ML15085A562
| ML15085A562 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/26/2015 |
| From: | Julio Lara Division of Nuclear Materials Safety III |
| To: | Nick B Dairyland Power Cooperative |
| References | |
| EA-15-026 IR 2014001, IR 2014008 | |
| Download: ML15085A562 (24) | |
See also: IR 05000409/2014008
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532-4352
March 26, 2015
Ms. Barbara A. Nick
President and CEO
Dairyland Power Cooperative
3200 East Avenue S.
P.O. Box 817
La Crosse, WI 54602-0817
SUBJECT: LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL
STORAGE INSTALLATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT
07200046/2014001(DNMS) AND 05000409/2014008(DNMS)
Dear Ms. Nick:
On December 15, 2014 through December 18, 2014, inspectors from the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted a routine inspection at your facility in Genoa,
Wisconsin, with continued in-office review through February 24, 2015. The purpose of the
inspection was to review activities performed under your NRC license to ensure that activities
were being performed in accordance with NRC requirements. The inspection results were
discussed with members of your staff at the conclusion of the site inspection on
December 18, 2014, and during a telephone discussion with members of your staff on
February 24, 2015. The enclosed inspection report presents the results of the inspection.
During this inspection, the NRC staff examined activities conducted under your license related
to public health and safety. Additionally, the staff examined your compliance with the
Commissions rules and regulations as well as the conditions of your license. Within these
areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative
records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, three apparent violations of NRC requirements were
identified and are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the
NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs website at
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The apparent violations
involved the failure to ensure emergency response staffing levels satisfied the La Crosse
Emergency Plan as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.54(q)(2),
failure to submit changes to the Emergency Plan that reduced its effectiveness to the NRC for
review prior to implementation as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4), and failure to conduct
emergency drills and exercises at the frequency specified in the La Crosse Emergency Plan as
required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2).
B. Nick -2-
Because the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, the NRC is not issuing an
enforcement action for these inspection findings at this time. The circumstances surrounding
these apparent violations, the significance of the issues, and the need for lasting and effective
corrective action were discussed with your staff at the inspection exit meeting on
February 24, 2015.
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to either:
(1) respond in writing to the apparent violations addressed in this inspection report within
30 days of the date of this letter; (2) request a Predecisional Enforcement Conference (PEC); or
(3) request Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR). If a PEC is held, it will be open for public
observation and the NRC will issue a press release to announce the time and date of the
conference. Please contact Wayne Slawinski at 630-829-9820 within ten days of the date of
this letter to notify the NRC of your intended response. A PEC should be held within
30 days and an ADR session within 45 days of the date of this letter.
If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as Response to the
Apparent Violations in Inspection Report No. 07200046/2014001(DNMS) and
05000409/2014008(DNMS); EA-15-026, and should include, for the apparent violations:
(1) the reason for the apparent violations, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent
violations; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the
corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations; and (4) the date when full
compliance was or will be achieved. In presenting your corrective actions, be aware that the
promptness and comprehensiveness of your actions will be considered in assessing any civil
penalty for the apparent violations. The guidance in NRC Information Notice 96-28, Suggested
Guidance Relating to Development and Implementation of Corrective Action, may be useful in
preparing your response. You can find the information notice on the NRC website at:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1996/in96028.html. Your
response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence
adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate response is not received within
the time specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will
proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a PEC.
If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your
perspective on the apparent violations and any other information that you believe the NRC
should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision to hold a
pre-decisional enforcement conference does not mean that the NRC has determined that
violations have occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be
conducted to obtain information to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. The
topics discussed during the conference may include the following: information to determine
whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation, information
related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective actions taken
or planned to be taken.
B. Nick -3-
In lieu of a PEC, you may also request Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) with the NRC in an
attempt to resolve this issue. ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for
resolving conflicts using a third party neutral. The technique that the NRC has decided to
employ is mediation. Mediation is a voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral (the
mediator) works with parties to help them reach resolution. If the parties agree to use ADR,
they select a mutually agreeable neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no
power to make decisions. Mediation gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up
misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the
issues. Additional information concerning the NRC's program can be obtained at
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html. The Institute on Conflict
Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral
third party. Please contact ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you
are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR.
Please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violations described in
the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be
advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
In addition to the apparent violations for which escalated enforcement action is being
considered, the NRC determined that three Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements
occurred. The violations were evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The
violations involved the failure to: submit an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
decommissioning funding plan timely as required by 10 CFR 72.30(b); have an adequate
program in place to ensure augmentation of emergency response capabilities was available to
implement Emergency Plan actions required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2); and have an emergency
classification system within implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency
classification system within the Emergency Plan as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). These
violations are being treated as non-cited violations, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the
NRCs Public Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRCs website at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not
include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made
publicly available without redaction.
B. Nick -4-
Please feel free to contact Matthew Learn of my staff if you have any questions regarding this
inspection. Mr. Learn can be reached at 630-829-9603.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Julio F. Lara, Acting Director
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
Docket Nos. 072-00046; 050-00409
License No. DPR-45
Enclosure:
IR Nos. 07200046/2014001(DNMS); 05000409/2014008(DNMS)
cc w/encl: R. Palmberg, Generation Vice President
L. Peters, Genoa Site Manager
D. Egge, Plant/ISFSI Supervisor
W. Trubilowicz, Technical Engineer
R. Grey, Radiation Protection Supervisor
cc w/o encl: T. Zaremba, Wheeler, Van Sickle and Anderson
J. Kitsembel, Chairman, Wisconsin Public Service Commission
S. Burmaster, Coulee Region Energy Coalition
G. Kruck, Chairman, Town of Genoa
P. Schmidt, Manager, Radiation Protection,
Wisconsin Department of Health Services
B. Nick -4-
Please feel free to contact Matthew Learn of my staff if you have any questions regarding this
inspection. Mr. Learn can be reached at 630-829-9603.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Julio F. Lara, Acting Director
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
Docket Nos. 072-00046; 050-00409
License No. DPR-45
Enclosure:
IR Nos.: 07200046/2014001(DNMS); 05000409/2014008(DNMS)
cc w/encl: R. Palmberg, Generation Vice President
L. Peters, Genoa Site Manager
D. Egge, Plant/ISFSI Supervisor
W. Trubilowicz, Technical Engineer
R. Grey, Radiation Protection Supervisor
cc w/o encl: T. Zaremba, Wheeler, Van Sickle and Anderson
J. Kitsembel, Chairman, Wisconsin Public Service Commission
S. Burmaster, Coulee Region Energy Coalition
G. Kruck, Chairman, Town of Genoa
P. Schmidt, Manager, Radiation Protection,
Wisconsin Department of Health Services
DISTRIBUTION w/encl: Jim Clay
Darrell Roberts Carmen Olteanu
Marlayna Vaaler Carol Ariano
Patrick Louden Paul Pelke
MCID Branch
ADAMS Accession Number:
DOCUMENT NAME: LACBWR 2014001.docx
Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Sensitive Non-Sensitive
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" =
Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy
OFFICE RIII-DNMS C RIII-DNMS RIII-EICS RIII-DNMS
NAME MLearn:ps ML WJS ROrlikowksi WJS for RSkokowski RS *1 JLara
for
DATE 3/20/2015 3/20/2015 3/26/2015 3/26/2015
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket No.: 072-00046; 050-00409
License No.: DPR-45, General License (ISFSI)
Report No.: IR 07200046/2014001(DNMS)
Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative (DPC)
Facility: La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (ISFSI)
Location: Genoa, WI
Dates: On-site Inspection: December 15-18, 2014
Telephone Exit Meeting: February 24, 2015
Inspectors: Matthew C. Learn, Reactor Engineer
Wayne J. Slawinski, Senior Health Physicist
Approved by: Robert J. Orlikowski, Chief
Materials Control, ISFSI, and
Decommissioning Branch
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
Enclosure
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR
NRC INSPECTION REPORT
07200046/2014001(DNMS) AND 05000409/2014008(DNMS)
A routine inspection of licensed activities associated with the storage of spent nuclear fuel at the
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI)
was conducted from December 15 through December 18, 2014 including in office review
through February 24, 2015 The inspection consisted of interviews of site personnel, onsite
walkdowns, and reviews of: emergency preparedness and fire protection; surveillance and
maintenance activities; environmental monitoring; and quality assurance activities related to the
The inspectors identified three apparent violations of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) section 50.54(q) concerning the licensees: failure to ensure emergency response staffing
levels as required by the La Crosse Emergency Plan, failure to submit changes to the
Emergency Plan that reduced its effectiveness to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) for review prior to implementation, and failure to conduct emergency drills and exercises
in accordance with the frequency specified in the La Crosse Emergency Plan.
The inspectors also identified three Severity Level IV non-cited violations concerning the
licensees: failure to submit their ISFSI decommissioning funding plan timely as required by
10 CFR 72.30(b), failure to have an adequate program in place for emergency staff
augmentation to ensure Emergency Plan actions could be accomplished as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), and failure to have an emergency classification system within their
implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency classification system of the
Emergency Plan as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).
2
Report Details
1.0 Away from Reactor Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (IP 60858)
1.1 Review of Emergency Plan Program from ISFSI Activation until Emergency Plan
Revision 34 Issuance (Revisions 31-33)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees compliance with the Emergency Plan and
associated Emergency Planning requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 and 72. The
inspectors reviewed staffing changes following fuel movement to the independent spent
fuel storage installation (ISFSI) pad. The inspectors reviewed changes to the
Emergency Plan Revision 31. The inspectors reviewed adherence to Emergency Plan
requirements for exercises and drills.
b. Observations and Findings
Non-Compliance with Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements
On June 20, 2011, the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) Emergency Plan
was updated to Revision 31. The revision to the LACBWR Emergency Plan added
provisions for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) that had not yet
been loaded with casks containing spent nuclear fuel. The previous revision of the
Emergency Plan (Revision 30) had solely focused on the non-operating reactor plant
and associated spent nuclear fuel that had been contained within the fuel element
storage well.
On July 12, 2012, the licensee moved their first Vertical Concrete Cask (VCC) to the
ISFSI pad. Between June and September 2012, the licensee successfully loaded all fuel
assemblies into dry casks and transferred each of those casks to the ISFSI onsite
storage pad. The fifth and final cask was successfully placed on the pad on
September 19, 2012.
Title 10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, a holder of a license under this part shall follow
and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in
appendix E of this part...
The LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 31 Section 1.1 Plant Emergency Response
Organization provided the authority and responsibility for Emergency Plan activation to
the Operations Shift Supervisor. Section 1.1 defined minimum emergency plan staffing
as an Operations Shift Supervisor, an Operator, a Security Shift Supervisor, and the
security force. Additionally, the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 31 Section A.1.3.8,
Augmented ISFSI Emergency Response Organization, states that On-shift ISFSI
personnel can implement the Emergency Plan without assistance from others.
The licensee maintained continuous operations staff coverage including an Operations
Supervisor and an Operator onsite while fuel was maintained in the Fuel Element
Storage Well (FESW) throughout the spent fuel assembly storage campaign which
culminated on September 19, 2012.
3
On September 20, 2012, the operations department staffing was reduced at the site
without a corresponding change to the Emergency Plan. Specifically, the operations
department was not staffed during backshifts and weekends as required by Emergency
Plan Section 1.1. Moreover, radiation protection technician staffing was not maintained
during backshifts, weekends and whenever radiological work did not occur at the plant.
As a result, backshift and weekend staffing was limited to site security personnel.
The operations personnel were trained to perform radiological surveys whenever health
physics staff were not onsite and consequently provided the emergency plan required
assessment capability while onsite. In contrast, the security staff had not been trained to
conduct radiation surveys. As a result of the staffing changes, radiological assessment
capability was limited only to weekday day shifts. Therefore, radiological assessment
capability required by the Emergency Plan was diminished because radiological survey
qualified staff were not continuously onsite. Consequently, during backshift and
weekends the licensee's ability to assess radiological conditions, evaluate emergency
preparedness event entry criteria (action level thresholds) and declare timely EALs was
degraded. Given their staffing changes, the licensee was unable to implement the
Emergency Plan without offsite assistance from others as required by Emergency Plan
Section A.1.3.8.
Following discussions with NRC staff on October 26, 2012, continuous operations
staffing was reinstated at the site. However, on October 29, 2012, the licensee
implemented Revision 32 to the Emergency Plan following an inadequate effectiveness
review by both the onsite and offsite safety review committees, at which time continuous
operations staff coverage was again terminated for backshifts and weekends. During
the October 26 - 29 transitional period between Revisions 31 and 32, the licensee
trained and qualified its security staff in basic radiological assessment capabilities
related to ISFSI operations, as the revised emergency plan delegated certain emergency
response functions to the Security Shift Supervisor when other qualified staff was not
onsite. The licensee documented this issue in their corrective action program under
An AV was identified, from September 20 until October 26, 2012, for the failure to
maintain staffing at minimum levels prescribed by the LACBWR Emergency Plan
Revision 31, as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2). Specifically, the licensee failed to
follow Emergency Plan Section 1.1 and Section A.1.3.8 which specifies minimum
staffing requirements to ensure the Emergency Plan may be implemented without offsite
assistance.
Pending final determination of the safety significance and NRCs enforcement
decision, this issue was identified as an Apparent Violation (AV 07200046/2014001-01;05000409/2014008-01; Non-Compliance with Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements)
Reduction in Effectiveness of Emergency Plan without NRC Approval
10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(3) states that, the licensee may make changes to its emergency
plan without NRC approval only if the licensee performs and retains an analysis
demonstrating that the changes do not reduce the effectiveness of the plan.
4
10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(4) further states that, the changes to a licensee emergency plan
that reduce the effectiveness of the plan may not be implemented without prior
approval by the NRC. A reduction in effectiveness means a change in the emergency
plan that reduces the capability to perform an emergency planning function which
includes assessment capability.
On October 29, 2012, the licensee made changes to their Emergency Plan through
issuance of the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 32. The LACBWR Emergency
Plan, Revision 31 established requirements for emergency response to ISFSI events
while maintaining emergency response to non-operating reactor plant events. The
licensee revised the plan to reduce the emergency response requirements for the
LACBWR plant following movement of all irradiated fuel from the plant facility to the
onsite ISFSI.
Specifically, among other changes, the revised Emergency Plan removed twelve plant
related events and retained three ISFSI related events. Additionally, the revision
eliminated the Alert classification, reduced the frequency of emergency exercises from
annually to biennially, and eliminated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> staff augmentations requirements. The
licensee evaluated the change against the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the
requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E and determined that the changes did not
decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan.
During the NRC review of Revision 32, NRC staff identified that the changes made in
Revision 32 reduced the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan, as defined
by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). The licensee eliminated plant EAL events related to radiological
releases including effluent releases because they reasoned that spent fuel was removed
from the plant and therefore the radiological source term that remained at the plant could
not create a significant consequence to the public. The licensee acknowledged in their
evaluation that, although the spent fuel was moved to the ISFSI, a potential for adverse
radiological conditions during plant decommissioning and dismantlement activities
existed. Since there were ongoing decommissioning and dismantlement operations
periodically conducted in the plant and liquid collection systems and the plant ventilation
systems remained in operation, the NRC determined that releases of radioactive
materials were possible. Therefore, the removal of these event types equated to a
reduction in effectiveness which required NRC approval.
The NRC staff also identified that an adequate technical evaluation or basis was not
provided by the licensee to eliminate the Alert classification, reduce exercise
frequencies, and reduce staffing augmentation times.
NRC staff identified that the licensee removed reactor plant related requirements from its
Emergency Plan although decommissioning was not complete and licensed radioactive
material was present in the plant.
The NRC communicated to the licensee in telephone conversations on
December 19, 2012, and January 24, 2013, that Revision 32 of the Emergency Plan
reduced its effectiveness and that the changes made by the licensee to the plan were
not consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). The licensee documented
the issue in their corrective action program under CAR 2013-004 on January 24, 2013.
5
As part of their corrective actions, the licensee performed a quantitative analysis of the
dispersion of the remaining LACBWR plant nuclide inventory in order to justify the
changes made in Revision 32. Following the completion of the analysis, the licensee
submitted Revision 33 of the Emergency Plan for NRC approval on August 6, 2013. On
April 14, 2014, Revision 34 was submitted for approval in response to NRCs inquiry
about the elimination of the Alert classification. NRC staff found that the licensee had
not justified removal of the Alert classification in Revision 32 and 33. Revision 34 was
subsequently approved by the NRC on September 18, 2014.
During the period of December 19, 2012 through September 18, 2014, the licensee
failed to implement corrective actions to regain compliance with Revision 31. Instead,
the licensee continued to implement Revision 32 even though it had not been approved
in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). The NRC discussed the need to restore
compliance with an acceptable Emergency Plan in telephone conversations with the
licensee on December 19, 2012, January 24, 2013, August 20, 2013, and
December 4, 2013. The licensee documented the issue in CAR 2013-004 dated
January 24, 2013, and CAR 2013-022 dated December 27, 2013, and initiated actions
for approval of the Emergency Plan by the NRC as discussed above. Actions were not
taken by the licensee in the interim nearly two year period between Revision 31 and
Revision 34 to fully restore compliance with Revision 31. The corrective actions were
closed following the submission of Revision 34 for NRC approval.
An AV was identified, because the license made changes to their emergency plan that
reduced the effectiveness of the plan and implemented these changes on
October 29, 2012, without prior approval by the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4).
Pending final determination of the safety significance and NRCs enforcement
decision, this issue was identified as an Apparent Violation (AV 072000046/2014001-02;05000409/2014008-02; Reduction in Effectiveness of Emergency Plan without NRC
Approval)
Title 10 CFR 50.54(q), "Emergency Plans" - Failure to Perform Drills and Exercises as
Required by the Emergency Plan
10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, a holder of a license under this part shall follow and
maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in
appendix E of this part...
Revision 31 of the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Section E.2.2.1, Plant Emergency Plan
Exercises, states that to ascertain the necessary level of familiarity with emergency
plan and procedures and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the plan, plant exercises
will be conducted annually to evaluate the overall response and emergency capability of
the LACBWR/DPC. Additionally, Section E.2.3 Drills, states that A drill is a
supervised instruction aimed at testing, developing, and maintaining skills in a particular
operation. Drills may be conducted as part of an exercise. Drills will be evaluated as
described in Subsection 2.5 of this Section. The types and frequency of drills is as
follows: fire drills will be conducted annually medical emergency drills will be
conducted annually health physics drills will be conducted annually.
6
The inspectors identified that the licensee conducted a plant emergency exercise in
2010, however, failed to perform a plant emergency exercise in 2011, 2012, and 2013.
The inspectors also identified that the licensee failed to perform fire drills in 2011 and
2012; a medical drill in 2013; and a valid health physics drill in 2012. The health physics
activity in 2012 credited as a drill was not a supervised instruction that tested, developed
and maintained skills because it did not involve radiological conditions that necessitated
an action, did require emergency plan implementation, and was not observed or
critiqued.
An AV was identified, in that between 2011 and 2013, the licensee failed to follow their
Emergency Plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). Specifically, the licensee failed
to perform emergency exercises and drills in accordance with the LACBWR Emergency
Plan, Revision 31 Sections E.2.2.1 and E.2.3 respectively.
Pending final determination of the safety significance and NRCs enforcement
decision, this issue was identified as an Apparent Violation (AV 07200046/2014001-03;05000409/2014008-03; Failure to Perform Drills and Exercises as Required by the
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program under CAR 2013-
002. Following the issuance of Revision 34 to emergency plan, the licensee was no
longer required by its plan to conduct plant (non-ISFSI) emergency exercises. The
licensee performed ISFSI facility related emergency exercises in 2012 and 2014, in
accordance with the Emergency Plan.
c. Conclusion
The inspectors identified three apparent violations of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for the licensee's
failure to maintain Emergency Plan staffing, submit changes to the Emergency Plan that
reduced its effectiveness to the NRC for review prior to implementation, and conduct
emergency drills and exercises in accordance with the frequency specified in the
1.2 Review of Emergency Plan Program since Emergency Plan Revision 34 Issuance
a. Inspection Scope
On September 18, 2014, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan,
Revision 34. The revision removed all event types associated with the plant (Non-ISFSI)
and associated processes and programs supporting these event types. The licensee
revised their implementing procedures, processes, and programs following the approval
of Revision 34.
The inspectors observed and evaluated the conduct of the ISFSI biennial emergency
preparedness exercise. The inspectors reviewed the Emergency Plan, implementing
procedures, and the exercise scenario with the exercise objectives and expected
sequence of events. The inspectors reviewed the proposed exercise scenario to
understand its scope and evaluate its adequacy to ensure the licensee could
demonstrate their emergency response capabilities. The inspectors observed the pre-
exercise briefing, the exercise, and the licensees formal post-exercise self-assessment.
7
Through document reviews and walkdowns, the inspectors also assessed the licensees
fire protection program for its effectiveness to support safe storage of spent nuclear fuel.
b. Observations and Findings
Review of 2014 ISFSI Emergency Exercise Performance
Section 8.3 of the LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan requires the licensee to perform a
biennial exercise to demonstrate emergency response capabilities and effectiveness of
the licensees Emergency Plan. The scenario for the December 16, 2014, exercise
involved a simulated tornado striking the ISFSI. Following an initiating event, the cask
was simulated to be damaged creating potential for a damaged confinement boundary.
The licensee implemented appropriate, timely, and necessary actions to address the
simulated event. The licensee correctly classified the event, made timely notifications,
augmented personnel onsite as needed, conducted adequate radiological monitoring,
and ensured the safety of personnel. Exercise participants maintained control
throughout the scenario, starting with a prompt recognition of the initiating event and
through recovery discussions. Throughout the exercise, the licensees staff
communicated well with all involved parties and demonstrated knowledge of the
Emergency Plan. During the post-exercise critique, the licensee adequately evaluated
its emergency response and management capability.
The licensees fire protection program was assessed through reviews of periodic fire drill
records and applicable fire protection program documents. The scenarios were
reviewed to determine whether they were realistic and met drill objectives. The
inspectors did not identify any un-analyzed combustibles stored or located within the
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in accordance with Emergency Plan
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states, in part, A standard emergency classification and action level
scheme is used by the nuclear facility.
The inspectors reviewed EPP-20.01, ISFSI Emergency Conditions, Revision 3. The
procedure defines conditions that constitute an emergency at the ISFSI and provides
guidance for determining when emergency conditions at the ISFSI should be classified
as an ALERT which would require activation of the Emergency Plan and implementation
of Emergency Plan Procedures. Within the procedures an emergency is classified
based on specific information contained in Attachment 1, ISFSI Emergency Events.
Specifically, Attachment 1 provides both quantitative and qualitative criteria requiring
declaration of an Alert under the event type Potential Damage to Loaded Cask
Confinement Boundary. Specifically, Attachment 1 required declaration of an Alert
when any one of the following qualitative conditions are observed: A VCC has moved
out of its normal position on the ISFSI Pad, or VCC damage to the top or sides of cask
with concrete debris found nearby, or tornado driven missile has impacted a VCC, or a
VCC has tipped over on the ISFSI Pad or has fallen off the ISFSI Pad, or 50% of VCC
inlets and outlets are blocked. Additionally Attachment 1 required declaration of an Alert
when any one of the following quantitative conditions are observed: >500R/hr before
reaching the Isolation Zone Fence, or Measured dose rate at the Isolation Zone Fence
8
exceeds the tag value in EPP-20.04 or 40 mRem/hr on side of VCC, or 50 mRem/hr
on top of VCC, or 200 mRem/hr average of measurements at eight air inlets and
outlets of VCC.
The inspectors reviewed the Emergency Plan, Revision 34, Table 4.1 ISFSI Emergency
Events, and identified that the Emergency Plan only contained quantitative criteria
requiring declarations of an Alert under the event type Potential Damage to Loaded
Cask Confinement Boundary. Specifically, Table 4.1 requires declaration of an Alert
when any one of the following quantitative (measured) conditions are identified:
40 mRem/hr on side of VCC, OR 50 mRem/hr on top of VCC, OR 200 mRem/hr
average of measurements at eight air inlets and outlets of VCC.
The inspectors determined that the licensees implementing procedures and associated
emergency action level scheme were not in alignment with the licensees Emergency
Plan emergency action level scheme. Specifically, the implementing procedures
contained qualitative criteria that would require declaration of an Alert that are not
contained within the Emergency Plan. The inspectors noted that while most of the
qualitative criteria was indicative of a potential event at the ISFSI which could lead to the
quantitative criteria being exceeded, there was potential for an over classification of an
event. For example, during a heavy snow fall, the lower vents of the VCC could be
blocked by snow, which would require declaration of an Alert according to the licensees
implementing procedures. In contrast the licensees design basis evaluation
demonstrates that the lower vents can be blocked for an indefinite amount of time
without any safety impact or associated increase in dose rate.
The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to have an emergency classification
system within their implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency
classification system within their Emergency Plan, and therefore this was a violation of
The licensee documented this issue within their corrective action program under
CAR 2014-022 and initiated actions for revision of the procedure.
The inspectors determined that this was a performance deficiency that warranted
screening for enforcement. The inspectors determined that the failure to have an
emergency classification system within their implementing procedures that adhered to
the emergency classification system within their Emergency Plan was a violation of more
than minor significance using Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples
of Minor Issues, example 4h.
The inspectors utilized Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B, Emergency
Preparedness Significance Determination Process, in conjunction with NRC
Enforcement Policy to make a significance determination. The inspectors determined
that requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) Emergency Classification System is a
Planning Standard. The inspectors determined that the violation was similar to the
Green Finding example in IMC 0609 Table 5.4-1, The EAL classification process would
result in an over-classification causing an unnecessary emergency declaration.
Specifically, the licensees implementing procedures contained additional qualitative
criteria that would require declaration of an Alert for a Potential Damage to Loaded
Cask Confinement Boundary when not required by the emergency plan.
9
The inspectors determined that this similar Green Finding example for a Planning
Standard Function for a Non-Risk Significant Planning Standard could be correlated to
Enforcement Policy example 6.6.d.1, in that a licensee ability to meet or implement any
regulatory requirement not related to assessment or notification such that the
effectiveness of the emergency plan decreases. The inspectors determined that the
violation could be evaluated using example 6.6.d.1 as a Severity Level IV violation.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states, in part, A standard emergency classification and action level
scheme is used by the nuclear facility.
Contrary to the above, on December 15, 2014, the licensee failed to utilize a standard
classification and action level scheme. Specifically, the inspectors identified that the
licensee failed to have an emergency classification system within their implementing
procedures that adhered to the emergency classification system within their Emergency
Plan.
Because this violation was of very low safety significance, Severity Level IV, and was
entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a
NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
(NCV 07200046/2014001-04;05000409/2014008-04; Emergency Plan Implementing
Procedures not in accordance with Emergency Plan)
Staff Augmentation Capability not in accordance with Emergency Plan
10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, a holder of a license under this part shall follow and
maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in
appendix E of this part...
10 CFR 50.47 states, in part, On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency
response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident
response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of
response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response
activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.
The LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 34, Section 3.3, ISFSI Event Response
Surveillance states: A Response Surveillance is required following off-normal, accident
or natural phenomena events. The NAC-MPC Systems in use at an ISFSI shall be
inspected within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after the occurrence of an off-normal, accident or natural
phenomena event in the area of the ISFSI. Following a natural phenomena event, the
ISFSI shall be inspected to determine if movement or damage to the CONCRETE
CASKS has resulted in unacceptable site boundary dose rates."
Through interviews with licensee staff, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to
have a staffing augmentation program in place to ensure that the actions specified in
Emergency Plan Section 3.3 could be met. Specifically, the inspectors identified that the
licensee did not have a staffing mechanism in place to ensure that radiological protection
staff could respond to the site within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of an event to adequately characterize the
site boundary dose rates.
10
The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to have an adequate program in place
to ensure augmentation of response capabilities is available to ensure Emergency Plan
actions could be accomplished as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).
The licensee documented this issue within their corrective action program under
CAR 2014-025 and initiated actions to implement a staffing augmentation program.
The inspectors determined that this was a performance deficiency that warranted
screening for enforcement. The inspectors determined that the failure to have a staffing
mechanism in place to ensure emergency plan compliance was a violation of more than
minor significance using Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of
Minor Issues, example 4h.
The inspectors utilized IMC 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance
Determination Process, in conjunction with NRC Enforcement Policy to risk inform the
significance determination. The inspectors determined that the violation was similar to
the Degraded Planning Standard Function example in IMC 0609 Table 5.2-1, Staffing
processes would permit a shift to go below Emergency Plan minimum staffing
requirements, but there were no actual instances in which such shortage occurred.
Specifically, the licensees staffing program could not ensure response capabilities were
available to timely implement Emergency Plan actions; however, there were no actual
instances of emergencies where this occurred.
The inspectors determined that this similar Green Finding example for a Planning
Standard Function for a Non-Risk Significant Planning Standard could be correlated to
Enforcement Policy example 6.6.d.1, in that a licensee ability to meet or implement any
regulatory requirement not related to assessment or notification such that the
effectiveness of the emergency plan decreases. The inspectors determined that the
violation could be evaluated using example 6.6.d.1 as a Severity Level IV violation of
10 CFR 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).
10 CFR 50.47 states, in part, On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency
response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident
response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of
response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response
activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.
Contrary to the above, on December 15, 2014, the licensee failed to ensure timely
augmentation of response capabilities is available. Specifically, the inspectors identified
that the licensee did not have a staffing mechanism in place to ensure that radiological
protection staff could respond to the site within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of an event to adequately
characterize the site boundary dose rates.
Because this violation was of very low safety significance, Severity Level IV, and was
entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a
NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
(NCV 07200046/2014001-05;05000409/2014008-05; Staff Augmentation Capability not
in accordance with Emergency Plan)
11
c. Conclusion
The inspectors identified two severity level IV violations of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for the
licensee's failure to have an emergency classification system within their implementing
procedures that adhered to the emergency classification system within their Emergency
Plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and failed to have adequate staffing
programs to ensure compliance with requirements contained within the Emergency Plan
and therefore this was a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).
The licensee demonstrated the ability to conduct an emergency exercise and assess
their performance during a formal critique. Fire protection requirements were met
regarding the conduct of drills and controlling combustibles in and around the ISFSI.
1.3 Surveillance and Maintenance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees surveillance and maintenance program
associated with dry fuel storage to verify compliance with the applicable regulations, the
License, and TS. The inspectors walked down the ISFSI pad, observed daily
surveillance activities, interviewed personnel, and reviewed select documents. The
inspectors reviewed several records of daily temperature checks and radiological
surveys performed since the last NRC inspection.
b. Observations and Findings
The inspectors conducted a walk down of the ISFSI pad and observed qualified
licensee staff perform daily surveillances of the casks including temperature
monitoring and inlet and outlet vent screen checks to ensure they were free of
significant blockage or damage. The inspectors also evaluated the general condition
of the ISFSI pad. The inspectors noted that temperature logs indicated that the
casks operated as designed with no abnormalities. The inspectors found that the
licensee performed and documented the surveillance activities as required by TS and
site procedures. In addition, the inspectors performed independent radiation surveys
of the casks, and general ISFSI area. The results were bounded by the radiological
postings and consistent with the licensee's radiological surveys.
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusion
The licensee implemented its surveillance and maintenance program in accordance with
applicable regulations, the License, and TS.
1.4 Environmental Monitoring
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports for
2012 and 2013. The inspectors also reviewed semi-annual radiological survey results
12
performed by the licensee in 2013 and 2014. This review evaluated whether the
licensee complied with the off-site dose requirements prescribed by 10 CFR 72.104.
b. Observations and Findings
The licensee performed environmental radiological monitoring as required for the ISFSI.
The survey results indicated that the licensee was well under the limits of
10 CFR 72.104. These results were verified by the inspectors performing independent
radiation surveys of the ISFSI
No findings of significance were identified.
c. Conclusion
The licensee established and maintained its environmental monitoring program in
accordance with applicable 10 CFR Part 20, 50, and 72 regulations, the License, and
TS.
1.5 Quality Assurance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified through document reviews and conduct of interviews whether
changes were appropriately controlled and done in accordance with QA requirements.
Corrective action reports from 2013 and 2014 were reviewed to determine whether the
licensee effectively identified, resolved, and prevented problems. Additionally, the
inspectors reviewed safety review committee and operations review committee
documents to assess the onsite safety culture and whether issues were being identified
and addressed. The inspectors reviewed the timeliness of financial assurance
documentation that is required to be submitted to the NRC.
b. Observations and Findings
The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 72.48 evaluations performed during 2012, 2013, and
2014. A review of CRs written during 2012, 2013, and 2014 indicated that the licensee
was effectively identifying and correcting facility issues. Safety review committee and
operations review committee meetings were conducted at regular intervals since the
previous inspection and issues were being addressed through the Corrective Action
Program (CAP).
Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan
Federal Register Notice 76FR35512, dated June 17, 2011, included a new rulemaking
requirement that affected Part 72 licensees. The Federal Register documented a
change to 72.30(b) which required Part 72 licensees to submit to the NRC for review and
approval an ISFSI decommissioning funding plan. The final rule made changes to the
financial assurance requirements for Part 72 licensees to provide greater consistency
with similar decommissioning requirements in the 10 CFR Part 50 regulations. Financial
assurances are financial arrangements provided by the licensee to ensure funds for
13
decommissioning will be available when needed. The effective date of the new rule was
December 17, 2012. The new rule required licensees to submit a decommissioning
funding plan to the NRC by the effective date of the rule. Contrary to this, LACBWR had
not submitted their ISFSI decommissioning funding plan until March 23, 2013.
10 CFR 72.30(b), Financial Assurance and recordkeeping for decommissioning, states
that, Each holder of of a license under this part must submit for NRC review and
approval a decommissioning funding plan
Contrary to the above, LACBWR had not submitted their ISFSI decommissioning funding
plan by December 17, 2012.
Because this violation was of very low safety significance, Severity Level IV, and was
entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a
NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
(NCV 07200046/2014001-06;05000409/2014008-06; Failure to Submit Decommissioning
Funding Plan)
The licensee submitted the ISFSI Decommissioning Funding Report on March 23, 2013.
(NCV 07200046/2014001-06;05000409/2014008-06; Failure to Submit
c. Conclusion
The licensee implemented its CAP in accordance with the applicable regulations and site
QA requirements. Through the CAP, issues were effectively identified and corrected by
the licensee. A violation of very low safety significance was identified for the licensees
failure to submit their ISFSI decommissioning funding plan timely as required by
2.0 Exit Meeting
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. L. Peters and other members of
your staff at the conclusion of the site inspection on December 18, 2014, and during a
teleconference on February 24, 2015. The licensee acknowledged the results presented
and did not identify any of the potential report input as proprietary in nature.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
14
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PEOPLE CONTACTED
- L. Peters, Genoa Manager
- D. Egge, Plant/ISFSI Supervisor
- J. Henkelman, Quality Assurance Specialist
- R. Grey, Radiation Protection Supervisor
- E. Martin, QA Manager
- W. Trubilowicz, Technical Engineer
- M. Mo, Security Manager
- Persons present at the exit meeting on February 24, 2015
INSPECTION PROCEDURE USED
60858 Away From Reactor ISFSI Inspection Guidance
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
07200046/2014001-01; AV Non-Compliance with Emergency Plan Staffing
05000409/2014008-01 Requirements
07200046/2014001-02; AV Reduction in Effectiveness of Emergency Plan Without
05000409/2014008-02 NRC Approval
07200046/2014001-03; AV Failure to Perform Drills and Exercises as Required by the
05000409/2014008-03 Emergency Plan
07200046/2014001-04; NCV Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in
05000409/2014008-04 accordance with Emergency Plan
07200046/2014001-05; NCV Staff Augmentation Capability not in Accordance with
05000409/2014008-05 Emergency Plan
07200046/2014001-06; NCV Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan
Attachment
Closed
07200046/2014001-04; NCV Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in
05000409/2014008-04 Accordance with Emergency Plan
07200046/2014001-05; NCV Staff Augmentation Capability not in Accordance with
05000409/2014008-05 Emergency Plan
07200046/2014001-06; NCV Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan
2
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
ADR Alternate Dispute Resolution
AV Apparent Violation
CAP Corrective Action Program
CAR Corrective Action Report
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CoC Certificate of Compliance
DNMS Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
EA Enforcement Action
EAL Emergency Action Level
FESW Fuel Element Storage Well
ICR Institute of Conflict Resolution
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
IR Inspection Report
ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
LACBWR La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor
NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PEC Predecisional Enforcement Conference
TS Technical Specification
VCC Vertical Concrete Cask
3
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list
does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that
selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or
any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
10 CFR 72.212 Report; Revision 4
2014 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Package
72.48-OP-99-5.01; ISFSI VCC heat Removal Monitoring System; Revision 0
72.48-RE-13-01; revise ISFSI Fire Protection Procedures; Revision 0
72.48-RE-2013-05; ACP-12.03, ISFSI VCC Heat Removal System; Revision 0
ACP-02.13; Operations Safety Review Committee; Revision 20
ACP-02.14; Safety Review Committee; Revision 18
ACP-07.06; 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations
ACP-12.03; ISFSI VCC Heat Removal System Monitoring; Revision 1
ACP-16.0; Corrective Action Program; Revision 24
CAR 2013-004; Emergency Plan Submittal to USNRC; dated January 24, 2013
CAR 2013-005; EAL Responses at ISFSI; dated January 24, 2013
CAR 2013-007; ISFSI Decommissioning Funding Plan; dated February 25, 2013
CAR 2013-021; Emergency Plan Exercise; dated November 20, 2013
CAR 2013-022; Emergency Plan Audit Issues; dated December 27, 2013
CAR 2014-022; Action Level is not Consistent for EPP Declaration; dated December 18, 2014
CAR 2014-023; EAL Entry Basis not Clear; dated December 18, 2014
CAR 2014-024; Subjective Deactivation Criteria; dated December 18, 2014
CAR 2014-025; Process or Program to Ensure 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> RPT Response Time; dated
December 18, 2014
CAR 2014-026; SRC Membership did not Include Off-Site Individual; dated December 18, 2014
Decommissioning Funding Plan for ISFSI; March 12, 2013
Emergency Exercise and Drill Records; 2011-2012
Environmental Dosimetry Data; 2013-2014
EPP-20.01; ISFSI Emergency Conditions; Revision 3
EPP-20.02; ISFSI Organization and Operations during Emergencies; Revision 4
EPP-20.03; ISFSI Communications Systems; Revision 3A
EPP-20.04; ISFSI Emergency Dose Rate Assessment and Survey; Revision 2A
EPP-20.06; ISFSI Emergency Radiation Monitoring; Revision 3
Fire Protection Training and Drill Records; 2012-2014
FPP-20.04; ISFSI Monthly Fire Prevention Inspection; Revision 3
HSP-20.06; Radiation Surveys; Revision 33
ISFSI Emergency Preparedness Training Slides
ISFSI Fire Protection Training Slides
ISFSI Outer Isolation Zone Fence Surveys; 2013-2014
ISFSI Quality Assurance Training Slides
LACBWR Emergency Plan; Revision 31
LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan; Revision 32
LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan; Revision 33
LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan; Revision 34
4
LACBWR Possession Only License; Amendment 72
Operations Safety Review Committee Minutes; 2012-2014
Quality Assurance Program Description; Revision 27
Radiation Protection Orientation Slides
Retrievability Strategy
Safety Review Committee Minutes; 2012-2014
TPP-08; Fire Protection Training Procedure; Revision 14
TPP-20; ISFSI General Employee Training; Revision 0
VCC Dose Surveys; 2013-2014
5