ML15034A368

FEMA, Submittal of Final Report for Seabrook Hostile Action Based (HAB) Plume Exercise Evaluated on 11/05/2014

ML15034A368
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	01/29/2015
From:	Colman S US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Document Control Desk, NRC Region 1
References
Download: ML15034A368 (298)

Text

U.S. Department of Homeland Security FE.MA Region I 99 High St., 5"h Floor

/

• Boston, MA 02110-2320 FEMA "'

January 29, 2015 NRC Headquarters Document Control Desk US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 To Whom it May Concern:

Enclosed is a copy of the final report for the Seabrook Station Hostile Action Based (HAB) plume exercise that was evaluated on November 5, 2014.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the State of New Hampshire and local emergency response organizations successfully demonstrated their capabilities to implement off-site radiological emergency response plans and procedures. Based on the evaluation of this exercise by federal evaluators, there were no deficiencies. There were no Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA). There was one prior ARCA from the 2012 plume exercise that was successfully re-demonstrated and closed. There were five planning issues identified and subsequently closed.

State and local preparedness remains adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the Seabrook Power Station and provides reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken off-site in the event of a radiological emergency.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact me at 617-832-4731, John Rice at (617) 956-7509, or Barbara Thomas at (617) 832-4703.

Sincerely, SIleve L. Colman Regional Assistance Committee Chair Enclosure E-copy: NRC Region I www'fctntig-

Seabrook Station After Action Report/

Improvement Plan Exercise Date - November 05, 2014 Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program W- FEMA Published January29, 2014

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/lmprovement Plan Seabrook Station Seabrook Station After Action Report/Improvement Plan Published Januaty 29, 2014 Contents Executive Summary 5 Section 1: Exercise Overview 6 1.1 Exercise Details 6 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership 6 1.3 Participating Organizations 7 Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 13 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design 13 2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities 13 2.3 Scenario Summary 13 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 14 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results 14 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation 14 3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries 25 3.3.1 Massachusetts Jurisdictions 25 3.3.1.1 Massachusetts State Emergency Operations Center 25 3.3.1.2 MA Region I EOC 25 3.3.1.3 MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-1 25 3.3.1.4 MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2 26 3.3.1.5 MA Media Center 26 3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions 26 3.3.2.1 Amesbury Local EOC 26 3.3.2.2 Merrimac Local EOC 27 3.3.2.3 Newbury Local EOC 27 3.3.2.4 Newburyport Local EOC 28 3.3.2.5 Salisbury Local EOC 28 3.3.2.6 West Newbury Local EOC 29 1

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.3 Support Jurisdictions 29 3.3.3.1 MA State Police Assembly- Troop A 29 3.3.4 New Hampshire Jurisdictions 29 3.3.4.1 NH State Emergency Operations Center 29 3.3.4.2 NH (SS) Emergency Operations Facility 31 3.3.4.3 NH Incident Field Office (SS) 32 3.3.4.4 NH State Police Communications Center, NH State 32 Warning Point 3.3.4.5 Rockinghamý County Dispatch Center 33 3.3.4.6 NH (SS) Joint Infornation Center 33 3.3.4.7 NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-i 33 3.3.4.8 NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2 34 3.3.4.9 MA (SS) Joint Information Center 34 3.3.5 Risk Jurisdictions 34 3.3.5.1 Brentwood Local EOC 34 3.3.5.2 East Kingston Local EOC 35 3.3.5.3 Exeter Local EOC 35 3.3.5.4 Greenland Local EOC 36 3.3.5.5 Hampton Local EOC 36 3.3.5.6 Hampton Falls Local EOC 36 3.3.5.7 Kensington Local EOC 37 3.3.5.8 Kingston NH Local EOC 37 3.3.5.9 New Castle Local EOC 38 3.3.5.10 Newfields Local EOC 38 3.3.5.11 Newton Local EOC 39 3.3.5.12 North Hampton Local EOC 39 3.3.5.13 Portsmouth Local EOC 40 3.3.5.14 Rye Local EOC 41 3.3.5.15 Seabrook Local EOC 41 3.3.5.16 South Hampton Local EOC 42 3.3.5.17 Stratham Local EOC 42 3.3.5.18 Hampton: Fun After School Program 43 2

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.5.19 Seabrook Police Incident Command Post 43 3.3.5.20 Building Block School 44 3.3.5.21 Langdon Place of Exeter 45 3.3.5.22 Kingston Child Center 45 3.3.5.23 The Village Preschool 45 3.3.5.24 Hampton Falls Child Care Center 45 3.3.5.25 The Learning Tree 46 3.3.6 Support Jurisdictions 46 3.3.6.1 Rochester Local EOC 46 3.3.6.2 Dover Local EOC 47 3.3.6.3 Dover MS Reception Center Operations 48 3.3.6.4 Dover MS Reception Center Dosimetry 48 3.3.6.5 Dover MS Reception Center Portal & Secondary 48 Monitoring 3.3.6.6 Dover MS Reception Center Female Mon/Decon 49 3.3.6.7 Dover MS Reception Center Male Mon/Decon 49 3.3.6.8 Dover MS Reception Center KI Decision 49 3.3.6.9 Dover MS Reception Center Registration 50 3.3.6.10 Dover MS Reception Center Vehicle Mon/Decon 50 3.3.6.11 Manchester Local EOC 50 Section 4: Conclusion 52 Appendix A: Best Practices 53 Appendix B: Exercise Timeline 60 Appendix C: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders 66 Appendix D: Exercise Plan 69 Appendix E: Eop 205 3

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station This page is intentionally blank.

4

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On November 5, 2014 the U.S Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Preparedness Directorate, National Preparedness Division, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP),

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region I conducted a Hostile Action Based exercise of the 10-mile plume exposure pathway zone around Seabrook Nuclear Power Station.

Out-of-sequence demonstrations of schools, host community schools, daycares and nursing homes were also conducted per the new 8-year exercise cycle. The purpose of the exercise and the out-of-sequence demonstrations was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency at Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. The exercise and out-of- sequence demonstrations were held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures.

DHS wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in The State of New Hampshire, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, local communities and private and volunteer organizations that participated in this exercise.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibly by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities.

Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

This report contains the final evaluation of the biennial exercise and the out of sequence activities.

5

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/inprovement Plan Seabrook Station SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW 1.1 Exercise Details Exercise Name Seabrook Station Type of Exercise Plume Exercise Date November 05, 2014 Program Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Scenario Type Radiological Emergency 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership Steve Colman RAC Chair FEMA - Region One - REP Branch REP Branch Chief 99 High Street, Fifth Floor Boston, Massachusetts, 02110 617-832-4731 Steve. Colman@fema.dhs.gov John Rice Senior Technological Hazards Specialist FEMA - Region One - REP Branch Senior Technological Hazards Specialist 99 High Street, Fifth Floor 6

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Boston, Massachusetts, 02110 617-956-7509 John.Rice@fema.dhs.gov Barbara Thomas Site Specialist FEMA - Region One - REP Branch Technological Hazards Specialist 99 High Street, Fifth Floor Boston, Massachusetts, 02110 617-832-4703 Barbara.Thomas@fema.dhs.gov 1.3 Participating Organizations Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the Seabrook Station exercise:

State Jurisdictions STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE New Hampshire Amateur Radio Emergency Service New Hampshire Bureau of Emergency Medical Services New Hampshire Department of Administrative Services New Hampshire Department of Agriculture New Hampshire Department of Education New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Emergency Services Unit New Hampshire Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management New Hampshire Department of Information Technology New Hampshire Department of Resources and Economic Development New Hampshire Department of Safety, Commissioner's Office New Hampshire Department of Safety, Division of Fire Safety New Hampshire Department of Transportation New Hampshire Division of Public Health Services 7

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station New Hampshire Fish and Game Department New Hampshire Governor's Office New Hampshire Homeland Security and Emergency Management New Hampshire Joint Information Center Public Information Officer New Hampshire National Guard New Hampshire Public Information Officer New Hampshire State Police New Hampshire State Police Troop A New Hamshire Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS Massachusetts Field Monitoring Team 1 (MA DPH)

Massachusetts 2-1 -1 Massachusetts Department of Public Health Massachusetts Department of Transportation Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency Massachusetts Joint Information Center Public Information Officer Massachusetts National Guard Massachusetts State Police Risk Jurisdictions STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE RISK JURISDICTIONS Town of Brentwood Department of Public Works Town of Brentwood Board of Selectmen Town of Brentwood Fire Department Town of Brentwood Police Department City of Portsmouth Emergency Management City of Portsmouth Fire Department City of Portsmouth Health Dept City of Portsmouth Human Resource Dept City of Portsmouth IT Dept City of Portsmouth Police Department City of Portsmouth Public Works Dept City of Portsmouth School Department City of Portsmouth Welfare Dept Town of East Kingston Emergency Operations Center 8

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Town of East Kingston Fire Department Town of East Kingston Highway Department Town of East Kingston Police Department Town of East Kingston Town Selectman Town of Exeter Board of Selectmen Town of Exeter Department of Public Works Town of Exeter Emergency Management Agency Town of Exeter Fire Department Town of Exeter Hospital Town of Exeter Parks and Recreation Department Town of Exeter Police Department Town of Exeter Public Health Cordinator Town of Exeter Public Safety Dispatch Unit Town of Exeter Public Schools Town of Exeter Town Manager Town of Greenland Department of Public Works Town of Greenland Police Department Town of Greenland Town Office Staff Town of Hampton Falls Board of Selectmen Town of Hampton Falls Emergency Management Town of Hampton Falls Fire Department Town of Hampton Falls Highway and Road Agent Town of Hampton Falls Police Department Town of Hampton Town Department of Buildings Town of Hampton Town Emergency Management Town of Hampton Town Emergency Medical Services Town of Hampton Town Fire Department Town of Hampton Town Police Department Town of Hampton Town Public Works Department Town of Kingston Police Department Town of Rye Department of Public Works Town of Rye Fire Department.

Town of Rye Municipal Government Town of Rye Police Department 9

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Town of South Hampton Board of Selectmen Town of South Hampton Clerk Town of South Hampton Fire Department Town of Kensington Elementary School Town of Kensington Fire Department Town of Kensington Police Department Town of Kensington Road Agent Town of New Castle Town of North Hampton Town of Newfields Town of Newton Board of Selectmen Town of Newton Fire Department Town of Newton Police Department Town of Newton School System Town of Newton Town Clerk Town of Newton Transportation Department Town of Seabrook Code Enforcement Town of Seabrook Emergency Management Director Town of Seabrook Emergency Management Staff Town of Seabrook Fire Department Town of Seabrook Police Department Town of Seabrook Public Works Town of Seabrook Schools Representative Town of Seabrook Selectmen Town of Seabrook Town Manager Town of Seabrook Transportation Officer Town of Seabrook Water Department Town of Stratham COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS RISK JURISDICTIONS City of Amesbury Department of Public Works City of Amesbury Emergency Managment Agency City of Amesbury Fire Department City of Amesbury Harbonnaster City of Amesbury Mayor 10

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station City of Amesbury Police Department City of Amesbury Public Health Department City of Amesbury RACES Sector 1 Easy City of Amesbury Schools Superintendent Town of Merrimac Emergency Management Town of Merrimac Fire Department Town of Merrimac olice Department Town of Merrimac Public Works Town of Newbury Department of Public Works Town of Newbury Fire Department Town of Newbury Police Department Town ofNewbury Town Administration Town of Newburyport Department of Public Safety Highway Division City of Newburyport Emergency Management City of Newburyport Fire Department City of Newburyport Harbor Master City of Newburyport Police Department Town of Salisbury Department of Public Works Town of Salisbury Emergency Management Town of Salisbury Fire/Rescue Town of Salisbury Police Department Town of Salisbury Town Manager Town of West Newbury Board of Health Town of West Newbury Council on Aging Town of West Newbury Department of Public Works Town of West Newbury Emergency Management Agency Town of West Newbury Fire Department Town of West Newbury Police Department Town of West Newbury Water Department Support Jurisdictions City of Manchester Fire Department City of Manchester Health Department City of Manchester Housing and Redevelopment Authority City of Manchester Information Services 11

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station City of Manchester Public Works City of Manchester School District City of Manchester Security Department City of Manchester Transit Authority City of Manchester Water Authority City of Dover Fire Department City of Dover Police Department City of Rochester City Administration Office City of Rochester Fire Department City of Rochester Police Department City of Rochester School District Rockingham County Dispatch Rockingham County Sheriffs Department Private Organizations American Medical Response NextEra Energy Federal Jurisdictions Federal Bureau of Investigation Federal Emergency Management Agency U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission United States Coast Guard 12

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN

SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design The FEMA Region I evaluated the Hostile Action Based exercise on November 5, 2014, to assess the capabilities of local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. The purpose of this report is to present the results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (OROs) during a simulated radiological emergency in HSEEP format.

2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities The exercise objectives, capabilities, and activities are noted in the extent of play agreement, included in Appendix Section.

2.3 Scenario Summary The exercise scenario was developed to evaluate the response of the exercise participants to a radiological emergency. The scenario is listed in Appendix: Exercise Plan 13

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the November 5, 2014 Hostile Action Based exercise, conducted to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of the State and local governments in the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station 10-Mile Emergency Planning Zone.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on its demonstration of criteria contained in the exercise evaluation areas as outlined in the Federal, Volume 67, No. 80 "FEMA -

Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology" (April 25, 2002).

Detailed information on the evaluation area criteria and the extent of play agreement for the exercise are included as appendices to this report.

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation The matrix presented in the table on the following pages presents the status of all exercise evaluations area criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during the drill by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and demonstration statuses of those criteria are indicated by use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercise)

A - ARCA assessed or unresolved ARCA from previous exercises D - Deficiency assessed P - Plan Issues N - Not Demonstrated 14

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (5 pages)

DATE: 2014-11-05 U SITE: Seabrook Station, NH r'l 00 E t Q-..

M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not W' Demonstrated VV CnE- CACA CA 4Z Z ZI 0,* ý- Z , 0 m jj Ol Emergency Operationis,,lanageuent.. . .. .. . .

Mobilization lal M M M M M M N N MIM M M Facilities IbN M M M M M M M M M Direction and Control lcl M M M M M M M M Communications Equipment id] M M M M.M M M M M M M M Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations lel M M M M M M M M M M M Protective ActionDecision lvlaking:  : " " "':

Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2al M Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event 2b1 P M Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event 2b2 M PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional 2cl M needs Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure 2dl Pathway Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase 2el Relocation. Reentry, and Return Protective ActgnImplemeni ttn l .*ioi . .* . .. .. . .

Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control 3al M M M M M M M M M Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the 3bl M M M M M Public Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and 3cl M M Mm access/functional needs Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and 3c2 M M M M access/functional needs I Implementation of Traffic and Access Control 3d) M M M M Implementation of Traffic and Access Control 3d2 M M M M M Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 3e]

Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 3e2 Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return 3fl Decisions FVeld:Measurement"

.... and Analis ." ..  :

RESERVED 4a I Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses 4a2 M Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses 4a3 M M Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling 4bI Laboratory Operations 4c I Enmer ibyNotificationandPubhclnfoi.1 Li.m. .....

Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5al M M RESERVED 5a2 Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5a3 Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5a4 Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media 5bl M M M SupMorig.Oerations/Facilitios, and Registration of Evacuee '.i Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees 6al 15

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their 6b]

Equipment and Vehicles Temporary Care of Evacuees 6c I Transoortation and Treatment of Contaminated Iniured Individuals 6d]

16

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 2/5)

U U 0 U DATE: 2014-11-05 w U 0 U U C CD W 0 0 U 9 W0U C u U

SITE: Seabrook Station, NH M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not 5 C g U U -

Demonstrated E .E U V t - .0 Ernei-gency Opeiraions Management Mobilization lal M M M M M M M M M M M M Facilities lb] M M M M M M M M M M M M Direction and Control Icl M M M M M NM M M M P M M Conmmunications Equipment Idl M M M M M M M M M MI M Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations lel M M M M M M M M M M M M ProtectiveAction Decision.Making . " ; ., " '" ._:___

Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2al Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event 2bl Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event 2b2 PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional 2cl needs Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure 2d1 Pathway Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase 2el Relocation,....":

Reentry,

" "* and ~............

Return ...

• • • '"° . .. .. '" '  !*

Protective Actn i entian tation ' . ..

Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control 3al M M M M M M M M Im M M Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the 3b] M M M M M M M M M M M Public Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and 3cl M M M M M M M M M M M access/functional needs Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and 3c2 M M M M M M M M M M M access/functional needs Implementation of Traffic and Access Control 3dl M M M M M M M M M M M M Implementation of Traffic and Access Control 3d2 M M M M M M M M M M M Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 3el Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 3e2 Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return 31f1 Decisions Fie ld Mea surinm e nt and A n aly s is .. ' . , . . . .. .

RESERVED 4al Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses 4a2 Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses 4a3 Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling 4bl Laboratory Operations 4c I Emrgenc~voilicationand Public Info * *.

Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5al RESERVED 5a2 Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5a3 Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5a4 Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media 5bl Monitoring. Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees 6al 17

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles 6b,, I I I I I I I I I Temporary Care of Evacuees 6c]1 Transoortation and Treatment of Contaminated Iniured Individuals 18

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 3/5) 0 DATE: 2014-11-05 z SITE: Seabrook Station, NH - o -- -

0. 0 M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not 2 U U U U U U UC)U Demonstrated EWU0 v) ) U o0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Emergency Operatio Management Mobilization tat M M MMM Facilities lbl M M M I Direction and Control Icl M M M M Communications Equipment ldl M M M M Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations lel M M M M ProtectiActin.Dectsi.i Making . -

Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2al Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event 2b1 Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event 2b2 PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional 2cl needs Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure 2d]

Pathway Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase 2el Relocation, Reentry, and Return Proie6tive Action lmilerhentatio "

Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control 3al M M M M M Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public 3bl M M M _

Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and 3cl M M access/functional needs Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and 3c2 M access/functional needs Inplementation of Traffic and Access Control 3dl M M M I_ IM Implementation of Traffic and Access Control 3d2 M M Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 3e]

Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 3e2 Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return 3fl Decisions RESERVED 4al Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses 4a2 Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses 4a3 Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling 4bl Laboratory Operations 4c I Emergency Notiflicaion and Pumbiit . .io". . *. *. a s.* / P Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5al RESERVED 5a2 Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5a3 Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5a4 Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media 5bl 19

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/inprovement Plan Seabrook Station Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees 6al M M M M M Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment 6bl M M and Vehicles Temporary Care of Evacuees 6c I Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals 6d I 20

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 4/5)

DATE:2014-11-05 - U W SITE: Seabrook Station, NH C- t M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not z < ci

• ci ci .

Demonstrated <E < < <* < * }

'Zer~nv eations Mariuternent *...  ;:*:: .*.:><**+

.U .:,...;

Mobilization lal M M M M M M M M M M M Facilities IbI M M M _ M_ M MMM Direction and Control lcl M M MM _ M_ M MMM Communications Equipment ldl M MM MM M MM Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations lel M __M M M ____M M M M ProectlvACti~n Decision Making, * ,: .__.. .. **.v.::.: . .J. ,, _!* .. ".:

Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2a1 __ M Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event 2b1l _ M Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event 2b2 ____M PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/futnctional 2cl needsM M Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure 2dl Pathway Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase 2el Relocation, Reentry., and Return Protect,* Uoni hnpleinentation..........:* '?v" .@"*;*i:*';: < ... "

Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control 3al M M M M M Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public 3bl M __M M M M M Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and 3cl M M access/functional needsMM M M M Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and 3c2 M MM M M M access/functional needsM MM M M M Implementation of Traffic and Access Control 3dl P ____M M M M Mv Implementation of Traffic and Access Control 3d2 M M M M :M Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 3e1 Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 3e2 Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return 3f"1 Decisions Fi~eld~l Measumreunent and Analysis* ..... * ,..:* ,.*,.:.,.: . .*. . ___ ". s.. I* * *,:j: i..

RESERVED 4a I Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses 4a2 Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses 4a3 Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling 4bl _

Laboratory Operations 4c I1_

Emergency Notification and Public. 1ntb-fo."' . .i, . , .. .> *...:

Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5al __ M __M M M M RESERVED 5a2 _

Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5a3 Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5a4__

Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media 5bl __ M M ___M M M M Suppdil Oper no* a~l e .ti:: ., . ; "' . ,.. : . * . * ,.. ,.... ... *Y... .

Monitoring. Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees 6al _

Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment 6b1 and Vehicles 21

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Temporary Care of Evacuees Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Iniured Individuals 6d I I I I I I I I I I I I 22

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 5/5)

<U P

[.-..

DATE: 2014-11-05 -

SITE: Seabrook Station, NH 0, 0 u:, 0~

M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not U =

Demonstrated r_ ' - M V- -

Ernergency 6iaOpera ,o e et .. J:..,., * . ...  : .

Mobilization lal M M M M M MIM M M Facilities lb] M M Direction and Control lcl M M P Communications Equipment Idl M M M M Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations lel M M M M Protective Action Decisiontn laking . . . . " . . .. ".

Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2al Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event 2b]

Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event 2b2 M PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional 2cl needs Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure 2dl Pathway Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase 2el Relocation, Reentry, and Return Protective.Action lmplementation.:4 , . "" ",

Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control 3al M M_ M I Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public 3b1 M M M M M M M M M Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and 3cl M access/functional needs Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and 3c2 M M M M M M M M access/functional needs Implementation of Traffic and Access Control 3d1 M M Implementation of Traffic and Access Control 3d2 M M Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 3el Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 3e2 Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return 3fl Decisions Field M eaui'ei ht n Anal ."... .. .. .

RESERVED 4a 1 Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses 4a2 Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses 4a3 Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling 4b]

Laboratory Operations 4c 1 Emergency. Notification and Public tnfo. ,... . . . .. ... .

Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5al M M RESERVED 5a2 Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5a3 23

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/lnIprovement Plan Seabrook Station Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 5a4 Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media 5bl M M M Supp*tdtOperations/F.ifs:" .g * ."

Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees 6al Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment 6bl and Vehicles Temporary Care of Evacuees 6cI Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals 6dI 24

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/htnprovetnent Plan Seabrook Station 3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries 3.3.1 Massachusetts Jurisdictions 3.3.1.1 Massachusetts State Emergency Operations Center In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, .e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.1.2 MA Region I EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: L.a. 1, 1.b. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 2.c. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.c. 1, 3.c.2, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.1.3 MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-1 In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: l.a.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None 25

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvenment Plan Seabrook Station

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.1.4 MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2 In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.1.5 MA Media Center In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: I.d.1, L.e. l, 5.b. 1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions 3.3.2.1 Amesbury Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, I.c.1, 1.d.1, L.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None 26

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/lnprovement Plan Seabrook Station

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.2 Merrimac Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: L.a.1, 1.b.1, l.c.1, 1.d.1, i.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.3 Newbury Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: l.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, i.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.l, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: 1.e.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-14-1el-P-04 CRITERION: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

CONDITION: The Town of Newbury Seabrook Emergency Response Plan position binders by job function contained outdated procedures (2011 instead of 2014).

Additionally, outdated forms were in the forms file box and emergency worker dosimetry kit box (e.g. Emergency Worker Exposure Forms).

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Available controlled copy binders with complete Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Response Plan and the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency Resource Manual contained up to date procedures and forms.

They were labeled as controlled copies, the position binders were not labeled as such (e.g. binder for Radiological Officer, Communications Officer, etc). The individual 27

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station or agency that issues and keeps the procedures up to date may not be aware that procedures and forms are in additional binders and files and should be updated when the large controlled binders are updated.

REFERENCE:

NUREG 0654, P.5 EFFECT: Without appropriate document version control, emergency responders cannot be assured that they are taking appropriate actions in response to a radiological emergency.

RECOMMENDATION: Update position binders and replace appropriate forms.

Ensure the process for procedure version control is updated to include the position binders and forms.

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.4 Newburyport Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: l.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, L.d.1, L.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.5 Salisbury Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.1, l.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, l.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None 28

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.6 West Newbury Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, l.c.1, l.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.l, 5.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.3 Support Jurisdictions 3.3.3.1 MA State Police Assembly- Troop A In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4 New Hampshire Jurisdictions 3.3.4.1 NH State Emergency Operations Center In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a. 1, L.b. 1, l.c. 1, 1.d. 1, Le. 1, 2.a. 1, 2.b.2, 2.c. 1, 5.a. 1, 5.b. 1.

29

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: 2.b.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-14-2bl-P-01 CRITERION: Appropriate PARs are based on available information on plant condition, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions.

CONDITION: The NH Implementing Procedures for State Agencies Accident Assessment Team (AAT) procedure has not been properly updated to reflect recent changes dictating performance of AAT functions at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) in Newington rather than the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in Concord. The current procedure, dated April 2011 still directs personnel to travel to the SEOC and report directly to the SEOC Radiological Health Technical Advisor (RHTA) rather than to the EOF, and the EOF RHTA.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Failure to update plans and procedures when changing implementation strategies and protocols

REFERENCE:

NUREG-0654 1.8, 110 NH Implementing Procedures for State Agencies, Attachment #A, Accident Assessment Team.

EFFECT: If accident assessment personnel had followed the existing procedure, they would have reported to the wrong location, resulting in delays and/or inability to perform assigned functions.

RECOMMENDATION: Revise NH Implementing Procedures for State Agencies, Accident Assessment Team procedure to reflect current practices and correct inaccurate information and AAT interface references associated with the SEOC.

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 1.c.1.

30

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station ISSUE NO.: 67-13-lcl-A-01 ISSUE: The State of New Hampshire Emergency Operations Center (EOC) placed conflicting weather information in blocks 7 and 8 of their Form 301B EOC Report Numbers 5-8, causing confusion for stakeholders who received them.

For example, Form 301B #005 reported in Block #7 ("Present Meteorological Conditions") a wind speed of 4.18 mph from a wind direction of 216.7 degrees.

Form 301 B #006 reported in Block #7 a wind speed of 4.20 mph from a direction of 148.6 degrees and in Block #8 ("Extended Weather Forecast"), reported the Emergency Classification Level rather than the extended weather forecast. Form 301B #007 again reported in Block #7 a wind direction from 148.6 degrees, but Block #8 reported the wind from the southwest.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED:

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.2 NH (SS) Emergency Operations Facility In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 4.a.2.

ISSUE NO.: 57-12-4a2-A-01 ISSUE: The New Hampshire Field Monitoring Team 1(FMT 1) did not receive sufficient direction to support characterization of the release. FMT1 never received direction to find the leading edge of the plume. The sample locations of 3.2, 3.7 and 3.8 provided by the Monitoring Team Coordinator (MTC) to the FMT 1 Team Lead never allowed FMT 1 to encounter any reading above background. Both air samples 31

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station taken by FMT 1 were taken in background areas.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: During the November 5, 2014 Seabrook Station Hostile Action Based (HAB) exercise, the HAB exercise did not have a radiological release, FEMA staff and New Hampshire staff developed a radiological plume inject for the Monitoring Team Coordinator (MTC) and the Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs). The two injects were implemented at the termination of the HAB exercise. Both teams were instructed to find a the sample point that was ten times background which indicated plume edge. The MTC in coordination with the Accident Assessment group identified locations for the field teams to traverse nearbthat would enable them to characterize the plume and find an area that was ten times background. This was satisfactorily accomplished by both FMTs finding the plume and taking air samples that had a low level of radioactivity on the samples.

This was performed in accordance with plans and procedures.

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.3 NH Incident Field Office (SS)

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a. 1, 1.b. 1, l.c. 1, l.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 5.b. 1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.4 NH State Police Communications Center, NH State Warning Point In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, L.e.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None 32

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None f PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

,. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.5 Rockingham County Dispatch Center In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a. 1, 1.b. 1, 1.d. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.d.2, 5.a. 1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.6 NH (SS) Joint Information Center In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, l.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.l, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.7 NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-1 In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: l.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.3.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: L.a.1.

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None 33

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.8 NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2 In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, I.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.3.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: l.a. 1.

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.9 MA (SS) Joint Information Center In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.l, l.b.l, l.c.l, l.d.1, l.e.l, 5.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5 Risk Jurisdictions 3.3.5.1 Brentwood Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: l.a.l, l.b.1, l.c.1, 1.d.1, I.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES- RESOLVED: 3.a.1.

34

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station ISSUE NO.: 57-12-3al-P-03 ISSUE: During the conduct of the Seabrook Station (SS) Exercise on April 17, 2012, the Brentwood New Hamphire Emergency Operations Center (EOC) assigned a Radiological Defense (RADEF) Officer who had never been in the position before.

The RADEF Officer did not understand his role in providing a briefing on dosimetry and potassium iodide (KI)to emergency workers before dispatching them to the field.

He issued the dosimetry and KI without a briefing.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED:

ISSUE NO.: 57-12-3a1-?-02 ISSUE: (Not found in the database!)

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED:

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.2 East Kingston Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.1, 1.b.l, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, L.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 35

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.5.3 Exeter Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, l.c.1, 1.d.1, L.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.4 Greenland Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a. 1, 1.b. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1, L.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.c. 1, 3.c.2, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.5 Hampton Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: l.a.1, L.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 36

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.5.6 Hampton Falls Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.7 Kensington Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.8 Kingston NH Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.l, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 3.a.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-12-3al-P-05 ISSUE: The RADEF Officer at the Kingston Emergency Operations Center (EOC) failed to supply potassium iodide (KI) tablets with a briefing to the entire facility 37

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station staff as per Kingston Plans and Procedures.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED:

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.9 New Castle Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: l.a. l, 1.b. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.c. 1, 3.c.2, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.10 Newfields Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 3.a.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-12-3al-A-07 ISSUE: The primary RADEF Officer in the Town of Newfields was unavailable and the alternate RADEF Officer substituted during the exercise. The alternate RADEF Officer was not familiar with zeroing the dosimetry. The Alternate RADEF Office did not brief the officer of the need to contact the officer's immediate supervisor when the 200mR reading was reached. The Alternate RADEF Officer did not brief the side effects of Potassium Iodide during the breifing until prompted by another staff member. The Alternate RADEF Officer did not understand the meaning of the 38

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 5 R turn back value and did not emphasize the turn back value meaning to the officer.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: During the exercise demonstration, the RADEF/Health Officer showed familiarity with zeroing the direct-reading dosimeters. He also demonstrated an understanding of the radiation dose reporting thresholds and briefed EOC personnel on the need to contact him if the dose reporting thresholds were reached. In addition, he provided the correct instructions for the use of KI, including possible side effects. These activities were carried out in accordance with the Town of Newfields Radiological Emergency Response Plan and the previous exercise issue 57-12-3al-A-07 was closed.

ISSUE NO.: 57-12-3a1-?-06 ISSUE: (Not found in the database!)

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED:

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.11 Newton Local EOC in summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: l.a.1, l.b.1, 1.c.1, l.d.1, L.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 39

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.5.12 North Hampton Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.1, l.b.1, 1.c.1, l .d.1, .e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.13 Portsmouth Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: L.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, l.d.1, L.e.1, 3.a.l, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 3.a. 1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-12-3al-A-08 ISSUE: Following RADEF Officer distribution of dosimetry kits to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staff, his emergency worker briefing was inadequate.

The Radiological Officer summarized the briefing using the Job Aid and gave inadequate information to emergency workers. The Radiological Officer's Job Aid conflicted with the Briefing Form the State provided to the EOC, which contains all information needed for emergency worker exposure control. The Radiological Officer also skipped important information that emergency workers needed to be briefed on prior to being deployed to the field (the Radiological Officer did not read off the Briefing Form that the State had provided to all EOCs)- the Radiological Officer did not address the 175mR exposure limit; only stated to notify the EOC when the dosimeter reaches 1R. Furthermore, the Radiological Officer provided inaccurate information pertaining to women and did not request that female workers 40

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Inmprovemnent Plan Seabrook Station who may be occupationally exposed (i.e., those who work in the restricted area at a nuclear power plant or at a hospital or other facility and whose occupation carries with it the potential for some radiation exposure) are counseled to make a declaration in writing if they are or think that they may be pregnant.

The Radiological Officer also had a Job Aid that conflicted with the Briefing Form that the State provided to the Emergency Operations Center.

The Radiological Officer was also using Rev 13 for Fornm 305A, which is out of date.

Rev 14 Forms are the most up to date and and FEMA approved forms for emergency workers.

The Emergency Operations Center also had the wrong inventory form for the emergency worker kits. The one provided was out of date.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: This ARCA was succesfully demonstrated during the 2014 SS HAB exercise on November 5, 2014. All activities described in the demonstration criterion were carried out in accordance with the plans, procedures, and extent-of-play agreement.

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.14 Rye Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.l, 1.b.l, I.c.1, 1.d.1, L.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 41

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.5.15 Seabrook Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.1, l.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, L.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.16 South Hampton Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: l.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, l.d.l, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 3.a.l.

ISSUE NO.: 57-12-3al-P-09 ISSUE: Revision 14 of form 350A contains incorrect information CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: In the current version of Town of South Hampton's Radiological Emergency Plan dated 2014, the 350 A form has been removed as part of the plan revision.

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 42

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.5.17 Stratham Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a. 1, 1.b. 1, 1.c. 1, 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.c. 1, 3.c.2, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.18 Hampton: Fun After School Program In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None O. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.19 Seabrook Police Incident Command Post In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a. 1, 1.d. 1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 3.a. 1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: 1.c.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-14-icl-P-05 CRITERION: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

CONDITION: There was concern over the attention to worker safety in the Incident 43

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Command Post. The Incident Command Post personnel did not receive dosimetry until after a General Emergency was declared. Additionally, the security at the command post was not given direction on who should be allowed access, which could allow an adversary into their midst.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Seabrook Police Department should have been involved in planning from the very beginning of the process.

REFERENCE:

K.3.a The organization shall make provisions for 24-hour-a-day capability to detennine doses received by emergency personnel.

EFFECT: Personnel could have received unecessary dose, or put in other unecessary danger.

RECOMMENDATION: With the Incident Command Post located so close to the reactor building, it is imperative that personnel receive dosimetry as soon as possible.

Assure security of the ICP by having a credentialling process or specific roster of known personnel. IC should request clearing/closing of beaches and waterways ASAP to prevent additional attacks on the plant. Alternative locations for the ICP should be considered.

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.20 Building Block School In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 44

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvxement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.5.21 Langdon Place of Exeter In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: l.a.1, 3.b. 1, 3.c.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.22 Kingston Child Center In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.23 The Village Preschool In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 45

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.5.24 Hampton Falls Child Care Center In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: L.a.1, 3.b.l, 3.c.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.25 The Learning Tree In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1,3.b.1,3.c.2.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.6 Support Jurisdictions 3.3.6.1 Rochester Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, l.b.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.d.l.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: 1.c.l.

ISSUE NO.: 57-14-1cl-P-03 CRITERION: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

46

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CONDITION: A table on the top of page 22 of the Rochester Host Community Plan (2014 edition) is missing the x-axis labels. Thus, there is no indication of which EOC/Community element is responsible for which of the listed Emergency Response Functions.

NOTE: This is a STATE of New Hampshire Planning Issue

[RECOMMENDATION]

POSSIBLE CAUSE: When the State-prepared/disseminated plan was reduced in size, it's very possible that the x-axis tables were accidentally deleted.

REFERENCE:

2.a.

EFFECT: There was no effect on the exercise play by Rochester personnel -

however, there could be issues/confusion when/if the city develops position-specific procedures or plans.

This table would also apply to non-REP planning efforts the city develops to ensure continuity of those planning efforts across all incident responses.

RECOMMENDATION: The State of New Hampshire should review the subject table on page 22 and make necessary corrections, then republish the page as a change document.

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.6.2 Dover Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, l.d.1, L.e.1, 3.d.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None 47

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/lnprovement Plan Seabrook Station

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.6.3 Dover MS Reception Center Operations In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. M ET: 1.a.1, l.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.6.4 Dover MS Reception Center Dosimetry In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.a.l,6.a.I.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.6.5 Dover MS Reception Center Portal & Secondary Monitoring In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.a.1, 6.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 48

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.6.6 Dover MS Reception Center Female Mon/Decon In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.a.1, 6.a.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.6.7 Dover MS Reception Center Male Mon/Decon In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.a.1, 6.a.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.6.8 Dover MS Reception Center KI Decision In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 49

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Iinprovenient Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.6.9 Dover MS Reception Center Registration In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.a.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.6.10 Dover MS Reception Center Vehicle Mon/Decon In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.d.1, 6.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.6.11 Manchester Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: L.a.1, 1.b. 1, l.c.1, 1.e. 1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None

c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: 3.d.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-14-3dl-P-02 CRITERION: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

CONDITION: The City of Manchester, New Hampshire (NH) procedure has the 50

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station written descriptions for the Dover, NH traffic control points instead of the Manchester, NH.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: When updating the procedure the Dover information was inadvertently used instead of the Manchester information.

REFERENCE:

NUREG - 0654, J. 1O.g City of Manchester, NH Radiological Emergency Response for Nuclear Facilities Plan Host Community, May 2014, Attachment A EFFECT: Although the maps are correct for the traffic control points the written description of the traffic control points may cause some confusion when it is necessary to dispatch police officers to the desired locations.

RECOMMENDATION: 1. Verify the traffic control point locations and update the City of Manchester, NH Radiological Emergency Response for Nuclear Facilities Plan Host Community procedure to reflect the actual verbal description of the traffic control points.

2. Train the appropriate staff on any procedure revisions made for the traffic control point locations.

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 51

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SECTION 4: CONCLUSION 52

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station APPENDIX A: BEST PRACTICES

1. Demonstrated Strengths Summary: Demonstrated Strengths

==

Description:==

NH State Emergency Operations Center

- The staff in the NH SEOC was knowledgeable and worked very well as a team. The Director relied on the expertise of the staff to assist her to make informed and appropriate decisions to protect the people of New Hampshire. There was strong internal collaboration between the NH SEOC Director and the SEOC staff members, most notably, the dialogue between the Unified Command, Operations and Planning staffs. Regular meetings between SEOC decision-making personnel were held in a dedicated SEOC conference room, which minimized distractions while facilitating exchange of needed informnation and viewpoints, aiding in the ability to formulate protective action recommendations in a timely manner. Additionally, the Public Information Officer and Communication Officer and their staff had great teamwork and collaboration. Both teams were very efficient with their work; they were very proactive in preparation of assignments and always timely with the completion of their tasks.

NH (SS) Emergency Operations Facility

" Excellent teamwork

" Constant reference to plans and procedures NH Incident Field Office (SS)

- Local Liaisons demonstrated outstanding service to local communities by providing clear instructions and assistance for a number of aspects of the emergency response, including:

WebEOC navigation, making requests for assistance from state and/or neighboring communities, and general situational awareness. Many liaisons went above and beyond to track down information for local communities.

- Local Liaisons had a genuine team mentality and were continually looking out for one another to insure that no liaison missed important activities.

NH State Police Communications Center, NH State Warning Point

- The New Hampshire State Police Dispatch Shift Supervisor demonstrated a commendable level of knowledge and familiarity of plans and procedures while carrying out his notification 53

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station responsibilities. Emergency information was relayed clearly, accurately and in a timely manner.

Rockingham County Dispatch Center 0 No demonstrated strengths NH (SS) Joint Information Center

• No demonstrated strengths NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-1

- The New Hampshire Rad Health Laboratory maintains supplies of older radiation survey equipment, including Eberline RO-2s and Eberline E- 140Ns. These instruments were within current calibration and provide backup instrumentation to replace malfunctioning or contaminated primary equipment, to equip additional monitoring and survey teams, and to compare performance and readings of primary instrumentation.

NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2

- No demonstrated strengths Brentwood Local EOC

• The Brentwood Emergency Management Director provided outstanding leadership, including providing accurate, up to date materials for each staff position, sharing information as available to create a common operating picture, and clearly inspiring confidence in the Selectmen present as well as among his staff.

East Kingston Local EOC

- The East Kingston Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Emergency Management Director (EMD) showed excellent command and control. Several of the staff, including the EMD, was new to their positions; however, the entire EOC staff clearly demonstrated knowledge of their positions and responsibilities. They used their checklists and collaborated with each other on similar tasks.

Exeter Local EOC

- The Town of Exeter, New Hampshire did an outstanding job integrating real time public alert and notifications into their EOC operations by updating the towns cable access channel with a drill message that both informed the public that the EOC was activated as part of the drill and 54

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station validated the ability to access, update and control this public access television station from the EOC in an actual emergency.

- The Town of Exeter, New Hampshire should be commended for their integration of public and private sector stakeholders into their EOC in order to better foster a whole of conmmnity environment. Exeter had representatives from Exeter Hospital, a major city medical facility and employer and Philips Exeter Academy, a large private boarding school with an extensive international student presence, integrated into their EOC operations allowing for rapid communication and coordination between these non-government stakeholders and town leadership.

Greenland Local EOC

• No demonstrated strengths Hampton Local EOC

- No demonstrated strengths Hampton Falls Local EOC

• Hampton Falls Selectmen were present throughout the exercise in the EOC; their relationship with the EMD was one of obvious mutual trust and respect. All decisions were discussed thoroughly among this group and decisions were ultimately based on which actions resulted in the highest level of safety for the public. The EMD demonstrated an extraordinary command presence while maintaining a calm and reserved demeanor. His leadership was laudable and his operational methods assured total cooperation from every responding agency.

Kensington Local EOC

- No demonstrated strengths Kingston NH Local EOC

- The Kingston, NH Police Chief injected a situation whereby a passenger train was disabled within their community. This prompted lively discussion of what to do with the 80 passengers on board. The pros and cons of responsibility and liability were debated.

New Castle Local EOC

- The New Castle EOC personnel functioned as a well-trained and well-experienced integrated 55

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Inprovement Plan Seabrook Station team in all areas. Each individual displayed expertise in executing his/her responsibilities and duties.

Newfields Local EOC

- The persomnel in the Newfields EOC demonstrated adherence to procedures and good teamwork.

• The Emergency Management Director assisted by the Police Chief demonstrated effective leadership skills in the management of the EOC response.

- The laminated poster-sized copies of the Dosimetry-KI Report Form utilized by the RADEF/Health Officer enhanced his dosimetry briefing and were effective tools to enable a better understanding of his instructions by the EOC staff.

Newton Local EOC

- No demonstrated strengths North Hampton Local EOC

- The Emergency Management Director (EMD), at the North Hampton Emergency Operations Center (EOC), demonstrated a strong ability to resolve conflicts. Communications between the North Hampton EOC and the Local Liaison at the Incident Field Office (IFO) was lost. To resolve this breakdown, the EMD used alternative phone numbers with no success. Then he directed the Fire Chief to use the State WebEOC to notify them of the problem.

Communications were re-established with the Liaison at the IFO and there was no loss of information flow.

Portsmouth Local EOC

- The Portsmouth EOC Emergency Management Director demonstrated excellent leadership leading up to and during the 2014 Seabrook Station Hostile Action Based Evaluated Exercise.

He has continued to stress the importance of training and staff participation in drills and exercises. This was evident, as all positions were manned and staff was fully engaged throughout the entire exercise.

Rochester Local EOC

• The EOC staff has worked together for a long time. They are familiar with each other's strengths and fully understand the process.

56

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Rye Local EOC

- No demonstrated strengths Seabrook Local EOC

- The Town of Seabrook Emergency Management Director (EMD) provided consistent, accurate, and ongoing details through briefings to the EOC staff concerning the incident at Seabrook Station. The EMD continued to provide necessary information to his staff throughout the exercise, provided opportunities for feedback from each Emergency Support Function (ESF) position, and maintained excellent direction and control that contributed to a successful response by the Town of Seabrook.

- The Town of Seabrook Police Department demonstrated the capability to provided protection and security to their staff and the public through an actual incident at the police dispatch center.

At the beginning of the exercise an individual identified as a serious threat to the public was observed parked outside of the Town of Seabrook Police Station. While observing and identifying the suspect on camera, the dispatcher notified back-up law enforcement officers as a precaution to respond to the entrance of the police station. Unknown to law enforcement of the intentions of the individual, four law enforcement officers greeted the suspect outside of the police station and took him into custody without incident.

South Hampton Local EOC

• The South Hampton response organization used the HAB exercise to train some of the next generation of responders. It's extremely heartening to see young people taking an active role in response organizations.

Stratham Local EOC

- Each of the distributed DRDS and TLDs has a unique identifying serial number and bar code.

The Radiological Officer has provided a personal bar code reader to read and record the bar codes on each of the devices. The serial numbers are then automatically entered onto the spreadsheet. This innovative process assures that each device is expressly linked to particular individuals and avoids potential errors.

- For a community of approximately 7,500 residents, Stratham Town has an EOC worthy of a much larger municipality. To its credit, several years ago the Town invested heavily in constructing a modem facility to provide a location to manage any hazards that might occur in 57

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Town. The main EOC is a large room sufficient to readily handle all possible staff, with sophisticated electronics for both wired and wireless Internet connections, flat-screen displays on the walls displaying WebEOC and other data, a well-equipment side communications room, fully handicapped accessible via an elevator to the second floor, convenient restrooms, and various other conveniences. The facility was well designed to facilitate interaction among the staff to assure a coordinated community response.

Dover Local EOC

• No demonstrated strengths Manchester Local EOC

• The Manchester EOC has purchased fifty (50) LED light signs which will be used to display emergency messages in the Manchester city area on a real-time basis to advise of the emergency status or actions to be taken.

Massachusetts State Emergency Operations Center

- The Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) demonstrated its expertise in responding to an incident at Seabrook Station. The leadership was insightful and efficient, and MEMA staff members at all levels were clearly highly skilled in their positions. The Public Affairs Officer and his staff were proactive in modifying the sheltering in place News Release template to more accurately reflect a non-release situation. The dispatchers completed their notifications in record time. All players displayed their commitment to public safety and their dedication to accomplishing the task at hand.

MA Region I EOC

• No demonstrated strengths MA (SS) Joint Infornation Center

- The Massachusetts Public Information Officer (PIO) and Assistant PIOs were successful, efficient, and flexible in fulfilling their duties and disseminating information to the media. The staff was very well organized, promptly dealt with communication complications, and provided the most up-to-date information about events underway during media briefings to ensure their constituents were aware of all situations.

MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-1 58

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

- No demonstrated strengths MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2

• No demonstrated strengths Amesbury Local EOC

- The City of Amesbury Emergency Operations Center staff commitment to safety of the public is shown through dedication and knowledge of emergency response.

Merrimac Local EOC

- No demonstrated strengths Newbury Local EOC

- No demonstrated strengths Newburyport Local EOC

- No demonstrated strengths Salisbury Local EOC

- Briefings were conducted frequently and in a very professional manner with full participation by all.

West Newbury Local EOC

- No demonstrated strengths MA Media Center

• The staff and director of United Way MA 211 clearly demonstrated their knowledge of plans and procedures for handling the various types of telephone calls from citizens in the Seabrook Power Station Emergency Planning Zone.

Seabrook Police Incident Command Post

• No demonstrated strengths 59

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station APPENDIX B: EXERCISE TIMELINE Table 1 - Exercise Timeline DATE: 2014-11-05, SITE: Seabrook Station, NH 1 * * ,...1 .. .1 . 1,:,

'.. . , . .. ..: ,f.:. .

Unusual Event N/A'*N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Alert N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Site Area Emergency 0756 0812 0804 0821 0807 0814 0811 General Emergency 0921 0936 0923 0946 0947 0942 0945 Simulated Rad. Release Started N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Simulated Rad. Release N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Terminated Facility Declared Operational 0815 0839 0736 0750 0840 0730 Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency 0822 N/A 0822 N/A 0922 0841 Declaration of Local Emergency N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Exercise Terminated 1035 1031 1035 1035 1030 1032 Precautionary Actions: Close Parks & Beaches N/A 0837 0954 N/A 0853 0841 Precautionary Actions: Restrict Water Traffic 0841 N/A 0954 N/A 1003 N/A Precautionary Actions: Restrict Rail Traffic 0937 N/A 0954 N/A 1003 0945 Precautionary Actions: Restrict Airspace 0937 N/A 0954 N/A 1003 0954 Precautionary Actions: Shelter Livestock, Stored 0841 N/A 0954 N/A 0853 0841 Feed & Water Ist A & N Decision: 0837 N/A 0842 0841 0853 0841 1st Siren Activation 0849 N/A 0849 0849 0853 0849 I st EAS Message 0852 N/A 0852 0852 0853 0852 2nd A & N Decision: 0948 0948 0955 0952 1003 0954 2nd Siren Activation 1000 1000 1000 1000 1003 1000 2nd EAS Message 1003 1003 1003 10003 1003 1003 KI Administration Decision: Emergency N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Workers Advised to take KI KI Administration Decision: General Public N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Advised to take KI KI Administration Decision: Emergency N/A 0948 N/A N/A N/A N/A Workers Advised NOT to take KI KI Administration Decision: General Public N/A 0948 N/A N/A N/A N/A Advised NOT to take KI I I I 60

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Table 1 - Exercise Timeline DATE: 2014-11-05, SITE: Seabrook Station, NH 0

Emrgnc ClasstIfication Level or 2 Event. .. .. ........ .

Unusual Event N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Alert N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Site Area Emergency 0756 0814 0814 0813 0814 0812 0810 General Emergency 0921 0945 0949 0954 0945 0950 0945 Simulated Rad. Release Started N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Simulated Rad. Release N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Termninated______ ______

Facility Declared Operational 0815 0830 0817 0823 0815 0810 Governors Declaration of State of Emergency 0841 0822 0854 0841 0843 0842 Declaration of Local Emergency N/A N/A N/A N/A 0852 N/A Exercise Ten-ninated 1037 1035 1040 1039 1039 1038 Precautionary Actions: Close Parks & Beaches 0841 0841 0854 0954 0958 0958 Precautionary Actions: Restrict Water Traffic 0841 084] 0854 0954 0843 0842 Precautionary Actions: Restrict Rail Traffic 0954 0954 1001 0954 0958 0958 Precautionary Actions: Restrict Airspace 0954 0954 1001 0954 . 0958 0958 Precautionary Actions: Shelter Livestock, Stored 0841 0841 0854 0841 0843 0846 Feed & Water Ist A & N Decision: N/A 0845 0854 0841 0843 0845 1st Siren Activation 0842 0849 0849 0849 0849 0849 I1st EAS Message 0842 0852 0852 0852 0852 0852 2nd A & NDecision: N/A 0954 1001 0954 N/A 0958 2nd Siren Activation 0954 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 2nd EAS Message 0954 1003 1003 1003 1003 1003 K, Administration Decision: Etnergency N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Workers Advised to take KI KI Administration Decision: General Putblic N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Advised to take KI____________

KI Administration Decision: Emergency N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Workers Advised NOT to take NA N N KI Administration Decision: General Public N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Advised NOT to take RI N/A N/INA_/A_/ I___N/A 61

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Table 1 - Exercise Timeline DATE: 2014-11-05, SITE: Seabrook Station, NH Unusual Event N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Alert N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Site Area Emergency 0756 0812 0815 0819 0815 0814 0815 General Emergzency 0921 0950 0945 0945 0935 0950 0948 Simulated Rad. Release Started N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Simulated Rad. Release N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Terminated Facility Declared Operational 0814 0737 0738 0735 0815 0823 Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency N/A 0841 0845 0841 0847 0908 Declaration of Local Emergency N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Exercise Termninated 1037 1037 1035 1032 1040 1039 Precautionary Actions: Close Parks & Beaches N/A N/A N/A 0954 0849 0843 Precautionary Actions: Restrict Water Traffic 0841 N/A N/A 0841 0849 0843 Precautionary Actions: Restrict Rail Traffic 0954 N/A N/A 0954 0950 0843 Precautionary Actions: Restrict Airspace N/A N/A N/A 0954 0950 0843 Precautionary Actions: Shelter Livestock, Stored 0841 N/A N/45 0141 0849 0843 Feed & Water ImstA & N Decision: N/A N/A 0845 N/A N/A 0843 1Fst Siren Activation 0849 0849 0849 0841 0849 0849 1st EAoS MessaSee N/A 0852 N/A 0914 0852 090852 2nd A & N Decision: N/A N/A 0945 N/A N/A 0957 2nd Siren Activation 1000 1000 1000 0955 1000 1000 2nd EAS Message N/A 1003 1003 1017 1003 1003 KI Administration Decision: Emergency N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Workers Advised to take KI KI Administration Decision: General Public N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Advised to take KI KI Administration Decision: Emergency N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Workers Advised NOT to take 0I9 N0 KI Administration Decision: General Public N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Advised NOT to take KI 62

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Table 1 - Exercise Timeline DATE: 2014-11-05, SITE: Seabrook Station, NH C.) C-)

0 0

• **!*iit~aionL 0~'

0 0 0

.0 Y

~s.

.5) c':t 5/2 Unusual Event N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Alert N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Site Area Emergency 0756 0836 0816 0821 0811 0811 0826 General Emergency 0921 0950 0945 0931 0950 0945 0926 Simulated Rad. Release Started N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Simulated Rad. Release N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Terminated Facility Declared Operational 0850 0821 0740 0814 0815 0845 Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency 0844 0841 0822 0841 0822 0841 Declaration of Local Emergency N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Exercise Terminated 1041 1038 1032 1040 1035 1038 Precautionary Actions: Close Parks & Beaches 0957 0841 0840 0854 0811 0954 Precautionary Actions: Restrict Water Traffic 0844 0841 0954 0954 0945 0841 Precautionary Actions: Restrict Rail Traffic 0957 1000 0954 0954 0954 0954 Precautionary Actions: Restrict Airspace 0957 1000 0954 0954 0954 0954 Precautionary Actions: Shelter Livestock, Stored 0844 0841 0840 0954 0822 0841 Feed & Water 1st A & N Decision: 0844 0841 0840 0841 0822 0843 1st Siren Activation 0844 0849 0849 0849 0849 0849 1st EAS Message 0844 0852 0852 0852 0852 0852 2nd A & N Decision: 0957 0954 0954 0954 0954 0956 2nd Siren Activation 0957 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 2nd EAS Message 0957 1003 1003 1003 1003 1003 KI Administration Decision: Emergency N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Workers Advised to take KI KI Administration Decision: General Public N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Advised to take KI KI Administration Decision: Emergency N/A N/A 0954 N/A N/A N/A Workers Advised NOT to take KI KI Administration Decision: General Public N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Advised NOT to take KI 63

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Table 1 - Exercise Timeline DATE: 2014-11-05, SITE: Seabrook Station, NH Emergen ivClassification Level or

• Ev.

• n -"

., ... .- t.* . . . ., ,

II.I  :. ..

Unusual Event N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Alert N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Site Area Emergency 0756 0814 0801 0815 0814 0807 0810 General Emerzency 0921 0950 0929 0954 0942 0939 0935 Simulated Rad. Release Started N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Simulated Rad. Release N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Terninated Facility Declared Operational 0855 0807 0811 0840 0811 0820 Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency 0954 0925 0925 0925 0925 0925 Declaration of Local Emergency N/A N/A 0851 N/A 0851 N/A Exercise Terminated 1039 1055 1057 1030 1039 1058 Precautionary Actions: Close Parks & Beaches N/A 0837 0844 0849 0849 N/A Precautionary Actions: Restrict Water Traffic N/A N/A 0844 0849 0849 N/A Precautionary Actions: Restrict Rail Traffic N/A N/A 0845 N/A N/A N/A Precautionary Actions: Restrict Airspace N/A N/A 0845 N/A N/A N/A Precautionary Actions: Shelter Livestock, Stored N/A 1025 N/A N/A 1013 N/A Feed & Water 1st A & N Decision: N/A 0837 0843 N/A 0839 0907 1st Siren Activation N/A 0849 0849 0849 0849 0849 1st EAS Message N/A 0852 0852 0852 0852 0852 2nd A & N Decision: 0954 0948 0954 N/A N/A N/A 2nd Siren Activation 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 N/A 2nd EAS Message 1003 1003 1003 1003 1003 N/A KI Administration Decision: Emergency N/A 1025 1025 N/A N/A 1048 Workers Advised to take KI KI Administration Decision: General Public N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Advised to take KI KI Administration Decision: Emergency N/A 0948 N/A N/A 1013 N/A Workers Advised NOT to take KI KI Administration Decision: General Public N/A 0948 1047 N/A N/A N/A Advised NOT to take KI 64

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Table 1 - Exercise Timeline DATE: 2014-11-05, SITE: Seabrook Station, NH U U Emergency Classtficat*on Lev!e o , . ' 0 E~~vent Unusual Event N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Alert N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Site Area Emergency 0756 0811 0809 0815 0808 General Emergency 0921 0944 0942 0943 0944 Simulated Rad. Release Started N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Simulated Rad. Release N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Terminated Facility Declared Operational 0811 0823 0815 0820 Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency 0925 0945 0929 0937 Declaration of Local Emergency 0926 0950 0930 0908 Exercise Tenninated 1102 1058 1057 1058 Precautionary Actions: Close Parks & Beaches 0846 0845 0845 0844 Precautionary Actions: Restrict Water Traffic 0846 0845 0845 0844 Precautionary Actions: Restrict Rail Traffic N/A N/A N/A 0844 Precautionary Actions: Restrict Airspace N/A N/A N/A 0844 Precautionary Actions: Shelter Livestock, Stored 1023 1051 1025 0844 Feed & Water Ist A & N Decision: 0843 0837 0845 0844 1st Siren Activation 0849 0849 0849 0849 1st EAS Message 0852 0852 0852 0852 2nd A & N Decision: 0958 0953 0955 0944 2nd Siren Activation 1000 1000 1000 1000 2nd EAS Message 1003 1003 1003 1003 KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers 1055 1051 1025 1050 Advised to take KI KI Administration Decision: General Public N/A N/A N/A N/A Advised to take KI KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers N/A N/A N/A N/A Advised NOT to take KI KI Administration Decision: General Public N/A N/A N/A N/A Advised NOT to take KI 65

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/]mprovement Plan Seabrook Station APPENDIX C: EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS 66

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station DATE: 2014-11-05, SITE: Seabrook Station, NH LOCATION.  :', EVALUATOR AGENCY NH State Emergency Operations Center Rosemary Samsel ICFI Mario Vigliani ICFI Miriam Weston FEMA RII NH (SS) Emergency Operations Facility Timothy Harris III Department of

• Martin Vyenielo Homeland Kenneth Wierman Security FEMA RIII FEMA HQ NH Incident Field Office (SS) *Cara Christianson-Riley FEMA RVII NH State Police Communications Center, NH State Warning Point *James Greer ICFI Rockingham County Dispatch Center *Laura Forrest FEMA RII Thomas Gahan ICFI NH (SS) Joint Information Center *Patricia Gardner FEMA - HQ NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-i *Michael Howe FEMA HQ NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2 *Michael Shuler FEMA RIIl Massachusetts State Emergency Operations Center Deborah Blunt ICFI

• Ingrid Pierce FEMA RI Bruce Swiren ICFI MA Region I EOC *Darren Bates FEMA HQ Ronald Bonmer ICFI Robert O'Sullivan FEMA - RI MA (SS) Joint Information Center *Rebecca Fontenot FEMA HQ Bruce Foreman FEMA HQ MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-I *Anthony Honnellio EPA MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2 *Johanma Berkey FEMA RIX MA Media Center *Robert Swartz FEMA RI Brentwood Local EOC William Palmer ICFI

• Laurel Ryan FEMA RIX East Kingston Local EOC Robert Lemeshka ICFI

• Lee Torres FEMA RIII Exeter Local EOC Frank Cordaro ICFI

• Ryan Jones FEMA - RI Greenland Local EOC Thomas Essig ICFI

• David Petta ICFI Hampton Local EOC *Brian Hasemann FEMA RII Samuel Nelson ICFI Hampton Falls Local EOC *Mark Dalton ICFI James Hickey ICFI Kensington Local EOC *Paul Nied ICFI Michele Skiermont ICFI Kingston NH Local EOC Sonia Eischen ICFI

• Marynette Herndon ICFI New Castle Local EOC Michael Burriss ICFI

• Daryl Thome ICFI Newfields Local EOC *Reggie Rodgers ICFI Cheryl Weaver ICFI Newton Local EOC *David Jacobson ICFI Meg Swearingen ICFI North Hampton Local EOC Robert Duggleby ICFI

• Kent Tosch ICFI 67

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Portsmouth Local EOC *Taneeka Hollins FEMA RI Matthew Wiedemer FEMA RIIl Rye Local EOC *Gary Goldberg ICFI John Zeidler ICFI Seabrook Local EOC Korkean Dulgerian FEMA RII

• Joseph Suders FEMA RIlI South Hampton Local EOC *Joseph Keller ICFI Brenda Rembert ICFI Stratham Local EOC *Danny Loomis ICFI Michael Meshenberg ICFI Hampton: Fun After School Program *Brian Kennedy FEMA Amesbury Local EOC Clark Duffy ICFI

• Brian Kennedy FEMA Merrimac Local EOC David Kayen ICFI

• Bill Webb FEMA RX Newbury Local EOC *Marcy Campbell ICFI Richard Fournier ICFI Newburyport Local EOC *Jill Leatherman ICFI Rebecca Thomson ICFI Salisbury Local EOC *Terry Blackmon ICFI John Wiecjorek ICFI West Newbury Local EOC *Gary Bolender ICFI Michael Henry ICFI Seabrook Police Incident Command Post *Bridget Ahlgrim FEMA HQ Larry Broockerd FEMA HQ B.uilding Block School Brian Kennedy FEMA Langdon Place of Exeter Brian Kennedy FEMA Kingston Child Center Brian Kennedy FEMA The Village Preschool Brian Kennedy FEMA Hampton Falls Child Care Center Brian Kennedy FEMA The Learning Tree Brian Kennedy FEMA Rochester Local EOC John McGough FEMA - RI

• Clayton Spangenberg ICFI Dover Local EOC *Robert Noecker ICFI Richard Watts ICFI Dover MS Reception Center Operations Brian Kennedy FEMA Dover MS Reception Center Dosimetry Brian Kennedy FEMA Dover MS Reception Center Portal & Secondary Monitoring Brian Kennedy FEMA Dover MS Reception Center Female Mon/Decon Brian Kennedy FEMA Dover MS Reception Center Male Mon/Decon Brian Kennedy FEMA Dover MS Reception Center KI Decision Brian Kennedy FEMA Dover MS Reception Center Registration Brian Kennedy FEMA Dover MS Reception Center Vehicle Mon/Decon Brian Kennedy FEMA Manchester Local EOC Alan Bevan ICFI

___*Wes Ryals ICFI MA State Police Assembly- Troop A *Brian Kennedy FEMA

. Team. Leader 68

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvemnent Plan Seabrook Station APPENDIX D: EXERCISE PLAN 69

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/inprovement Plan Seabrook Station WITHHOLD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE CONFIDENTIAL (until 11/6/14) owember 5 CFE 14-05 U 20 In the interest of assuring that the health and safety of the general public is protected in the event of an accident at Seabrook Station, and to meet the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E, NextEra Energy plans and CFE 14- 05 conducts training drills.

70

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station WITHHOLD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE CONFIDENTIAL (until 11/6/14)

Contents A. Objectives and Extent-of-Play .................................................................................................................

Sco p e ................................................................................................................................................. A-1 Objectives ......................................................................................................................................... A-3 Ru le s .................................................................................................................................................. A-7 VISITOR OBSERVATION RULES .......................................................................................................... A-9 B. Participant Instructions ...........................................................................................................................

B.1 Responder Briefings .................................................................................................................... B-3 GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................ B-3 Control Room (Sim ulator) .................................................................................................................. B-5 Technical Support Center ................................................................................................................... B-6 Em ergency Offsite Facility .................................................................................................................. B-6 Operations Support Center ................................................................................................................ B-7 Field M onitoring Teams ..................................................................................................................... B-7 Assem bly Area .................................................................................................................................... B-8 B.2 GENERAL CONTROLLER GUIDANCE ........................................................................................... B-9 B.3 LEAD FACILITY CONTROLLER GENERAL GUIDANCE ............................................................... B-11 B.3.1 CONTROL ROOM LEAD CONTROLLER (SIM ULATOR) ............................................................. B-12 B.3.2. TSC - LEAD CONTROLLER ....................................................................................................... B-14 B.3.3 OSC - LEAD CONTROLLER ....................................................................................................... B-16 B.3.3 EOF - LEAD CONTROLLER ....................................................................................................... B-18 B.3.4 JIC - LEAD CONTROLLER ........................................................................................................ B-21 B.3.5 ASSEM BLY AREA - LEAD CONTROLLER .................................................................................. B-24 B.3.6 GUARD ISLAND CONTROLLER ................................................................................................ B-25 ATT B-1 ERO CONTROLLER ORGANIZATION .................................................................................... B-26 ATT B-2 ERO TELEPHONE DIRECTORY ............................................................................................. B-27 ATT B-3 TYPICAL DRILL / EXERCISE CONTROLLER LOG ..................................................................... B-28 ATT B-4 Drill Participant Com m ent Form ......................................................................................... B-30 B.4 FACILITY CRITIQUE PROCESS ..................................................................................................... B-32 C. Scenario Description and Tim eline .........................................................................................................

71 NARRATIVE SUM M ARY ...................................................................................................................... C-1

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ....................................................................................................................... C-4 SHIFT TURNOVER INFORM ATION ...................................................................................................... C-4 DRILL SIM ULATOR SCENARIO INSTRUCTIONS ................................................................................... C-7 DRILL SIM ULATOR SCENARIO INSTRUCTIONS - CFE 14- 05 ............................................................... C-7 CONTROLLER INFORM ATION ............................................................................................................. C-9 D. Me ssa g e s.................................................................................................................................................

MESSAGE NO.: D.1 ............................................................................................................................ D-1 MESSAGE NO.: D.2 ............................................................................................................................ D-2 MESSAGE NO.: D.3 ............................................................................................................................ D-3 MESSAGE NO.: D.4 ............................................................................................................................ D-4 MESSAGE NO.: D.5 ............................................................................................................................ D-5 MESSAGE NO.: D.6 ............................................................................................................................ D-6 MESSAGE NO.: D.7 ............................................................................................................................ D-7 MESSAGE NO.: D.8 ............................................................................................................................ D-8 MESSAGE NO.: D.9 ............................................................................................................................ D-9 MESSAGE NO.: D.10 ........................................................................................................................ D-10 M ESSAGE NO.: D.11 ........................................................................................................................ D-11 MESSAGE NO.: D.12 ........................................................................................................................ D-12 MESSAGE NO.: D.13 ........................................................................................................................ D-13 MESSAGE NO.: D.14 ........................................................................................................................ D-14 MESSAGE NO:D.15 .......................................................................................................................... D-17 MESSAGE NO: D.16 ......................................................................................................................... D-18 MESSAGE NO.: D.17 ........................................................................................................................ D-19 MESSAGE NO: D.18 ......................................................................................................................... D-21 MESSAGE NO: D.19 ......................................................................................................................... D-22 MESSAGE NO: D.20 ......................................................................................................................... D-23 MESSAGE NO: D.21 ......................................................................................................................... D-24 MESSAGE NO.: D.22 ........................................................................................................................ D-25 E. M ini-Scenarios ........................................................................................................................................

E.1 CONTROL CELL INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXTERNAL ERO INTERFACE SIMULATIONS ......................... E-1 E.2 Service W ater Pum p House Repair Team Investigation .............................................................. E-5 E.3 EOD Investigation .................. .............................. E-7 E.4 M S-V-22 ....................................................................................................................................... E-1

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station F. Plant Parameter Data ......................................................................................................................... F-i G. Radiological Data .............................................................................................................................. G-1 H. M eteorological Data ......................................................................................................................... H-1 I. Ch e m istry Data ................................................................................................................................... I-1 73

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SCENARIO REVIEW AND APPROVAL Drill / Exercise

Title:

CFE 14- 05 Date(s): November 5, 2014 (drill / exercise title)

1. The following Emergency Response Organization (ERO) facilities will be activated in this drill / exercise:

[] Simulator Control Room AlternativeTechnical Support 0 Center 7x AlternativeOperational Support

[] Emergency Operations Facility Center

[] JIC / ENC Remote Monitoring Area

[] Onsite Assembly Area Offsite Laboratory

2. The following ERO objectives will be demonstrated in this drill / exercise.

See attacheddrill package

3. The following initiating events will be used in this drill / exercise.

See attached drillpackage.

4. To support scheduled implementation, please complete all reviews by:

I have reviewed the attached drill / exercise scenario material, and concur that the scenario:

• is adequate to support demonstration of the intended objectives.

• me ets the scenario r se crjter" of the Emergency Preparedness Drill and Exercise Procedure.

EP Manager/ Supervisor: _____________Date: * .'

I have reviewed the attached drill / exercise scenario material, and concur that the selected scenario events are acceptable for development and implementation.

Plant General Manager I Station Director: Date:

Site Vice President: Date:

74

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Inprovement Plan Seabrook Station I

A. Objectives and Extent-of-Play 75

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Withhold from Public Disclosure Scope On November 5, 2014, an NRC-evaluated Hostile Action-Based (HAB) Exercise will be conducted at Seabrook Station, which is designed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F. The primary purpose of this Exercise is to demonstrate Seabrook Station's capability to protect the health and safety of the public during a HAB event. This Drill will evaluate the integrated capability of the Emergency Response Organization responding to a Hostile Action event. A portion of the Radiation Emergency Plan's basic elements will also be evaluated. The expected emergency classification and related notification will be evaluated for the Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator.

The postulated HAB emergency will require mobilization and response of onsite and offsite personnel to evaluate their capability to respond in an actual HAB emergency. Since Seabrook Station has opted to demonstrate its Alternative Emergency Response Facilities for this Exercise (reference NEI 06-04 Rev. 2, Appendix A, Objective #10), the HAB event is simulated to occur on a Saturday morning.

The Alternative Technical Support Center (ATSC), Alternative Operational Support Center (AOSC),

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and Joint Information Center (JIC), all located at 108 Corporate Drive in Portsmouth, NH, will be operational to support activities. The Simulator Control Room, located at the Operations Training Center, will be used in place of the actual Control Room. A Drill-NRC Control Cell will be used to simulate the requisite Control Room and ENS Communicator communications. A Drill-CAS/SAS cell will be located in General Office Building (GOB), to be used in lieu of actual CAS/SAS for onsite Security-related communications and coordination, and for Drill injects as necessary to progress the scenario. Associated phone numbers or extensions can be found in the "Participant Instructions" section of this Drill Book, and will be made available to Exercise participants.

The simulated Hostile Action attack will require activation and operation of an Incident Command Post (ICP), from which resources from Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) will be coordinated. The designated ICP in the GOB to be the ICP for this Exercise.

ERDS will be activated and used to provide plant data during this Exercise.

Given that the focus of a HAB response is communication and coordination between Control Room, Security, the ERO, and the ICP, it was not necessary to include actual resources of the offsite response organizations in the Exercise. Therefore, response by EMS, fire, law enforcement, etc. inside the protected area will be simulated via Drill injects.

Given that the scenario is to occur on a Saturday morning, Exercise participation on site will be limited to what would be a normal shift staff:

Operations in the Simulator Control Room 5 Nuclear System Operators 76 1 Shift Chemist

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Withhold from Public Disclosure 1 Health Physics Technician The required Security complement.

All Exercise-related public address announcements will begin with "this is a Drill Message" and end with "this is a Drill Message-- All personnel not involved in the Drill please disregard this message." This is being done to allow the balance of the plant contingent not involved in the Exercise to conduct normal plant business while the above-listed shift staff personnel carry out the onsite portion of the Exercise needed to support the Exercise objectives.

There will be very limited Drill play within the Plant. However, personnel may be requested by the Control Room, and later the ERO, to respond to various locations or equipment for assessments, troubleshooting, and maintenance. Such activities are expected to be coordinated between Security and the Control Room onsite, with law enforcement and the ICP, and later with the ERO to ensure adequate protection of personnel from any remaining adversaries after such time as all known adversaries are neutralized. Such requests may come before the arrival of offsite repair teams onsite, in order to provide the Control Room and the ERO an earlier assessment of repair needs and priorities, or the more timely completion of a high-priority task. However, the scenario encourages the need for repair teams to be dispatched from the ATSC/AOSC.

It should be noted that weaponry, attack targets, numbers of adversaries, etc. included in this scenario are not part of the Design Basis Threat.

77

CFE14- OS OBJECTIVES ies

!s are based upon Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements provided in 10CFR50, Appendix E, Emergency Planningand Preparednessfor Production and Utilization Facilities, and inspection criteria listed in the NRC Inspection Manual.

i1 guidance provided in NUREG 0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev 1, Criteriafor Preparationand Evaluation of Rodiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparednessin Support of Nuclear Power Plants, was used in developing the objectives.

specific drill objectives are described in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Drill and Exercise Manual, Chapter 3. NexteraEnergy Nuclear Fleet Planning Standards are described in EP-AA-101-1000, NUCLEAR DIVISION DRILL AND PROCEDURE.

evaluation criterion for each objective is provided to event Controllers in section B.

• AA-101-1000 EP-AA-101-1000 EPDE JING STANDARD DECRIPTION FACILITY OBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE FR 50.47(b)(#)]

'0 Demonstrate the ability to provide overall command and control of the emergency response by initiating, coordinating and implementing timely and  ;-t Command and I Control effective decisions during the event. Additionally, demonstrate the management of the ERFs by providing command and control within each facility.

signment of Demonstrate the coordination of the implementation of emergency

?sponsibility 2 Operational measures and the exchange of information between the utility and Federal, Agreements State and local agencies and other support organizations having an emergency response role within the EPZ.

Continuous Demonstrate the capability to establish and maintain continuous (24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) A.7 Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the station emergency response organization and EOF Operations operations for a protracted period, activate station emergency response facilities in a timely manner. TSC 0

site Emergency 3 Line of Demonstrate the ability to transfer overall command and control of the AS. Demonstrate the ability of on-shift personnel to implement the station emergency plan CR E on

'ganizate rnLesof and to transfer appropriate emergency-related functions to other emergency response TSC rganization Succession emergency response. organization personnel. EOF A7. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the station emergency response organization CR Offsite Demonstrate the ability to notify the offsite Emergency Response 1 Notifications* Organizations consistent with the classification scheme including the and activate station emergency response facilities in a timely manner. TSC otification Methods verification of messages in a timely manner. EOF id Procedures A7. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the station emergency response organization CR 2 ERO Notification Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and mobilize ERO personnel, and activate station emergency response facilities in a timely manner. Guard Island A4. Demonstrate the ability to gather, assess, coordinate, and disseminate 1 Primary Media Demonstrate the ability to provide points of contact and physical locations information regarding station emergency conditions and emergency response JIC Accommodations for use by the news media at the Joint Information Center. activities.

iblic Education And formation 2 Media Briefing Demonstrate the ability of the Corporate Spokespersons to brief the media A15 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the preparation, review and release of JIC 0' in a clear, accurate and timely manner, public information, and to provide timely and accurate information to the media 0

SIGNIFICANT PLANNING STANDARD A-3

CFE 14- 05 OBJECTIVES

.AA-101-1000 EP-AA-101-1000 EPDE JING STANDARD DECRIPTION FACILITY C OBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE

FR50.47(b)(#)]

and general public.

Exchange of 3 Public Demonstrate timely exchange of public information among designated JIC Information agency spokespersons.

iTSC 1 Support Of Emergency Demonstrate the adequacy of the TSC to support emergency response A7. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the station emergency response organization Operations activities. and activate station emergency response facilities in a timely manner. TSC EOF Support Of 2Emergency Demonstrate the adequacy of the EOF to support emergency response A7. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the station emergency response organization nergency Facilities Operations activities. and activate station emergency response facilities in a timely manner.

id Equipment OSCSupport Of Demonstrate the adequacy of the OSC to support emergency response A7. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the station emergency response organization OSC 3 Emergency S 00 Operations activities, and activate station emergency response facilities in a timely manner.

6 Meteorological Demonstrate the ability to obtain current and forecasted meteorological No Specific Correlation TSC Data information from primary as well as back-up and alternate sources. EOF Accident Demonstrate the ability to provide initial values and continuing assessment Al, P11. Demonstrate the ability to recognize station conditions and parameter CR

cident Assessment 1 Recognition And throughout the course of an accident as well as the parameter values which trends as emergency plan initiating conditions, and to develop potential solutions TSC Assessment* correspond to the initiating conditions for EALs and PARs. for placing the station in a safe, stable condition. EOF 0m EXERCISE/ DRILL Demonstrate the capability to prepare a scenario drill or exercise package to JNDUCT DRILLS PREPARATION allow for training and testing of stations Emergency Response Plan.

VJDEXERCISE EXERCISE / DRILL Demonstrate the capability to conduct drill / exercise and evaluate 0)

EVALUATION performance.

TSC EOF Demonstrate the ability to implement the emergency plan during a hostile OSC action-based event. CR o0 JSTILEACTION ICP

,SEDEVENT (NEI CAS / SAS i-04, APPENDIX A) 01 2 Demonstrate the ability to classify an emergency during a hostile based drill TSC or exercise. CR Demonstrate the ability to notify offsite response agencies during a hostile EOF based drill or exercise. CR SIGNIFICANT PLANNING STANDARD A-4

CFE 14- 05 OBJECTIVES

.AA-101-1000 EP-AA-101-1000 EPDE 4IINGSTANDARD DECRIPTION FACILITY OBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE FR 50.47(b)(#)]

TSC

-o Demonstrate the ability to make a protective action recommendation offsite during a hostile based drill or exercise. EOF CR Demonstrate the ability to make initial notifications to law enforcement and CR other first-responder agencies during a hostile action-based event. CAS / SAS C,

TSC Demonstrate the ability to communicate threat-related information to the EOF NRC during a hostile action-based event. CR TSC Demonstrate the ability of on-shift Operations and Security personnel to CR 7 coordinate response actions among themselves, and with the Incident Commander and local law enforcement agency (LLEA)personnel. ICP CAS / SAS "C, TSC Demonstrate the ability of on-shift Operations and Security personnel to CR 8 coordinate with the Incident Commander for deployment of on-site and 00:: offsite first-responders in a post-attack environment.

CAS / SAS TSC Demonstrate the ability to coordinate implementation of on-site radiation EOF protection measures for offsite first-responders with the ICP. OSC ICP TSC EOF Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) to OSC support operation of an Incident Command Post (ICP).

CR ICP TSC 11 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate mobilization of the Emergency OSC Response Organization (ERO) with Security and the ICP. ICP CAS / SAS -o Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) to 12 coordinate in-plant and on-site response actions with Security and the Incident Command Post (ICP).

TSC 13 Demonstrate the ability of the ERO to activate alternative facilities TSC OSC SIGNIFICANT PLANNING STANDARD A-5S

CFE 14- 05 OBJECTIVES (5

• AA-101-1000 0 EP-AA-101-1000 EPDE JIINGSTANDARD DECRIPTION FACILITY OBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE FR 50.47(b)(#)] 0 TSC OSC 0 14 As appropriate to the scenario, coordinate deployment of fire and medical response resources between the ICP, on-site ERO facilities, and Security. ICP CAS / SAS

-o 15 Demonstrate the ability to account for on-site personnel in a post-attack CAS SAS 5, environment.

16 Demonstrate the ability to perform an assessment of offsite radiological EOF consequences as appropriate to the scenario events.

5, 17 Demonstrate the ability of the ERO to coordinate the development and 0-0 release of public information in a post-attack environment. 0 an 5,

l~I1 an

~2.

0

-o 0

55 0

m

-o C's 0*

SIGNIFICANT PLANNING STANDARD A-6 FI

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Rules The following general rules have been established to delineate the extent of play for responders to meet drill objectives.

The exercise will be conducted on November 5, 2014. Responders will not be informed of the sequence of events or any aspect of the scenario.

The exercise will postulate conditions necessitating the declaration of emergency classifications in accordance with the Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan and Emergency Response Procedures.

Scenario data will be available real time, provided from the simulator.

Responder - An emergency responder who performs assigned functions during a drill and exercise.

Controller- An individual responsible for facilitating the progress of a drill or exercise (e.g., by passing a message), observing responder performance, and assessing whether objectives have been demonstrated. They will also assure the continuity of the scenario by initiating actions through pre-scripted messages, or as directed by the Drill Manager.

Evaluator- Individual assigned to a drill or exercise whose function is to assess the performance of responders against drill objectives. Controllers often perform this function.

Observer! Visitor-Personnel who serve no control or participatory function related to the event. These personnel should not interface with responders. They shall direct all questions to a CONTROLLER.

Some responders may insist that certain parts of the scenario are unrealistic. The controllers have the authority with approval of the Drill Manager to clarify any questions regarding scenario content. In some cases, it may become necessary for a controller to countermand responder actions to preserve the continuity and objectives of the event. Responders must accept the controllers word as final and proceed as directed.

Scenario events are hypothetical. Any portions of the scenario depicting plant system operational transients are simulated events. NO scenario actions involve the operation of plant systems or components or affect generation capability. To help delineate such actions all scenario messages must be proceeded and followed by the words: "THIS ISA DRILL".

Participation of personnel directly involved in responding to an emergency condition should be carried out to the extent necessary to meet the scope and objectives, including the deployment of radiological monitoring teams, emergency repair/damage control teams, and other emergency workers. All actions are to be performed, as much as possible, as if it were an actual emergency. Actions should be identified to the controller for guidance as to whether to play them out or simulate them.

82

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/lmprovement Plan Seabrook Station Coaches, when identified on the event roster, are not meant to be an adjunct to the designated position responder. Coaches should provide guidance when required, but should ensure the response position is not a team of two.

If an actual situation occurs that requires a group to terminate its participation in the exercise, Drill Manager will be notified, All personnel shall comply with all Federal, State and local laws. More specifically, traffic laws, such as speed limits, will be observed. Additionally, event participants will adhere to all station access, safety and radiation protection requirements.

All personnel will avoid endangering public or private property, members of the general public, or the environment. It is the responsibility of all players, controllers and evaluators to correct any unsafe conditions that arise during the exercise.

All participants will take part in a critique session in their emergency response facility immediately upon termination of scenario activities.

Termination Criteria:

1. The exercise may be terminated under any of the following conditions:

a. All objectives are satisfactorily demonstrated;

b. An actual onsite or offsite emergency develops; and/or

c. Available time has expired.

2. The following personnel may request temporary suspension or termination of the onsite portion of the exercise:

a. Shift Manager

b. Plant General Manager

c. Executive Management

3. Decisions to temporary suspend or terminate a exercise should be coordinated through the Drill Manager.

83

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 VISITOR OBSERVATION RULES Visitors should request access to a facility at least one week prior to the drill.

Access requests for Seabrook Station ERO facilities should be directed to the Seabrook Station EP Department. Requests to visit New Hampshire, Massachusetts or Maine facilities should be addressed to the appropriate State emergency management agency.

The number of visitors to a facility may be limited, or in some cases visitors mah be prohibited.

Visitors will not be allowed to travel in any event-related vehicle.

Unless approved by the Drill Manager, no photography or taping of events by visitors will be permitted.

Note-taking is acceptable. Visitors may not take any event-related documentation (or copies thereof))

without authorization from the Drill Manager.

The visitor shall comply with these instructions and any further verbal directions provided by escort, if assigned, and from facility drill controllers. Violation of these instructions or directions may result in the visitor's expulsion from the facility.

Visitors shall comply with security requirements at the facility during the drill, including sign-in and sign-out requirements.

Visitors will wear proper identification at all times. At the EOF, visitors will be required to obtain a "Visitor" IDbadge and proximity card from Access Control to allow transit to the Joint Information Center. These items must be returned to Access Control at the end of the drill.

Visitors shall not interact with or assist responders during the course of the event. They must take care not to cause congestion or noise which distracts players and controllers from their tasks.

Visitors shall not operate any equipment (including telephones) without permission.

During the event, the Drill Manager has final authority regarding visitor access, conduct and expulsion.

84

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station I

B. Participant Instructions 85

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 86

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 B.1 Responder Briefings GENERAL If, for any reason you are unable to fill your assigned role on the day of the drill, notify your supervisor as soon as possible and remind him/her that you are a participant in the drill and to contact the drill manager in the simulator x2609 to coordinate a replacement participant.

Real-time response ERO personnel should proceed to their facilities only after being notified of the emergency; DO NOT pre-stage or report early. Proceed to your assigned facility upon the first means of notification of the event.

Drillsmanship:

• All communications should be prefaced and concluded with "This is a drill".

" Stay engaged in the drill.

• Ensure Controllers understands the basis key decisions made by you or your team.

Do Not Bring any uncontrolled material to the drill. You are expected to use the procedures that are maintained in the facilities.

The site siren will not be sounded to notify station personnel of the emergency.

The LAN-based PC messaging system will be used to notify personnel of the commencement of the event Operational, Radiological and Meteorological Data:

• MUST BE OBTAINED FROM AN MPCS or PC TERMINAL CONNECTED TO THE SIMULATOR

• CONTROLLERS WILL PROVIDE SPECIFIC RADIOLOGICAL OR METEOROLOGICAL DATA TO RESPONDERS.

In order to present opportunities for demonstration of some drill objectives, this scenario may contain radiological data that is "disconnected" from operational parameters. For example, certain radiological data may be artificially elevated or presented in a time-compressed fashion. While being aware of this condition, players are expected to assess, and respond to, the data as presented. Questions should be directed to a controller.

Drill related calls:

Calls to the "Control Room" should be directed to the Simulator Shift Manager (603) 474-9521 x2608 Unit Supervisor (603) 474-9521 (603) 474-9521 x2991 Work Control Supervisor (605A474-9521 x2911 or x2912

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 DO NOT call the Online/Outage Control Center (OCC) with drill-related information or requests unless directed to do so by a drill controller.

DO NOT call vendors with drill-related requests. Calls for vendor services or support should be directed to 603-468-3859. Record the time of any requested action and projected completion times on ER 2.OE forms.

All routine industrial and radiological safety requirements shall be followed. If any participant sees a potential or actual conflict between drill "realism" and safety, safety ALWAYS has priority.

Players are expected to coach each other in regard to safety and human performance tool use. There is recent drill OE of our HU tool use (specifically 3-way communication) not being up to our standards.

Let's help each other keep our standards high.

Ifadditional personnel are needed, do NOT call these individuals directly. All callouts of additional personnel must be coordinated through the Maintenance Coordinator and the Administrative Services Coordinator per established procedural guidance.

Controllers may provide performance improvement coaching during this drill so long as it does not affect the Classification, Notification or PAR assessment. Additionally, specific positions may have assigned coaches for this event. These coaches should not directly answer questions from others for their player. This is not a team of two, but one individual mentoring the other.

Simulator data will be available to LAN PC's (via SDS) and MPCS terminals.

The Personal Computers (PC's) in the TSC, OSC and EOF can be connected to the Simulator SDS by performing the following actions:

1. Locate the "SimulatorSDSfor Windows" icon on the PC desktop. Double-click / open it.

2. When connected, " I e ' will appear in the lower right-hand corner of the SDS "I

display.

3. If you have questions, contact G. Spaide at x7865 BEFORE the drill. Please realize that there are a limited number of "Simulator SDS for Window" links. Use only if required to support your facility action.

4. Remember to close any drill/simulator SDS windows after the drill has ended.

A post-drill critique will be conducted. The goal of the critique process is to self-identify any weaknesses or deficiencies, and opportunities for improvement. Be frank and self-critical during the critique. During the 2012 graded exercise, an incorrect PAR was made which was not identified or critiqued, ultimately resulting in a white finding. All players are expected to attend their facility critique and provide input.

Make your drill comments clear and specific, recommending solutions when possible. Drill comments should be identified as 'Enhancements' (nice to do) or 'Deficiencies' (need to do in order to maintain the effectiveness of the facility).

Each facility manager is expected to work with the facility lead controller to identify significant issues. In some cases, additional ARs may be required for uni e issues or concerns identified during the critique.

For these items, participants are expected to write Ns prior to the end of the day. Simplifying the drill

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Ihnprovement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 AR process is meant to streamline the review of critique issues and in no way is meant to discourage any individual from writing an AR.

Emergency facilities must be returned to their original state of readiness.

Control Room (Simulator)

The NRC Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) will not be activated from the Simulator.

Telephone notifications to the States will be made using the Nuclear Alert System (NAS) or designated backup methods. Callback from the Health Departments to the Simulator Control Room is not expected.

NRC Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator (DEP) - Performance opportunities in this drill will count towards the DEP Indicator for Seabrook. Performance in the following areas affects this indicator.

• Emergency Classifications

• State Notifications

• Protective Action Recommendations Remember wind shifts, stability class changes, and dose assessment changes can affect Protective Action Recommendations (PARs). Multiple PAR notifications may be required after the declaration of a General Emergency. Each counts as a DEP opportunity. CFD 12-01 OE-missed DEP-AR 1728341.

After control board walkdowns, the WCS will be sequestered outside of the simulator to simulate their normal work location in the OCC.

SIMULATOR CONTROL ROOM ER 1.2 A EXPECTATIONS:

• Announce UPDATE for EAL declaration.

" Notify GI Security per checklist and direct pager activation. The specific phone to use will be identified during the pre-job brief.

• When plant announcement is made in the simulator, a controller will notify the US in actual Control Room and request notification of station personnel via Gaitronics of any declaration announcement.

" Complete State Notification and give to WCS to make the Nuclear Alert System (NAS) phone call.

• The drill NAS phone has been placed on CP295 cabinet. This is a live phone to State warning points. Follow the appropriate checklist.

• If NAS phone fails, the backup unit is available in the Simulator. If that also fails, proceed to use phone line 2911 or 2912 to notify each State separately per the checklist.

• A Fire Brigade Leader has been scheduled to be a Control Room Communicator. Calls to the NRC (control cell) should be made using phone line 2911 or 2912.

" Completed copies of the State Notification Fact sheet, ER2.0B, and the NRC form, ER 2.0D, must be given to the Simulator Controller ASAP to allow transmittal to the TSC.

89

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 Technical Support Center NRC Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator (DEP) - Performance opportunities in this drill will count towards the DEP Indicator for Seabrook. Performance in the following areas affects this indicator.

" Emergency Classifications

• State Notifications

• Protective Action Recommendations TSC responders need NOT ask for Shift Manager permission to enter the Control Room. Respond as you would in an actual emergency - quietly enter the Control Room and proceed directly to the TSC. Do not forget your dosimetry.

Assembly Area simulation/interface - The Maintenance Coordinator should call the Assembly Area Coordinator at the Assembly Area to request additional response personnel. As requested, the Assembly Area Coordinator will call-out personnel and direct them to report to a specified emergency response facility.

A control cell (staffed by a controller) has been established to take initial and follow-up notifications to the NRC. When ready to make NRC notifications, the ENS Communicator should call 603-468-3859. Do not use the existing facility ENS FTS phones circuit.

The ENS Communicator should use 603-468-3859 on the 2 line phone to simulate calls to NRC. The Controller will direct the player to callback within a pre-designated time (e.g., 20 minutes).

WebEOC software links have been installed on the Site Emergency Director's (SED) personnel computer in the TSC. It is imperative that the Site Emergency Director notify the Response Manager before an update is posted so that Response Manager can update the EOF and Joint Information Center staff before it is displayed on the facility monitors. A copy of Supplemental Material 11-04, Web EOC Classification Board Instructions, has been placed at the SED and RM work stations. Questions or concerns, please contact P. Casey (X7221) before the drill.

Color 11x17 Classification chart (i.e., ER 1.1A, B, and C) tear-away pads have been placed at the Emergency Operations Manager's work station in the TSC. This supplements the black and white copies assigned to multiple player files in both facilities.

Emergency Offsite Facility NRC Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator (DEP) - Performance opportunities in this drill will count towards the DEP Indicator for Seabrook. Performance in the following areas affects this indicator.

• Emergency Classifications

• State Notifications

• Protective Action Recommendations Color 11x17 Classification chart (i.e., ER 1.1A, B, and C)tear-away pads have been placed at the 90 Technical Assistant's work station in the EOF. This supplements the black and white copies assigned to multiple player files in both facilities.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 Remember wind shifts, stability class changes, and dose assessment changes can affect Protective Action Recommendations (PARs). Multiple PAR notifications may be required after the declaration of a General Emergency. Each counts as a DEP opportunity. CFD 12-01 OE-missed DEP-AR 1728341.

The ERO Technical Liaison should document any actions driven by the scenario using ER 2.OE form. Do NOT actually call RCDC, MEMA, and Maine State Police, NHPUC, and the State Technical Liaisons for this drill as they are not participating.

A control cell (staffed by a controller) has been established to take initial and follow-up notifications to the NRC. When ready to make NRC notifications, the HPN Communicator should call 603-468-3859. Do not use the existing facility HPN FTS phones circuit.

The HPN communicator should dial 603-468-3859 to simulate calls to NRC. The Controller will direct the player to callback within a pre-designated time (e.g., 25 minutes). The Controller can call this phone line directly.

National Weather Service (NWS) - in order to test actual capabilities, EOF radiological assessment personnel should contact the NWS when required by Procedure ER 3.3 to obtain a current meteorological forecast. When the call is completed, a controller will provide a forecast to be used for drill purposes.

Assembly Area simulation/interface - The Administrative Services Coordinator should call the Assembly Area Coordinator at the Assembly Area to request additional response personnel. As requested, the Assembly Area Coordinator will call-out personnel and direct them to report to a specified emergency response facility.

Operations Support Center The dispatch of OSC teams should be performed to the maximum practical extent (i.e., simulation of activities should be minimized). This means:

• Obtain needed tools, parts, equipment, etc. unless precluded by size or other considerations

• Obtain needed documents

" A team should travel along the specified route to the assigned destination.

• A repair team should arrive at the assigned destination and visually locate the component to be repaired. Once the component is positively identified and access to it confirmed, the team may return to the OSC.

• DO NOT enter any PROTECTED TRAIN or GUARDED EQUIPMENT area or room; discuss simulated entry with a controller. Protected Train on the day of this event Is 'B'.

• DO NOT direct or allow any operation of plant equipment, unless specifically directed to do so by a drill controller.

OSC personnel should use the 1B (RP) radio channel. Precede and end all communications with "This is a drill message" Field Monitoring Teams 91 Upon logging into WebEOC, Field Monitoring Teams should select "Seabrook-Training 2014" from the Incident drop down menu.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 Assembly Area Assembly Area simulation/interface - The Maintenance Coordinator and Administrative Services Coordinator should call the Assembly Area Coordinator at the Assembly Area to request additional response personnel. As requested, the Assembly Area Coordinator will call-out personnel and direct them to report to a specified emergency response facility.

In order to minimize drill impacts on normal station work activities, it may be necessary for the Assembly Area Controller to dispatch simulated personnel to a facility, e.g., additional mechanics reporting to the OSC. If this is done, the Assembly Area Coordinator will clearly indicate that the dispatched personnel are being simulated. The individual requesting the dispatch of the simulated personnel should ensure each simulated person's name is entered on the appropriate accountability board form, etc.

92

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 B.2 GENERAL CONTROLLER GUIDANCE Each controller will be provided a scenario package that corresponds to their respective assignments. It is the responsibility of the controller to become familiar with the scenario, appropriate implementing procedures, message and mini-scenario implementation responsibilities, exercise documentation requirements and any assignment-specific information prior to the event. The controller package must be considered "CONFIDENTIAL" until the drill / exercise is completed.

Each controller will be requested to attend appropriate training or briefing sessions before each drill.

Any questions regarding the scenario or assignments should be discussed at this time. Each controller should ensure they are familiar with location(s) required by their assignment.

Controllers must wear appropriate badges, specifically identifying themselves as controllers.

Direct players to inform controllers if any actions are going to deviate from plant procedures.

Controllers must keep a detailed narrative of their observations throughout this event. The narrative should note the time, location, activity, and player responses. Additional data may be required by the event scenario or the evaluation forms. A master copy of the narrative is provided as an attachment to this section (ATT B-3 ) make additional copies as needed. Controllers should refrain from including personal bias, unsupported opinions or conjecture in this narrative.

With exception of classification, notification, and protective action recommendations (DEP opportunities), controllers may discuss the proper use of scenario data or expected responses with players (coaching is allowed). When significant coaching is required it must be noted on the controller event narrative log to ensure that gaps are evaluated during the critique process.

Controllers should ensure that interaction between responders and observers (visitors) does not occur.

This may include the establishment of visitor areas in the emergency response facilities.

Controllers will capture comments from event responders relating to realism of scenario to be evaluated in the critique. It is the responsibility of the Facility Lead Controllers to clarify any questions that may arise during the exercise.

Controllers will ensure that any inquiries originating from the general public or news media as a result of exercise activities are immediately passed to the Drill Manager who will notify the appropriate public information personnel.

Controllers will comply with instructions from the Drill Manager and the Facility Lead Controllers. Unless otherwise instructed by the Drill Manager or Facility Lead Controllers, all messages and data should be issued at their designated times and/or as described in the event scenario.

Contingency Messages will be used if a responder fails to take a major expected action (e.g., make an emergency classification) as indicated in the scenario outline. The Controller will give the contingency message to the designated responder and explain in as much detail as necessary what actions the responder is expected to perform. Contingency messages are used to keep the drill on schedule. The necessity to use a contingency message must be documented in the controller's observations.

The Drill Manager is the only individual who may authorize deviations from the scenario.

Controllers are expected to coach each other, and Iyers, specifically in regard to safety and human performance tool use.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 Controllers should be at their assigned locations as follows:

Simulator: 0700 All Other Facilities: 0730 Controllers should synchronize their watches with the SDS/Main Plant Computer System (MPCS) time display AFTER the PC SDS display or MPCS terminal has been "swapped" to the Simulator. This will typically be completed 30 minutes prior to the exercise start time.

The NRC is not participating in this drill. Calls to the NRC should be made over the simulated Emergency Notification System (ENS) and the Health Physics Network (HPN).

94

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 B.3 LEAD FACILITY CONTROLLER GENERAL GUIDANCE The Lead Facility Controller is the controller responsible for a group of controllers at a specific facility or location.

Their responsibilities include:

Direction and coordination of drill / exercise activities within the facility in accordance with the event scenario.

Keeping the Drill / Exercise Manager informed of significant or unexpected events occurring within the facility.

Capturing the significant comments during the facility critique following the drill / exercise.

Distributing and collecting attendance sheets and responder comment forms.

Collecting drill / exercise related records generated within the facility.

Preparing the evaluation results using the input of assigned controller /evaluators.

Initiating a Facility Critique following the conclusion of a drill or exercise.

Ensuring that drill / exercise events are conducted safely, specified objectives are adequately evaluated prior to drill / exercise termination and conduct of the drill / exercise does not compromise the operation of the station.

Assisting the Lead Controller in development of the drill / exercise report, including the recommendation of corrective actions needed to address deficiencies.

Ensuring corrective action program documents are written as appropriate.

Clarifying any questions that may arise during the exercise from controllers or responders.

During the period preceding the arrival of the players, the Lead Controller should lead a Job Site Huddle with the other facility controllers to review roles, responsibilities, expectations, handoffs, etc.

Lead Facility Controllers should ensure that players remain engaged in the event activities during any distractions, specifically when lunch is served.

Some exercise players may insist that certain parts of the scenario are unrealistic. Facility Lead Controllers will clarify any questions that may arise during the exercise.

Any inquiries originating from the general public or news media as a result of exercise activities should be immediately passed to the Drill Manager who will notify the appropriate public information personnel.

Lead Facility Controllers should contact the Drill Manager at x2609 within 30 minutes of the exercise start time to verify communications links and exercise readiness.

95

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 B.3.1 CONTROL ROOM LEAD CONTROLLER (SIMULATOR)

1. Complete position checklist

2. Following the critique, provide a performance assessment of the facility's objectives by completing the appropriate objective matrix.

When determining whether, and to what degree, an objective was met, controllers should compare observed performance against the listed performance attributes.

3. Lead Facility Controllers should provide the following materials to the Drill / Exercise Manager.

A. Responder-generated documents B. Drill / Exercise Controller Logs (EP-AA-101-1000-F04)

C. Critique results, including easel paper or white board transcription notes (if used)

D. ERO Comment Forms (EP-AA-101-1000-F03)

E. Completed objective performance assessment matrix F. A brief verbal or written summary of drill highlights and key issues 96

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 SIMULATOR LEAD CONTROLLER CHECKLIST Before Drill/Exercise Day of Drill/Exercise D] Copy messages and data sheets as El Conduct Job Site Huddle with other facility controllers, needed and distribute controller badges ED Obtain controller identification El Review simulator setup with simulator operator (armbands, badges, etc)

• Correct Protected Train is specified on MCB and El Make copies of Drill/Exercise MPCS displays Controller Logs

• Station portable radio available on USS desk El Make copies of ERO Comment " Verify that ERF SDS/MPCS terminals are receiving Forms & Critique Review Points simulator data

• Turn on ERDS modem if needed El Ensure spare battery for 4-way link

• Phones installed; SM - 2608, USS - 2991, 4-way is obtained and charged.

link, Lead Controller - 2609 After Drill/Exercise is Terminated

• MPCS clock set to real time

• Speaker phone in booth using extension 2608 El Make announcement per drill

• Forms/packets have been checked message

• Simulator Gai-Tronics volume is turned up El Pass out copies of ERO Comment

" Tags are hung per scenario Form and Critique Review Points.

• Shift turnover sheets prepared El Conduct Drill/Exercise Critique per

• Simulator annunciator alarms are on and RDMS section 2 of controller package.

alarms are off El Collect all Seabrook Station ERO

• Op check the NAS line Comment Forms

• Use different NSO names - on-shift crew vs. those El Collect all Drill/Exercise Controller responding to OSC Logs

• Drill Primary Responders listed on duty board El Collect all player logs and El Conduct a briefing with the Operations crew.

documentation El Brief the Control Room on the following items.

El Inspect facility to determine if it

• Conduct a walk-thru of the phone has been restored to the degree communications for the exercise practical.

• Actions required by ER 1.2-including:

El Remind Operations controller to " Security -

return station portable radio

• Control Room to make PA announcements El Verify that Computer Engineering

• Faxing of ER 2.0B and ER 2.OD has swapped ERF MPCS displays

• Drill-related radio traffic back to the real plant computer

• Drill-related calls to the Control Room should be El Remind simulator operator to re-directed to the Simulator verify "island" status, i.e., no active El Review expected actions with each controller.

communication links to outside world. El Periodically check in with Drill Manager on status of objective demonstrations 97

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 Controller Instructions B.3.2. TSC - LEAD CONTROLLER

1. Complete position checklist

2. Ensure that a Gaitronics announcement is made when event is terminated to ensure all site personnel are notified.

3. Following the critique, Facility Lead Controllers should provide a performance assessment of their facility's objectives by completing the appropriate objective matrix.

When determining whether, and to what degree, an objective was met, controllers should compare observed performance against the listed performance attributes.

4. Lead Facility Controllers should provide the following materials to the Drill / Exercise Manager.

A. Responder-generated documents B. Drill / Exercise Controller Logs (EP-AA-101-1000-F04)

C. Critique results, including easel paper or white board transcription notes (if used)

D. ERO Comment Forms (EP-AA-101-1000-F03)

E. Completed objective performance assessment matrix F. A brief verbal or written summary of drill highlights and key issues 98

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 TSC LEAD CONTROLLER CHECKLIST Before Drill/Exercise Day of Drill/Exercise D] Copy Initial Conditions Message and IZ Establish communications with Drill/Drill Player Telephone Directory. Manager.

L Conduct Job Site Huddle with other facility D] Obtain controller identification controllers, and distribute controller badges (armbands, badges, etc). ED Review expected actions with each D] Make copies of Drill/Exercise Controller controller.

Logs. D Review messages and mini-scenarios for TSC-based personnel. Assign messages U Make copies of ERO Comment Forms & to controllers. Instruct controllers to Critique Review Points. notify you before messages are passed.

After Drill/Exercise is Terminated L] Review objective assignments with controllers - who will watch for what.

L Make announcement regarding the 11 Distribute Initial Conditions Message and Player following:

Telephone Directory to all position

- Workstation restoration/facility cleanup workstations.

- Assembly and collection of F1 Verify that MPCS terminal is receiving simulator documentation data and has correct time.

- Facility critique DI Review expected actions with each controller.

L1 Request the Control Room to announce LI Remind SED and EOM not to talk with real that the drill/exercise has been Control Room staff - call the Simulator terminated.

- Shift Manager x2608 ED Pass out copies of ERO Comment Form

- Unit Supervisor x2991 and Critique Review Points.

LI Ensure that the TSC Work Control Supervisor L Conduct Drill/Exercise Critique per section has the drill instruction set for establishing the 2 of controller package.

4-way link with the simulator.

IZ Collect all Seabrook Station ERO Comment LI Inform the ENS Communicator to use the ENS Forms commercial telephone line for calls to the NRC 11 Collect all Drill/Exercise Controller Logs Control Cell. The communicator is NOT to use 11 Collect all player logs and documentation the ENS telephone on the FTS circuit.

D1 Inspect facility to determine if it has been LI Periodically check in with controllers on status restored to the degree practical. of objective demonstrations L Ensure that all simulator-driven SDS LI Notify Drill/Drill Manager when all objectives windows are closed (i.e., no SDS running). have been met.

Ei Request the Health Physics controller to LI When directed by the Drill Manager, terminate return the drill electronic dosimeters to TSC drill/exercise play by informing the Site the HP Control Point. Emergency Director.

L1 Provide verbal or written summary of drill results to the Drill Manager.

L1 Provide all drill documentation to the Drill Manager.

99

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 Controller Instructions B.3.3 OSC - LEAD CONTROLLER

1. Complete position checklist

2. Clearly identify the OSC "play" area within the Health Physics Access Control Point

3. Following the critique, Facility Lead Controllers should provide a performance assessment of their facility's objectives by completing the appropriate objective matrix.

When determining whether, and to what degree, an objective was met, controllers should compare observed performance against the listed performance attributes.

4. Lead Facility Controllers should provide the following materials to the Drill / Exercise Manager.

A. Responder-generated documents B. Drill / Exercise Controller Logs (EP-AA-1O1-1000-F04)

C. Critique results, including easel paper or white board transcription notes (if used)

D. ERO Comment Forms (EP-AA-101-1000-F03)

E. Completed objective performance assessment matrix F. A brief verbal or written summary of drill highlights and key issues 100

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 OSC LEAD CONTROLLER CHECKLIST Before Drill/Exercise Day of Drill/Exercise El Copy Initial Conditions Message. El Establish communications with Drill/Drill Manager.

El Obtain controller identification (armbands, badges, etc). El Conduct Job Site Huddle with other facility controllers, and distribute controller badges El Make copies of Drill/Exercise Controller Logs. El Review expected actions with each El Make copies of ERO Comment Forms & Critique controller.

Review Points. El Review messages and mini-scenarios for OSC-based personnel. Assign El Review objective assignments with controllers -

messages to controllers. Instruct who will watch for what controllers to notify you before messages are passed.

After Drill/Exercise is Terminated El Review objective assignments with El Make announcement regarding the controllers - who will watch for what.

following: El Distribute Initial Conditions Message and

- Workstation restoration/facility cleanup Player Telephone Directory to all position

- Assembly and collection of documentation workstations.

- Facility critique El Clearly identify the OSC "play" area within El Pass out copies of ERO Comment Form and the RP Access Control Point.

Critique Review Points. El Verify that MPCS terminal is receiving El Conduct Drill/Exercise Critique per section 2 simulator data and has correct time.

of controller package. El Periodically check in with controllers on El Collect all Seabrook Station ERO Comment status of objective demonstrations Forms El Notify Drill/Drill Manager when all objectives El Collect all Drill/Exercise Controller Logs have been met.

El Collect all player logs and documentation El When directed by the Drill Manager, terminate OSC drill/exercise play by El Inspect facility to determine if it has been informing the OSC Coordinator.

restored to the degree practical.

El Ensure that all simulator-driven SDS windows are closed (i.e., no SDS running).

El Provide verbal or written summary of drill results to the Drill Manager.

El Provide all drill documentation to the Drill Manager.

101

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 Controller Instructions B.3.3 EOF - LEAD CONTROLLER

1. Complete position checklist

2. Ensure the PA system is used for all briefings and the facility critique.

3. Following the critique, Facility Lead Controllers should provide a performance assessment of their facility's objectives by completing the appropriate objective matrix.

When determining whether, and to what degree, an objective was met, controllers should compare observed performance against the listed performance attributes.

4. Lead Facility Controllers should provide the following materials to the Drill / Exercise Manager.

• Responder-generated documents

• Drill / Exercise Controller Logs (EP-AA-101-1000-F04)

• Critique results, including easel paper or white board transcription notes (if used)

• ERO Comment Forms (EP-AA-1O1-1000-F03)

• Completed objective performance assessment matrix

• A brief verbal or written summary of drill highlights and key issues 102

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 EOF LEAD CONTROLLER CHECKLIST Before Drill/Exercise Day of Drill/Exercise U1 Copy Initial Conditions Message and Player U Establish communications with Drill Telephone Directory. Manager.

U1 Obtain visitor list, badges and visitor rules. U Obtain controller identification (armbands, U Make copies of Drill/Exercise Controller badges, etc). Located at AA/FFD workstation.

Logs. U Place "drill in progress" signs in front of EOF U1 Make copies of ERO Comment Forms & so public can see. Located in garage.

Critique Review Points. U1 Conduct Job Site Huddle with other facility controllers, and distribute controller badges After Drill/Exercise is Terminated U1 Review expected actions with each U Make announcement regarding the controller.

following: U] Review messages and mini-scenarios

- Workstation restoration/facility cleanup for EOF-based personnel. Assign

- Assembly and collection of documentation messages to controllers. Instruct

- Facility critique controllers to notify you before messages are passed.

Ul Pass out copies of ERO Comment Form and Critique Review Points. Ul Review objective assignments with controllers - who will watch for what.

Ul Conduct Drill/Exercise Critique per section 2 of controller package. U Distribute Initial Conditions Message and player telephone directory to all position U] Collect all Seabrook Station ERO Comment workstations.

Forms U Verify that MPCS terminal is receiving U Collect all Drill/Exercise Controller Logs simulator data and has correct time.

U1 Collect all player logs and documentation U Have the Radiological Assessment Controller U1 Inspect facility to determine if it has been inform the HPN Communicator to use the restored to the degree practical.

HPN commercial telephone line for drill-U1 Ensure that all simulator-driven SDS related notifications. The communicator is windows are closed (i.e., no SDS running). NOT to use the HPN telephone on the FTS U Turn off MPCS local printer. circuit.

U1 Ensure all appliances are turned off in both Ul Brief the Security Coordinator on the EOF and IFO (e.g., coffee makers, PCs, expectations for arriving visitors.

copy machines, space heaters, etc.). U Periodically check in with controllers on U1 Turn off lights. status of objective demonstrations.

U Secure all exterior doors. U Notify Drill/Drill Manager when all objectives U Provide verbal or written summary of drill have been met.

results to the Drill Manager. U When directed by the Drill/Drill Manager, Ul Provide all drill documentation to the Drill terminate EOF drill/exercise play by Manager. informing the Response Manager.

103

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 104

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 Controller Instructions B.3.4 JIC - LEAD CONTROLLER

1. Complete position checklist

2. Following the critique, Facility Lead Controllers should provide a performance assessment of their facility's objectives by completing the appropriate objective matrix.

When determining whether, and to what degree, an objective was met, controllers should compare observed performance against the listed performance attributes.

3. Lead Facility Controllers should provide the following materials to the Drill / Exercise Manager.

A. Responder-generated documents B. Drill / Exercise Controller Logs (EP-AA-101-1000-F04)

C. Critique results, including easel paper or white board transcription notes (if used)

D. ERO Comment Forms (EP-AA-101-1000-F03)

E. Completed objective performance assessment matrix F. A brief verbal or written summary of drill highlights and key issues 105

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 Controller Instructions JOINT INFORMATION CENTER CONTROLLER EXPECTATIONS

1. There are two types of controllers: facility operation controllers and mock news media.

2. Documentation of assignments as described below must be maintained by all controllers.

FACILITY OPERATION CONTROLLERS: MOCK NEWS MEDIA Lead Controller Responsibilities - As reporters, you will be expected to "recreate" the scenario based on your

• Activation experience at the Joint Information Center.

• Command & Control Restructure the event in your log by documenting the info that you receive at the

• Key Message Development Joint Information Center:

• NextEra Seabrook Station Interface with Offsite PlOs Stagger arrival times

" Evaluator/Observer Management Call the Information Line throughout drill Controller # 2 -

Upon entry to Joint Information Center,

• Intra-facility information flow from operations room ask questions about the facility throughout Joint Information Center Ask when the next news conference will

• Monitor all MRC room activities be held; can you get interviews

• Information flow between MC & EOF Don't be satisfied with long gaps of time

• Media Relations/Rumor Control processes Leave the building and come back; re-

" Document distribution (bulletins, news statements, register as someone else press releases)

Keep the Media Relations phones going;

• Back-up to lead controller even during press conferences ({Always Controllers #3 & 4 precede calls with "THIS IS A DRILL"}

• Media Briefing Room activation & maintenance Plant misinformation based on other news

• Ensuring mock media continue to make calls to sources the Media Relations Room (incl. During Use THIS ISA DRILL throughout the conferences) exercise prior to engaging in questions

• Log news conferences: Always ask for explanation of acronyms or

• Start/finish other "nukespeak".

" Open commitments/unaddressed "Media" are facilitating player issues/rumors addressed performance; while being moderately

• Organization and Control challenging

• Mock Media Management Repeat the questions; ask them in a different manner; ask for recap of events

• "Media" are facilitating player performance; while being moderately challenging Don't be satisfied with unanswered questions; follow-up

• "Media" stay within the bounds Play off of information presented; make up questions Generate misinformation to be asked of the Media Relations personnel and determine if it is addressed in subsequent news conference.

106

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 JOINT INFORMATION CENTER LEAD CONTROLLER CHECKLIST Before Drill/Exercise Day of Drill/Exercise U Copy Initial Conditions Message and Player U Establish communications with Drill/Drill Telephone Directory. Manager.

U Obtain visitor list, badges and visitor rules. U Conduct Job Site Huddle with other facility U1 Obtain controller identification (armbands, controllers, and distribute controller badges badges, etc). U Review expected actions with each U Make copies of Drill/Exercise Controller controller.

Logs. U Review messages and mini-scenarios U Make copies of ERO Comment Forms & for JIC-based personnel. Assign Critique Review Points. messages to controllers. Instruct controllers to notify you before After Drill/Exercise is Terminated messages are passed.

U Make announcement regarding the U1 Review objective assignments with following: controllers - who will watch for what.

- Workstation restoration/facility cleanup U Distribute Initial Conditions Message and

- Assembly and collection of documentation player telephone directory to all position workstations.

- Facility critique U Periodically check in with controllers on U Pass out copies of ERO Comment Form and status of objective demonstrations.

Critique Review Points.

U Notify Drill/Drill Manager when all objectives U Conduct Drill/Exercise Critique per section 2 have been met.

of controller package.

U1 When directed by the Drill/Drill Manager, U Collect all Seabrook Station ERO Comment terminate Joint Information Center Forms drill/exercise play by informing the U Collect all Drill/Exercise Controller Logs Emergency News Manager.

U Collect all player logs and documentation U1 Ensure that no drill messages are recorded on the Seabrook Information Line.

U Inspect facility to determine if it has been restored to the degree practical.

U Ensure all appliances are turned off (e.g.,

coffee makers, PCs, copy machines, space heaters, etc.).

Ul Turn off lights.

U Secure all exterior doors.

U Provide verbal or written summary of drill results to the Drill Manager.

U Provide all drill documentation to the Drill Manager.

107

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 Controller Instructions B.3.5 ASSEMBLY AREA - LEAD CONTROLLER You will call out personnel and direct them to facilities, as requested Callout of craft/shift/bargaining unit workers is to be simulated Call Operations Department if licensed operators are requested Do not call the Help Desk for computer-related assistance No actual reporting if remaining drill play time is less than 60 minutes (for onsite responders) or 90 minutes (for offsite responders).

Phone numbers: Maintenance Coordinator x3961 Admin Services Coordinator x4561 Others - Emergency Response Telephone Directory In order to minimize exercise impacts on normal station work activities, it may be necessary for the Assembly Area Coordinator to dispatch simulated personnel to a facility, e.g., additional mechanics reporting to the OSC. If this is done, the Assembly Area Coordinator should clearly indicate that the dispatched personnel are being simulated. The individual requesting the dispatch of the simulated personnel should ensure each simulated person's name is entered on the appropriate accountability board, form, etc.

108

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP.)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 Controller Instructions B.3.6 GUARD ISLAND CONTROLLER The Guard Island Controller shall ensure that:

• The site siren is not sounded.

" Drill emergency pager messages (text or numeric) are sent by the Security Officer activating the ERO pagers. The numeric drill-use pager codes are listed below. [Criticalpeer check - see Operating Experience in CR #04-08167]

Unusual Event 712 Alert 713 Site Area Emergency 714 General Emergency 715

" "This is a drill" messages are sent by the Security Officer activating the LAN messaging system - see EMS menu for drill-related messages.

" Following the critique, Facility Lead Controllers should provide a performance assessment of their facility's objectives by completing the appropriate objective matrix.

When determining whether, and to what degree, an objective was met, controllers should compare observed performance against the listed performance attributes.

" Lead Facility Controllers should provide the following materials to the Drill / Exercise Manager.

A. Responder-generated documents B. Drill / Exercise Controller Logs (EP-AA-1O1-1000-F04)

C. Critique results, including easel paper or white board transcription notes (if used)

D. ERO Comment Forms (EP-AA-1O1-1000-F03)

E. Completed objective performance assessment matrix F. A brief verbal or written summary of drill highlights and key issues 109

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station ATT B-i ERO CONTROLLER ORGANIZATION Simulator Control Room Drill Manager E. Spaide x2609 Operations B. Bryant x2993 Simulator Operator x2993 Technical Support Center Command and Control R. Duarte x3956/3957 (Fax x7990)

Operations Support B. Bradburry Technical Assessment P. Tutinas Technical Assessment R. Noble Radiological Assessment D. Flahardy Operational Support Center Command and Control J. Kennish x3965 Radiological Controller C. Ellis Emergency Repair Team (IC) E. Gregg Emergency Repair Team (IC) R. Evans Emergency Repair Team (MM) K. Schoff Emergency Repair Team (MM) D. J. Antonellis Chem Lab/WRGM Team TBD Chem Lab/WRGM Team TBD Assembly Area Coordinator N/A x2400 or 603-773-7692 603-773-7655 fax Security Command and Control M. Hambrook x8053 CAS X TBD SAS X TBD Security Command Center Emergency Operations Facility/Control Cell Command and Control J. Sobatka 603-468-3885 Technical Assessment S. Samstag Technical Liaison M. Toole Radiological Assessment - EOF Coordinator P. Casey Radiological Assessment - Dose Assessment D. Robinson x4571 Field Team No. 1 M. Nadeau Field Team No. 2 R.Jones Industry Contacts P. Willoughby TBD Joint Information Center Command and Control N. Durand 603-468-3854 Media 110 R.McCabe M. Mitchell TBD

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 Controller Instructions ATT B-2 ERO TELEPHONE DIRECTORY EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS Remember to use "This is a Drill..."

American Nuclear Insurers Actual contacts should be made to ANI.

Assembly Area Coordinator - x2400 (603)-773-7692 INPO Actual contacts should be made to the INPO emergency operations center.

National Weather Service Actual contacts should be made to the NWS.

Nuclear Energy Institute Actual contacts should be made to NEI.

NRC Emergency Notification Control cell number 603-468-3857 System (ENS)

NRC Health Physics Network (HPN) Control cell number 603-468-3857 Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited/ Actual contacts should be made to Nuclear Mutual Limited NEIL/NML.

PSNH Dispatcher Control cell number 603-468-3859 RSCS Control cell number 603-468-3859 State Notifications Use actual numbers.

Westinghouse Control cell number 603-468-3859 Other Vendor Contacts Control cell number 603-468-3859 CONTROL ROOM POSITIONS

1. Shift Manager (603) 474-9521 x 2608

2. Unit Supervisor (603) 474-9521 x 2991 111

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station ATT B-3 TYPICAL DRILL / EXERCISE CONTROLLER LOG 112

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station TYPICAL DRILL / EXERCISE CONTROLLER LOG Drill / Exercise: CFE 14- 05 Drill / Exercise Date: November 5. 2014 Controller's Name (print):

Controller's Location / Assignment:

Observations should include the proper and effective use of procedures, equipment and personnel. Comments concerning drill performance should document: the time of observation, personnel or equipment involved, procedures involved, and the impact that the condition had on the ability of the player organization to meet its objectives.

TIME OBSERVATION i

i i

i 113 EP-AA-101-1000-F04 Page __ of

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station ATT B-4 Drill Participant Comment Form 114

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Drill Participant Feedback Did the procedures provide adequate guidance and direction for you to perform the tasks assigned to your function? ED YES D NO If NO, please provide comments:

Was the necessary equipment available and operable to support your assigned activities? If NO, please provide comments: ED YES El NO Did this drill illustrate your need for additional training for the position you have been assigned? ED YES ED NO If YES, please provide comments:

Did this drill enhance your proficiency in your assigned position and as an emergency responder? ED YES ED NO If NO, please provide comments:

Please provide any additional comments regarding the drill or your training that were not addressed above:

115 Name (Optional): Date: November 5, 2014 I Facility: I Position:

I1 B-31 'I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station B.4 FACILITY CRITIQUE PROCESS Controllers should avoid any commitments that are beyond the authority of the controller organization. Solutions are not the focus of the critique.

1. Following termination of the drill, Facility Lead Controllers should perform the following actions:

A. ALWAYS use microphone, when available.

B. Make announcement per message D.23 C. Distribute Drill Participant Feedback Form, B-4, and Drill / Exercise Critique Review Points (located in this section) or equivalent, to all responders.

D. Direct responders to take the following actions.

(1) Save all materials for review (2) Restore their facilities / areas to the original state of readiness.

(2) Conduct a self-critique, by functional area, during the period before the facility critique. Drill / Exercise Critique Review Points should be used to stimulate discussion.

(3) Designate a spokesperson, as appropriate for each functional area to present the self-critique results in the combined facility critique.

E. Assign a scribe to ensure comments are captured.

2. While responders are self-critiquing, controllers should caucus in a separate area and summarize their observations. Keep this meeting brief and focus on the more significant issues.

The formal facility critique cannot begin until controllers have rejoined the responders.

3. Each Facility Manager (or lead controller in their absence) will facilitate a critique of drill activities at his/her assigned emergency response facility. This should be done in the following manner.

A. As appropriate, set up a display of the items for discussion.

B. Announce that the critique has started, and briefly explain the process and goal.

(1) We want to self-identify all weaknesses and deficiencies. Discuss importance of being self critical.

(2) Provide the ERO examples of a Risk Significant Planning Standard and what it means from a regulatory standpoint, critique process and overall importance as it relates to the protection of the health and welfare of the public.

(3) Identify Strengths as approff te.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station (4) Every responder should feel comfortable sharing successes and challenges as it relates to their team's performance. Discuss importance of everyone being involved by providing written or verbal critique comments.

(5) Discuss that all written material from the facility (checklists, logs, faxes, etc.)

will be collected at the end of the critique.

C. Review the scenario with the responders.

D. Solicit feedback and comments from each functional area in the facility (e.g.,

command and control, technical assessment / support, radiological assessment /

support, repair and corrective actions, administrative support, etc.).

E. Closely monitor the conduct and progress of the critique, and provide direction as needed to ensure a self-critical / thorough review. Additional focus should be provided on areas associated with RSPS.

F. Resist rationalizing actual performance vs. expected performance, ensure the timeframes for events are captured and compared between actual and expected.

(1) Ensure that all deviations from the scenario expected performance are portrayed to the Drill / Exercise Manager for evaluation.

G. At the critique conclusion, summarize the preliminary results:

(1) Status of Major Objectives o Command and Control o Facility Activation o Onsite Protective Measures o Augmentation o Inter and Intra facility communications o Adequacy and Use of Procedures o Equipment o Human Performance Tools o Effectiveness of Critique o Other (2) NEI 99-02 Performance Indicator opportunities: emergency classification, State notifications, and PARs. State that these results are preliminary and subject to further review by the EP Department. If there is any doubt / question about the results of an opportunity, state that the result is Indeterminate and that the EP Department will determine the opportunity outcome.

(3) Accident Assessment H. Ensure that all critique comments are captured (e.g., scribe, easel, ERO Comment Forms, etc.). All individuals should have the opportunity to provide comments during the critique.

117

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Responders should generate ARs prior to the end of business that day for any critique items deemed needed during the critique.

4. Following the critique, Facility Lead Controllers should provide a performance assessment of their facility's objectives by completing the appropriate objective matrix.

A. When determining whether, and to what degree, an objective was met, controllers should compare observed performance against the listed performance attributes.

5. Lead Facility Controllers should provide the following materials to the Drill / Exercise Manager. This meeting may take place following the drill or exercise (same day or next day).

A. Responder-generated documents B. Drill / Exercise Controller Logs (EP-AA-101-1000-F04)

C. Critique results, including easel paper or white board transcription notes (if used)

D. Drill Participant Feedback Forms E. Completed objective performance assessment matrix F. A brief verbal or written summary of drill highlights and key issues

6. The Drill / Exercise Manager will review the expected results from the scenario (state /

local notification forms) against the actual forms and determine if the drill or exercise DEP opportunities (notification forms) were appropriately completed. Use guidance provided in NEI 99-02 and EP-AA-101-1000 118

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE.'

NUCLEAR DIVISION DRILL AND EXERCISE PROCEDURE 56 Of 101 PROCEDURE NO.:

EP-AA-101-1000 NUCLEAR FLEET ADMINISTRATIVE ATTACHMENT 2 TYPICAL FACILITY DRILL CRITIQUE PROCESS (Page 1 of 3)

Facility Critique Process Agenda Review with the Facility lead by Facility Manager (or designee)

• Importance for returning the facility to a state of readiness

• Overview of the Critique Process

• Importance of being Self Critical and Identify Issues

• Importance of everyone being involved by providing written or verbal critique comments

• Assign a scribe to make sure comments are captured

• Capture copies of all written material from facility (checklists, logs, faxes, etc.)

• Review the Scenario with the Responders (may be performed by Lead Controller)

Status of Risk Significant Planning Standards

• Classification of Emergencies

• Notification

• Protective Action Recommendations

• Accident Assessment Review Performance for Strengths I Opportunities

• Facility Leader / responder comments

• Controller comments Status of Objectives

• Command and Control

• Facility activation

• Onsite Protective Measures

• Augmentation

• Inter and Intra facility communications

• Adequacy and Use of Procedures

• Equipment

• Human Performance Tools

• Effectiveness of Critique

• Other Summary of Preliminary DEP (as appropriate)

Management Observer and Oversight Comments lip

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:

9 NUCLEAR DMSION DRILL AND EXERCISE PROCEDURE 57 of 101 PROCEDURE NO-EP-AA-1101-1000 NUCLEAR FLEET ADMINISTRATIVE ATTACHMENT 2 TYPICAL FACIUTY DRILL CRmQUE PROCESS (Page 2 of 3)

Critique Tool 1 II 11 1 I 11 1i 1 I 11 11 I 1 II II I

1 II 1 120

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station I

C. Scenario Description and Timeline 121

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

The plant is operating at 100% power, Middle of Life, equilibrium Xenon and Samarium.

It is a Saturday morning. For Drill/Exercise purposes, it is Saturday, 11/05/14. Crew turnover is just completing in the Control Room. [RATIONALE: Seabrook Station has elected to establish off-shift hours for this Evaluated Exercise]

METEOROLOGICAL DATA: It is a sunny day, with no rain or severe weather in the forecast. Winds direction is from 225° at 7 mph, with ocassional gusts to 10 mph with an "D" Stability Class. Wind direction, speed, and stability class will remain constant throught the Exercise window.

The Barometric Pressure is 30.2 and steady, with a Probability of Precipitation of <10%. Todays high temperature will be 40' F, with a Low Temp of 23° F.

Spent Fuel Pool time to reach 2000 F is 27.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. (IER 11-2)

EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE: The Newington Line (369) is out of service for breaker replacement at Newington. Estimated time to completion is 3 days.

EXPECTED ACTION: The Operational Plan is to maintain 100% Power.

Scenario:

Prior to T=O, Adversary Team #1 puts in at the Farm Lane boat launch in Seabrook. This is witnessed by a fisherman who is unable to report it until he gets back. The team meanders through the salt marsh avoiding security detection.

A van is observed parked on the North Access Road, when Security arrives to investigate the van is driven to the 'A' parking lot, parked under the tower for the SCOBIE line and detonates an explosive device. This explosion damages the tower and removes this line from service leaving the WARD HILL line as the only offsite power supply.

The explosion also injured the owner controlled area patrol that had followed the van, his exact status will remain unknown. This attack in the Owner Controlled Area will require Security to declare a CODE RED condition and the declaration of an ALERT by the Control Room. The CODE RED declaration will result in immediate notification of LLEAs.

During this period adversary teams one and two are approaching the protected area. Commensurate with the explosion in the parking lot, the adversary teams storm the protected area. Team one approaching from the southeast using hand carried bulk charges to explosively breach PA Gate 2 and gain entrance to the Protected Area.

Team two initiates suppressive fire on the Defensive Positions in the SW corner of the PA while explosively breaching the SOCA & PA fence near thl2oling Tower. This team reaches the SEPS Diesel Generators and plants explosive devices on both SEPS-Diesel Generator Enclosures. The device on SEPS-

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station DG-2B does not activate during this scenario and the generator reamains functional. SEPS- DG-2A is destroyed. Adversary Team 2 is neutralized by SFMs while attempting to make movement into the Waste Process Building.

This attack on the protected area will require the declaration of a Site Area Emergency, since the attack in the Owner Controlled Area and the Protected area happen concurrently, the Site Area Emergency should be declared.

The Control Room will implement OS1290.03, Response to a Security Event requiring a reactor trip and entry in E-0, Reactor Trip / Safety Injection.

Team 1 proceeds to the Service Water Pump house (SWPH). While en route surrounding defensive positions are targeted by rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPG). The CAS Operator receives report of Security Force Member (SFMs) engagements from the SWPH prior to losing contact with the SFMs.

The status of these Security Force Members is not immediately known. The adversary team gains access to the SWPH through the East door.

The ERO is activated per OS1290.03, Response to a Security Event. The ERO is directed to report to ALTERNATIVE facilities.

The adversaries in the SWPH detonate a large satchel charge in the SWPH, damaging SW piping. The blast damage results in Service Water transferring to the cooling tower. When this transfer occurs the Control Room operators will note a lowering Cooling Tower level requiring them to secure the Cooling Tower Pumps.

A General Emergency will be declared.

If Service Water Pumps are secured Primary Component Cooling Water temperature will slowly increase requiring alternative cooling to components. The Control Room will consider aligning alternate cooling to the Coolant Charging Pump in order to maintain charging to the Reactor Coolant Pump Seals. This will require Control Room-Security coordination for safe travel for an NSO to travel to the Primary Auxiliary Building.

The damage to the B Train Service Water Piping is repairable, but this will not be known until team investigates damage.

The status of the adversaries in the SWPH will not be known until investigated.

Law enforcement will form an Incident Command Post, with the Chief of Police for Seabrook, NH or his designee as Incident Commander, from which to allocate the necessary resources and support to mitigate the Hostile Action event. As resources become available (EMS, fire, law enforcement teams, EOD, etc.), they will be simulated staged at a designated offsite staging area, in accordance with ICP direction. They will be briefed on the physical and radiological hazards that may be present. Immediate Plant needs of the ICP will be a perimeter sweep, e1alishment of perimeter control and access

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station restrictions, EMS for the injured Security Force Members, and Explosives and Ordinates Disposal for undetonated explosives.

After the adversaries are contained in the SWPH, Security will be able to support NSO alignment of alternate cooling to the charging pump and other tasks the Control Room may require. At this point the ICP should be coordinating sweeps of affected areas.

It is at this time that explosion debris induced insulator damage results in the loss of the Ward Hill Line.

This will result in a loss of offsite power. Prior to the loss of power SFM reports unusual arcing in the

'high yard'. Both Diesel Generators will start, as will the 'B' SEPS Diesel Generator. The Control Room will follow the guidance in E-O and recognize the lack of cooling water to the Diesel Generators. They will consult with Engineering on a course of action, it is anticipated that the Diesel Generators will be secured. The '13'SEPs Diesel Generator is available to power bus 6.

This loss of offsite power will require a General Emergency Declaration, but will not be declared as a General Emergency is currently in effect.

Security reports to the Control Room that all known adversaries have been neutralized. Security and the Control Room discuss the attack with law enforcement, including immediate needs and any radiation protection requirements. Security will report that 3 SFMs are wounded. Control Room coordinates with Security and ICP to establish safe or protected route(s) of travel within and out of the PA for response and support organizations such as EMS. Since all known adversaries are neutralized, the Control Room will also be coordinating with Security and LLEA for safe travel of Nuclear System Operators and available discipline personnel to investigate damage.

The STED will turn over to the Site Emergency Director (SED), and the Alternative TSC, Alternative OSC, and EOF will be activated in accordance with Emergency Response procedure. For purposes of this Exercise, only designated personnel will respond. If this were an actual emergency, all ERO members would respond, and ongoing 24-hour ERO coverage would be established along with current facility activation. The Joint Information Center at the EOF will also be activated within this approximate timeframe, though various PlOs may arrive sooner. The ERO will initiate coordination of repair teams to be sent to site for assessment and eventual restoration of Service Water. Repair teams will be briefed, and their escorted/protected travel discussed and coordinated. However, repair teams will not actually be transported on site for this Exercise, only simulated.

Repair teams will be briefed at the Alternative OSC, and their safe/protected travel to the plant will be simulated. Repair teams will be simulated to have arrived on site. Simulated assessments and success paths will be communicated to the ERO via Drill Messages.

Just prior to Exercise termination, it will be reported by repair teams that the B-Train Service Water piping has been repaired, and will be restored shortly. The Exercise will be terminated when the objectives are satisfied or have had the opportunity to be satisfied.

124

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

1. Van explodes in 'A' Lot, removing SCOBIE line from service

2. Adversaries in Protected Area, plant explosives on SEPS Diesel Generators and Enter SWPH

3. Explosion in SWPH, Service Water swaps to Cooling Tower, but unavailable

4. Loss of offsite power, SEPS-DG-2B available SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION 125

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 11/5/14 0700

- OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT TURNOVER 9 Plant Status

• Plant Is In Mode 1 At 100 %Power Protected Train

• The Security Threat Level Is Yellow Current PRA Risk is Green A Aggregate Risk is 6 Low Reactivity

• RCS Boron Concentration is 1058 ppm.

" Performing A 300 Gal Dilution Every 3 Hours.

" Rod Control Is In Auto With Control Bank "D" at 230 steps.

" RCS Tave Band (Deg. F): 589-589.3

• Dilution Amount Required To Raise Tave By 1 Deg. F (Gal): 218

• Boration Amount Required To Lower Tave By 1 Deg F (Gal): 38

" SG Blowdown Lineup: Hotwells At 60 GPM/SG

• Cation Run (Minutes): Mids-6 Days- 6 Cation Flowrate: Full Flow

• Turbine Controls: Make adjustments as required to maintain the 8 Hour thermal power between 3646.0 MW and 3647.9 MW. The 1 Hour thermal power average will be maintained below 3648 MW.

" Control Rods will be manipulated per Reactor Engineering recommendations and will normally be left in automatic control. Utilize OS1000.10 Fig. 11, Rod Motion Checklist.

• ODI 56 Values For NEPEX Contingency Downpower

" Amount Of Boration Needed To Reduce Output To 1200 MWE Net (C6123) Is 124 Gal.

• Amount Of Boration Needed To Reduce Output To 800 MWE Net (C6123) Is 694 Gal.

11/5/14 0:00 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*

By: rsm0m53 1. Discuss the expected amount and frequency of routine reactivity manipulations to maintain steady state power operations.

2. Discuss the attached Shift Reactivity Plan 126

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Today 06:35 By:

Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*

By:

Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*

By:

Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*

By:

Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*

By:

Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*

By:

Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*

By:

Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*

By:

Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*

By:

Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*

By:

. Comments, problems, operator workarounds, etc.

127

DRILL SIMULATOR SCENARIO INSTRUCTIONS - CFE 14- 05 IZ RESET Simulator to IC 30 Ii SELECT: Scenario D SELECT: EP Simulator Setup 11 SELECT: 1405 Setup E SELECT: Run Li Place Tag on MOD-3J-69 Newington line out of service D SELECT: Scenario 0 C

E SELECT: EP El SELECT: 1405 Met Data m C

D SELECT: Run VERIFY Simulator clock is synchronized with real time.

0741 OO [ SELECT: Scenario *0 D SELECT: EP Loss of Scobie line After explosion T=11 D SELECT: 1405 Loss of Scobie C Control Room enters OS1210.05, Dropped Rod 0

_ _SELECT: Run C D SELECT: Scenario 0747 L SELECT: EP T=17 E SELECT: 1405 Loss of Ward Hill E SELECT: Run C

0 C

C C-7 J

DRILL SIMULATOR SCENARIO INSTRUCTIONS - CFE 14- 05 When required by Control Room Actions, swap CS-P-2B to alternate cooling:

0904 0 SELECT:RF List T4SELECT:Primary Component Cooling Swaps CS-P-2B to Fire Protection.

T4SELECT: rfCC020, CS-P-2B ALTERNATE COOLING SOURCE E SELECT a Final Value of FP

_ _SELECT: Insert ILI N)

Co r C-8 i

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Timeline: CFE 14- 05 INITIAL The plant is operating at 100% power, Middle of Life, equilibrium Xenon and Samarium.

CONDITIONS:

It is a Saturday morning. For Drill/Exercise purposes, it is Saturday, 11/05/14.

Crew turnover has just completed in the Control Room.

METEOROLOGICAL DATA: It is a sunny day, with no rain or severe weather in the forecast. Winds direction is from 225' at 7 mph, with ocassional gusts tO 10 mph with an "D" Stability Class. Wind direction, speed, and stability class will remain constant throught the Exercise window.

The Barometric Pressure is 30.2 and steady, with a Probability of Precipitation of <10%. Todays high temperature will be 409 F, with a Low Temp of 23- F.

Spent Fuel Pool time to reach 2000 F is 27.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. (IER 11-2)

EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE: Newington Line (369) is out of service for breaker replacement at Newington. Estimated time to completion is 3 days.

Risk is YELLOW.

EXPECTED ACTION: The Operational Plan is to maintain 100% Power.

Phone communications will be per ATT B-2 and mini scenario E.1.

Security escorts will not be available for operations activitiies until directed by the Scenario (@

T=36)

CR LEAD Controller: Verify Simulator Initial Conditions Established.

Message D.1 for Control M, D.2 for Control Controllers provide Initial conditions personnel as they respond Uponto theirassigned facilities Room, D.2 for Non-Control tofciliiesRoom teir ssiged Personnel.

130

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Adversary Team #1 puts in at the Farm Lane boat launch in Seabrook. This is witnessed by a T= Prior to Drill fisherman who is unable to report it until he gets back. The team meanders through the salt marsh Window avoiding security detection.

ATTAC Phs 1- 30 mis Sequester WCS outside of simulator for 3 mins after any event is initiated which CR LEAD Controller: After board walkdown, the sequester the WCS would require his return to outside of the simulator. the control room.

Ensure adequate delay on his return.

0730 TSC LEAD Controller: Ensure US announces drill start Message D.3 Operations Crew takes the Shift in the Simulator Control Room. The T=0 Security oncoming shift begins their morning briefing.

-0730 EXPECTED ACTION: None 131

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Message D.4 EVENT DESCRIPTION:

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Message D.4

" Guard Island observes (via CCTV) a white van driving down the North Access road and parking on the north side of the road, east of the checkpoint.

• Adversary Team 1 consisting of six individuals, has traversed the marsh and is staged in the scaffold storage facility on the southeast side of the site near Gate 2.

" Adversary Team 2 consisting of three individuals, approaches the protected area fence from the nature trail on the SW side

~0737 of the site using the marsh as cover.

DRILL MSG D.4: (This is a Drill Message.)

CAS:"We picked up a white van speeding down the North Access road before parking on the north side of the road, east of the checkpoint."

(This is a Drill Message.)

EXPECTED ACTION(s):

• Adversary team has not been detected by anyone - no action

• Security Owner Controlled Area (OCA) Patrol dispatched to investigate van.

132

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station EVENT DESCRIPTION: Message D.5

• As the OCA Patrol nears the van on the North Access Road, the van departs at a high rate of speed, heading east on the Message D.6 north access road. The OCA patrol gives chase and the van comes stops in the east side of the "A" parking lot, north of the towers for the WARD HILL and SCOBIE lines.

DRILL MSG D.5: (This is a Drill Message.)

OCA: "CODE GRAY, the white van took off heading towardAlpha Lot.

T-10 No license plates visible. Standby for further information."

-0740 (This is a Drill Message.)

DRILL MSG D.6: (This is a Drill Message.)

OCA: "Ihave visual on white van. He's stopped by the VBS under the highlines."

(This is a Drill Message.)

EXPECTED ACTION(s):

• Adversary Team threat unkown - no action

• Security declares a CODE Gray condition.

133

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Timeline: CFE 14- 05 EVENT DESCRIPTION: Message D.7

" As the OCA patrol arrives, the driver of the van detonates an explosive device. The detonation is focused upwards, damaging the tower for the SCOBIE line,causing it to fall to the north. The lines on this tower were severed in the explosion. The explosion distributes a large amount of debris throughout the parking lot and the HIGH YARD. There is a large black cloud of smoke rising from the parking lot.

" The OCA patrol was severely injured in the explosion, unable T-11 to respond on the radio.

~0741 DRILL MSG D.7: (This is a Drill Message.)

Controller: "You hear/see a large explosion. OCA patrol appears damaged on camera and is non-responsive on radio."

(This is a Drill Message.)

EXPECTED ACTION(s):

• Adversary Team has not been detected - no action

" Security declares a CODE RED condition. CR/LLEA notified of code declaration as a result of a large explosion in the OCA near the switchyard/VBS with the OCA patrol believed to be disabled/neutralized.

EVENT DESCRIPTION: LLEA Notification a Notifies LLEA of Attack Expected Message: (This is a Drill Message.)

CAS: "This is SGT Smith at Seabrook Station. A CODE RED has been declared. We have a large vehicle explosion in the T~12 OCA near the switchyard. One of our OCA Patrols appears

~0742 down."

(This is a Drill Message.)

EXPECTED ACTION(s):

• LLEA Notification Objective: Demonstratethe ability to make initialnotifications to law enforcement and otherfirst-responderagencies during a hostile action-basedevent.

134

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Timeline: CFE 14- 05 EVENT DESCRIPTION: Control Room Notification CAS Controller:

• Notifies the Control Room of Attack Ensure that X 2991 is used

" CAS controller ensures that X2991 is used to reach the Unit for Unit Supervisor.

Supervisor Expected Message: (This is a Drill Message.)

T~13 CAS to CR: "ControlRoom, this is SGT Smith. A CODE RED has

-0743 been declared. We have a large vehicle explosion in the OCA near the switchyard. One of our OCA Patrols appears down. LLEA has been notified." (This is a Drill Message.)

EXPECTED ACTION(s):

• Control Room Notification EVENT DESCRIPTION: Control Room Response 0 The Control Room implements OS1290.03 (Response to a Security Event), Trips the Reactor, Implements E - 0 (Reactor Trip/Safety Injection).

EXPECTED ACTION(s): The Control Room will:

T~13 0 WCS will perform O51290.03 ATTACHMENT B, EMERGENCY

~0743 PLAN ACTIVATION DURING CODE RED.

• Stop RC-P-1D and 1B

" Implement applicable emergency operating procedures (EOPs)

• Notify Town of Seabrook Fire Dispatch that an attack is imminent or underway, and to be - ON STANDBY 135

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station EVENT DESCRIPTION: Message D.8

" Using the explosion as a diversion, Adversary teams 1 and 2 initiate their assault on the Protected Area (PA).

• Team 1 uses hand carried bulk charges to explosively breach PA Gate 2.

" Team 2 initiates suppressive fire on the Defensive Positions in the S/SW corner of the PA while explosively breaching the SOCA & PA fence in the SW corner (Zones 801 & 16) near the T~14 Cooling Tower.

~0744 DRILL MSG D.8: (This is a DrillMessage.)

Controller: "You simultaneously receive Intrusion alarms on Zones 801, 16 and Gate 2". (This is a Drill Message.)

EXPECTED ACTION(s):

• Security maintains a CODE RED condition. SAS operator provides SALE report (size, activity, location, equipment) informing the Control Room of attacks.

" Control Room or Security notifies ICP of hostile action occurring at the SWPH.

136

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

" Team 2 reaches the SEPS Diesel Generators and plants Message D.9 explosive devices on the SEPS DG fuel tanks.

• Team 1 proceeds to the Service Water Pump house (SWPH). Message D.10 While en route the adversaries target surrounding defensive positions utilizing rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPG).

CAS Operator receives report of Security Force Member (SFMs) engagements from the SWPH prior to losing contact with the SFMs. Shortly after, the CAS Operator receives an Intrusion alarm on SW100.

DRILL MSG D.9: (This is a Drill Message.)

SFM to CAS: "Multiple Adversaries in the area of Gate 2 and the T-15 Cooling Tower. I'm receiving suppressive fire on my

-0745 East and West ports". Followed shortly by "RPGs impacting the roof'. (This is a Drill Message.)

DRILL MSG D.10: (This is a Drill Message.)

Controller to CAS/SAS: "You receive Intrusion alarm on SWi100.".

(This is a Drill Message.)

EXPECTED ACTION(s):

• Security maintains a CODE RED condition. SAS operator provides SALE report (size, activity, location, equipment) informing the Control Room of attacks and entry into SWPH.

• Control Room or Security notifies ICP of hostile action occurring at the SWPH.

137

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station EVENT DESCRIPTION: Declaration of General Emergency

" The Shift Manager may declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY at this time, based on HS4, Notification of HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA as directed by 0S1290.03 ATTACHMENT D, SITE AREA EMERGENCY ACTIONS DURING CODE RED.

" The conditions are met for the ALERT and SAE ECLs at the DEP Opportunity same time, only the SAE should be declared.

SAE Time Recognized CLASSIFICATION Time Declared HS4 EXPECTED ACTION: Site Area Emergency is Declared and actions of T -15 OS1290.03 ATTACHMENT D, SITE AREA

-0745 EMERGENCY ACTIONS DURING CODE RED are implemented.

Objective: Demonstrate the ability to implement the emergency plan during a HAB event.

Objective: Demonstrate the ability to classify an emergency during a hostile based drill or exercise Objective: Demonstrate the ability to recognize station conditions and parameter trends as emergency plan initiating conditions, and to develop potential solutions for placing the station in a safe, stable condition.

138

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Unit Supervisor:

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Unit Supervisor:

The WCS makes the following announcement over the PA System, Message D.11 and sounds the SPARE alarm: "This is a Drill Message. ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. A SECURITY EVENT IS IN PROGRESS. CLEAR ALL HALLWAYS AND STOP ALL MOVEMENT UNTIL ADVISED OTHERWISE.

TURN OFFALL RADIOS AND PLACE PAGERS TO VIBRATE MODE.

TRESPASSERS MUST HALT IMMEDIATELY OR DEADL Y FORCE MAY BE T-16 USED." This is a Drill Message (Announcement/alarm repeated.)

~0746 EXPECTED ACTION(s):

• The Control Room repeats the announcement over the public address system.

• All personnel on site clear hallways and stop movement and remain there until directed otherwise by Operations or Security.

Objective: Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the station emergency response organizationand activate station emergency responsefacilities in a timely manner.

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

• The WCS activates the ERO per OS1290.03 ATTACHMENT B, T-16 EMERGENCY PLAN ACTIVATION DURING CODE RED.

-0746 Objective: Demonstratethe abilityto mobilize the station emergency response organizationand activate station emergency responsefacilities in a timely manner.

139

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Message D.12 EVENT DESCRIPTION:

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Message D.12

" SFMs report explosions occurring at SEPS Diesel Generators, sending a large cloud of black smoke into the air. (SEPS-DG-2A is destroyed, SEPS-DG-2B remains undamaged)

• Adversary Team 2 is neutralized by SFMs while attempting to make movement into the Waste Process Building.

T~17 DRILL MSG D.12: (This is a Drill Message.)

~0747 SFM: "MultipleAdversaries in the area of the Cooling Tower neutralized crossing the 50 yard line. There was an explosion near the SEPS and I see black smoke & fire.". (This is a Drill Message.)

EXPECTED ACTION(s):

Alarm Station Operator expected to report explosions in the area of the Cooling Tower before reporting adversary neutralization in the area of WPB..

140

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Inprovement Plan Seabrook Station Timeline: CFE 14- 05 EVENT DESCRIPTION: Message D.13

• SFMs report a large explosion in SWPH with light smoke coming out of the building.

" Adversary team I detonates a large satchel charge in the SWPH, damaging SW piping.

DRILL MSG D.13: (This is a Drill Message.)

SFM: "We have explosions occurring inside the SWPH. ". (This is a Drill Message.)

• Both Trains of SW swap to the cooling tower due to low service water pump discharge pressure. This results in the cooling tower being pumped to the service water pump house. This condition will result in rising PCCW temperatures and lowering cooling tower level. This will drive the Control T-17 Room to secure all service water pumps to maintain cooling tower inventory.

'0747

• A Train SW piping is severely damaged and will require extensive repair. B Train SW piping has a large hole, that can be repaired.

" The loss of service water will necessitate shutting down equipment as Service Water and PCCW Temperatures rise.

EXPECTED ACTION(s):

• SAS notifies Control Room of explosion.

• Control Room Implements OS1216.01, Degraded Ultimate Heat Sink and OS1212.01, PCCW SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.

" Drive actions to align alternate cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler per OS1002.02, OPERATION OF LETDOWN, CHARGING AND SEAL INJECTION.

• Control Room will secure all Service Water and Cooling Tower Pumps resulting in loss of cooling to PCCW.

141

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station EVENT DESCRIPTION: Message D.14 a SFMs monitor SWPH.

T-18 DRILL MSG D.14: (This is a Drill Message.)

SFM: "We have observation of SW. No activity.". (This is a Drill Message.)

EXPECTED ACTION(s):

0 SFMs maintain observation of SWPH.

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Message D.15

• The WCS performs an accelerated notification to the NRC B

T-18 Operations Center, per OS1290.03 ATTACHMENT

~0748 Objective: Demonstratethe abilityto communicate threat-relatedinformation to the NRC during a hostile action-basedevent.

Perf Crit.: Perform acceleratednotification to the NRC in accordancewith appropriateprocedures EVENT DESCRIPTION: LLEA arriving on site reports arcing in the high Message D.16 yard on the Southern line.

DRILL MSG D.16: (This is a Drill Message.)

T~18 SFM to CAS: "There is a large amount of arcingon the insulators in

-0748 the high yardfor the Southern line". (This is a Drill Message.)

EXPECTED ACTION:

• Security reports to Control Room arcing on the northern 345 kv line.

142

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Timeline- CFE 14- 05 EVENT DESCRIPTION: Declaration of General Emergency

• The Shift Manager may declare a General Emergency at this time, based on HG1, Security Event Resulting In Loss of Physical Control as directed by OS1290.03 ATTACHMENT E, GENERAL EMERGENCY ACTIONS DURING CODE RED.

" This classification is based upon loss of physical control of the facility, which may not be recongized at this time.

DEP Opportunity " This classification may also be based on the Judgement of the GE STED/SED.

CLASSIFICATION Time Recognized HG1 (HG2) Time Declared T ~18 EXPECTED ACTION: General Emergency is Declared and actions of

~0748 0S1290.03 ATTACHMENT E, GENERAL EMERGENCY ACTIONS DURING CODE RED are implemented.

Objective: Demonstrate the ability to implement the emergency plan during a HAB event.

Objective: Demonstrate the ability to classify an emergency during a hostile based drill or exercise Objective: Demonstrate the ability to recognize station conditions and parameter trends as emergency plan initiating conditions, and to develop potential solutions for placing the station in a safe, stable condition.

+

CR Lead Controller: If no emergency declaration has been made AND Message D.17 is not pending, the Shift Manager will be directed to declare a T -28 General Emergency based on HG1.

-0758 Contingency time is based on 15 minutes from the notification of HOSTILE ACTION within the protected area.

INTIA SWEP PASE(3060 in)

I EVENT DESCRIPTION: PAR Identification 0 Control Room identifies PARs for EPZ.

T ~30 "0800 EXPECTED ACTION(s):

• Control Room correctly identifies PAR Group A, wind direction from 168 - 281.4.

143

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station EVENT DESCRIPTION: Recommendation to Implement KI plans for the general public (and emergency workers)

T -30 EXPECTED ACTION(s):

"0800 0 Control Room correctly identifies the recommendation to Implement KI plans for the general public.

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

T -30 a Security Officers surround SWPH.

~0800 EXPECTED ACTION(s):

• Security officers maintain perimeter on SWPH.

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Data Validation Verify Notification was made within 15 minutes E-Yes El No Declaration Time:

Notification Time:

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Security reports that all known adversaries Message D.18 have been neutralized or contained in Service Water Pumphouse.

DRILL MSG D.18: (This is a Drill Message.)

Controller: "Seven total adversariesconfirmed neutralizedtwo are contained in the SWPH at this time. Status unknown. We have 2 T ~35 wounded Security Force Member in need of immediate medical "0805 attention on the roof.". (This is a Drill Message.)

EXPECTED ACTION:

• Security reports to Control Room and ICP that all known adversaries neutralized or contained in the SWPH.

" SFMs maintain a 360'watch from their firing positions.

• Security coordinates with Control Room and ICP to preserve the crime scene to the extent possible.

144

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Timeline: CFE 14- 05 EVENT DESCRIPTION: A SBK resident makes report to Seabrook PD, Message D.19 noted that when he was leaving for fishing this morning a group of men were leaving from the Farm Lane Boat launch in two boats.

They had guns and packs with them.

DRILL MSG D.19: (This is a Drill Message.)

Controller: "Person called Seabrook Police, reported that when he T-35 was leaving for fishing this morning a group of men were leaving 0805 from the Farm Lane Boat launch in two boats. They had guns and packs with them. One of their vehicles is still there.". (This is a Drill Message.)

EXPECTED ACTIONS:

o Incident Commander:

o Incident Commander coordinates the necessary support to investigate this report.

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Security, with input from the Control Room, discusses the attack with ICP. Immediate needs and radiation protection requirements are reviewed with Incident Commander.

EXPECTED ACTIONS:

• Security:

o Maintains onsite protective measures (cover).

o Requests LLEA sweep of Owner Controlled Area.

o Requests medical care for 3 wounded SFMs, 2 of which T-36 require immediate medical attention.

-0806 o Coordinates perimeter control and site access restrictions with LLEA.

o Requests Explosives and Ordinates Disposal (EOD) Team to mitigate undetonated explosives that may have been left behind in areas traversed by adversaries.

• Control Room:

o Requests EMS for injured personnel.

o Requests Fire Response for SEPS DG o Requests Security support to enable safe limited movement for assessments of plant damal4prznd with associated Health Physics support.

Unclassified Radiologica] Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station o May discuss possible establishment of fire service water cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler.

• Incident Commander:

o Incident Commander and Security coordinate the necessary support.

Objective: Demonstrate the abilityof on-shift Operationsand Security personnel to coordinate response actions among themselves, and with the Incident Commanderand local law enforcement agency (LLEA) personnel.

Objective: Demonstrate the ability of on-shift Operationsand Security personnel to coordinatewith the Incident Commanderfor deployment of on-site and offsite first-responders in a post-attack environment EVENT DESCRIPTION: Security Support of NSO movement to PAB

• At this time Security can support movement of NSO to PAB to T-36 align cooling for CS-P-2B.

EXPECTED ACTION:

• SFM escort or safe travel path provided to NSO by Security.

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Security reports arcing in the high yard on the Message D.20 Southern line.

DRILL MSG D.20: (This is a Drill Message.)

T~40 SFM to CAS: " There is a large amount of arcing on the insulatorsin

-0810 the high yard". (This is a Drill Message.)

EXPECTED ACTION:

9 Security reports to Control Room arcing on the northern 345 kv line.

146

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station EVENT DESCRIPTION: ERDS will be activated as directed by OS1290.03.

EXPECTED ACTION: The Control Room activates ERDS using a T -40 computer monitor in accordance with "0810 OS1290.03.

Time ERDS is activated:

Objective: Demonstrate the ability to perform timely and accurate NRC notification.

EVENT DESCRIPTION: State Notification EXPECTED ACTION:

0 The WCS develops notifies the states within 15 minutes of DEP Opportunity DECLARATION per OS1290.03.

GE / SAE 0 This notification is based upon T=O for the SAE.

NOTIFICATION (Per ER 1.2, Notification should be made of the higher level ECL)

HG1 / HS4 (NEI) Record time of contact with first state:

T-43 (NRC) Record time both states have been notified:

-0805 Objective: Demonstrate the ability to notify offsite response agencies during a hostile based drill or exercise.

Objective: Demonstrate the ability to make a protective action recommendation offsite during a hostile based drill or exercise EVENT DESCRIPTION: NRC Notification.

EXPECTED ACTION: NRC headquarters operations center is notified T -45 per OS1290.03.

-0815 Time NRC is notified:

Objective: Demonstratethe abilityto communicate threat-relatedinformation to the NRC during a hostile action-basedevent.

147

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station EVENT DESCRIPTION: Loss of Offsite Power

• Due to debris from prior explosion damaging insulator in high yard, the Ward Hill line (394) trips on line faults. Resulting in loss of offsite power.

T-50

• Both Diesel Generator Start and load Buses 5 & 6

-0820

• SEPS 2A is unavailable, SEPS DG-2B starts.

EXPECTED ACTION(s):

Control Room Implements actions in E.0 to restore power to emergency busses from an offsite source.

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Control Room Considerations

• Diesel Generators will be running without cooling water. This condition is not described by station procedures and will require Engineering input in order to plan Diesel Generator T-51 use.

-0821

• High Temperature alarms will be actuated if running without full cooling.

EXPECTED ACTION(s):

• Control Room Requests guidance on use of Diesel Generators.

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Align Alternate Cooling to Charging Pump 2B

• Diesel Generators will be running without cooling water. This condition is not described by station procedures and will When requested require Engineering input in order to plan Diesel Generator and support ue use.

available.

EXPECTED ACTION(s):

• Control Room Requests guidance on use of Diesel Generators.

148

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Timeline: CFE 14- 05 EVENT DESCRIPTION: Offsite first responders continue staging (at Staging Area), awaiting additional response direction from ICP.

EXPECTED ACTION:

T-55 " ICP continues discussion and decision-making necessary to support

-0825 deployment of offsite response assets and ERO movement and mobilization.

" LLEA continues initial sweep of Owner Controlled Area.

" Security continues initial sweep of PA and OCA, and coordination of limited movement within PA.

ER MOIIZTO PHS (36 min)

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Declaration of General Emergency

" IF diesel generators are secured with a loss of offsite power, the Shift Manager will declare a General Emergency, based on SG1, Prolonged loss of both AC emergency buses.

• This classification will not be made if GE declared under HG1.

DEP Opportunity Time Recognized GE CLASSIFICATION Time Declared SG1 EXPECTED ACTION: General Emergency is Declared and actions of OS1290.03 ATTACHMENT E, GENERAL T ~58 EMERGENCY ACTIONS DURING CODE RED are (when applicable) implemented.

~0828 Objective: Demonstrate the ability to implement the emergency plan during a HAB event.

Objective: Demonstrate the ability to classify an emergency during a hostile based drill or exercise Objective: Demonstrate the ability to recognize station conditions and parameter trends as emergency plan initiating conditions, and to develop potential solutions for placing the station in a safe, stable condition.

149

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Timeline: CFE 14- 05 EVENT DESCRIPTION: State Notification EXPECTED ACTION:

• The WCS develops notifies the states within 15 minutes of DECLARATION per OS1290.03.

DEP Opportunity 0 This notification is based upon T=0 for the Loss of AC power.

GE N Notification not required if GE not declared.

NOTIFICATION SG1 / HS4 (NEI) Record time of contact with first state:

T - 15 min after declaration (NRC) Record time both states have been notified:

Objective: Demonstrate the ability to notify offsite response agencies during a hostile based drill or exercise.

Objective: Demonstrate the ability to make a protective action recommendation offsite during a hostile based drill or exercise EVENT DESCRIPTION: LLEA coordinates with Security on safe travel paths to/from the PA. LLEA Coordinates with Security on tacking back SWPH.

EXPECTED ACTION:

• Security maintains onsite protective measures (cover).

" Security coordinates with LLEA Tactical Units on course of action to deal with barricaded adversaries (2) in SWPH.

" LLEA investigative branch works on developing leads in reference to the SBK resident report of suspicious activities observed earlier in the day.

T~60 9 Security establishes safe and/or protected areas and routes to/from

-0830 PA for necessary troubleshooting and repair activities.

" Safe and/or protected routes of travel have been established out of the PA and OCA by Security and LLEA to enable PA evacuation and accountability.

" Coordination of EMS for wounded SFMs, FBI/crime scene investigation, and EOD for undetonated explosives.

Objective: Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) to coordinate in-plant and on-site response actions with Security and the Incident Command Post (ICP).

Objective: As appropriate to the scenario, coordinate deployment of fire and medical response resources between the ICP, on-site ERO facilities, and Security. 150

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station EVENT DESCRIPTION: The SED (ERO still forming at EOF), in concert with the STED, Security, and the ICP, will likely be coordinating with Operations and Maintenance personnel to conduct an initial investigation of damaged plant equipment and render opinions on its T~70 repair. But it is anticipated that the ERO will coordinate repair teams

~0840 from the Alternative OSC for the major equipment repair operations.

EXPECTED ACTION:

Onsite Operations and Maintenance personnel should communicate the need for REPAIR TEAMS to Control Room, who relays the need to available ERO facilities and ICP.

151

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station EVENT DESCRIPTION: The STED turns over to the SED, and the ATSC, AOSC, and EOF are fully staffed and activated, lAW ER 3.1, ER 3.2, ER and 3.3. (NOTE: Forpurposes of this Exercise, designatedpersonnel will respond. If this were an actual emergency, all available ERO personnel would respond, and ongoing 24-hour ERO coverage would be establishedalong with currentfacility activation.)

Alternative TSC activated:

Alternative OSC activated:

EOF activated:

EXPECTED ACTION:

T~71

• Communication established between EOF, TSC, ICP, and CR.

-0841 a ERO members initiate applicable portions of applicable ER procedures:

o The SED is in charge of overall emergency response.

o SED contacts Control Room and receive report on plant and personnel conditions.

o EOF assumes communications from Control Room as soon as possible.

o TSC will designate a Site Emergency Director as the Operations Liaison to the SCC and the OSC will designate an available RP tech as the SCC Liaison.

After being briefed, they will be dispatched to the ICP.

Objective: Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) to support operation of an Incident Command Post (ICP).

Objective: Demonstrate the ability of the ERO to activate alternative facilities 152

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improverment Plan Seabrook Station EVENT DESCRIPTION: The JIC is staffed and activated at the EOF, lAW ER 3.5.

JIC activated:

EXPECTED ACTION:

" State, federal, and company PIOs arrive and integrate into JIC T-71 operations.

-0O841 " Press releases are accurate, and are vetted for sensitive and safeguards information prior issuance.

• Media line updated appropriate to available information.

• Joint Information Center will designate an SCC Liaison. After being briefed, they will be dispatched to the ICP.

Objective: Demonstratethe ability of the ERO to coordinatethe development and release of publicinformation in a post-attack environment.

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Radiation Protection measures determined between ERO, HP, and ICP, with assistance of state agencies.

T-90

• Dosimetry provided by the State of New Hampshire to ORO at

~0900 staging area.

• Dosimetry provided by Seabrook Station to ICP.

Objective: Demonstrate the abilityto coordinateimplementationof on-site radiationprotection measuresfor offsite first-responderswith the ICP.

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Security completes PA accountability, and presents it to Control Room.

EXPECTED ACTION:

" Personnel Search and Rescue will be initiated when possible of any missing PA personnel. Scenario does not include any missing personnel.

T~9S

• Security is maintaining safe cordons for personnel to exit and travel within

~0905 the PA.

" LLEA is ensuring safe passage on the South Access Road and via traffic control points to the staging area.

" Non-essentials will remain at the Offsite Holding Area until released by FBI/LLEA.

Objective: Demonstrate the ability to accountfor on-site personnel in a post-attack environment. 1 53

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Inmprovement Plan Seabrook Station EVENT DESCRIPTION: ICP executes plan to extract barricaded subjects in SWPH.

T-95 EXPECTED ACTION:

~0905 ICP will coordinate with LLEA to extract / neutralize adversaries in SWPH. The Control Room should impress upon the ICP the need to evaluate the status of Service Water in order to restore Service T~100 EVENT DESCRIPTION: First New Briefing Message D.22

-0910 During first News Briefing, ask questions in Message T-100 EVENT DESCRIPTION: Requested offsite first responders (EMS, EOD, etc.) enter PA and commence operations under the direction of Security and the ICP.

EVENT DESCRIPTION: REPAIR TEAMS are briefed at AOSC, and begin T~130 escorted/protected travel to plant.

-0940 Objective: Demonstrate the ability to coordinatemobilization of the Emergency Response Organization(ERO) with Security and the ICP.

T-150 EVENT DESCRIPTION: EOD completes initial sweep of the PA near

-1000 gate 2 through SWPH to detect explosive ordinance.

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Crime scene team(s) continue to coordinate T,160 with EMS, Fire, and Security to gain access to the crime scene. Crime scene investigators conduct investigation in the PA. This consists of collecting evidence prior to allowing repair team activity at the SWPH.

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Repair Teams arrive on site, where safe travel has been coordinated to SEPS and SWPH (if/when verified no hazard due to undetonated explosives). They make their assessments, and T~160 begin to formulate success paths to respective equipment

~1010 restoration.

EXPECTED ACTION:

• Maintenance welding of eventual B Train Service Water piping repair will governed by work order.

EVENT DESCRIPTION: Service Water Pump House Repair Team T~195 reports that repair to the A Train Serv-Water piping will take at

-1035 least a week, and B-Service Water train can be restored with within 12 hrs.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Timeline. CFE 14- 05 EVENT DESCRIPTION: Exercise is terminated when objectives are Message D.23 T~200 satisfied. Message D.24

~1040 EXPECTED ACTION: Termination message is sent to the State and counties.

155

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Timeline: CFE 14- 05 I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 157

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Seabrook Station State Notification Fact Sheet Time Notification Initiated: NH 0744 - 0813 MA 0744 - 0813 Block 1: This is: Name WCS at Seabrook Station.

Name Title Block 2: Time Declared: I I Unusual Event ITime Terminated:

f I Alert OR 0743 - 0758 IX] Site Area Emergency:

[ ] General Emergency Block 3: The emergency initiating condition is HS4 Block 4: We recommend the following protective actions: 1 DP E.B SAE-

[I None [X] As follows New Hampshire Massachusetts ERPA Town Shelter Evacuate ERPA Town Shelter Evacuate A. Seabrook II Il B. Amesbury [I[l I1 Hampton Falls 1] Salisbury I C. Kensington Il I1 E. Merrimac [l S. Hampton II Newburyport [ I [ I Newbury I ] [ l D. Hampton [I II West Newbury [ I l N. Hampton [] [ I Beaches F. Brentwood I I Evacuate E. Kingston I I I I Seabrook Beach Exeter [ [ [ ] Hampton Beach Newfields []

Newton [ [ Close Kingston [ [ II Parker River National Wildlife Refuge 11 Plum Island Beach G. Greenland [I ]l [1I Salisbury Beach Stratham I1 II Rye ll II Potassium Iodide (General Emergency only)

New Castle ll I1 [ I Implement KI plans for the general public Portsmouth II

[XJ Block 5: A radiological release Has not occurred II Has occurred and is continuing II Occurred but has been terminated Block 6: Authorized by: ,..Name 11/5/14 0743-0800 q VSED / RM Date Time Block 7: Acknowledge receipt of this message with your name.

New Hampshire: New Harrpshire Massachusetts: Massachusetts Name of Dis )atcher Name of Dispatcher Time Notification Initiated: NH 0744-o08118 MA 0744-0813 ER 2.OB Rev. 31 Pane 1 of 1

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Seabrook Station State Notification Fact Sheet Block 1: This is: Name WCs at Seabrook Station.

Name Title Block 2: Time Declared: [ ] Unusual Event Time Terminated:

[ ] Alert OR 0743 - 0758 1 Site Area Emergency:

IX] General Emergency Block 3: The emergency initiating condition is HG1 (HG2)

Block 4: We recommend the following protective actions:

=DE E2.B GE II None IX] As follows New Hampshire Massachusetts ERPA Town Shelter Evacuate ERPA Town Shelter Evacuate A. Seabrook II IXl B. Amesbury IXl [!

Hampton Falls [I IX Salisbury [xI II C. Kensington [XJ I I E. Merrimac [X] II S. Hampton IX] II Newburyport [X] II Newbury [X] I I D. Hampton I I [XI West Newbury IX] I N. Hampton I I IX]

Beaches F. Brentwood IX] II Evacuate E. Kingston IX] I IX] Seabrook Beach Exeter [X I[ [X] Hampton Beach Newfields IX] I I Newton [X] I I Close Kingston [X] I IX] Parker River National Wildlife Refuge IX] Plum Island Beach G. Greenland IX] (( 11 [XI Salisbury Beach Stratham lXI I1 Rye [Xl [1 Potassium Iodide (General Emergency only)

New Castle IX] !I [X] Implement KI plans for the general public Portsmouth IlX Block 5: A radiological release IX] Has not occurred II Has occurred and is continuing I] Occurred but has been terminated Block 6: Authorized by: ,Name 11/5/14 0743-0800 DSED / R Date Time Block 7: Acknowledge receipt of this message with your name.

New Hampshire: New Hampshire Massachusetts: Massachusetts Name of Dispatcher Name of Dispatcher 159 ER 2.OB Rev. 31 Pane 1 of 1

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station D. Messages 160

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/lmprovement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: Control Room Personnel MESSAGE NO.: D.1 FROM: Drill Manager TIME: ~0730 LOCATION: Simulator Control Room THIS IS A DRILL The drill date is simulated as Saturday, November 5, 2014.

On-site personnel are limited to the normal weekday compliment. Current reactor power is 100%.

Reactor core power history since the completion of OR-15 is Average Burnup = 10,000 MWD/MTU and Effective Full Power Days = 257. All plant parameters are normal except for those identified below.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 161 D-1 I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: Non-Control Room Personnel MESSAGE NO.: D.2 FROM: Drill Manager TIME: Upon Arrival LOCATION: Emergency Response Facilities THIS IS A DRILL The drill date is simulated as Saturda, November 5, 2014.

On-site personnel are limited to the normal weekday compliment. Current reactor power is 100%.

Reactor core power history since the completion of OR-15 is Average Burnup = 10,000 MWD/MTU and Effective Full Power Days = 257. All plant parameters are normal except for those identified below.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 162 D-2 I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: Plant Unit Supervisor (CR) MESSAGE NO.: D.3 FROM: CR Lead Controller TIME: 0730 LOCATION: CR THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

Notify Site personnel as follows:

a. Ensure Gaitronics night muting is off.

b. Using the Gaitronics override, make the following announcement:

"ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION DRILL HAS COMMENCED. NON-PARTICIPANT PERSONNEL DISREGARD ALL DRILL RELATED ALARMS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS."

c. Using the Gaitronics override, repeat the announcement.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 163 I D-3 J

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: CAS MESSAGE NO.: D.4 FROM: Guard Island TIME: -0737 LOCATION: CAS

___THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

We picked up a white van speeding down the North Access road before parking on the north side of the road, east of the checkpoint.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 164 D-4 I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: Central Alarm Station MESSAGE NO.: D.5 FROM: OCA Patrol TIME: --0740 LOCATION: CAS THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

CODE GRAY, the white van took off heading toward Alpha Lot. No license plates visible. Standby for further information.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 165 D-5 I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: Central Alarm Station MESSAGE NO.: D.6 FROM: OCA Patrol TIME: -0740 LOCATION: CAS THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

I have visual on white van. He's stopped by the VBS under the highlines.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 166 D-6

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: CAS Operator MESSAGE NO.: D.7 FROM: CAS Controller TIME: -0741 LOCATION: CAS THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

You hear/see a large explosion. OCA patrol appears damaged on camera and is non-responsive on radio THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 167 D-7 I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: CAS / SAS MESSAGE NO.: D.8 FROM: CAS Controller TIME: -0744 LOCATION: Simulator THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

You simultaneously receive Intrusion alarms on Zones 801, 16 and Gate 2.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 168 f D-8 1

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14-05 November 5, 2014 TO: CAS / SAS MESSAGE NO.: D.9 FROM: SFM TIME:-0745 LOCATION: CAS/SAS THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

"Multiple Adversaries in the area of Gate 2 and the Cooling Tower. I'm receiving suppressive fire on my East and West ports."

after a few seconds report the following:

"RPGs impacting the roof."

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 169 D-9

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: CAS/SAS MESSAGE NO.: D.10 FROM: CAS Controller TIME: -0745 LOCATION: CAS THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

You receive Intrusion alarm on SW100.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 170 D-10 I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: Plant Unit Supervisor (CR) MESSAGE NO.: D.11 FROM: Drill Manager TIME:-0746 LOCATION: CR (Sim)

L I THIS IS A DRILL L Notify Site personnel as follows:

a. Ensure Gaitronics night muting is off.

b. Place telephone page lockout to ON C. Sound the Plant Security Alarm by pressing the button for the Spare Alarm.

d. Using the Gaitronics override, make the following announcement:

THIS ISA DRILL MESSAGE "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. A SECURITY EVENT IS IN PROGRESS. CLEAR ALL HALLWAYS AND STOP ALL MOVEMENT UNTIL ADVISED OTHERWISE. TURN OFF ALL RADIOS AND PLACE PAGERS TO VIBRATE MODE. TRESPASSERS MUST HALT IMMEDIATELY OR DEADLY FORCE MAY BE USED."

THIS ISA DRILL MESSAGE

e. Repeat the Plant Security Alarm.

f. Repeat the Gaitronics announcement.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 171 D-11 J.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 MESSAGE NO.: D.12 TO: CAS / SAS FROM: SFM TIME: -0747 LOCATION: CAS THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

Multiple Adversaries in the area of the Cooling Tower neutralized crossing the 50 yard line. There was an explosion near the SEPS generators and I see black smoke & fire.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 172 D-12 I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: CAS/SAS MESSAGE NO.: D.13 FROM: CAS Controller TIME: -0747 LOCATION: CAS THIS IS A DRILL "We have explosions occurring inside the SWPH."

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 173 D-13 I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: CAS / SAS MESSAGE NO.: D.14 FROM: SFM TIME: -0O748 LOCATION: CAS THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

We have observation of SW. No activity.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION D°-14 174

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvernent Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: WCS MESSAGE NO: D.1S FROM: CR Controller TIME: ~0748 LOCATION: Simulator THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

Perform accelerated NRC Notification using the FTS handset phone. IF this phone is not operable, THEN use a commercial line. The numbers below can be used for either phone

• 1-(301) 816-5100 (Primary)

-OR-

.1-(301) 951-0550 (Back-Up)

1) When the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) answers the phone, announce the following:

- This is (name) calling from Seabrook Station notifying the NRC of an onsite security threat.

• The authentication code is (daily code).

2) Upon NRC confirmation of the authentication code, provide the following information:

" If determined, state the emergency classification,

• Brief description of the nature of the threat, ED Type of threat/attack El Threat/attack status (i.e., himinent, in progress, repelled)

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 175 D-15J

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: CAS/SAS MESSAGE NO: D.16 FROM: LLEA TIME: ~0810 LOCATION: CAS/SAS THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

There is a large amount of arcing on the insulators in the high yard for the Southern line.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 176 D-16 I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: Control Room and TSC MESSAGE NO:D.17 FROM: CR Controller / TSC controller TIME:~0758 LOCATION: Control Room / TSC THIS IS A DRILL Inform the Facility Lead Controller and Drill Manager if this message is passed.

Deliver the following message if a General Emergency has not been declared by this time.

T-0 time starts when explosions reported in SWPH.

MESSAGE:

Declare a General Emergency at this time in accordance with OS1290.03, Response To Security Event.

Initiating Condition is HG1, Security Event Resulting In Loss Of Physical Control Of The Facility.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 177 D-17

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: Control Room / SCC MESSAGE NO: D.18 FROM: SCC Security Lead TIME: -0805 LOCATION: SCC M THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

Seven total adversaries confirmed neutralized two are contained in the SWPH at this time. Status unknown. We have 2 wounded Security Force Member in need immediate medical attention on the roof.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 178 D-18 I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/linprovement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: Seabrook Police Rep at ICP MESSAGE NO.: D.19 FROM: ICP Controller TIME: '0805 LOCATION: ICP THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

Person called Seabrook Police, reported that when he was leaving for fishing this morning a group of men were leaving from the Farm Lane Boat launch in two boats.

They had guns and packs with them. One of their vehicles is still there.

rigure u-i - rarmers Lane aoaz Launcn THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 179 D-19

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 180 D-20 I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: CAS/SAS MESSAGE NO: D.20 FROM: SFM TIME: -0810 LOCATION: CAS/SAS THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

There is a large amount of arcing on the insulators in the high yard for the Southern line.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 181 D-21 1

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: Shift Manager MESSAGE NO: D.21 FROM: Control Room Lead Controller TIME: "0748 LOCATION: Simulator Control Room THIS IS A DRILL When notified that a General Emergency has been declared, notify the Unit Supervisor to deliver the following message.

MESSAGE:

Notify Site personnel as follows:

a. Ensure Gaitronics night muting is off.

b. Sound the plant emergency alarm.

c. Using the Gaitronics override, make the following announcement:

THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. A GENERAL EMERGENCY HAS BEEN DECLARED.

ALL PERSONNEL WITH GENERAL EMERGENCY DUTIES REPORT TO YOUR ASSIGNED LOCATIONS. ALL NON-ASSIGNED PERSONNEL EVACUATE THE SITE TO YOUR HOME."

THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE

d. Repeat the plant emergency alarm.

e. Using the Gaitronics override, repeat the announcement.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 182 D-22)

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: Shift Manager MESSAGE NO: D.22 FROM: Control Room Lead Controller TIME: ~0910 LOCATION: Simulator Control Room THIS IS A DRILL As News Media, ask the following questions during the briefing; The black smoke that is blowing thoroughout the area, is that burning radioactive material?

What is FEMA's role in the response to these events?

If PARs have been issued by this time ask why it was recommended to issue KI?

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 183 D-23

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: All Drill Participants MESSAGE NO: D.23 FROM: Drill Controllers TIME: When Directed LOCATION: All Facilities THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

DRILL ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN TERMINATED A post-drill critique of facility performance will begin in approximately 20 minutes. This critique will be facilitated by the Facility Lead Controller. You should complete the following actions prior to the start of the critique.

1. Restore your work area to the original state of readiness.

2. Save ALL materials for review.

3. Conduct a self-critique with the other players in your functional/work area. Refer to the Drill/Exercise Critique Review Points handout for topics to consider.

4. Each functional area should designate a spokesperson to present the self-critique results during the facility critique.

5. Controllers will caucus in a separate area and summarize their observations. Keep this meeting brief and focus on the more significant issues.

As directed by the Lead Controller, the designated spokespersons will present the self-critique comments for each functional/work area. Other players may offer comments after the spokesperson is done.

Controllers will give their comments following the players.

Document drill comments on EP-AA-101-1000-F03, Typical Drill / Exercise Comment Form, and provide the completed form to a controller.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 184 D-24

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION CONTROLLER MESSAGE CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 TO: Plant Unit Supervisor (CR)

MESSAGE NO.: D.24 FROM: TSC Lead Controller TIME:: - 1430 LOCATION: CR THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE:

Notify Site personnel as follows:

a. Ensure Gaitronics night muting is off.

b. Using the Gaitronics override, make the following announcement:

"ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION DRILL HAS BEEN TERMINATED. REGARD ALL FURTHER ALARMS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS."

c. Using the Gaitronics override, repeat the announcement.

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION 185 D-25

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station E. Mini-Scenarios 186

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION MINI-SCENARIO CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 MINI-SCENARIO E.1 Page 1 of 4 CONTROL CELL INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXTERNAL ERO INTERFACE SIMULATIONS I. General Instructions and Comments A. The following information should be used as a basis for simulating responses.

B. Controllers may add to, delete from or otherwise modify any of the following information in response to player actions as deemed appropriate.

C. Controllers should thorough hly acquaint themselves with any referenced documents and forms prior to the drill.

II. NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS)

A. Start Time: Approximately 0830 -0900 B. ERO

Contact:

STED/WCS and Operations Technician/ENS Communicator C. Contact Location: Control Room and TSC D. Form Used to Record Data: ER 2.0D E. Topic(s) Discussed:

1. Information/entries on Form ER 2.0D

2. Is there any change to the classification of the event? If so, what is the reason?

3. What is the ongoing/imminent damage to the facility, including affected equipment and safety features?

4. Have toxic or radiological releases occurred or been projected, including changes in the release rate? If so, what is the projected onsite and offsite releases, and what is the basis of assessment?

5. What are the health effect/consequences to onsite/offsite people? How many onsite/offsite people are/will be affected and to what extent?

6. Is the event under control? When was control established, or what is the planned action to bring the event under control? What is the mitigative action underway or planned?

7. What onsite protective measuresl1*ae been taken or planned?

8. What offsite protective actions have been recommended to State/local officials?

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION MINI-SCENARIO CFE 14- 0S November 5, 2014 MINI-SCENARIO E.1 Page 2 of 4 CONTROL CELL INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXTERNAL ERO INTERFACE SIMULATIONS

9. What is the status of State/local/other Federal agencies' responses, if known?

10. Ifapplicable, what is the status of public information activities, such as alarm, broadcast, or press releases? Has a Joint Information Center been activated?

When asked, confirm that the NRC is receiving plant data from ERDS. Request a call back every 30 minutes with an update until the event is terminated. DO NOT provide any guidance, recommendations or directions.

E. Information to Provide:

1. When notified of the Site Area Emergency declaration, inform your ENS contact that an NRC Site Team has been dispatched to the EOF.

a. Estimated arrival time at the EOF is 1400 today

b. Team members:

• Site Team Leader

• Deputy Site Team Leader

• Technical Assessment Branch Leader

• Deputy Technical Assessment Branch Leader

• Technical Assessment Communicator

• Technical Assessment Specialist

" Protective Measures Branch Leader

" Deputy Protective Measures Branch Leader

" Radiation Safety Coordinator

• Dose Assessor.

• Protective Measures Specialist

• Protective Measures Communicator

• Safeguards/Security Branch Leader

• Chronology/Documentation Branch Leader

• Response Coordination Leader

" Liaison Leader

• State Emergency Operatiof0&enter Liaison

• Public Information Leader

• Public Information Technical Briefer(s)

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION MINI-SCENARIO CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 MINI-SCENARIO E.1 Page 3 of 4 CONTROL CELL INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXTERNAL ERO INTERFACE SIMULATIONS

c. Team will fly to Pease International Tradeport.

d. Ground transportation to the EOF has been arranged.

2. When notified of the Site Area Emergency declaration, inform your ENS contact that the NRC wants the Health Physics Line (HPN) line established by Seabrook Station as soon as possible. Provide your number as the HPN contact number and ask that the HPN Communicator be directed to contact you.

Ill. NRC Health Physics Network B. Start Time: Sometime after Site Area Emergency declaration. If contact has not been initiated by 1045, call the HPN Communicator at 468-3950 and identify yourself as the NRC HPN Communicator.

C. ERO

Contact:

HPN Communicator D. Contact Location: EOF E. Form Used to Record Data: ER 2.OG F. Topic(s) Discussed:

1. Information/entries on Form ER 2.OG

2. Is there any change to the classification of the event? If so, what is the reason?

3. Have toxic or radiological releases occurred or been projected (including changes in the release rate)? If so, what are the actual or currently projected on-site and off-site releases, and what is the basis for this assessment?

4. What are the health effects or consequences to on-site and off-site people? How many onsite or offsite people are being or will be affected and to what extent?

5. Is the event under control? When was control established, or what is the planned action to bring the event under control? What mitigative actions are currently underway or planned?

6. What on-site protective measures have been taken or are planned?

7. What off-site protective actions are being considered or have been recommended to state and local officials?

8. What are the current meteorological conditions?

9. What are the dose and dose rate readings on-site and off-site?

Request a call back every 30 minutes \4fan update until the event is terminated. DO NOT provide any guidance, recommendations or directions.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/inprovement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION MINI-SCENARIO CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 MINI-SCENARIO E.1 Page 4 of 4 CONTROL CELL INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXTERNAL ERO INTERFACE SIMULATIONS F. Information to Provide:

1. Telecopy number for HPN forms V. Westinghouse A. Start Time: As initiated by players B. ERO

Contact:

Industry Liaison C. Contact Location: EOF D. Topic(s) Discussed:

a. Availability of Westinghouse resources

i. Accident and transient analysis ii. Fuel damage assessment iii. Replacement fuel and parts to support recovery operations

b. DO NOT provide any response guidance or recommendations.

E. Information to provide:

1. If a Westinghouse response team is requested by the EOF, provide the following information.

a. Estimated arrival time at the EOF: 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after the request, but not earlier than 1500.

b. Team composition as requested by EOF players

c. Team will fly to Logan Airport

d. Request assistance with ground transportation, lodging arrangements, directions to the EOF and required passes.

V. PSNH Load Dispatcher A. Start Time: As initiated by players B. ERO

Contact:

Various C. Contact Location: Various D. Topic(s) Discussed: Status of offsite power sources

1. The grid is stable. No problems are expected with offsite power sources.

190

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION MINI-SCENARIO CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 MINI-SCENARIO E.2 2 Pages Service Water Pump House Repair Team Investigation Upon entry into the Service Water Pump House the water level in the lower level is approximately 3 feet and slowly lowering. (Figure E-i). This will necessitate the need to bring in a pump to rapidly initiate repairs.

Train "A" Service Water Piping is completely split and will require 4 days to repair. (Figure E-2)

Train 'B" Service Water Piping has a reapairable hole (Figure E-3). Sufficent repairs can be made to make this train functional and restore cooling to PCCW/ Diesel Generator.

Yigure E-i Figure E-.ý tigure i,-z

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION MINI-SCENARIO CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 MINI-SCENARIO E.2 2 Pages Service Water Pump House Repair Team Investigation For the purposes of this drill the line numbers for the leak locations are:

A Train Pipe: SW-1801-32, 24" pipe in SWPH B Train Pipe: SW-1802-38, 24" pipe in SWPH Temporary Repairs will be made under a work order developed for this purpose.

192

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION MINI-SCENARIO CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014 MINI-SCENARIO E.3 1 Page EOD Investigation There are no unexploded devices except for the device attached to the 'B" SEPS Diesel Generator.

(Figure E-4) tigure L,-4

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station F. Plant Parameter Data 194

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 4-,

V~)

0 u-I UL-U CU 195 0

z

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station G. Radiological Data 196

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05 Drill Data Radiological Data Unless otherwise specified in Mini-Scenarios on-site and off-site radiological data will remain "as found" throughout the event. There are no events associated with this scenario that impact radiological conditions.

There is no radiological release associated with this scenario.

Radiological data will be provided from the simulator.

197

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station H. Meteorological Data 198

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station CFE 14- 05Drill Data Meteorological Data Wind and Stability Class Info, for 11/5/14 ERO HAB Evaluated Exercise:

Wind speed, stability class, and wind direction will be relatively constant throughout the Exercise window. The following times indicate stability class, wind speed, and wind direction at discrete points:

Wind Wind Wind Time Direction Direction Delta T Delta T Langley Stability Speed Upper Lower Upper Lower Class (from) (from)

Prior to 0800 8 225 222 1.20 1.00 1 E 0800 0900 7 222 220 1.10 1.20 1 E 1000 To end of 7 225' 223 1.10 1.10 1 D Exercise 199

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station I. Chemistry Data 200

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 201

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvemnent Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MESSAGE FORM CH-L121 Seabrook Station PRIMARY CHEMISTRY REPORT Modes 1 and 2 Reactor AL 2 AL 3 Coolant Sample Date /

Parameter( 1 ) AL 1 System Time Chloride (ppm) (2) >0.050 Ž0.150 >1.50 <0.001 11/4/2014 08:45 Fluoride (ppm) (2) >0.050 >0.150 >1.50 <0.001 11/4/2014 08:45 Sulfate (ppm) >0.025 >0.150 >1.50 <0.0002 11/4/2014 08:45 Dissolved 02 (ppm) (2) >0.005 >0.100 >1.00 <0.0001 11/4/2014 08:45 Hydrogen cc/Kg (STP) <25 or >50 <15 <5 34.75 11/4/2014 08:45 Boron (ppm) Per COLR N/A N/A 1058 11/4/2014 08:45 Lithium (ppm) N/A N/A N/A 2.14 11/4/2014 08:45 Dose Equivalent Iodine (pCi/gm) (3) >1.0 3.26e-05 10/29/2014 08:45 Gross Activity (pCi/gm)

(3) LIMIT - DATE : 77.5 >100/E 1.18e01 11/4/201408:45 01/14/2014 08:30 Parameter Pressurizer Sam e Date/

Boron (ppm) 1055 11/4/2014 08:51 Borated Water Source Source Boron (ppm) Date/Time BAST A (5) 7221 10/28/2014 12:22 BAST B (5) 7287 10/28/2014 00:22 RWST (4) 2528 10/28/2014 12:34 SFPP (4) 2489 10/17/2014 10:23 THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MESSAGE FORM RM-6505 Correlation Values For S/G Tube Leak 1 gpd 25 cpm 30 gpd 760 cpm 75 gpd 1899 cpm Note: Values used until 'st chemistry grab sample results.

(1) Circle all parameters exceeding action level specifications and refer to procedure CP3.1, Section 4.2.6.3 for recommended action.

(2) Refer to Technical Requirement 30-3.4.7.

(3) Refer to Technical Specification 3.4.8 and Table 4.4-3.

(4) Refer to COLR for Action Initiation Value.

(5) Refer to Technical Specification 29-3.1.2.6 and COLR Cation Bed Runs - Normally performed at full flow Minutes:

Midshift (-2400): 0 Dayshift(-1200): TBD Cation Bed Preservice Rinse Required: NO Remarks:

Technician Signature: 11/4/2014 14:45 THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SEABROOK STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MESSAGE FORM CHL-088 SEABROOK STATION SECONDARY SAMPLE REPORT Above 50% Power ACTION VALUE SAMPLE PARAMETERS LEVEL (1) (1) DATE/TIME CONDENSATE/FEEDWATER CPD, Oxygen ppb >10 2.9 11/4/2014 08:40 FW Hydrazine ppb (3) <8xCPD02or 81 11/4/2014 08:41

______________________ <20 FW MPA ppb <8,000or> 10332 11/4/201408:42

____________________ 12,000 FW Oxygen ppb >5 0.71 11/4/201408:43 STEAM GENERATORS ACTION LEVEL A S/G B S/G C S/G D S/G (1) 11/4/2014 00:45 11/4/2014 00:45 11/4/2014 00:45 11/4/2014 00:45 Sodium ppb >5 0.37 0.32 0.28 0.29 Chloride ppb >10 0.2 <0.2 0.22 <0.2 Sulfate ppb >10 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.33 rotal Cation Cond. pS/cm >1.2 0.198 0.202 0.202 0.201 Secondary (DEI-131), pCi/g (2) 08/05/2014 00:40 ND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION LEVELS Technician: 11/4/14 NOTES: (1) Circled values have exceeded action levels (CPD Oxygen is an Action Initiation Value only)

(2) per CX0901.20, limits are 1.OE-3 pCi/g and 1.0E-01 pCi/g. Notify supervision if > 1.OE-6 pCi/g (3) If the ratio of feedwater hoursr hydrazine to feedwater oxygen decreases to a value < 2 and is not restored to a value of >2 within 8 commence shutdo returned to fulwn as quickly as safe plant operation permits. If this ratio is restored to a value >2, the plant may be power.

Original: Chemistry Department file Copies: Control Room (FAX #7087)

THIS IS A DRILL DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station APPENDIX E: EOP 2014 - 2015 SEABROOK STATION EXERCISE CYCLE HOSTILE ACTION BASED (HAB)

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE EXTENT Q9F PLAY

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station This page left intentionally blank 206

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station TABLE OF CONTENTS Contents BA CKGRO UN D : ............................................................................................................................ 6 CA LEN D A R A N D PLA YERS ................................................................................................ 6 FA C ILITIES: ................................................................................................................................... 7 In Sequence: .............................................................................................................................. 7 Equipm ent checklist - O O5 day before ........................................................................... 7 O ut of Sequence: ............................................................................................................... 8 Evaluation Criteria ........................................................................................................................... 8 Special N ote: A LL facilities w ill be evaluated (1.b.1) ................................................... 8 EVALUATION AREA 1: Emergency Operations Management ............................................ 10 Sub-elem ent L.a - M obilization ............................................................................................ 10 Extent of Play ............................................................................................................................ 10 N ew Ham pshire Extent of Play ............................................................................................. 11 Sub-elem ent L.b - Facilities ...................................................................................................... 11 New H am pshire Extent of Play .......................................................................................... 12 Sub-elem ent 1.c - D irection and Control ............................................................................. 12 N ew H am pshire Extent of Play .......................................................................................... 12 Sub-elem ent 1.d - Com m unications Equipm ent ................................................................. 13 N ew H am pshire Extent of Play .......................................................................................... 13 Sub-element I.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations ..................................... 14 N ew H am pshire Extent of Play .......................................................................................... 15 EVALUATION AREA 2: Protective Action Decision-Making .............................................. 16 Sub-elem ent 2.a - Em ergency W orker Exposure Control ................................................... 16 New H am pshire Extent of Play ............................................................................................ 16 Sub-element 2.b. - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and D ecisions for the Plum e Phase of the Em ergency ............................................................... 17 Criterion2.b.1 ........................................................................................................................... 17 New H am pshire Extent of Play .......................................................................................... 18 Criterion2.b.2: .......................................................................................................................... 18 New H am pshire Extent of Play .......................................................................................... 19 Sub-element 2.c - Protective Action DecisiobFonsideration for the Protection of Persons w ith D isabilities and A ccess/Functional N eeds .................................................................... 19 New Ham pshire Extent of Play .......................................................................................... 20

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Sub-element 2.d. -Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure P a th w ay ..................................................................................................................................... 20 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 21 Sub-element 2.e. - Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, R e-entry, and Return ........................................................................................................... . . 21 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 22 EVALUATION AREA 3: Protective Action Implementation ............................................... 23 Sub-element 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control ..................... 23 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 24 Sub-element 3.b - Implementation of KI Decision ............................................................. 24 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 25 Sub-element 3.c - Implementation of Protective Actions for Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs ...................................................................................................... 26 Criterion 3.c.1 ........................................................................................................................... 26 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 26 Criterion 3.c.2 ........................................................................................................................... 27 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 27 Sub-element 3.d. - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control ..................................... 28 Criterion 3.d. ........................................................................................................................... 28 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 28 C riterion 3 .d 2 .......................................................................................................................... 29 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 29 Sub-element 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions .................................. 29 Criterion 3.e.1 : .......................................................................................................................... 30 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 30 Criterion 3.e.2 : .......................................................................................................................... 30 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 30 Sub-element 3.f- Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions ............. 31 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 32 EVALUATION AREA 4: Field Measurement And Analysis ................................................. 32 Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses ................................... 32 Criterion 4.a.2: .......................................................................................................................... 32 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 33 Criterion 4.a,3: .......................................................................................................................... 33 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 34 Sub-element 4.b - Post Plume Phase Field Il" urements and Sampling ........................... 34 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 35 Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations ............................................................................ 35

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station New Hampshire Extent of Play ................................................................................................. 36 EVALUATION AREA 5: Emergency Notification and Public Information ........................... 36 Sub-element 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System ....................... 36 Criterion 5 .a.1 : .......................................................................................................................... 36 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 37 Criterion 5.a.3 : .......................................................................................................................... 38 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 38 Criterion 5.a.4 : .......................................................................................................................... 38 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 39 Sub-element 5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media ..... 39 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 41 EVALUATION AREA 6: Support Operation/Facilities ......................................................... 41 Sub-element 6.a - Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees ................ 41 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 43 Sub-element 6.b - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment ....... 43 New Hampshire Extent of Play ............................................................................................... 44 Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees .................................................................. 45 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 46 Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals .......... 46 New Hampshire Extent of Play ........................................................................................ 47 209

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station NEW HAMPSHIRE EXTENT OF PLAY SEABROOK STATION NUCLEAR POWER STATION HOSTILE ACTION BASED EXERCISE Evaluated Exercise - November 5, 2014 BACKGROUND:

This is the proposed 2014-2015 Extent of Play (EOP) Criteria for the New Hampshire (N.H.) Off-Site Response Organization (ORO) involved in the Hostile Action Based (HAB) Exercise Cycle for Seabrook Station. No changes have been made to any criterion except as noted in the document.

This EOP covers all components and activities of the exercise cycle starting with a one day workshop on June 18, 2014. Several Out-of-Sequence (OOS) activities have been or will be conducted prior to the Tabletop Exercise (TTX) scheduled for July 22, 2014. The Exercise Cycle will culminate with the "graded exercise" on November 5, 2014. Various "out-of-sequence" activities and exercises will be scheduled, but the criteria utilized will be incorporated within this EOP and noted throughout the document, as appropriate.

This document does NOT identify all exercise areas to be discussed/exercised by the State and other off-site response organizations/agencies. The scenarios developed for and utilized in the drills and exercises will incorporate sufficient injects to provide opportunities for all players to participate in response and recovery activities mindful of an all-hazard approach. Items identified in this EOP only will be subject to evaluation.

This is a NEW HAMPSHIRE ONLY document. The EOPs for Maine and Massachusetts will be combined with this document by FEMA to form a comprehensive EOP for this exercise cycle.

CALENDAR AND PLAYERS:

Invited: N.H. and Mass. Local EPZ/Host EOC, ICP, Wed. June 18, 2014 personnel; SEOC Command & General Staff; ESF Workshop DES Registration: 8 a.m. 1,2,3,6,7,8,10, 11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; Presentation Pease Tradeport Program 8:30-12:30 DPHS/Rad Health Unified Command; RHTA; AA; Discussion-Portsmouth, p.m. Lab; EOF Personnel (both DPHS/HSEM); FEMA based N.H. Seabrook Station Non-evaluated Invited: SEOC (N.H., Maine, Mass.);

Command & General Staff ICP, ESF TTX Tues,July 22, 2014 1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; DES Pease Exercise 8:30 - 4 DPHS/Rad Health Unified Command; RHTA; AA; Tradeport Discussion-p.m. Lab; EOF Personnel (both DPHS/HSEM); FEMA Portsmouth, N.H based Region I; I-MAT Team; RRCC; Seabrook Station Non-evaluated Monitoring/Sampling Teams State EOCs N.H. and Mass. Local/Host EPZ EOC personnel; Local EOCs ICP, SEOC Command & General Staff; ESF EOF, JIC,ICP, 1,2,3,6,7,8,10, 11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; CFE #1 Monitoring Team DPHS/Rad24Qth Unified Command; RHTA; AA; Exercise Wed., Aug.20, 2014 locations Lab; EOF Personnel (both DPHS/HSEM); FEMA (appropriate Region I; Seabrook Station Non-evaluated other locations)

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Inprovement Plan Seabrook Station State EO~s SEOC (N.H., Mass.) Command & General Staff; Local EO~s ESF 1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; EOF, JIGIGP, ICP, Staging Area personnel (selected) CFE#2 Wed., OctCP 8DPHS/Rad Health Unified Command; RHTA; AA;; Exercise 1 ontitorng EOF Personnel (both DPHS/HSEM); FEMA Region locations (appropriate I; FRMAC; Seabrook Station; Non-evaluated other locations) Sampling Teams State EOC N.H. and Mass. Local/Host EPZ EOC personnel; Local EOCs SEOC Command & General Staff; ICP, ESF Localo.

FO1 1,2,3,6,7,8,10, 11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; Wed., Nov. 5, 2014 FEo,JIC,IgP DPHS/Rad Health Unified Command; RHTA; AA;;

Monitoring Team DPHS/HSEM); Seabrook EOF Personnel (bothStation locationsStio FACILITIES:

The following organizations/locations will be involved in the Seabrook Station HAB Exercises Cycle in FY2014/2015:

In Sequence:

Local EPZ Community EOCs: Brentwood, E. Kingston, Exeter, Greenland, Hampton, Hampton Falls, Kensington, Kingston, New Castle, Newfields, Newton, North Hampton, Portsmouth, Rye, Seabrook, South Hampton, Stratham.

Local Host Communities: Dover, Manchester, Rochester (EOCs only - in sequence)

State Emergency Operations Center N.H. Homeland Security & Emergency Management

• • • State Local Liaisons may be located at the IFO Bldg. on Pease Tradeport for part or all of the Exercise Cycle Emergency Operations Facility New Hampshire Homeland Security & Emergency Management Agency (HSEM)

New Hampshire Department of Public Health/Radiological Health Radiological Field Monitoring Teams State Police Dispatch - State Warning Point State Police Troop A Rockingham County Dispatch Rumor Control - E-911 PSAP joint Information Center Incident Command Post-General Statement: Town of Seabrook Police, N.H. State Police and other members of the Incident Command Post will demonstrate the ability to provide command and coordination of the incident, as well as radiological protection of personnel. No tactical actions or manning of control points will be demonstrated. Only those assets or personnel necessary to demonstrate the command, communication, and radiological protection components will be deployed. The Incident Command Post may be placed at an alternatelocation to protect operationalsecurity.

Field Monitoring Teams - Monitorin~l 1 eams (MT1 & MT2)

Equipment checklist - OOS day before Dose Assessment Personnel - Will be located at the EOF on Pease Tradeport

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Out of Sequence:

Risk Special Facilities: Tuesday, May 27, 2014 Kingston Children's Center Building Block School (Kingston)

The Learning Tree (Exeter)

Hampton Falls Child Care Center Fun After School (Hampton)

The Village Preschool (Hampton)

Langdon Place of Exeter Wednesday, May 28,2014 Sportsmouth Nature School (Greenland)

Place for Friends and Fun (Portsmouth)

Greenland Central School Portsmouth High School Mark Wentworth Home Thursday, May 29, 2014 Kid Logic (E. Kingston)

Daniel J. Bakie Elementary School (Kingston)

Seabrook Middle School Main St. School (Exeter)

Hampton Centre School Reception Center(s): Manchester Memorial High School (CFEs Feb.19, March 3; Graded: May 5,2014 Dover Middle School (CFEs - May 8, June 5, TBD; Graded :Sept. 18, 2014 MS-1 Hospital: Elliot Hospital, Manchester (Date TBD)

NH State Police: Troop A - Epping, N.H.

Tactical Staging Area- Simulated Evaluation Criteria Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates sub-element 1.d.1, L.e.1, 3.a, 3.a.1, 3.b. 1, 3.d. 1, 3.d.2, 4.a.3, 4.b. 1 or 5.b. 1, 6.a. I and 6.b. 1 unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Special Note: ALL facilities will be evaluated (1.b.1), except ICP.

Incident Command Post Evaluation Criteria L.a.1 1.c. 1 1.d.1 212 1.e.1 2.b.2 3.a.1

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 213

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station EVALUATION AREA 1: Emergency Operations Management Sub-element L.a - Mobilization Intent This Sub-element is derivedfiom NUREG-0654/FEMA -REP-I, which requires that OROs have the capability to alert, notiji, and mobilize emergency personnel, and activate and staff emergency facilities.

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective proceduresto alert,notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activatefacilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.L.a, A.l.e, A.3, A.4; C.1, C.4, C.6; D.3, D.4; E.1, E.2; H.3, H.4)

Extent of Play Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensee; verify the notification; and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely maruner and demonstrate the ability to maintain and staff 24-hour operations. Twenty-four-hour operations can be demonstrated during the exercise via rosters or shift changes or otherwise in an actual activation. Local responders must demonstrate the ability to receive and/or initiate notification to the licensees or other respective emergency management organizations of an incident in a timely manner, when they receive information from the licensee or alternate sources. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized persormel upon their arrival.

Activation of facilities and staff, including those associated with the Incident Command System, must be completed in accordance with ORO plans/procedures. The location and contact information for facilities included in the incident comumand must be available to all appropriate responding agencies and the NPP after these facilities have been activated.

Pre-staging of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal conunuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. This could include the staggered release of resources from an assembly area. Additionally, pre-staging of staff for out-of-sequence demonstrations may be used in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

The REP program does not evaluate Incident Command Post tactical operations (e.g., Law Enforcement hostile action suppression techniques), only coordination among the incident command, the utility, and all appropriate OROs, pursuant to plans/procedures.

Initial law enforcement, fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical response to the NPP site may impact the ability to staff REP functions. The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures must be demonstrated. Exercises must also address the role of mutual aid in the incident, as appropriate. An integral part of the response to an HAB scenario at an NPP may also be within the auspices of the Federal Government (e.g., FBI, NRC, or DHS). Protocols for requesting Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement support must be demonstrated, as appropriate. Any resources must be on the ORO's mobilization list so they can be contacted during an incident, if needed.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specifkI 4 n the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/ImproveExent Plan Seabrook Station New Hampshire Extent of Play Sub-element 1.b - Facilities Intent This sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which provides that OJfsite Response Organizations(ORO) have facilities to support the emergency response.

Criterion1.b.1: Facilitiesare sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, H.3; G.3.a; J.1O.h; J.12; K.5.b)

Extent of Play 215 Responsible OROs must demonstrate, no less than once every eight years, the availability of facilities to support accomplishment of emergency operations (this includes all alternate and backup facilities).

Evaluations are typically performed for EOCs and JICs, as well as other facilities such as reception/relocation centers. Some of the areas evaluated within the facilities are adequate space,

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, backup power, and/or alternate facility, if required to support operations. Radio stations, laboratories, initial warning points and hospitals are not evaluated under 1.b.1.

In addition, facilities will be evaluated for this criterion during the first biennial exercise after any new or substantial changes in structure, equipment, or mission that affect key capabilities, as outlined in espective emergency plans/procedures. A substantial change is one that has a direct effect or impact on emergency response operations performed in those facilities. Examples of substantial changes include:

modifying the size or configuration of an emergency operations center, adding more function to a center, or changing the equipment available for use in a center. All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control Intent This sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEM -REP-], which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.

Criterion1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership rolesfor the ORO provide direction and controlto thatpart of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

(NUREG-0654, A.l.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6)

Extent of Play Leadership personnel must demonstrate the ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort (e.g., keeping staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.) Leadership must demonstratethe ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources (e.g., through MOUs or otheragreements) when faced with competing demands for finite resources. Any resources identified through LOA/MOUs must be on the ORO's mobilization list so they may be contacted during an incident, if needed.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Sub-element 1.d - Communications Equipment Intent This Sub-element is derived firom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs establish and operate reliableprimary and backup communication systems to ensure coinnunicationswith key emergency personnel at locations such as contiguousgovernments within the EPZ, Federalemergency response organizations,the licensee and its.facilities,EOCs, Incident Command Posts, and FMTs.

Criterion 1.d. 1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilitiesare managedin support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterioni is accomplishedinitially in a baseline evaluation and subsequently in periodic testing and drills. System familiarity and use must be demonstratedas applicable in biennialor tabletop exercise, or if their use would be required,during an actual event OROs must demonstrate that a primary system, and at least one backup system for fixed facilities, is fully functional at all times. Communications systems are maintained and tested on a recurring basis throughout the assessment period and system status is available to all operators. Periodic test results and corrective actions are maintained on a real time basis. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed.

Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units are used as needed for transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities, FMTs, and incident conmand must have the capability to access at least one conununication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations. OROs must ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists.

Exercise scenarios may require the failure of a conurnunication system and use of an alternate system, as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

217

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Sub-element i.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Intent This sub-element is derivedfiom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-], which provides that Offsite Response Organizations(ORO) have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.

Criterion1.e.l: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetiy, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H. 7, 10; L 7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b)

Extent ofPlay Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion is accomplished primarily through a baseline evaluation and subsequent periodic inspections.

A particular facility's equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with that facility's assigned role in the ORO's emergency operations plans. Use of maps and other displays is encouraged.

For non-facility-based operations, the equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with the assigned operational role. At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones, and signs) must be available, or their availability described.

Specific equipment and supplies that must be demonstrated under this criterion include KI inventories, dosinetry, and monitoring equipment, as follows:

KI: Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by: (1) emergency workers; (2) institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and (3) where stipulated by the plans / procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make KI available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans / procedures). The plans / procedures must include the forms to be used for documenting emergency worker ingestion of KI, as well as a mechanism for identifying emergency workers that have declined KI in advance.

Consider carefully the placement of emergency workers that have declined KI in advance.

ORO quantities of dosimnetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at the storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the ALC submission, and/or verified during an SAV. Available supplies of KI must be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or state laboratory indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards.

Dosimetry: Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers must be available for issuance to all emergency workers who will be dispatched to perform an ORO mission. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make dosinetry available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans /

procedures).

218 Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry must allow an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans / procedures.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Direct-reading dosimeters must be zeroed or operationally checked prior to issuance. The dosimeters must be inspected for electrical leakage at least arnually and replaced when necessary. Civil Defense Victoreen Model 138s (CD V-138s) (0-200 mR), due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems, must be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced when necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV.

Operational checks and testing of electronic dosimeters must be in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions and be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV.

Monitoring Instruments: All instruments must be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. Unmodified CDV-700 series instruments and other instruments without a manufacturer's recommendation must be calibrated annually. Modified CDV-700 instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the modification manufacturer. A label indicating such calibration must be on each instrument or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. In addition, instruments being used to measure activity must have a sticker-affixed to their sides indicating the effective range of the readings. The range of readings documentation specifies the acceptable range of readings that the meter should indicate when it is response-checked using a standard test source.

For FMTs, the instruments must be capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting beta radiation. These instruments must be capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological protection/exposure control of team members and detection of activity on air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the ORO's plans / procedures.

An appropriate radioactive check source must be used to verify proper operational response for each low-range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1R/hr) and for high-range instruments when available. If a source is not available for a high-range instrument, a procedure must exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a high-range instrument can make useful readings.

In areas where portal monitors are used, the OROs must set up and operationally check the monitor(s).

The monitor(s) must conform to the standards set forth in the Contamination Monitoring Standard for a Portal Monitor Used for Emergency Response, FEMA-REP-21 (March 1995) or in accordance with the manufacturer's reconmmendations.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the IIIA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station EVALUATION AREA 2: Protective Action Decision-Making Sub-element 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control Intent This Sub-element is derivedfirom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capabilih, to assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the ORO's plans/procedures,to authorizeemergency worker exposure limits to be exceededfor specific missions.

Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the recommended accumulated dose limits or exposure rates that emergency workers may be permitted to incur during an emergency. These limits include any pre-establishedadministrativereportinglimits (that take into considerationTEDE or organ- specific limits) identified in the ORO's plans/procedures.

Criterion 2.a.l: OROs use a decision-makingprocess, considering relevantfactors and appropriatecoordination,to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in placefor emergency workers includingprovisions to authorizeradiation exposure in excess of administrativelimits orprotective action guides. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.6; J.lO. e,f; K.4)

Extent of Play OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ should demonstrate a capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans and procedures.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and to the number of emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels. As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure, based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for KI administration. All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/improvement Plan Seabrook Station Sub-element 2.b. - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency Intent This Sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requiresthat OROs have the capabilityto independently project integrateddose fiom projected or actualdose rates and compare these estimates to the PA Gs.

OROs must have the capability to choose, among a range ofprotective actions, those most appropriatein a given emergency. OROs base these choices on PA Gsfrom their plans/proceduresor EPA 's Manualof ProtectiveAction Guides and ProtectiveActionsfor Nuclear hIcidents and other criteria,such as plant conditions, licensee PARs, coordinationof PADs with other politicaljurisdictions(e.g., other affected OROs and incident command),

availabilityof in-place shelter, weather conditions, and situations, to include HAB incidents.,

the threatposed by the specific hostile action, the affiliatedresponse, and the effect of an evacuation on the threat response effort, that create higher than normal riskfiom general populationevacuation.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, 1.10 and Supplement 3)

Extent of Play Assessment of this DemonstrationCriterionmust be accomplishedconcurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstratedin a biennialor tabletop exercise.

During the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification of plant conditions that may warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO must demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means, described in the plans/procedures, to develop PARs for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations provided by the licensee as well as field monitoring data, if available. The ORO must also consider any release and meteorological data provided by the licensee.

The ORO must demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs must be appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of projected dose must be demonstrated. Projected doses must be related to quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be compared. PARs must be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a pre-arranged format.

When the licensee and ORO projected doses differ by more than a factor of 10, the ORO and licensee must determine the source of the difference by discussing input data and assumptions, using different models, or exploring possible reasons. Resolution of these differences must be incorporated into the PARs if timely and appropriate. The ORO must demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

221 All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station New Hampshire Extent of Play Criterion2.b.2: A decision-makingprocess involving considerationof appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the generalpublic (includingthe recommendationfor the use of KI, if ORO policy).

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.lO.f, n)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion mtiust be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstratedin a biennial or tabletop exercise.

OROs must have the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADs. OROs must demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a timely manner appropriate to the incident, based on information from the licensee, assessment of plant status and potential or actual releases, other available information related to the incident, input from appropriate ORO authorities (e.g., incident command), and PARs from the utility and ORO staff. In addition, a subsequent or alternate PAD may be appropriate if various conditions (e.g., an HAB incident, weather, release timing and magnitude) pose undue risk to an evacuation, or if evacuation may disrupt the efforts to respond to a hostile action.

OROs must demonstrate the ability to obtain supplemental resources (e.g., mutual aid) necessary to implement a PAD if local law enforcement, fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical resources are utilized to augment response to the NPP site or other key infrastructure.

Dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. In addition, incident command must provide input regarding considerations for subsequent PARs based on the magnitude of the ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions. The decision-makers must demonstrate the capability to change protective actions based on the combination of all these factors.

If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective measure for the general public under offsite plans/procedures, then it must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI to supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI administration. The KI decision-making process must involve close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision- making staff.

If more than one ORO is involved in decision making, all appropriate OROs must communicate and coordinate PADs with each other. In addition, decisions must be coordinated/communicated with incident command. OROs must demonstrate the capability to communicate the results of decisions to all the affected locations. 222 All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station New Hampshire Extent of Play Sub-element 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs Intent This Sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to determine PADs, including evacuation, sheltering,and use of KI, if applicable, for groups ofpersons with disabilitiesand access/functionalneeds (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, correctionalfacilities,schools, licensed daycare centers, mobility-impairedindividuals, and transportation-dependentindividuals). The focus is on those groups of persons with disabilitiesand access/functionalneeds that are, or potentially will be, affected by a radiologicalreleasefiom an NPP.

Criterion2.c. 1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate,for groups of persons with disabilitiesand access/functionalneeds. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,D.4; J.9; J.1O.d, e)

Extent of Play Assessment of this DemonstrationCriterionmust be accomplishedconcurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstratedin a biennialor tabletop exercise that would include the use ofplant conditions transmittedfrom the licensee.

Usually it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the range of PAGs, except for incidents where there is a high-risk environmental condition or where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or infirm) are involved. In these cases, factors that must be considered include weather conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation versus risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In addition, decisions must be coordinated/communicated with the incident command. In situations where an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the ORO must consider use of KI.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students.

Demonstration requires that the OROs actually contact public school systems/districts during the exercise.

In accordance with plans/procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school systems/districts must demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. The decision-making process, including any preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, must consider the location of students at the time (e.g., whether the students are still at home, en route to school, or at school).

223 All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station New Hampshire Extent of Play Sub-element 2.d. -Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway Intent This Sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA -REP-i, which requires that OROs have the means to assess the radiologicalconsequencesfor the ingestion exposurepathway, relate them to the appropriate PAGs, and make timely, appropriatePADs to mitigate exposurefrom the pathway.

During an incident at an NPP, a release of radioactivematerialmay contaminatewater supplies and agriculturalproducts in the surroundingareas.Any such contaminationwould likely occur during the plume phase of the incident and, depending on the nature of the release,could impact the ingestion pathwayfor weeks or years.

Criterion 2.d.l: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriateprotective action decisions are made based on the ORO's planning criteria. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; D.4; J.9, 11)

Extent of Play Assessment of this DemonstrationCriterion must be accomplished concurrentlywith a licensee exercise and mtlay be demonstratedin a biennial or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmittedfrom the licensee.

OROs are expected to take precautionary actions to protect food and water supplies, or to mininmize exposure to potentially contaminated water and food, in accordance with their respective plans/procedures. Often OROs initiate such actions based on criteria related to the facility's ECLs. Such actions may include recommendations to place milk animals on stored feed and use protected water supplies.

The ORO must use its procedures to assess the radiological consequences of a release on the food and water supplies, such as the development of a sampling plan. The ORO's assessment must include evaluation of the radiological analyses of representative samples of water, food, and other ingestible substances of local interest from potentially impacted areas; characterization of the releases from the facility; and the extent of areas potentially impacted by the release. During this assessment, OROs must consider use of agricultural and watershed data vdARtn the 50-mile EPZ. The radiological impacts on the food and water must then be compared to the appropriate ingestion PAGs contained in the ORO's plans/procedures. The plans/procedures contain PAGs based on specific dose commitment criteria or on criteria as recommended by current Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance. Timely and

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station appropriate recommnendations must be provided to the ORO decision-makers group for implementation decisions. OROs may also include a comparison of taking or not taking a given action on the resultant ingestion pathway dose commitments.

The ORO must demonstrate timely decisions to minimize radiological impacts from the ingestion pathway, based on the given assessments and other information. Any such decisions must be communicated and, to the extent practical, coordinated with neighboring OROs.

OROs will use Federal resources, as identified in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the NRF and other resources (e.g., compacts or nuclear insurers), as necessary. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other participating resources.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Sub-element 2.e. - Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Intent This Sub-element is derivedfriom NUREG-0654/FEMA4-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to make decisions on post-plumephase relocation,reentry, and return of the generalpublic. These decisions are essentialforprotection of the publicfiom direct long-term exposure to depositedradioactivematerialsfiom a severe incident at an NPP.

Criterion2.e.l: Timely relocation,re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinatedas appropriate,based on assessments of the radiologicalconditions and criteriain the ORO's plan and/orprocedures. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, .10; J.9; K.3.a; M.1)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a .fill-scale, functional or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmittedfromt the licensee.

Relocation: OROs must demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and compare these estimates with PAGs; apply decision criteria for relocation of those individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated, but where actual or projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs; and control access to evacuated and restricted areas.

OROs will make decisions for relocating members of the evacuated public who lived in areas that now have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs. Determination of areas to be restricted must be based on factors such as the mix of radionuclides in deposited materials, calculated exposure rates versus the PAGs, and analyses of vegetation and soil field samples.

225 Reentry: Decisions must be made on location of control points and policies regarding access and exposure control for emergency workers and members of the general public who need to temporarily enter the evacuated area to perform specific tasks or missions.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Examples of control procedures are the assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry for emergency workers; questions regarding an individual's objectives, locations expected to be visited, and associated timeframes; availability of maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; and advice on areas to avoid. Control procedures also include monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; the implementation of decision criteria regarding decontamination; and proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to develop a strategy for authorized reentry of individuals into the restricted zone(s), based on established decision criteria. OROs must demonstrate the capability to modify those policies for security purposes (e.g., police patrols), maintenance of essential services (e.g., fire protection and utilities), and other critical functions. They must demonstrate the capability to use decision-making criteria in allowing access to the restricted zone by the public for various reasons, such as to maintain property (e.g., to care for farm animnals or secure machinery for storage) or retrieve important possessions. Coordinated policies for access and exposure control must be developed among all agencies with roles to perform in the restricted zone(s). OROs must demonstrate the capability to establish policies for provision of dosimetry to all individuals allowed to reenter the restricted zone(s). The extent to which OROs need to develop policies on reentry will be determined by scenario events.

Return: OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase (i.e., permitting populations that were previously evacuated to reoccupy their homes and businesses on an unrestricted basis). OROs must base decisions on environmental data and political boundaries or physical/ geological features, which allow identification of the boundaries of areas to which members of the general public may return. Return is permitted to the boundary of the restricted area(s) that is based on the relocation PAG.

Other factors that the ORO must consider in decision-making include conditions that permit cancellation of the ECL and relaxation of associated restrictive measures. OROs must base return reconmmendations on measurements of radiation from ground deposition. OROs must have the capability to identify services and facilities that require restoration within a few days and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, schools, and intermediate-term housing for relocated persons.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play 226

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station EVALUATION AREA 3: Protective Action Implementation Sub-element 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control Intent This Sub-element is derivedf!om NUREG-0654/FEAIL4-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection., and processing of direct-readingdosimetry andpermanent record dosimety; reading of direct-readingdosimetry by emergency workers at appropriatefrequencies; maintaininga radiationdose recordfor each emergency worker; establishing a decision chain or authorization procedurefor emergency workers to incur radiationexposures in excess of the PA Gs, and the capability to provide Klfor emergency workers, always applying the as low as is reasonably achievable principle as appropriate.

Criterion3.a.l: The OROs issue appropriatedosimetry and procedures,and manage radiologicalexposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emnergency workers periodicallyand at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and recordthe readingson the appropriateexposure record or chart.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J. 1O.e; K.3.a, b; K.4)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during afill-scale,fiunctional or tabletop exercise.

Other means mtay include drills, seniinars or trainingactivities that would filly demtonstrate technical proficiency.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting linmits that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of TEDE and maximum exposure limits, for those emergency workers involved in lifesaving activities, contained in the ORO's plans / procedures.

Each emergency worker must have basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plans / procedures. If supplemental resources are used, they must be provided with just-in-time training to ensure basic knowledge of radiation exposure control. Emergency workers must demonstrate procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and manage radiological exposure control.

During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers must demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached. The emergency worker must report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans / procedures. OROs must demonstrate the actions described in the plans / procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, authorize the worker to incur additional exposures, or take other actions. If exercise play does not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators must interview at least two workers to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in case authorization is needed, and at what exposure levels. Workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or coworkers) in providing responses. 227 Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission. In

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station such cases, adequate control of exposure can be achieved for all team members using one direct-reading dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers assigned to low-exposure rate fixed facilities (e.g., EOCs and conmmunications center within the EPZ, reception centers, and counting laboratories) may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored using group dosimetry (i.e., direct-reading dosimeters strategically placed in the work area). Each team member must still have his or her own permanent record dosimetry. Individuals authorized by the ORO to reenter an evacuated area during the plume (emergency) phase, must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure conmmensurate with completing their missions.

OROs may have administrative limits lower than EPA-400-R-92-001 dose limits for emergency workers performing various services (e.g., life-saving, protection of valuable property, all activities). OROs must ensure that the process used to seek authorization for exceeding dose limits does not negatively impact the capability to respond to an incident where life-saving and/or protection of valuable property may require an urgent response.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI to emergency workers consistent with decisions made. OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they did so. Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it. Emergency workers must demonstrate basic knowledge of procedures for using KI whether or not the scenario drives the implementation of KI use. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inforn the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 3.b - Implementation of KI Decision Intent This Sub-element is derived fiom NUREG-O647*EMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide Kifor institutionalizedindividuals, and, if in the plans / procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, veiy difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capabiliot to provide KI to

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Inprovement Plan Seabrook Station institutionalizedindividuals,providing KI to the general public is an ORO option and must be reflected as such in ORO plans / procedures. Provisions nmust include the availability of adequate quantities,storage,and means of distributingKI.

Criterion3.b.1: KI and appropriateinstructionsare available should a decision to recommend use of K! be made. Appropriate recordkeeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalizedindividualsis maintained.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,J. 10.e, f)

Extent of Play Assessmenit of this DenionstrationCriterion may be accomplished during a full-scale,finctionalor tabletop exercise.

Other means may include drills, seminars or trainingactivities that zoodd fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to make KI available to institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in their plans / procedures, to members of the general public. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made.

OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI.

Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it.

If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information must be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO's plans / procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inforn the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

229

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Sub-element 3.c - Implementation of Protective Actions for Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs Intent This Sub-element is derivedfirom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-], which requires that OROs have the capability to implement PADs, including evacuation and/or sheltering,for all persons with disabilities and access /fiunctional needs. The focus is on those persons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are (or potentially will be) qffected by a radiologicalreleasefroin an NPP.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.1O.c, d, e, g)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Denionstration Criterion may be accomplished dnring a fill-scale or functional exercise, an actualevent, or by ummeans of drills conducted at any time.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (i.e., provide PARs and emergency information and instructions to) persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, including hospitals / medical facilities, nursing homes, correctional facilities, and mobility-inpaired and transportation-dependent individuals. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide for persons with disabilities and access / functional needs in accordance with plans / procedures.

Contact with persons with disabilities and access / functional needs and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the extent of play. Some contacts with transportation providers must be actual, as negotiated in the extent of play. All actual and simulated contacts must be logged.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Criterion3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actionsfor schools.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.1O.c, d, e, g)

Extent of Play Assessnient of this Denmonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a fidl-scale, fiunctional, or tabletop exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Public school systems / districts must demonstrate the ability to implement PADs for students. The demonstration must be made as follows: each school system / district within the 10 mile EPZ must demonstrate implementation of protective actions. At least one school per affected system / district must participate in the demonstration. Canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering in place must be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process.

If accomplished through an interview, appropriate school personnel including decision-making officials (e.g., schools' superintendent/principals and transportation director/bus dispatchers), and at least one bus driver (and the bus driver's escort, if applicable) must be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. Corm-nunications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by the plans / procedures, must be verified.

Officials of the school system(s) must demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

The provisions of this criterion also apply to any private schools, private kindergartens, and licensed daycare centers that participate in REP exercises pursuant to the ORO's plans / procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play 231

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/mnprovement Plan Seabrook Station Sub-element 3.d. - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control Intent This Sub-element is derivedfirom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective action plans / procedures, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This Sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing,and staffing of traffic and access control points, and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructionsare provided to traffic and access controlpersonnel.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C1, 4; J.1O.gj)

E.xtent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, an actual event, or byi means of drills conducted at anly time.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff must demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities, including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas, as per the Extent-of-Play Agreement. These capabilities may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic), they must demonstrate the capability to contact the state or Federal agencies that have the needed authority, as agreed upon in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Criterion3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,J. 10.k)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a fidl-scale or functional exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to deal with impediments, such as wreckers, need not be demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, must be logged.

The impediment must occur during the evacuation and be on an evacuation route such that re-routing of traffic is required, triggering decision-making and coordination with the JIC to communicate the alternate route to evacuees leaving the area.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions Intent This Sub-element is derived fiom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-], which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective actions, based on criteriarecommended by current FDA guidance,for the ingestion exposure pathway 2 (i.e., the area within an approximate 50-mile radius of the NPP). This Sub-element focuses on those actions requiredfor implementation of protective actions.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for imnplementation ofprotective actions. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C. 1, 4; J.11)

Extent of Play Assessmtent of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a fill-scale or finctional exercise, an actual evtent, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to secure and use current information on the locations of dairy farms, meat and poultry producers, fisheries, fruit growers, vegetable growers, grain producers, food processing plants, and water supply intake points to implement protective actions within the EPZ.

OROs use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear / Radiological Incident Amnex, and other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisionsfor contaminated water,food products, milk, and agriculturalproduction. ('NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, G.1, J.9, 11)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a fidl-scale or finctional exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at aniy time.

OROs must demonstrate the development of measures and strategies for implementation of ingestion exposure pathway EPZ protective actions by formulating protective action information for the general public and food producers and processors. Demonstration of this criterion includes either pre-distributed public information material in the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ or the capability for rapid reproduction and distribution of appropriate reproduction-ready information and instructions to pre-determined individuals and businesses.

OROs must also demonstrate the capability to control, restrict, or prevent distribution of contaminated food by conmmercial sectors. Exercise play must include demonstration of communications and coordination among organizations to implement protective actions. Field play of implementation activities may be simulated. For example, communications and coordination with agencies responsible for enforcing food controls within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ must be demonstrated, but actual communications with food producers and processors may be simulated.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

234 New Hamnshire Extent of Plav

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Sub-element 3.f- Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions Intent This Sub-element is derived firom NUREG-0654/FEA'I-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement plans, procedures, and decisions fir post-plume phase relocation, reentry, and return. Inplementation of these decisions is essentialfor protecting the publicfrom direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials firom a severe incident at a commercial NPP.

Criterion 3.fh1: Decisions regarding controlled reentry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public during the post-plume phase are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E. 7; J.IO.j; J.12; K.5.b; M.1, 3)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a fidl-scale, firnctional, or tabletop exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Relocation: OROs must demonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement decisions concerning relocation of individuals located in radiologically contaminated areas who were not previously evacuated. Such individuals must be relocated to an area(s) where radiological contamination will not expose the general public to doses that exceed the relocation PAGs. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to provide for short- or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in an area(s) that has residual radiation levels above the (first-, second-, and 50-year) PAGs.

Areas of consideration must include the capability of OROs to communicate with other OROs regarding timing of actions, notification of the population of procedures for relocation, and notification of, and advice for, evacuated individuals who will be converted to relocation status in situations where they will not be able to return to their homes due to high levels of contamination. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to communicate instructions to the public regarding relocation decisions and intermediate-term housing for relocated persons.

Reentry: OROs must demonstrate the capability to control reentry and exit of individuals who are authorized by the ORO to temporarily reenter the restricted area during the post-plume (i.e.,

intermediate or late) phase to protect them from unnecessary radiation exposure. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to control exit of vehicles and other equipment to control the spread of contamination outside the restricted area(s). Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as farmers for animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public who must reenter an evacuated area during the post-emergency phase must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions. Monitoring and decontamination facilities will be established as appropriate.

Examples of control procedures are: (1) assignmnent of, or checking for, direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry for emergency workers; (2) questions regarding the individuals' objective(s), location(s) expected to be visited, and associated timeframes; (3) maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; (4) advice on areas to avoid; (5) procedures for exit, including monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; (6) decision criteria regarding contamination; (7) proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry, and (8) maintenance of emergency worl3adiation exposure records.

Return: OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. OROs must demonstrate the capability

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/improvement Plan Seabrook Station to identify and prioritize services and facilities that require restoration within a few days, and to identify procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, and schools.

Communication among OROs for relocation, reentry, and return may be simulated. All simulated or actual contacts must be documented. These discussions may be accomplished in a group setting.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, and other resources (e.g., compacts or nuclear insurers), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play EVALUATION AREA 4: Field Measurement and Analysis Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses Intent This Sub-element is derived firom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-], which requires that OROs have the capability to deploy FMTs with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborneradiation and particulatedeposition on the groundfiom an airborneplume. hI addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA -REP-] indicates that OROs must have the capability to use FMTs within the plumne exposure pathway EPZ to detect airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and radioactiveparticulatematerialin the airborneplume. In an incident at an NPP, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby population and environment. Although incident assessment methods are available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an incident, it is important to collect field radiologicaldata to help characterizeaniy radiological release. Adequate equipment andproceduresare essential to such field measurement efforts.

Criterion4.a.1: [RESERVED]

Criterion4.a.2: Field teams (2 or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterizethe release and to control radiationexposure.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12; L 7, 8, 11; J.1O.a)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterionmay be accomplishedduring a full-scale,functional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or trainingactivities that would fidly demonstrate technicalproficiency. 236

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/lmprovemnent Plan Seabrook Station Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to brief FMTs on predicted plume location and direction, plume travel speed, and exposure control procedures before deployment. During an HAB incident, the Field Team management must keep the incident command informed of field monitoring teams' activities and location. Coordination with FMTs and field monitoring may be demonstrated as out-of-sequence demonstrations, as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and support the adequacy of implemented protective actions, or to be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams must be directed to take measurements at such locations and thnes as necessary to provide sufficient information to characterize the plume and its impacts.

If the responsibility for obtaining peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these measurements to be repeated by ORO monitoring teams. If the licensee FMTs do not obtain peak measurements in the plume, it is the ORO's decision as to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume. The sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all FMTs (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form(s), to a radiological laboratory(ies) must be demonstrated.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-O654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12: L8, 9; J.1O.a)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion mio~e accomplishedduring a full-scale,functional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, semnhars or trainingactivities that would filly demonstrate technicalproficiency.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Two or more FMTs must demonstrate the capability to make and report measurements of ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment team, or other appropriate authority. FMTs must also demonstrate the capability to obtain an air sample for measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates, and to provide the appropriate authority with field data pertaining to measurement. If samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the authority must consider the need for expedited laboratory analyses of these samples.

OROs must share data in a timely manrner with all other appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory(ies), will be in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Arnex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 4.b - Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling Intent This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to assess the actual or potential magnitude and locations of radiologicalhazards to determine the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ and to support relocation, reentty, and return decisions. This Sub-element focuses on collecting environmental samples for laboratoly analyses that are essentialfor decisions on protecting the public from contaminatedfood and water and direct radiationfrom depositedmaterials.

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams (22g8 more) demonstrate the capability to make appropriatemeasurements and to collect appropriatesamples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision making. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; 1.8; J.11)

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion miiay be accomplished during a fidl-scale, fianctional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would filly demonstrate technical proficiency.

The ORO's FMTs must demonstrate the capability to take measurements and samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support reentry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are available, use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement is appropriate. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory(ies), will be in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

The FMTs and/or other sampling personnel must secure ingestion pathway samples from agricultural products and water. Samples in support of relocation and return must be secured from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces in areas that received radioactive ground deposition.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts, the licensee, or nuclear insurers). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations Intent This Sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA4-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in air, liquid, and environmental samples to supportprotective action decision making.

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1, 3; J.11)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, fitnctional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fidly demonstrate technical proficiency.

The laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to follow appropriate procedures for receiving samples, including logging information, preventing contamination of the laboratory(ies), preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored arles, preventing cross contamination of samples, preserving samples that may spoil (e.g., milk), al-eeping track of sample identity. In addition, the laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station The laboratory(ies) must be appropriately equipped to provide, upon request, timely analyses of media of sufficient quality and sensitivity to support assessments and decisions anticipated in the ORO's plans /

procedures. The laboratory instrument calibrations must be traceable to standards provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze typical radionuclides released in a reactor incident must be as described in the plans / procedures. New or revised methods may be used to analyze atypical radionuclide releases (e.g., transuranics or as a result of a terrorist incident) or if warranted by incident circumstances. Analysis may require resources beyond those of the ORO.

The laboratory staff must be qualified in radio-analytical techniques and contamination control procedures.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts, the licensee, or nuclear insurers). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play EVALUATION AREA 5: Emergency Notification and Public Information Sub-element 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System Intent This Sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in this Sub-element are derived from the Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, FEMA-REP-IO (November 1985).

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely mannerfollowing the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructionalmessage to the public must include as a mininium the elements required by currentREP guidance. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,E.5, 6, 7)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demtonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a-fidl-scale or fiuctional exercise, drills, or operationaltesting qf equipment that would fidly demonstrate capabilijy.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capabilit214sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, OROs must complete system activation for primary alert / notification and disseminate the information / instructions in a timely manner. For exercise purposes, timely is defined as with a sense of urgency and without

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station undue delay. If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message must be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test message(s) is not required. The procedures must be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation. The alert signal activation should be simulated, not performed. Evaluations of EAS broadcast stations may also be accomplished through SAVs.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis must be verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification system, including verification of provisions for backup power or an alternate station.

The initial message must include at a minimum the following elements:

• Identification of the ORO responsible and the official with authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message;

" Identification of the commercial NPP and a statement that an emergency exists there;

" Reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures, calendars, and/or information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency;

• A closing statement asking that the affected and potentially affected population stay tuned for additional information, or that the population tune to another station for additional information.

If route alerting is demonstrated as a primary method of alert and notification, it must be done in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures and the Extent-of-Play Agreement. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting in a timely manner (not subject to specific time requirements). At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) must vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.

OROs may demonstrate any means of primary alert and notification included in their plans / procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Criterion 5.a.2: [RESER VED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, drills, or operational testing qf equipment that would fully demonstrate capability.

If the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary system(s) or if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function during the exercise, OROs must demonstrate backup means of alert and notification. Backup means of alert and notification will differ from facility to facility.

Backup alert and notification procedures that would be implemented in multiple stages must be structured such that the population closest to the plant (e.g., within 2 miles) is alerted and notified first.

The populations farther away and downwind of any potential radiological release would be covered sequentially (e.g., 2 to 5 miles, followed by downwind 5 to 10 miles, and finally the remaining population as directed by authorities). Topography, population density, existing ORO resources, and timing will be considered in judging the acceptability of backup means of alert and notification.

Although circumstances may not allow this for all situations, FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators attempt to establish backup means that will reach those hi the plume exposure EPZ within a reasonable time of failure of the primary alert and notification system, with a reconmmended goal of 45 minutes. The backup alert message must, at a minimum, include (1) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.

If backup route alerting is demonstrated, only one route needs to be selected and demonstrated. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast), as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.

OROs may demonstrate any means of backup alert and notification included in their plans / procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Criterion 5.a.4: Activities associated with FEMA-approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials 4-eotify the public of an emergency situation.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a fill-scale or finctional exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipmnent that would fully demonstrate capability.

OROs with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report), 5 to 10 miles from the NPP, must demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s). FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators establish means that will reach those in approved exception areas in a timely manner, with a recommended goal of 45 minutes, once the initial decision is made by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an incident. The exception area alert message must, at a minimum, include (1) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.

For exception area alerting, at least one route must be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) must vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcasted) as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location. For exception areas alerted by aircraft, actual flights will be negotiated in the extent of play, but must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Sub-element 5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media Intent This Sub-element is derivedfiom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to disseminate appropriateemergency information and instructions, including any recommended protective actions, to the public. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEAA-REP-I requires OROs to ensure that the capability exists for providing information to the media. This includes the availability qf a physical location for use by the media during an emergency.

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 also provides that a system must be availablefor dealing with rumors. This system will hereafter be known as the "publicinquily hotline.

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate subsequent entergency information and instructionsto the public and the news media in a timely manner.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, c)

Extent of Play 243 Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or finctional exercise, or drills.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station The responsible ORO personnel / representatives must demonstrate actions to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner following the initial alert and notification (not subject to specific time requirements). For exercise purposes, timely is defined as with a sense of urgency and without undue delay. If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Message elements: The ORO must ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with PADs made by appropriate officials. The emergency information must contain all necessary and applicable instructions (e.g., evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools and persons with disabilities and access / functional needs, and public inquiry hotline telephone number) to assist the public in carrying out the PADs provided. The ORO must also be prepared to disclose and explain the ECL of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs must demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.

The emergency information must be all-inclusive by including the four items specified under exercise Demonstration Criterion 5.a.1 and previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media.

In addition, the OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plans / procedures. OROs must demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the plans /

procedures.

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs must demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

Media information: OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public. This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the incident warrants. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information presented in media briefings and releases must be consistent with PADs and other emergency information provided to the public. Copies of pertinent emergency information (e.g., EAS messages and media releases) and media information kits must be available for dissemination to the media.

Public inquiry: OROs must demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls received via the public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff must demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to appropriate information source. Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, must be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases.

HAB considerations: The dissemination of information dealing with specific aspects of NPP security capabilities, actual or perceived adversarial (terrorist) force or threat, and tactical law enforcement response must be coordinated / communicated with appropriate security authorities, e.g., law enforcement and NPP security agencies, in accordA 44with ORO plans / procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station New Hampshire Extent of Play Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

EVALUATION AREA 6: Support Operation/Facilities Sub-element 6.a - Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees Intent This Sub-element is derived firom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-], which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiological mo24kting and decontamination of evacuees, while minimizing contamination of the facility. OROs must also have the capability to identify and registerevacuees at reception centers.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registrationof evacuees. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4; J.1O.h; J.12)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be acconiplished dnring a finl-scale or finctional exercise, drills, or SAV.

Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees must be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

OROs conducting this demonstration must have one-third of the resources (e.g., monitoring teams /

instrumentation / portal monitors) available at the facility(ies) as necessary to monitor 20 percent of the population within a 12-hour period. This would include adequate space for evacuees' vehicles.

Availability of resources can be demonstrated with valid documentation (e.g., MOU/LOA, etc.) reflecting how necessary equipment would be procured for the location. Plans / procedures must indicate provisions for service animals.

Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees must demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain, within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20 percent EPZ population planning base. The monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored, per hour, by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate procedure. For demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities, a minimum of six evacuees must be monitored per station using equipment and procedures specified in the plans / procedures. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators to determine whether the 12-hour requirement can be met.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to register evacuees upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities. The activities for recording radiological monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination must include establishing a registration record consisting of the evacuee's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination (if any), or as otherwise designated in the plan and/or procedures. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration.

Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger / action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures. Contamination of the evacuee(s) will be determined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level radiation source. All activities must be based on the plans /

procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Decontamination of evacuees may be simulated and conducted by interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex monitoring must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs, and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate uncontaminated from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions must also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated evacuees, provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing; and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamili46n of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any evacuee found to be contaminated, procedures must be discussed concerning handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Individuals who have completed monitoring (and decontamination, if needed) must have means (e.g.,

hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc) indicating that they, and their service animals and vehicles, where applicable, have been monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or contamination below the trigger / action level.

In accordance with plans / procedures, individuals found to be clean after monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored. These individuals do not require confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles impounded or monitored and decontaminated (if applicable) and do require confirmation that their vehicle is impounded or free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 6.b - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment Intent This Sub-element is derivedfiom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiologicalmonitoringand decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment, inclusive of vehicles.

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,K.5.a, b)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or finctionalexercise, drills, or SA V The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

247 Specific attention must be given to equipment, including any vehicles that were in contact with contamination. The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of personnel, equipment, and vehicles based on trigger/action levels and procedures

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/improvement Plan Seabrook Station stated in the ORO plans / procedures. Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the 12-hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination must be set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping, and contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles must be demonstrated.

Interior surfaces of vehicles that were in contact with contaminated individuals must also be checked.

Decontam-ination of emergency workers may be simulated and conducted via interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex monitoring must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs, and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate uncontaminated from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions must also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals where applicable; provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing; and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of emergency workers or facilities.

Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any emergency workers who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures. Contamination of the individual(s) will be determined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level radiation source.

Decontamination capabilities and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be successfully decontaminated may be simulated and conducted by interview. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FIrJjA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees Intent This Sub-element is derivedfromn NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-], which requires OROs to have the capability to establish relocation centers in host / support jurisdictions. The American Red Cross normally provides congregate care in support of OROs under existing letters of agreement.

Criterion 6. c. 1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriatepriorto entering congregate carefacilities. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.1O.h, J12)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion mnay be accomplished during a fidl-scale or finctional exercise, drills, or SA V.

The evaluator must conduct a walk-through of the center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are consistent with applicable guidance.

For planning purposes, OROs must plan for a sufficient number of congregate care centers in host /

support jurisdictions to acconunodate a minimum of 20 percent of the EPZ population. In this simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations as they would be in an actual emergency.

Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this criterion, exercise demonstration expectations must be clearly specified in Extent-of-Play Agreements.

Congregate care staff must also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees, service animals, and vehicles have been monitored for contamination, decontaminated as appropriate, and registered before entering the facility.

Individuals arriving at congregate care facilities must have means (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc.) indicating that they, and their service animals and vehicles, where applicable, have been monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or contamination below the trigger / action level.

In accordance with plans / procedures, individuals found to be clean after monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored. These individuals do not need confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles monitored and decontaminated (if applicable) and does need confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas. This capability may be determined through an interview process. 249 If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically available at the

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/lmprovemnent Plan Seabrook Station facility(ies). However, availability of such items must be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals Intent This Sub-element is derivedfiom NUREG-0654/FEMA -REP-i which requires that OROs have the capabilit, to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities with the capability to provide medical semvices.

Criterion 6.d.l: The facilit./ORO has the appropriatespace, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.2; H.10; K.S.a, b; L.1, 4)

Extent of Play Assessnitent of this Demnoustration Criterion mtay be accomtplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, or drills.

Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control efforts must not delay urgent medical care for the victim. OROs must demonstrate the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities.

An ambulance must be used for response to the victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an extended time, OROs may use any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) to transport the victim to the medical facility. Normal communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving medical facility must be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is used for transport to the medical facility, this conununication must occur before releasing the ambulance from the drill. This communication would include reporting radiation monitoring results, if available. In addition, the ambulance crew must demonstrate, by interview, knowledge of where the ambulance and crew would be monitored and decontaminated, if required, or whom to contact for such information.

Monitoring of the victim may be performed before transport or en route, or may be deferred to the medical facility. Before using monitoring instruments, the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All monitoring activities must be completed as they would be in an actual emergency. Appropriate contamination control measures must be demonstrated before and during transport and at the receiving medical facility.

The medical facility must demonstrate the capability to activate and set up a radiological emergency area for treatment. Equipment and supplies must 0Advailable for treatment of contaminated injured individuals.

The medical facility must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of the individual, follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and maintain records of all survey

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station measurements and samples taken. All procedures for collection and analysis of samples and decontamination of the individual must be demonstrated or described to the evaluator. Waste water from decontamination operations must be handled according to facility plans / procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play 251

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 252

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station MASSACHUSETTS EVALUATION AREAS AND EXTENT OF PLAY SEABROOK NUCLEAR POWER STATION HOSTILE ACTION BASED EXERCISE November 5, 2014 Overview The following organizations/locations will demonstrate in 2014:

State Emer2ency Operations Center Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency Massachusetts Department of Public Health Massachusetts State Police Massachusetts Department of Transportation Massachusetts National Guard Massachusetts Department of Mental Health Mass 2-1-1 Call Center American Red Cross Federal Emergency Management Agency Region I NextEra Energy Seabrook Station Liaison Re2ion I Emergency Operations Center Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency - Region I Massachusetts State Police - Troop A MassDOT Massachusetts Department of Mental Health American Red Cross Central Medical Emergency Direction (C-Med)

Region I EOC Volunteer Staff RACES Volunteer Staff Emerg~ency Operations Facility Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency Massachusetts Department of Public Health/Radiation Control Program NextEra Energy Seabrook Station Radiolo2ical Field Monitoring and Samplin2 Teams Massachusetts Department of Public Health/Radiation Control Program NextEra Energy Seabrook Station Joint Information Center Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency NextEra Energy Seabrook Station EAS Radio Station WBZ 1030 AM 253 OVA DDnnfl Cr A ink; Ui AD 1A I A CVTCTT flC ft AV n___ I -CAI IA1 A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station I*, "*'°*:*:. " .,' . -I*" ".... .` 4**.  :* *** .. * .*. C .:* * :jJ* **.; .:.*`**.  :*

Risk Jurisdictions Amesbury EOC Merrimac EOC Newbury EOC Newburyport EOC Salisbury EOC West Newbury EOC Support Jurisdictions The following demonstrations will be conducted out of sequence during TBD State Police Troop A, Danvers: TBD The following organizations/locations will NOT demonstrate in 2014:

MassDOT, Scotland Rd, Newbury - demonstrated November 2008 State Transportation Staging Area - demonstrated June 2010 Local Transportation Staging Areas - demonstrated June 2010 Masconomet Reception Center - demonstrated June 2008 NOTE: There is standing FEMA umbrella approval for "On the Spot" Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates sub-element 1.d. 1, 1.e. 1, 3.a. 1, 3.b. 1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 4.a.3, 4.b.1 or 5.b.1, 6.a.1 and 6.b.1 unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

254 CC A Dnnný Cý A ý AD - I A --- - nT Aý .--- I _ý A I *IA

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/improvement Plan Seabrook Station EVALUATION AREA 1: Einergency OperationsManagemnent Sub-element L.a - Mobilization Intent This Sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel, and activate and staff emergencyfacilities.

CriterionL.a.1: OROs use effective proceduresto alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activatefacilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.L.a, A.1.e, A.3, A.4; C.1, C.4, C.6; D.3, D.4; E.1, E.2; H.3, H.4)

Extent of Play Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to receive notificationof an incident from the licensee; verify the notification; and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner and demonstrate the ability to maintain andstaff 24-hour operations.Twenty-four-hour operations can be demonstratedduring the exercise via rosters or shift changes or otherwise in an actual activation.Local respondersmust demonstrate the ability to receive and/or initiate notificationto the licensees or other respective emergency management organizationsofan incident in a tinely manner, when they receive informationfr0om the licensee or alternate sources. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the activation offacilities for immediate use by mobilizedpersonnel upon their arrival.

Activation Offacilities andstaff, including those associatedwith the Incident Command System, must be completed in accordancewith ORO plans/procedures.The location and contact infbrmnationfor facilities included in the incident command must be available to all appropriaterespondingagencies and the NPP after these.facilities have been activated.

Pre-stagingof emergency personnel is appropriate,in accordancewith the Extent-of-Play Agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal conunuting distancefiom the individual's duty location or residence. This could include the staggeredrelease of resourcesfrom an assembly area.Additionally, pre-stagingofstafffor out-of-sequence demonstrationsmay be used in accordancewith the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

The REP program does not evaluate Incident Commnand Post tacticaloperations(e.g., Law Enforcement hostile action suppression techniques), only coordinationamong the incident command, the utility, and all appropriateOROs, pursuant to plans/procedures.

Initial law enforcement,fire service, HAZMA T, and emergency medical response to the NPP site may impact the ability to staff REPfiuctions. The ability to identifi, and request additionalresources or identify compensatomy measures must be demonstrated.Exercises must also address the role ofmnutual aid in the incident, as appropriate.An integralpart of the response to an HAB scenarioat an NPP may also be within the auspices of the FederalGovernment (e.g., FBI, NRC, or DHS). Protocolsfor requestingFederal,state, local, and tribal law enforcement support must be demonstrated as appropriate.Any resources must be on the ORO's mobilization list so they can be contacted during an incident, if needed.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/proceduresand completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specijk&5n the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

CC ý .. nnI 01-n- -A. 'A I ý C11C.11 n. .1 A- .--- I -r- I., ý

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Massachusetts Extent of Play The notification process for state and local responders will be completed, and call down rosters kwill be shown to the FEMA Evaluator.

State.EOC: -Massachusetts Emergency Management (MEMA) SEOC emergency staff,

.including the Massachusetts Emergency Support Functions Team staff (Massachusetts

ýDepartment of Public Health (MDPH), Massachusetts Department of Transportation,

,(MassDOT), Massachusetts Department of Mental Health (MDMH), Massachusetts State Police

.(MSP), Massachusetts Army National Guard (MANG), and American Red Cross (ARC), the iState Public Information Line staff, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and

the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Liaison...

KThe MASS 211 Call Center will be activated for an event at Seabrook Station.

.Region I EOC-MEMA Region I EOC( Laffand emergency volunteer staff.

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) - Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) and Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH).

Joint Information Center (JIC) - The JIC may be pre-staged. Although it is possible that a "Virtual JIC" may be opened at MEMA's SEOC for a HAB incident.

NIAT Field Monitoring Team Personnel: Field Team personnel will be in the area awaiting notification.,bOnce notified to report, they will use a compressed time: 10 minutes/hour of normal travel response time.

Community EOCs: Due to time constrainht Municipalities may .pre-stage their.. personnel fori IHABI exercisesý Evaluator will conductan interview of how tae miunicipality would activate.

Transportation Providers - Calls will be made to five transportation providers to verify the contact information and resources (drivers and vehicles) under the LOA. A Controller messageZ*

will provide the number of vehicles and drivers available for exercise play. No vehicles or personnel will be m obilized. ............... ......

Sub-elente ktAl*.b.-.

Facilit'ies. .

Intent This sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations(ORO) havefacilities to support the emergency response.

Criterion1.b.1: Facilitiesare sufficient to support the emnergency response. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.3; G.3.a; J.1O.h; J.12; K.S.b)

Extent of Play 256 Responsible OROs must demonstrate, no less than once evejy eightyears, the availability offacilities to support accomplishment of emergency operations (this includes all alternateand backup facilities).

Evaluations are typically pem formedfor EOCs and JICs, as well as otherfacilities such as

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station reception/relocationcenters. Some of the areas evaluated within the facilities are adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, access to backup power, and/or alternatefacility, if required to support operations. Radio stations, laboratories,initial warningpoints and hospitals are not evaluated under 1.b.1.

In addition, facilities will be evaluatedfor this criterion during the first biennialexercise after any new or substantialchanges in structure, equipment, or mission that affect key capabilities,as outlined in respective emergency plans/procediures.A substantialchange is one that has a direct effect or impact on emergency response operationsperformed in those facilities. Examples of substantialchanges include.-

mnodiýf..ing the size or configurationof an emergency operations center, adding morefunction to a center, or changing the equipment available for use in a center.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/proceduresand completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-qf-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Communities will demonstrate this criteria during federal evaluation (generally once per 8 year.

cycle) unless new or substantial improvements occur. All EPZ EOCs, as well as MEMA's Region I EOC will be evaluated during this exercise. MEMA's State EOC has been evaluated

,during the Pilgrim Exercise on April 30, 20.14.

The Incident Command Post will not be evaluated with this criteria during this Hostile Action:

Based Exer cise. .

ISub-element 1.c - Direction and Control Intent This sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-J, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations(ORO) have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.

Criterion1.c.l: Key personnel with leadershiprolesfor the ORO provide direction and controlto thatpart of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

(NUREG-0654, A.l.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6)

Extent of Play Leadershippersonnel must demonstrate the ability to cart)' out the essential managementfunctions of the response effort (e.g., keeping staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other OROs, and ensuring comnpletion ofrequirements and requests.) Leadership must demonstrate the ability to prioritize resourcetasking and replace/supplement resources (e.g., through MOUs or other agreements) when faced with competing demandsforfinite resources. Any resources identified through LOA/MOUs must be on the ORO's mobilization list so they)may be contactedduring an incident, if needed.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/proceduresand completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specifq.-p7 the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play CC ý .. nnl C- -n- - ý In I I n. - A- In, A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station If a comrmunity is directed to evyacuate, EOC personinel Will demonstrate continuity of governilent

.through a discussioni oflogjstics withthe FEMIAEvaluator. Closing of the local EOC and relocation will

• be simulated..........

FSub-element Ld Communications Equiment Intent This Sub-elemnent is derivedfirom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs establish and operate reliableprimat3,and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as contiguousgovernments within the EPZ, Federalemergency response organizations,the licensee and itsfacilities,EOCs, Incident Command Posts.,and FMTs.

Criterion1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available,at least one operates properly, and communication links are establishedand maintainedwith appropriate locations. Communications capabilitiesare managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2)

Extent of Play Assessment of this DemonstrationCriterion is accomplished initially in a baseline evaluation and subsequently in periodic testing and drills. System familiarity and use must be demonstratedas applicable in biennial or tabletop exercise, or if their use would be required,during an actual event OROs must de/nonstrate that a pri/na/y system, and at least one backup system forfixedfacilities, is fully fuictional at all ti/nes. Comm/nun ications syste/ns are maintainedand tested on a recurringbasis throughout the assess//entperiodand svste/i status is available to all operators.Periodic test results and corrective actions are maintainedon a real ti/ne basis. If a communications syste/n or syste/ns are not finctional, but exercisepe/formance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed.

Co/i/nunicationsequipment andproceduresfor facilities andfield units are used as neededfor trans/nissionandreceipt of exercise /nessages. Allfacilities, FMTs, and incident co/n/nand/nust have the capability to access at least one co/n/nu/icationsystem that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to manage the commnunication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handledwithout delays that /night disrupt emergency operations.OROs must ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists.

Exercise scenariosmai' require thefailure of a communication system and use of an alternatesystem, as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

A ll activities /nustbe based 0/i the ORO's plans/proceduresand completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

.Contact with locations not playing will be simulated. See Extent of Play Overview for the listing of facilities that will be playing during the exercise (pages 173).

258 NOTE: "On the Spot" correctionsapprovedtor the fore mentioned sub-element. That portion of the evaluation element relating to both the properfunctionality of comnmunications systems

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station and the proper use of those systems. This portion of the criterion that deals with performance Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element Le - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Intent This sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations(ORO) have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.

CriterionI.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetty, potassium iodide (K[), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H. 7, 10; I. 7, 8, 9; J.O.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion is accomplishedprimarily through a baseline evaluation and subsequentperiodic inspections.

A particular facility's equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with that facility's assigned role in the ORO's emergency operations plans. Use of maps and other displays is encouraged.

For non-facility-based operations, the equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with the assigned operational role. At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones, and signs) must be available, or their availability described.

Specific equipment and supplies that must be demonstrated under this criterion include KI inventories, dosimetry, and monitoring equipment, as follows:

KI: Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by: (1) emergency workers; (2) institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and (3) where stipulated by the plans / procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make KI available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans / procedures). The plans / procedures must include the forms to be used for documenting emergency worker ingestion of KI, as well as a mechanism for identifying emergency workers that have declined KI in advance. Consider carefully the placement of emergency workers that have declined KI in advance.

ORO quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at the storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the ALC submission, and/or Z-o~i~ed during an SAV. Available supplies of KI must be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or state laboratory indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards.

VU ADDflCAV QCTA TnXT UiAD Sn I A UCVTUITý fV DT A U n--- ý -CAI IAI A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Dosimetry: Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers must be available for issuance to all emergency workers who will be dispatched to perform an ORO mission. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make dosimetry available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans / procedures).

Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry must allow an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans / procedures.

Direct-reading dosimeters must be zeroed or operationally checked prior to issuance. The dosimeters must be inspected for. electrical leakage at least annually and replaced when necessary. Civil Defense Victoreen Model 138s (CD V-138s) (0-200 mR), due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems, must be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced when necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV.

Operational checks and testing of electronic dosimeters must be in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions and be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV.

Monitoring Instruments: All instruments must be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.

Unmodified CDV-700 series instruments and other instruments without a manufacturer's recommendation must be calibrated annually. Modified CDV-700 instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the modification manufacturer. A label indicating such calibration must be on each instrument or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. In addition, instruments being used to measure activity must have a sticker-affixed to their sides indicating the effective range of the readings. The range of readings documentation specifies the acceptable range of readings that the meter should indicate when it is response-checked using a standard test source.

For FMTs, the instruments must be capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting beta radiation. These instruments must be capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological protection/exposure control of team members and detection of activity on air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the ORO's plans / procedures.

An appropriate radioactive check source must be used to verify proper operational response for each low-range radiation measurement instrument (less than tR/hr) and for high-range instruments when available.

If a source is not available for a high-range instrument, a procedure must exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a high-range instrument can make useful readings.

In areas where portal monitors are used, the OROs must set up and operationally check the monitor(s).

The monitor(s) must conform to the standards set forth in the Contamination Monitoring Standard for a Portal Monitor Used for Emergency Response, FEMA-REP-21 (March 1995) or in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Participating facilities will demonstrate that eq2Wnent, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI and other' supplies are adequate and sufficient to support the emergency response.

CU A DDnnCV Cý A -~fn- U AD 1A I A CVTCJTý flU M AV ýAl 4

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Documentation of dosimetry inspection, dosimetry inventory and KI invent6 ry will be available for review at the Region I office.

Note: FEMA will provide copies of the Annual Letter of Certification to evaluators, as  ;

appropriate.

. .. . .. ..... .. . ... .... . .L NOTE: "On the Spot" correctionsapprovedfor the fore mentioned sub-element. That portion of the evaluation element where players are initially unable to show proper equipment, supplies or documentation. This portion of the criterion that deal with performance only.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

EVALUATIONAREA 2: Protective Action Decision-Makin' Sub-element 2.a - Emergehcy Worker Exposure Control ". .

Intent This Sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to assess and control the radiationexposure received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the ORO's plans/procedures,to authorizeemergency worker exposure limits to be exceededfor specific missions.

Radiationexposure limitsfor emergency workers are the recommended accumulateddose limits or exposure rates that emergency workers may be permittedto incur duringan emergency. These limits include any pre-establishedadministrativereportinglimits (that take into considerationTEDE or organ- specific limits) identifiedin the ORO 'splans/procedures.

Criterion2.a.1: OROs use a decision-makingprocess, consideringrelevantfactors and appropriatecoordination,to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of K1, is in placefor emergency workers includingprovisions to authorize radiation exposure ii excess of administrativelimits orprotective action guides. ('NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.6; J.lO. e, fi K.3.a;k.4)

Extent of Play OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ should demonstrate a capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans and procedures.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the cap26i4ity to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and to the number of emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels.

Q. A .. nnl CIA 1-1 U AD - I 1 1 nU .1 A- -_ . _rAl 1-

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure, based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for KI administration.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the Massachusetts State EOC by MEMA and MDPH, with input from Incident Commander (if HAB event) based upon information provided from the EOF and until the adversaries are confinred to be neutralized from the Incident Command Post.

Radiation Control Program EOF staff will analyze utility, field team and meteorological data provided at the EOF to make a recommendation to the State EOC for their consideration in making protective action decisions.

Radiological briefings will: be provided to address exposure limits, procedures to replace thoe personnel. approaching exposure limits and how permission to., exceed limits is Obtained.

Em~~e~rgency workers will also be briefed on when to take KI. Distribution of KI to:emergen workers will be simulated. MDPH will authorize use of KI when .radiological conditions warrant:

Iuse.. If thescnrio hasnoo paotntial. for a radiological release, the decision oni the distribution

.and administrati*n of KI as "a protective iimeaesuire for einiergency workers 9 .tledauthorization process. for emergency 'workers to exceed pre-authorized, levels can be addressed through an, interview . " .... .... ...

Sub-element 2.b. - RadiologicalAssessmnent and ProtectiveAction Recommnedations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the EmergeniVc-: .

Intent This Sub-element is derivedfiromNUREG-0654/FEMA4-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capabilitY to independentlyprojectintegrateddosefrom projected or actualdose rates and compare these estimates to the PAGs.

OROs must have the capability to choose, among a range ofprotective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency. OROs base these choices on PAGs fiom theirplans/proceduresor EPA 's Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actionsfor NuclearIncidents and other criteria,such as plant conditions, licensee PARs, coordinationofPADs with other politicaljurisdictions(e.g., other affected OROs and incident command), availabilityof in-placeshelter, weather conditions, and situations, to include HAB incidents, the threatposed by the specific hostile action, the affiliated response,and the effect of an evacuation on the threat response effort, that createhigher than normal riskfrom generalpopulation evacuation.

262 Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriateprotective action recommendationsare based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose C- A flfllfl C-! A -AT U AD - I!lA -- TIk- nO 11T A V .___ I AC'

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

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projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, 1.10 and Supplement 3)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

During the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification of plant conditions that may warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO must demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means, described in the plans/procedures, to develop PARs for decision-makers based on available information and recormnendations provided by the licensee as well as field monitoring data, if available. The ORO must also consider any release and meteorological data provided by the licensee.

The ORO must demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs must be appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of projected dose must be demonstrated. Projected doses must be related to quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be compared. PARs must be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a pre-arranged format.

When the licensee and ORO projected doses differ by more than a factor of 10, the ORO and licensee must determine the source of the difference by discussing input data and assumptions, using different models, or exploring possible reasons. Resolution of these differences must be incorporated into the PARs if timely and appropriate. The ORO must demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This evaluation area will be demonstrated in accordance with the NIAT Handbook in the context of the exercise scenario.

The State EOC decision making team will evaluate the protective action reconimendations of the NIAT accident assessment team and develop appropriate protective action decisions.

Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the Massachusetts State EOC by MEMA and MDPH, in concert with the Incident Commander (if HAB event) based upon information provided from the EOF and until the adversaries are confirmed to be neutralized from the

Incident Command Post.

.Protective action recomniendations will b.emade in accordance with the MARERP and NIAT'

.Handbook. MDPH will validate plant dose projections and coordinate resolution. .,

,:~~. ~~~~~~...... . . . . . .. .... . .. . ......... . .........

~~~~~~ . .......

....1 Criterion2.b.2: A decision-makingprocess involving considerationof appropriate factors and necessaiy coordinationis used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the generalpublic (includingthe recommendationfor the use of KI, if ORO policy).

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; Q&36; D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m)

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

OROs must have the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADs. OROs must demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a timely manner appropriate to the incident, based on information from the licensee, assessment of plant status and potential or actual releases, other available information related to the incident, input from appropriate ORO authorities (e.g., incident command), and PARs from the utility and ORO staff. In addition, a subsequent or alternate PAD may be appropriate if various conditions (e.g., an HAB incident, weather, release timing and magnitude) pose undue risk to an evacuation, or if evacuation may disrupt the efforts to respond to a hostile action.

OROs must demonstrate the ability to obtain supplemental resources (e.g., mutual aid) necessary to implement a PAD if local law enforcement, fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical resources are used to augment response to the NPP site or other key infrastructure.

Dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. In addition, incident cormmand must provide input regarding considerations for subsequent PARs based on the magnitude of the ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions. The decision-makers must demonstrate the capability to change protective actions based on the combination of all these factors.

If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective measure for the general public under offsite plans/procedures, then it must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI to supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI administration. The KI decision-making process must involve close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision- making staff.

If more than one ORO is involved in decision making, all appropriate OROs must communicate and coordinate PADs with each other. In addition, decisions must be coordinated/communicated with incident commnand. OROs must demonstrate the capability to communicate the results of decisions to all the affected locations.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the Massachusetts State EOC. bas*d uipon, information provided by the EOF. MIEMA sand MDPH: Radiation Control Program staff will analyze utility, field team and meteorological data provided at the EOF to nmake a* recommendation

to the State EOC'for~their6considerafion in making protective action decisions. H. -1HAB exercise.

Incident Command wil be onulted as part of the decision. making processý :ttil the adversaries.

are confirmed

....... .. ...... to be neutralized.

. . . . .. .. . .. . . . . : . .. :. . . . . . .. .. . . ... .,C . . . . . , ..:

Sub-element 2.c - ProtectiveAction Decisions Considerationfor the Protectionof Persons with Disabilitiesan Access/FunctionalNeeds,.

Intent 264 This Sub-element is derivedfiom NUREG-0654/FEMA -REP-], which requires that OROs have the capability to determine PADs, including evacuation, sheltering,and use ofKI, if applicable,for groups In, VUA DDnnV C- -nXT U Aý ýnl A -U- nV - AM .--- 11 _rAl

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station of persons with disabilitiesand access/functionalneeds (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities,schools, licensed daycarecenters, mobility-impairedindividuals, and transportation-dependent individuals). The focus is on those groups ofpersons with disabilitiesand access/fiuctionalneeds that are, orpotentiallywill be, affected by a radiologicalreleasefrom an NPP.

Criterion 2.c. 1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate,for groups ofpersons with disabilitiesand access/functionalneeds. (NUREG-0654/FEMA -REP-1,D.4;£9; J.1O.d, e)

Extent of Play Assessment of this DemonstrationCriterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstratedin a biennialor tabletop exercise that would include the use ofplant conditions transmittedfrom the licensee.

Usually it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the range of PAGs, except for incidents where there is a high-risk enviromnental condition or where high-risk groups (e.g., the inmmobile or infirm) are involved. In these cases, factors that must be considered include weather conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation versus risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In addition, decisions must be coordinated/communicated with the incident command. In situations where an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the ORO must consider use of KI.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students.

Demonstration requires that the OROs actually contact public school systems/districts during the exercise.

In accordance with plans/procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school systems/districts must demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. The decision-making process, including any preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, must consider the location of students at the time (e.g., whether the students are still at home, en route to school, or at school).

Since other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prepare for contaminated patients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate these facilities, nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Protective action decisions, including those for individuals with disabilities and access/functional

needs population groups, are demonstrated at the Massachusetts State EOC based upon information provided b y MEMA and MDPH Radiation Control Program staff at the EOF. MIEMA and MDPH Radiation Control Program staff will analyze utility, field team and meteorological data provided at the EOF to make a recommendation to the State EOC for their consideration in making protective action decisions.

In'a *THAB exercise Incident- Command will be2 &sulted 'as part of the decision making process

.until*the adver.rsaries are confirmed to be neutralized.:.

CCflCU

.r - l-X - ri~-. A. 1.1lI .T~ ~ n X..A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SSub-element 2.d. -Radiological Assessmient Jad Decisiohi-M ,kinfg for the Ingestion Exposure:-

Intent This Sub-element is derived firom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-], which requires that OROs have the means to assess the radiologicalconsequencesfor the ingestion exposure pathway, relate them to the appropriatePA Gs, andmake timnelv, appropriatePADs to mitigate exposurefiom the pathway.

Duringan incident at an NPP,a release of radioactivematerialmay contaminate water supplies and agriculturalproducts in the surroundingareas.An' such contaminationwould likely occur during the plume phase of the incident and,depending on the nature of the release,could impact the ingestion pathway for weeks or Years.

Criterion 2. d. 1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriateprotective action decisions are made based on the ORO's planning criteria. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; D.4; J9, 11)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmitted from the licensee.

OROs are expected to take precautionary actions to protect food and water supplies, or to minimize exposure to potentially contaminated water and food, in accordance with their respective plans/procedures. Often OROs initiate such actions based on criteria related to the facility's ECLs. Such actions may include recommendations to place milk animals on stored feed and use protected water supplies.

The ORO must use its procedures to assess the radiological consequences of a release on the food and water supplies, such as the development of a sampling plan. The ORO's assessment must include evaluation of the radiological analyses of representative samples of water, food, and other ingestible substances of local interest from potentially impacted areas; characterization of the releases from the facility; and the extent of areas potentially impacted by the release. During this assessment, OROs must consider use of agricultural and watershed data within the 50-mile EPZ. The radiological impacts on the food and water must then be compared to the appropriate ingestion PAGs contained in the ORO's plans/procedures. The plans/procedures contain PAGs based on specific dose commitment criteria or on criteria as recommended by current Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance. Timely and appropriate recommendations must be provided to the ORO decision-makers group for implementation decisions. OROs may also include a comparison of taking or not taking a given action on the resultant ingestion pathway dose coimmitments.

The ORO must demonstrate timely decisions to minimize radiological impacts from the ingestion pathway, based on the given assessments and other information. Any such decisions must be communicated and, to the extent practical, coordinated with neighboring OROs. These decisions include tracking agricultural products entering and leaving the EPZ. Demonstration of plans and procedures which use traffic access control points to track agricultural products entering and leaving the EPZ may be conducted through interview.

266 OROs will use Federal resources, as identified in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the NRF and other resources (e.g., compacts or nuclear insurers), as necessary. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other participating resources.

C. ý .. nný CI A 11n11 . ý .'A I ý ýý .1 A- I ý -1 A I 1.1 A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and cotrpleted as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise.

Sub-element 2 e. - RadiologicalAssessment and Decision-Making ConcerningRelocation, Re-entry, and Return Intent This Sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requiresthat OROs have the capability to make decisions on post-plumephase relocation,reently, and return of the generalpublic. These decisions are essentialforprotection of the publicfiom direct long-term exposure to depositedradioactivematerialsfiom a severe incident at an NPP.

Criterion2.e.1: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are Blade and coordinatedas appropriate,based on assessments of the radiologicalconditions and criteriain the ORO's plan and/orprocedures.(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,LIO; J.9; K.3.a; M.)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a full-scale, functional or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmitted from the licensee.

Relocation: OROs must demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and compare these estimates with PAGs; apply decision criteria for relocation of those individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated, but where actual or projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs; and control access to evacuated and restricted areas.

OROs will make decisions for relocating members of the evacuated public who lived in areas that now have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs. Determination of areas to be restricted must be based on factors such as the mix of radionuclides in deposited materials, calculated exposure rates versus the PAGs, and analyses of vegetation and soil field samples.

Reentry: Decisions must be made on location of control points and policies regarding access and exposure control for emergency workers and members of the general public who need to temporarily enter the evacuated area to perform specific tasks or missions.

Examples of control procedures are the assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry for emergency workers; questions regarding an individual's objectives, locations expected to be visited, and associated timeframes; availability of maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; and advice o,&eas to avoid. Control procedures also include monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; the implementation of decision criteria regarding decontamination; and proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.

CC A DflflfV Qr A -- lX UAAD jOT A UVTCXT.ý flC DI AV .--- I ý _rAI 1. 1A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to develop a strategy for authorized reentry of individuals into the restricted zone(s), based on established decision criteria. OROs must demonstrate the capability to modify those policies for security purposes (e.g., police patrols),

maintenance of essential services (e.g., fire protection and utilities), and other critical functions.

They must demonstrate the capability to use decision-making criteria in allowing access to the restricted zone by the public for various reasons, such as to maintain property (e.g., to care for farm animals or secure machinery for storage) or retrieve important possessions. Coordinated policies for access and exposure control must be developed among all agencies with roles to perform in the restricted zone(s). OROs must demonstrate the capability to establish policies for provision of dosimetry to all individuals allowed to reenter the restricted zone(s). The extent to which OROs need to develop policies on reentry will be determined by scenario events.

Return: OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase (i.e., permitting populations that were previously evacuated to reoccupy their homes and businesses on an unrestricted basis). OROs must base decisions on environmental data and political boundaries or physical/ geological features, which allow identification of the boundaries of areas to which members of the general public may return. Return is permitted to the boundary of the restricted area(s) that is based on the relocation PAG.

Other factors that the ORO must consider in decision-making include conditions that permit cancellation of the ECL and relaxation of associated restrictive measures. OROs must base return recommendations on measurements of radiation from ground deposition. OROs must have the capability to identify services and facilities that require restoration within a few days and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, schools, and internmediate-term housing for relocated persons.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 3: ProtectiveAction Implementation Sub-element 3.a-Implementationof Emergencvl Woitrker Exposure Control Intent This Sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA4-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide for the following: distribuition, use, collection, and processing of direct-readingdosimetry and permanent record dosimetny; reading of direct-readingdosimetry by emergency workers at appropriatefiequencies;,maintaininga radiationdose recordfor each emergency worker, establishing a decision 6Bn or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur radiationexposures in excess of the PA Gs, and the capability to provide Kifor emergency workers, always applying the as low as is reasonably achievable principle as appropriate.

QUA DDflfV -T A -n-lX U AD 1A I A U-'CkTT flU DI AMV _V Al 1A1 A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Criterion3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriatedosimetry and procedures,and manage radiologicalexposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodicallyand at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readingson the appropriateexposure record or chart.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.1O.e; K.3.a, b; K.4)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or trainingactivities that would fidly demonstrate technicalproficiencv.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of TEDE and maximum exposure limits, for those emergency workers involved in lifesaving activities, contained in the ORO's plans / procedures.

Each emergency worker must have basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plans / procedures. If supplemental resources are used, they must be provided with just-in-time training to ensure basic knowledge of radiation exposure control. Emergency workers must demonstrate procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and manage radiological exposure control.

During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers must demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached. The emergency worker must report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans / procedures. OROs must demonstrate the actions described in the plans / procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, authorize the worker to incur additional exposures, or take other actions. If exercise play does not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators must interview at least two workers to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in case authorization is needed, and at what exposure levels.

Workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or coworkers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission. In such cases, adequate control of exposure can be achieved for all team members using one direct-reading dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers assigned to low-exposure rate fixed facilities (e.g., EOCs and communications center within the EPZ, reception centers, and counting laboratories) may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored using group dosimetry (i.e., direct-reading dosimeters strategically placed in the work area). Each team member must still have his or her own permanent record dosimetry. Individuals authorized by the OR9 6 V reenter an evacuated area during the plume (emergency) phase, must be limited to the l'owest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions.

CC A -ýný Qý A -- ý Aý - I A C-C- - nT Aý

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station OROs may have administrative limits lower than EPA-400-R-92-001 dose limits for emergency workers performing various services (e.g., life-saving, protection of valuable property, all activities). OROs must ensure that the process used to seek authorization for exceeding dose limits does not negatively impact the capability to respond to an incident where life-saving and/or protection of valuable property may require an urgent response.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI to emergency workers consistent with decisions made. OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they did so. Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary.

For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it. Emergency workers must demonstrate basic knowledge of procedures for using KI whether or not the scenario drives the implementation of KI use. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play EPZ/RC EOCs: Dosimetry packets will be issued to a minimum of two individuals who will be working inside each EPZ EOC. Actual distribution and ingestion of KI will not occur.

Knowledge of,the use of dosimetry and Massachusetts policies on dosimetry will be demonstrateditlirough an interview with the. FEMA Evaluator and only with individuals issued<*

dosimet*..._ _

NOTE: "On the Spot" correctionsapproved for the fore mentioned sub-element. That portion of the evaluation element dealing with issuing of doshnetry and briefihms. Also to be included is the demonstration by emnereency worker knowledge of radiation control.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 3.b - Implementation ofKI Decision' Intent This Sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide Kl for institutionalizedindividuals, and, if in the plans /procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary fA27(OROs to have the capability to provide K! to institutionalized individuals,providing K1 to the generalpublic is an ORO option and must be reflected as such in ORO plans / procedures. Provisions must include the availability of adequate quantities,storage,and means of distributingKI.

CCA DffV C A TI N~I A. 1f1A I ~ cr fl flY. A V -- ICo~ _c 'An A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Criterion3. b. 1: KI and appropriateinstructions are available should a decision to recommend use of Kl be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of Klfor emergency workers and institutionalizedindividuals is maintained.

(NUREG-O654/FEMA-REP-1,J. 1O.ej)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplishedduring a fidl-scale, functional or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fidly demonstrate technicalproficiency.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to make KI available to institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in their plans / procedures, to members of the general public. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made.

OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it.

If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information must be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO's plans / procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

.... , " .. ....... .............i : ' * - r : .. . . ..* , " . . . .. .. .... ............

'Actual distribution and ingestion of KI will not occur. Empty KI tablet containers (Small zip-,

lock baigs) will be included in the dosimetry packets for emergency workers.

NOTE: "On the Spot" correctionsapproved for the fore mentioned sub-element.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub 2-element 3.c - Implementation of :*Protective Actions for Persons with Disabilities and Access/FunctionalNeeds Intent This Sub-element is derivedfiom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement PADs, including o7iFcuation and/or sheltering,for all persons with disabilities and access /fiunctional needs. The focus is on those persons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiologicalreleaseftomn an NPP.

V. ý -11n- A. In I I ný - A- .--- In -1 ý I

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

• • • • ~~~~~~~~~~~~~.*

• .... *'.' >v;,*,.* *.!:<:s*,.,t: .,

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)

Extent ofPlay Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a fidl-scale or functional exercise, an actualevent, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (i.e., provide PARs and emergency information and instructions to) persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, including hospitals / medical facilities, nursing homes, correctional facilities, and mobility-impaired and transportation-dependent individuals. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide for persons with disabilities and access / functional needs in accordance with plans / procedures.

Contact with persons with disabilities and access / functional needs and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the extent of play. Some contacts with transportation providers must be actual, as negotiated in the extent of play. All actual and simulated contacts must be logged.

Since the other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prepare for contaminated patients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate these facilities, nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play All actual and simulated contacts must be logged.

Region I: Initial callstoTransportation Providers will be made to verify telephone number and contact person. Defa'ult numbers from the Resource Manual will be Used to detennine transportation:

'requirements. No vehicles or personnel will be mobilized: A list of the Transportation Providers from the ResourceCManual will be provided to the FEMA Evaluator.

Region I Special Needs Coordinator and staff will demonstrate 5 all appropriate communicatons with EPZ community EOC staff and~coordination of bed space assigninent for evacuating nursing hometý patients, and hospital patients, although actual evacuation of special facihtltes will not occur. Default numbers:,

from the Resource Manual will be used. .

.EPZ EOCs: All special facilities willlreceive initial contact only to verify attendance (to be logged for comparisonmto default number). Defaqultnumbers will be used from the Resource Manual for exercise play. Follow-up calts will be simulated and logged. Participating special:facilities will be interviewed lout of sequence by a FEMA Evalator. .

Local Transportation Coordinators will report to R?gnI I thi number of additional beds needed to .

accommodate patients frofrn each participating facility that may be directed to evacuate; however, no patients will actually be moved or be:lmpacted in any way. Default numbers from the: Resource Manual

.will be used to determine number of bedýs needed.

C. A Dff VCIA Iflnd L A. 1.1 . C -, f11- -iC -r*' A) l..~ 1.l A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

>Thelist ofaccess and functional needs dtsIII1e sIiown tothe FEMA evaluator; however, thex*it, information is confidenta:l and copies will not be prjo)idd tothe evaluator. All calls will be simulatedA.

and l6gged. There areiio access and functional iv ls requiring the use of TTY in the EPZ. therefore TTY wiI ot. be demonstrated.

Criterion3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actionsfor schools.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,J.10.c, d, e, g)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplishedduring afull-scale,finctional, or tabletop exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any thne.

Public school systems / districts must demonstrate the ability to implement PADs for students.

The demonstration must be made as follows: each school system / district within the 10 mile EPZ must demonstrate implementation of protective actions. At least one school per affected system / district must participate in the demonstration. Canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering in place must be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process.

If accomplished through an interview, appropriate school personnel including decision-making officials (e.g., schools' superintendent/principals and transportation director/bus dispatchers),

and at least one bus driver (and the bus driver's escort, if applicable) must be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by the plans / procedures, must be verified.

Officials of the school system(s) must demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

If a school facility has emergency plans as a condition of licensing, those plans may be submitted to FEMA review in place of demonstration or interview pursuant to the ORO's plans/procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Since the other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prepare for contaminated patients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate these facilities, nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

'Regi!" IEOC. The MEIA Region.%l S cial N 'o ordinator, in an interview 1.with the FEMA Evaluator;:will- provide a ist of sc hools located out*ide the EPZ with students who::reside within the EPZ.

(C.all0to schools outside the EPZ will be simulated and logged.. .

Cý A -nný Cý A -n- ý Aý 1A I A VVýCXIý nV DT A ý -CAI ýAl A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station rEP.ZEOCs: Initial notificatio \will be made to ill school superintendents who will conta'ct each*school;

.and day care per procedure to obtain attendance (informationk togged 6 for comparison.jto1d>1 f0ultl .

numbers). Default numbers for the Resour&\MaLiiua1 will b.eusedfor exercise playFo.llow-up.calls wll besir*ulated atnd logged:

SchoolSuperintendents:  : . " ""

Amesbury School Superintenh:: ...

Newburyport School Supierintendent

entucket School Superintendent Triton School SSuperintendent ..

Sub-element 3.d. - Implementation of TrafficandAccess Contro Intent This Sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA -REP-], which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective action plans / procedures, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This Sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing,and stqffing of traffic and access controlpoints, and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or finctional exercise, an actualevent, or bjy' means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff must demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities, including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas, as per the Extent-of-Play Agreement. These capabilities may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic), they must demonstrate the capability to contact the state or Federal agencies that have the needed authority, as agreed upon in the Extent-of-Play Agreement. 274 All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

C- -DflflflV r A r~i 2A1I

-,.L1AD CVTUAlr -VU n' A -J fl--- 11 .. 4-l jA

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Massachusetts Extent of Play

.EPZ EOCs and/or ICP: EPZ EOCs will demonstrate the ability to direct and monitor traffic

.control operations within their jurisdictions through discussions and communications with the ievaluator. At the EOCs, local highway representative and the Loc al Police representative will

.participate in a discussion.'6f procedures andiesources available for traffic control. No personnel or equipment will be deployed to field.locations.

NOTE: "On the Spot" correctionsapproved for the fore mentioned sub-element. Appropriate traffic and access control established.Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access controlpoint personnel Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to deal with impediments, such as wreckers, need not be demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, must be logged. The impediment must remain in place during the evacuation, does not necessarily need to occur on an evacuation route, and should be such that re-routing of traffic is required. The impediment should result in, and must remain in place long enough, for demonstration of the decision-making and coordination with the JIC to communicate the alternate route to evacuees leaving the area.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Each EPZ Local EOC will demonstrate decision-making regarding rerouting of traffic following

[a traffic impediment by a controller inject or through an interview with the FEMA Evaluator.

No personnel or equipment will be dispatched to the simulated accident scene.

If the scenario does not lead to evacuation the y, sria shall be deemed complete if the ORO can describe to the evaluator the actions they would take to overcome a major traffic impediment during an evacuation and how such actions would be communicated to the public and affected OROs. .

A. 1.1 ý - .1 A- .--- 11 _1A1 'Al A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station I

NOTE: "On the Spot" corrections approvedfor the fore mentioned sub-element. Impediments to evacuation are identifted and resolved.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Siub-elemnenht3.e- IImplementation of Ingestion PathwaV Decisions Intent This Sub-element is derivedfiom NUREG-0654/FEMA -REP-IL which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective actions, based on criteriarecommended by current FDA guidance,for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ (i.e., the area within an approximate 50-mile radius of the NPP). This Sub-element focuses on those actions requiredfor implementation of protective actions.

Criterion 3.e.l: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.11)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or finctional exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to secure and use current information on the locations of dairy farms, meat and poultry producers, fisheries, fruit growers, vegetable growers, grain producers, food processing plants, and water supply intake points to implement protective actions within the EPZ. OROs use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear / Radiological Incident Aimex, and other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

.Tbhis sumen t ' : "*<:"*'* ~~~~....

-ele ......... . .... .............

This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise. ..

276 Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated CUA - -llll

- T A I.-~h U A. 1.1 1 rSrrlr .lCf All _rAl I-A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station water,food products, milk, and agriculturalproduction. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, G.1,J.9,11)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or finctional exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the development of measures and strategies for implementation of ingestion exposure pathway EPZ protective actions by formulating protective action information for the general public and food producers and processors. Demonstration of this criterion includes either pre-distributed public information material in the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ or the capability for rapid reproduction and distribution of appropriate reproduction-ready information and instructions to pre-determined individuals and businesses.

OROs must also demonstrate the capability to control, restrict, or prevent distribution of contaminated food by commercial sectors. Exercise play must include demonstration of communications and coordination among organizations to implement protective actions. Field play of implementation activities may be simulated. For example, communications and coordination with agencies responsible for enforcing food controls within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ must be demonstrated, but actual communications with food producers and processors may be simulated.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise. ..

Sub-element 3.f- Inplementation of Relocation,Re-entry, and Return Decisions Intent This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEM4-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement plans, procedures, and decisions for post-plune phase relocation, reentry, and return. Implementation of these decisions is essentialfor protecting the public firom direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe incident at a commercial NPP.

Criterion3.fl1: Decisions regardingcontrolled reentry, relocation,and return of individuals during the post-plume phase are coordinatedwith appropriate organizationsand implemented. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,E. 7; J.10.j; J.12; K.S.b; M.1, 3)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion mi'7Je accomplished duringa fill-scale,functional, or tabletop exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at an)' time.

C. A .. nný CIA 11n1l . A. 1A I I - T A- .--- 14 -1 ýI 'A' A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Relocation: OROs must demonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement decisions concerning relocation of individuals located in radiologically contaminated areas who were not previously evacuated. Such individuals must be relocated to an area(s) where radiological contamination will not expose the general public to doses that exceed the relocation PAGs.

OROs must also demonstrate the capability to provide for short- or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in an area(s) that has residual radiation levels above the (first-, second-, and 50-year) PAGs.

Areas of consideration must include the capability of OROs to communicate with other OROs regarding timing of actions, notification of the population of procedures for relocation, and notification of, and advice for, evacuated individuals who will be converted to relocation status in situations where they will not be able to return to their homes due to high levels of contamination. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to communicate instructions to the public regarding relocation decisions and intermediate-term housing for relocated persons.

Reentry: OROs must demonstrate the capability to control reentry and exit of individuals who are authorized by the ORO to temporarily reenter the restricted area during the post-plume (i.e., intermediate or late) phase to protect them from unnecessary radiation exposure. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to control exit of vehicles and other equipment to control the spread of contamination outside the restricted area(s). Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as farmers for animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public who must reenter an evacuated area during the post-emergency phase must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions. Monitoring and decontamination facilities will be established as appropriate.

Examples of control procedures are: (1) assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry for emergency workers; (2) questions regarding the individuals' objective(s), location(s) expected to be visited, and associated timeframes; (3) maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; (4) advice on areas to avoid; (5) procedures for exit, including monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; (6) decision criteria regarding contamination; (7) proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry, and (8) maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.

Return: OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. OROs must demonstrate the capability to identify and prioritize services and facilities that require restoration within a few days, and to identify procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, and schools.

Communication among OROs for relocation, reentry, and return may be simulated. All simulated or actual contacts must be documented. These discussions may be accomplished in a group setting.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, and other resources (e.g., compacts or nuclear insurers), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federa and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

CC A flfflfV Cm

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Massachusetts Extent of Play Týis suhJýbement will not be evaluated dUlji this

• ' -xe""ise' EVALUATION AREA 4: FieldMeasurementAnd Analysis Sab-elinenU.a.- Plume Phase FiektA11easurements andg lnalyses...

Intent This Sub-element is derivedfiom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to deploy FMTs with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiationand particulate deposition on the ground.from an airborneplume. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA -REP-I indicates that OROs must have the capability to use FMTs within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to detect airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and radioactiveparticulatematerial in the airborneplume. In an incident at an NPP, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby population and envirolnent. Although incident assessment methods are available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an incident, it is important to collectfield radiologicaldata to help characterizeany radiological release. Adequate equipment andproceduresare essentialto such field measurement efforts.

Criterion 4.a.l: [RESERVED]

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams (2 or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12; 1.7, 8, 11; J.10.a)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterionmay be accomplishedduring a fidl-scale, functional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or trainingactivities that would fully demonstrate technicalproficiency.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to brief FMTs on predicted plume location and direction, plume travel speed, and exposure control procedures before deployment. During an HAB incident, the Field Team management must keep the incident command informed of field monitoring teams' activities and location. Coordination with FMTs and field monitoring may be demonstrated as out-of-sequence demonstrations, as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and support the adequacy of implemented protective actions, or to be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams must be directed to take measurements at such locations and times as necessary to provide sufficient information to characterize the plume and its inmacts. 279 If the responsibility for obtaining peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these CC A DDnnV Cý A "nM ý AD IA1 A ýý DT A ý -__ 11 -CAI InI A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvenent Plan Seabrook Station

ý'44 measurements to be repeated by ORO monitoring teams. If the licensee FMTs do not obtain peak measurements in the plume, it is the ORO's decision as to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume. The sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all FMTs (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Anmex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This criterion v/as demonstrated during the Pilgrin .2014 exercis*, the team will deploy for training pirposes only. ..

NIAT FieLd Teams are managed44bTy thi": IcTea'm Coordinator who is located .at. the:utility OF. Hle will brief and dispamch sampling location.s 1inaccordance Nwith the NIAT'

• Handbook, Section T).4 a*dictated by scenarioPlay The Field 'Teamcst i\l collect one complete sam p le . ** * . . . . . ... ....**.=. ...... *= ..** .. . * .

..~. . ........ ..... ... . . ..  :.

NIAT Field.Teamnpersonnel will prepare sample mnedia, uey fonrs, and chain of c6ustoly, documentsiasif they were being transferred to thelabhor anaiysis. Actual transporL6f. amples wilblbe simulated. N*

Fbr scen'arifs involving. Hostile A\ctioin se inkýidnts the Field Te" '"oordinatorwi*...

ci:cqdinia.e atctivities with the Ic*i*ldt Command Post and . or operate beyonid.,an establishecFI

'Security Perimeter. <4 4 Controller injects will be specifically prepared to.. allm\ " >Ie" Teaný to e.. evaluated but the'se inject, .will not-be part of the HAB scenario afid .theirce1or ill be separate: fromnthe I AB:

scenano. .. .

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12: 1.8, 9; J.10.a)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterionmay be accomplished during a full-scale,finctional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or trainingactivities that would fidly demonstrate technicalproficiency.

280 Two or more FMTs must demonstrate the capability to make and report measurements of ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment team, or other appropriate authority. FMTs must also demonstrate the capability to obtain an air sample for measurement QU A ODC\CV CT A - AA

-fl TT l -flI A U - -C~'1 -l -l A 'J 1A1 A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station of airborne radioiodine and particulates, and to provide the appropriate authority with field data pertaining to measurement. If samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the authority must consider the need for expedited laboratory analyses of these samples.

Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form(s), to a radiological laboratory(ies) must be demonstrated.

OROs must share data in a timely manner with all other appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory(ies), will be in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

.This criterion was demonstrated during the Pilgrim 2014 exercise* the team will deploy for training purposes only...

Two MA NIAT Field Teams willbe dispatched from theEOF in. accordance iththeNMAT "Handbook. Once, dispatched, only disposable gloves will be used for actual exeicise play

Charcoal cartridges will be usedinstead of silver zeolite.

TheN!AT FieldTeams x llcollect one 'complete sminple (moitoring and air sample) as> '*"v

specified by the proceduresin .Section D.4of the.NAT Handbook. .

For scenarios involving Hostile .Action based'iiicidents the FielId Team Controlwill coordinate,

'activities with the Incident Cofmmand Post 'aAd/ or operate beyond an established Security, NOTE: "On the Spot" correctionsapproved for the fore mentioned sub-element. That portion of the evaluation element that demonstratesone complete sample.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 4.b - PostPlume PhaseFieldMeasurements and Saný ling .

Intent 281 This Sub-element is derived firom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to assess the actual or potential magnitude and locations of radiologicalhazards

- A DD -fl -T A - -*XTI A D ýA IA l~lI

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_A1 1.l '1

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station to determine the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ and to support relocation, reenty, and return decisions. This Sub-element focuses on collecting environmental samples for laboratoty analyses that are essentialfor decisions on protecting the public from contaminatedfood and water and direct radiationfirom depositedmaterials.

Criterion 4.b.l: The field teams (2 or more) demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision making. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; 1.8; J.11)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterionmay be accomplishedduring a fill-scale,finctional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or trainingactivities that would fidly demonstrate technicalproficiency.

The ORO's FMTs must demonstrate the capability to take measurements and samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support reentry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are available, use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement is appropriate. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory(ies), will be in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

The FMTs and/or other sampling personnel must secure ingestion pathway samples from agricultural products and water. Samples in support of relocation and return must be secured from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces in areas that received radioactive ground deposition.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts, the licensee, or nuclear insurers). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This sub-element wi 11 be not demonstrated during this exercise.

Sub-element 4.c - Laborator' Op:eratio..ns Intent This Sub-element is derivedfiom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to peform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in air, liquid, and environmental samples to supportprotective action decision making.

282 Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1, 3; J.11)

CC . - -Dlfl -T A r1-l 1 - AD

. fl- I ~ ~ fV .lY A I -_ 'A _ý111 'A,1%1,

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterionmay be accomplishedduring afidl-scale, finctional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or trainingactivities that would fidly demonstrate technicalproficiency.

The laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to follow appropriate procedures for receiving samples, including logging infornation, preventing contamination of the laboratory(ies), preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored samples, preventing cross contamination of samples, preserving samples that may spoil (e.g., milk), and keeping track of sample identity. In addition, the laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.

The laboratory(ies) must be appropriately equipped to provide, upon request, timely analyses of media of sufficient quality and sensitivity to support assessments and decisions anticipated in the ORO's plans / procedures. The laboratory instrument calibrations must be traceable to standards provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze typical radionuclides released in a reactor incident must be as described in the plans / procedures. New or revised methods may be used to analyze atypical radionuclide releases (e.g., transuranics or as a result of a terrorist incident) or if warranted by incident circumstances. Analysis may require resources beyond those of the ORO.

The laboratory staff must be qualified in radio-analytical techniques and contamination control procedures.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts, the licensee, or nuclear insurers). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

.This*sub-element will býn:iiot demonstrated duringl this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 5: Emergency Notification and Public Information Sub-element S.a - Activation of thePromptAlert and Notification Sistem.

Intent This Sub-element is derivedfiom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in this 18&-element are derived firom the Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, FEMIA-REP-JO (November 1985).

.--- I 1 -1 ý I - IA

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primaiy alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructionalmessage to the public must include as a mininium the elements required by currentREP guidance. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6, 7)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a fidl-scale or finctional exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipment that would fidly demonstrate capability.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, OROs must complete system activation for primary alert / notification and disseminate the information / instructions in a timely manner. For exercise purposes, timely is defined as with a sense of urgency and without undue delay. If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely maimer, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message must be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test message(s) is not required. The procedures must be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation. The alert signal activation should be simulated, not performed. Evaluations of EAS broadcast stations may also be accomplished through SAVs.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis must be verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification system, including verification of provisions for backup power or an alternate station.

The initial message must include at a minimum the following elements:

• Identification of the ORO responsible and the official with authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message;

• Identification of the commercial NPP and a statement that an emergency exists there;

• Reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures, calendars, and/or information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency;

• A closing statement asking that the affected and potentially affected population stay tuned for additional information, or that the population tune to another station for additional information.

If route alerting is demonstrated as a primary method of alert and notification, it must be done in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures and the Extent-of-Play Agreement. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting in a timely manner (not subject to specific time requirements). At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) must vary2tlmn exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is CC A oDr-W -r A -- 7KU4*

AD - fI I vrC- nC DT A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.

OROs may demonstrate any means of primary alert and notification included in their plans / procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play MEMA SEOC: Actions to demonstrate performance of initial notification of the public will be performed up to the point of actual..,transmission of the Emergency Alert Systeiii.(EAS) message.

The EAS message will be prepared / elq6ded by MEMA.`The State Primary EAS Station of WBZ will be contacted only once and notified that activations of the EAS System will be handled out of the SEOC. Actual activation of the Emergency Alert System will be simulated by!

SEOC staff.

The MA SEOC in coordination with New Hampshire will demonstrate the actions necessary to:

perform the siren activation up to the point of actually sounding the sirens. Sir6ii sounding willWff be sirmulated.

Criterion5. a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a fidl-scale or finctional exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipment that would filly demonstrate capability.

If the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary system(s) or if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function during the exercise, OROs must demonstrate backup means of alert and notification. Backup means of alert and notification will differ from facility to facility.

Backup alert and notification procedures that would be implemented in multiple stages must be structured such that the population closest to the plant (e.g., within 2 miles) is alerted and notified first. The populations farther away and downwind of any potential radiological release would be covered sequentially (e.g., 2 to 5 miles, followed by downwind 5 to 10 miles, and finally the remaining population as directed by authorities). Topography, population density, existing ORO resources, and timing will be considered in judging the acceptability of backup means of alert and notification. 285 Although circumstances may not allow this for all situations, FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators attempt to establish backup means that will reach those in the plume CýA DD"I*

.. n 0- T^ 11n1'*K . D 1A I n T VT n'E .1K AV- *In,

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station exposure EPZ within a reasonable time of failure of the primary alert and notification system, with a recomnmended goal of 45 minutes. The backup alert message must, at a minimum, include (1) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.

If backup route alerting is demonstrated, only one route needs to be selected and demonstrated.

All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast), as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.

OROs may demonstrate any means of backup alert and notification included in their plans / procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play m.' ............. Vý . 1 . . ... ................... .... .. ......

This sub-element will not be demonstrated in this exercise..*

Criterion 5.a.4: Activities associated with FEMA-approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipment that would fully demonstrate capability.

OROs with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report), 5 to 10 miles from the NPP, must demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s). FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators establish means that will reach those in approved exception areas in a timely manner, with a recommended goal of 45 minutes, once the initial decision is made by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an incident. The exception area alert message must, at a minimum, include (1) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.

For exception area alerting, at least one route must be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) must vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcasted) as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conductel* an agreed-upon location. For exception areas alerted by aircraft, actual flights will be negotiated in the extent of play, but must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years.

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

.This sub-element will not be demonstrated in this exercise.

Sub-element 5. b - Emereency In forlation and Instructionsfor."thePublic and tlhe Mdi.i(...,

Intent This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to disseminate appropriateemergency information and instructions,including any' recommended protective actions, to the public, hI addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 requires OROs to ensure that the capability exists for providing information to the media. This includes the availability of a physical location for use by the media during an emergency.

NUREG-0654/FEM44-REP-1 also provides that a system must be available for dealing with rumors. This system will hereafterbe known as the "public inquiry hotline. "

Criterion 5.b.l: OROs provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, c)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a fidl-scale or functional exercise, or drills.

The responsible ORO personnel / representatives must demonstrate actions to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner following the initial alert and notification (not subject to specific time requirements). For exercise purposes, timely is defined as with a sense of urgency and without undue delay. If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Message elements: The ORO must ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with PADs made by appropriate officials. The emergency information must contain all necessary and applicable instructions (e.g., evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools and persons with disabilities and access / functional needs, and public inquiry hotline telephone number) to assist the public in carrying out the PADs provided. The ORO must also be prepared to disclose and explain the ECL of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs must demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to u28fmiliar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station The emergency information must be all-inclusive by including the four items specified under exercise Demonstration Criterion 5.a.1 and previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media.

In addition, the OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plans / procedures.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the plans / procedures.

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs must demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

Media information: OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public. This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the incident warrants. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information presented in media briefings and releases must be consistent with PADs and other emergency information provided to the public. Copies of pertinent emergency information (e.g., EAS messages and media releases) and media information kits must be available for dissemination to the media.

Public inquiry: OROs must demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls received via the public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff must demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to appropriate information source. Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, must be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases.

HAB considerations: The dissemination of information dealing with specific aspects of NPP security capabilities, actual or perceived adversarial (terrorist) force or threat, and tactical law enforcement response must be coordinated / communicated with appropriate security authorities, e.g., law enforcement and NPP security agencies, in accordance with ORO plans / procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

Subsequent emergency

• m ation and instrructions should be provided to the public and the.

,media in a timely.manner.

Joint Information Center: Rumor trends generated as a result of public inquiry calls to the Mass-

.211 Public Infonnation Line will be included in news briefings by the MEMA PIO. (In compliance with NIMS terminology, Rumor Control is now considered to be "Public Inquiry").

It is possible during a HAB incident, that a "vin '"JIC will be opened at MEMA's SEOC.

• This "virtual" JIC will be connected to and d recty communicate with the NPP's JIC through Selectronic means.

CU-Afllffl CIAn rIlnt A D IflI A UVCCNII -VC -T

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

.. *.... , 9..99 " "":

State EOC: Simulation Cell personnel will make calls simulating members of the public to the111 Mass-21 1 Public Information Line. This process will commence&after the initial:siren activation.

Information on rumor trend..s re.ognized at the Mass-211 Public Information Line will be ,. ,'

forwarded to the Public: Affairs O'fficc at the SEOC. .... ..

Mass-2 11 Operations Center: Staff from Mass-2 11 will demonstrate the ability to handle inquiry calls. Handling at least two rumor trends will be demonstrated.

.EPZ Towns: Simulation Cell personnel at the SEOC will make calls to the local EOCs simulating members of the public with inquiries. Each local EO'C will demonstrate the ability to

properly handle these inquiries..-

HAB exercises will demonstratie iat public information relating to security matters should

.receive approval of the Unified Command before release. Each ORO should only be reporting:

iontheir areas*Of operation and not on others sucli as the law enforcement aspects.-

i*:..L. ...... ... . ...........

NOTE: "On the Spot" correctionsapprovedfor the fore mentioned sub-elements. That portion of the evaluation element dealing with "tinely manner" and emergencv information being all-inclusive. Playersshould have the opportunity to re-demonstrate this criterion in subsequent messages.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

EVALUATION AREA 6: Support Operation/Facilities j'ub-"element 6.a - Monitoring,DecontantitonandRegtstratton of Evacuees Intent This Sub-element is derivedfirom NUREG-0654/FEMA'-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, while minimizing contamination of the facilit,. OROs must also have the capability to identify and registerevacuees at reception centers.

Criterion 6.a.l: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4; J.10.h; J.12)

Extent of Play 289 Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a fidl-scale or finctional exercise, drills, or SA V.

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees must be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement. OROs conducting this demonstration must have one-third of the resources (e.g., monitoring teams / instrumentation / portal monitors) available at the facility(ies) as necessary to monitor 20 percent of the population within a 12-hour period. This would include adequate space for evacuees' vehicles. Availability of resources can be demonstrated with valid documentation (e.g., MOU/LOA, etc.) reflecting how necessary equipment would be procured for the location. Plans / procedures must indicate provisions for service animals.

Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees must demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain, within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20 percent EPZ population planning base. The monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored, per hour, by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate procedure. For demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities, a minimum of six evacuees must be monitored per station using equipment and procedures specified in the plans / procedures. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators to determine whether the 12-hour requirement can be met.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to register evacuees upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities. The activities for recording radiological monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination must include establishing a registration record consisting of the evacuee's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination (if any), or as otherwise designated in the plan and/or procedures. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration.

Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger / action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures. All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Decontamination of evacuees may be simulated and conducted by interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex monitoring must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs, and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate uncontaminated from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions must also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated evacuees, provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing; and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any evacuee found to be contaminated, procedures must be discussed concerning handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.

209 Individuals who have completed monitoring (aM -lecontamination, if needed) must have means (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc) indicating that they, and their service animals and vehicles, where applicable, have been monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or CC

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station contamination below the trigger / action level, or have been placed in a secure area until they can be monitored and decontaminated, if necessary.

In accordance with plans / procedures, individuals found to be clean after monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored. These individuals do not require confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles held in a secure area or monitored and decontaminated (if applicable) and do require confirmation that their vehicle is being held in a secure area or free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This sub-element will.not be.demonstrated during this exercise..

Sub-element 6.b - Monitoring and Decontamin.ationof Emermency Worker Equipment Intent This Sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA4-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiologicalmonitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment, inchlsive of vehicles.

Criterion 6.b.l: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, K.5.a, b)

Extent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a fill-scale or finctional exercise, drills, or SA V.

The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

Specific attention must be given to equipment, including any vehicles that were in contact with contamination. The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of personnel, equipment, and vehicles based on trigger/action levels and procedures stated in the ORO plans / procedures. Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the 12-hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles.

Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.

The area to be used for monitoring and decoa4nination must be set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping, and contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface of vehicles. However, the Cý A DDý Qý A -ý- U AD - I A --- - nT Aý .--- 1. -1 11 - A

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles must be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that were in contact with contaminated individuals must also be checked.

Decontamination of emergency workers may be simulated and conducted via interview.

Provisions for separate showering and same-sex monitoring must be demonstrated or explained.

The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs, and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate uncontaminated from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions must also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals where applicable; provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing; and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of emergency workers or facilities.

Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any emergency workers who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

Decontamination capabilities and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be successfully decontaminated may be simulated and conducted by interview. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise "Sfibeleimiiient6 Tern* ivCare "f cuees:

Intent This Sub-element is derivedfriom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-], which requires OROs to have the capability to establish relocation centers in host / support jurisdictions. The American Red Cross normally provides congregate care in support of OROs under existing letters of agreement.

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.h, J.12)

Extent of Play 292 Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion mnay be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, drills, or SA V.

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station The evaluator must conduct a walk-through of the center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are consistent with applicable guidance.

For planming purposes, OROs must plan for a sufficient number of congregate care centers in host/support jurisdictions based on their all-hazard sheltering experience and what is historically relevant for that particular area. In this simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations as they would be in an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this criterion, exercise demonstration expectations must be clearly specified in Extentof-Play Agreements.

Congregate care staff must also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees, service animals, and vehicles have been monitored for contamination, decontaminated as appropriate, and registered before entering the facility.

Individuals arriving at congregate care facilities must have means (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc.) indicating that they, and their service animals and vehicles, where applicable, have been placed in a secured area or monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or contamination below the trigger/action level.

In accordance with plans / procedures, individuals found to be clean after monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored. These individuals do not need confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles held in a secure area until they can be monitored and decontaminated (if applicable) and do need confirmation that their vehicle is being held in a secure area or free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas. This capability may be determined through an interview process.

If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically available at the facility(ies). However, availability of such items must be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

[ S*"li-lem nt6d

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Sbelement 6.d - Traisportationand Treatment of ContaminatedInjuredIndividuals ..

Intent This Sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-O64i#rEMA-REP-J, which requires that OROs have the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities with the capability to provide medical se-vices.

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)

Ex-tent of Play Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplishedduring a biennial exercise, an actual evenit, or drills.

FEMA has determined that these capabilities have been enhanced and consistently demonstrated as adequate; therefore, offsite medical services drills need only be evaluated biennially. FEMA will, at the request of the involved ORO, continue to evaluate the drills on an annual basis. If more than two medical facilities and transportation providers are designated as primary or backup, they are also evaluated biennially.

Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control efforts must not delay urgent medical care for the victim.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities.

An ambulance must be used for response to the victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an extended time, OROs may use any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) to transport the victim to the medical facility. It is allowable for an ambulance to demonstrate up to the point of departure for the medical facility and then have a non-specialized vehicle transport the "victim(s)" to the medical facility. This option is used in areas where removing an ambulance from service to drive a great distance (over an hour) for a drill would not be in the best interests of the community.

Normal communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving medical facility must be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is used for transport to the medical facility, this communication must occur before releasing the ambulance from the drill. This communication would include reporting radiation monitoring results, if available. In addition, the ambulance crew must demonstrate, by interview, knowledge of where the ambulance and crew would be monitored and decontaminated, if required, or whom to contact for such information.

Monitoring of the victim may be performed before transport or en route, or may be deferred to the medical facility. Contaminated injured individuals transported to medical facilities are monitored as soon as possible to assure that everyone (ambulance and medical facility) is aware of the medical and radiological status of the individual(s). However, if an ambulance defers monitoring to the medical facility, then the ambulance crew presumes that the patient(s) is contaminated and demonstrate appropriate contamination controls until the patient(s) is monitored. Before using monitoring instruments, the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All monitoring activities must be completed as they would be in an actual emergency. Appropriate contamination control measures must be demonstrated before and during transport and at the receiving medical facility.

The medical facility must demonstrate the c bility to activate and set up a radiological emergency area for treatment. Medical faciftWs are expected to have at least one trained physician and one trained nurse to perform and supervise treatment of contaminated injured

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (PEP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station individuals. Equipment and supplies must be available for treatment of contaminated injured individuals.

The medical facility must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of the individual, follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and maintain records of all survey measurements and samples taken. All procedures for collection and analysis of samples and decontamination of the individual must be demonstrated or described to the evaluator. Waste water from decontamination operations must be handled according to facility plans / procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

ýThis sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

295

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station This page is intentionally blank.

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