackball.

a. SELECT BYPASSED TRANSMITTERS" from the BOP MENU.

RO b. SELECT 1LPY0920412P.

c. SELECT MAINT BYP SIGNAL B for 1LPY0920412P.

d. CONFIRM MAINT BYP SIGNAL B changes from gray to red.

e. VERIFY yellow BYP displayed above column A.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 14 of 65 Event

Description:

Power Range N41, Detector A (UPPER) fails high. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions, Section 3.4, Power Range Monitor malfunction, at Step 6.

6. ENSURE 1-NR-92-145 recording an operable PRM.

RO RO observes 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER and determines that PR N41 is NOT selected.

NOTE Inputs to 1-TR-68-2A include power range monitor, pressurizer pressure, T and TAVG. Selection of an operable channel should consider other failures in addition to the failed power range monitor channel.

7. ENSURE 1-TR-68-2A placed to operable T/OTT/OPT channel using 1-XS-68-2B, T RCDR TR-68-2A LOOP SELECT [1-M-5].

RO RO observes 1-XS-68-2B T RCDR TR-68-2A LOOP SELECT and determines that Loop 1 is selected. RO selects any other Loop using 1-XS-682B, T RCDR TR-68-2A LOOP SELECT.

8. INITIATE Repair on failed equipment.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for PR N41.

CAUTION Allowing at least 5 minutes between any rod control input (i.e., TAVG, TREF, or NIS) changes and placing rods in AUTO, will help prevent undesired control rod movement.

9. WHEN AUTO rod control desired, THEN:

a. ENSURE Tavg and Tref within 1°F.

RO observes 1-TR-68-2B, TREF & AUCT TAVG - °F, and determines that Tavg and Tref are within 1°F.

b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication [1-M-4].

RO RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor 1 and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 and determines that a zero demand is present.

c. PLACE control rods in AUTO.

RO locates 1-RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT and rotates the handswitch to the right from the MAN position to the AUTO position.

10. NOTIFY Work Control to have IM trip failed channel bistables.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to have the bistables tripped for PR N41.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 15 of 65 Event

Description:

Power Range N41, Detector A (UPPER) fails high. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

11. REFER TO Tech Specs:

3.3.1-1, Rx Trip System (RTS) 2.a. Power Range Neutron Flux - High Condition D. One Power Range Neutron Flux-High channel inoperable.

Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND Reduce THERMAL POWER to 75% RTP within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />; OR Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND Perform SR 3.2.4.2 every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

3.a. Power Range Neutron Flux Rate - High Positive Rate Condition E. With one channel inoperable, place the channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

6. Overtemperature T Condition W. Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

EXAMINER: P-7 remains operable.

16.c. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8 SRO Condition S. With ONE channel inoperable, verify the interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.

16.d. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-9 Condition S. With ONE channel inoperable, verify the interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.

16.e. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 Condition R. With ONE channel inoperable, verify the interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.

3.2.4 Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR).

SR 3.2.4.2 Verify QPTR is within limit using the movable incore detectors, once within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> AND 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter.

When contacted as Reactor Engineering, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for performance of 1-SI-0-22, Incore QPTR.

12. WHEN notified bistables are tripped, THEN CHECK lights and alarms referenced in Appendix A are LIT.

SRO Bistables are not expected to be tripped during the scenario. The SRO will hold this step open.

13. NOTIFY Operations Duty Manager and Rx Engineering of failed channel.

When contacted as the Operations Duty Manager, the Console Operator will repeat back that PR N41 has failed.

SRO When contacted as Reactor Engineering, the Console Operator will repeat back that PR N41 has failed. Performance of 1-SI-0-22, Incore QPTR, may be discussed.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 16 of 65 Event

Description:

Power Range N41, Detector A (UPPER) fails high. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-4, Nuclear Instrumentation Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

14. DO NOT CONTINUE with this Instruction UNTIL failed PRM repair is completed.

SRO The SRO will hold this procedure open until repairs have been completed.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next events, Event 3 and 4, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior to SRO the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Events 3 and 4.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 and 4 Page 17 of 65 Event

Description:

3. 1B #3 Heater Drain Pump bearing seizes, causing a motor overload alarm. 45 seconds later the 1B #3 HDP trips. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-37, Turbine Runback Response, Section 3.2, #3 HDT High Level or Low Pump Flow.

4. During load reduction, 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL fails to start when 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE is selected to the BOR position. Requires the RO to open 1-FCV-62-138, EMERG BORATE, to accomplish the required boration.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

1-EI-6-116 pegged, off-scale high 14-D, M-1 THRU M-6 MOTOR OVERLOAD 14-E, M-1 THRU M-6 MOTOR TRIPOUT 31-E, #3 HD PMP FAIL TO START 29-E, #3 HD TANK LEVEL HI/LO 30-E,#3 HD TANK BYP TO CONDENSER OPEN 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO Diagnoses and announces the loss of 1B #3 Heater Drain pump due to an BOP electrical fault.

May dispatch AUO to the #3 Heater Drain Tank to monitor levels.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the BOP request to monitor #3 HD Tank level. The Console Operator will call up the THUNDERVIEW High Pressure Heater Diagram fw6, and report heater and tank levels as requested.

May dispatch AUO to the 1B #3 HD pump to determine cause of trip/condition of pump and motor.

BOP When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to investigate the condition of the 1B #3 HD pump. Console Operator reports back that there are scorch marks on the motor, and the pump bearings are extremely hot.

May dispatch AUO to the 1B 6.9KV Unit Board to investigate relays associated with 1B #3 HD pump.

BOP When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to investigate the 1B #3 HD pump breaker relays. Console Operator reports back the instantaneous overcurrent relay has picked up.

SRO May enter and direct actions of AOI-37, Turbine Runback Response.

The following actions are taken from AOI-37, Turbine Runback Response, Section 3.2, AOI-37 #3 HDT High Level or Low Pump Flow.

EXAMINER: The Console Operator will call up the THUNDERVIEW High Pressure Heater Diagram, and provide heater levels when dispatched to monitor tank levels.

1. MONITOR turbine runback annunciator: [28-E] TURBINE RUNBACK BOP BOP is DARK.

BOP reports that 28-E TURBINE RUNBACK BOP is LIT 2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 and 4 Page 18 of 65 Event

Description:

3. 1B #3 Heater Drain Pump bearing seizes, causing a motor overload alarm. 45 seconds later the 1B #3 HDP trips. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-37, Turbine Runback Response, Section 3.2, #3 HDT High Level or Low Pump Flow.

4. During load reduction, 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL fails to start when 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE is selected to the BOR position. Requires the RO to open 1-FCV-62-138, EMERG BORATE, to accomplish the required boration.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP **GO TO Step 12 SRO continues to Step 12.

12. CHECK BOP runback to less than or equal to 1000 MW (85%) turbine BOP load.

BOP reports turbine load is approximately 950 MWe.

13. MONITOR T-avg and T-ref returning to within 3°F.

RO RO reports T-avg within 3°F of T-ref.

14. ENSURE at least two #3 HDT pumps RUNNING with adequate flow to BOP maintain S/G levels.

BOP reports that the 1A and 1C #3 HDT pumps are running.

15. MONITOR the following to determine if main turbine free of water induction:

• FWHT level alarms.

• Turbine vibration.

BOP

• Turbine Metal Temperature ICS points T2609A-T2611A and T2060A-T2062A (turn-on code TURBMET).

BOP monitors parameters to determine if the main turbine is free of water.

EXAMINER: With PR N41 Upper Detector failed high, Channel 1 AFD will indicate a + value which when entered into the calculation of average AFD will make the cursor on the ICS computer display inaccurate.

Actual values displayed for each NIS channel are accurate.

16. MONITOR AFD within the limits of LCO 3.2.3.

RO RO reports that AFD is outside the Target Band.

16. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

INITIATE boration to return AFD within limits using Attachment 1, RO Manual Boration.

SRO directs the RO to perform actions of Attachment 1, Manual Boration.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-37, Turbine Runback Response, , Manual Boration.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 and 4 Page 19 of 65 Event

Description:

3. 1B #3 Heater Drain Pump bearing seizes, causing a motor overload alarm. 45 seconds later the 1B #3 HDP trips. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-37, Turbine Runback Response, Section 3.2, #3 HDT High Level or Low Pump Flow.

4. During load reduction, 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL fails to start when 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE is selected to the BOR position. Requires the RO to open 1-FCV-62-138, EMERG BORATE, to accomplish the required boration.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1.1 Normal Manual Boration A. INITIATE normal boration to change CB as necessary:

RO 1. SET 1-FC-62-139, BA TO BLENDER [1-M-6], to desired flow rate.

RO selects a flow rate between 28 and 40 gpm on 1-FC-62-139, BA TO BLENDER.

2. ADJUST 1-FQ-62-139, BA BATCH COUNTER [1-M6] to ensure boration continues.

RO adjusts 1-FQ-62-139 BA BATCH COUNTER as follows:

1. Depresses and holds the black pushbutton.

RO 2. While holding the pushbutton, the applicant raises the red translucent cover.

3. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant enters 000150 in the display.

4. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant lowers the red translucent cover, and then releases the pushbutton.

3. PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE [1-M-6], to BORATE.

RO RO rotates 1-HS-62-140B VCT MAKEUP MODE from AUTO to the right to BOR position.

4. () PLACE 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL [1-M-6], TO START.

RO RO rotates 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL to the right to the START position. RO observes the GREEN light LIT and the RED light DARK, indicating the makeup control system has a failure.

Indications:

After 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE handswitch is placed in BOR, 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP handswitch fails and boration cannot be started.

NOTE: Makeup controls will not work past this point in the scenario. This will complicate the RCS leak encountered later in the scenario.

A. IF manual boration unavailable, THEN ESTABLISH required SRO emergency boration flow:

1. () PLACE both BA pumps in FAST speed.

RO locates 1-HS-62-230D, BA PMP A SPEED, and rotates the RO handswitch to the RIGHT to the FAST position.

RO locates 1-HS-62-232-D, BA PMP B SPEED, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the FAST position.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 and 4 Page 20 of 65 Event

Description:

3. 1B #3 Heater Drain Pump bearing seizes, causing a motor overload alarm. 45 seconds later the 1B #3 HDP trips. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-37, Turbine Runback Response, Section 3.2, #3 HDT High Level or Low Pump Flow.

4. During load reduction, 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL fails to start when 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE is selected to the BOR position. Requires the RO to open 1-FCV-62-138, EMERG BORATE, to accomplish the required boration.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. ADJUST emergency borate valve 1-FCV-62-138 to obtain required flow.

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-138A, EMERG BORATE, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT and HOLDS the handswitch to the OPEN position.

3. CHECK emergency borate flow on 1-FI-62-137A.

RO RO locates 1-FI-62-137A, EMER BORATE FLOW and checks flow is established.

4. WHEN adequate amount of boric acid injected, THEN CONTINUE with this instruction.

RO RO divides total amount of boric acid to be added by the flow rate established to determine the time required to inject the required boric acid.

5. PLACE both BA pumps in SLOW speed.

RO locates 1-HS-62-230D, BA PMP A SPEED, and rotates the RO handswitch to the LEFT to the SLOW position.

RO locates 1-HS-62-232-D, BA PMP B SPEED, and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the SLOW position.

6. CLOSE emergency borate valve 1-FCV-62-138.

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-138A, EMERG BORATE, and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position while observing flow on 1-FI-62-137A, EMER BORATE FLOW go to zero gpm.

7. VERIFY emergency borate flow, 1-FI-62-137A, indicating ZERO flow.

RO RO locates 1-FI-62-137A, EMER BORATE FLOW and checks flow is ZERO.

When SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat SRO back the request for a troubleshooting and repair packages for the VCT makeup control circuit.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from AOI-37, Turbine Runback Response, Section 3.2, #3 HDT High Level or Low Pump Flow, beginning at Step 17.

17. ENSURE S/G levels return to program.

BOP BOP reports SG levels are returning to program.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 and 4 Page 21 of 65 Event

Description:

3. 1B #3 Heater Drain Pump bearing seizes, causing a motor overload alarm. 45 seconds later the 1B #3 HDP trips. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-37, Turbine Runback Response, Section 3.2, #3 HDT High Level or Low Pump Flow.

4. During load reduction, 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL fails to start when 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE is selected to the BOR position. Requires the RO to open 1-FCV-62-138, EMERG BORATE, to accomplish the required boration.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

18. DISPATCH personnel as necessary to check the following to determine cause of #3 HDT high level or low pump flow:

• #3 HDT level, flow & controls.

• #2 FW heater level.

BOP

• 1-LCV-6-106A, #3 HDT level control [T2D/708 in valve pit].

• #3 HDT pump cavitation control 1-HS-6-106A, NOT reset [T1D/708 on west wall].

When contacted as AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the parameters and components to be monitored.

19. ENSURE condensate system pumps in service as unit load requires:

• REFER TO GO-4, Normal Power Operation.

SRO SRO may refer to GO-4, Normal Power Operation, at a later point, after the unit has been stabilized.

20. IF reactor power dropped by greater than or equal to 15% in one hour, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate power change sampling SRO requirements.

When SRO contacts Chemistry, the Console Operator reports back the request to perform power change sampling requirements.

21. REFER TO SOI-5 & 6.01, Extraction Steam, Heater Drains, and Vent System, to adjust #3 HDT LEVEL and reset pump cavitation control 1-HS-6-106A as necessary.

BOP When BOP contacts an AUO the Console Operator reports back the request to perform SOI-5 & 6.01, Extraction Steam, Heater Drains, and Vent System, to adjust #3 HDT LEVEL and reset pump cavitation control 1-HS-6-106A.

22. CHECK VALVE POS LIMIT light LIT BOP BOP determines from 1-XX-47-1000, EHC DISPLAY that the RED VALVE POS LIMIT is LIT.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 and 4 Page 22 of 65 Event

Description:

3. 1B #3 Heater Drain Pump bearing seizes, causing a motor overload alarm. 45 seconds later the 1B #3 HDP trips. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-37, Turbine Runback Response, Section 3.2, #3 HDT High Level or Low Pump Flow.

4. During load reduction, 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL fails to start when 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE is selected to the BOR position. Requires the RO to open 1-FCV-62-138, EMERG BORATE, to accomplish the required boration.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

23. RETURN valve position limiter to normal

a. ENSURE turbine in IMP OUT.

BOP locates the IMP-OUT pushbutton on 1-XX-47-1000 and determines that the light is NOT LIT. BOP depresses the pushbutton to transfer from IMP-IN to IMP-OUT mode.

b. () REDUCE turbine load using REFERENCE CONTROL (lower) and GO button until VALVE POS LIMIT light not LIT.

BOP BOP locates the REFERENCE CONTROL on 1-XX-47-1000, EHC CONTROL. BOP depresses the REFERENCE CONTROL pushbutton and reduces REFERENCE display to a value slightly less than the indicated VALVE POSITION LIMIT on 1-XX-47-2000 EHC DISPLAY.

BOP selects a load rate using the LOAD RATE % PER MIN.

c. RAISE valve position limiter to 95%.

After the VALVE POSITION LIMIT RED light is DARK, the BOP depresses the VALVE POSITION LIMITER pushbutton to raise the valve position limit to 95%.

24. ENSURE reset of C-7

a. CHECK C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK annunciator LIT [66-E]

BOP will verify C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK (66-E) is LIT.

b. ENSURE steam dump valves have zero demand.

BOP BOP locates 1-XI-1-33, STEAM DUMP DEMAND and observes zero on the indicator.

c. RESET loss-of-load interlock with steam dump mode switch (1-HS 103D).

BOP locates 1-HS-1-103D, STEAM DUMP MODE, and rotates the switch to the left and verifies C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK (66-E) is DARK.

25. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

SRO When SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair packages for the 1B

1. 3 HDT pump and 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL.

SRO 26. RETURN TO instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 5, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior to SRO the next event.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 and 4 Page 23 of 65 Event

Description:

3. 1B #3 Heater Drain Pump bearing seizes, causing a motor overload alarm. 45 seconds later the 1B #3 HDP trips. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-37, Turbine Runback Response, Section 3.2, #3 HDT High Level or Low Pump Flow.

4. During load reduction, 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL fails to start when 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE is selected to the BOR position. Requires the RO to open 1-FCV-62-138, EMERG BORATE, to accomplish the required boration.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 5.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 24 of 65 Event

Description:

1A ERCW Supply Header Break at the Intake Pumping Station. Requires entry into 0-AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water. During performance of 0-AOI-13, Section 3.5, Supply Header Rupture in IPS, 2-FCV-67-22, STRAINER 2A-A INLET fails to close, requiring additional compensatory actions to complete the isolation. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

170-E, IPS VLV & STRNR ROOM A SUMP LEVEL HI 223-A, ERCW HDR A SUP PRESS LO 223-B, ERCW PMP A-A DISCH PRESS LO 225-E, TR-A/B ERCW TO C&SS COMPR FLOW HI BOP Diagnoses and announces the ERCW pipe break on 1B header in the IPS.

May dispatch the Outside AUO to the Intake Pumping Station (IPS) to assess the flooding.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back BOP request to go to the IPS to determine the location of the rupture.

Console Operator reports back that the IPS is flooding rapidly and the break is on the common discharge of the A ERCW pumps.

Enters and directs actions of 0-AOI-13, Loss of ERCW, Section 3.5, SRO Supply Header Rupture in IPS.

The following actions are taken from 0-AOI-13, Loss of ERCW, Section 3.5, Supply 0-AOI-13 Header Rupture in IPS.

NOTE This Section applies to a header break prior to the ERCW Strainer inlet valves or as directed by another section in this procedure.

1. DISPATCH personnel to determine location of rupture.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back BOP request to go to the IPS to determine the location of the rupture.

Console Operator reports back that the IPS is flooding rapidly and the break is on the common discharge of the A ERCW pumps.

2. DISPATCH AUO, with a radio, to the Rx MOV Bds.

BOP When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back request to go the Rx MOV Bds. The Console Operator will report back that he is at the Rx MOV Bds.

CAUTION MOVs with power normally removed may not travel to full closed position under high flow conditions, local verification of isolation may be required.

3. CHECK Train A Supply Header pressure at expected values for existing BOP plant conditions.

BOP observes Train A Supply Header pressure is LOW.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 25 of 65 Event

Description:

1A ERCW Supply Header Break at the Intake Pumping Station. Requires entry into 0-AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water. During performance of 0-AOI-13, Section 3.5, Supply Header Rupture in IPS, 2-FCV-67-22, STRAINER 2A-A INLET fails to close, requiring additional compensatory actions to complete the isolation. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED PERFORM the following:

a. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/7B, 1-FCV-67-22.

When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/7B. The Console Operator reports the breaker closed after rwr05.

b. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/11B, 1-FCV 147.

When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/11B. The Console Operator reports the breaker closed after entering rwr12.

c. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/15E, 1-FCV 458.

When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/15E. The Console Operator reports the breaker closed after entering rwr22

d. UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 2A2-A c/7B, 2-FCV-67-22.

BOP When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 2A2-A c/7B. The Console Operator reports the breaker closed after entering rw29.

e. ENSURE 1-FCV-67-223, ERCW Hdr 1B To 2A Xtie, OPEN.

BOP checks 2-HS-67-223A placard indicates the valve is OPEN with POWER DISCONNECTED.

f. ENSURE 2-FCV-67-223, ERCW Hdr 2A To 1B Xtie, OPEN.

BOP checks 2-HS-67-223A placard indicates the valve is OPEN with POWER DISCONNECTED.

g. OPEN 1-FCV-67-458, CCS Hx A Sup From Hdr 1B.

BOP locates handswitch 1-HS-67-458, CCS Hx A Sup From Hdr 1B, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the OPEN position. BOP observes the RED light LIT and GREEN light DARK.

h. STOP, and PULL TO LOCK all Tr A ERCW Pumps.

i. CLOSE 1-FCV-67-22, Strainer 1A-A Inlet.

BOP locates handswitch 1-HS-67-22A, STRAINER 1A-A INLET, and rotates the handswitch to the left to the CLOSE position. BOP observes the RED light DARK and GREEN light LIT.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 26 of 65 Event

Description:

1A ERCW Supply Header Break at the Intake Pumping Station. Requires entry into 0-AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water. During performance of 0-AOI-13, Section 3.5, Supply Header Rupture in IPS, 2-FCV-67-22, STRAINER 2A-A INLET fails to close, requiring additional compensatory actions to complete the isolation. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: When the BOP rotates 2-HS-67-22A, STRAINER 2A-A INLET, to the CLOSE position, malfunction rw75, fail 2-FCV-67-22 to position, will enter automatically. 2-FCV-67-22A will fail approximately 25% closed. This failure will require additional actions to be taken.

j. CLOSE 2-FCV-67-22, Strainer 2A-A Inlet.

BOP locates handswitch 2-HS-67-22A, STRAINER 2A-A INLET, and rotates the handswitch to the left to the CLOSE position. BOP observes the RED light LIT and GREEN light LIT, indicating that the valve did not close. BOP reports failure to the SRO.

k. START additional Tr B ERCW Pumps as required.

l. OPEN 1-FCV-67-147, CCS Hx C Sup From Hdr 1A.

BOP locates 1-HS-67-147A, CCS HX C SUP FROM HDR 1A, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the OPEN position. BOP observes the RED light LIT and GREEN light DARK.

m. ENSURE 2-FCV-67-147, CCS Hx C Sup From Hdr 2B, is OPEN.

BOP checks 2-FCV-67-147 placard indicates the valve is OPEN with POWER DISCONNECTED.

n. IF strainer inlet isolation(s) failed to close, THEN PERFORM the following:

• UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 2A2-A c/8A, 2-FCV-67-81.

BOP When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Bd 2A2-A c/8A for 2-FCV-67-81.The Console Operator reports the breaker closed after entering rwr30.

• UNLOCK, and CLOSE bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/8A, 1-FCV-67-81.

When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/8A. The Console Operator reports the breaker closed after entering rwr03.

• CLOSE 1-FCV-67-81, AB Supply Hdr 1A.

BOP locates handswitch 1-HS-67-81A, AB SUPPLY HDR 1A, and rotates the handswitch to the left to the CLOSE position. BOP observes the RED light DARK and GREEN light LIT.

• CLOSE 2-FCV-67-81, AB Supply Hdr 2A.

BOP locates handswitch 2-HS-67-81A, AB SUPPLY HDR 2A, and rotates the handswitch to the left to the CLOSE position. BOP observes the RED light DARK and GREEN light LIT.

o. **GO TO Step 5.

SRO implements actions of Step 5.

NOTES

• With ruptured header strainer inlet valves closed, the flow indicators on the isolated supply headers will be off-scale low

• With ERCW headers cross-tied, evaluate LCO 3.0.3 applicability.

5. CHECK in-service header(s) flow(s) and pressure(s) return to expected BOP values for existing plant conditions.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 27 of 65 Event

Description:

1A ERCW Supply Header Break at the Intake Pumping Station. Requires entry into 0-AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water. During performance of 0-AOI-13, Section 3.5, Supply Header Rupture in IPS, 2-FCV-67-22, STRAINER 2A-A INLET fails to close, requiring additional compensatory actions to complete the isolation. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP 6. CHECK pump amps within limits.

7. ALIGN backup ERCW supply to DGs without normal supply:

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-67-68A, DG 1A-A BACKUP SUP (FCV-67-68 for C-S) and rotates the handswitch to the right to the OPEN position. BOP observes RED light LIT and GREEN light DARK.

BOP locates 2-HS-67-68A, DG 2A-A BACKUP SUP (FCV-67-68 for C-S) and rotates the handswitch to the right to the OPEN position. BOP observes RED light LIT and GREEN light DARK.

8. REFER TO Tech Specs:

• 3.0.3, Applicability With the ERCW headers cross-connected, entry into LCO 3.0.3 is required. When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place the unit, as applicable, in:

a. MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />;

b. MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and

c. MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

SRO

• 3.4.6, RCS Loops-Mode 4 Not applicable, since the plant is in Mode 1.

• 3.7.8, Essential Raw Cooling Water System (ERCW).

With trains cross-connected, LCO 3.0.3 is most limiting.

• 3.8.1, AC Sources-Operating.

Condition C. Two required DGs in Train B inoperable may be entered.

However, LCO 3.0.3 is the most limiting and a Safety Function Determination would be required in this situation.

• OR 14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment 14.10 With one or more of the breakers and/or valves specified in design output documents not in the noted position or condition, return the breakers and/or valve to the required position within 30 days.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 28 of 65 Event

Description:

1A ERCW Supply Header Break at the Intake Pumping Station. Requires entry into 0-AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water. During performance of 0-AOI-13, Section 3.5, Supply Header Rupture in IPS, 2-FCV-67-22, STRAINER 2A-A INLET fails to close, requiring additional compensatory actions to complete the isolation. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. EVALUATE ERCW availability to DGs.

SRO determines that the backup supply valves are open to the affected DGs.

SRO When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to check ERCW flow to the DGs. Console Operator reports back that flow is between 850 and 900 gpm to each DG.

10. INITIATE repair.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator repeats back the request for a work package to troubleshoot and repair A ERCW Header at the IPS.

11. IF ERCW to in-service CCS heat exchanger was interrupted, THEN SRO NOTIFY Duty System Engineer to initiate evaluation for effect on CCS equipment and piping.

12. REFER TO SOI-67.01, Essential Raw Cooling Water System for system SRO realignment.

SRO 13. RETURN TO instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 6, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior to SRO the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 6.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 29 of 65 Event

Description:

A leak develops on RCS Loop 3. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak. When charging is isolated per AOI-6, the leak propagates requiring a reactor trip and safety injection.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

144-A. ICE COND INLET DOOR OPEN 175-B, LWR CNTMT AIR 1-RM-106 RAD HI 103-B CNTMT MOISTURE HIGH 83-D, PLANT COMPUTER GENERATED ALARM (SEE ICS) 160-C, RX BLDG POCKET SUMP LEVEL HI 1-LR-68-339, PZR LEVEL - % indicating a decreasing trend.

1-LI-62-129A, VCT LEVEL indicating a decreasing trend as charging flow rises.

CNTMT PRESS rising slowly.

RO Diagnoses and announces the RCS leak.

RO May increase charging flow to stabilize PZR level.

BOP Reports 1-RM-90-106 high radiation alarm.

SRO Enters and directs actions of AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak.

AOI-6 The following actions are taken from AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak.

NOTE During performance of this instruction the need for rapid load reduction or Unit trip should be continuously evaluated.

1. CHECK CCP in service.

RO RO reports that the 1A-A CCP is in service.

2. ADJUST 1-FCV-62-89 AND 1-FCV-62-93 as necessary to maintain pzr level on program.

RO places 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL and RO places in MANUAL and raises charging flow by holding the toggle switch to the LEFT.

RO locates 1-HIC-62-89A, CHRG HDR - RCP SEALS FLOW CONTROL and rotates the dial to the RIGHT to OPEN the valve.

3. CHECK letdown flow in service for 75 gpm.

RO RO locates 1-FI-62-82, LETDOWN FLOW and reports flow is 75 GPM.

RO may also report that 1-HS-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM CIV

- A is OPEN.

4. INCREASE VCT Auto makeup:

RO reports that 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL failed previously and makeup will not start.

RO a. DOUBLE setting on Boric Acid and PW water flow controllers

• 1-FC-62-142

• 1-FC-62-139

b. ENSURE RED light lit on 1-HS-62-140A.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 30 of 65 Event

Description:

A leak develops on RCS Loop 3. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak. When charging is isolated per AOI-6, the leak propagates requiring a reactor trip and safety injection.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. CHECK in Modes 1 through 3 SRO SRO determines that the unit is in Mode 1.

NOTE Pzr level must be allowed time to change following changes in charging flow.

6. MONITOR the following parameters:

• Pzr level STABLE or RISING.

RO reports current trend in PZR level.

• Containment pressure STABLE or DROPPING.

RO RO reports containment pressure is slowly rising.

SRO enters RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED column for actions.

• RCS pressure STABLE or RISING.

RO reports current trend in RCS pressure.

6. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF any of the following occur:

• Loss of pzr level is IMMINENT,

• Containment pressure is approaching 1.5 psig.

• RCS pressure is approaching 1970 psig (dropping), THEN RO

1) ()TRIP Rx.

2) INITIATE SI.

3) ** GO TO E-0, Rx Trip or Safety Injection.

RO determines that the conditions of the RNO DO NOT exist at this time, and monitors parameters for changes.

7. CHECK secondary plant radiation NORMAL:

• Condenser exhaust monitors.

BOP

• S/G blowdown monitors.

• Main steam line monitors.

BOP reports secondary radiation is NORMAL.

8. MAKE plant announcement via PA:

SRO "Attention plant personnel. A primary system leak has developed. Any personnel located either inside containment or in the Auxiliary Building should exit the area immediately." (Repeat)

CAUTION Attempts to quantify leak rate should not delay performance of the remaining steps.

NOTE Appendix B may be used to estimate RCS leak rate.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 31 of 65 Event

Description:

A leak develops on RCS Loop 3. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak. When charging is isolated per AOI-6, the leak propagates requiring a reactor trip and safety injection.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. INITIATE leak rate estimate:

a. STOP any heatup/cooldown in progress.

b. ADJUST charging flow to STABALIZE pzr level.

RO

c. CHECK Net Charging on ICS (UF1016)

RO stabilizes PZR level and reports leak rate estimate of approximately 50 gpm.

10. CHECK safety valves CLOSED:

• EVALUATE tailpipe temp and acoustic monitors.

RO observes response of 1-TI-68-330, SAFETY 68-563 TAILPIPE TEMP, RO 1-TI-68-329, SAFETY 68-564 TAILPIPE TEMP, and 1-TI-68-328, SAFETY 68-565, stable at approximately 110°F.

BOP may observe 1-XI-68-363, PZR VALVES ACOUSTIC MONITOR lights are DARK for 1-XI-68-363 (68-563), 1-XI-68-364 (68-564) and 1-XI-68-365 (68-565).

11. CHECK PORVs CLOSED:

• EVALUATE tailpipe temp and acoustic monitors.

RO RO observes response of 1-TI-68-331, PORV 340A & 334 TAILPIPE TEMP, stable at approximately 110°F.

BOP may observe 1-XI-68-363, PZR VALVES ACOUSTIC MONITOR lights are DARK for 1-XI-68-340 and 1-XI-68-334.

NOTE Relief valves (pzr PORVs, pzr safeties, CVCS letdown, RHR suction, and SI lines), and Rx head vent isolation valves could be leaking to the PRT. Further investigation will have to be made if PRT conditions become abnormal and leakage path is not readily identifiable.

12. MONITOR PRT conditions NORMAL:

• Level.

• Temperature.

RO

• Press.

RO locates 1-LI-68-300, PRT LEVEL, 1-PI-68-301, PRT PRESS, 1-TI 309, PRT TEMP, and reports that PRT conditions are NORMAL.

NOTE If leak is on CVCS, pzr level should begin rising with charging and letdown isolated. Appendix B can be used to verify small leaks are isolated.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 32 of 65 Event

Description:

A leak develops on RCS Loop 3. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak. When charging is isolated per AOI-6, the leak propagates requiring a reactor trip and safety injection.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

13. ISOLATE letdown:

• CLOSE 1-FCV-62-72, (45 gpm).

• CLOSE 1-FCV-62-73, (75 gpm).

• CLOSE 1-FCV-62-74, (75 gpm).

RO locates 1-FCV-62-74, LETDOWN ORIFICE C 75 GPM - CIV-A and rotates the handswitch to the left to the CLOSE position. RO observes RED light is DARK and the GREEN indicating light is LIT.

RO

• CLOSE 1-FCV-62-76, (5 gpm).

• CLOSE 1-FCV-62-69.

RO rotates 1-HS-62-69A RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT to the left to the CLOSE position. RO observes the RED light LIT and GREEN light is LIT.

• CLOSE 1-FCV-62-70.

RO rotates 1-HS-62-70A RCS LETDOWN FRM LOOP 3 IN CNTMT to the left to the CLOSE position. RO observes the RED light LIT and GREEN light is LIT.

EXAMINER: When the RO closes 1-FCV-62-90, CHARGING ISOLATION, the leak size will automatically increase to 25%. The change in leak size will require the applicants to re-evaluate AOI-6, Step 6 and Step 6 RNO, and ultimately trip the reactor and initiate a safety injection.

14. ISOLATE charging:

• CLOSE 1-FCV-62-85.

• CLOSE 1-FCV-62-86.

RO rotates 1-HS-62-86A, ALT CHARGING TO LOOP 4, to the left to the CLOSE position. RO observes the RED light LIT and GREEN light is LIT.

RO

• CLOSE 1-FCV-62-90.

RO rotates 1-HS-62-90A, CHARGING LINE ISOL, to the left to the CLOSE position. RO observes the RED light LIT and GREEN light is LIT.

• CLOSE 1-FCV-62-91.

RO rotates 1-HS-62-91A, CHARGING LINE ISOL, to the left to the CLOSE position. RO observes the RED light LIT and GREEN light is LIT.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 6 Page 33 of 65 Event

Description:

A leak develops on RCS Loop 3. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak. When charging is isolated per AOI-6, the leak propagates requiring a reactor trip and safety injection.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior AOI-6 The following actions are taken from AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak.

6. MONITOR the following parameters:

• Pzr level STABLE or RISING.

RO reports that PZR level is dropping at a faster rate.

RO

• Containment pressure STABLE or DROPPING.

RO reports that containment pressure is rising at a faster rate.

• RCS pressure STABLE or RISING.

RO reports RCS pressure dropping.

6. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

Based on the trends provided by the RO, the SRO determines that there is no way to stabilize the plant and directs the RO to initiate a reactor trip, verify the trip and then to initiate Safety Injection.

IF any of the following occur:

• Loss of pzr level is IMMINENT, SRO/RO

• Containment pressure is approaching 1.5 psig.

• RCS pressure is approaching 1970 psig (dropping), THEN

1) ()TRIP Rx.

2) INITIATE SI.

3) ** GO TO E-0, Rx Trip or Safety Injection.

SRO directs operators to take IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

EXAMINER: The remaining event, Event 7 is automatically initiated by the reactor trip. Leak size increase to 65% is seen immediately; the loss of 6.9 KV Shutdown Board occurs 10 minutes after the trip.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 34 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-E-0 The following actions are taken from E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NOTE Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS.

Status Trees / SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR A GREEN indicating light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR B GREEN indicating light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52BYA, BYPASS BKR A lights DARK.

RO checks 1-52BYB, BYPASS BKR B lights DARK.

RO

• RPIs at bottom of scale.

RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor 1 and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 for indication that all SHUTDOWN and CONTROL bank rods are inserted.

• Neutron flux DROPPING.

RO observes neutron flux trending down on 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER. May also observe levels decreasing on 1-NI-92-135A, CH I NEUTRON MON % PWR, and 1-NI-92-136A, CH II NEUTRON MON % PWR.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

BOP/RO RO observes that indicating lights on 1-XX-47-1000 EHC CONTROL for individual throttle and governor valves are GREEN.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

CSST (offsite),

OR D/G (blackout).

BOP/RO RO observes that 1-HS-57-41A, 1716 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1A-A FROM CSST C RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-39, 6.9 SDB 1A-A VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

RO observes that 1-HS-57-71A, 1728 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1B-B FROM CSST D RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-66, 6.9 SDB 1B-B VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 35 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO will announce that the window 70-A, SI ACTUATED is LIT. May also RO announce that FIRST OUT 76-G SI MANUAL is LIT.

b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

• 1-XX-55-6C

• 1-XX-55-6D EXAMINER: E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendixes A and B are included as .

EXAMINER: 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendices A, B and Attachments 1 through 5 are included as Attachment 2. During performance the appendices and attachments the BOP will contact multiple AUOs to perform the following actions:

1. Perform Attachment 1, Ice Condenser AHU Breaker Operation.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to perform 1-E-0, . Console Operator will wait, and report that Attachment 1 is complete.

2. DISPATCH AUO to shutdown Upper and Lower CNTMT rad monitors USING 1-SOI-90.02, Gaseous Process Radiation Monitors When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to shutdown Upper and Lower CNTMT rad monitors USING 1-SOI-90.02, Gaseous Process Radiation Monitors.

EXAMINER: Ten minutes after the reactor trip is initiated, 1B-B 6.9KV Shutdown Board trips on differential relay operation. At that time, the SRO may assign the performance of 1-AOI-43.02, Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown Boards, to the BOP to be performed on a not to interfere basis.

5. PERFORM Appendixes A and B, E-0, pages 16-30.

BOP BOP is assigned to perform actions contained in the Appendices. A separate copy of the Appendices is contained in this package for Examiner use.

RO 6. ANNOUNCE reactor trip and safety injection over PA system.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 36 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 1 Establish the minimum required auxiliary feedwater flow rate to the steam generators by manually starting the 1A-A and 1B-B motor driven or the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps prior to exiting Step 7 of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Critical 7. ENSURE secondary heat sink available with either:

Task 1 The 1A-A MD AFW pump and the TD AFW pump must be manually started due to the failure of the automatic start circuitry.

• Total AFW flow greater than 410 gpm, RO OR It is expected that Adverse Containment (>2.81 psig) conditions will exist soon after the entry into E-0. When announced, the crew will use the bracketed parameter values.

• At least one S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

8. MONITOR RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F using:

• RCS Loop T-avg with any RCP running, RO OR

• RCS Loop T-cold with RCPs out-of-service.

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF temp less than 557°F, THEN ENSURE steam dumps and S/G PORVs CLOSED.

IF cooldown continues, THEN CONTROL total AFW flow to maintain greater than 410 gpm UNTIL NR level in at least one S/G greater than 29% [39% ADV].

RO IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN

• PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

• CLOSE MSIVs.

• ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

IF RCS temp greater than 564°F, THEN ENSURE either steam dumps or S/G PORVs OPEN.

9. ENSURE excess letdown valves CLOSED:

• 1-FCV-62-54 RO

• 1-FCV-62-55 RO observes GREEN indicating lights LIT on handswitches 1-HS 54A, EXCESS LTDN ISOL, and 1-HS-62-55A, EXCESS LTDN.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 37 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. CHECK pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV 340A, in P-AUTO position and CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

RO observes 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334, in P-AUTO position and RO CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

RO observes 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A, is OPEN, GREEN light is DARK and RED light is LIT.

RO observes 1-HS-68-332A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 334, is OPEN, GREEN light is DARK and RED light is LIT.

11. CHECK pzr safety valves CLOSED:

• EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitors.

RO observes response of 1-TI-68-330, SAFETY 68-563 TAILPIPE TEMP, RO 1-TI-68-329, SAFETY 68-564 TAILPIPE TEMP, and 1-TI-68-328, SAFETY 68-565, stable at approximately 110°F.

BOP may observe 1-XI-68-363, PZR VALVES ACOUSTIC MONITOR indicating lights are DARK for 1-XI-68-363 (68-563), 1-XI-68-364 (68-564) and 1-XI-68-365 (68-565).

12. CHECK pzr sprays CLOSED.

RO RO observes the pzr spray valves closed by GREEN indicating lights LIT for 1-XI-68-340B, PZR SPRAY LOOP 2 and 1-XI-68-340D, PZR SPRAY LOOP 1.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

13. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

The RCPs may have been tripped prior to reaching this step in 1-E-0, due to the actuation of the Containment Phase B signal OR RO pressure dropping below 1500 psig.

a. Phase B signals DARK [MISSP].

b. RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 38 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

14. CHECK S/G pressures:

• All S/G pressures controlled or rising.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressures are controlled. May also RO observe trends on 1-PR-1-2, SG 1 & 2 PRESS PSIG, and 1-PR-1-23, SG 3 & 4 PRESS PSIG to assess this step.

• All S/G pressures greater than 140 psig.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressures are greater than 120 psig.

15. CHECK for RUPTURED S/G

• All S/Gs narrow range levels CONTROLLED or DROPPING.

RO informs the SRO that S/G narrow range levels are controlled after RO observing PAM narrow range level instruments (black labels).

• Secondary side radiation NORMAL from Appendix A.

BOP informs the SRO that secondary radiation levels are normal after performing Appendix A, Step 8.

16. CHECK cntmt conditions:

• Cntmt pressure NORMAL.

RO reports containment pressure is abnormally high.

• Radiation NORMAL from Appendix A.

RO BOP informs the SRO that containment radiation recorders were not normal prior to isolation.

• Cntmt sump level NORMAL.

• Cntmt temp ann window DARK [104-B].

SRO enters RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED column.

16. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO

• • GO TO 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 39 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-E-1 The following actions are taken from 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

EXAMINER: The RCPs may have been stopped previously.

1. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

RO

a. Phase B DARK [MISSP].

1. a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED RO

a. STOP all RCPs. ** GO TO Step 2.

SRO 2. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart.

NOTE Time since initiation of event is defined by performance of Step 3.

3. RECORD current time to mark initiation of LOCA and determination of SRO time for hot leg recirc.

4. CHECK S/G pressures:

• All S/G pressures controlled or rising.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressures are controlled. May also RO observe trends on 1-PR-1-2, SG 1 & 2 PRESS PSIG, and 1-PR-1-23, SG 3 & 4 PRESS PSIG to assess this step.

• All S/G pressures greater than 140 psig.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressures are greater than 140 psig.

5. MAINTAIN Intact S/G NR levels:

a. MONITOR levels greater than 29% [39% ADV].

BOP informs the SRO that S/G narrow range levels are controlled after BOP observing PAM narrow range level instruments (black labels).

b. CONTROL intact S/G levels between 29% and 50% [39% and 50%

ADV].

BOP acknowledges the need to control SG levels between 39 and 50%.

EXAMINER: The status of secondary radiation may have already been reported as normal by the BOP during performance of 1-E-0 Appendix A.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 40 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. CHECK secondary radiation:

• S/G discharge monitors NORMAL.

BOP

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.

• S/G blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

7. ENSURE cntmt hydrogen analyzers in service:

• PLACE 1-HS-43-200A in ANALYZE [M-10].

BOP places 1-HS-43-200A, H2 ANALYZER A FAN to the ANALYZE position on panel 1-M-10.

• PLACE 1-HS-43-210A in ANALYZE [M-10].

BOP determines that power is not available.

BOP

• CHECK low flow lights NOT lit [M-10].

BOP checks 1-XI-43-200, LO FLOW - ANAL A, WHITE light is DARK.

BOP determines that power is not available.

• LOCALLY CHECK low analyzer temp lights NOT lit AND RESET local alarm panel. [North wall of Train A 480V SD Bd rm].

When contacted as the Control Building AUO the Console Operator repeat back request to check low analyzer temp lights, and reports that the lights are NOT LIT.

8. MONITOR pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV 340A, in P-AUTO position and valve CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

RO observes 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334, in P-AUTO position and valve CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

RO

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

RO observes 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A, OPEN, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is LIT.

RO observes 1-HS-68-332A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 334, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is DARK due to the loss of power. May report last known position as OPEN.

EXAMINER: Containment pressure may not be below 2.0 psig when the operators evaluate this step initially. Since it is a continuous action step, when containment pressure does drop below 2.0 psig, the actions will be performed.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 41 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. DETERMINE if cntmt spray should be stopped:

a. MONITOR cntmt pressure less than 2.0 psig.

b. CHECK at least one cntmt spray pump RUNNING.

SRO

c. RESET cntmt spray signal.

d. STOP cntmt spray pumps, and PLACE in A-AUTO.

e. CLOSE cntmt spray discharge valves 1-FCV-72-2 and 1-FCV- 72-39.

9. a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO WHEN cntmt pressure is less than 2.0 psig, THEN PERFORM Sub steps 9b thru e.

10. ENSURE both pocket sump pumps STOPPED [M-15]:

• 1-HS-77-410.

BOP

• 1-HS-77-411.

BOP observes handswitch 1-HS-77-410, POCKET SUMP PMP A GREEN light is LIT, and 1-HS-77-411, POCKET SUMP PMP B GREEN light is LIT.

11. CHECK SI termination criteria:

a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65ºF [85ºF ADV].

RO RO determines that subcooling is less than 85ºF by observing 1-TI-68-105, RCS SUBCOOLING indications.

RO determines that subcooling is less than 85ºF by observing 1-TI-68-110, RCS SUBCOOLING indications.

11.a. REPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO

• • GO TO Caution prior to Step 12.

CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal.

12. RESET SI and CHECK the following:

RO resets SI signal by depressing 1-HS-63-134A, SI RESET TR A and 1-HS-63-134B one at a time.

RO

• SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.

RO observes and reports that Window 70-A, SI ACTUATED is DARK.

• AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

RO observes and reports that Window 70-B, AUTO SI BLOCKED is LIT.

13. DETERMINE if RHR pumps should be stopped:

a. CHECK RCS pressure greater than 150 psig.

RO

b. CHECK RHR suction aligned from RWST.

c. CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 42 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

c. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE CCS from RHR heat exchanger 1-FCV-70-153 and 1-FCV-70-156 OPEN.

BOP rotates 1-FCV-70-156 RHR HX 1A OUTLET to the right to the BOP OPEN position. Ensures RED light is LIT and GREEN light is DARK.

CLOSE SFP heat exchanger A CCS supply 0-FCV-70-197.

BOP rotates 0-FCV-70-197, SFP HX A SUPPLY to the left to the CLOSE position. Ensures RED light is DARK and GREEN light is LIT.

GO TO Step 14.

14. CHECK pressure in all S/Gs controlled or rising.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black RO labels) and determines that pressures are controlled. May also observe trends on 1-PR-1-2, SG 1 & 2 PRESS PSIG, and 1-PR-1-23, SG 3 & 4 PRESS PSIG to assess this step.

15. CHECK RCS pressure stable or dropping.

RO determines that RCS pressure is lowering by observing 1-XI RO 100, RVLIS - ICCM PLASMA DISPLAY indications.

RO determines that RCS pressure is lowering by observing 1-XI 110, RVLIS - ICCM PLASMA DISPLAY indications.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 43 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: 1-AOI-43.02, Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown Boards is contained as Attachment 2.

16. MONITOR electrical board status:

a. CHECK offsite power available.

b. CHECK all shutdown boards ENERGIZED by offsite power.

BOP reports that the 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board has tripped.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back request to determine cause of 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trip.

BOP Console Operator reports the differential relay has picked up, and that there is visible damage to the board.

If not already assigned, the SRO may direct the BOP to perform the actions of 1-AOI-43.02, Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown Boards, on a not to interfere basis.

c. PLACE any unloaded D/G in standby USING 1-SOI-82 Diesel Generators.

EXAMINER: AOI-17, Turbine Trip, Section 3.3, BOP Realignment, is contained as Attachment 3.

17. INITIATE BOP realignment:

• REFER TO 1-AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

SRO assigns 1-AOI-17, Turbine Trip to the BOP for performance on BOP a not to interfere basis.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to perform AOI-17, Attachment 1, Turbine Building NAUO Duties Following A Turbine Trip.

EXAMINER: 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Appendices A through C are contained as Attachment 4.

18. INITIATE 480V board room breaker alignments USING the following:

• Appendix A (1-E-1), CLA Breaker Operation.

• Appendix B (1-E-1), 1-FCV-63-1 Breaker Operation.

BOP

• Appendix C (1-E-1), 1-FCV-63-22 Breaker Operation.

When contacted as the Control Building AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request, and then report that Appendix A through C have been performed. Console Operator enters remote functions sir01, sir14 and sir06 to perform actions.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 44 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: NO RHR pumps are available, so transition to ECA-1.1 is required after Step 19.

19. ENSURE RHR available for cntmt sump recirculation:

• Power to at least one operable RHR pump AVAILABLE.

SRO

• Cntmt sump valve 1-FCV-63-72 or 1-FCV-63-73 to operable RHR pump AVAILABLE.

SRO determines that both RHR pumps are out of service and enters the RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED column.

19. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF neither train of RHR is available for Cntmt sump recirculation, THEN SRO ** GO TO 1-ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

SRO determines that both RHR pumps are out of service and transitions to ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 45 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump ECA-1 Recirculation.

CAUTION IF RWST level drops to 8%, then any ECCS or cntmt spray pump taking suction from the RWST must be stopped.

1. CHECK cntmt sump recirculation equipment AVAILABLE:

• Power to RHR pumps AVAILABLE.

The SRO determines that neither of the RHR pumps are available at SRO this point, and transitions to the RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED column.

• RHR pumps AVAILABLE.

• Cntmt sump valves AVAILABLE.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RESTORE at least one train.

SRO If not already accomplished, the SRO may contact Work Control to expedite repairs to both RHR pumps.

2. IF RHR sump recirculation restored during performance of this SRO Instruction, THEN RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

RO 3. MONITOR RWST level greater than 8%.

EXAMINER: Step 4.b. is a Continuous Action Step. When containment pressure is less than 2.0 psig, Step 4.c. RNO will be implemented. When the applicants first reach this step, containment pressure may be between 2.0 and 13.5 psig. With the loss of the 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Board, only the 1A-A Containment Spray pump will be running.

4. DETERMINE cntmt spray pump alignment and operation:

a. CHECK cntmt spray pump suction aligned to RWST.

b. MONITOR cntmt press, and DETERMINE number of spray pumps required:

RO

c. CHECK number of spray pumps running equal to number required.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 46 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 4.c. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED STOP and PULL TO LOCK any cntmt spray pump NOT required, AND RO CLOSE discharge valve(s) 1-FCV-72-2 and/or 1-FCV-72-39 for pump(s) stopped.

Manually OPERATE spray pumps as required.

d. DO NOT OPERATE cntmt spray pumps as required by FR-Z.1, High Containment Pressure, UNTIL either of the following:

SRO

• Cntmt spray pump suction aligned to cntmt sump, OR

• RWST makeup sufficient to support cntmt spray pump operation.

EXAMINER: ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation, Appendix B, ERCW Operation, is contained as Attachment 5.

5. DETERMINE if cntmt spray should be aligned to cntmt sump:

a. CHECK spray pumps RUNNING.

RO reports that the 1A-A CNTMT SPRAY Pump is running and the 1B-B CNTMT SPRAY pump has no power.

b. ENSURE ERCW system operating requirements met:

• REFER TO Appendix B (ECA-1.1), ERCW Operation.

BOP performs Appendix B and aligns ERCW to the 1A Containment RO Spray Heat Exchanger.

c. WHEN cntmt sump level greater than 28% [36% ADV], THEN ALIGN suction to cntmt sump:

Actions are deferred since CNTMT SUMP level is less than 36%.

1) STOP both spray pumps, and PLACE in PULL TO LOCK.

2) CLOSE suction from RWST 1-FCV-72-21 and 1-FCV-72-22.

3) OPEN cntmt spray suction from sump 1-FCV-72-44.

4) OPEN cntmt spray suction from sump 1-FCV-72-45.

6. MONITOR cntmt press less than 2.0 psig.

RO RO reports containment pressure is greater than 2.0 psig.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 47 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

6. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF cntmt press greater than or equal to 2.0 psig, THEN:

RO reports containment pressure is greater than 2.0 psig.

a. START cntmt spray pumps.

RO

b. ENSURE discharge valves 1-FCV-72-2 and 1-FCV-72-39 OPEN.

c. VERIFY spray flow on 1-FI-72-34 and 1-FI-72-13.

RO locates 1-FI-72-34, CS PMP A FLOW, and observes approximately 3700 gpm.

7. ENSURE cntmt spray pumps in A-AUTO.

RO RO locates 1-HS-72-27A, CNTMT SPRAY PMP A, observes that the handswitch is in the A-AUTO (mid) position.

CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action may be required to restore ECCS equipment.

8. RESET SI, AND CHECK the following:

• SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.

RO

• AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

Step has been performed previously.

9. RESET SI interlock to RHR sump suction AUTO-swapover:

• 1-HS-63-72D.

RO rotates 1-HS-63-72D, RWST-CNTMT SUMP SWITCHOVER SI SIG RO TO FCV-63-72 to the right to the RESET position and verifies that the WHITE indicating light is DARK.

• 1-HS-63-73D.

Power is not available to perform this action.

EXAMINER: The TSC is NOT manned at this point, so no direction will be given to the crew.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 48 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. INITIATE makeup to RWST:

a. NOTIFY Radprot/Chemistry to evaluate radiation level of water in cntmt sump for potential transfer to RWST.

When contacted as Chemistry, the Console Operator will repeat back request to evaluate sump water rad levels.

When contacted as Radiation Protection, the Console Operator will SRO repeat back request to evaluate sump water rad levels.

b. NOTIFY TSC to evaluate transferring water to RWST from one of the following:

• Appendix C (ECA-1.1), Cntmt Spray Recirc to RWST Alignment.

• Spent fuel pit.

• Holdup tank.

• Normal RWST fill USING SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control

11. MONITOR CST volume greater than 200,000 gal.

BOP BOP reports current reading from 1-LI-2-230A CST A LEVEL as approximately 300,000 gal.

12. MAINTAIN Intact S/G NR levels:

Step is already being performed.

BOP a. MONITOR Intact S/G NR levels greater than 29% [39% ADV].

b. CONTROL intact S/G levels between 29% and 50% [39% and 50%

ADV].

13. MONITOR shutdown margin during RCS cooldown:

SRO assigns this task to the Surrogate STA.

SRO

• REFER TO 1-SI-0-10, Shutdown Margin OR REACTINW Computer Program.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 2 Event # 7 Page 49 of 65 Event

Description:

After the reactor trip, the small RCS leak propagates to a small-break LOCA. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Ten minutes after the reactor trip and safety injection occur, 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. This results in the loss of the 1B-B RHR pump and entry into ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 2 Establish a controlled RCS cooldown at a rate not to exceed 100°F in an hour, to support the SI reduction sequence and preclude swapover to the containment sump.

14. INITIATE RCS cooldown to cold shutdown:

a. WHEN RCS pressure is less than 1962 psig (P-11), THEN

• BLOCK low pzr pressure SI.

• BLOCK low steam pressure SI.

b. MAINTAIN T-cold cooldown less than 100ºF in any 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

SRO SRO calls up the HEATUP/COOLDOWN RATE page on the ICS computer and determines that the RCS has NOT cooled down more than 100ºF in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

c. DUMP steam to condenser from Intact S/Gs.

BOP reports that the condenser is NOT AVAILABLE. SRO enters RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED column for actions.

c. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

c. IF condenser NOT available, THEN Manually or locally DUMP steam from Intact S/G:

• USE Intact S/G PORV, BOP calls up the HEATUP/COOLDOWN RATE page on the ICS computer to monitor cooldown rate, then slowly opens SG PORVs to BOP begin cooldown.

OR

• USE TD AFW pump supply from Intact S/G.

OR

• RESET Phase A, AND USE Intact S/G blowdown.

IF Intact S/G NOT available, THEN USE Faulted S/G.

EXAMINER: When the cooldown is established in Step 14, inform applicants that another crew will continue from this point, and terminate the scenario.

END OF SCENARIO 2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

1. ENSURE Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 302 by performing the following actions:

a. Select ICManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate IC# 302.

c. Right click on IC# 302.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC# 302.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value hs-74-03a hs-74-03a rhr pump a-a suction sw O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 close close hs-63-72a-1 01170 rhr pmp aa suct fr cnt smp(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off On hs-74-10a hs-74-10a rhr pump a-a motor sw O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 ptlock ptlock rh12 fail cnt sump to rhr pmp a fcv-63-72 to any position M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 0 hs-74-10a-1 01230 hr pump a-a motor switch(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off On hs-74-03a-1 01110 hr pump a-a suction(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off On rh01a rhr pump a trip M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active hs-72-40a hs-72-40a rhr spray header a isolation valve sw O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 close auto hs-72-40a-1 01150 hr spray hdr a isol vlv sw(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off rp55a failure of auto-start on motor driven aux feedpump a M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:05:00 Active Active rp55b failure of auto-start on motor driven aux feedpump b M 00:10:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active rp55c failure of auto-start on turbine driven aux feedpump M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active Page 50 of 65

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value th03c loca - small leak loop 3 M 19 00:00:00 00:05:00 65 0 ed06b loss of 6.9 kv shutdown board bus 1b-b M 19 00:10:00 00:00:00 Active Active ni08a pr detector a failure pr chnl 1 M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 120 98.3736 rwr05 valve fcv-67-22 breaker position R 21 00:00:00 00:00:00 close open rwr12 power to appendix r valve 1-fcv-67-147 R 22 00:00:00 00:00:00 on 00:00:00 rwr22 power to appendix r valve 1-fcv-67-458 R 23 00:00:00 00:00:00 on 00:00:00 rwr29 power to 2-fcv-67-22 strainer 2a-a inlet R 24 00:00:00 00:00:00 on off rwr30 power to 2-fcv-67-81 aux building supply header 2a R 25 00:00:00 00:00:00 on off rwr03 power to appendix r valve 1-fcv-67-81 R 25 00:00:00 00:00:00 on off rw75 fail 2-fcv-67-22a to position M 28 00:00:00 00:00:00 75 100 hs-62-140a hs-62-140a cvcs makeup start/stop sw O 29 00:00:00 00:00:00 stop stop fw56b hdp 3b bearing wear M 3 00:00:00 00:00:00 9 0 fw56b hdp 3b bearing wear M 3 00:00:45 00:00:15 11 0 th03c loca - small leak loop 3 M 30 00:00:00 00:00:00 25 0 rw14a ercw ips header a break M 4 00:00:00 00:02:00 80 0 th03c loca - small leak loop 3 M 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 2.5 0

5. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

6. ENSURE the following Events are loaded (Event 28 - [Power ON 2-FCV-67-22 and 2-HS-67-22A to CLOSE] rw_26722pwr ==1 & zdi2hs6722a(1)==1)

(Event 29 - [1-HS-62-140B to BOR position] zdihs62140b(4)==1)

(Event 30 - [1-HS-62-91A to CLOSE position] zdohs6291a(2)==1)

7. ENSURE 1-HS-74-10A, RHR PMP A (ECCS), in the STOP, PULL-TO-LOCK position with a GREEN tag. GREEN tags are placed on 1-HS-74-3A, RHR PMP A SUCTION, 1-HS-63-72, CNTMT SUMP TO RHR PMP A SUCT, and 1-HS-72-40A, RHR SPRAY HDR A TO CNTMT. ENSURE 1-HS-74-20A, RHR PMP B (ECCS) and 1-HS-82-48, DG MODE SELECTOR is designated as PROTECTED EQUIPMENT.

8. ENSURE the Train A Week - Channel 1 sign is placed on 1-M-30.

Page 51 of 65

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

9. Place simulator in FREEZE.

10. ENSURE Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Reactivity Briefing Book MOL (Middle Of Life) is provided to the crew as part of the Turnover Package, and that the MOL placards are on 1-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water Integrators.

11. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN.

Page 52 of 65

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

1 1 Return 1A-A CCP to service and remove 1B-B CCP from service using SOI-62.01, CVCS - Charging and Letdown, Section 6.2, Swap CCPs.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back the request to check the closing spring charged on 1-BKR-62-108, CENT CHARGING PUMP 1A-A (1-PMP-62-108). Report back the closing spring is charged for 1-BKR-62-108, CENT CHARGING PUMP 1A-A (1-PMP-62-108).

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back the request to check the closing spring charged on 1-BKR-62-104, CENT CHARGING PUMP 1B-B (1-PMP-62-104). Report back the closing spring is charged for 1-BKR-62-104, CENT CHARGING PUMP 1B-B (1-PMP-62-104).

2 2 Power Range N41, Detector A (UPPER) fails high.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for PR N41.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, repeat back the request to have the bistables tripped for PR N41.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Reactor Engineering, repeat back the request for performance of 1-SI 22, Incore QPTR.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Operations Duty Manager, repeat back that PR N41 has failed.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Reactor Engineering, repeat back that PR N41 has failed. Performance of 1-SI-0-22, Incore QPTR, may be discussed.

Page 53 of 65

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

3 3 1B #3 Heater Drain Pump bearing seizes, causing a motor overload alarm. Forty-five seconds later the 1B #3 HDP trips.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back the request to monitor #3 HD Tank level. Call up the THUNDERVIEW High Pressure Heater Diagram fw6, and report heater levels as requested.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back the request to investigate the condition of the 1B #3 HD pump. Report that there are scorch marks on the motor, and the pump bearings are extremely hot.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back the request to investigate the 1B #3 HD pump breaker relays. Report back the instantaneous overcurrent relay has picked up.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as AUO, repeat back the parameters and components to be monitored:

• #3 HDT level, flow & controls.

• #2 FW heater level.

• 1-LCV-6-106A, #3 HDT level control [T2D/708 in valve pit].

• #3 HDT pump cavitation control 1-HS-6-106A, NOT reset [T1D/708 on west wall].

ROLE PLAY: When SRO contacts Chemistry, report back the request to perform power change sampling requirements.

ROLE PLAY: When BOP contacts an AUO, report back the request to perform SOI-5 & 6.01, Extraction Steam, Heater Drains, and Vent System, to adjust #3 HDT LEVEL and reset pump cavitation control 1-HS 106A. Refer to Simulator Console Operator Instructions Pages 57 and 58 for actions.

ROLE PLAY: When SRO contacts Work Control, repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair packages for the 1B #3 HDT pump.

ROLE PLAY: If SRO contacts the Shift Manager, repeat back request that EPIP-1 be evaluated.

ROLE PLAY: When the BOP contacts Condensate Demineralizer AUO, repeat back the information provided.

ROLE PLAY: If the SRO contacts Chemistry, repeat back the request to initiate 1-SI-68-26.

4 3 During load reduction, 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL fails to start when 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE is selected to the BOR position.

ROLE PLAY: When SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair packages for the VCT makeup control circuit.

Page 54 of 65

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

5 4 1A ERCW Supply Header line ruptures in the Intake Pumping Station (IPS).

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back request to go to the IPS to determine the location of the rupture. Report back that the IPS is flooding rapidly and the break is on the common discharge of the A ERCW pumps.

ROLE PLAY: If When contacted as an AUO, repeat back request to go the Rx MOV Bds. Report back that he is at the Rx MOV Bds.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back request to go the Rx MOV Bds. Reports back that he is at the Rx MOV Bds.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the AUO:

Repeat back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/7B. Report the breaker closed after entering rwr05.

Repeat back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/11B. Report the breaker closed after entering rwr12.

Repeats back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/15E. Report the breaker closed after entering rwr22 Repeat back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 2A2-A c/7B. Report the breaker closed after entering rw29.

Repeat back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Bd 2A2-A c/8A for 2-FCV-67-81.Reports the breaker closed after entering rwr30.

Repeats back the request to unlock, and close bkr on Rx MOV Bd 1A2-A c/8A. Report the breaker closed after entering rwr03.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to check ERCW flow to the DGs. Console Operator reports back that flow is between 850 and 900 gpm to each DG.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator repeats back the request for a work package to troubleshoot and repair A ERCW Header at the IPS.

6 5 A leak develops on RCS Loop 3. When charging is isolated per AOI-6, the leak propagates to a small break LOCA, requiring a reactor trip and safety injection ROLE PLAY: NONE Page 55 of 65

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

7 After the reactor trip, the small break LOCA worsens. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to and performance of 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back the request to perform 1-E-0, Attachment 1. Wait and report that Attachment 1 is complete.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back the request to shutdown Upper and Lower CNTMT rad monitors USING 1-SOI-90.02, Gaseous Process Radiation Monitors.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Control Building AUO, repeat back request to check low analyzer temp lights, and reports that the lights are NOT LIT.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back the request to perform AOI-17, Attachment 1, Turbine Building NAUO Duties Following A Turbine Trip.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Control Building AUO, repeat back the request, and then report that Appendices A through C have been performed. Enter remote functions sir01, sir14 and sir06 to perform actions.

7 1B-B 6.9 Kv Shutdown Board trips due to differential relay operation. Requires performance of Aoi-43.02, Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown Boards. Requires performance of ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation, due to loss of both RHR pumps.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back request to determine cause of 1B-B 6.9 KV Shutdown Board trip. Report the differential relay has picked up, and that there is visible damage to the board.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Chemistry, repeat back request to evaluate sump water rad levels.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Radiation Protection, repeat back request to evaluate sump water rad levels.

Page 56 of 65

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Page 57 of 65

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 2 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Page 58 of 65

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb = 845 ppm.

• Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

1A-A RHR Pump is out of service for pump bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago.

EOOS Risk is GREEN. Expected return-to-service in 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. SG 1 has a stable 0.9 gpd tube leak. AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Appendix A and C have been performed. Leak rate has been stable for the last 2 weeks.

Steam to TD AFW pump is aligned to SG #4 as a precautionary measure. Caution Order placed.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% Power, MOL conditions. Control Bank D rods are at 220 steps. RCS boron concentration is 845 ppm.

EOOS Risk is GREEN.

As soon as possible after assuming the shift, swap CCPs (place 1A-A CCP in service, stop 1B-B CCP)

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [01-14-2011]

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb = 845 ppm.

• Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

1A-A RHR Pump is out of service for pump bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago.

EOOS Risk is GREEN. Expected return-to-service in 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. SG 1 has a stable 0.9 gpd tube leak. AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Appendix A and C have been performed. Leak rate has been stable for the last 2 weeks.

Steam to TD AFW pump is aligned to SG #4 as a precautionary measure. Caution Order placed.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% Power, MOL conditions. Control Bank D rods are at 220 steps. RCS boron concentration is 845 ppm.

EOOS Risk is GREEN.

As soon as possible after assuming the shift, swap CCPs (place 1A-A CCP in service, stop 1B-B CCP)

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [12-19-2011]

Scenario 2 Attachment 1 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendixes A and B

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 1 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

1. ENSURE PCBs OPEN: OPEN manually.

• PCB 5084.

• PCB 5088.

2. ENSURE AFW pump operation: ESTABLISH at least one train AFW operation.

• Both MD AFW pumps RUNNING.

• TD AFW pump RUNNING.

• LCVs in AUTO, OR controlled in MANUAL.

3. ENSURE MFW isolation: Manually CLOSE valves AND

• MFW isolation and bypass STOP pumps, as necessary.

isolation valves CLOSED.

• MFW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED. IF any valves can NOT be closed, THEN

• MFP A and B TRIPPED.

• Standby MFP STOPPED. CLOSE #1 heater outlet valves.

• Cond demin pumps TRIPPED.

• Cond booster pumps TRIPPED.

• #3 HDT Pumps TRIPPED.

• #7 HDT Pumps TRIPPED.

Page 16 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 2 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

4. MONITOR ECCS operation:

a. Charging pumps RUNNING. a. Manually START charging pumps.

b. Charging pump alignment: b. ENSURE at least one valve in each set aligned.

• RWST outlets 1-LCV-62-135 and 1-LCV-62-136 OPEN.

• VCT outlets 1-LCV-62-132 and 1-LCV-62-133 CLOSED.

• Charging 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91 CLOSED.

c. RHR pumps RUNNING. c. Manually START RHR pumps.

d. SI pumps RUNNING. d. Manually START SI pumps.

e. BIT alignment: e. ENSURE at least one valve aligned, and flow thru BIT.

• Outlets 1-FCV-63-25 and 1-FCV-63-26 OPEN.

• Flow thru BIT.

f. RCS pressure greater f. ENSURE SI pump flow.

than 1650 psig.

IF RCS press drops to less than 150 psig, THEN ENSURE RHR pump flow.

Page 17 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 3 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

5. CHECK Cntmt isolation: ACTUATE Phase A and Cntmt Vent Isolation signal,

a. Phase A isolation:

• Train A GREEN. OR

• Train B GREEN.

Manually CLOSE valves and

b. Cntmt vent isolation: dampers as necessary.

• Train A GREEN.

• Train B GREEN.

Page 18 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 4 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

6. CHECK Cntmt pressure: PERFORM the following:

• Phase B DARK [MISSP]. 1) ENSURE Phase B actuated.

• Cntmt Spray DARK [MISSP]. 2) ENSURE Cntmt Spray actuated.

• Cntmt press less than 2.8 psig. 3) ENSURE Cntmt spray pumps running.

4) ENSURE Cntmt spray flow.

5) ENSURE Phase B isolation:

• Train A GREEN.

• Train B GREEN

• Manually CLOSE valves and dampers as necessary.

6) STOP all RCPs.

7) ENSURE MSIVs and bypasses CLOSED.

8) PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

9) WHEN 10 minutes has elapsed since Phase B actuated, THEN ENSURE air return fans start.

10) USE adverse Cntmt [ADV] setpoints where provided.

7. DISPATCH AUO to perform Attachment 1 (1-E-0), Ice Condenser AHU Breaker Operation.

Page 19 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 5 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

8. CHECK plant radiation NORMAL: NOTIFY Unit Supervisor IMMEDIATELY.

• S/G blowdown rad recorder 1-RR-90-120 NORMAL prior to isolation [M-12].

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad recorder 1-RR-90-119 NORMAL prior to trip [M-12].

• 1-RR-90-106 and 1-RR-90-112 radiation recorders NORMAL prior to isolation [M-12].

• S/G main steamline discharge monitors NORMAL [M-30].

• Upper and Lower containment high range monitors NORMAL

[M-30].

• NOTIFY Unit Supervisor conditions NORMAL.

9. ENSURE all D/Gs RUNNING. EMERGENCY START D/Gs

10. ENSURE ABGTS operation:

a. ABGTS fans RUNNING. a. Manually START fans.

b. ABGTS dampers OPEN: b. Locally OPEN dampers.

• FCO-30-146A.

• FCO-30-146B.

• FCO-30-157A.

• FCO-30-157B.

Page 20 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 6 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

11. ENSURE at least four ERCW pumps Manually START pumps as necessary.

RUNNING, one on each shutdown board preferred.

12. ENSURE ERCW supply valves IF ERCW can NOT be OPEN to running D/Gs. aligned to running D/G, THEN EMERGENCY STOP affected D/G.

13. ENSURE 0-FCV-67-152, CCS HX C Manually OPEN 0-FCV-67-152 ALT DISCH TO HDR B, is open to to position A.

position A.

14. CLOSE 0-FCV-67-144, CCS HX C DISCH TO HDR A.

15. MONITOR EGTS operation: Manually START fans

• EGTS fans RUNNING.

AND

• ENSURE dampers OPEN OPEN dampers.

• VERIFY filter bank dp between 5 and 9 inches of water.

16. ENSURE CCS pumps RUNNING: Manually START pumps as necessary.

• 1A-A CCS pump.

• 1B-B CCS pump.

• C-S or 2B-B CCS pump.

17. DISPATCH AUO to shutdown Upper and Lower CNTMT rad monitors USING 1-SOI-90.02.Gaseous Process Radiation Monitors Page 21 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 7 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

18. WHEN Attachment 1 is complete (Ice Condenser AHU Breakers OPEN),

THEN ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters

[1-M-10]:

• 1-HS-268-73 ON.

• 1-HS-268-74 ON.

NOTE The following equipment is located on 1-M-9.

19. CHECK CNTMT PURGE fans STOP fans AND STOPPED.

PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

20. CHECK FUEL HANDLING EXH fans STOP fans AND STOPPED, Fuel and Cask loading dampers CLOSED: PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK, THEN Manually CLOSE dampers.

21. ENSURE AB GEN SUPPLY and STOP fans AND EXH fans STOPPED.

PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

NOTE Dampers 1-HS-30-158 and 2-HS-30-270 remain open during ABI.

22. ENSURE AB GEN SUP & EXH Manually CLOSE dampers.

dampers CLOSED.

Page 22 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 8 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

23. ENSURE MCR & SPREAD RM Manually CLOSE dampers.

FRESH AIR dampers CLOSED:

• FCV-31-3.

• FCV-31-4.

24. ENSURE at least one CB EMER CLEANUP fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EMERG CLEANUP FAN A-A, Manually START fan.

OR

• Fan B-B RUNNING..

• FCO-31-8, OPEN. NOTIFY TSC if at least one damper NOT OPEN.

OR

• FCO-31-7, OPEN

25. ENSURE at least one CB EMER PRESS fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EMERG PRESS FAN A-A, Manually START fan.

OR FAN B-B RUNNING.

• FCO-31-6, OPEN. NOTIFY TSC if at least one damper NOT OPEN.

OR

• FCO-31-5, OPEN.

Page 23 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 9 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

26. ENSURE Control Building fans STOPPED and dampers CLOSED:

• SPREADING ROOM SUPPLY Manually STOP fans AND and EXH FANS AND dampers.

NOTIFY TSC if any damper NOT

• TOILET & LKR RM EXHAUST CLOSED.

FAN AND dampers.

NOTE Loss of shutdown power could result in a loss of SFP cooling.

Annunciator Window 128-A and 128-B could be indicative of this condition and increased monitoring of SFP level and temperature will be necessary..

27. CHECK at least one 6.9kV Shutdown DISPATCH AUO to perform Board ENERGIZED. Attachment 6, Monitor Spent Fuel Pool.

IF AUO reports abnormal SFP level or temperature, THEN REFER to 1-AOI-45, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Level or Cooling

28. INITIATE Appendix B (1-E-0), Phase B Pipe Break Contingencies.

Page 24 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix B (Page 1 of 1)

Phase B Pipe Break Contingencies Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

1. CHECK PHASE B actuated. WHEN PHASE B actuation occurs,

[MISSP XX-55-6C, -6D] THEN GO TO step 2.

2. ENSURE 1-FCV-32-110 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP XX-55-6E] Attachment 2 (1-E-0).

(A-train, window 13)

3. ENSURE 1-FCV-67-107 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP XX-55-6E] Attachment 3 (1-E-0).

(A -train, window 43)

4. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-92 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP XX-55-6E] Attachment 4 (1-E-0).

(A -train, window 73)

5. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-140 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP XX-55-6F] Attachment 5 (1-E-0).

(B -train, window 74)

Page 25 of 32

Scenario 2 Attachment 2 1-AOI-43.02, Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown Boards

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Abnormal Operating Instruction 1-AOI-43.02 Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown Boards Revision 0001 Quality Related Level of Use: Continuous Use Effective Date: 05-10-2013 Responsible Organization: OPS, Operations Prepared By: Travis Uptegrove Approved By: W.E. Sprinkle

WBN Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown 1-AOI-43.02 Unit 1 Boards Rev. 0001 Revision Affected or Change Effective Page Number Date Numbers Description of Revision/Change 0 02/21/2013 All Created from AOI-43.02 R12 Added unit designators IAW ODM-23.

Revised 3.1[3] RNO to monitor for lower bearing and seal water temp. if loss of seal cooling and added Attachment 1[PER 594400]

Added step to ensure UNIT 1 Instrument Power B Rack selected to energized source to 3.5.2[2]

to prevent unit trip on loss of cooling to Generator H2 and MTOT. [PCR 6313]

1 05/10/13 2, 22, 27 Deleted note at beginning of Section 3.2.6 and 3.2.7 about loads auto starting due to boards not being energized by their associated boards.

[PER 644643-002]

Page 2 of 73

WBN Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown 1-AOI-43.02 Unit 1 Boards Rev. 0001 1.0 PURPOSE This Instruction provides operator actions for:

• A loss of 6.9kV Shutdown Board 1B-B OR

• A loss of either 480V Shutdown Board 1B1-B or 1B2-B, without a loss of 6.9kV SD BD 1B-B 2.0 SYMPTOMS 2.1 Alarms A. PNL 1-M-7 BREAKER TRIP [15-E].

B. 6.9 SD BD 1B-B UV/OV/CONTROL PWR FAILURE [13-B, 208-C].

C. 480 SD BD 1B1-B/1B2-B FAILURE/ABN [11-D, 207-D].

D. RX MOV VENT BD TRAIN B UNDERVOLTAGE [142-D].

E. C & A VENT BD 1B1-B/1B2-B UNDERVOLTAGE [142-E].

F. DG AUX BD 1B1-B/1B2-B UNDERVOLTAGE [207-E].

2.2 Indications A. Low voltage on any Unit 1 Train B 6.9KV or 480V Shutdown Board.

B. Zero amps indicated on CSST to Shutdown Board indication.

C. Open breaker indications.

D. Failure of Shutdown Board supplied loads.

2.3 Automatic Actions A. Diesel Generator 1B-B starts upon loss of voltage to 6.9KV SD BD 1B-B.

B. Designated loads are auto stripped from 6.9kV SD BD 1B-B, 480V SD BDs 1B1-B and 1B2-B.

C. Designated loads auto sequence on when voltage is restored to 6.9kV SD BD 1B-B and the Diesel Generator feeder breaker is closed.

D. Auto start for shed loads is blocked (except for SI auto start).

Page 3 of 73

WBN Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown 1-AOI-43.02 Unit 1 Boards Rev. 0001 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE 1 The loss of all onsite and offsite power is covered in the Emergency Instructions and 1-AOI-40.

NOTE 2 A complete or partial loss of 161kV offsite power is addressed in 1-AOI-35.

NOTE 3 Restoration of equipment IAW 1-AOI-43.02 should NOT interfere with current actions to mitigate accidents in progress.

DIAGNOSTICS CONDITION APPLICABLE PAGE PROCEDURE SECTION LOSS of Power to 6.9kV SD GO TO Section 3.1 5 BD 1B-B 6.9kV SD BD 1B-B GO TO Section 3.3 28 ENERGIZED from DG 1B-B following blackout LOSS of Power to 480V SD BD GO TO Section 3.5.1 42 1B1-B WITHOUT loss of 6.9kV SD BD 1B-B LOSS of Power to 480V SD BD GO TO Section 3.5.2 45 1B2-B WITHOUT loss of 6.9kV SD BD 1B-B End of Section Page 4 of 73

WBN Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown 1-AOI-43.02 Unit 1 Boards Rev. 0001 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.1 Initial Actions

1. MONITOR A TRAIN 6.9KV SD BD EMERGENCY START DGs:

1A-A ENERGIZED.

• 1-HS-82-15 [1-M-1].

• 2-HS-82-15 [2-M-1].

IF BOTH Unit 1 6.9KV SD BDs still de-energized, AND

a. IF Unit in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, THEN

• • GO TO 1-ECA-0.0, Loss of Shutdown Power.

b. IF Unit in MODE 5, or 6,THEN:

1) TRIP RCPs

2) PERFORM 1-AOI-14, Loss of RHR SD Cooling, WHILE CONTINUING this procedure at Step 2.

2. ENSURE Diesel Generators running: EMERGENCY START Diesel Generators:

• DG 1A-A

• 1-HS-82-15 [1-M-1].

• DG 1B-B

• 2-HS-82-15 [2-M-1].

• DG 2A-A

• DG 2B-B Step 2 continued on next page.

Page 5 of 73

WBN Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown 1-AOI-43.02 Unit 1 Boards Rev. 0001 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.1 Initial Actions (continued)

Step 2 continued.

IF any D/G is NOT RUNNING, THEN EVALUATE RESETTING EMERGENCY STOP IF RESET and START of a DG is desired, THEN:

a. PRESS and RELEASE DG AUTO SAFETY SHUTDOWN RELAY-RESET [0-M-26]:

• 1-HS-82-20 [1A-A].

• 1-HS-82-50 [1B-B].

• 2-HS-82-80 [2A-A].

• 2-HS-82-110 [2B-B].

b. EMERGENCY START Diesel Generator [0-M-26]:

• 1-HS-82-16A [1A-A].

• 1-HS-82-46A [1B-B].

• 2-HS-82-76A [2A-A].

• 2-HS-82-106A [2B-B].

Page 6 of 73

WBN Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown 1-AOI-43.02 Unit 1 Boards Rev. 0001 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.1 Initial Actions (continued)

NOTES

• Appendix A provides a list of affected equipment.

• RCPs can be operated for up to 10 minutes after a loss of CCS flow.

3. MONITOR RCP seal cooling MANUALLY START available:

• CCP 1A-A

• Seal injection flow

• CCS pump 1A-A.

OR IF seal cooling NOT restored, THEN

• CCS flow through Thermal MONITOR lower bearing and seal Barrier Heat Exchangers water temperatures less than 225F, AND IF greater than 225F, THEN

1) TRIP Reactor

2) STOP RCPs

3) **GO TO 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection WHILE CONTINUING this instruction.

4) ISOLATE Seals using Attachment 1 Page 7 of 73

WBN Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown 1-AOI-43.02 Unit 1 Boards Rev. 0001 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.1 Initial Actions (continued)

4. EVALUATE ERCW supply on B Train IF any B Train Diesel Generator headers: running with NO ERCW cooling, THEN

a. ENSURE at least one B Train 1) EMERGENCY STOP B Train DGs.

ERCW Pump In-service: 2) OPEN 1-FCV-67-65, DG 1B-B

• ERCW Pump G-B ERCW SUP from Hdr. 2A, Manually [1B-B DG RM]

• ERCW Pump H-B

3) OPEN 2-FCV-67-65, DG 2B-B

b. START second pump as needed.

ERCW SUP from Hdr. 2A, Manually. [2B-B DG RM]

4) RESET and EMERGENCY START B Train Diesel Generators Stopped due to lack of ERCW Cooling.

5. ENSURE Unit 1 Instrument Power B Rack selected to ENERGIZED feeder (amber light ON). [1-M-7]

Page 8 of 73

WBN Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown 1-AOI-43.02 Unit 1 Boards Rev. 0001 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.1 Initial Actions (continued)

CAUTION Further damage may occur if 86 LOCKOUT relay(s) are reset before status of board is evaluated and understood.

6. DISPATCH personnel to inspect the following equipment for damage, protective relay operation, and determine reason for BO:

• 6.9kV SD BD 1B-B

• DG 1B-B

• 480V SD BD 1B1-B

• 480V SD BD 1B2-B

• 480V SD Xfmrs

7. NOTIFY Work Control for support and evaluation of BD.

8. MONITOR containment upper and START containment fans as needed:

lower compartment average air

• CRD Mech Cooler Fans temperatures are within limits:

• Lower Compartment Cooler

• S/R 3.6.5.1, Computer Point Fans U9019

• Upper Compartment Cooler

• S/R 3.6.5.2, Computer Point Fans U9020

9. ENSURE 1A Primary Water Pump in-service as required.

Page 9 of 73

WBN Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown 1-AOI-43.02 Unit 1 Boards Rev. 0001 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.1 Initial Actions (continued)

NOTE Continuous monitoring of the SFP level and temperature is NOT required once verified stable and SFP cooling is verified to be supplied by another source.

10. DISPATCH NAUO to MONITOR SFP REFER TO 1-AOI-45, Loss of Spent temp and level every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for the Fuel Pool Level or Cooling.

following:

• SFP Temperature less than 127F and stable.

• SFP level greater than 748 11-1/2 and stable.

NOTE Operability verification of remaining AC power sources is required to be completed within one hour per LCO 3.8.1. S/R 3.8.1.1 (0-SI-82-2)

11. NOTIFY Shift Manager to evaluate staffing the TSC/OSC for support,

12. EVALUATE Relay Operation and GO TO Section 3.4, Compensatory Damage reports, THEN Actions for Loss of 6.9kVSD BD 1B-B, WHILE continuing to Evaluate DETERMINE if safe to energize 6.9kV Energizing 1B-B 6.9kV SD BD.

SD BD 1B-B.

13. GO TO Section 3.2 End of Section Page 10 of 73

WBN Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown 1-AOI-43.02 Unit 1 Boards Rev. 0001 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.4 Compensatory Actions for Loss of 6.9kVSD BD 1B-B NOTE Appendix A provides list of Unavailable Equipment resulting from a loss of 6.9kV SD BD 1B-B.

1. MONITOR condition of 6.9kV SD BD 1B-B and supply sources, WHEN ready to energized Board from available power supply, THEN

• • GO TO Section 3.2.1, Step 1.

2. DISPATCH AUO to D/G Bldg to monitor D/Gs conditions USING SOI-82 series, APPENDIX A, for operating parameters.

3. CHECK any charging pump PERFORM the following:

RUNNING. a. ISOLATE letdown:

• CLOSE letdown orifice(s).

• CLOSE 1-FCV-62-69A.

• CLOSE 1-FCV-62-70A.

b. RESTORE charging and letdown using APPENDIX E ALIGNMENT OF CHARGING AND LETDOWN.

Page 39 of 73

WBN Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown 1-AOI-43.02 Unit 1 Boards Rev. 0001 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.4 Compensatory Actions for Loss of 6.9kVSD BD 1B-B (continued)

4. CHECK A Train CCS flow adequate. START 1A-A CCS Pump.

ENSURE one of the following CLOSED to avoid excessive flow

• RHR HTX A , 1-FCV-70-156 OR

• SFP HTX A, 0-FCV-70-197 IF A Train CCS is lost, THEN REFER TO 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS) FOR LOSS OF CCS FLOW.

5. ENSURE Thermal Barrier Booster REFER TO 1-AOI-15, Loss of Pump 1A-A in-service Component Cooling Water (CCS) FOR (0-SOI-70.01). LOSS OF CCS FLOW.

6. EVALUATE transferring one of the following to preserve Vital Battery life:

• 480V AC Vital Transfer Switch II to Alternate power supply (1-SOI-235.02).

OR

• 125V Vital Batt BD II to Battery Charger 6-S or 8-S (0-SOI-236.02)

7. EVALUATE transferring 24V CAP Battery Charger 2 from Normal to Alternate (0-SOI-252).

8. ENSURE Aux Bldg General Supply and Exhaust Fans in-service as required to maintain ventilation and pressure (0-SOI-30.05).

Page 40 of 73

WBN Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown 1-AOI-43.02 Unit 1 Boards Rev. 0001 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.4 Compensatory Actions for Loss of 6.9kVSD BD 1B-B (continued)

9. ENSURE EBR Air Conditioning Unit A-A and MCR Air Conditioning Unit A-A in-service (0-SOI-31.01).

10. ENSURE 1A Annulus Vacuum Fan in-service (1-SOI-65.01).

11. ENSURE 6.9kV SDBR Air Conditioning Unit A-A in-service.

(0-SOI-30.07)

12. ENSURE A Train or B Train 480V Shutdown Board Room Ventilation in-service (0-SOI-30.07).

Page 41 of 73

WBN Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown 1-AOI-43.02 Unit 1 Boards Rev. 0001 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.4 Compensatory Actions for Loss of 6.9kVSD BD 1B-B (continued)

CAUTION LCO 3.8.1 is expected to require performance of S/R 3.8.1.1 (0-SI-82-2). Performers are NOT to take ANY actions which would interrupt power supplies in-service by this AOI.

13. REFER TO Tech Specs:

• 3.5.2, ECCS-Operating.

• 3.5.3, ECCS-Shutdown.

• 3.8.1, AC Sources-Operating.

• 3.8.2, AC Sources-Shutdown.

• 3.8.4, DC Sources-Operating.

• 3.8.5, DC Sources-Shutdown.

• 3.8.9, Distribution Sys-Operating.

• 3.8.10, Distribution Sys-SD.

14. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart.

15. CONTINUE MONITORING 6.9Kv SD BD 1B-B supply sources using 1-EI-82-36A [0-M-26]. .

WHEN Power supply AVAILABLE, THEN

• • GO TO Section 3.2.1 Step 1.

End of Section Page 42 of 73

Scenario 2 Attachment 3 AOI-17, Turbine Trip, Section 3.3, BOP Realignment

WBN Turbine Trip AOI-17 Unit 1 Rev. 0051 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.3 BOP Realignment CAUTION Performance of this instruction should not be allowed to delay or interfere with actions required by applicable emergency procedures or abnormal operating procedures.

NOTES

• Control room operators may initiate shutdown of pumps and equipment from the bench board immediately after a trip.

Performance of this instruction will subsequently verify proper secondary equipment alignment.

• Steps in this section and items in Attachment 1 may be performed out of sequence.

• Attachment 1 may be initiated as soon as Turbine has tripped while MCR completes Section 3.2. Initiation of Attachment 1 may be part of briefing for preplanned Turbine trip with performance to begin when NAUO is notified of Turbine trip by UO.

1. DISPATCH turbine building NAUO to perform Attachment 1.

2. NOTIFY condensate demineralizer NAUO prior to Operator initiated press changes in condensate.

3. CHECK exciter field breaker OPEN, MOMENTARITY PLACE 1-HS-57-19, as indicated by GREEN light lit for EXCITATION CONTROL, to STOP 1-HS-57-19, EXCITATION AND CONTROL. VERIFY GREEN light lit.

Page 11 of 26

WBN Turbine Trip AOI-17 Unit 1 Rev. 0051 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.3 BOP Realignment (continued)

NOTE For turbine shutdown, if an immediate restart is not planned (i.e.

Refueling Outage or Turbine work), placement on turning gear is not required, since any rotor thermal bowing will dissipate or be rolled out on turning gear prior to restart.

4. MONITOR main turbine:

a. VERIFY seal oil backup pump a. ENSURE seal oil backup pump RUNNING as indicated by 1-HS-47-61D in NORMAL 1-HS-47-61A. (T7J/729 behind MTOT)

b. ENSURE turning gear oil pump RUNNING using 1-HS-47-61A.

c. WHEN less than 600 rpm THEN ENSURE bearing lift oil pump RUNNING using 1-HS-47-111A.

d. WHEN turbine is at ZERO RPM, AND IF turning gear operation required THEN ENSURE turbine on turning gear.

e. MAINTAIN MTOT lube oil temp between 95°F° and 100°F (may require RCW isolation if TCV has excessive leakage).

f. MAINTAIN GENERATOR H2 (Cold Gas) temp 95°F (may require RCW isolation if TCV has excessive leakage).

g. ENSURE Gland Steam Spillover Bypass valve is CLOSED using 1-HS-47-191A.

Page 12 of 26

WBN Turbine Trip AOI-17 Unit 1 Rev. 0051 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.3 BOP Realignment (continued)

5. ALIGN MSRs:

a. PUSH RESET on MSR control panel.

b. CLOSE MSR HP steam and bypass isol.

c. ENSURE MSR warming valves CLOSED.

d. OPEN MSR startup vents.

e. CLOSE MSR operating vents.

6. CHECK MSIVs OPEN. IF vacuum is to be maintained, THEN ENSURE auxiliary boiler is aligned for steam seals.

7. ENSURE adequate FW press:

a. ENSURE two hotwell pumps RUNNING.

b. IF FW isolation reset, THEN ENSURE one condensate booster pump RUNNING if needed for unit conditions.

c. ENSURE CNDS demin pumps OFF.

d. ENSURE #3 HDT pumps OFF, AND CLOSE the discharge valves to condensate heater strings.

e. ENSURE #7 HDT pumps OFF, AND CLOSE the discharge valves to condensate heater strings.

Page 13 of 26

WBN Turbine Trip AOI-17 Unit 1 Rev. 0051 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.3 BOP Realignment (continued)

8. SHUTDOWN any MFW pump NOT required.

9. SHUTDOWN any RCW pumps NOT required.

10. SHUTDOWN any CCW pumps NOT required.

11. ALIGN extraction steam valves and drain valves:

a. CLOSE #1 and #2 Heater extraction steam valves.

b. ENSURE turbine drain valves OPEN.

c. OPEN MFW pump turbine drain valves.

12. PERFORM as required:

a. OBTAIN switching instructions from NEAD, and OPEN main generator PCB(s)

MODs.

b. PULL-TO-LOCK bus duct cooling fans.

c. VERIFY MTOT and seal oil temps STABLE and trending to 95°F.

13. IF MFW isolated to steam generators, THEN REQUEST Chem Lab sample condensate and feedwater prior to re-admitting water to S/Gs from condensate-feedwater system.

Page 14 of 26

WBN Turbine Trip AOI-17 Unit 1 Rev. 0051 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.3 BOP Realignment (continued)

14. IF EGTS started, THEN SHUTDOWN one train after 1 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and place in P-AUTO:

• REFER TO SOI-65.02, Emergency Gas Treatment System, section on Auto EGTS Actuation.

15. IF ABGTS started, THEN SHUTDOWN one train after 1 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and place in P-AUTO:

• REFER TO SOI-30.06, Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System, section on Auto Start of ABGTS

16. IF MFW required, THEN ESTABLISH MFW:

• REFER TO Attachment 2, Establishing MFW Following Reactor Trip.

17. CHECK S/G NR levels between 38% IF S/G level can NOT be maintained, and 50%. THEN START MD AFW pumps.

18. REFER TO SOI-47.02 for EHC Pumps alignment.

19. RETURN TO applicable Instruction.

End of Subsection Page 15 of 26

Scenario 2 Attachment 4 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Appendices A through C

WBN Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 1-E-1 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 1 of 1)

CLA Breaker Operation CLOSE the following to restore power to cold leg accumulator isolation valves:

BOARD COMPT NOMENCLATURE 480 V Reactor MOV 3F2 1-BKR-63-118A Board 1A1-A SIS CL ACCUM 1 OUT ISOL (1-FCV-63-118) 480 V Reactor MOV 17F2 1-BKR-63-80A Board 1A1-A SIS CL ACCUM 3 OUT ISOL (1-FCV-63-80) 480 V Reactor MOV 3F2 1-BKR-63-98A Board 1B1-B SIS CL ACCUM 2 OUT ISOL (1-FCV-63-98) 480 V Reactor MOV 16F2 1-BKR-63-67A Board 1B1-B SIS CL ACCUM 4 OUT ISOL (1-FCV-63-67)

Page 20 of 24

WBN Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 1-E-1 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix B (Page 1 of 1) 1-FCV-63-1 Breaker Operation CLOSE the following to restore power to 1-FCV-63-1:

BOARD COMPT NOMENCLATURE 480 V Reactor MOV 2E1 1-BKR-63-1A Board 1A1-A RWST TO RHR SUCT (1-FCV-63-1)

Page 21 of 24

WBN Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 1-E-1 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix C (Page 1 of 1) 1-FCV-63-22 Breaker Operation CLOSE the following to restore power to 1-FCV-63-22:

BOARD COMPT NOMENCLATURE 480 V Reactor MOV 2F2 1-BKR-63-22A Board 1B1-B SIP COLD LEG INJECTION (1-FCV-63-22)

SHUNT TRIP BREAKER Page 22 of 24

Scenario 2 Attachment 5 ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation, Appendix B, ERCW Operation

WBN Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation ECA-1.1 Unit 1 Rev. 0012 Appendix B (Page 1 of 1)

ERCW Operation 1.0 INSTRUCTIONS A. ENSURE at least two ERCW pumps running on each train.

B. ALIGN ERCW to Train A cntmt spray:

• OPEN 1-FCV-67-125 CNTMT SPRAY HX 1A INLET.

• OPEN 1-FCV-67-126 CNTMT SPRAY HX 1A RETURN.

C. ALIGN ERCW to Train B cntmt spray:

• OPEN 1-FCV-67-123 CNTMT SPRAY HX 1B INLET.

• OPEN 1-FCV-67-124 CNTMT SPRAY HX 1B RETURN.

D. IF supply flow less than 5200 gpm on 1-FI-67-136, CS HX 1A SUP FLOW, and 1-FI-67-122, CS HX 1B SUP FLOW, THEN ADJUST CCS heat exchanger outlet valves as necessary, AND CONSULT TSC.

Page 32 of 35

Scenario 2 TURNOVER PACKAGE

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant NRC EXAM 2013302 Scenario 3

Events Number Description Page(s) 1 Transfer RCP Start Bus A from Alternate to Normal. Requires the BOP to 8-9 perform SOI-200.02, 6.9kV RCP Start Buses, Section 8.1, Transfer from Alternate to Normal.

2 1A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump (TBBP) trips. 1B TBBP fails to auto start. 10-11 Requires entry into ARI 237-B, RCP 1 THRM BAR RET FLOW LO. Requires an OR14.10 evaluation.

3 1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, closes due to a controller failure. 12-13 Requires entry into ARI 110-B LO PRESS LTDN FLOW/PRESS HI. Requires manual operation of 1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL to maintain pressure.

4 Eagle 21 Rack, 1-R-2 Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) fails. Loop 1 14-23 Auctioneered Tavg fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, and 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

5 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Loss of 1C 6.9 Kv Unit 24-36 Board results in the loss of CCW PMP 1C, CONDENSATE BOOSTER PMP 1C, HOTWELL PMP 1B, and #7 HEATER DRAIN PMP 1B. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO and performance of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, OR 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater.

6 RO must borate to return AFD to within limits of LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux 28 or Difference, within 30 minutes. 32-34 7 1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be 37-51 generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1-SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open.

Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Critical Tasks Critical Description Page(s)

Task 1 Insert control rods upon discovery of ATWS conditions. Manual insertion 39 required when automatic rod insertion slows to less than 72 steps/minute.

(Discovery of the ATWS condition is considered to be the time when the second manual reactor trip switch is actuated and fails to trip.)

2 Manually trip the Main Turbine within 30 seconds of discovery of the ATWS 39 condition.

3 Manually start AFW pumps within 1 minute of discovery of the ATWS 39-40 condition.

4 Manually isolate feedwater flow to SG 3 (Faulted SG) prior to 49 Attachments Number Description 1 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Attachment 1, Reactor Power VS T-avg/T-ref Temperature and PZR Level.

2 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendices A and B.

References Number Title Revision WBN Technical Specifications Amendment 91 Fire Protection Report 1-SOI-200.02 6.9kV RCP Start Buses 11 ARI-109-115 CVCS & RHR - RPS & ESF 20 1-AOI-15 Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS) 2 1-AOI-2 Malfunction of Reactor Control System 0 1-AOI-44 Eagle 21 Malfunctions 1 ARI-43-49 CNDS & CONDENSER 14 ARI-8-14 Aux Power 9 AOI-39 Rapid Load Reduction 15 1-AOI-16 Loss of Normal Feedwater 2 1-FR-S.1 Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS 0 1-E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 0 1-E-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation 0 1-ES-1.1 SI Termination 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Scenario No. 3 Op Test No.: 302 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Run Time:

Initial Conditions: 100% Power, MOL conditions. Control Bank D at 220 steps. RCS boron concentration is 845 ppm.

Turnover: Train A Channel I Work Week. 1A-A RHR Pump is out of service for pump bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago. EOOS Risk is GREEN. SG 1 has a stable 0.9 gpd tube leak. AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Appendix A and C have been performed. Leak rate has been stable for the last 2 weeks. TD AFW pump is aligned to SG #4 as a precautionary measure. Caution Order placed. Repairs have been completed on 6.9 KV RCP Start Bus A Normal Feeder Breaker 2614 and a transfer from Alternate to Normal is to be performed as soon as practical after assuming the shift.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description No.

1 n/a N-BOP/SRO Transfer RCP Start Bus A from Alternate to Normal.

2 cc08a C-BOP 1A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump (TBBP) trips. 1B TBBP fails to TS-SRO auto start.

3 hic-62-81a_ai C-RO 1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, closes due to a controller failure.

4 rp38c I-RO Eagle 21 Rack, 1-R-2 Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) fails.

TS-SRO 5 ed07d C-BOP 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Results in the loss of multiple secondary pumps and the need to reduce load.

6 n/a R-RO/SRO RO borates during load reduction, to return AFD to within limits of TS-SRO LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, within 30 minutes.

7 ms06a 0 M-ALL 1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal ms03b to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS rp01c 22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1-SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 3 - Summary Initial Condition 100% Power, MOL conditions. Control Bank D at 220 steps. RCS boron concentration is 845 ppm.

Turnover Train A Channel I Work Week. 1A-A RHR Pump is out of service for pump bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago. EOOS Risk is GREEN. SG 1 has a stable 0.9 gpd tube leak. AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Appendix A and C have been performed. Leak rate has been stable for the last 2 weeks. TD AFW pump is aligned to SG #4 as a precautionary measure. Caution Order placed. Repairs have been completed on 6.9 KV RCP Start Bus A Normal Feeder Breaker 2614 and transfer from Alternate to Normal is to be performed as soon as practical after assuming the shift.

Event Description 1 Transfer RCP Start Bus A from Alternate to Normal. Requires the BOP to perform SOI-200.02, 6.9kV RCP Start Buses, Section 8.1, Transfer from Alternate to Normal.

2 1A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump (TBBP) trips. 1B TBBP fails to auto start. Requires entry into ARI 237-B, RCP 1 THRM BAR RET FLOW LO. Requires a Fire Protection Plan evaluation and entry into OR 14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment, 14.10.1.

3 1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, closes due to a controller failure. Requires entry into ARI 110-B LO PRESS LTDN FLOW/PRESS HI. Requires manual operation of 1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL to maintain pressure.

4 Eagle 21 Rack, 1-R-2 Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) fails. Loop 1 Auctioneered Tavg fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, and 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into multiple CONDITIONS for LCOs 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS)

Instrumentation, and 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.

5 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Loss of 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board results in the loss of CCW PMP 1C, CONDENSATE BOOSTER PMP 1C, HOTWELL PMP 1B, and #7 HEATER DRAIN PMP 1B. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO and performance of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction,(SUCCESS PATH

1) or 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater,(SUCCESS PATH 2).

6 RO borates during load reduction, using 1-AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, Step 1, or 1-AOI-16, Rapid Load Reduction, Attachment 1, Boration Methods. RO must borate to return AFD to within limits of LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, within 30 minutes.

7 1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1-SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 3 - Critical Task Summary Critical Task Description 1 Manually insert control rods upon discovery of ATWS conditions. (Discovery of the ATWS condition is considered to be the time the when second manual reactor trip switch is actuated and fails to trip.)

2 Manually trip the Main Turbine within 30 seconds of discovery of the ATWS condition.

3 Manually start AFW pumps within 1 minute of discovery of the ATWS condition.

4 Isolate the faulted steam generator (SG 3) prior to exiting 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 8 of 60 Event

Description:

Transfer RCP Start Bus A from Alternate to Normal. Requires the BOP to perform SOI-200.02, 6.9kV RCP Start Buses, Section 8.1, Transfer from Alternate to Normal.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: Event 1 is a normal evolution which will begin as soon as the crew assumes shift.

The following actions are taken from SOI-200.02, 6.9kV RCP Start Buses, SOI-200.02 Section 8.1, Transfer from Alternate to Normal.

[1] OBTAIN SRO approval.

BOP BOP enters N/A.

NOTES

1) IF the Unit is out of service, the board may be energized by USST 1B, if energized by backfeeding the USSTs.

2) The Unit Bd may be energizing 6.9kV Shutdown Bd via Maint Brkr.

[2] CHECK 6560-7260V to Bkr 1122, on one of the following (N/A unused blank):

[2.1] START BUS A VOLTS voltmeter [0=ECB-3].

BOP BOP locates 1-EI-57-58, USST 1B Volts and reports approximately 7200 volts.

[2.2] 6.9kV RCP Start Bus A, 0-BKR-200-2512/A [Pnl A3].

BOP enters N/A.

[3] PLACE RCP ST BUS 1 6.9kV Transfer Selector [0-ECB-2], in MAN.

BOP BOP locates RCP ST BUS 1 6.9kV Transfer Selector and selects MAN.

EXAMINER: The following definition is taken from NPG-SPP-01.2, Administration of Site Technical Procedures.

Critical Step - A critical step is a work-related step or action that, if performed incorrectly, will significantly harm plant equipment or significantly impact plant operation. A step, action, or phase of a task is considered critical, if it satisfies all of the following conditions:

A. The consequences of incorrect performance are intolerable to reactor safety, generation, or to plant equipment (see DEFINITION of Intolerable Consequences to the Plant).

NOTE Immediately should be construed as during implementation of the procedure. For example, if the incorrect performance of Step A could cause an immediate intolerable consequence when Step B is performed, then Step A should be considered a critical step.

B. The consequences are realized immediately.

C. The step, action, or phase is dependent solely upon the actions or inaction of the individual(s).

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 9 of 60 Event

Description:

Transfer RCP Start Bus A from Alternate to Normal. Requires the BOP to perform SOI-200.02, 6.9kV RCP Start Buses, Section 8.1, Transfer from Alternate to Normal.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: The following actions to transfer the electrical board require two-handed operation.

[4] PLACE Bkr 2512 handswitch [0-ECB-2], to CLOSE, and HOLD UNTIL BOP transfer is complete.

BOP locates Bkr 2512 handswitch on 0-ECB-2, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the CLOSE position and holds it in position until transfer is completed.

[5] TURN Bkr 2614 handswitch [0-ECB-2], to TRIP, and VERIFY Bkr 2512, CLOSED, and CHECK Bkr 2614 OPEN.

BOP locates Bkr 2614 handswitch and rotates the handswitch to the BOP LEFT to the TRIP position and holds it in position until after confirming Breaker 2512 CLOSED and Breaker 2614 OPEN.

[6] VERIFY 6560-7260V on RCP Start Bus A voltmeter [0-ECB-2].

BOP BOP locates RCP Start Bus A voltmeter on 0-ECB-2, and observes approximately 7200 volts.

[7] PLACE RCP ST BUS 1 6.9kV Bus Transfer Selector, in AUTO.

BOP BOP locates RCP ST BUS 1 6.9kV Bus Transfer Selector and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the AUTO position.

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 2.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 10 of 60 Event

Description:

1A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump (TBBP) trips. 1B TBBP fails to auto start. Requires entry into ARI 237-B, RCP 1 THRM BAR RET FLOW LO. Requires an OR14.10 evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

237-B, RCP 1 THRM BAR RET FLOW LO.

238-B, RCP 2 THRM BAR RET FLOW LO.

239-B, RCP 3 THRM BAR RET FLOW LO.

240-B, RCP 4 THRM BAR RET FLOW LO.

1-FI-70-81, TH BAR RET HDR FLOW reduced to approximately 120 gpm.

1-FI-70-115, TH BAR 1 FLOW reduced to approximately 30 gpm.

1-FI-70-105, TH BAR 2 FLOW reduced to approximately 30 gpm.

1-FI-70-95, TH BAR 3 FLOW reduced to approximately 30 gpm.

1-FI-70-124, TH BAR 4 FLOW reduced to approximately 30 gpm.

Diagnoses and announces the trip of the 1A TBBP, and the failure of the 1B BOP TBBP to start automatically.

May start the 1B TBBP manually to restore thermal barrier flow to normal, BOP since this is an automatic action that should have occurred and did not.

Prudent action, allowed by TI-12.04.

SRO Enters and directs actions of ARI 237-B, RCP 1 THRM BAR RET FLOW LO.

EXAMINER: Equivalent actions are contained in 238-B, 239-B and 240B.

ARI 237-B The following actions are taken from 237-B, RCP 1 THRM BAR RET FLOW LO.

[1] IF Phase B initiated, THEN GO TO Emergency Instructions.

BOP BOP determines that Phase B has NOT been initiated, and continues with ARI actions.

[2] CHECK 1-FI-70-115, TH BAR 1 FLOW [0-M-27B], AND COMPARE with other RCPs.

BOP BOP determines that all RCP thermal barrier flows are lower than normal.

[3] ENSURE TB Booster Pump ON.

BOP locates 1-HS-70-131A, THRM BAR BSTR PMP 1A (TBBP) and BOP determines that the pump is OFF. BOP locates 1-HS-70-130A, THRM BAR BSTR PMP 1B (TBBP) pushes the handswitch in then rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the START position. BOP determines that thermal barrier flow has returned to approximately 45 gpm per RCP.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 11 of 60 Event

Description:

1A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump (TBBP) trips. 1B TBBP fails to auto start. Requires entry into ARI 237-B, RCP 1 THRM BAR RET FLOW LO. Requires an OR14.10 evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[4] ENSURE the following TB isolation valves OPEN:

• 1-FCV-70-133 and -134, THERMAL BAR SUP CIV- B BOP locates 1-HS-70-133A, THERMAL BAR SUP CIV- B and observes the RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK, and valve is OPEN BOP locates 1-HS-70-134A, THERMAL BAR SUP CIV- B and observes BOP the RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK, and valve is OPEN.

• 1-FCV-70-87 and -90, THERMAL BAR RET CIV- B BOP locates 1-HS-70-90A, THERMAL BAR RET CIV- B and observes the RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK, and valve is OPEN.

BOP locates 1-HS-70-87A, THERMAL BAR RET CIV- B and observes the RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK, and valve is OPEN.

[5] IF flow NOT restored, THEN SRO BOP reports that thermal barrier flow has been restored, and SRO determines the step is not applicable.

Enters OR-14.10 for the failure of 1A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump.

SRO determines that 1-PMP-70-131-A, CCS THERMAL BARRIER BOOSTER PUMP 1A, is listed in TABLE 14.10 (FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT) (PAGE 4 OF 4) and that its required FSSD CONDITION is SRO OPERABLE.

SRO enters 14.10.1 With one or more required equipment in Table 14.10 inoperable (or not in its FSSD condition), restore to operable status (or its FSSD condition) within 30 days.

When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat the SRO request for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1A TBBP trip, and to determine why the 1B TBBP failed to start.

EXAMINER: The crew brief is optional. The next event, Event 3, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior to SRO the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 3.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 12 of 60 Event

Description:

1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, closes due to a controller failure. Requires entry into ARI 110-B LO PRESS LTDN FLOW/PRESS HI. Requires manual operation of 1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL to maintain pressure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

110-B, LO PRESS LTDN FLOW/PRESS HI LIT 247-A, LTDN HX RET FLOW LO LIT 1-PI-62-81, LP LETDOWN PRESS indicates a rising trend Announces rising pressure on 1-PI-62-81, and diagnoses the failure of 1-RO PIC-62-81A LETDOWN PRESSURE CONTROL to control in AUTOMATIC.

Enters and directs actions of ARI 110-B, LO PRESS LTDN FLOW/PRESS SRO HI.

The following actions are taken from ARI 110-B, LO PRESS LTDN ARI 110-B FLOW/PRESS HI.

[1] CHECK letdown flow, 1-FI-62-82, and letdown pressure, 1-PI-62-81 [1-M-6].

RO RO observes letdown flow lowering on 1-FI-62-82 and letdown pressure is rising on 1-PI-62-81.

NOTE If 1-PCV-62-81 has failed, SOI-62.01 may be referenced to bypass the valve.

[2] ENSURE 1-PCV-62-81 is maintaining 320 to 350 psig on 1-PI-62-81.

RO places 1-HIC-62-81A, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, in MANUAL and returns letdown pressure to approximately 320 psig by opening RO the valve slowly.

If contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, the Console Operator acknowledges the request to locally inspect 1-PCV-62-81. Report back that there are no obvious problems at the controller and that the valve appears to be responding to manual signals.

[3] ENSURE proper orifice(s) are aligned to supply letdown flow 45 to 120 gpm.

RO With letdown flow at 75 gpm, the RO ensures that either 1-FCV-62-73 or 1-FCV-62-74 is open.

[4] IF conditions persist, THEN, CONSIDER taking normal Charging and Letdown out of service and placing excess letdown in service per SOI-SRO 62.01, CVCS - CHARGING AND LETDOWN.

SRO determines that letdown pressure can be maintained with 1-HIC-62-81A in MANUAL, and does not isolate charging and letdown.

Contacts Work Control to repair 1-PCV-62-81, LETDOWN PRESSURE CONTROL.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator repeats the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-PCV-62-81, LETDOWN PRESSURE CONTROL.

EXAMINER: The crew brief is optional. The next event, Event 4, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 13 of 60 Event

Description:

1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, closes due to a controller failure. Requires entry into ARI 110-B LO PRESS LTDN FLOW/PRESS HI. Requires manual operation of 1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL to maintain pressure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 4.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 14 of 60 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 Rack, 1-R-2 Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) fails. Loop 1 Auctioneered Tavg fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, and 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

87-A, ROD INSERTION LIMIT LO 93-A. RCS LOOP T DEVIATION 94-A, TAVG-TREF DEVIATION 94-B, TAVG-T AUCT DEVIATION 111-F, PROT SET I CHANNEL FAILURE 122-C OVERPOWER T TRIP ALERT 122-D, OVERPOWER T TURB RUNBACK & C-4 ROD BLOCK 123-C, OVERTEMP T TRIP ALERT 123-D, OVERTEMP T TURB RUNBACK &C-3 ROD BLOCK Control rods inserting at 72 steps per minute.

Determines that NO runback condition exists, and diagnoses and RO announces the unwarranted continuous rod insertion.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS associated with 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of RO Reactor Control System.

May place 1-HIC-62-93A, CHARGING FLOW PZR LEVEL CONTROL in RO MANUAL to minimize effect of Tavg failure.

RO/BOP Diagnoses and announces the failure of Eagle Rack 1-R-2.

Enters and directs actions of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control SRO System.

SRO Enters and directs actions of 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions.

EXAMINER: Entry into both 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, and 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions, are required for this event. Order of entry is optional.

The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, 1-AOI-2 Section 3.2, Uncontrolled Rod Bank Movement.

NOTE Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step

1. STOP uncontrolled rod motion:

a. PLACE control rods in MAN.

RO b. CHECK control rod movement STOPPED.

Since these are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps, the actions have already been taken.

EXAMINER: 1-AOI-2, Attachment 1 is included in the scenario as Attachment 1.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 15 of 60 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 Rack, 1-R-2 Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) fails. Loop 1 Auctioneered Tavg fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, and 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. MAINTAIN T-ave on PROGRAM.

(Reference Attachment 1) * () USE control rods.

RO OR

• () ADJUST turbine load.

RO may return Control Bank D to 220 steps.

3. CHECK loop T-ave channels NORMAL.

RO RO reports that Loop 1 T-ave channel is FAILED.

3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

DEFEAT failed channels:

a. PLACE 1-XS-68-2D, T CHANNEL DEFEAT, to failed channel position, AND PULL.

RO will rotate 1-XS-68-2D to the LOOP 1 position and then pull out the selector switch.

b. PLACE 1-XS-68-2M, TAVG CHANNEL DEFEAT, in failed channel position AND PULL.

RO will rotate 1-XS-68-2M to the LOOP 1 position and then pull out the selector switch.

ENSURE TR-68-2A placed to a Loop with operable T/OTT/OPT channels using 1-XS-68-2B.

Since 1-XS-68-2B is selected to LOOP 1, the RO will select any other loop as input to the recorder.

RO NOTIFY Maintenance to implement IMI-160 for failed channel.

SRO will contact Maintenance/Work Control and request performance of IMI-160. Console Operator will repeat back request.

WHEN at least 5 minutes have elapsed since failed T-ave channel is defeated AND auto rod control desired, THEN

a. ENSURE T-ave and T-ref within 1°F.

RO observes T-avg and T-ref within 1°F on 1-TR-68-2B, TREF & AUCT TAVG - °F or ROBAR display.

b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication [1-M-4].

RO observes that there is a zero demand indicated on the PASSIVE SUMMER ROD DEMAND on both CERPI displays.

c. PLACE rods in AUTO.

RO rotates 1-RBSS from the MANUAL position to the right to the AUTO position.

4. CHECK Auct T-avg NORMAL on 1-TR-68-2B.

RO After Step 3 is performed and the failed channel is defeated, Auct Tavg will indicate NORMAL on 1-TR-68-2B.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 16 of 60 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 Rack, 1-R-2 Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) fails. Loop 1 Auctioneered Tavg fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, and 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. CHECK NIS power range channels NORMAL.

RO RO observes all NIS channels are indicating the same values and are NORMAL.

6. CHECK the following:

• Turbine impulse pressure channel 1-PI-1-73, NORMAL.

BOP observes that 1-PI-1-73, % HP TURBINE POWER TR A is matched with 1-PI-1-72, % HP TURBINE POWER TR B and both are NORMAL.

RO/BOP

• T-ref and Auct T-avg NORMAL on 1-TR-68-2B (Reference Attachment 1).

After failed loop T and loop T-avg channels have been defeated in Step 3 RNO, Tref and Auct Tavg are NORMAL.

7. MONITOR core power distribution parameters:

• Power range channels

• Flux Indicators

• T-ave RO

• Loop T

• Incore TCs

• Feed flow/Steam flow RO writes down the list of parameters to MONITOR.

EXAMINER: SRO may wait to contact Work Control until directed by 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions.

SRO 8. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 17 of 60 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 Rack, 1-R-2 Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) fails. Loop 1 Auctioneered Tavg fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, and 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: SRO may wait to determine Tech Spec applicability until directed by 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions.

9. REFER TO Tech Specs:

• 3.1.1, Shutdown Margin - Not applicable.

• 3.1.5, Rod Group Alignment Limits - Not applicable.

• 3.1.6, Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits - Not applicable.

• 3.1.7, Control Bank Insertion Limits - Not applicable.

• 3.2.1, Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor - Not applicable.

• 3.2.2, Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor - Not applicable.

• 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio - Not applicable.

• 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference - Not applicable.

SRO

• 3.3.1-1, Rx Trip System (RTS)

Function 6. Overtemperature T - Condition W. Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

Function 7. Overpower T - Condition W. Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR reduce THERMAL POWER to <P-7.

SG level trip LCO is not applicable, since Loop 1 does not input into the TTD circuitry.

• 3.3.2-1, ESFAS Instrumentation.

AFW pump start logic LCO is not applicable, since Loop 1 does not input into the TTD circuitry.

10. NOTIFY Chemistry of any reactor power changes greater than 15% in SRO one hour.

Power change has not exceeded 15%, so this step is not applicable.

11. WHEN ready to restore repaired T and loop T-avg channels, THEN:

• PUSH IN 1-XS-68-2D, T CHANNEL DEFEAT and SELECT AWAY from all channels.

• PUSH IN 1-XS-68-2M, TAVG CHANNEL DEFEAT, and SELECT AWAY from all channels.

SRO determines that this step cannot be accomplished at this time and continues to Step 12.

EXAMINER: Step 12 actions are provided if the applicants did NOT return rods to automatic during the performance of Step 3 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED actions.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 18 of 60 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 Rack, 1-R-2 Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) fails. Loop 1 Auctioneered Tavg fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, and 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. WHEN auto rod control desired, THEN:

a. ENSURE T-ave and T-ref within 1°F.

RO withdraws control rods in MANUAL to match T-avg and T-ref within 1°F.

b. ENSURE zero demand on control rod position indication [1-M-4].

RO RO observes that there is a zero demand indicated on the PASSIVE SUMMER ROD DEMAND on both CERPI displays.

c. PLACE rods in AUTO.

RO rotates 1-RBSS from the MANUAL position to the right to the AUTO position.

13. WHEN conditions allow auto PZR level control, THEN ENSURE PZR level returned to normal program, AND PLACE 1-FCV-62-93 in AUTO.

RO If action was taken earlier to take manual control of PZR level, the RO will place 1-HIC-62-93A in AUTO after verifying level has been returned to program.

SRO 14. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 19 of 60 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 Rack, 1-R-2 Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) fails. Loop 1 Auctioneered Tavg fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, and 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-AOI-44 The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions.

CAUTION Rack failure with existing OOS loops may result in some controls forced to MANUAL by Distributed Control System (DCS) logic.

NOTE DCS should auto bypass out of range inputs. Partial failures require manual BYPASS using DCS Operator Display.

1. IDENTIFY rack associated with failure:

• REFER TO ALARM printer.

RO may refer to the ALARM printer screen, and determine that 1-R-2 has failed.

OR

• ENTER EGLRCK Turn-on code into ICS computer screen (failed rack RO will have red lights next to any status):

RO may call up EAGLE 21 ICS display, and determines that 1-R-2 has failed.

OR

• REFER TO Appendix A to identify failed rack from bistable pattern RO may refer to Appendix A to determine that 1-R-2 has failed.

NOTE Additional bistables lit in row may indicate a power or Logic Control Panel (LCP) failure. (PROT SET TROUBLE lights 19, 39, 59, & 79 are not bistables)

2. CHECK bistable indications NORMAL.

RO RO determines that the bistable indications are not normal (additional bistable lights are LIT).

2. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO **GO TO Section 3.2, Response to LCP or Output Failure.

SRO enters Section 3.2, Response to LCP or Output Failure.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 20 of 60 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 Rack, 1-R-2 Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) fails. Loop 1 Auctioneered Tavg fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, and 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3.2 Response to LCP or Output Failure SRO SRO determines that Section 3.2.2, 1-R-2, is required to be implemented.

CAUTION All analog outputs from failed rack are FROZEN in place (providing power supply has not failed). This may include inputs to recorders.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 21 of 60 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 Rack, 1-R-2 Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) fails. Loop 1 Auctioneered Tavg fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, and 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE IMI-99.002 may be referenced for 1-R-2 Eagle 21 loop identifiers and failure responses.

1. CHECK auto rod control unaffected by failure.

RO RO reports that rod control was affected by the failure.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

REFER TO 1-AOI-2 while continuing this procedure.

SRO If already accomplished, the SRO states that 1-AOI-2 performance is complete.

If NOT previously accomplished, the SRO enters 1-AOI-2 and performs actions.

2. ENSURE 1-HS-68-340/AD, COPS BLOCK/ARM FOR PORV 340A in BLOCK.

RO RO locates 1-HS-68-340AD, COPS BLOCK/ARM FOR PORV 340A, and observes the handswitch is in the BLOCK position.

NOTE The following instrument loops are affected by this failure:

• Auctioneered Delta T and Tavg (Chnl 1) LPT-68-2.

• Loops 1 & 2 RCS Wide Range T-Hot/T-Cold (Loops LPT-68-1 &18, 24 & 41).

• RCS Wide Range Pressure LPP-68-63 including 1-FCV-74-1 & 8 & interlock & ICCM.

• COMS Loops 1 & 2 PORV 340A.

• RVLIS and Subcooling Monitor 1-XI-68-100 & 1-TI-68-105.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 22 of 60 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 Rack, 1-R-2 Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) fails. Loop 1 Auctioneered Tavg fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, and 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

3. REFER TO Tech Specs:

• 3.3.1 for Modes 1 and 2 LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation.

Function 6, Overtemperature T - Condition W, With one channel inoperable, place the channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR Be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

Function 7 Overpower T - Condition W (Same as above).

• 3.3.3 for Modes 1, 2 and 3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation.

Function 3, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot Leg Temperature (T-Hot) - Condition C, One or more Functions with two required channels SRO inoperable OR Functions 3, 4, 14, and 16 with one required channel inoperable, Restore one channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

Function 4, RCS Cold Leg Temperature (T Cold) - Condition C (same as above).

Function 5, RCS Pressure (Wide Range) - Condition A, With One or more Functions with one required channel inoperable, Restore required channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days.

Function 6, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Condition A, (same as above).

Function 22, Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor -

Condition A, (same as above).

• 3.4.12 for Modes 4, 5 and 6 when the reactor vessel head is on Not applicable.

4. INITIATE repairs to failed rack.

SRO When SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to have a troubleshooting and repair package made up for Eagle 21 Rack 1-R-2.

5. CHECK indications normal for other Eagle 21 rack(s).

RO/BOP BOP or RO may call up EAGLE 21 ICS display, and determine that only 1-R-2 has failed.

6. MONITOR any alternate indications available for inputs lost to lit alarms.

RO/BOP BOP and RO monitor alternate indications.

SRO 7. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 5, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 23 of 60 Event

Description:

Eagle 21 Rack, 1-R-2 Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) fails. Loop 1 Auctioneered Tavg fails high, causing rod insertion. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, and 1-AOI-44, Eagle 21 Malfunctions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 5.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 and 6 Page 24 of 60 Event

Description:

5. 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Loss of the Unit Board results in the loss of CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP 1C, HOTWELL PMP 1B and #7 HEATER DRAIN PMP 1B. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, OR 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater than or Equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

6. RO must borate to return AFD to within limits of LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, within 30 minutes.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

10-B, 6.9 UNIT BD 1C UV/CONTROL PWR FAILURE 14-E, M-1 THRU M-6 MOTOR TRIPOUT 35-B,#7 HD PMP FAIL TO START 41-E, INJ WATER PMPS DISCH HDR PRESS LO 43-B, CNDS BSTR PMP FAIL TO START 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO 50-E, MFPT 1A INJ WATER P LO 51-E, MFPT 1B INJ WATER P LO 1-PI-2-129 MFW PMPS SUCT PRESS dropping to approximately 230 psig.

BOP Diagnoses and announces the loss of 1C 6.9 KV Unit Board.

May dispatch an AUO to investigate the 1C 6.9 KV Unit Board.

When the BOP contacts an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat BOP back the request to investigate the cause of the 1C 6.9KV Unit Board trip. Console Operator reports back that the timed overcurrent relay has actuated and that there is no apparent damage to the board.

Diagnoses and announces the loss of 1B #7 HD PMP, 1C COND BOP BOOSTER PMP, and 1B HOTWELL PMP.

May dispatch an AUO to investigate the cause of window 41-E, INJ WATER PMPS DISCH HDR PRESS LO.

When the BOP contacts an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat BOP back the request to check the condition of the injection water pumps and to check injection water pump discharge pressure. Console Operator reports both injection water pumps are running and discharge pressure is 282 psig.

Diagnoses and announces Window 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH BOP LO. Reports 1-PI-2-129, MFW PMPS SUCT PRESS at approximately 230 psig.

May enter and direct actions of ARI-49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH SRO LO SRO Enters and directs actions of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 and 6 Page 25 of 60 Event

Description:

5. 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Loss of the Unit Board results in the loss of CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP 1C, HOTWELL PMP 1B and #7 HEATER DRAIN PMP 1B. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, OR 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater than or Equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

6. RO must borate to return AFD to within limits of LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, within 30 minutes.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP ARI 49-E SUCTION NPSH LO.

[1] MONITOR MFWP suction press on 1-PI-2-129 [1-M-3].

BOP BOP locates 1-PI-2-129 MFW PMPS SUCT PRESS and reports that pressure is approximately 230 psig.

[2] ENSURE the following pumps/flow paths are operating as required by current unit load and plant conditions:

• Hotwell Pumps

• Condensate Demin Pumps BOP

• Condensate Booster Pumps

• No. 7 HDT Pumps

• No. 3 HDT Pumps BOP reports that the loss of the 1C 6.9 KV Unit Board has prevented any possibility of recovering the lost flow.

EXAMINER: The SRO may elect to perform AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, to recover MFP suction pressure (Success Path 1) OR elect to trip one MFP and perform 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, (Success Path 2). Actions of each success path are provided on the following pages.

[3] IF unable to recover suction pressure by restoring required Condensate flow, THEN PERFORM the following:

[3.1] IF a No. 3 HDT Pump has tripped, THEN REFER TO AOI-37, SRO TURBINE RUNBACK RESPONSE.

[3.2] IF cause of alarm NOT related to HDT Pumps, THEN REFER TO AOI-39, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION, to reduce Turbine load.

NOTE The low suction press limits given in the table below are conservative, and allow time for the operator to attempt recovery actions.

[4] IF unable to recover suction pressure by restoring required Condensate flow or reducing load, THEN PERFORM the following:

SRO SRO may hold ARI 49-E open and evaluate the success of the load reduction.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 and 6 Page 26 of 60 Event

Description:

5. 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Loss of the Unit Board results in the loss of CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP 1C, HOTWELL PMP 1B and #7 HEATER DRAIN PMP 1B. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, OR 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater than or Equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

6. RO must borate to return AFD to within limits of LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, within 30 minutes.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 and 6 Page 27 of 60 Event

Description:

5. 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Loss of the Unit Board results in the loss of CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP 1C, HOTWELL PMP 1B and #7 HEATER DRAIN PMP 1B. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, OR 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater than or Equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

6. RO must borate to return AFD to within limits of LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, within 30 minutes.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SUCCESS PATH 1 AOI-39 The following actions are taken from AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction.

CAUTION Over boration may result in excessive rod withdrawal, T-avg lower than desired, and AFD oscillations.

NOTE

• Rod Control should remain in automatic for T-avg Control

• Reactivity Briefing Sheet, Thumb Rules (page 3), lists boration flows and volumes for different reduction rates.

• Effect of boration will lag behind turbine load reduction and can be compensated for by temporarily increasing boric acid flow rate above recommended rate.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 and 6 Page 28 of 60 Event

Description:

5. 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Loss of the Unit Board results in the loss of CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP 1C, HOTWELL PMP 1B and #7 HEATER DRAIN PMP 1B. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, OR 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater than or Equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

6. RO must borate to return AFD to within limits of LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, within 30 minutes.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. INITIATE a manual boration:

a. DETERMINE recommended boration flow rate and volume from Reactivity Briefing Sheet:

RO determines the recommended boration flow rate between 27 to 40 gpm and the total volume to add to be approximately 90 gallons of boron.

b. INITIATE normal boration:

1) ADJUST BA flow controller, 1-FC-62-139, to desired flow rate.

RO adjusts 1-FC-62-139 to the value corresponding to the flow rate for the selected load reduction rate.

2) ADJUST BA batch counter 1-FQ-62-139 to required quantity.

RO adjusts 1-FQ-62-139 BA BATCH COUNTER as follows:

1. Depresses and holds the black pushbutton.

RO 2. While holding the pushbutton, the applicant raises the red translucent cover.

3. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant enters 000090 in the display

4. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant lowers the red translucent cover, and then releases the pushbutton.

3) PLACE mode selector 1-HS-62-140B to BOR.

RO rotates 1-HS-62-140B VCT MAKEUP MODE from AUTO to the right to BOR position.

4) () PLACE VCT makeup control 1-HS-62-140A, to START.

RO rotates 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL to the right to the START position.

5) VERIFY desired boric acid flow indicated on 1-FI-62-139.

RO observes the desired flow on 1-FI-62-139, BA TO BLENDER FLOW CAUTION

• Condenser Backpressure limits are on page 5.

• TURBINE MANUAL Operation requires continuous operator monitoring and control.

• LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM may be made worse if steam dumps are actuated. AOI-11 requires T-ave and T-ref be maintained within 3°F.

NOTE If the initiating condition is corrected, the power reduction may be terminated 2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 and 6 Page 29 of 60 Event

Description:

5. 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Loss of the Unit Board results in the loss of CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP 1C, HOTWELL PMP 1B and #7 HEATER DRAIN PMP 1B. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, OR 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater than or Equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

6. RO must borate to return AFD to within limits of LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, within 30 minutes.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. ESTABLISH a turbine load reduction rate less than or equal to 5%/min:

a. PLACE turbine in IMP IN BOP depressed the IMP IN pushbutton and observes the transfer from IMP OUT to IMP IN control complete.

b. SET a desired load in the SETTER with the REFERENCE CONTROL.

BOP depresses the reference control (down) button to reduce the BOP setter display to approximately 90% load or as directed by the SRO.

c. SET the LOAD RATE at less than or equal to 5%/min.

BOP selects the load reduction rate directed by the SRO using the LOAD RATE % PER MIN thumbwheel selector. It is expected that a load reduction rate of 2-4%/minute will be used

d. () DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

BOP depresses the REFERENCE CONTROL GO button.

NOTE AFD green target band can be monitored using ICS Turn On code DOGHOUSE.

3. MONITOR rod position:

RO

• Rods above Lo-Lo insertion limit

• AFD within Target Band

4. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart SRO When the SRO contacts the Shift Manager and Console Operator will repeat back request that EPIP-1 be evaluated

5. NOTIFY the Load Coordinator of the required load reduction and expected ramp rate SRO When the SRO contacts Load Coordinator, the Console Operator will repeat back the information provided.

NOTE If reactor power is stabilized at a lower level a drop in T-avg will occur due to Xenon build up. Dilution may be required to maintain power level.

6. MONITOR T-avg and T-ref:

RO

• T-ave trending to T-ref.

• Mismatch less than 5°F.

7. CHECK rate of power reduction is rapid enough for existing plant SRO conditions.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 and 6 Page 30 of 60 Event

Description:

5. 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Loss of the Unit Board results in the loss of CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP 1C, HOTWELL PMP 1B and #7 HEATER DRAIN PMP 1B. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, OR 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater than or Equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

6. RO must borate to return AFD to within limits of LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, within 30 minutes.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. NOTIFY Cnds Demin AUO of impending pmp shutdowns (REFER to Appendix B).

BOP When the BOP contacts Condensate Demineralizer AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the information provided.

9. WHEN rated thermal power change exceeds 15% in one hour, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate 1-SI-68-28.

If the SRO contacts Chemistry, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to initiate 1-SI-68-26.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 6, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

END OF SUCCESS PATH 1 If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 6.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 and 6 Page 31 of 60 Event

Description:

5. 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Loss of the Unit Board results in the loss of CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP 1C, HOTWELL PMP 1B and #7 HEATER DRAIN PMP 1B. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, OR 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater than or Equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

6. RO must borate to return AFD to within limits of LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, within 30 minutes.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SUCCESS PATH 2 The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 1-AOI-16 3.4, GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

1. () IF loss of S/G level is imminent, THEN TRIP reactor, and ** GO TO BOP 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

BOP determines that loss of SG level is not imminent.

2. ENSURE failed MFPT TRIPPED.

BOP BOP manually tripped the 1B MFP earlier.

3. CHECK turbine load less than or equal to 1000 MWe (85%).

BOP BOP determines that turbine load is less than 1000 MWe.

4. PLACE tripped MFWP recirc valve controller in MANUAL, and CLOSE recirc valve.

BOP BOP locates 1-FIC-3-70, MFWP A RECIRC CONTROL, and depresses the AUTO/MAN pushbutton. The BOP observes MAN is backlit in YELLOW. BOP depresses the RAMP and << pushbuttons to close the valve.

5. CHECK turbine load less than 800 MWe (67%).

BOP BOP determines that load is greater than 800 MWe.

5. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE Standby MFWP running.

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-3-200A, STANDBY MFWP, and observes RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK indicating the pump is running.

5. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

BOP ENSURE Standby MFWP running.

BOP had previously confirmed the Standby MFP running.

6. ENSURE MFPT speed rising to control S/G P and levels on program.

BOP BOP determines that the 1A MFWP speed rising.

CAUTION Continued load reductions below 800 MWe should be done using normal turbine controls at less than or equal to 5%/min.

NOTE Load will NOT change until VALVE POS LIMIT light is cleared.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 and 6 Page 32 of 60 Event

Description:

5. 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Loss of the Unit Board results in the loss of CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP 1C, HOTWELL PMP 1B and #7 HEATER DRAIN PMP 1B. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, OR 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater than or Equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

6. RO must borate to return AFD to within limits of LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, within 30 minutes.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. MONITOR adequate feed flow for existing conditions:

BOP

• Feed flow greater than or equal to steam flow.

• S/G levels returning to program.

EXAMINER: Automatic rod control is failed, requiring the RO to insert control rods in MANUAL to maintain Tavg within 3°F of Tref.

RO 8. MONITOR Tavg trending to within 3°F of Tref.

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RO

() INSERT Control Rods in manual to match Tavg to Tref.

CAUTION Runback may result in exceeding Tech Spec 3.2.3 limits on Axial Flux Difference (AFD).

9. MAINTAIN AFD within limits.

a. () INITIATE boration as required RO 1) REFER TO ATTACHMENT 1, Manual Boration SRO directs RO to perform actions of Attachment 1, Manual Boration.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, ATTACHMENT 1, Manual Boration.

NOTE The required Boric Acid needed to compensate for a runback may be obtained from Reactivity Briefing Sheet.

EXAMINER: From the MOL TI-7.012, Reactivity Briefing Sheet - Shift Instructions, 255 gallons of boric acid are required for a runback to 960 MW (80%).

INITIATE boration of RCS to restore AFD to normal using Section 1.1 OR 1.2.

1.1 Normal Manual Boration A. INITIATE normal boration to change CB as necessary:

1. SET 1-FC-62-139, BA TO BLENDER [1-M-6], to desired flow rate.

RO RO adjusts 1-FC-62-139 to a desired value.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 and 6 Page 33 of 60 Event

Description:

5. 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Loss of the Unit Board results in the loss of CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP 1C, HOTWELL PMP 1B and #7 HEATER DRAIN PMP 1B. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, OR 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater than or Equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

6. RO must borate to return AFD to within limits of LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, within 30 minutes.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. ADJUST 1-FQ-62-139, BA BATCH COUNTER [1-M-6] to ensure boration continues.

RO adjusts 1-FQ-62-139 BA BATCH COUNTER as follows:

1. Depresses and holds the black pushbutton.

RO 2. While holding the pushbutton, the applicant raises the red translucent cover.

3. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant enters 000255 in the display.

4. While still holding the pushbutton, the applicant lowers the red translucent cover, and then releases the pushbutton.

3. PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE [1-M-6], to BORATE.

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE and rotates the handswitch to the right 2 positions to BOR.

4. PLACE 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL [1-M-6], to START.

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the START position.

5. VERIFY boric acid flow indicated on 1-FI-62-139.

RO RO locates 1-FI-62-139, BA TO BLENDER FLOW and flow corresponding to the setting selected on 1-FC-62-139, BA TO BLENDER.

6. WHEN adequate amount of boric acid injected, THEN CONTINUE with RO this instruction.

When boration stops, the RO performs the remaining actions.

7. PLACE 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL [1-M-6], to STOP.

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the STOP position.

8. VERIFY 1-FI-62-139 Boric Acid to Blender, indicating ZERO.

RO RO locates 1-FI-62-139, BA TO BLENDER FLOW, and observes ZERO flow.

9. ENSURE 1-FC-62-142, PW TO BLENDER on 35% (70 gpm), AND Manual-Auto toggle in AUTO.

RO RO locates 1-FC-62-62-142, PW TO BLENDER FCV-62-143 CONTROL, and determines that the MANUAL - AUTO toggle switch is in the AUTO position.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 and 6 Page 34 of 60 Event

Description:

5. 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Loss of the Unit Board results in the loss of CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP 1C, HOTWELL PMP 1B and #7 HEATER DRAIN PMP 1B. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, OR 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater than or Equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

6. RO must borate to return AFD to within limits of LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, within 30 minutes.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. ADJUST 1-FC-62-139, BA TO BLENDER [1-M-6] to reflect desired RCS CB.

If/When the RO contacts Chemistry, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for an RCS boron sample. Console Operator RO informs the RO that the sample will require approximately 45 minutes to process.

RO may set the dial to 100%, until the results of the RCS boron sample are received.

11. PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE, in AUTO.

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE and rotates the handswitch to the left 2 positions to AUTO.

12. TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL, to START, and VERIFY red light LIT.

RO RO locates 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the START position.

EXAMINER: The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, GREATER than or equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

10. ENSURE tripped MFP turbine condenser valves CLOSED:

• Pump A, 1-FCV-2-205 and 210.

OR BOP

• Pump B, 1-FCV-2-211 and 216.

BOP locates 1-HS-2-211A, MFPT B CONDENSER INLET, and observes RED light DARK, GREEN light LIT.

BOP locates 1-HS-2-216A, MFPT B CONDENSER OUTLET, and observes RED light DARK, GREEN light LIT.

11. MONITOR reg valves controlling S/G levels on program.

BOP BOP determines that SG levels are returning to program.

12. LOCALLY MAINTAIN oil temp between 110 and 130°F on running Standby MFP using 1-THV-24-948.

BOP When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to locally maintain SBMFP oil temperature between 110 and 130°F using 1-THV-24-948. Console Operator reports that oil temperature is currently 118°F.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 and 6 Page 35 of 60 Event

Description:

5. 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Loss of the Unit Board results in the loss of CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP 1C, HOTWELL PMP 1B and #7 HEATER DRAIN PMP 1B. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, OR 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater than or Equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

6. RO must borate to return AFD to within limits of LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, within 30 minutes.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

13. ENSURE reset of C-7:

a. CHECK C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK annunciator LIT. [66-E]

BOP will verify C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK (66-E) is LIT.

b. ENSURE steam dump valves have zero demand.

BOP BOP locates 1-XI-1-33, STEAM DUMP DEMAND and observes zero on the indicator.

c. RESET loss-of-load interlock with steam dump mode switch.

BOP locates 1-HS-1-103D, STEAM DUMP MODE, and rotates the switch to the left. BOP verifies C-7 LOSS OF LOAD STM DUMP INTERLOCK (66-E) is DARK.

14. ENSURE Condensate System Pumps in service as necessary:

• REFER TO 1-GO-4, Normal Power Operation.

BOP SRO may direct the BOP to refer to 1-GO-4, Normal Power Operation, for appropriate condensate/hotwell pump/heater drain pump alignment for current power level.

15. IF reactor power dropped by greater than or equal to 15% in one hour, THEN NOTIFY Chemistry to initiate power change sampling BOP requirements.

When contacted as Chemistry, the Console Operator repeats back the request to perform power change samples.

16. CHECK VALVE POS LIMIT LIT.

BOP BOP determines from 1-XX-47-1000, EHC DISPLAY that the RED VALVE POS LIMIT is LIT.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 and 6 Page 36 of 60 Event

Description:

5. 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay. Loss of the Unit Board results in the loss of CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP 1C, HOTWELL PMP 1B and #7 HEATER DRAIN PMP 1B. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 49-E, MN/STBY FWP SUCTION NPSH LO. Requires entry into and performance of AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, OR 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater, Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater than or Equal to 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load).

6. RO must borate to return AFD to within limits of LCO 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, within 30 minutes.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

17. RETURN valve position limiter to normal:

a. ENSURE TURBINE in IMP OUT.

BOP locates the IMP-OUT pushbutton on 1-XX-47-1000 and determines that the light is NOT LIT. BOP depresses the pushbutton to transfer from IMP-IN to IMP-OUT mode.

b. () REDUCE turbine load setpoint using REFERENCE CONTROL (lower) AND GO button until VALVE POS LIMIT LIGHT NOT LIT.

BOP BOP locates the REFERENCE CONTROL on 1-XX-47-1000, EHC CONTROL. BOP depresses the REFERENCE CONTROL pushbutton and reduces REFERENCE display to a value slightly less than the indicated VALVE POSITION LIMIT on 1-XX-47-2000 EHC DISPLAY. BOP selects a load rate using the LOAD RATE % PER MIN.

c. SET valve position limiter to 95%.

After the VALVE POSITION LIMIT RED light is DARK, the BOP depresses the VALVE POSITION LIMITER pushbutton to raise the valve position limit to 95%.

18. INITIATE repairs on failed pump.

SRO When SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request for a troubleshooting and repair packages for the 1B MFP.

SRO 19. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

END OF SUCCESS PATH 2 If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 6.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 37 of 60 Event

Description:

1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1- SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

57-E, MSIV(S) CLOSED 58-B, SG FEEDWATER FLOW HI 59-C, LO FW FLOW WTR HAMMER 62-C, SG 3 STM-FW FLOW MISMATCH 83-B, POWER RANGE UPR DETECTOR FLUX DEVN 83-C, POWER RANGE LWR DETECTOR FLUX DEVN 83-E, POWER RANGE CHANNEL DEVIATION 76-D, OVERPOWER T (Reactor Trip First-Out annunciator, with 1-XX-55-5 Window 11, 31, 51 and 71 bistable lights LIT) 1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 BLUE and GREEN lights LIT ICS SECONDARY MIMICS, STEAM GENERATORS display indicates SG 3 Safety valves are OPEN.

BOP Diagnoses and announces the failure of 1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 CLOSED.

May dispatch an AUO to determine the source of the steam leakage.

BOP When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to look for steam leaks. Console Operator will report that there is steam coming from the roof of the North Valve Vault Room.

May initiate a manual reactor trip, based on the closure of SG 3 MSIV, RO based on the plant being in an unanalyzed condition (3-loop operation).

Direct the RO to manually trip the reactor and perform IMMEDIATE SRO ACTION STEPS of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

EXAMINER: Enter the time the RO attempts to trip the reactor using 1-RT-2 REACTOR TRIP.

TIME: ____________________

Diagnoses and announces the ATWS condition after attempting to trip the RO reactor from 1-RT-2, REACTOR TRIP on 1-M-6.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 1- FR-S.1, NUCLEAR POWER RO GENERATION/ATWS, and manually inserts control rods.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 38 of 60 Event

Description:

1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1- SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior After IMMEDIATE ACTIONS are performed, may dispatch AUOs to locally open the reactor trip breakers, the Rod Drive M-G set input breakers, and the Rod Drive M-G set output breakers.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to OPEN reactor trip breakers and MG set output breakers in RO the MG set rooms.

When contacted as an additional AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to OPEN breakers to MG sets on the 480V unit boards A and B.

After receiving these requests the Console Operator will wait 2 minutes, and then open the reactor trip breakers.

EXAMINER: When the Console Operator receives the communication from the RO dispatching personnel to open the reactor trip breakers locally OR to open the MG set supply breakers, the Console Operator will wait 2 minutes, then will remove malfunction rp01c to clear the ATWS, and enter malfunctions rp51a (Event 24) and rp51b (Event 25) to open the reactor trip breakers.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 1- FR-S.1, NUCLEAR POWER BOP GENERATION/ATWS, and manually trips the main turbine.

BOP Manually starts ALL Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.

Enters and directs actions of 1- FR-S.1, NUCLEAR POWER SRO GENERATION/ATWS.

1-FR-S.1 The following actions are taken from 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS.

CAUTION RCPs should not be tripped UNTIL reactor power is less than 5%.

NOTE Steps 1 and 2 are IMMEDIATE ACTION steps.

1. ENSURE Reactor Trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers RO OPEN.

• RPIs at bottom of scale.

• Neutron flux DROPPING.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 39 of 60 Event

Description:

1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1- SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 1 Insert negative reactivity into the core by inserting control rods.

Critical 1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

Task 1 Manually TRIP reactor.

IF reactor will NOT trip, THEN INSERT control rods.

RO RO observes rods inserting at 72 steps per minute in AUTOMATIC.

When the rod speed slows to 48 steps per minute, the RO transfers from AUTO to MAN on 1-RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT. After selecting MAN, the RO inserts rods at 48 steps per minute by holding 1-FLRM, ROD MOTION CONTROL to the IN position.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

BOP

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

Critical Task 2 Manually trip the main turbine within 30 seconds after recognition of the ATWS condition (initiation of the second reactor trip handswitch). (Ref. TI-12.19).

ENTER TIME WHEN 1-HS-47-24, TURBINE TRIP is actuated.

TIME: ___________________

ELAPSED TIME must be less than 30 seconds.

Critical 2. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

Task 2 Manually TRIP turbine.

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-47-24, TURBINE TRIP, and rotates the handswitch to the right to the TRIP position.

3. CHECK AFW pumps operation:

a. Both MD AFW pumps RUNNING.

BOP

b. TD AFW pump RUNNING.

c. LCVs in AUTO or controlled in MANUAL.

Critical Task 3 Manually start the AFW pumps within 1 minute after recognition of the ATWS condition (initiation of the second reactor trip handswitch). (Ref. TI-12.19).

ENTER TIME WHEN 1-HS-3-118A, AFW PMP A-A is placed in START.

TIME: ___________________

ENTER TIME WHEN 1-HS-3-128A, AFW PMP B-B is placed in START.

TIME: ___________________

ENTER TIME WHEN 1-HS-46-56A-S, T-D AFW T&T VLV is placed in OPEN.

TIME: ___________________

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 40 of 60 Event

Description:

1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1- SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ELAPSED TIME must be less than 1 minute.

Critical 3. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

Task 3 Manually START pumps and open valves as necessary.

BOP locates 1-HS-3-118A, AFW PMP A-A and rotates the handswitch BOP to the right to the START position. BOP locates 1-HS-3-128A, AFW PMP B-B and rotates the handswitch to the right to the START position. BOP locates 1-HS-46-56A-S, T-D AFW T&T VLV and rotates the handswitch to the right to the OPEN position.

4. INITIATE RCS Boration:

a. ENSURE at least one centrifugal charging pump RUNNING.

SI actuation has started both CCPs.

b. OPEN RWST outlet valves 1-LCV-62-135 and 1-LCV-62-136.

SI actuation has opened valves.

c. CLOSE VCT outlet valves 1-LCV-62-132 and 1-LCV-62-133.

SI actuation has closed valves.

d. OPEN BIT outlet valves 1-FCV-63-25 and 1-FCV-63-26.

SI actuation has opened valves.

e. CHECK BIT flow.

BOP RO locates 1-FI-63-170, BIT FLOW, and reports approximately 200 gpm flow.

f. PLACE BA pumps in FAST speed.

RO locates 1-HS-62-230D, BA PMP A SPEED, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the FAST position.

RO locates 1-HS-62-232-D, BA PMP B SPEED, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the FAST position.

g. Throttle OPEN emergency borate valve 1-FCV-62-138 to maintain boric acid flow greater than 35 gpm.

RO locates 1-HS-62-138A, EMERG BORATE, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the OPEN position while observing flow on 1-FI-62-137A, EMER BORATE FLOW rise to greater than 35 gpm.

5. CHECK PZR pressure less than 2335 psig.

RO RO locates PAM designated PZR PRESS indicators (1-PI-68-70, 1-PI-68-64, 1-PI-68-63, 1-XI 1-68-100, or 1-XI-68-110) and reports pressure less than 2335 psig.

6. VERIFY Cntmt Vent Isolation:

• Train A GREEN.

RO

• Train B GREEN.

RO reports that the CNTMT VENT ISOLATION has occurred.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 41 of 60 Event

Description:

1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1- SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

7. IF AFW flow established, THEN

a. PLACE 1-HS-3-45 to LONG CYCLE RECIRC.

BOP locates 1-HS-3-45, MFW - MODE SWITCH, and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to the LONG CYCLE RECIRC position.

b. PLACE MFW Bypass Reg Valves in AUTO.

RO BOP locates 1-LIC-3-35A, SG 1 MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL, 1-LIC 48A, SG 2 MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL, 1-LIC-3-90A, SG 3 MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL, and 1-LIC-3-103A, SG 4 MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL and observes the AMBER MAN light LIT. BOP depresses each AUTO/MAN pushbutton and observes the BLUE AUTO light LIT.

8. IF SI actuated OR required, THEN PERFORM Steps 1 through 6 of 1-E-0 SRO Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, as time allows.

SRO assigns the BOP 1-E-0, Steps 1 through 6.

EXAMINER: Actions taken prior to Step 9 may have already caused the reactor trip breakers to be open. If AUOs were dispatched earlier, and the 2 minute time has elapsed, then the reactor will be tripped.

If NOT, then the SRO will implement Step 9 RNO actions.

9. ENSURE the following trips:

RO a. Reactor Trip.

RO determines that a reactor trip has occurred.

9.a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. DISPATCH operator to locally trip reactor:

• OPEN reactor trip breakers and MG set output breakers [MG set RO room].

• OPEN breakers to MG sets [480V unit boards A and B].

RO may have addressed dispatching operators to locally trip the reactor prior to this step.

b. Turbine Trip.

BOP BOP manually tripped the turbine previously, at Step 2.

RO 10. MAINTAIN rod insertion UNTIL rods fully inserted.

11. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart for ATWS event.

SRO When contacted as Shift Manager to refer to EPIP-1, Console Operator will acknowledge the request.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 42 of 60 Event

Description:

1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1- SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. MONITOR reactor subcriticality:

a. CHECK Power range channels less than 5%.

RO observes 1-NI-41B, PR FLUX % POWER, 1-NI-42B, PR FLUX %

POWER, 1-NI-43B, PR FLUX % POWER. 1-NI-44B, PR FLUX % POWER and/or 1-NR-90-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER, and SRO determines that Power Range power level is less than 5%.

b. CHECK Intermediate range startup rate NEGATIVE.

RO observes 1-NI-35D, IR STARTUP RATE DPM and 1-NI-36D, IR STARTUP RATE DPM and determines that startup rate is negative.

c. ** GO TO Step 21.

SRO goes to Step 21.

21. TERMINATE emergency boration:

a. PLACE BA transfer pumps in SLOW speed.

RO locates 1-HS-62-230D, BA PMP A SPEED, and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the SLOW position.

RO locates 1-HS-62-232-D, BA PMP B SPEED, and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the SLOW position.

RO

b. CLOSE emergency borate valve 1-FCV-62-138.

RO locates 1-HS-62-138A, EMERG BORATE, and rotates the handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position while observing flow on 1-FI-62-137A, EMER BORATE FLOW go to zero gpm.

c. IF alternate boration opened, THEN Locally CLOSE 1-ISV-62-929.

RO reports that alternate boration was NOT opened.

NOTE If the reactor is verified to be subcritical, Status Trees may be implemented for other Red or Orange paths

22. IMPLEMENT other Red or Orange paths identified on Status Trees SRO SRO determines that there are no RED or ORANGE paths on the Status Trees.

23. IF SI actuated, THEN RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

SRO SRO enters 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, at Step 1.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 43 of 60 Event

Description:

1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1- SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-E-0 The following actions are taken from 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NOTE

• Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS

• Status Trees / SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR A GREEN light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR B GREEN light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52BYA, BYPASS BKR A lights DARK.

RO checks 1-52BYB, BYPASS BKR B lights DARK.

• RPIs at bottom of scale.

RO RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor 1 and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 for indication that all SHUTDOWN and CONTROL bank rods are inserted.

• Neutron flux DROPPING.

RO observes neutron flux trending down on 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER. May also observe levels decreasing on 1-NI-92-135A, CH I NEUTRON MON % PWR, and 1-NI-92-136A, CH II NEUTRON MON % PWR.

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

BOP RO observes that lights on 1-XX-47-1000 EHC CONTROL for individual throttle and governor valves are GREEN.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

• CSST (offsite),

OR

• D/G (blackout).

BOP RO observes that 1-HS-57-41A, 1716 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1A-A FROM CSST C RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-39, 6.9 SDB 1A-A VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

RO observes that 1-HS-57-71A, 1728 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1B-B FROM CSST D RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-66, 6.9 SDB 1B-B VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 44 of 60 Event

Description:

1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1- SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO will announce that the window 70-A, SI ACTUATED is LIT.

RO

b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

• 1-XX-55-6C

• 1-XX-55-6D EXAMINER: 1-E-0, Appendices A and B are contained as Attachment 2 to this scenario.

5. PERFORM Appendixes A and B ,1-E-0, pages 16-30 BOP If not previously performed, the SRO assigns BOP to perform Appendices A and B.

SRO 6. ANNOUNCE reactor trip and safety injection over PA system.

EXAMINER: The RO may isolate AFW flow to SG 3 during the performance of the next step, in accordance with TI-12.04, Section 2.7, Prudent Operator Actions, Item 9.

9. Early isolation of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) should be performed after positive identification of a ruptured, faulted, or ruptured and faulted S/G, providing the following guidelines are met:

a. Prior to isolation, the steps of E-0 are complete through verification of heat sink.

b. For a ruptured S/G, ensure that narrow range (NR) level on the affected S/G is >29% and heat sink minimum requirements are met for the unaffected S/Gs.

c. For a faulted or ruptured and faulted S/G, ensure heat sink minimum requirements are met for the unaffected S/Gs.

7. ENSURE secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total AFW flow greater than 410 gpm, RO OR

• At least one S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

8. MONITOR RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F using:

• RCS Loop T-avg with any RCP running, RO OR

• RCS Loop T-cold with RCPs out-of-service.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 45 of 60 Event

Description:

1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1- SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IF temp less than 557°F, THEN ENSURE steam dumps and S/G PORVs CLOSED.

IF cooldown continues, THEN CONTROL total AFW flow to maintain greater than 410 gpm UNTIL NR level in at least one S/G greater than 29% [39% ADV].

RO takes manual control of AFW LCVs and reduces AFW flow.

IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN

• PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

RO RO rotates 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A, and 1-HS-103B STEAM DUMP FSV B to the left to the OFF RESET position.

• CLOSE MSIVs.

RO determines that SG 1, 2 and 4 MSIVs are OPEN based on RED lights LIT on handswitches.

RO rotates each MSIV handswitch to the LEFT to the CLOSE position and observes GREEN and BLUE lights LIT on MSIV 1, MSIV 2 and MSIV 4 handswitches.

• ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

IF RCS temp greater than 564°F, THEN ENSURE either steam dumps or S/G PORVs OPEN.

9. ENSURE excess letdown valves CLOSED RO

• 1-FCV-62-54

• 1-FCV-62-55

10. CHECK pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV 340A, GREEN light LIT, RED light DARK.

RO RO observes 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334, GREEN light LIT, RED light DARK.

RO observes 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A, GREEN light DARK, RED light LIT.

RO observes 1-HS-68-332A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 334, GREEN light DARK, RED light LIT.

11. CHECK PZR safety valves CLOSED:

• EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitors.

RO RO observes response of 1-TI-68-330, SAFETY 68-563 TAILPIPE TEMP, 1-TI-68-329, SAFETY 68-564 TAILPIPE TEMP, and 1-TI-68-328, SAFETY 68-565, stable.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 46 of 60 Event

Description:

1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1- SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

12. CHECK PZR sprays CLOSED.

RO RO observes the GREEN lights are LIT for 1-XI-68-334B, PZR SPRAY LOOP 2 and 1-XI-68-334D, PZR SPRAY LOOP 1.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

13. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

a. Phase B signals DARK [MISSP].

RO

b. RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig.

RO determines that RCPs will remain in service.

14. CHECK S/G pressures:

• All S/G pressures controlled or rising.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressure on SG 3 is NOT controlled. May also observe trends on 1-PR-1-2, SG 1 & 2 PRESS PSIG, and 1-PR BOP 23, SG 3 & 4 PRESS PSIG to assess this step.

• All S/G pressures greater than 140 psig.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that pressure greater than 140 psig, but is low on SG 3.

14.RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

SRO IF S/G pressure low OR dropping uncontrolled, THEN GO TO 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 47 of 60 Event

Description:

1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1- SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from 1-E-0, Faulted Steam Generator 1-E-2 Isolation.

CAUTION If a faulted S/G is NOT needed for RCS cooldown, it should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions.

1. ENSURE all MSIVs and MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

BOP RO determines that the MSIVs are CLOSED based on GREEN lights LIT on handswitches.

NOTE If it is known that a steam leak exists in the Turbine building, the following step should NOT be performed until the affected steam header is depressurized.

2. PLACE steam dump controls OFF:

• 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A.

BOP

• 1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B.

SRO observes that the steam dump controls were placed in the OFF position during 1-E-0 performance.

3. CHECK for at least one Intact S/G:

• Any S/G pressure controlled or rising, OR BOP

• Any S/G pressure greater than P-sat for RCS incore temperature.

BOP determines that SG 3 is FAULTED and that the remaining SGs are INTACT based on SG pressure response.

4. IDENTIFY Faulted S/G based on ANY of the following:

• Any S/G pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner, OR

• Any S/G pressure less than 140 psig, OR

• S/G enclosure temps high:

1) T1002A for 2 and 3, BOP

2) T1003A for 1 and 4.

OR

• Local indication of break in any of the following:

• Main steam lines,

• Main feedwater lines,

• Other secondary piping.

BOP determines that SG 3 is faulted, based on SG pressure lowering.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 48 of 60 Event

Description:

1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1- SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION

• If the turbine-driven AFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, steam supply to the turbine-driven AFW pump must be maintained from one S/G.

• RCS cooldown requires the availability of at least one S/G.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 49 of 60 Event

Description:

1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1- SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 4 Isolate the faulted steam generator (SG 3) prior to exiting Step 5 of 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Critical 5. ISOLATE Faulted S/G:

Task 4 a. ISOLATE AFW flow to Faulted S/G.

BOP rotates 1-HS-3-148A, SG 3 SUPPLY LCV-3-148 CNTL from the AUTO position to the ACC. RESET MODULATE position. The BOP then rotates 1-HS-3-148A, SG 3 SUPPLY LCV-3-148 CNTL to the CLOSE position and PULLS the switch OUT.

BOP rotates 1-HS-3-172A, SG 3 SUPPLY LCV-3-172 CNTL from the AUTO position to the ACC. RESET MODULATE position. The BOP then rotates 1-HS-3-172A, SG 3 SUPPLY LCV-3-172 CNTL to the CLOSE position and PULLS the switch OUT.

b. ENSURE MFW ISOLATED to Faulted S/G:

• MFW isolation and bypass isolation valves CLOSED.

BOP observes 1-HS-3-33A, SG 1 MFW ISOL VLV, 1-HS-3-47A, SG2 MFW ISOL VLV, 1-HS-3-87A, SG 3 MFW ISOL VLV and 1-HS-3-100A, SG 4 MFW ISOL VLV, RED lights are DARK, GREEN lights are LIT BOP observes 1-XI-3-236, SG 1 MFW BYP ISOL VLV, 1-XI-3-239, SG2 MFW BYP ISOL VLV, 1-XI-3-242, SG 3 MFW BYP ISOL VLV and 1-XI 245, SG 4 MFW BYP ISOL VLV, RED lights are DARK, GREEN lights BOP are LIT

• MFW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED.

BOP observes 1-XX-3-35 MFW REG, RED lights are DARK, GREEN lights are LIT.

BOP observes 1-XX-3-35A BYP REG, RED lights are DARK, GREEN lights are LIT.

• MFPs TRIPPED.

BOP observes 1-HS-46-9A, MFPT A TRIP-RESET and 1-HS-46-36A, MFPT B TRIP-RESET RED lights are DARK, GREEN lights are LIT.

BOP observes 1-HS-3-200A, Standby MFWP Switch, RED light is DARK, GREEN light is LIT.

c. ENSURE Faulted S/G PORV CLOSED.

BOP may rotate 1-HS-1-24, SG 3 PORV PCV-1-23 from the P-AUTO position to the CLOSE position. BOP observes the RED light is DARK, GREEN light is LIT.

d. ENSURE Faulted S/G blowdown ISOLATED.

BOP may rotate 1-HS-1-25/183 SG 3 BLOWDOWN VLVS from the P-AUTO position to the CLOSE position. BOP observes RED light is DARK, GREEN light is LIT.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 50 of 60 Event

Description:

1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1- SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE TD AFW pump steam supply should NOT be aligned from a S/G with a known primary to secondary leak if other AFW sources are available.

BOP 6. ENSURE TD AFW pump being supplied from Intact S/G.

BOP 7. MONITOR CST volume greater than 200,000 gal.

8. WHEN RCS temperature is stable or rising following Faulted S/G blowdown, THEN ADJUST Intact S/G PORV controllers in AUTO to:

• P-sat for the highest RCS temp (one or more RCPs running)

BOP or RO will check 1-TI-68-2E, LOOP 1 TAVG, 1-TI-68-25E, LOOP 2 TAVG, 1-TI-68-44E, LOOP 3 TAVG and 1-TI-68-67E, LOOP 4 TAVG to determine the highest TAVG. The BOP or RO will then refer to steam BOP tables or the ICS computer to determine the saturation pressure.

The BOP will then lower the setting of 1-PIC-1-13A, SG 2 PORV FCV 12, 1-PIC-1-24A, SG 3 PORV FCV-1-23, and 1-PIC-1-31A, SG 4 PORV FCV-1-30 to the saturation pressure identified.

OR

• P-sat for the highest T-cold temp (no RCPs running)

9. CHECK secondary side radiation:

During performance of 1-E-0, Appendix A, the BOP reported that all secondary radiation monitors are normal.

• S/G discharge monitors NORMAL.

BOP

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.

• S/G blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

• S/G sample results by Chemistry.

SRO may have requested samples of all SGs prior to this point in the scenario.

10. CHECK SI termination criteria:

a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65ºF [85ºF ADV].

b. CHECK secondary heat sink available with either:

RO/ BOP

• Total feed flow to Intact S/Gs greater than 410 gpm, OR

• At least one Intact S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

c. CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising.

d. CHECK pzr level greater than 15% [33% ADV].

e. GO TO 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination.

SRO SRO transitions to 1-ES-1.1, "SI Termination.

The Chief Examiner may elect to end the scenario when the SRO announces the transition to 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2 Scenario # 3 Event # 7 Page 51 of 60 Event

Description:

1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed, causing a reactor trip signal to be generated, but the reactor trip fails to occur. When 1-HS-1-22A fails closed, 1-SV-1-512 and 1- SV-1-513, SG 3 Safety Valves fail open and remain open. Requires entry into and performance of 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. Requires entry into and performance of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Requires transition to 1- E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ES-1.1 The following actions are taken from ES-1.1, SI Termination.

CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal.

1. RESET SI, and CHECK the following:

RO

• SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.

• AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

BOP 2. RESET Phase A and Phase B.

3. ENSURE cntmt air in service:

a. Aux air press greater than 75 psig [M-15].

b. Cntmt air supply valves OPEN [M-15]:

BOP

• 1-FCV-32-80.

• 1-FCV-32-102.

• 1-FCV-32-110.

NOTE On SI reset failure, the non-affected train should be stopped and placed in A-AUTO.

4. ENSURE ONLY one Charging Pump running:

RO

• STOP all but one CCP and PLACE in A-AUTO.

BOP 5. CHECK RCS press stable or rising.

6. ALIGN charging:

a. CLOSE RCP seal flow control 1-FCV-62-89.

b. OPEN charging isolation valves 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91.

SRO

c. ENSURE charging valve 1-FCV-62-85 OR 1-FCV-62-86 OPEN.

d. CHECK RHR Suction aligned from RWST.

e. OPEN seal return valves 1-FCV-62-61 and 1-FCV-62-63.

7. CLOSE BIT outlet valves 1-FCV-63-25 and 1-FCV-63-26.

RO When the BIT valves are closed by an operator, inform the applicants that another crew will continue from this point.

END OF SCENARIO 2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 3 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

1. ENSURE Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 303 by performing the following actions:

a. Select ICManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate IC# 303.

c. Right click on IC# 303.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC# 303.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value c rh01a rhr pump a trip M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active hs-74-03a-1 01110 hr pump a-a suction(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off c rp01c manual and automatic reactor trip signal failure (atws) M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active hs-72-40a-1 01150 hr spray hdr a isol vlv sw(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off rh12 fail cnt sumo to rhr pump a fcv-63-72 to any position M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 0 hs-74-10a hs-74-10a rhr pump a-a motor sw O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 ptlock ptlock hs-72-40a hs-72-40a rhr spray header a isolation valve sw O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 close auto hs-74-03a hs-74-03a rhr pump a-a suction sw O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 close auto hs-63-72a-1 01170 rhr pmp aa suct fr cnt smp(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off On hs-74-10a-1 01230 hr pump a-a motor switch(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off On cc18b block auto start thermal barrier booster pmp 1b-b M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active Page 52 of 60

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 3 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value cc08a thermal barrier booster pump a trip M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive rp51a reactor trip breaker rta trip M 24 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive rp51b reactor trip breaker rtb trip M 25 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive hic-62-81a_ai 26060 letdown hx exch press cont M 3 00:00:00 00:00:30 94 56.0272 rp38c eagle rack #2 loop proc - lcp card failure M 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 0 ed07c loss of 6.9 kv unit board 1c M 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive ms06c fail msiv 1-22 to position M 6 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 100 ms03l steam gen #3 safety valve 1-513 fail to position M 6 00:00:01 00:00:00 100 0 ms03k steam gen #3 safety valve 1-512 fail to position M 6 00:00:01 00:00:00 100 0

5. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

6. ENSURE 1-HS-74-10A, RHR PMP A (ECCS), in the STOP, PULL-TO-LOCK position with a GREEN tag. GREEN tags are placed on 1-HS-74-3A, RHR PMP A SUCTION, 1-HS-63-72, CNTMT SUMP TO RHR PMP A SUCT, and 1-HS-72-40A, RHR SPRAY HDR A TO CNTMT. ENSURE 1-HS-74-20A, RHR PMP B (ECCS) is designated as PROTECTED EQUIPMENT.

7. ENSURE the Train A Week - Channel 1 sign is placed on 1-M-30.

8. Place simulator in FREEZE.

9. ENSURE Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Reactivity Briefing Book MOL (Middle Of Life) is provided to the crew as part of the Turnover Package, and that the MOL placards are on 1-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water Integrators.

10. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN.

Page 53 of 60

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 3 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

1 n/a Transfer RCP Start Bus A from Alternate to Normal.

ROLE PLAY: NONE 2 2 1A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump (TBBP) trips. 1B TBBP fails to auto start.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, repeat the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1A TBBP trip, and to determine why the 1B TBBP failed to start.

3 3 1-PIC-62-81, LETDOWN PRESS CONTROL, closes due to a controller failure.

ROLE PLAY: If contacted as the Auxiliary Building AUO, acknowledge the request to locally inspect 1-PCV-62-81. Report back that there are no obvious problems at the controller and that the valve appears to be responding to manual signals.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, repeat the request for a troubleshooting and repair package for 1-PCV-62-81, LETDOWN PRESSURE CONTROL.

4 4 Eagle 21 Rack, 1-R-2 Loop Calculation Processor (LCP) fails.

ROLE PLAY: When SRO contacts Work Control, repeat back the request to have a troubleshooting and repair package made up for Eagle 21 Rack 1-R-2.

Page 54 of 60

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 3 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

5 5 1C 6.9 Kv Unit Board trips due to a faulty 51 relay.

ROLE PLAY: When the BOP contacts an AUO, repeat back the request to investigate the cause of the 1C 6.9KV Unit Board trip. Report that the timed overcurrent relay has actuated and that there is no apparent damage to the board.

ROLE PLAY: When the BOP contacts an AUO, repeat back the request to check the condition of the injection water pumps and to check injection water pump discharge pressure. Reports both injection water pumps are running and discharge pressure is 282 psig.

ROLE PLAY: When SRO contacts the Shift Manager, repeat back request that EPIP-1 be evaluated.

ROLE PLAY: When the SRO contacts Load Coordinator, repeat back the information provided.

ROLE PLAY: When the BOP contacts Condensate Demineralizer AUO, repeat back the information provided.

ROLE PLAY: If the SRO contacts Chemistry, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to initiate 1-SI-68-26.

6 6 1-HS-1-22A, MSIV SG 3 fails closed. 1-SV-1-512 and 1-SV-1-513 SG 3 Safety valves open and remain open for the duration of the scenario. ATWS conditions are discovered.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator repeats back the request to look for steam leaks. Console Operator will report that there is steam coming from the roof of the North Valve Vault Room.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back the requests to:36 OPEN reactor trip breakers and MG set output breakers in the MG set rooms.

OPEN breakers to MG sets on the 480V unit boards A and B.

Wait 2 minutes, and then open the reactor trip breakers by removing malfunction rp01c, and then entering malfunction 51a (Event 24) and 51b (Event 25).

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Shift Manager, repeat back the request to evaluate EPIP-1.

ROLE PLAY: When the SRO contacts Chemistry, repeat back the request to sample all SGs for activity.

Page 55 of 60

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 3 Simulator Console Operators Instructions Page 56 of 60

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb = 845 ppm.

• Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

1A-A RHR Pump is out of service for pump bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago.

EOOS Risk is GREEN. Expected return-to-service in 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. SG 1 has a stable 0.9 gpd tube leak. AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Appendix A and C have been performed. Leak rate has been stable for the last 2 weeks.

TD AFW pump is aligned to SG #4 as a precautionary measure. TD AFW pump is aligned to SG #4 as a precautionary measure. Caution Order placed. Repairs have been completed on 6.9 KV RCP Start Bus A Normal Feeder Breaker 2614 and a transfer from Alternate to Normal is to be performed as soon as practical after assuming the shift.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% Power, MOL conditions. Control Bank D rods are at 220 steps. RCS boron concentration is 845 ppm.

Maintain current plant conditions.

Transfer 6.9 KV RCP Start Bus from Alternate to Normal. Perform SOI-200.02, 6.9kV RCP Start Buses, Section 8.1, Transfer from Alternate to Normal

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [01-14-2011]

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb = 845 ppm.

• Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

1A-A RHR Pump is out of service for pump bearing replacement. LCO 3.5.2 and 3.6.6 were entered 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> ago.

EOOS Risk is GREEN. Expected return-to-service in 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. SG 1 has a stable 0.9 gpd tube leak. AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Appendix A and C have been performed. Leak rate has been stable for the last 2 weeks.

TD AFW pump is aligned to SG #4 as a precautionary measure. TD AFW pump is aligned to SG #4 as a precautionary measure. Caution Order placed. Repairs have been completed on 6.9 KV RCP Start Bus A Normal Feeder Breaker 2614 and a transfer from Alternate to Normal is to be performed as soon as practical after assuming the shift.

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

100% Power, MOL conditions. Control Bank D rods are at 220 steps. RCS boron concentration is 845 ppm.

Maintain current plant conditions.

Transfer 6.9 KV RCP Start Bus from Alternate to Normal. Perform SOI-200.02, 6.9kV RCP Start Buses, Section 8.1, Transfer from Alternate to Normal

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [12-19-2011]

Scenario 3 Attachment 1 1-AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Attachment 1, Reactor Power VS T-avg/T-ref Temperature and PZR Level.

WBN Malfunction of Reactor Control System 1-AOI-2 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Attachment 1 (Page 1 of 1)

Reactor Power VS T-avg/T-ref Temperature and PZR Level (Tavg-Tref values rounded to one tenth of a degree)

RX TAVG- PZR RX TAVE- PZR POWER TREF LEVEL POWER TREF LEVEL 2% 557.6 °F 25.7 % 52% 572.2 °F 43.0 %

4% 558.2 °F 26.4 % 54% 572.8 °F 43.7 %

6% 558.8 °F 27.1 % 56% 573.4 °F 44.4 %

8% 559.3 °F 27.8 % 58% 573.9 °F 45.1 %

10% 559.9 °F 28.5 % 60% 574.5 °F 45.8%

12% 560.5 °F 29.2 % 62% 575.1 °F 46.5 %

14% 561.1 °F 29.8 % 64% 575.7 °F 47.1 %

16% 561.7 °F 30.5 % 66% 576.3 °F 47.8 %

18% 562.3 °F 31.2 % 68% 576.9 °F 48.5 %

20% 562.8 °F 31.9 % 70% 577.4 °F 49.2 %

22% 563.4 °F 32.6 % 72% 578.0 °F 49.9 %

24% 564.0 °F 33.3 % 74% 578.6 °F 50.6 %

26% 564.6 °F 34.0 % 76% 579.2 °F 51.3 %

28% 565.2 °F 34.7 % 78% 579.8 °F 52.0 %

30% 565.8 °F 35.4 % 80% 580.4 °F 52.7 %

32% 566.3 °F 36.1 % 82% 580.9 °F 53.4 %

34% 566.9 °F 36.8 % 84% 581.5 °F 54.1 %

36% 567.5 °F 37.5 % 86% 582.1 °F 54.8 %

38% 568.1 °F 38.1 % 88% 582.7 °F 55.4 %

40% 568.7 °F 38.8 % 90% 583.3 °F 56.1 %

42% 569.3 °F 39.5 % 92% 583.9 °F 56.8 %

44% 569.8 °F 40.2 % 94% 584.4 °F 57.5 %

46% 570.4 °F 40.9 % 96% 585.0 °F 58.2 %

48% 571.0 °F 41.6 % 98% 585.6 °F 58.9 %

50% 571.6 °F 42.3 % 100% 586.2 °F 59.6 %

Page 49 of 51

Scenario 3 Attachment 2 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendices A and B.

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 1 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

1. ENSURE PCBs OPEN: OPEN manually.

• PCB 5084.

• PCB 5088.

2. ENSURE AFW pump operation: ESTABLISH at least one train AFW operation.

• Both MD AFW pumps RUNNING.

• TD AFW pump RUNNING.

• LCVs in AUTO, OR controlled in MANUAL.

3. ENSURE MFW isolation: Manually CLOSE valves AND

• MFW isolation and bypass STOP pumps, as necessary.

isolation valves CLOSED.

• MFW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED. IF any valves can NOT be closed, THEN

• MFP A and B TRIPPED.

• Standby MFP STOPPED. CLOSE #1 heater outlet valves.

• Cond demin pumps TRIPPED.

• Cond booster pumps TRIPPED.

• #3 HDT Pumps TRIPPED.

• #7 HDT Pumps TRIPPED.

Page 16 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 2 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

4. MONITOR ECCS operation:

a. Charging pumps RUNNING. a. Manually START charging pumps.

b. Charging pump alignment: b. ENSURE at least one valve in each set aligned.

• RWST outlets 1-LCV-62-135 and 1-LCV-62-136 OPEN.

• VCT outlets 1-LCV-62-132 and 1-LCV-62-133 CLOSED.

• Charging 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91 CLOSED.

c. RHR pumps RUNNING. c. Manually START RHR pumps.

d. SI pumps RUNNING. d. Manually START SI pumps.

e. BIT alignment: e. ENSURE at least one valve aligned, and flow thru BIT.

• Outlets 1-FCV-63-25 and 1-FCV-63-26 OPEN.

• Flow thru BIT.

f. RCS pressure greater f. ENSURE SI pump flow.

than 1650 psig.

IF RCS press drops to less than 150 psig, THEN ENSURE RHR pump flow.

Page 17 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 3 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

5. CHECK Cntmt isolation: ACTUATE Phase A and Cntmt Vent Isolation signal,

a. Phase A isolation:

• Train A GREEN. OR

• Train B GREEN.

Manually CLOSE valves and

b. Cntmt vent isolation: dampers as necessary.

• Train A GREEN.

• Train B GREEN.

Page 18 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 4 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

6. CHECK Cntmt pressure: PERFORM the following:

• Phase B DARK [MISSP]. 1) ENSURE Phase B actuated.

• Cntmt Spray DARK [MISSP]. 2) ENSURE Cntmt Spray actuated.

• Cntmt press less than 2.8 psig. 3) ENSURE Cntmt spray pumps running.

4) ENSURE Cntmt spray flow.

5) ENSURE Phase B isolation:

• Train A GREEN.

• Train B GREEN

• Manually CLOSE valves and dampers as necessary.

6) STOP all RCPs.

7) ENSURE MSIVs and bypasses CLOSED.

8) PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

9) WHEN 10 minutes has elapsed since Phase B actuated, THEN ENSURE air return fans start.

10) USE adverse Cntmt [ADV] setpoints where provided.

7. DISPATCH AUO to perform Attachment 1 (1-E-0), Ice Condenser AHU Breaker Operation.

Page 19 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 5 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

8. CHECK plant radiation NORMAL: NOTIFY Unit Supervisor IMMEDIATELY.

• S/G blowdown rad recorder 1-RR-90-120 NORMAL prior to isolation [M-12].

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad recorder 1-RR-90-119 NORMAL prior to trip [M-12].

• 1-RR-90-106 and 1-RR-90-112 radiation recorders NORMAL prior to isolation [M-12].

• S/G main steamline discharge monitors NORMAL [M-30].

• Upper and Lower containment high range monitors NORMAL

[M-30].

• NOTIFY Unit Supervisor conditions NORMAL.

9. ENSURE all D/Gs RUNNING. EMERGENCY START D/Gs

10. ENSURE ABGTS operation:

a. ABGTS fans RUNNING. a. Manually START fans.

b. ABGTS dampers OPEN: b. Locally OPEN dampers.

• FCO-30-146A.

• FCO-30-146B.

• FCO-30-157A.

• FCO-30-157B.

Page 20 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 6 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

11. ENSURE at least four ERCW pumps Manually START pumps as necessary.

RUNNING, one on each shutdown board preferred.

12. ENSURE ERCW supply valves IF ERCW can NOT be OPEN to running D/Gs. aligned to running D/G, THEN EMERGENCY STOP affected D/G.

13. ENSURE 0-FCV-67-152, CCS HX C Manually OPEN 0-FCV-67-152 ALT DISCH TO HDR B, is open to to position A.

position A.

14. CLOSE 0-FCV-67-144, CCS HX C DISCH TO HDR A.

15. MONITOR EGTS operation: Manually START fans

• EGTS fans RUNNING.

AND

• ENSURE dampers OPEN OPEN dampers.

• VERIFY filter bank dp between 5 and 9 inches of water.

16. ENSURE CCS pumps RUNNING: Manually START pumps as necessary.

• 1A-A CCS pump.

• 1B-B CCS pump.

• C-S or 2B-B CCS pump.

17. DISPATCH AUO to shutdown Upper and Lower CNTMT rad monitors USING 1-SOI-90.02.Gaseous Process Radiation Monitors Page 21 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 7 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

18. WHEN Attachment 1 is complete (Ice Condenser AHU Breakers OPEN),

THEN ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters

[1-M-10]:

• 1-HS-268-73 ON.

• 1-HS-268-74 ON.

NOTE The following equipment is located on 1-M-9.

19. CHECK CNTMT PURGE fans STOP fans AND STOPPED.

PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

20. CHECK FUEL HANDLING EXH fans STOP fans AND STOPPED, Fuel and Cask loading dampers CLOSED: PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK, THEN Manually CLOSE dampers.

21. ENSURE AB GEN SUPPLY and STOP fans AND EXH fans STOPPED.

PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

NOTE Dampers 1-HS-30-158 and 2-HS-30-270 remain open during ABI.

22. ENSURE AB GEN SUP & EXH Manually CLOSE dampers.

dampers CLOSED.

Page 22 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 8 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

23. ENSURE MCR & SPREAD RM Manually CLOSE dampers.

FRESH AIR dampers CLOSED:

• FCV-31-3.

• FCV-31-4.

24. ENSURE at least one CB EMER CLEANUP fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EMERG CLEANUP FAN A-A, Manually START fan.

OR

• Fan B-B RUNNING..

• FCO-31-8, OPEN. NOTIFY TSC if at least one damper NOT OPEN.

OR

• FCO-31-7, OPEN

25. ENSURE at least one CB EMER PRESS fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EMERG PRESS FAN A-A, Manually START fan.

OR FAN B-B RUNNING.

• FCO-31-6, OPEN. NOTIFY TSC if at least one damper NOT OPEN.

OR

• FCO-31-5, OPEN.

Page 23 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 9 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

26. ENSURE Control Building fans STOPPED and dampers CLOSED:

• SPREADING ROOM SUPPLY Manually STOP fans AND and EXH FANS AND dampers.

NOTIFY TSC if any damper NOT

• TOILET & LKR RM EXHAUST CLOSED.

FAN AND dampers.

NOTE Loss of shutdown power could result in a loss of SFP cooling.

Annunciator Window 128-A and 128-B could be indicative of this condition and increased monitoring of SFP level and temperature will be necessary..

27. CHECK at least one 6.9kV Shutdown DISPATCH AUO to perform Board ENERGIZED. Attachment 6, Monitor Spent Fuel Pool.

IF AUO reports abnormal SFP level or temperature, THEN REFER to 1-AOI-45, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Level or Cooling

28. INITIATE Appendix B (1-E-0), Phase B Pipe Break Contingencies.

Page 24 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix B (Page 1 of 1)

Phase B Pipe Break Contingencies Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

1. CHECK PHASE B actuated. WHEN PHASE B actuation occurs,

[MISSP XX-55-6C, -6D] THEN GO TO step 2.

2. ENSURE 1-FCV-32-110 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP XX-55-6E] Attachment 2 (1-E-0).

(A-train, window 13)

3. ENSURE 1-FCV-67-107 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP XX-55-6E] Attachment 3 (1-E-0).

(A -train, window 43)

4. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-92 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP XX-55-6E] Attachment 4 (1-E-0).

(A -train, window 73)

5. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-140 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP XX-55-6F] Attachment 5 (1-E-0).

(B -train, window 74)

Page 25 of 32

Scenario 3 TURNOVER PACKAGE

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant NRC EXAM 2013302 Scenario 4

Events Number Description Page(s) 1 Raise power from 1.66 x 10-4% to 1-4% power using 1-GO-2, Reactor 7-10 Startup, Section 5.3, beginning at Step 27.

2 1-LT-62-129, VCT LEVEL, fails off-scale high. Requires entry into and 11-12 performance of ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO. Requires entry into OR-14.10, Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment.

3 1A-A CCS Pump stops. 1B-B CCS Pump fails to start automatically. Requires 13-16 entry into and performance of 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS), Section 3.2, Loss of CCS Flow. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

4 1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high, causing the spray valves to open and 17-21 all heaters to de-energize. Requires the RO to take manual control of 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL to close the spray valves and energize the heaters. Requires entry into AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

5 480 V C & A Vent Board 1B2-B trips due to a fault. Requires entry into ARI 22-23 142-E, C&A VENT BD 1B1-B/1B2-B UNDERVOLTAGE, and SOI-214.04, 480V C&A BLDG Vent BD 1B2-B, for compensatory actions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

6 A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires 24-39 entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination.

Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically. Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS 101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close.

Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Critical Tasks Critical Description Page(s)

Task 1 Manually start the 1B-B Component Cooling Water (CCS) pump within 10 14 minutes of the trip of the 1A-A Component Cooling Water (CCS) pump to establish Reactor Coolant pump oil cooling.

2 Manually initiate at least one train of Containment Phase A isolation prior to 26 completion of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix A, Equipment Verification.

3 Isolate the faulted steam generator (SG 4) prior to exiting 1-E-2, Faulted 32 Steam Generator Isolation.

Attachments Number Description 1 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendices A and B.

References Number Title Revision WBN Technical Specifications Amendment 91 Fire Protection Report 1-GO-2 Reactor Startup 1 1-SOI-85.01 Control Rod Drive And Indication System 0 1-SI-68-34 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY TAVG-TREF 4 DEVIATION ALARM NOT RESET ARI 230 - 240 CLRS ERCW SUP 17 ARI 109-115 CVCS & RHR - RPS & ESF 20 1-AOI-15 Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS) 2 AOI-18 Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System 23 1-E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 0 1-E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 0 1-E-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation 0 1-ES-1.1 SI Termination 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Scenario No. 4 Op Test No.: 302 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Run Time:

Initial Conditions: Reactor Startup is in progress, Reactor power is 1.66 x 10-4%. Control Bank C is at 207 steps, Control Bank D is at 91 steps. RCS boron concentration is 1532 ppm.

Turnover: Train A, Channel I Work Week. Raise power from 1.66 x 10-4% to 1-4% power using 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, beginning at Step 27.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description No.

1 n/a R-RO Raise power from 1.66 x 10-4% to 1-4% power using 1-GO-2, N- BOP/SRO Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, beginning at Step 27.

2 cv11 100 I-RO 1-LT-62-129, VCT LEVEL, fails off-scale high.

TS-SRO 3 cc12a C-BOP 1A-A CCS Pump trips. 1B-B CCS Pump fails to start TS-SRO automatically.

4 rc13b C-RO 1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high, causing the spray valves TS-SRO to open and all heaters to de-energize.

5 ed08d C-BOP 480 V C & A Vent Board 1B2-B trips due to a fault.

TS-SRO 6 ms01d M-ALL A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment.

si09l Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then si09m transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-si10c 1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to si10d occur automatically. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to si10o actuate automatically. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP si10p OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor 2013-10 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 4 - Summary Initial Condition Reactor Startup is in progress, Reactor power is 1.66 x 10-4%. Control Bank C is at 207 steps, Control Bank D is at 91 steps. RCS boron concentration is 1532 ppm.

Turnover Train A, Channel I Work Week. Raise power from 1.66 x 10-4% to 1-4% power using 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, beginning at Step 27.

Event Description 1 Raise power from 1.66 x 10-4% to 1-4% power using 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, beginning at Step 27. Power will be stabilized at approximately 1x 10-2% power and critical data will be logged. After critical data is logged, power will be raised to 1-4% power.

2 1-LT-62-129, VCT LEVEL, fails off-scale high. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO. Requires Fire Protection Plan evaluation and entry into OR-14.10.1 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment 14.10.1.

3 1A-A CCS Pump stops. 1B-B CCS Pump fails to start automatically. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS), Section 3.2, Loss of CCS Flow. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into LCO 3.7.7, Component Cooling System (CCS), CONDITION A.

4 1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high, causing the spray valves to open and all heaters to de-energize. Requires the RO to take manual control of 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL to close the spray valves and energize the heaters. Requires entry into AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into multiple CONDITIONS for LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation, and LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation.

5 480 V C & A Vent Board 1B2-B trips due to a fault. Requires entry into ARI 142-E, C&A VENT BD 1B1-B/1B2-B UNDERVOLTAGE, and SOI-214.04, 480V C&A BLDG Vent BD 1B2-B, for compensatory actions. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation and entry into LCO 3.8.9, Distribution Systems - Operating, CONDITION A.

6 A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS 63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically. Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A.

1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

2013-10 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Scenario 4 - Critical Task Summary Critical Task Description 1 Manually start the 1B-B Component Cooling Water (CCS) pump within 10 minutes of the trip of the 1A-A Component Cooling Water (CCS) pump to establish reactor coolant pump oil cooling.

2 Manually initiate at least one train of Containment Phase A isolation prior to completion of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix A, Equipment Verification.

3 Isolate the faulted steam generator (SG 4) prior to exiting 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

2013-10 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 7 of 46 Event

Description:

Raise power from 1.66 x 10-4% to 1-4% power using 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor Startup, beginning at Step 27.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor 1-GO-2 Startup.

[27] () ADJUST Control Rods and/or boron concentration to RAISE Reactor power, at a rate of less than 1 dpm, to 1 X 10-2 %.

RO RO withdraws Control Bank D to raise power to 1 X 10-2 % at a rate less than 1 dpm.

The following actions are taken from 1-SOI-85.01, Control Rod Drive And Indication 1-SOI-85.01 System, Section 5.5, Control Bank Withdrawal.

[5] ENSURE ROD BANK SELECT SWITCH, 1-RBSS, in MANUAL.

RO RO locates 1-RBSS, ROD BANK SELECT, and determines that the MAN position is selected.

[6] OBTAIN SRO Approval to withdraw Control Banks.

RO RO requests permission from or is directed by the SRO prior to withdrawing Control Banks.

[7] PLACE the 1-FLRM, IN-HOLD-OUT SWITCH, to OUT to begin RO intermittent programmed withdrawal of Control Banks to obtain criticality.

RO withdraws Control Bank D to establish the desired startup rate.

[8] MONITOR the following as the Control Banks are withdrawn:

• Group Step Counters RO

• RPIs

• Rod Speed (48 Steps/Minute)

• Proper Bank Overlap The following actions are taken from 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor 1-GO-2 Startup.

[28] STABILIZE Reactor power at 1 X 10-2 %.

RO RO inserts Control Rods to stabilize reactor power at APPROXIMATELY 1 X 10-2 %.

[29] RECORD CRITICAL DATA:

RO SRO records critical data provided by the RO.

If/When contacted as Chemistry, the Console Operator will repeat the request for an RCS boron concentration. Console Operator reports current RCS boron concentration, and states that a new sample will be drawn and analyzed.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 8 of 46 Event

Description:

Raise power from 1.66 x 10-4% to 1-4% power using 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor Startup, beginning at Step 27.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[30] IF Actual Critical Rod Position is between 500 and 750 pcm from ECP, THEN ENSURE Reactor Engineering evaluates AND initiates a SR.

SRO SRO determines that the Actual Critical Rod position was not outside the stated band and marks the step as not applicable.

[31] IF Mode 2 physics testing required, THEN ENSURE that the Mode 2 and Mode 3 Surveillances are in effect during the duration of rod worth measurements (approx 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />) per PET-201, AND ENSURE Reactor SRO Engineering has performed the applicable low-power physics tests per PET-201.

SRO refers to the turnover sheet and states that Mode 2 physics testing is NOT required.

NOTE If AFW is in service, Reactor power must be maintained within the capability of AFW to maintain SG levels.

[32] EVALUATE closing AFW Pumps Recirc Valves (refer to 1-SOI-3.02, BOP Section 8.9).

EXAMINER: Annunciator 94-A, TAVG-TREF DEVIATION may be received during the power escalation to 1 to 4% power. A copy of 1-SI-68-34, MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY TAVG-TREF DEVIATION ALARM NOT RESET, was included in the Turnover Package handed out to the crew. If the alarm does occur, the steps to be performed are contained on Page 10 NOTE TAVG will vary as a function of reactor power until the unit is greater than 15% turbine load (C5) and the TAVG program is maintained by AUTO or manual rod control. The TAVG-TREF deviation alarm is expected as reactor power approaches 7% RTP.

[33] () ADJUST Control Rods or RCS CB to RAISE Reactor power, at a rate of less than 1 dpm, to between 1 and 4%.

RO RO withdraws Control Bank D to raise power to between 1 and 4%

power at a rate less than 1 dpm.

CAUTION If AFW is controlling levels in one or more SGs, then Reactor power must be maintained within AFW capability (less than 4% power).

[34] STABILIZE Reactor power between 1 and 4%:

[34.1] MAINTAIN RCS Steam Dumps in Pressure Mode, set at 84%

(1092 psig.), or SG PORVs set at 84%.

BOP locates 1-PIC-1-33, STM DUMP PRESS CONTROL, and RO/BOP determines that the dial is set at 84%.

[34.2] () FOLLOW Xenon by Rod movement or Boration to maintain control banks ABOVE the LO INSERTION LIMIT.

RO maintains power level between 1% and 4% by periodic rod motion.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 9 of 46 Event

Description:

Raise power from 1.66 x 10-4% to 1-4% power using 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor Startup, beginning at Step 27.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 2.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 10 of 46 Event

Description:

Raise power from 1.66 x 10-4% to 1-4% power using 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor Startup, beginning at Step 27.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from 1-SI-68-34, MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR 1-SI-68-34 CRITICALITY TAVG-TREF DEVIATION ALARM NOT RESET.

[1] ENSURE precautions and limitations in Section 3.0 have been reviewed.

RO RO reviews Precautions and Limitations, then signs off step.

[2] ENSURE prerequisite actions in Section 4.0 have been met.

RO RO determines that the prerequisite actions of Section 4.0 are complete and signs off the step.

NOTES

1) Failure to maintain each loop average temperature (Tavg) 555°F may require entry into LCO 3.4.2.

2) Extra copies of Appendix A may be made at any time for use.

[3] RECORD RCS loop Tavg once every 30 minutes on Appendix A, Tavg Data Sheet, AND VERIFY the lowest loop Tavg is 555°F on Appendix RO A. (Acc Crit)

RO records data on Appendix A once every 30 minutes.

[4] CONTINUE data taking UNTIL the Tavg-Tref Deviation Alarm is reset RO OR Tavg is 561°F.

[5] RECORD date and time alarm reset OR Tavg 561°F.

RO Date: _________Time: _________

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 2.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 11 of 46 Event

Description:

1-LT-62-129, VCT LEVEL, fails off-scale high. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO. Requires entry into OR-14.10, Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO.

1-LI-62-129A, VCT LEVEL indicates off-scale high.

1-LI-62-130 VCT LEVEL on the ICS display indicates level in the normal range, and trending down.

RO Diagnoses and announces the failure of 1-LI-62-129, VCT LEVEL.

RO May place 1-HS-62-118, in the VC TK position.

May dispatch an AUO to the blender area to check for workers in the area.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the RO request to check the blender area for work in progress. Console Operator will report that there is no work in progress, and that there are no workers in the area.

SRO Enters and directs actions of ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO.

ARI 109-A The following actions are taken from ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO.

CAUTIONS

1) If either VCT level transmitter fails high, then auto swap over to RWST on low level is disabled.

2) 1-LT-62-129A failing high will divert letdown flow but will NOT prevent auto makeup. 1-LI-62-129 will indicate offscale high; however computer point Lo112A will indicate actual level.

3) 1-LT-62-130A failing high will divert letdown and prevent auto makeup, however, 1-LI-62-129 will indicate actual level.

NOTE OR-14.10 should be evaluated if 1-LI-62-129 is inoperable.

[1] IF high level, THEN:

RO RO determines from ICS computer display of 1-LI-62-130 VCT LEVEL that level is not HIGH.

[2] IF low level, THEN:

RO RO determines from ICS computer display of 1-LI-62-130 VCT LEVEL that level is not LOW.

[3] VERIFY letdown and charging in service and that Reactor Coolant Filter is NOT clogged.

RO determines that letdown and charging are in service and that there RO is no indication of Reactor Coolant filter problems.

If RO contacts an AUO to check Reactor Coolant filter, the Console Operator will repeat back the request. Console Operator reports that the Reactor Coolant filter is normal.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 12 of 46 Event

Description:

1-LT-62-129, VCT LEVEL, fails off-scale high. Requires entry into and performance of ARI 109-A, VCT LEVEL HI/LO. Requires entry into OR-14.10, Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

[4] IF 1-LCV-62-118 diverted to HUT due to instrument failure, THEN:

[4.1] PLACE 1-HS-62-118 in VCT position until repairs complete.

RO locates 1-HS-62-118A, LETDOWN DIVERT TO HUT and rotates the RO handswitch to the LEFT to the V.C. TK position.

[4.2] PLACE 1-HS-62-118 in P-AUTO position once repairs completed.

Step remains open until repairs are complete.

[5] IF RCS leakage is suspected, THEN GO TO AOI-6, SMALL REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK.

SRO SRO determines that there is no leakage suspected and DOES NOT implement AOI-6, Small Reactor Coolant System Leak.

Enters OR-14.10 for the failure of 1-LT-62-129, VCT LEVEL.

SRO determines that 1-LT-62-129, VCT LEVEL is listed in TABLE 14.10 (FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT) (PAGE 3 OF 4) and that its SRO required FSSD CONDITION is OPERABLE.

SRO enters 14.10.1 With one or more required equipment in Table 14.10 inoperable (or not in its FSSD condition), restore to operable status (or its FSSD condition) within 30 days.

SRO contacts Work Control.

SRO When SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to have a troubleshooting and repair package made up investigate the failure of 1-LT-62-129.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 3, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior to SRO the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 3.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 13 of 46 Event

Description:

1A-A CCS Pump trips. 1B-B CCS Pump fails to start automatically. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS),

Section 3.2, Loss of CCS Flow. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER:

Enter time 1A-A CCS pump tripped: ____________

Indications:

179-D, CCS HX A OUTLET 1-RM-123 INSTR MALF 226-E, ERCW/CCS MOTOR TRIPOUT 237-B (238-B, 239-B, 240-B) RCP 1 (2,3,4) THRM BAR RET FLOW LO 237-C (238-C, 239-C, 240-C), RCP 1 (2,3,4) OIL CLRS RET FLOW LO 240-E, ERCW/CCS MOTOR TRIPOUT 241-D, CCP 1A-A GEAR & OIL CLR FLOW LO 241-E, SIP 1A-A OIL CLR FLOW LO 242-A, SAMPLE HXS RET HDR FLOW LO 243-D, CSP 1A-A OIL CLR FLOW LO 243-E, RHRP 1A-A MECH SEAL HX FLOW LO 244-A, WG COMPR A RET FLOW LO 246-A, RCP SEAL WTR HX RET FLOW LO 247-A, LTDN HX RET FLOW LO 247-B, LTDN HX RET TEMP HI 248-A, MISC EQUIP SUPPLY HDR FLOW LO 249-E, SFP HX A RETURN FLOW LO 250-C, CCS PMPS 1A-A & 1B-B DISCH PRESS LO Diagnoses and announces loss of 1A-A CCS pump, and the failure of the 1B-BOP B CCS pump to automatically start.

May start 1B-B CCS pump manually to restore CCS flow to multiple BOP components.

May dispatch an AUO to the 1A-A CCS pump to determine cause of the loss of the pump.

BOP When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to determine the cause of the 1A-A CCS pump trip. Console Operator will report back that the amptector has picked up on the 1A-A CCS Pump breaker.

Enters and directs actions of 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water SRO (CCS).

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 14 of 46 Event

Description:

1A-A CCS Pump trips. 1B-B CCS Pump fails to start automatically. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS),

Section 3.2, Loss of CCS Flow. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following actions are taken from 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water 1-AOI-15 (CCS).

1. CHECK at least one U-1 Train A header supply pump RUNNING AND pumping forward:

• 1A-A BOP

• 1B-B BOP determines that there is NO U-1 Train A pump running and the SRO enters step1.b RNO.

Critical Task 1 Manually start the 1B-B Component Cooling Water (CCS) pump within 10 minutes of the trip of the 1A-A Component Cooling Water (CCS) pump to establish Reactor Coolant pump oil cooling.

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

START available U-1 Train A CCS pump.

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-70-38A, CCS PMP 1B-B, and rotates handswitch to the START position and verifies that 1A CCS header pressures and flows return to normal.

EXAMINER:

Enter time 1B-B CCS pump started: ____________

CAUTIONS

• CCP may survive for only 10 to 12 minutes after loss of CCS to lube oil cooler.

• RCPs can be operated for up to 10 minutes after loss of CCS flow.

2. CHECK 1A Train flows NORMAL

• CCS Low Flow alarms on 0-M-27 CLEAR.

BOP BOP reports that low flow alarms are clear on the CCS annunciator panel.

CAUTION Seal injection should NOT be reestablished to RCP seals on a total loss of cooling due to probable damage to the seals. Attachment 3 has guidance to isolate RCP seals.

3. CHECK thermal barrier flow OR seal injection flow established.

BOP confirms thermal barrier flow has returned to normal BOP (approximately 45 gpm per RCP)

SRO may check with RO to ensure seal injection flow is established.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 15 of 46 Event

Description:

1A-A CCS Pump trips. 1B-B CCS Pump fails to start automatically. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS),

Section 3.2, Loss of CCS Flow. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. CHECK any Train B header supply pump RUNNING AND pumping forward:

BOP

• C-S.

• 2B-B.

BOP reports the C-S CCS pump is running and pumping forward.

5. CHECK CCS Pump 2A-A running.

BOP BOP reports the 2A-A CCS pump is running and pumping forward.

6. PLACE any non-operable or tripped CCS pump in STOP/PULL-TO-LOCK.

BOP If not already performed, the BOP places 1-HS-70-46A, CCS PMP 1A-A in the STOP, PULL-TO-LOCK position.

7. CHECK only one TBBP running BOP locates 1-HS-60-131A, THRM BAR BSTR PMP 1A (TBBP) and observes RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK and determines the pump is running.

BOP BOP locates 1-HS-60-130A, THRM BAR BSTR PMP 1B (TBBP) and observes RED light LIT, GREEN light DARK and determines the pump is running.

SRO enters Step 7 RNO.

7. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

STOP second running TBBP AND RETURN HS to A-P AUTO.

BOP places either 1-HS-60-131A, THRM BAR BSTR PMP 1A (TBBP) or BOP 1-HS-70-130A, THRM BAR BSTR PMP 1B (TBBP) in STOP and then PULL A-P AUTO position.

BOP ensures that the running pump (1-HS-60-131A, THRM BAR BSTR PMP 1A (TBBP) or 1-HS-70-130A, THRM BAR BSTR PMP 1B (TBBP)) is in the PULL A-P AUTO position.

8. CHECK TWO U-1 Train A header supply pumps RUNNING:

• 1A-A BOP

• 1B-B BOP reports that only one Train A pump is running.

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

ENSURE at least one of the following CLOSED to avoid excessive flow:

• RHR HX A, 1-FCV-70-156, BOP OR

• SFP HX A, 0-FCV-70-197.

BOP reports that 1-HS-70-156A, RHR HX 1A OUTLET is CLOSED.

9. CHECK A and B side Surge Tank levels between 57% and 85%.

BOP BOP reports A and B side Surge Tank levels approximately 66%.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 16 of 46 Event

Description:

1A-A CCS Pump trips. 1B-B CCS Pump fails to start automatically. Requires entry into and performance of 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS),

Section 3.2, Loss of CCS Flow. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. REFER TO Tech Spec 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water System (CCS).

SRO LCO 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water System (CCS), Condition A, With one CCS train inoperable, restore CCS train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

11. NOTIFY Work Control to initiate repairs.

When SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat SRO back the request to have a troubleshooting and repair package made up for 1A-A CCS pump, and for the failure of the low pressure signal to start the 1B-B CCS pump.

SRO 12. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew briefing is optional. The next event, Event 4, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 4.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 17 of 46 Event

Description:

1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high, causing the spray valves to open and all heaters to de-energize. Requires the RO to take manual control of 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL to close the spray valves and energize the heaters. Requires entry into AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

90-A, PZR PRESS HI LIT 124-B, PZR PRESS HI LIT 1-PI-68-340A, PZR PRESS indicates off-scale high.

1-XI-68-340B, PZR SPRAY LOOP 2 and 1-XI-68-340D, PZR SPRAY LOOP 1 RED lights are LIT, indicating spray valves are full open.

1-PI-68-334, PZR PRESS, 1-PI-68-323, PZR PRESS and 1-PI-68-322, PZR PRESS indicating decreasing trends.

1-HS-68-341A, BACKUP HEATERS A-A, 1-HS-68-341D, BACKUP HEATERS B-B, 1-HS-68-341H, BACKUP HEATERS C, and 1-HS-68-341F, CONTROL HEATERS D all have GREEN lights LIT, and are OFF.

RO Diagnoses and announces failure of 1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS.

Performs IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, and places 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL in MANUAL to stabilize RCS pressure.

Places 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL in MANUAL by RO lifting the toggle switch up from the AUTO position to the MANUAL position.

Since the failure caused the controller output to lower in AUTO, the output must be raised by moving the toggle switch to the left and observing pressure response.

Enters and directs the actions of AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer SRO Pressure Control System, Section 3.1, Pressure Transient Due to Instrument or Controller Malfunction.

The following actions are taken from AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure AOI-18 Control System, Section 3.1, Pressure Transient Due to Instrument or Controller Malfunction.

NOTE Step 1 is an IMMEDIATE ACTION step.

1. CHECK PZR pressure STABLE or TRENDING to desired pressure:

RO RO reports actual pressure is low, but responding to manual operation of 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 18 of 46 Event

Description:

1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high, causing the spray valves to open and all heaters to de-energize. Requires the RO to take manual control of 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL to close the spray valves and energize the heaters. Requires entry into AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

PLACE PZR master controller 1-PIC-68-340A in MANUAL and RESTORE press to normal.

These actions may have already been taken by the RO to stabilize PZR pressure.

Places 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL in MANUAL by lifting the toggle switch up from the AUTO position to the MANUAL RO position.

Since the failure caused the controller output to lower in AUTO, the output must be raised by moving the toggle switch to the left and observing pressure response.

IF PZR pressure drop due failed PORV/Safety or Spray valve, THEN GO TO Section 3.2.

RO reports that the PORV /Safety and Spray valves are not the cause of the pressure drop.

2. ENSURE 1-XS-68-340D selected to OPERABLE channels for control and backup:

• PT-68-340 & 334 OR RO

• PT-68-334 & 323 RO locates 1-XS-68-340D, PZR PRESS CONTROL CHANNEL SELECT and rotates the handswitch to the RIGHT to select PT-68-334 & 323.

OR

• PT-68-340 & 322

3. CHECK PZR press STABLE or RISING.

RO RO observes a rising trend on 1-PI-68-340, 1-PI-68-334, 1-PI-68-323 and 1-PI-68-322, PZR PRESS indicators.

4. DETERMINE if PZR heaters and sprays are operating properly:

RO a. CHECK master control controlling sprays and heaters.

b. CHECK PZR press greater than2250 psig.

4.b RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RO WHEN PZR press is greater than 2250 psig, THEN PERFORM Step 4.c.

RO c. ENSURE all PZR heaters OFF

d. ENSURE PZR sprays maintain RCS press on program.

RO RO verifies PZR heaters and sprays responding properly to manual control of PZR press master controller.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 19 of 46 Event

Description:

1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high, causing the spray valves to open and all heaters to de-energize. Requires the RO to take manual control of 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL to close the spray valves and energize the heaters. Requires entry into AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. ENSURE operable channel selected for recording with 1-XS-68-340B.

RO RO locates 1-XS-68-340B, PZR PRESS RECORDER CHANNEL SELECT, and reports that 1-PT-68-334 is selected.

6. ENSURE TR-68-2A placed to operable channel using 1-XS-68-2B, T RCDR TR-68-2A LOOP SELECT [1-M-5].

RO RO locates 1-XS-68-2B, T RCDR TR-68-2A LOOP SELECT, and rotates the handswitch to the right to select Loop 2, Loop 3 or Loop 4.

7. CHECK PZR level at or trending to PROGRAM.

RO RO observes 1-LR-68-339, PZR LEVEL -%, RWED and BLUE pens and determines that PZR level is near program.

8. NOTIFY Work Control to remove any failed channel from service and repair any failed controllers.

SRO When the SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back request for removing 1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS channel from service.

9. WHEN pressurizer pressure stable and equipment status supports returned to normal, THEN ENSURE the following in AUTO:

• PZR Master controller

• PZR spray controllers

• All heater groups RO RO will stabilize RCS pressure, then request permission to return 1-PIC-68-340A to AUTO.

Returns 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL to AUTO.

Automatic is selected by lowering the toggle switch from the MANUAL position to the AUTO position.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 20 of 46 Event

Description:

1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high, causing the spray valves to open and all heaters to de-energize. Requires the RO to take manual control of 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL to close the spray valves and energize the heaters. Requires entry into AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. REFER TO the following Tech Specs:

• 3.3.1, RTS Instrumentation Function 6, OTT, Condition W, With one channel inoperable, place the channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

Function 8.a, Low Pressure, Condition X, With one channel inoperable, place the channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR reduce THERMAL POWER to <P-7 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

Function 8.b, High Pressure, Condition W, With one channel inoperable, place the channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

• 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation Function 1.d, Pressurizer Pressure - Low, Condition D, With one channel inoperable, place the channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> AND be in Mode 4 in 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br />.

SRO Function 8.b, P-11, (1) Unblock (Auto Reset of SI Block)

(2) Enable Manual Block of SI Condition L, With one P-11 interlock channel inoperable, verify the interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> AND be in Mode 4 in 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.

• 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System - not applicable

• 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits SRO states that CONDITION A was entered when pressure dropped below 2214 psig, and was exited when pressure was returned to greater than 2214 psig.

• 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits - not applicable

• 3.4.9, Pressurizer - not applicable

• 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves - not applicable

• 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power -Operated Relief Valves - not applicable

11. INITIATE repairs to failed equipment.

SRO When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back request to prepare a package to troubleshoot and repair 1-PT 340A.

SRO 12. RETURN TO Instruction in effect.

EXAMINER: The crew brief is optional. The next event, Event 5, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 21 of 46 Event

Description:

1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high, causing the spray valves to open and all heaters to de-energize. Requires the RO to take manual control of 1-PIC-68-340A, PZR PRESS MASTER CONTROL to close the spray valves and energize the heaters. Requires entry into AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior SRO to the next event.

Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 5.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 22 of 46 Event

Description:

1B2-B 480V C & A Vent Board trips due to a fault. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

142-D, 480 RX MOV BDS THRM OVERLOADS BYPASSED 142-E, C&A VENT BD 1B1-B/1B2-B UNDERVOLTAGE 147-A, FEEDER BREAKERS TO RX/C&A VNT BDS Diagnoses and announces the failure of 480 V C & A Vent Board 1B2-B trips BOP due to a fault.

May dispatch an AUO to investigate the cause of the 480 V C & A Vent Board 1B2-B trip.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back BOP request to go to C&A Vent Board 1B1-B and 1B2-B to determine the cause of the alarm. Console Operator will report that C&A Vent Board 1B2-B has tripped due to a fault, and that the board is severely damaged.

SRO Enters ARI 142-E, C&A VENT BD 1B1-B/1B2-B UNDERVOLTAGE.

The following actions are taken from ARI 142-E, C&A VENT BD 1B1-B/1B2-B ARI 142-E UNDERVOLTAGE.

[1] DISPATCH Operator to determine affected board AND INITIATE corrective action.

When contacted as an AUO, the Console Operator will repeat back BOP request to go to C&A Vent Board 1B1-B and 1B2-B to determine the cause of the alarm. Console Operator will report that C&A Vent Board 1B2-B has tripped due to a fault, and that the board is severely damaged.

[2] REFER TO SOI-214.03 (1B1-B) or SOI-214.04 (1B2-B) to restore voltage to the affected board.

SRO SRO may refer to SOI-214.04, 480V C&A BLDG Vent BD 1B2-B, for additional actions.

[3] REFER TO Tech Specs.

SRO evaluates Tech Specs and enters LCO 3.8.9, Distribution SRO Systems - Operating. SRO enters CONDITION A, One or more AC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable, restore AC electrical power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> AND 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from discovery of failure to meet LCO EXAMINER: The crew brief is optional. The next event, Event 6, may be entered prior to the brief, at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.

Crew Brief would typically be conducted for this event as time allows prior to SRO the next event.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 23 of 46 Event

Description:

1B2-B 480V C & A Vent Board trips due to a fault. Requires a Tech Spec evaluation.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Notifications should be addressed as applicable if not specifically addressed by the procedure or in the crew brief.

SRO Operations Management - Typically Shift Manager.

Maintenance Personnel - Typically Work Control Center (WCC). (Note:

Maintenance notification may be delegated to the Shift Manager).

If not already cued, Console Operator will check with the Chief Examiner prior to inserting Event 6.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 24 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Indications:

95-F, RCS LOOSE PARTS DETECTED 103-C. LWR CNTMT TEMP HI 144-A, ICE COND INLET DOOR OPEN 265-A, UPPER CNTMT RE-271/272 RAD HI 265-B, LOWER CNTMT RE-273/274 RAD HI 63-F, SG LEVEL DEVIATION NO increase on 1-RM-90-106, NO increase on 1-RM-90-112, Diagnoses and announces SG 4 main steam line rupture, inside BOP containment.

SRO Enters and directs actions of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

1-E-0 The following actions are taken from 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety injection.

NOTE

• Steps 1 thru 4 are IMMEDIATE ACTION STEPS

• Status Trees / SPDS should be monitored when transitioned to another instruction.

1. ENSURE reactor trip:

• Reactor trip and bypass breakers OPEN.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR A GREEN light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52RTB, RX TRIP BKR B GREEN light LIT on panel 1-M-4.

RO checks 1-52BYA, BYPASS BKR A lights DARK.

RO checks 1-52BYB, BYPASS BKR B lights DARK.

• RPIs at bottom of scale.

RO RO observes 1-MON 85 5000/1 CERPI Monitor 1 and 1-MON-85 5000/2 CERPI MONITOR 2 for indication that all SHUTDOWN and CONTROL bank rods are inserted.

• Neutron flux DROPPING.

RO observes neutron flux trending down on 1-NR-92-145, NEUTRON FLUX LEVEL RECORDER. May also observe levels decreasing on 1-NI-92-135A, CH I NEUTRON MON % PWR, and 1-NI-92-136A, CH II NEUTRON MON % PWR.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 25 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

2. ENSURE Turbine Trip:

• All turbine stop valves CLOSED.

RO/BOP RO observes that lights on 1-XX-47-1000 EHC CONTROL for individual throttle and governor valves are GREEN.

3. CHECK 6.9 kV shutdown boards:

a. At least one board energized from:

• CSST (offsite),

OR

• D/G (blackout).

RO/BOP RO observes that 1-HS-57-41A, 1716 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1A-A FROM CSST C RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-39, 6.9 SDB 1A-A VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

RO observes that 1-HS-57-71A, 1728 NORMAL - 6.9 SD BD 1B-B FROM CSST D RED light is LIT, GREEN light is DARK (breaker closed) and 1-EI-57-66, 6.9 SDB 1B-B VOLTS indicates approximately 7000 volts.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 26 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. CHECK SI actuated:

a. Any SI annunciator LIT.

RO b. Both trains SI ACTUATED.

• 1-XX-55-6C

• 1-XX-55-6D EXAMINER: 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendices A and B are included as .

EXAMINER: Critical Task 2 is identified in Attachment 1 (1-E-0 Appendix A Step 5). If not previously performed, the BOP will complete Critical Task 2 during the performance of 1-E-0 Appendix A. BOP may manually initiate at least one train of Containment Phase A isolation prior to 1-E-0 Appendix A, Step 5.

Critical Task 2 Manually initiate and complete a Containment Phase A isolation on at least one train prior to completion of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix A, Equipment Verification.

Critical Task 2 is accomplished by:

1. MANUALLY actuating Phase A isolation by rotating1-HS-30-63A, Phase A & CNTMT VENT ISOL and/or 1-HS-30-63B, Phase A & CNTMT VENT ISOL to the right to the ACTUATE position.

2. MANUALLY actuating Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) by rotating 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A to the ACTUATE position.

3. MANUALLY rotating 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and/or 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A handswitches to the left to the CLOSE position.

Critical 5. PERFORM Appendixes A and B, 1-E-0, pages 16-30.

Task 2 BOP is assigned to perform actions contained in the Appendices. A BOP separate copy of the Appendices is contained in this package for Examiner use.

SRO 6. ANNOUNCE reactor trip and safety injection over PA system.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 27 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINER: After confirming that the secondary heat sink is available, the RO may isolate AFW flow to SG 4, as a PRUDENT OPERATOR ACTION.

7. ENSURE secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total AFW flow greater than 410 gpm, RO OR

• At least one S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

8. MONITOR RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F using:

• RCS Loop T-avg with any RCP running, RO OR

• RCS Loop T-cold with RCPs out-of-service.

8. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED IF temp less than 557°F, THEN ENSURE steam dumps and S/G PORVs CLOSED.

IF cooldown continues, THEN CONTROL total AFW flow to maintain greater than 410 gpm UNTIL NR level in at least one S/G greater than 29% [39% ADV].

BOP BOP takes manual control of AFW LCVs and reduces AFW flow.

IF cooldown continues after AFW flow is controlled, THEN

• PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

• CLOSE MSIVs.

• ENSURE MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

IF RCS temp greater than 564°F, THEN ENSURE either steam dumps or S/G PORVs OPEN.

9. ENSURE excess letdown valves CLOSED:

• 1-FCV-62-54 RO

• 1-FCV-62-55 RO observes GREEN lights LIT on handswitches 1-HS-62-54A, EXCESS LTDN ISOL, and 1-HS-62-55A, EXCESS LTDN.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 28 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. CHECK pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV 340A, in P-AUTO position and valve CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

RO observes 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334, in P-AUTO position and RO valve CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

RO observes 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A, OPEN, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is LIT.

RO observes 1-HS-68-332A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 334, OPEN, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is LIT.

11. CHECK pzr safety valves CLOSED:

• EVALUATE tailpipe temperatures and acoustic monitors.

RO observes response of 1-TI-68-330, SAFETY 68-563 TAILPIPE TEMP, RO 1-TI-68-329, SAFETY 68-564 TAILPIPE TEMP, and 1-TI-68-328, SAFETY 68-565. All are normal with 1-TI-68-329, SAFETY 68-564 TAILPIPE TEMP, indicating approximately 100°F.

BOP may observe 1-XI-68-363, PZR VALVES ACOUSTIC MONITOR indicating lights DARK.

12. CHECK PZR sprays CLOSED.

RO RO observes the GREEN lights are LIT for 1-XI-68-334B, PZR SPRAY LOOP 2 and 1-XI-68-334D, PZR SPRAY LOOP 1.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

13. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

a. Phase B signals DARK [MISSP].

RO locates 1-XX-55-6C, MASTER ISOL SIGNAL STATUS PNL, and RO observes the B light is RED.

RO locates 1-XX-55-6D, MASTER ISOL SIGNAL STATUS PNL, and observes the B light is RED.

SRO enters 13.a. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED for actions.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 29 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 13.a RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

a. STOP all RCPs.

RO locates 1-HS-68-8BA, RCP 1 ALTERNATE BKR & XFER SELECTOR, pushes the handswitch in and rotates the handswitch to the STOP position. RO observes RED light DARK, GREEN light LIT.

RO locates 1-HS-68-31BA, RCP 2 ALTERNATE BKR & XFER SELECTOR, pushes the handswitch in and rotates the handswitch to the STOP position. RO observes RED light DARK, GREEN light LIT.

RO RO locates 1-HS-68-50BA, RCP 3 ALTERNATE BKR & XFER SELECTOR, pushes the handswitch in and rotates the handswitch to the STOP position. RO observes RED light DARK, GREEN light LIT.

RO locates 1-HS-68-73BA, RCP 1 ALTERNATE BKR & XFER SELECTOR, pushes the handswitch in and rotates the handswitch to the STOP position. RO observes RED light DARK, GREEN light LIT.

• • GO TO Step 14.

SRO continues to Step 14.

14. CHECK S/G pressures:

• All S/G pressures controlled or rising.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that SG 1, 2 and 3 pressures are controlled, and reports that SG 4 pressure is dropping rapidly. May also observe BOP trends on 1-PR-1-2, SG 1 & 2 PRESS PSIG, and 1-PR-1-23, SG 3 & 4 PRESS PSIG to assess this step.

• All S/G pressures greater than 140 psig.

RO observes PAM pressure instruments on SG 1 through 4 (black labels) and determines that SG 1,2 and 3 pressures are greater than 140 psig, but SG 4 pressure is below 140 psig.

14. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF S/G pressure low OR dropping uncontrolled, THEN ** GO TO 1-E-2, SRO Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

SRO transitions to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 30 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-E-2 The following actions are taken from 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

CAUTION If a faulted S/G is NOT needed for RCS cooldown, it should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions.

1. ENSURE all MSIVs and MSIV bypasses CLOSED.

BOP RO determines that the MSIVs are CLOSED based on RED lights DARK, GREEN and BLUE lights LIT on handswitches.

NOTE If it is known that a steam leak exists in the Turbine building, the following step should NOT be performed until the affected steam header is depressurized.

2. PLACE steam dump controls OFF:

• 1-HS-1-103A, STEAM DUMP FSV A.

BOP

• 1-HS-1-103B, STEAM DUMP FSV B.

SRO observes that the steam dump controls were placed in the OFF position during 1-E-0 performance.

3. CHECK for at least one Intact S/G:

• Any S/G pressure controlled or rising, OR BOP

• Any S/G pressure greater than P-sat for RCS incore temperature.

BOP determines that SG 4 is FAULTED and that the remaining SGs are INTACT based on SG pressure response.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 31 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

4. IDENTIFY Faulted S/G based on ANY of the following:

• Any S/G pressure dropping in an uncontrolled manner, BOP reports SG 4 pressure has dropped in an uncontrolled manner.

OR

• Any S/G pressure less than 140 psig, BOP reports SG 4 pressure is less than 140 psig.

OR BOP

• S/G enclosure temps high:

1) T1002A for 2 and 3,

2) T1003A for 1 and 4.

OR

• Local indication of break in any of the following:

• Main steam lines,

• Main feedwater lines,

• Other secondary piping.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 32 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Critical Task 3 Isolate the faulted steam generator (SG 4) prior to exiting 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

5. ISOLATE Faulted S/G:

a. ISOLATE AFW flow to Faulted S/G.

BOP rotates 1-HS-3-164A, SG 4 SUPPLY LCV-3-164 CNTL from the AUTO position to the ACC. RESET MODULATE position. The BOP then rotates 1-HS-3-164A, SG 4 SUPPLY LCV-3-164 CNTL to the CLOSE position and PULLS the switch OUT.

BOP rotates 1-HS-3-174A, SG 4 SUPPLY LCV-3-174 CNTL from the AUTO position to the ACC. RESET MODULATE position. The BOP then rotates 1-HS-3-173A, SG 4 SUPPLY LCV-3-174 CNTL to the CLOSE position and PULLS the switch OUT.

b. ENSURE MFW ISOLATED to Faulted S/G:

• MFW isolation and bypass isolation valves CLOSED.

BOP observes 1-HS-3-33A, SG 1 MFW ISOL VLV, 1-HS-3-47A, SG2 MFW ISOL VLV, 1-HS-3-87A, SG 3 MFW ISOL VLV and 1-HS-3-100A, SG 4 MFW ISOL VLV, RED lights are DARK, GREEN lights are LIT BOP observes 1-XI-3-236, SG 1 MFW BYP ISOL VLV, 1-XI-3-239, SG2 MFW BYP ISOL VLV, 1-XI-3-242, SG 3 MFW BYP ISOL VLV and 1-XI-3-245, SG 4 MFW BYP ISOL VLV, RED lights are DARK, GREEN lights are LIT BOP

• MFW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED.

BOP observes 1-XX-3-35 MFW REG, RED lights are DARK, GREEN lights are LIT.

BOP observes 1-XX-3-35A BYP REG, RED lights are DARK, GREEN lights are LIT.

• MFPs TRIPPED.

BOP observes 1-HS-46-9A, MFPT A TRIP-RESET and 1-HS-46-36A, MFPT B TRIP-RESET RED lights are DARK, GREEN lights are LIT.

BOP observes 1-HS-3-200A, Standby MFWP Switch, RED light is DARK, GREEN light is LIT.

c. ENSURE Faulted S/G PORV CLOSED.

BOP may rotate 1-HS-1-6, SG 1 PORV PCV-1-5 from the P-AUTO position to the CLOSE position. BOP observes the RED light is DARK, GREEN light is LIT.

d. ENSURE Faulted S/G blowdown ISOLATED.

BOP may rotate 1-HS-1-7/181 SG 1 BLOWDOWN VLVS from the P-AUTO position to the CLOSE position. BOP observes RED light is DARK, GREEN light is LIT.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 33 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE TD AFW pump steam supply should NOT be aligned from a S/G with a known primary to secondary leak if other AFW sources are available.

6. ENSURE TD AFW pump being supplied from Intact S/G.

BOP BOP reports that SG 1 is supplying the TD AFW pump.

7. MONITOR CST volume greater than 200,000 gal.

BOP BOP reports CST levels are greater than 300,000 gal.

8. WHEN RCS temperature is stable or rising following Faulted S/G blowdown, THEN ADJUST Intact S/G PORV controllers in AUTO to:

• P-sat for the highest RCS temp (one or more RCPs running)

OR

• P-sat for the highest T-cold temp (no RCPs running)

BOP or RO will check 1-TI-68-18, LOOP 1 CL TEMP, 1-TI-68-41, LOOP 2 CL TEMP, 1-TI-68-60, LOOP 3 CL TEMP and 1-TI-68-83, LOOP 4 CL RO TEMP to determine the highest T-cold temperature. The BOP or RO will then refer to steam tables or the ICS computer to determine the saturation pressure.

BOP locates 1-PIC-1-6A, SG 1 PORV PCV-1-5, and adjusts setpoint dial to the value corresponding to P-sat value.

BOP locates 1-PIC-1-13A, SG 2 PORV PCV-1-12, and adjusts setpoint dial to the value corresponding to P-sat value.

BOP locates 1-PIC-1-24A, SG 3 PORV PCV-1-23, and adjusts setpoint dial to the value corresponding to P-sat value.

9. CHECK secondary side radiation:

During performance of 1-E-0, Appendix A, the BOP reported that all secondary radiation monitors are normal.

• S/G discharge monitors NORMAL.

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.

BOP

• S/G blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

• S/G sample results by Chemistry.

BOP reports SG blowdown rad monitor recorders indicated normal trends prior to isolation.

If the SRO contacts Chemistry, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to sample all SGs for activity.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 34 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

10. CHECK SI termination criteria:

a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65°F [85°F ADV].

b. CHECK secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total feed flow to Intact S/Gs greater than 410 gpm, OR

• At least one Intact S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

RO c. CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising.

d. CHECK PZR level greater than 15% [33% ADV].

e. ** GO TO 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination.

It is possible that PZR level may not be greater than 33% when the crew reaches this step. If PZR level is less than 33%, the crew will transition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, instead of ES-1.1, SI Termination.

EXAMINER: Scenario may be terminated at this point, upon the transition to either 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant or 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination.

1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant steps are included on pages 35 through 37 if the Chief Examiner determines that additional actions need to be observed.

1-ES-1.1, SI Termination, steps are included on pages 38 and 39 if the Chief Examiner determines that additional actions need to be observed.

d. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

RESTORE pzr level:

SRO

1) ATTEMPT to stabilize RCS pressure with normal pzr sprays.

2) ** GO TO Step 11.

e. GO TO 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination.

SRO SRO transitions to ES-1.1, "SI Termination.

11. GO TO 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 35 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-E-1 The following actions are taken from 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

NOTE Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs.

1. CHECK if RCPs should remain in service:

a. Phase B DARK [MISSP].

SRO b. RCS pressure greater than 1500 psig.

SRO states that the RCPs were stopped previously and continues to Step 2.

2. REFER TO EPIP-1, Emergency Plan Classification Flowchart.

SRO When the SRO contacts the Shift Manager, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to refer to EPIP-1.

NOTE Time since initiation of event is defined by performance of Step 3.

3. RECORD current time to mark initiation of LOCA and determination of SRO time for hot leg recirc.

NOTE On SI reset failure, the non-affected train should be stopped and placed in A-AUTO.

4. CHECK S/G pressures:

• All S/G pressures controlled or rising.

BOP

• All S/Gs pressures greater than 140 psig.

BOP reports SG 4 is completely depressurized.

4. RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED:

IF Faulted S/G has NOT been isolated, THEN SRO SRO states that the faulted SG has been isolated and continues to Step 5.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 36 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

5. MAINTAIN Intact S/G NR levels:

a. MONITOR levels greater than 29% [39% ADV].

BOP reports SG 1,2 and 3 levels are greater than 39%.

BOP

b. CONTROL intact S/G levels between 29% and 50% [39% and 50%

ADV].

BOP repeats back the control band of 39% to 50%.

6. CHECK secondary radiation:

During performance of 1-E-0, Appendix A, the BOP reported that all secondary radiation monitors are normal.

• S/G discharge monitors NORMAL.

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad monitors NORMAL.

SRO

• S/G blowdown rad monitor recorders NORMAL trend prior to isolation.

BOP reports SG blowdown rad monitor recorders indicated normal trends prior to isolation.

If 10 minutes have elapsed since the SRO first contacted Chemistry, the Console Operator will report SG activity levels are normal.

7. ENSURE cntmt hydrogen analyzers in service:

• PLACE 1-HS-43-200A in ANALYZE [M-10].

BOP places 1-HS-43-200A, H2 ANALYZER A FAN to the ANALYZE position on panel 1-M-10.

• PLACE 1-HS-43-210A in ANALYZE [M-10].

BOP places 1-HS-43-200A, H2 ANALYZER A FAN to the ANALYZE position on panel 1-M-10.

BOP

• CHECK low flow lights NOT lit [M-10].

BOP checks 1-XI-43-200, LO FLOW - ANAL A, WHITE light is DARK.

BOP checks 1-XI-43-210, LO FLOW - ANAL B, WHITE light is DARK.

• LOCALLY CHECK low analyzer temp lights NOT lit AND RESET local alarm panel. [North wall of Train A 480V SD Bd rm].

When contacted as the Control Building AUO the Console Operator repeat back request to check low analyzer temp lights, and reports that the lights are NOT LIT.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 37 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

8. MONITOR pzr PORVs and block valves:

a. Pzr PORVs CLOSED.

RO observes 1-HS-68-340AA, PZR PORV 340A, in P-AUTO position and valve CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

RO observes 1-HS-68-334A, PZR PORV 334, in P-AUTO position and RO valve CLOSED, GREEN light is LIT, RED light is DARK.

b. At least one block valve OPEN.

RO observes 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 340A, OPEN, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is LIT.

RO observes 1-HS-68-332A, BLOCK VLV FOR PORV 334, OPEN, GREEN light is DARK, RED light is LIT.

9. DETERMINE if cntmt spray should be stopped:

RO a. MONITOR cntmt pressure less than 2.0 psig.

b. CHECK at least one cntmt spray pump RUNNING.

10. ENSURE both pocket sump pumps STOPPED [M-15]:

• 1-HS-77-410.

BOP

• 1-HS-77-411.

BOP observes handswitch 1-HS-77-410, POCKET SUMP PMP A GREEN light is LIT, and 1-HS-77-411, POCKET SUMP PMP B GREEN light is LIT.

11. CHECK SI termination criteria:

a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65°F [85°F ADV].

b. CHECK secondary heat sink available with either:

• Total feed flow to Intact S/Gs greater than 410 gpm, OR SRO

• At least one Intact S/G NR level greater than 29% [39% ADV].

c. CHECK RCS pressure stable or rising.

d. CHECK PZR level greater than 15% [33% ADV].

e. ** GO TO 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination.

SRO enters 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 38 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1-ES-1.1 The following actions are taken from 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination.

CAUTION If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action will be required to restart the SI pumps and RHR pumps due to loss of SI start signal.

1. RESET SI, and CHECK the following:

RO

• SI ACTUATED permissive DARK.

• AUTO SI BLOCKED permissive LIT.

RO 2. RESET Phase A and Phase B.

3. ENSURE cntmt air in service:

a. Aux air press greater than 75 psig [1-M-15].

b. Cntmt air supply valves OPEN [1-M-15]:

BOP

• 1-FCV-32-80.

• 1-FCV-32-102.

• 1-FCV-32-110.

NOTE On SI reset failure, the non-affected train should be stopped and placed in A-AUTO.

4. ENSURE ONLY one Charging Pump running:

RO

• STOP all but one CCP and PLACE in A-AUTO.

RO 5. CHECK RCS press stable or rising.

6. ALIGN charging:

a. CLOSE RCP seal flow control 1-FCV-62-89.

b. OPEN charging isolation valves 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91.

RO

c. ENSURE charging valve 1-FCV-62-85 OR 1-FCV-62-86 OPEN.

d. CHECK RHR Suction aligned from RWST.

e. OPEN seal return valves 1-FCV-62-61 and 1-FCV-62-63 RO 7. CLOSE BIT outlet valves 1-FCV-63-25 and 1-FCV-63-26.

8. ADJUST 1-FCV-62-89 and 1-FCV-62-93 to maintain:

RO

• Seal injection flow between 8 and 13 gpm for each RCP.

• Pzr level stable or rising.

2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 302 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page 39 of 46 Event

Description:

A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Requires entry into 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, then transition to 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and ES-1.1, SI Termination. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically. Requires the BOP to manually initiate the Phase A isolation using 1-HS-30-63A, A & CNTMT VENT ISOL or 1-HS-30-63B, A &

CNTMT VENT ISOL. Auxiliary Building Isolation (ABI) fails to actuate automatically.

Requires BOP to manually actuate using 1-HS-30-101A, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A and 1-HS-30-101B, AUX BLDG ISOL TR A. 1-FCV-61-96, FLOOR CLG SUP OUTSIDE CIV-A and 1-FCV-61-97, FLOOR CLG SUP INSIDE CIV-A fail to close. Requires the BOP to close valves manually.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

9. CONTROL charging flow to maintain pzr level:

a. IF any S/G Faulted, THEN DO NOT CONTINUE this Instruction UNTIL RO Faulted S/G depressurization stops.

b. CHECK pzr level stable or rising.

10. DETERMINE if SI pumps should be stopped:

a. CHECK RCS pressure:

• Stable or rising.

• Greater than 1350 psig.

RO

b. CHECK RHR Suction aligned from RWST.

c. CHECK RCS pressure:

• Stable or rising.

• Greater than 1650 psig.

NOTE On SI reset failure, the non-affected train should be stopped and placed in A-AUTO with the affected train placed in PULL-TO LOCK.

RO 11. STOP SI pumps, AND PLACE in A-AUTO.

12. DETERMINE if RHR pumps should be stopped:

RO

a. CHECK RHR suction aligned from RWST.

NOTE On SI reset failure, the non-affected train should be stopped and placed in A-AUTO with the affected train placed in PULL-TO LOCK.

RO b. STOP RHR pumps, and PLACE in A-AUTO.

13. MONITOR ECCS injection not required:

RO a. CHECK RCS subcooling greater than 65°F [85°F ADV].

b. CHECK pzr level greater than 15% [33% ADV].

END OF SCENARIO 2013-302 Watts Bar NRC Examination

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

1. ENSURE Examination Security has been established.

2. RESET to Initial Condition 304 by performing the following actions:

a. Select ICManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

b. Locate IC# 304.

c. Right click on IC# 304.

d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.

e. Right click on RESET.

f. Enter the password for IC# 304.

g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.

h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.

3. SELECT Director on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).

4. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Screen:

Key Description Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value si10o failure of phase a signal for ab isolation train a M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active si10p failure of phase a signal for ab isolation train b M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active si10c failure of phase a signal for fcv-61-96 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active si10d failure of phase a signal for fcv-61-97 M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active cc03b ccs pump pmp 1b-b auto start inhibit M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active si09l failure of auto si for phase a train a isolation M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active si09m failure of auto si for phase a train b isolation M 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active cv11 vct level transmitter fails to position, 129-a M 2 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 39.4752 cc12a ccs pump 1a-a bearing wear M 3 00:00:00 00:00:25 15 0 rx07a pzr pressure transmitter fails to position chnl 1 68-340 M 4 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 66.9178 ed08d loss of 480v shutdown board 1b2-b M 5 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active InActive ms01d main steam line break inside containment sg #4 M 6 00:00:00 00:00:00 100 0 Page 40 of 46

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION

5. Place simulator in RUN and acknowledge any alarms.

6. ENSURE the Train A Week - Channel 1 sign is placed on 1-M-30.

7. Place simulator in FREEZE.

8. ENSURE Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Reactivity Briefing Book BOL (Beginning Of Life) is provided to the crew as part of the Turnover Package, and that the BOL placards are on 1-M-6, below the Boric Acid and Primary Water Integrators.

9. WHEN prompted by the Chief Examiner, place the Simulator in RUN.

Page 41 of 46

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

2

-4 1 Raise power from 1.66 x 10 % to 1-4% power using 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, beginning at Step 27.

ROLE PLAY: If/When contacted as Chemistry, repeat the request for an RCS boron concentration. Report current RCS boron concentration, and states that a new sample will be drawn and analyzed.

2 2 1-LT-62-129, VCT LEVEL, fails off-scale high.

ROLE PLAY: If RO contacts an AUO to check Reactor Coolant filter, repeat back the request. Report that the Reactor Coolant filter is normal.

ROLE PLAY: When SRO contacts Work Control, repeat back the request to have a troubleshooting and repair package made up investigate the failure of 1-LT-62-129.

3 3 1A-A CCS Pump trips. 1B-B CCS Pump fails to start automatically.

ROLE PLAY: When SRO contacts Work Control, repeat back the request to have a troubleshooting and repair package made up for the trip of the 1A-A CCS, and for the failure of the low pressure signal to start the 1B-B CCS pump.

4 4 1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS fails high.

ROLE PLAY: When the SRO contacts Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back request for removing 1-PT-68-340A, PZR PRESS channel from service.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as Work Control, the Console Operator will repeat back request to prepare a package to troubleshoot and repair 1-PT-68-340A.

5 5 480 V C & A Vent Board 1B2-B trips due to a fault.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as an AUO, repeat back request to go to C&A Vent Boards 1B1-B and 1B2-B to determine the cause of the alarm. Report that C&A Vent Board 1B2-B has tripped due to a fault, and that the board is severely damaged.

Page 42 of 46

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2013-302 NRC Examination Scenario 4 Simulator Console Operators Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP INFORMATION Exam Simulator Event Event No. Description/Role Play No.

2 6 6 A main steam line rupture occurs on SG 4 inside containment. Containment Isolation Phase A fails to occur automatically.

ROLE PLAY: If the SRO contacts Chemistry, repeat back the request to sample all SGs for activity. After 10 minutes, report that SG activity levels are normal.

ROLE PLAY: When the SRO contacts the Shift Manager, the Console Operator will repeat back the request to refer to EPIP-1.

ROLE PLAY: When contacted as the Control Building AUO the Console Operator repeat back request to check low analyzer temp lights, and reports that the lights are NOT LIT.

Page 43 of 46

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb =1532

• Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

None

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Reactor startup in progress. 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor Startup, has been performed through Step 26. The reactor is in Mode 2, and Mode 2 Physics tests are NOT required. Criticality was achieved within the ECP limits. Continue the startup and stabilize the reactor at 1-4% power.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

None Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [01-14-2011]

SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 2 SHIFT TURNOVER CHECKLIST Page 1 of 1 SM US/MCR Unit 1 UO Unit Off-going - Name AUO Station STA (STA Function) On-coming - Name Part 1 - Completed by off-going shift / Reviewed by on-coming shift: RCS Cb = 1532

• Abnormal equipment lineup / conditions:

None

• SI/Test in progress/planned: (including need for conduct of evolution briefings)

US/SM review late SI report (SQN and WBN only)

• Major Activities/Procedures in progress/planned:

Reactor startup in progress. 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Section 5.3, Reactor Startup, has been performed through Step 26. The reactor is in Mode 2, and Mode 2 Physics tests are NOT required. Criticality was achieved within the ECP limits. Continue the startup and stabilize the reactor at 1-4% power.

• Radiological changes in plant during shift:

Part 2 - Completed by on-coming shift prior to assuming duties Review station rounds / Abnormal reading (AUOs only)

Review Narrative Logs (previous day and carry-over items)

Current qualification status Review the current controlling Reactivity Management Plans (N/A for AUOs)

Review current TS/TRM/ODCM/FPR Required Actions (N/A for AUOs)

Walkdown MCR Control Boards with off-going Operator (N/A for AUOs, as applicable for SM/STAs)

SR/PER reviews complete for previous shift (SM/US/STA)

Relief Time: _________________________________ Relief Date: ______________

Part 3 - Completed by on-coming shift. These items may be reviewed after assuming duties:

Review Operator Workarounds, Burdens and Challenges (applicable Unit/Station)

Review applicable ODMI actions (first shift of shift week)

Review changes in Standing / Shift Orders (since last shift worked)

Review changes to TACFs issued (since last shift worked) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Control Room Deficiencies (first shift of shift week ) (N/A for AUOs)

Review Component Deviation Log (N/A for AUOs)

TVA 40741 Page 1 of 1 OPDP-1-1 [12-19-2011]

Scenario 4 Attachment 1 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendices A and B

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 1 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

1. ENSURE PCBs OPEN: OPEN manually.

• PCB 5084.

• PCB 5088.

2. ENSURE AFW pump operation: ESTABLISH at least one train AFW operation.

• Both MD AFW pumps RUNNING.

• TD AFW pump RUNNING.

• LCVs in AUTO, OR controlled in MANUAL.

3. ENSURE MFW isolation: Manually CLOSE valves AND

• MFW isolation and bypass STOP pumps, as necessary.

isolation valves CLOSED.

• MFW reg and bypass reg valves CLOSED. IF any valves can NOT be closed, THEN

• MFP A and B TRIPPED.

• Standby MFP STOPPED. CLOSE #1 heater outlet valves.

• Cond demin pumps TRIPPED.

• Cond booster pumps TRIPPED.

• #3 HDT Pumps TRIPPED.

• #7 HDT Pumps TRIPPED.

Page 16 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 2 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

4. MONITOR ECCS operation:

a. Charging pumps RUNNING. a. Manually START charging pumps.

b. Charging pump alignment: b. ENSURE at least one valve in each set aligned.

• RWST outlets 1-LCV-62-135 and 1-LCV-62-136 OPEN.

• VCT outlets 1-LCV-62-132 and 1-LCV-62-133 CLOSED.

• Charging 1-FCV-62-90 and 1-FCV-62-91 CLOSED.

c. RHR pumps RUNNING. c. Manually START RHR pumps.

d. SI pumps RUNNING. d. Manually START SI pumps.

e. BIT alignment: e. ENSURE at least one valve aligned, and flow thru BIT.

• Outlets 1-FCV-63-25 and 1-FCV-63-26 OPEN.

• Flow thru BIT.

f. RCS pressure greater f. ENSURE SI pump flow.

than 1650 psig.

IF RCS press drops to less than 150 psig, THEN ENSURE RHR pump flow.

Page 17 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 3 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

5. CHECK Cntmt isolation: ACTUATE Phase A and Cntmt Vent Isolation signal,

a. Phase A isolation:

• Train A GREEN. OR

• Train B GREEN.

Manually CLOSE valves and

b. Cntmt vent isolation: dampers as necessary.

• Train A GREEN.

• Train B GREEN.

Page 18 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 4 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

6. CHECK Cntmt pressure: PERFORM the following:

• Phase B DARK [MISSP]. 1) ENSURE Phase B actuated.

• Cntmt Spray DARK [MISSP]. 2) ENSURE Cntmt Spray actuated.

• Cntmt press less than 2.8 psig. 3) ENSURE Cntmt spray pumps running.

4) ENSURE Cntmt spray flow.

5) ENSURE Phase B isolation:

• Train A GREEN.

• Train B GREEN

• Manually CLOSE valves and dampers as necessary.

6) STOP all RCPs.

7) ENSURE MSIVs and bypasses CLOSED.

8) PLACE steam dump controls OFF.

9) WHEN 10 minutes has elapsed since Phase B actuated, THEN ENSURE air return fans start.

10) USE adverse Cntmt [ADV] setpoints where provided.

7. DISPATCH AUO to perform Attachment 1 (1-E-0), Ice Condenser AHU Breaker Operation.

Page 19 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 5 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

8. CHECK plant radiation NORMAL: NOTIFY Unit Supervisor IMMEDIATELY.

• S/G blowdown rad recorder 1-RR-90-120 NORMAL prior to isolation [M-12].

• Condenser vacuum exhaust rad recorder 1-RR-90-119 NORMAL prior to trip [M-12].

• 1-RR-90-106 and 1-RR-90-112 radiation recorders NORMAL prior to isolation [M-12].

• S/G main steamline discharge monitors NORMAL [M-30].

• Upper and Lower containment high range monitors NORMAL

[M-30].

• NOTIFY Unit Supervisor conditions NORMAL.

9. ENSURE all D/Gs RUNNING. EMERGENCY START D/Gs

10. ENSURE ABGTS operation:

a. ABGTS fans RUNNING. a. Manually START fans.

b. ABGTS dampers OPEN: b. Locally OPEN dampers.

• FCO-30-146A.

• FCO-30-146B.

• FCO-30-157A.

• FCO-30-157B.

Page 20 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 6 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

11. ENSURE at least four ERCW pumps Manually START pumps as necessary.

RUNNING, one on each shutdown board preferred.

12. ENSURE ERCW supply valves IF ERCW can NOT be OPEN to running D/Gs. aligned to running D/G, THEN EMERGENCY STOP affected D/G.

13. ENSURE 0-FCV-67-152, CCS HX C Manually OPEN 0-FCV-67-152 ALT DISCH TO HDR B, is open to to position A.

position A.

14. CLOSE 0-FCV-67-144, CCS HX C DISCH TO HDR A.

15. MONITOR EGTS operation: Manually START fans

• EGTS fans RUNNING.

AND

• ENSURE dampers OPEN OPEN dampers.

• VERIFY filter bank dp between 5 and 9 inches of water.

16. ENSURE CCS pumps RUNNING: Manually START pumps as necessary.

• 1A-A CCS pump.

• 1B-B CCS pump.

• C-S or 2B-B CCS pump.

17. DISPATCH AUO to shutdown Upper and Lower CNTMT rad monitors USING 1-SOI-90.02.Gaseous Process Radiation Monitors Page 21 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 7 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

18. WHEN Attachment 1 is complete (Ice Condenser AHU Breakers OPEN),

THEN ENERGIZE hydrogen igniters

[1-M-10]:

• 1-HS-268-73 ON.

• 1-HS-268-74 ON.

NOTE The following equipment is located on 1-M-9.

19. CHECK CNTMT PURGE fans STOP fans AND STOPPED.

PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

20. CHECK FUEL HANDLING EXH fans STOP fans AND STOPPED, Fuel and Cask loading dampers CLOSED: PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK, THEN Manually CLOSE dampers.

21. ENSURE AB GEN SUPPLY and STOP fans AND EXH fans STOPPED.

PLACE handswitch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

NOTE Dampers 1-HS-30-158 and 2-HS-30-270 remain open during ABI.

22. ENSURE AB GEN SUP & EXH Manually CLOSE dampers.

dampers CLOSED.

Page 22 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 8 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

23. ENSURE MCR & SPREAD RM Manually CLOSE dampers.

FRESH AIR dampers CLOSED:

• FCV-31-3.

• FCV-31-4.

24. ENSURE at least one CB EMER CLEANUP fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EMERG CLEANUP FAN A-A, Manually START fan.

OR

• Fan B-B RUNNING..

• FCO-31-8, OPEN. NOTIFY TSC if at least one damper NOT OPEN.

OR

• FCO-31-7, OPEN

25. ENSURE at least one CB EMER PRESS fan RUNNING and associated damper OPEN:

• CB EMERG PRESS FAN A-A, Manually START fan.

OR FAN B-B RUNNING.

• FCO-31-6, OPEN. NOTIFY TSC if at least one damper NOT OPEN.

OR

• FCO-31-5, OPEN.

Page 23 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix A (Page 9 of 9)

Equipment Verification Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

26. ENSURE Control Building fans STOPPED and dampers CLOSED:

• SPREADING ROOM SUPPLY Manually STOP fans AND and EXH FANS AND dampers.

NOTIFY TSC if any damper NOT

• TOILET & LKR RM EXHAUST CLOSED.

FAN AND dampers.

NOTE Loss of shutdown power could result in a loss of SFP cooling.

Annunciator Window 128-A and 128-B could be indicative of this condition and increased monitoring of SFP level and temperature will be necessary..

27. CHECK at least one 6.9kV Shutdown DISPATCH AUO to perform Board ENERGIZED. Attachment 6, Monitor Spent Fuel Pool.

IF AUO reports abnormal SFP level or temperature, THEN REFER to 1-AOI-45, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Level or Cooling

28. INITIATE Appendix B (1-E-0), Phase B Pipe Break Contingencies.

Page 24 of 32

WBN Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-E-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0000 Appendix B (Page 1 of 1)

Phase B Pipe Break Contingencies Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained

1. CHECK PHASE B actuated. WHEN PHASE B actuation occurs,

[MISSP XX-55-6C, -6D] THEN GO TO step 2.

2. ENSURE 1-FCV-32-110 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP XX-55-6E] Attachment 2 (1-E-0).

(A-train, window 13)

3. ENSURE 1-FCV-67-107 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP XX-55-6E] Attachment 3 (1-E-0).

(A -train, window 43)

4. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-92 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP XX-55-6E] Attachment 4 (1-E-0).

(A -train, window 73)

5. ENSURE 1-FCV-70-140 CLOSED. DISPATCH AUO to perform

[CISP XX-55-6F] Attachment 5 (1-E-0).

(B -train, window 74)

Page 25 of 32

Scenario 4 TURNOVER PACKAGE

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Surveillance Instruction 1-SI-68-34 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY TAVG-TREF DEVIATION ALARM NOT RESET Revision 0004 Quality Related Level of Use: Continuous Use Effective Date: 08-26-2010 Responsible Organization: OPS, Operations Prepared By: Nicholas Armour Approved By: Greg Evans

WBN MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR 1-SI-68-34 Unit 1 CRITICALITY Rev. 0004 TAVG-TREF DEVIATION ALARM NOT Page 2 of 9 RESET Revision Log Revision Affected or Change Effective Page Number Date Numbers Description of Revision/Change 0 12/14/93 All New Instruction. Supersedes SI-1.8.

Incorporates restructured Technical Specifications. Upgraded and written to the Writer's Guide for Technical and Normal Operating Instructions.

1 07/14/95 All Change Sect 1.3 and 6.0, conditions requiring performance of 1-SI-68-34 to reflect new Tech Spec figure of 561°F. Add Note 2 to sect 6.0. Change Step [4] to read "reset AND Tavg is at least 561°F ". Add Note 1 to sect 6.0 for LCO entry. Remove Data Package page and Date heading from each page. Replace check boxes with signoffs.

CN-1 09/15/95 2, 5, 6 Corrected Steps 3, Sect 6.0 and Appendix A to read 551°F. Correct Step 4, Sect 6.0 to read 561°F.

CN-2 05/03/97 2-6 Applied NSSD instrument inaccuracies to LCO limit of 551°F resulting in board indication of greater than 555°F.

2 02/06/04 2-8 Non-intent. Incorporated CN-1 & CN-2.

Changed SOS to SM. Added TOC and reformatted procedure.

3 02/25/04 2, 4 Non-intent. Changed Technical to Surveillance requirement in table.

4 08/26/10 All Converted procedure to Word 2007 using Rev 3 (PCR 4567).

WBN MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR 1-SI-68-34 Unit 1 CRITICALITY Rev. 0004 TAVG-TREF DEVIATION ALARM NOT Page 3 of 9 RESET Table of Contents

1.0 INTRODUCTION

.......................................................................................................... 4 1.1 Purpose ........................................................................................................................ 4 1.2 Scope............................................................................................................................ 4 1.2.1 Operability Tests to be Performed .................................................................. 4 1.2.2 Surveillance Requirements Fulfilled and Modes ............................................. 4 1.3 Frequency and Conditions ............................................................................................ 4

2.0 REFERENCES

............................................................................................................. 5 2.1 Performance References .............................................................................................. 5 2.2 Developmental References........................................................................................... 5 2.2.1 TVA Procedures.............................................................................................. 5 2.2.2 Other ............................................................................................................... 5 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ........................................................................... 5 4.0 PREREQUISITE ACTIONS .......................................................................................... 5 4.1 Preliminary Actions ....................................................................................................... 5 4.2 Approvals and Notifications .......................................................................................... 5 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ........................................................................................... 6 6.0 PERFORMANCE .......................................................................................................... 6 7.0 POST PERFORMANCE ACTIVITY .............................................................................. 6 8.0 RECORDS .................................................................................................................... 7 8.1 QA Records .................................................................................................................. 7 8.2 Non-QA Records .......................................................................................................... 7 Appendix A: TAVG DATA SHEET (COMPLIANCE) ........................................................ 8 Source Notes............................................................................................... 9

WBN MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR 1-SI-68-34 Unit 1 CRITICALITY Rev. 0004 TAVG-TREF DEVIATION ALARM NOT Page 4 of 9 RESET

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose This Instruction provides detailed steps to verify that Minimum Temperature for Criticality (MTC) is maintained.

1.2 Scope 1.2.1 Operability Tests to be Performed Verification that the lowest Reactor Coolant System (RCS) loop temperature (Tavg) is at least 555°F.

1.2.2 Surveillance Requirements Fulfilled and Modes Performance of this Instruction partially satisfies the following Surveillance Requirement (SR):

SURVEILLANCE APPLICABLE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENT MODES MODES SR 3.4.2.1 1, 2 (1) 1, 2 (1)

(1)

With Keff 1.0 1.3 Frequency and Conditions This Instruction is a conditional surveillance and will be initiated by ARI-88-94, Window 94A. When the Tavg-Tref Deviation Alarm is NOT reset and any RCS loop Tavg < 561°F, the RCS Tavg in each loop is to be verified as 555°F once every 30 minutes.

WBN MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR 1-SI-68-34 Unit 1 CRITICALITY Rev. 0004 TAVG-TREF DEVIATION ALARM NOT Page 5 of 9 RESET Date ________ Initials

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Performance References None 2.2 Developmental References 2.2.1 TVA Procedures A. ARI-88-94, Annunciator Response Instruction 2.2.2 Other A. Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 3.4.2 3.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS A. Technical Specifications requires each RCS loop average temperature to be 555°F. If a loop Tavg falls below 551°F, then LCO 3.4.2 may be applicable.

The temperature limit of 555°F accounts for instrument uncertainties applied to LCO 3.4.2.

4.0 PREREQUISITE ACTIONS 4.1 Preliminary Actions

[1] RECORD start date and time on Surveillance Task Sheet. ________

[2] RECORD present plant operating mode: ________ ________

4.2 Approvals and Notifications

[1] OBTAIN SM/Unit SRO approval to perform this Instruction on Surveillance Task Sheet. ________

WBN MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR 1-SI-68-34 Unit 1 CRITICALITY Rev. 0004 TAVG-TREF DEVIATION ALARM NOT Page 6 of 9 RESET Date ________ Initials 5.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA A. RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality for each RCS loop Tavg is 555°F in Mode 1 and 2. This minimum temperature must be recorded once every 30 minutes.

B. Noncompliance of Acceptance Criteria requires notification of the SRO as soon as practical.

6.0 PERFORMANCE

[1] ENSURE precautions and limitations in Section 3.0 have been reviewed. ________

[2] ENSURE prerequisite actions in Section 4.0 have been met. ________

NOTES

1) Failure to maintain each loop average temperature (Tavg) 555°F may require entry into LCO 3.4.2.

2) Extra copies of Appendix A may be made at any time for use.

[3] RECORD RCS loop Tavg once every 30 minutes on Appendix A, Tavg Data Sheet, AND VERIFY the lowest loop Tavg is 555°F on Appendix A.

(Acc Crit) ________

[4] CONTINUE data taking UNTIL the Tavg-Tref Deviation Alarm is reset OR Tavg is 561°F. ________

[5] RECORD date and time alarm reset OR Tavg 561°F.

Date: _________Time: _________ ________

7.0 POST PERFORMANCE ACTIVITY

[1] NOTIFY SM/Unit SRO that this Instruction is complete. ________

[2] RECORD completion date and time on Surveillance Task Sheet. ________

WBN MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR 1-SI-68-34 Unit 1 CRITICALITY Rev. 0004 TAVG-TREF DEVIATION ALARM NOT Page 7 of 9 RESET 8.0 RECORDS 8.1 QA Records The Data Package is a QA record, is handled in accordance with the Document Control and Records Management Program, and contains the following:

Completed Data Package 8.2 Non-QA Records None

WBN MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR 1-SI-68-34 Unit 1 CRITICALITY Rev. 0004 TAVG-TREF DEVIATION ALARM NOT Page 8 of 9 RESET Appendix A (Page 1 of 1)

TAVG DATA SHEET (COMPLIANCE)

Date ________

LOWEST TEMP LOOP 1 LOOP 2 LOOP 3 LOOP 4 555°F(Acc Crit)

TIME 1-TI-68-2E 1-TI-68-25E 1-TI-68-44E 1-TI-68-67E INITIALS

WBN MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR 1-SI-68-34 Unit 1 CRITICALITY Rev. 0004 TAVG-TREF DEVIATION ALARM NOT Page 9 of 9 RESET Source Notes (Page 1 of 1)

Implementing Requirements Statement Source Document Statement None

WBN Administration Of The 0-TI-7.012 1&2 Reactivity Briefing Sheets And Rev. 0000 Reactivity Control Plans Page 21 of 24 Appendix A (Page 1 of 1)

Reactivity Control Plan (Example Form)

Station: WBN Unit: 1 Cycle: 12 Burnup: 150 MWD/MTU Revision: 0 Preparer: _________________/________ Reviewer: __________________/________

/ Date RXE / Date Approver: _________________/________ Authorizer: __________________/_______

RXES or designee / Date Ops / Date RXE support required Onsite? ;Yes No Describe: Until released by Operations Title of Reactivity Control Plan: Power Escalation (BOL)

Assumptions: 1. Reactor was tripped from 100% power.

2. Fuel was conditioned at 100% at the time of trip.

3. Reactor critical at 100 hrs after trip. (Assumed no xenon.)

4. Ramp from 15% power to 100% at 5%/hr.

5. Reactor reaches 100% RTP within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, therefore fuel should not decondition below 100% during the ramp.

Major Steps: 1. Reactor power is raised from HZP to ~3.0% RTP

2. Unit is ramped to ~15%

3. Unit is maintained at ~15% for 4 hrs

4. Unit is ramped to 100% at 10%/hr.

Detailed

Description:

NOTE: See attached plots.

NOTE: Should deviations occur from the projected power ascension profile, particularly delays, there should be no major effects on the predicted parameters. Should delays occur, lower dilution rates could be expected later due to a greater amount of Xenon build-in during the delays.

Power Increase to ~3.0% RTP:

1. BORATE to withdraw CBD to ~140 steps.

1. WITHDRAW CBD to facilitate power rise.

Ramp Up to ~15% RTP:

1. WITHDRAW CBD to facilitate power rise.

2. IF CBD has been withdrawn to ~155 steps and reactor power has not reached 15%

RTP, THEN DILUTE as necessary to raise power to ~15% for synchronization of the Turbine-Generator. (The actual amount of dilution necessary depends upon the CBD position at criticality.)

WBN Administration Of The 0-TI-7.012 1&2 Reactivity Briefing Sheets And Rev. 0000 Reactivity Control Plans Page 21 of 24 Power Escalation (BOL)

Continued Operation on Steam Dumps until Generator Synchronization:

1. DILUTE ~0-500 gal PW per hour to compensate for Xenon build-in. See attached plots.

2. MAINTAIN CBD position.

Ramp Up to 100%:

1. DILUTE ~15,000 gal PW to raise power to 100% and maintain Tave matched with Tref.

2. INITIATE ramp up.

3. WITHDRAW CBD to maintain AFD near target.

Full Power Maintenance:

1. DILUTE as necessary to compensate for Xenon build-in. Dilution rates may start out at ~1400 gal PW per hour, but will taper off as Xenon builds in.

2. WITHDRAW AND MAINTAIN CBD at ~220 steps.

Critical Parameter Limit Required Action Rate of Power Increase As specified in TI-45 Reduce ramp rate or hold power until limits satisfied.

AFD < 2% Margin to AFD If AFD is outside Admin Limits, Limits per then INSERT/WITHDRAW rods to NOB Sheet A-1 restore AFD to within limits.

Control Rod Height RIL Lo If rods < RIL, then BORATE RCS and ALLOW AFD to drift higher than Target.

Activated: ____________________/_______ Terminated: ____________________/______

SM or US Date SM or US or RXE Date