Text

Final After Action Report, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise - Exercise Date: September 14, 2016
	ML16363A280
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	12/02/2016
From:	Szczech G; US Dept of Homeland Security
To:	Wert L; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC/RGN-II
References
	Download: ML16363A280 (53)
	v • d • e

Department of Homeland Security Region IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 DEC 2 2016 FEMA Leonard Wert, Regional Administrator - RII Nuclear Regulatory Commission One Marquis Tower 245 Peachtree Center A venue, Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Wert:

Enclosed is a copy of the final report for the September 14, 2016, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant plume-exposure-pathway exercise. This report addresses the evaluation and implementation of the plans and preparedness for the State of Tennessee, and Hamilton, Bradley, Meigs, Rhea and Sequatchie Counties.

The seven selected core capabilities were successfully demonstrated, and no level 1 or level 2 findings were identified. The coordination between the onsite and offsite response organization was timely and efficient.

All the organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them. The State of Tennessee, along with Hamilton and Bradley counties' emergency responders successfully demonstrated the assigned exercise objectives and corresponding core capabilities as outlined in this report. The continued dedication and commitment of all emergency response organizations was clearly demonstrated.

Based on the results of this exercise and FEMA's review of the 2015 Annual Letter of Certification submitted by Tennessee, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness of the State of Tennessee and the affected local jurisdictions site-specific to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant can be implemented. They are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an emergency at the site. The Title 44 CFR, Part 350 approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness site-specific to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant granted Tennessee on August 7, 1980, will remain in effect.

If you have any questions, please contact Conrad S. Burnside at 770/220-5486.

Sincerely, Gracia B. Szczech Regional Administrator Enclosure cc: Ms. Va~a E. Quinn, Branch Chief Rad5.k,gical Emergency Preparedness Branch

\.N'kc Headquarters' Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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I Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise I Exercise Date: September 14, 2016 I December 2, 2016 I

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Unclassified Radiological' Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I Table of Contents Page I Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................. 3 Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 5 Section 1: Exercise Overview ......................................................................................................... 7 I 1.1 1.2 Exercise Details ............................................................................................................. 7 Exercise Planning Team Leadership ............................................................................. 8 1.3 Participating Organizations ........................................................................................... 9 I Section 2: Exercise Design Summary ..................................................................... ,..................... 11 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design ....................................................................................... 11 2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives .................................................................. 11 I 2.3 Exercise Scenario ......................................................................................................... 13 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities ............................................................................................... 15 3 .1 Exercise Evaluation and Results .................................................................................. 15 I 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation .................................................................... 16 Tables 3 .2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation ............................................................ 18 3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation ............................................. 19 I 3.3.1 State of Tennessee ........................................................................................... 19 3.3.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center .............................................. 19 3.3.1.2 Forward Coordination Center ........................................................ 21 I 3.3.1.3 3.3.1.4 Central Emergency Coordination Center ....................................... 22 Dose Assessment ........................................................................... 23 I 3.3 .1.5 3.3.1.6 Radiological Monitoring Coordination Center .............................. 24 Waterway Clearance ...................................................................... 25 3.3.2 Hamilton County ............................................................................................. 26 I 3.3.3 Bradley County ................................................................................................ 30 3.3.4 Joint Information System I Center ................................................................... 32 Section 4: Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 35 I Appendix A: Exercise Timeline ................................................................................................... 37 Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders .................................................................. 39 Appendix C: Exercise Extent of Play Agreement ........................................................................ 41 I

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I Unclassified RadiologicarEmergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report

2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I Executive Summary On September 14, 2016, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency I Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated a plume-exposure-pathway exercise for the 10-mile emergency planning zone of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. The evaluations of out-of-sequence activities conducted the week of I July 18, 2016, are also included in this report.

The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant is located in Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee, 18 miles north of I Chattanooga in Hamilton County. The emergency planning zone encompasses portions of Hamilton and Bradley Counties. The plant is operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority.

I The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of state and local preparedness in responding to an incident at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. It was conducted in accordance with FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response I plans and procedures. The previous federally evaluated exercise at this site was conducted on November 19, 2014. The federal approval of those plans and procedures was granted on August I 7, 1980 and the qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on July 11, 1990.

Officials and representatives from participating agencies and organizations demonstrated I knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them during the exercise. Out of sequence activities were also successfully demonstrated; those included the core capabilities of: On-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement; Critical I Transportation; Mass Care and Public Information and Warning which was the physical demonstration of Emergency Alert System messaging. All jurisdictions met their exercise objectives and successfully demonstrated the corresponding core capabilities identified in

'I Section 2.2 of this report. FEMA did not identify any level 1 or level 2 findings during this exercise.

I Highlights of the exercise included the State of Tennessee's emphasis on post plume recovery planning and operations, supporting the Tennessee Valley Authority in the mitigation of the event. These highlights demonstrate the commitment of all of the jurisdictions involved to I improve their preparedness. FEMA will provide an Improvement Plan to the State of Tennessee that details the strengths and areas for improvement observed during the exercise. The Improvement Plan is published under separate cover for official use only in accordance with HSEEP methodology.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in the exercise and made it a success. The professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise.

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2016 Sequoyah Nucl~ar Plant I Section 1: Exercise Overview I 1.1 Exercise Details Exercise Name 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise I Type of Exercise I Full-Scale Exercise Exercise Date I September 14, 2016 Exercise Off-Scenario/Out-of-Sequence Dates I July 18-22, 2016 Locations I See the extent-of-play agreements in Appendix C for exercise locations ..

Sponsors I Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street*

Chattanooga, Tennessee 37416 I Tennessee Emergency Management Agency 3041 Sidco Drive I Nashville, Tennessee 37204 Program I U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I Mission

Response

I Scenario Type Full-Participation Plume-Phase Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise I

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, Radiologic;al *Emergency Preparedness Program I

After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership I

Kevin Keyes ' ! *,

i John (J.T.) Ackermann North Section Chief FEMA Region IV Sr~ Emerge.ncy Managem~nt SpeCialist FEMA Region IV . I 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 770/220-5378 Atlanta, Georgia '30341 **

770/220-3175 I

kevin.keyes@fema.dhs.goy *. john.ackermann@fema.dhs.gov Tim Holden . Courtney Rose I

State of Tennessee Program Manager State of Tenn.essee Exercise Officer TEMA 3041 Sidco Drive TEMA 3041 Sidco Drive*

I Nashville, Tennessee 37204 .. Nashville, Tenn~ssee 37204 6151741-2128 tholden@tnema.org 6151741-9367 crose@tnema.org I

John Addison Drills and Exercise Manager I

Tennessee Valley Authority I

'i 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, Tennessee .374~6< ~ . , , ..

4231751-7913 jaaddison@tva.gov I I

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I *Unclassified Radiological 'Einergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I 1.3 Participating Organizations Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the 2016 I Se.quoyahNuclear'Plant exercise. **

State Ji:trisdictio~s:

I State of Tennessee

' Military Department, Tennessee Emergency Management Agency I Department of Public Safety Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Radiological Health; bivisiori *of Air Pollution I Department of Health and Human Services Department of Transportation Department of Agriculture, Division 6f Forestry I Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency I Risk Jurisdictions:

Hamilton County I Office of Emergency Manaement Sheriff's Office Chattanooga-Hamilton County Health Department I Department of Education Public Works Chattanooga Police Department I Collegedale Police Department Tri Community Volunteer Fire Department I Bradley County Emergency Management Agency Sheriff's Office I Fire and Rescue Emergency Medical Service Health Department I Road Department County Schools I Private Organizations:

American Red Cross I Salvation Army I

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I *Unclassified RadiologicaVEmergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design I FEMA administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) parts 350, 351, 352, I 353 and 354. 44 CFR 350 codifies sixteen planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for the licensee and for state, tribal, and local governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear I power plant site in the United States. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, tribal, and local government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by FEMA. One of the REP Program cornerstones I established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities.

During these exercises, affected state, tribal, and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the I public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant.

I The results of this exercise, together with review of the radiological emergency response plans, and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, along with supplements through the annual letter of certification and staff I assistance visits, enabled FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final after action report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory ,Co,mmission, that the affected state, tribal, and local plans and preparedness are: ( 1) adequate to protect the health and safety I of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.

I Formal submission of the radiological emergency response procedures for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant to FEMA Region N by the State of Tennessee occurred on June 20, 1980.

I In accordance with 44 CFR 350, formal approval of those procedures was granted on August 7, 1980.

I 2.2 Exercise Core Capabilities and Objectives Core capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise I objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items.

Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) methodology, the exercise objectives meet the REP Program requirements and encompass the I emergency preparedness evaluation areas. The critical tasks to be demonstrated were negotiated with the State of Tennessee and the participating counties. The core capabilities scheduled for demonstration during this exercise were:

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Operational Coordination

Operational Communications I

Public Information and Warning

Situational Assessment . .

Environmental Response/Health and Safety I

On-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement

Critical Transportation.

Mass Care 1*

I The definitions of each.core capability* is as follows: I Operational Coordination: . Establish *and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

I Operational Communications.: Ensu~e the capacity for timely cominu~ications in support I of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the imp~ct area and *a11 response forces ..

I Public Information and*Warning: Deliver co,or:dinated,,prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community.through the use of ,clear, consistent,. accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information I regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.

I Situational Assessment: Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent 'of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response. I Environmental Response/Health and Safety: Ensure the av~ilability of guidance and resources to address all haz'ards induding hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and I

natural disasters in support of the responder operations and the affected 'communities.

. On-Scene Secufity, Protection and Law Enforcement: Ensure a safe and* secure I

environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas, and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

I Critical Transportation: . Provide transportation* (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation: services)' for response priority objectives; including the I

evacuation of people arid animals' and the 'delivery of vital response. personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas. I I

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I ,Unclassified Radiological:'Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I Mass Care: Provide life-sustaining services to the ~ffected population with a focus on hydration, feeding, and sheltering to those who have the most n~ed,; as well as support for reunifying families.

I These core capabilities, when successfully demopstrated, meet the ~xerci~e objectives.

The objectives for this exercise were as follows: , ...

I t ! j_ .I Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide direction and control and make protective action decisions through the state emergency operatforis centers, county I emergency operations centers (EOCs), and field coordination center (FCC) by exercise play and discussion of plans and procedures. ' * * . * * '

I *Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to physically. implement protective actions for state and county emergency workers, access/functiornil needs, schools and the public through exercise demonstration.

Objyct~ve 3: Demonstrate the ability to perform plume~phase field measurements and analysis utilizing sirrililated state field team data and discussion of plans and procedures.

Objective 4.: Demqnstrate the ability to.activate prompt alert and notification system and Emergency Alert System through exercise play. .

Objective 5: Demonstrate the effeclivdness:of plans, policies and procedures in the joint information system for publiC and private secto'r emergency: information communications.

Objective 6: Demonstrate the ability to. ~~nit~i:

~lecontami~~te, ind register .evacuees.

I 2.3 Exercise Scenario The following is a brief summ~y, of the scenario developed by iµe* Tennessee, Valley Authority to drive exercise play. , *

Exercise begins at 0800; at 0802, a 12 gallons per minute reactor coolant system leak begins on loop 3 of Unit 1. Notification of Unusual Event emergency cfassification level

.(ECL) should be declared by 0806. * *

At 0820, the reactor.coolant system leak on lOC?P 3 of Unit 1 increases to 120 gallons per minute. At 0821, operations shm;Ild map.ually trip the reactor and initiate safety injection.

I An.Alert ECL should be declared by 0835.

At 0930, the reactor coolant system leak increases and sub-cooling is lost. Valve failures I result i.n loss of containm~nt. Contaip.ment atmqsphere begins leaking into the annulus:

At 0939,, el.ectrical loq.ds fail resulting .in the. loss qf half of emergency core cooling system pumps. Based on a non-isolatable reactor cqolan:t sy~tem leak exceeding charging I pump capacity and loss of containment isolation, *a Site Are~ Emergency ~CL should be declared by 0945. *

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After Actiop Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I At 1023, the reactor ves~el level indication system is <42% .. At 1028, cold sump water injection into the core results 'iii fuel clad failure due to thermal shock. A filtered I radiological release begins. Containment radiation monitors begin to increase. Based on reactor vessel level indication system <42%, loss 'of sub-cooling,' and ioss of containment isolation, a. General Emergency JjCL should be declared by 1038. I Protective .Action Recommend~tion~. (PARs) from the utility are to. ev,acuate 2 miles around SQN (Zones A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1) and shelter 5 miles downwind (Zones A-3 and I D-2), and consid~r potassium ~odide (KI) in accordance with the State Plan. The 1045

licensee dose projection ind.icates.the EPA PAGs for Adult Thyroid Committed Dose Equivalent will l).ot be exceede~ at the 0.62-illile site boundary; however; the release mix I

.includes iodine. which s4ouid dfi:ve. the potassium iqdide (KI) administration. deCision.

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At 1130, containment fails into the annulus and containment pressur~ falls to zero. At I

1215, the wind direction changes n~quiring an additional PAR to she,lter Zone A-2.

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The exercise will terminate at approximately i360 after ali objectives have been completed. At 1315, if the exercise has not terininated, an fltlditicinal PAR to evacuate 5 miles downwind in Zones A-2 and* A-*3 arid shelter Zone D~2 may be made depending upon when the State reports that counties have completed evacuation of the 2-mile radius.

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I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I Section 3: Analysis of Ca;pabilities 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results I This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jhrisdictions and functional entities that participated in the. S,eptember 14, 2016 plume-exposure-pathway I exercise and out-of-sequence ~ctivities of July l8~-f.2; 2016: **

. Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on the demonstration of core I *capabilities, capability targets and critical tasks arid the underlying REP criteria as delineated in the FEMA REP Program Manual dat~d January 2016. Exercise criteria are I listed by number, and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:

M: Met (no unresolved level 1 o~ level' 2 findings assessed and no un*rbsolved I

findings from prior exercises)

1: Level i finding assessed I

2: Level?- finding as~essed.or an uriresolyed ~evel 2 firiding(s) from a prior exerc;se

P: Plan issue I

N: Not demonstrated HSEEP terms/definitions differ from those of the REP Program and are as follows:

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Performed without Challenges (P): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the I objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other activities.

Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was conducted in I accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws.

Performed with Some Challenges (S): The targets and critical tasks associated I with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other activities.

I Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws.

I However, opportunities to enhance effectiveness and/or efficiency were identified.

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Performed with Major Challenges: The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s),

but some or all of the following were observed: demonstrated performance had I

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I a negative impact on the performance of other activities; contributed to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers; I and/or was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, ,and laws ..

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Unable to be performed:. The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were not performed in a manner that achieved the objective(s). I 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation i ..

Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) is an emergency I

management planning tool. It is a struetured method through which an emergency management organization can develop an internal. profile of resources required to meet the Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response and Recovery goals*of its I

organization. Tennessee's THIRA highlighted a nuclear radiation release as one of its scenarios. The required resources in.Tennessee's THIRA encompass those.necessary to satisfy Buccessful management of this scenario.

I The State Preparedness Report (SPR) is the document in which a state assesses its internal resource capability. This internal capacity can satisfy the entire resource I

requirement described in THIRA or .it may be a subset of the entire requirement.* If it is a subset, the required resources the state cannot meet are the ones it will ask for either through mutual aid or thr.ough federal support. **

I HSEEP evaluation methodology is an analytical process used to assess the demonstration of specific capabilities during an exercise. A capability provides a means to perform one I

or more critical tasks under specified conditions and to specific performance standards.

Core capabilities form the foundation of the FEMA Region IV REP Program evaluations.

The core capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of state I

and local jurisdictions based upon, their collective demonstrated performance as it relates to the specific core capability. The core capabilities exercised are aligned with the State I of Tennessee's SPR and THIRA. Each jurisdiction's standalone capability summaries are listed in Section 3.3 of this report.

I Operational Coordination: Key leadership personnel from the participating agencies established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure which provided effective and responsive direction and control. The overall decision making I process integrated critical stakeholders, enabling protective-actions and subsequent decisions to be.made in a sensible* and* timely manner. Discussions over the conference phone line were.ccinductedwith some challenges due to the use of unclear terminology I by some parties. This resulted in differing interpretations of protective action decisions.

These challenges were self-identified and corrected by employing repeat backs by the decision makers. I I

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

,I Operational Communications: The facilities that were activated contained ample communications capabilities to allow responders to perform their respective roles.

Communications in support of situational awareness and operations 'were performed with I some challenges. The primary means of communication with the counties was inoperable during this exercise. Alternate means of communication, to include commercial phone, cell phone, and cellular alert texting were employed to remedy the problem. The alternate means of communication enabled county personnel to successfully demonstrate this core capability.

I Public Information and Warning: Alert and notification of the public was made using simulated siren activation and EAS messages, followed by supplemental news broadcast messages, media releases, and formal media briefings in the joint information center I (JIC). These processes enabled a coordinated, prompt and reliable *information message to be delivered to the public and media.

I Situational Assessment: Decision makers were provided with relevant information regarding assessed radiological and plant conditions. This information allowed decision makers to understand the extent of the hazards, and cascading effects and to make the I appropriate protective action decisions .

Environmental Response/Health and Safety: State personnel assessed radiological and I plant conditions and made well-reasoned recommendations and decisions. Workers at a Hamilton County emergency worker dec;:ontamination station demonstrated their ability I to perform radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers during an out-of-sequence activity. . '

I On-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement: The ability to ensure a safe and secure environment of an affected community was demonstrated as an out-of-sequence activity. This was accomplished by the Tennessee Wildlife Resource Agency I demonstrating clearance and access control of the Harrison Bay State Park and waterway.

Critical Transportation: Administrators from Hamilton County Schools demonstrated I their ability to implement protective actions and safeguard students, staff, and faculty in the event of an incident at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant during an out-of-sequence discussion.

I Mass Care: Hamilton County demonstrated the ability to 'provide services and accommodations for .evacuees during out-of-sequence activities. These activities I included evacuee reception, radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees at the Brainerd High School and Dalewood *Middle School Reception Center and Congregate Care facilities.

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I Tables 3.2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation I

DATE: September 14, 2016 SITE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant M: Met, 1: Level 1 Finding, 2: Level 2 Finding, P: Plan Issue, I

N: Not Demonstrated, D: Not Scheduled for Demonstration Alert and Mobilization Facilities la!

!bl M M M M I Directi on and Control !cl M M M Communications Equipment Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

!di M le i M M M M M M

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Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2al M M M Dose Assess ment, PARs, and PADs for the Emergency Event -PAR Development Dose Assessment, PARs, and PADs for the Emergency Event-Decision Making 2bl 2b2 M M

M M I

P ADs for the Protection of Persons with Di sabilities and Access/Functional Needs 2c l M M Radi ological Assessment and Decision Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway Radiological Assessment and Decision Making Concerning Post-Plume Phase 2dl 2el I

Implementati on of Emergency Worker Exposure Control 3a l M M M Implementation of Kl Decision for Institutionali zed Indi viduals and the Public Implementati on of Protective Actions for Persons with Disabilities & Access/Functional Need 3bl 3c 1 M

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Imple mentati on of Protecti ve Actions for Schools 3c2 M Imple mentati on of Traffic and Access Control Implementation of Traffic and Access Control-Impediments to Eva~uati on 3dl 3d2 M M M M

M M I Implementation of Ingestion Exposure Pathway Decisions-Adequate Information 3el Implementation of Ingestion Exposure Pathway Decisions-Measures* and Strategies Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions RESERVED 3e2 3fl I 4a l Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses-Field Team Management Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses-Field Team Meas urements and Sampling Post-Plume Phase Field Meas urements and Sampling 4a2 M 4a3 M 4bl I

Laboratory Operati ons Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System RESERVED 4cl Sal Sa2 M M M I I

Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification Syste m-Backup Alert and Notification Sa3 M M M Acti vities Associated with FEMA-Approved Exception Areas Completed Sa4 Emergency In for mation and Instructi ons for the Public and the Medi a Sb! M M M M Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registrati on of Evacuees 6al M Monitoring and Decontaminati on of Emergency Workers, Equipment, and Vehicles Temporary Care of Evacuees 6bl 6cl M

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Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals 6dl I

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I *unclassified Radiol6gical'.Emergency Preparedness Program I After :Action Report' 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I 3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Ev~hiation

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State of Tennessee I 3.3.l.1 State Emergency Operations. Center

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Op,erational Coordination Capability Summary:

The Tennessee State Emergency Operations Center.staff successfully demonstrated this I

capability-in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.

Per the extent of play agreement, the staff were prepositicmeclin.proximity to their

assigned response locations and responded upon electronic .notification. The center had '

I sufficient supplies and equipment for the* response. _:Informative 'displays and maps .

placed throughout the facility enhanced situational*awareness; Throughout the exercise,

. . a unified, coordinated, and collaborative operational structure was maintained.

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The direction and control officer, and alternate, demonstrated the ability to lead and*

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. coordinate-the response to the simulateq emergency the plant withthe risk counties and I other response agencies. Protective actiop. recorill.neridatiohs were discussed with the Tennessee Emergency Manageinent Agency* direc.tor and senior staff. A decision-miling ptocess was used to consider the appropriate factors. and necessary coordination in I making decisions to protect the. public. Ad~itional prptective action' decisions were made as new information became availabl,e, Piscu~sipµs pyer, the .conference phone line Wyre I performed with some challenges ihtbatprotectiye a¢tiqns "".ith'the risl< .cou.µties' ,officials lacked clarity. Unclear terminology used by,participants resulte4. in differing interpretations of the protective action decisions; These challenges were* self-jdentified

I and quickly remedied by employillgthree*way.communication.practices by.the decision*

. makers. These challenges could have affectedthe heaith and safety ofthepublfo if they had riot tjeeh remedied.

I For this capability the following Radiological*Ernergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.a.1; l.c.l, Le.l, 2.a.l, 2.b.2.

I a: Level 1 Finding: None I b. *Level 2-~inding: None c~ )Jot Demonstrated: None ... '

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d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report, 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I Operational Communications Capability Summary:

I The Tennessee State Emergency Operations*Center, State Warning Point, demonstrated the ability to initiate, maintain, and manage interoperable communications systems. The primary communication system among Tennessee Valley Authority, state and county I

operations centers was a dedicatedring down phone line: Secondary communications included commercial telephones, 800-megahertz radios, cell phones, an internebbased resource tracking tool, and facsimile. These communications capabilities ensured the I

capacity for timely communications and no failures were .observed.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criterion was I

MET: l.d.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None

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e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None

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Public Information* and.Warning Capability Summary:,

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.,The notification aspect of the prompt alert and notification system asso.ciated with the I

. Sequoyah Nuclear, Plant 10-mile emergency planning zone was demonstrated out-of-sequence on July 19, 2016. This demonstration involved.the local primary emergency alert radio station, WUSY 101.7 FM, the Tennessee State Emergency Operations Center I

and the Ha,milton County 911 dispatch center. During this demonstration the WUSY engineer received an emergency alert system message from the state authorities and processed the message for transmission. The message was rec.eived, trar).sposed; and I

readied for broadcast within three minutes. The message contained the .Federal ..

Emergency Management Agency Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program's I initial requirements for an Emergency Alert System message. The demonstrated process w.as completed in accordance with.Federal Co.mmunications.Commission protqcols and the message was not broadcasted to the general pubUc.

I During the exercise, on Septemb.er;l4, 2016; ~he state emergency information director oversaw the communication and coordination of the public information and warning I

. capability .. He parti!:::ipated.in all decision-making calls. These calls helped develop consistent emergency public information. The state emergency information team produced and coordinated six Emergency Alert System messages during the exercise. I These messages provided relevant emergency instructions to_the public.: Supplemental I

20 I

I Unclassified RadiologicalrEmergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I news releases were produced in the joint information center that expanded upon these messages. Minor discrepancies were identified between the state and Hamilton County

. news releases. These discrepancies would not have affected the health and safety of the I public.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were I MET: 5.a.l, 5.a.3 and.5.b.l. ***,. * *

a. Level 1 Finding: None ;, '

I b. Level 2 Finding: No.ne ,,\.

I c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings -Resolved: None I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I 3.3.1.2 Forward Coordination Center Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

I .. ,

The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency Field Coordination Center staff successfully demonstrated.the capability to establish*aridmaintain a unified and I coordinated operational structure. This process appropriately integrated all critical stakeholders and supported the execution of their mission. Plans and procedures to alert, I notify, and mobilize key emergency response personnel were followed and*activation was completed in a timely manner.

I The primary purpose of the.Field Coordination Center was to coordinate resources in

. support of local governments. The center's location* within the Tennessee Air National

Guard Armory easily provided the space, equipment, and.supplies needed to support I extended operations. *

" The director coordinated closely with the direction and control officer in: the Tennessee I

State Emergency Operations Center and ensured that the local emergency operations center's liaisons received the relevant.information regarding the simulated emergency at the plant. The Field Coordination Center staff coordinated and tracked resource requests I in a timely manner with no unmet needs identified:

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were I MET: 1.a.l, l'.c.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.l, 2.b.2.

'I

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear.Plant I

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None

- . '~

I Operational Communications Capability Summary: -

Operating from the dedicated space in the Tennessee National Guard Armory the staff I

successfully demonstrated that at least two communication systems were available, and at least one operated properly. Communications included commercial telephones, 800-megahertz radios, cell phones, an internet-based resource tracking tool, and facsimile.

I Communication links were established and maintained with appropriat~ locations. These communications capabilities ensured the capacity for timely communications. No failures of these communications were observed.

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criterion was MET: l.d.l.

I

a. Level 1 Finding: None 1.

I

b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None I

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None I

-e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolv~d: None 3.3.1.3 Central En;iergency Coordination Center I

Operational Coordination Capability Summary: 11 The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency and Division of Radiological Health liaisons were located in the Tennessee Valley Authority Central Emergency Control I Center.. They demonstrated this capability by successfully integrating inforlllation sharing amongst onsite and offsite decision makers.

I The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency liaison helped facilitate coordination between the state direction and control officer ,and the Central Emergency Control Center director. He ensured appropriate communication was occurring and. provided clarifying I information to both parties when needed. He provided the direction and control officer I

22 I

I Uriclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I with detailed information regarding plant status and incident prognosis. He also served as a source of information to the Central Emergency Control Center staff regarding offsite response actions.

I The State Division of Radiological Health liaison maintained frequent communication with the staff at the Tennessee State Emergency Operations Center, Field Coordination I Center, Joint Information Center, and the Radiation.Monitoring Control Center. He verified and supplemented their receipt of information regarding meteorological data, dose projections, field monitoring team data;.an'd plant status.:The liaisons were an I integral component in information coordination.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criterion was I MET: 2.b.2. I i .** '

a. Level 1 Finding: None I b. Level 2 Finding: None I c. *Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I 3.3.1.4 Dose Assessment

. Ji I Situational Assessment Capability Summary:

Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Radiological I Health personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to assess radiological and plant conditions and to provide appropriate recommendations to decision makers in response to a simulated radiological incident at the Sequoyah Nuelear Plant.. Alt positions in the dose I assessment team were filled promptly after the radiological control officer initiated the call down list. The Tennessee State Emergency Operations Center's dose assessment room had sufficient equipment, communications, and supplies to support emergency I operations.

The dose assessment team consisted of three personnel, each calculated projected doses I at various locations downwind from the plant based on plant conditions provided by Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Due to the limited amount of radioactive material released in this scenario, the projected doses were based oh data provided by the plant and field team I *data. *Throughout the exercise, dose projections at the plant boundary were below federal protective action guides.

I

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I The radiological control officer. provided overall direction to the Division of Radiological Health response .effort and provided sound guidance to decision makers during numerous I meetings and discussions.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were I

MET: 2.a.l, 2.b.1, 2.b.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I 3.3.1.5 Radiological Monitoring Coordination Center I Radiological Field Monitoring Teams I Environmental Response/Health and Safety. Capability Summary:

- Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Division .of Radiological I

Health personnelstaffing the Radiological Monitoring Control Center, radiological monitoring teams,. and sample receipt area demonstrated the ability to monitor

.. radiological conditions and obtain environmental air samples in response to an event at I

the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.

Personnel were pre:-positioned near their assigned locations in accordance with the I

.

extent-of-play agreement and responded promptly when notified of the emergency. All personnel were familiar with the proper use of dosimetry, administrative dose limits, and use of potassium iodide. Two radiological monitoring teams properly inventoried, I

prepared, and checked all equipment and survey instruments. Each team demonstrated proper monitoring, air sampling, and contamination control techniques. (Two additional I radiological monitoring teams participated in the exercise for training only and were not evaluated.)

I Radiological Monitoring Control Center personnel directed field teams to appropriate monitoring locations to locate the edges of the radiological plume. They coordinated radiological monitoring team movements with the Tennessee Valley Authority liaison at I the Radiological Monitoring Control Center and relied on. Tennessee Valley Authority field teams to find the centerline of the plume and to take centerline air samples. All monitoring data were promptly forwarded to dose assessment personnel at the Tennessee I State Emergency Operations Center. Personnel at the sample receipt area demonstrated I

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I Unclassified Radiological.Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report* 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I proper contamination control techniques and chain'-of-custody measures. Redundant communication systems were available and used effectively throughout the exercise.

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.e.l, 3.a.l, 4.a:2, 4.a.3. **

I a. Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I c. Not Demonstrated: None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings -Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I 3.3.1.6 Waterway Clearance I On-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement Capability Summary:

During an out-of-sequence activitynnJuly 21,.2016,aTennessee Wildlife Resources*

I Agency officer demonstrated that the State of Tennessee had the ability to conduct traffic and access control, waterway warning artd clearance activities in the event of an incident I at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Notification would' come through normal'dispatching channels and the officer would be instructed on where to report and wbat actions to take.

Based on a simulated failure of a warning siren, a Tennessee Emergency *Management I Agency official issued the officer an emergency worker response kit', proper dosimetry, potassium iodide and a recording form to document exposure. The officer then launched

'his patrol boat and demonstrated waterway access control, warning, and clearance on I Chickamauga Lake and Tennessee River .in the Harrison State Park area. *Complete

patrol of his assigned area was accomplished in a timely manner. Communication capabilities included both mobile and boat-mounted 800-megahertz emergency service I radios; a* marine band radio, and a state-issued cellular phone, an ofwhich operated without fail during -the demonstration.

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.d.l, l.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.l, 3.d.2, and 5.a.3.

I a. *Level 1 Finding: None

b. Level 2 Finding: None I c. Not Demonstrated: None I

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: Non~

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e. Prior Level 2.Findings- Unresolved: None.

3.3.2 Hamilton County I

Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

I The Hamilton County emergency oper.ations center staff, including the supporting non-governmental organizations, demonstrated excellent coordination and control while responding to a simulated incident.at the.Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. The entire staff was I

instrumental in implementing the county response and communicated:valuable.

information to outside agencies. However, discussions over the conference phone line did not result in a clear understanding of protective actions by county officials. Unclear I

terminology used by participants both in the county and state resulted in differing interpretations of the protective action decisions. This lack of clarity could have affected the health and safety of the public if they had not been remedied by using three way I

communication practices.

Emergency operations center leadership was prnactive in providing informative briefings I

to the staff. The staff identified resources to support operations as requested and proactively anticipated future needs. Radiological exposure control equipment was readily available and the radiation safety officer provided a briefing to emergency I

workers and issued dosim~try kits;!* . , .

Support staff identified ti;ansportation assets .to support the relocation of schools and I

access/functional.needs populations. Traffic and access control along with impediments

. were notionally put in place as the exercise scenario dictated. Sufficient equipment and

supplies. were available to support the simulated emergency response.

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.l, 1.e.1, 2.a.l, 2.b.2, 3,a.1,.3.c.1, 3.d.l, and 3.d.2.

I

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

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I Unclassified Radiological* Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I Operational Communications Capability Summary:

Communications in support of situational awareness and operations were performed with I some challenges. The primary means of communication, digital national warning system, was not used during this exercise. Alternate means of communication; to include commercial phone, cell phone, and cellular alert texting were employed. The alternate I means of communication were not as timely as the primary and challenged responders from the onset. Conversely, the alternate means of communication did enable county personnel to successfully demonstrate this core capability.

I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criterion was MET: l.d.l.

I a. Level 1 Finding: None I b.

Level,2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None

I I ' ;'

e. Prfor.Level 2 Findings -*Unresolved:* None

I Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

Public information staff from Hamilton County Emergency Services demonstrated the I ability to deliver actionable information to the public and media. Simulated activities associated with the prompt alert and notification system were completed in a timely manner following the decisions by state and county officials to notify the public. County I news releases and instructions to the public and media were provided to the county's public' information officer from the joint information center. Minor discrepancies were identified between Hamilton County and-the state news releases. These discrepancies I would not have affected the health and safety of the public.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were I MET: 5.a.l and 5.b.l.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I b. Level 2 Finding: None I c. Not Demonstrated: None

d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None I

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'Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary: .

Hamilton County emergency worker decontamination was demonstrated as an out-of-I sequence activity on July 21, 2016 at the Ooltewah Middle School campus. This demonstration was completed by personnel from Hamilton County Emergency Services, Chattanooga-Hamilton County Health Department, Collegedale Police Department, Tri I

Community Volunteer Fire Department, and the Tennessee Division of Forestry.

Personnel from those agencies successfully demonstrated that county procedures and resources were. sufficient for the monitoring. and decontamination of emergency workers, I

their equipment, and vehicles.' With th.is demonstration, the county validated its ability to implement this core capabilit:y. : ... I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.e.l, 3.a.l, and 6.b.l. ,.

, I

a. Level 1 Finding: None . *

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

c. Not Demonstrated: None * ** I

d. Prior.Level 2.Findings 7;Resolved: None fr

e. *Prior Level2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

Critical Transportation Capability Summary: I Hamilton County School's staff successfully demonstrated their-ability to implement protective actions for the students and staff of the schools located within.the 10-:mile emergency planning zone. An interview was conducted with the district's safety I

manager and transportation manager as an out-of-sequence activity on July 18, 2016 .

. During the interview, school officials demonstrated their knowledge and ability to I relocate and safeguard the students and staff, as well as notify parents. of the 26 schools located within the emergency planning zone. The two officials were conversant within their plans and procedures. Protective actions were well defined and* there was sufficient I transportation assets available to relocate those 26 endangered schools.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criterion was I MET: 3.c.2.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I I

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I Unclassified Radiological' Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated:* None '* .

I d. Prior Level 2 Findings-Resolved: None * *

I e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved:* None . * *

., (

Mass Care Capability Summary:

I Hamilton County personnel successfully demonstrated evacuee reception; radiological monitoring, decontamination, issuance of potassium iodide and registration of evacuees I at the Brainerd High School and Dalewood Middle*School Reception Center and Congregate Care facilities. These demonstrations were completed during out-of-sequence activities on July 19 and 20, 2016, respectivelY'. County reception and I congregate care facilities would be established and operated by county and state agencies and the Southeast Tennessee chapter of the American Red Cross. The facilities were setup in accordance with local procedures and agreements. Each facility offered ample I space and reasonable accommodations for assigned purpose.

The shelter portions of each facility were under the management of the Southeast I Tennessee chapter of the American Red Cross with assistance from the Tennessee Department of Health and Human Services. Provisions were in place to care for service I animals and pets on site with the assistance ohhe Hamilton County Disaster Animal Response Team. Shelter management staff were knowledgeable and conscientious in the performance of their duties. All activities observed were ill' accordance witfrplans and I procedures of Hamilton County, the State of Tennessee, and American Red Cross shelter guidelines.

I .The processes*demonstrated were logical and effective. The staff and volunteers were extremely knowledgeable in their duties and displayed a commendable dedication to the health and welfare of the public.'

I Forthis capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET:* 'l.e.l, 3.a.1, 3.b.l, 6.a.l, and 6.c.l.

I a. Level 1 Finding: None I b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None I d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report; 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

3.3.3 Bradley County Operational Coordination Capability Summary:

I Cleveland/Bradley County emergency operations center staff demonstrated the ability to respond to a simulated emergency at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant to protect the health and I

safety of the public. The county warning point received the.initial notification of an emergency at the plant, and promptly informed key leadership. The director assessed the situation and oversaw the county's phased response. He coordinated his actions with the I

state and Hamilton County's emergency services director. The county staff implemented precautionary and protective actions as agreed upon with.Hamilton County-and state leadership.

I The staff was proactive and implemented required actions throughout the exercise.

Periodic. status briefings helped.maintain accurate situational awareness and provided I

good cross-communication among the staff. Law enforcement;offkers were fully prepared to establish ~nd maintain appropriate traffic and; access control me~sures.

Sufficient equipment and supplies were available to support :the emergency response.

I Radiological exposure control equipment was readily available and the radiation safety officer provided a briefing to emergency workers and issued dosimetry kits. ; I

. For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criteria were MET: l.a.1; l.c.1, l.e.l, 2,a.*1;2.b.2, 3.a.1,.3.d.l, 3.d.2_, _____ _

I ,,*,

I

a. Level 1 Finding: None. *

b. Level 2-Finding:* .None, I

c. Not Demonstrated: None I

d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

Operational Communications Capability Summary:

.)

I The Cleveland/Bradley County emergency operations center staff successfully established redundant communications, demonstrated, and effectively managed

I operational communications upon activation of the emergency operations center in response to the radiological incide_nt. All communications fun.ctioqed during this exercise. Some delays in the alternate notification systems occurred; however, they did I not have an adverse impact on the outcome of the exercise.

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I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After: Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criterion was MET: l.d.1.

I a. Level 1 Finding: None . \ .( .

I

b. Level 2 Finding: 'None I ' " '* .. ' . . -~

' c. .Not Demonstrated: None I d. *Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None I e. Prior *Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None *.: *

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

I *r. '

Activities* associated with the prompt alert and notification system were completed in a timely manner following the decisions by state and county officials to notify the public.

I Cleveland/Bradley County public info'rmation staff accurately and effectively.

communicated with their Joint Information Center counterpart. They conducted virtual operations until activation*of the joint information center, at which time they coordinated I and disseminated public informatioll'-in accordance with established procedures.

I Backup alert and notification of the 'public was successfully demonstrated in accordance with plans and procedures as part of the out-of-sequence activities on .July 20, 2016. The demonstration was completed by a deputy of the Bradley County Sheriff's Office after I notification of a simulated failure of siren 60. The alert and notification of the public within the coverage area of the siren was completed in 15 minutes with the notification aspects of the activity being simulated. This demonstrated that backup alert and I notification of the public could be completed within a reasonable time.

For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 5.a.l, 5.a.3, 5.b.l I a. Level 1 Finding: None I b. Level 2 Finding: None

c. Not Demonstrated: None I < I

d. Prior Level 2 Findings:.... Resolved: None' , J * *.

! I.'*

I e. PriOr Level 2 Findings* - Unresolved:, None I

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.Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report

2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I 3.3.4 Joint Information System I Center I

Public Information and Warning Capability Summary:

The State of Tennessee and the risk counties of Hamilton and Bradley successfully I

demonstrated the capability to provide coordinated emergency information to the public and media in support of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.

Activation was done in accordance with jurisdictional plans following the declaration of a I

Notice of Unusual Event. The Joint Information Center served as the central point of contact for the distribution and release of information to the public and media. The facility offered ample space for the public information officers and supplemental I

technical staff to perform the duties required of them. Primary and backup communications systems were fully functional and there were no failures. Additionally, equipment and supplies were sufficient to support all operations during this exercise.

I The public information function operated within a joint information system. The structure of the joint information system was defined and supported through multiple I

agencies at different locations. This included: the Tennessee State Emergency Operations Center; Central Emergency Control Center; and the emergency operations centers in Hamilton and Bradley Counties. Responsibility for direction and control was I

shared between the State of Tennessee and the Tennessee Valley Authority.

The ability to provide timely emergency information and instructions for the public and I the media was successfully demonstrated. The public information officers prepared and coordinated the news releases with their respective jurisdictional leadership. Message preparation was in accordance with published plans. Minor discrepancies were identified I between the state and Hamilton County news releases. These discrepancies would not have affected the health and safety of the public. During the exercise two joint news media briefings were conducted. The spokespersons answered all questions asked of them and I were able to fully discuss what precautionary and protective actions had been taken by their organizations.

Rumor control was a joint operation between the utility and state. During the exercise, I

they fielded multiple calls and identified several potential trends. The trends were relayed to the joint information center directors for resolution. The utility performed media monitoring. This included the monitoring of multiple television and radio stations, I

news websites, and several social media sites.

For this capability the following Radiological Emergency Preparedness criterion was I MET: 5.b.1.

a. Level 1 Finding: None I

b. Level 2 Finding: None I

c. Not Demonstrated: None I

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I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I d. Prior Level 2 Findings - Resolved: None*

e. Prior Level 2 Findings - Unresolved: None I

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I Unclassified RadiologicalEmergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I Section 4: Conclusion Overall, the exercise was a success. Officials and representatives from: the State of Tennessee; I the risk counties of Hamilton and Bradley; Tennessee Valley Authority; and numerous other organizations participated in the exercise. The cooperation and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the I many individuals who participated and made this exercise a success. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still, others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to I provide vital emergency services to their communities. State and local emergency response organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and successfully implemented them.

I Highlights of the exercise included the State of Tennessee's emphasis on post plume recovery I planning and operations, supporting the Tennessee Valley Authority in the mitigation of the event. These highlights demonstrate the commitment of all of the jurisdictions involved to improve their preparedness to respond to an incident at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.

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After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I I

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I Unclassified RadiologicaVEmergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report ')

2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I Appendix A: Exercise Timeline Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken.

I Emergency Classification Level or Event Time Utility Declared Tennessee FCC/RMCC Hamilton Bradley nc SEOC/Dose County County I NOUE Alert 0812 0829 0812 0834 0818 0838 0823 0838 0825 0839 0830 0846 Site Area Emergency 0952 0959 0959 095911015 0959/1015 0959 I General Emergency Simulated start of 1024 1030 1032 1030/1043 1030/1043 1029 Radiological Release 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 1050 I Simulated end of Radiological Release Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Facility Declared Operational 0906 0937 0842 0839 0910 I Declaration of Emergency

State:

0906 0906

-~-------

0917 Local: 0843 0843 I Exercise Terminated Precautionary Actions:

1400 1400 1400 1400 1347 Pre-position school buses 0852 0852 0852 0852 -

I Prepared schools Waterway clearance pt Protective Action:

0856 i',

0856 0856 0856 -

Stay Tuned I 1st Siren Activation 1st EAS Message:

0905 '0905 0905 0905 0905 0905 0905 0905 0905 0905

4and#5 I 2nd Protective Action:

Monitor and prepare 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019 Relocation of schools I 2nd 2nd Siren Activation EAS Message:

1035 1035 1035 1035 1035

7 and #8 modified 1035 1035 1035 1035 1035 I JIC EAS #103 3n1 Protective Action Decision:

Evacuate Zones: Al, Bl, Cl, DI Shelter in Place Zones: A2, A3, D2 1057 1057 1057 1057 1057 I Go inside stay inside: A4, AS, A6, D3, D4, D5,D6 3rd Siren Activation 1105 1105 1105 1105 1105 I 3rd EAS Message:

7, 39 and #139 1105 1105 1105 1105 1105 KI Ingestion Decision:

I Emergency Workers: No General Public: No 1057 1057 1057 1057 1057 I

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I I

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I Uri classified Radiological'Emergency Preparedness Program I After.Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders Regional Assistance Committee Chair: Conrad Burnside I Section Chief: Kevin Keyes Site Specialist: J.T. Ackermann I Location I Venue Evaluation Team State of Tennessee: Director - Patrick Sheehan Core Capability(ies)

Operational Coordination, I SEOC/Dose Assessment McLemore, Simpson, Nash, Hollingsworth (OJT), I Winklemann Operational Communications, Public Information and Warning, Situational Assessment I FCC/RMCC Smith I Fill Operational Coordination, Operational Communications, Environmental Response/Health and Safety CECC Bradley Operational Coordination I Field Teams (2) Harris, Henry Joint Information System Spence, Seward Environmental Response/Health and Safety Public Information and Warning LPI COOS) Ackermann Public Information and Warning I Waterway Clearance COOS)

Dolder, Spence Hamilton County: Director - Tony Reavley On-Scene Security, Protection & Law Enforcement I EOC Ackermann, Lewis, Cushman, Bryson (OJT)

Operational Coordination, Operational Communications,

, , Public Information and Warning Schools COOS) Lewis Critical Transportation I EWD COOS Ooltewah)

RCCC COOS Brainerd Lewis, Dalton, Winkelmann Ackermann, Lewis, Dolder, Spence, Environmental Response/Health and Safety Mass Care and Dalewood) Winkelmann, Dalton I

Bradley County: Director - Troy Spence Operational Coordination EOC Dolder, Spencer, Adkins COJT) Operational Communications Public Information and Warning I Backup Route Alerting COOS)

Ackermann Public Information and Warning I

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After.Action Report . 2016 Sequoyah Nu.clear Plant I I

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I Unclassified Radiological 'Emergency Preparedness Program I After* Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I Appendix C: Exercise Extent of Play Agreement GRADED EVALUATION EXERCISE I (Full Scale Plume Phase Exercise)

EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT I 2016 FULL PARTICIPATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE I All activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans and procedures as they would be in an actual event. This extent of play agreement is written by exception. If it is I not listed as an exception it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, standard or suggested operating guides (SOGs) and/or procedures (SOPs). Any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play may be redemonstrated if allowed by the RAC Chair or as listed herein. This I allowance may be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and mutually agreed to by the TEMA lead controller and FEMA lead evaluator, as designated by the RAC Chair.

I The State of Tennessee and TV A have prepared goals addressing respective obligations. Both reflect the necessary interactions between the State and local governments as well as TV A as set forth in the Multi-Jurisdictional Radiological Emergency Response Plan (MJRERP) for the TVA I Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.

NOTE: All exercise times are Eastern Standard Time (EST).

I Exercise Date: September 14, 2016 Exercise Start Time: 0800 I Exercise Objectives Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide Direction and Control and make protective I action decisions through the State Emergency Operations Centers, County EOCs, and FCC by exercise play and discussion of plans and procedures.

Mission Area I Core Capability (ies) - Response I Operational Coordination; Operational I Communications Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for State and I County emergency workers, access/functional needs, schools and the public through exercise demonstration.

I Mission Area I Core Capability (ies) - Response/Environmental Response Health & Safety; On-Scene Security, Protection & Law Enforcement; Critical Transportation.

I Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to perform plume-phase field measurements and analysis utilizing simulated State field team data and discussion of plans and procedures.

I 41 I

Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear* Plant I Mission Area I Core Capability (ies}- Response I Situational Assessment; Environmental Response Health & Safety I Objective 4: Demonstrate* the ability to activate.Prompt Alert and Notification System (PNS) and Emergency Alert System (EAS) throughi~xercise play.

I Mission Area I Core Capability*(ies)-::- Response./ Public Information & Warning Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the Joint I

Information System (JIS) for public and private sector emergency information communications.

Mission Area I Core Capability (ies) .-:- Response I Public Information & Warning

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I Objective 6: Demonstrate,the ability,,to monitor, decontaminate and registration of evacuees.

Mission Area I Core Capability (ies) - Response I Mass Care I Exercise Evaluation Criteria *

Capability: Operational Coordination

' : ~ '* .,.. I Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure. and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the* execution of core capabilities.

I This capability will be demonstrated at the SEOC, FCC, CECC, Hamilton County and Bradley .

County EOCs.

I Target:, Emergency Operations ;Management I Critical Task: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel andactivatefacilities in.a timely manner (Criterion l.a.1). " . ;* I Participants may be prepositioned in proximity to their assigned response locations.

Participants will not be allowed to enter their assigned exercise location prior to receiving activation/notification in accordance with plans and procedures.

I All notifications to adjacent states, Federal government agencies and railroads will be simulated I and verbalized to evaluators.

Discussion of agency capabilities I procedures to alert and mobilize staff may be discussed with I participants as appropriate.

Critical Task: Key personnel with leadership rnles for the Offsite Response Organizations I (ORO) provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654 A.l.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6; Criterion l.c.l).*

In accordance with plans and procedures.. I I

I

I Unclassified Radiological'Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, XI, and other

supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (Criterion l.e. l).

I In accordance with plans and procedures, State and*county SA Vs will be completed*during the out of sequence week of July 19-22, 2016.. TEMA Radiological Shop will be July 18th, Hamilton County EMA will be fitly 19th and Bradley County EMA.will be July 20th.

I Target: Protective Action Decision Making .* *. ;*

't ;

I Critical Task: OROs use a decision-making process,corisidering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI (if appropriate), is in place for EWs including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess*

I of administrative limits or PAGs (Criterion 2.a.1 ).

In accordance with plans and procedures. This critical task will be demo'!Js(rated at the SEOC.

I and risk county EOCs (Hamilton and Bradley).

Critical Task: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and I necessary coordination is used to make P ADs for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy) (Criterion 2.h.2).

I In*accordance with plans and procedures at the SEOC and risk counties. At the SEOC, solely from the DACO's perspective.

I Critical Task: Protective action decisions are made, as* appropriate~ for groµps of persons with:

disabilities and access/functional needs (Criterion 2.c.1).

I This critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs in accordance*Withplans and*.

procedures.

I Target: Protective Action Implementation I Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological

exp*osure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or I chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (Criterion 3.a.1).

I In accordance with plans and procedures from a management perspective. Issuance of KI to emergency workers will be explained and completed during out. of sequence activities.

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I Critical Task: KI and appropriate.instructions are available if a deCision to recciminend use of KI is made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals and the general public is maintained (Criterion 3.b.l).

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency PreparedhessProgram After Aetion Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I If applicable this critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs from the . . . I management perspective and in accordance with plans and procedures. The issuance of KI will be simulated.

I Critical Task: Protective .action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than schpols within areas subject to protective actions (Criterion '

3.c.l).

I This critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs from the management perspective and in accordance with plans and procedures by discussion with evaluator as appropriate .

I

.Personal information.relative to' access and functional needs individuals will not be copied or .

removed from the EOC by the. FEMkevaluation team. ,, I Critical Task: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools (Criterion 3.c.2).

This critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs from the management perspective I

and in accordance with plans and procedures by discussion with evaluator as appropriate ..

Critical Task: Appropriate traffic and access cc:mtrol is established .. Accurate instructions are I

provided to traffic and access control personnel. (Criterion 3.d.1).

This critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs from the management perspective I

and in accordance with plans and pro.cedures. by discussion with evaluator as appropriate ..

Critical Task: Impediments to evacuation, are i_dentified and resolved (NUREG-0654 J.10.k; I

Criterion 3.d.2).

This critical task will be demonstrated at the risk county EOCs from the management perspective I

and in accordance with plans and procedures by discussion l'Yith evaluator as *appropriate ...

Capability:. Operational Communications I

Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness; and I operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces.

I This capability will be demonstrated at the SEOC, FCC, Hamilton County and Bradley County EOCs.

':I I

Critical Task: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate loq1.tions..

I Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (Criterion* 1.d. l ),

I 44 I

I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I In accordance with plans and procedures:

I Capability: Situational Assessment Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of I the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of.the: response.

This capability will be demonstrated at the SEOC by Dose Assessment.

I Critical Task: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in I place for EW s including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs (Criterion 2.a.1).

I In accordance with plans and procedures.

Critical Task: Appropriate P ARs* are based on available information on plant condition, field I monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions (Criterion 2.b. l ).

I In accordance with plans and procedures.

Critical Task: A decision~making process involving consideration of appFopriate factors and.

I necessary coordination is used to make P ADs for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy) (Criterion 2.b.2). * *. * . ,

I In accordance with plans and procedure I Capability: Public Information and Warning Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the wh_ole community I through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.:

I This capability will be demonstrated at the SEOC, Hamilton County and Bradley County EOCs and Joint Information Center. *

I Target: Emergency Notification and Public Information I Critical Task: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are

., completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the 45 I

Unclassified I Radiological.Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I public must include, as a minimum, the elements required by current FEMA REP Guidance (Timely: The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the I appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (Criterion 5.a.l).

I This critical task will be demonstrated out of sequence on July 19, 2016. Hamilton County participants responsible for the activation of the PNS will discuss procedure*s for activations and demonstrate same up to the point of activation. Sirens will not be activated. WUS¥, the LPl I

station, staff along with the State Emergency Information Director or designee will discuss procedures for the formulation, approval, release, receipt, acknowledgment/validati'on and broadcast of an EAS message. EAS message will not be broadcasted.

I As part of the graded evaluation, the initial activation of the PNS to include EAS will be simulated by the State Emergency Information Director or designee as applicable. Applicable I

EAS message formulation( s) and approval(s) will be demonstrated. EAS message(s) will not be given to the watch point. ,, I Critical Task: Backup alert notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system (Criterion 5.a.3).

I Backup route alerting will be demonstrated out of sequence .by Bradley County on July 20, 201.6.

As part of the graded evaluation, Hamilton County participants will discuss backup route I

alerting with evaluators as applicable.. . *. ,

Critical Task: Ensure OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the I

public and the news media in a*timely manner (The responsible ORO personnel/representatives, demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of

urgency and without undue delay) (Criterion 5.b. l).

I This critical task will be demonstrated at the SEOC,. risk County EOCs, and Joint Information Center.

I The Joint Information Center (JIC) personnel, State/local and TVA, can be pre-positioned in area. Using a virtual joint information system, public information management will be I

demonstrated and provide the necessary public messaging until the JIC is activated and made operational in accordance with established procedures. Locally available State PIOs may be I utilized in the JIC to supplement TEMA PIOs.

Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety I Ensure the availability of guidance and resources to address all hazards including hazardous materials, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support of the responder, operations*~nd* the I affected communities.

I 46 I

I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I This capability will be*demonstrated at the RMCC, by the radiological field monitoring teams and Hamilton County as applicable.

I The following task will be demonstrated by DRH RMCC.

I Critical Task: Field teams (two or more) are managed. to obtain sufficient *information t0 help characterize the release and to control radiation' exposure'{Criterion 4.a.2): **

I This critical*task will be demonstrated at the RMCC in accordance withplans and procedures.

The following three tasks will be demonstrated by the State Radiological Field Monitoring I teams. . \. ;.*.*.

Critical Task: Equipment, maps,* displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other I supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (Criterion l.e.l).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and Ki may I be used. '*

Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological I exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of*

each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to EWs

I (Criterion 3.a.l).

I In accordance With plans and procedures.* A p*rop forpermanentrecord dosim-etry and Ki may be used.

I Critical Task: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected.. Teams will move to an appropriate low-

background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or I procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media (Criterion 4.a.3).

In accordance with plans and procedures.

I The following three *tasks will be demonstrated out ofseqiience byHamilton County on July 21, 2016 at the Ooltewah Middle School EWD site.

I Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, pzonitoringiinstruwf!lits, dosimetry; KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (Criterion l.e.l).

I In accordance With plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and KI may

-1 be used.

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Unclassified I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI; and procedures, andmqnage radiological I exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and rer;ord the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the adminis.tration of KI to EWs I

(Criterion 3. a. I).

In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and KI may I

be used.

Critical Task: The facility/ORO had adequate procedures and resources to accomplish I

monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles (Criteria 6.b.1). .. I Monitoring of emergency workers and their vehicles will be demonstrated in accordance with plans and procedures. The set up and operationa~ checks of radi.Qlogical monitoring instruments is an evaluative component and will be completed with an evaluator. Decontamination of I

emergency workers, at least one, will be simulated in accordance with plans and procedures.

Simulated contamination will be given by controller inject. Physical decontamination of an*

emergency worker vehicle will be demon"$frated in accordance with plans and procedures.

I Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) will be available for wear in accordance with plans and procedures. Actual donning/doffing of PPE will be a lead controller and lead evaluator decision I

at the time of the activity.*

Capability: Critical Transportation I

Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation seryic;es). for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals, and the. delivery of I

vital re.sponse personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.

This core capability will be demonstrated out of sequence on July 18, 2016 by Hamilton County.

I Critical Task: OROs/School officials implement protective actionsforschools (Criterion 3.c.2). I In accordance with plans and procedures by discussion with applicable representatives of the Hamilton County School District out of sequence on July 18, 2016. I Capability: On-Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement I

Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations fo,r people and communities located within affected area1l*_and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations. I I

48 I

I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I This core capability will be demonstrated out of sequence on July 21, 2016 by the Tennessee Wildlife Resource Administration (TWRA).'

' : i.

I Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring in'struments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations -(Criterion 1. e. l ).

I In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and KI may be used.* -, ! , . , *.

I Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. "EWs p'eriodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record I or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (Criterion 3.a.l).

I

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fn *accordance with plans andprocedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and KI may be used.. ' ," - '- "*

I Critical Task: -Appropriate traffic and access control is_established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel (Criterion 3.d.1).

I In accordance with plans and procedures.

"* ' . ~ \

.r.

Critical Task: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved (Criterion 3.d.2).

I In accordance with plans and procedures. ~ . . .- '

~ '" *'*: .

I Capability: Mass Care *

I Provide life-sustaining services to the affected *population with a focus on hydration; feeding and sheltering to those who have the most need as well as support for reunifying families .

I This core capability will be demonstrated out of sequence on July 19th and 201h, 2016 by Hamilton Cbunty at the Brainerd and Dalewood RCCC. locations.

I Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (Criterion 1: e. l ).

I In accordance with plans and procedures. *A pr:op forpertrtanent record dosimetry and Kl may be used.

Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure' to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodiCally and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record 49 I

Unclassified I Radiological Emergency.Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to EWs (Criterion 3.a.1 ). ,

1 In accordance with plans and procedures. A prop for permanent record dosimetry and KI may be used.

I Critical Task: KI and appropriate instructions are made available in case a decision to recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for I

institutionalized individuals and the general public is maintained (Criterion 3.b.l).

In accordance with plans and procedures. KI will not be distributed but procedures for I

distribution will be discussed.

Critical Task: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and I

trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees (Criterion 6.a.l). I Radiological monitoring, decontamination and registration facilities for evacuees will be set up in accordance with plans and procedures. The set up and operational checks of radiological monitoring instruments is an evaluative component and will be completed with an evaluator.

I Counties will have one-third of the resources available at thefacility for this demonstration as necessary to monitor 20% of the population within a 12-hour period. The remaining two-thirds of the necessary resources will be demonstrated by the counties providing valid documentation I

reflecting how/where the equipment and staff will be procured/stored/respond from.

A minimum of six evacuees, of which at least one being a female and two of which will be.

I contaminated (simulated) including the female, be available for monitoring, registration and decontamination as applicable. A minimum for two evacuee vehicles, one of which will be contaminated (simulated) will be available for monitoring, registration and decontamination as I

applicable. Simulated contamination will be given by controller inject. Physical decontamination of evacuees and vehicles will be simulated and in accordance with plans and procedures.

I PPE will be available and will be used at the controller/evaluator's discretion. I Critical Task: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and I

have been decontaminated as appropriate before entering congregate care facilities (Criterion 6.c.l). I I

I 50 I

I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I In accordance with plans and procedures. Each shelter is Red Cross certified and a limited demonstration of services will be provided. A valid and current LOA or MOU between the county and American Red Cross will be provided to the evaluation team either prior to the I demonstration or at the time of the demonstration.

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ML16363A280

Text

Dear Mr. Wert:

Response

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