ML14311A624
| ML14311A624 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/2015 |
| From: | Uhle J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Sreenivas V | |
| Shared Package | |
| mL15071A339 | List: |
| References | |
| 2.206, G20110757 | |
| Download: ML14311A624 (21) | |
Text
[7590-01-P]
DD UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Jennifer Uhle, Deputy Director In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339
)
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC )
AND POWER COMPANY ) License Nos. NPF-4 and NPF-7
)
North Anna Power Station, )
Units 1 and 2 )
PROPOSED DIRECTORS DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 I. Introduction By letter dated October 20, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11293A116), Paul Gunter, Kevin Kamps, Thomas Saporito, Paxus Calta, Alex Jack, Scott Price, and John Cruickshank (Petitioners), filed a petition under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 2.206, Requests for Action Under This Subpart. Upon their request, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) added Eleanor Amidon, Erika Kretzmer, Lovell King II, David Levy, Hilary Boyd, G. Paul Blundell, Erica Gray, Edmund Frost, and Richard Ball to the list of Petitioners. The Petitioners requested in the petition that the NRC suspend the operating licenses for the North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (North Anna 1 and 2), until the completion of a set of activities described in the petition.
A letter dated November 2, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11308A027), and an e-mail message dated December 15, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12060A197), supplemented the petition. Two meetings with the NRC Petition Review Board (PRB), held on December 12, 2011
(meeting transcript at ADAMS Accession No. ML12033A025), and February 2, 2012 (meeting transcript at ADAMS Accession No. ML12047A240) further supplemented the petition.
Section II of this Directors Decision (DD) describes the bases for the request.
The PRB met on November 7, 2011, to discuss the petition, and it denied the petitions request for immediate action, because it identified no immediate safety concern to North Anna 1 and 2, and no undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The PRB concluded that the requirement to demonstrate to the Commission that no functional damage has occurred from the August 23, 2011, earthquake to those features necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public already exists in Appendix A, Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, to 10 CFR Part 100, Reactor Site Criteria.
The PRB communicated this decision to the Petitioners in an e-mail dated November 10, 2011, and the Petitioners requested an opportunity to address the PRB before its initial meeting to provide supplemental information for the PRBs consideration.
The Petitioners met with the PRB at a public meeting on December 12, 2011, to discuss the petition. The PRB met on January 9, 2012, to consider if it would accept or reject the petition based on the criteria in the NRC staffs Management Directive (MD) 8.11, Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions (ADAMS Accession No. ML041770328). The PRB made an initial recommendation to partially accept the petition based on the fact that some of the concerns identified in the petition met the criteria in MD 8.11, while other concerns did not. The PRB communicated its initial recommendation to the Petitioners in an e-mail dated January 19, 2012. The Petitioners received additional information about the PRBs recommendation through an e-mail dated January 30, 2012. During the public meeting held on December 12, 2011, the Petitioners requested a second opportunity to address the PRB at a
public meeting. The Petitioners met with the PRB on February 2, 2012, to provide supplemental information in support of the petition request.
The PRB considered the results of these discussions, along with the additional information, in determining its final recommendation to partially accept the petition for review and in establishing the schedule for reviewing the petition. In an acknowledgment letter dated March 16, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12060A090), the NRC informed the Petitioners that it had partially accepted the petition for review under 10 CFR 2.206 and that the petition had been referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for appropriate action. That partial DD addressed the concerns raised in the original petition, along with the additional concerns raised during the public meetings between the Petitioners and the PRB held on December 12, 2011, and February 2, 2012, and in the supplemental letter and e-mail message to the NRC dated November 2, 2011, and December 15, 2011, respectively.
The NRC has treated the transcripts of these meetings between the PRB and the Petitioners as supplements to the petition and made them available in ADAMS for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, MD 20852. Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are accessible electronically through ADAMS in the NRC Library section of the Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who do not have access to ADAMS or who encounter problems accessing the documents located in ADAMS should contact the NRC PDR reference staff by telephone at 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, or by e-mail at PDR.Resource@nrc.gov.
The NRC staff sent a copy of the proposed partial DD to the Petitioners and to the licensee for comment on July 10, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12165A208 and ML12165A209, respectively). The licensee indicated by letter dated July 30, 2012 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML12219A120), that it had no comments. By e-mail dated July 31, 2012 (ADAMS No. ML12261A228), Paul Gunter and Kevin Kamps of Beyond Nuclear, one of the parties to the petition, sent comments on the proposed partial DD. By e-mail dated July 31, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12261A227), Scott Price of the Alliance for Progressive Values (APV), another party to the petition, indicated that the comments submitted by Beyond Nuclear accurately describes APVs concerns as well and restated the comments contained in the letter by Beyond Nuclear.
The NRC staff issued the partial DD on October 19, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12262A156). As detailed in the partial DD, the NRR decided to partially grant the Petitioners' request. Twelve of the concerns were accepted for review by the NRC staff. As detailed in the partial DD, eight of these concerns were closed. The remaining four concerns accepted for review were identified as those that may take longer than the target timeframe for reaching a decision on a petition based on the fact they were undergoing NRC review as part of the agencys response to the Fukushima event in Japan.
The NRC staff completed its activities before restart of North Anna 1 and 2, to ensure that, before resuming operations, the licensee had demonstrated no functional damage from the August 23, 2011, earthquake had occurred to those features at North Anna 1 and 2, necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public, consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, Section V(a)(2).
The four remaining issues accepted for review by the NRC were incorporated into the staffs review as part of the agencys response to the Fukushima event in Japan.
II. Discussion
Background
On August 23, 2011, with North Anna 1 and 2 operating at 100 percent power, the site experienced ground motion from a seismic event (a magnitude 5.8 earthquake reported by the U.S. Geological Survey) in Mineral, Virginia, approximately 11 miles from the site. Shortly after the earthquake, both of the North Anna reactors tripped, and the station lost offsite power. After the earthquake, both units were stabilized, taken to a hot shutdown condition, and offsite power was restored. During the loss of offsite power, the four emergency diesel generators, along with the one alternate alternating current (AC) diesel generator, were activated to provide onsite AC power. Subsequent analysis indicated that the spectral and peak ground accelerations for the operating-basis earthquake (OBE) and design-basis earthquake for North Anna 1 and 2 were exceeded at certain frequencies for a short time.
The August 23, 2011, earthquake resulted in ground accelerations exceeding the OBE of North Anna 1 and 2. The requirements of 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, Section V(a)(2) required North Anna 1 and 2 to be shut down and to remain shut down until the licensee for this plant demonstrated to the NRC that no functional damage occurred to those features necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
Following the earthquake, the NRC dispatched an augmented inspection team (AIT) to North Anna 1 and 2 to better understand the event and the licensee's response. The AIT's findings included the following: (1) operators responded to the event in accordance with established procedures and in a manner that protected public health and safety, (2) the ground motion from the earthquake exceeded the plant's licensed design basis, (3) no significant damage to the plant was identified, (4) safety system functions were maintained, and (5) some equipment issues were experienced. Overall, the AIT concluded that the event did not
adversely impact the health and safety of the public. Safety limits were not approached and there was no measurable release of radioactivity associated with the event. The NRC staff published an inspection report summarizing the AIT findings October 31, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113040031).
To demonstrate that no functional damage occurred as a result of the earthquake and that it was safe to operate North Anna 1 and 2, without undue risk to the health and safety of the public, the licensee performed a number of inspections, tests, and analyses to address the requirements of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100. This demonstration also aligned with the guidance in the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) document NP-6695, Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake. In Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.167, Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shut Down by a Seismic Event, the NRC endorsed EPRl NP-6695, with exceptions, as an acceptable way of performing inspections and tests of nuclear power plant equipment and structures prior to restart of a plant that has been shut down by a seismic event.
A letter from the licensee dated September 17, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11262A151),
described the licensees activities in support of the restart of North Anna 1 and 2, after the earthquake of August 23, 2011. In the letter, the licensee enclosed its Restart Readiness Determination Plan for North Anna 1 and 2. (The licensee later supplemented its plan numerous times in response to NRC requests for additional information issued to support the development of the NRCs independent technical evaluation).
To further ensure compliance with regulatory requirements, the NRC issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) No. 2-2011-001 to the licensee of North Anna 1 and 2, on September 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11273A078), which confirmed the licensee's commitment that the reactors at North Anna 1 and 2 would not be restarted until the NRC staff had completed its review of the licensees demonstration to the Commission that no functional
damage occurred to those features necessary for continued operation of North Anna 1 and 2 without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. In addition, the licensee performed other testing and inspections not included in the NP-6695 guidelines, some of which it performed as a result of questions raised by the NRC staff.
Following completion of the AIT inspection, the NRC sent another team of inspectors, the restart readiness inspection team (RRIT), to assess the licensee's inspection program and readiness for restarting North Anna 1 and 2. The RRIT began its inspection on October 5, 2011. The RRIT followed Inspection Procedure 92702, Followup on Traditional Enforcement Actions Including Violations, Deviations, Confirmatory Action Letters, Confirmatory Orders, and Alternative Dispute Resolution Confirmatory Orders. The following sources provided supplemental guidance to this inspection procedure: EPRI NP-6695; NRC RG 1.166, Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Post-Earthquake Actions; RG 1.167; the AIT inspection report dated October 31, 2011; and input from NRC subject-matter experts.
The objectives of the RRIT included the following: (1) assess the licensee's inspection process to ensure damage attributable to the event would be identified, (2) ensure the underlying causes of the dual unit reactor trip and failure of the 2H diesel generator were properly identified and the appropriate corrective actions were assigned, (3) review how licensee-identified issues were evaluated and dispositioned, (4) observe and review licensee testing of plant systems and selected surveillance test data packages completed since the seismic event, (5) review the tracking and completion of the licensee's committed actions, and (6) support a final determination as to the overall condition of the plant to support restart.
The RRIT completed its onsite inspection activities on October 14, 2011. They observed some earthquake-related damage to nonsafety-related equipment at North Anna 1 and 2
(e.g., limited damage to main generator step-up transformer bushings); however, this damage was considered minor (i.e., it was not functional damage that would preclude safe operation of the facility). The NRC reviewed these issues through established licensee and NRC processes to ensure they were adequately addressed without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
The licensee and the NRC staff discussed the resolution of issues that the RRIT identified at an exit meeting held on November 7, 2011, that was documented in the RRIT's inspection report dated November 30, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113340345). The RRIT concluded that the licensee performed adequate inspections, walkdowns, and testing to ensure that the August 23, 2011, earthquake had not adversely affected safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs). The NRCs independent inspection of plant equipment, observation of selected surveillance testing, and its review of completed test data, calculations, root cause evaluations, and other documents associated with the stations corrective action process and work order programs confirmed the licensees process to properly evaluate the operability and functionality of the plants SSCs. The RRIT reviewed the unresolved items from the AIT and determined that the licensee had completed the corrective actions necessary to support the restart of North Anna 1 and 2.
In addition to the onsite inspection activities, the NRC performed an independent technical evaluation of the information submitted by the licensee to demonstrate that no functional damage occurred at North Anna 1 and 2, as a result of the August 23, 2011, earthquake. The regulatory requirements and guidance used in the NRCs independent technical evaluation of the licensee's restart readiness determination included the following:
(1) Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 100, Section V(a)(2); (2) the North Anna 1 and 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR); (3) Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power
Plant Operator Post earthquake Actions (Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.166); (4) Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shut Down by a Seismic Event (RG 1.167); (5) NRC Generic Letter (GL) 88-20, Supplement 4; Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, along with the licensees response to GL 88-20, Supplement 4; (6) International Atomic Energy Agency Safety Reports Series No. 66, Earthquake Preparedness and Response for Nuclear Power Plants; and (7) NRC Inspection Manual, Part 9900, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety, and the associated NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2005-20, Revision 1, Revision to NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety. In the summary of the independent technical evaluation issued November 11, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11308B406), the NRC staff concluded that the licensee acceptably demonstrated that no functional damage occurred at North Anna 1 and 2 to those features necessary for continued operation and that North Anna 1 and 2 could be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
Although the NRC staff concluded that North Anna 1 and 2 could be safely restarted, the licensee identified several activities (inspections and tests) that would be performed as part of the restart process. The NRC monitored the startup of North Anna 1 and 2 to confirm that the plant would be safely operated (see inspection report at ADAMS Accession No ML113540520).
In addition to these startup activities, the licensee identified several long-term action items consistent with the guidance contained in the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) document NP-6695, Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake and changes to the North Anna 1 and 2 UFSAR. The NRC issued confirmatory action letter (CAL)
No. NRR-2011-002 on November 11, 2011(ADAMS Accession No. ML11311A201) documents
these actions, which are independent of the NRC's conclusion that the licensee demonstrated that no functional damage occurred to North Anna 1 and 2 and that the plant could be restarted safely.
Concerns Raised by the Petitioners and the Response by the NRC The Petitioners raised a total of 16 concerns in the petition dated October 20, 2011, and in supplements to the original petition. Of these 16 concerns, 12 were accepted for review, as documented in the partial DD issued on October 19, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12262A156). The NRC staff noted that this activity may take longer than the standard of 120 days for reaching a decision. The four concerns that were deferred for consideration by that partial DD were to remain open and the NRC staff provided periodic updates on the status of the 2.206 petition.
As the basis for this request, the petitioners state several concerns which are summarized as follows:
(1) Prior to the approval of restart for North Anna 1 and 2, after the earthquake of August 23, 2011, the licensee should be required to obtain a license amendment from the NRC that reanalyzes and reevaluates the plants design basis for earthquakes and for associated retrofits.
(2) Prior to the approval of restart for North Anna 1 and 2, after the earthquake of August 23, 2011, the licensee should be required to ensure that North Anna 1 and 2 are subjected to thorough inspections of the same level and rigor.
(3) The licensee should be required to reanalyze and requalify the adequacy and condition of the Lake Anna dam after the earthquake of August 23, 2011.
(4) The licensee should be required to reanalyze and reevaluate the North Anna Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) due to damage caused by the
earthquake of August 23, 2011, and ensure that no threat is posed to public health and safety by its operation.
(5) The licensee should ensure the reliability and accuracy of the seismic instrumentation at North Anna 1 and 2.
(6) The NRC staff made hasty decisions about the restart of North Anna 1 and 2, and gave priority to economic considerations. The long-term action plan was not even complete before the NRC gave authorization to restart.
(7) Regulatory commitments are an inadequate regulatory tool for ensuring that the critical long-term tasks identified in the NRC staffs confirmatory action letter (CAL) dated November 11, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11311A201), are completed.
(8) The NRC should provide greater access to certain documents concerning North Anna 1 and 2, which are stored at the University of Virginia.
(9) The licensee needs to address the possibility of both boildown and rapid draindown events at the North Anna 1 and 2, spent fuel pool.
(10) The long-term storage of spent fuel in the spent fuel pool at North Anna 1 and 2, and at the North Anna ISFSI poses challenges to the public health and safety.
(11) Hardened on-site storage strategies for spent fuel should be used at North Anna 1 and 2.
(12) Concerns exist about age-related degradation at North Anna 1 and 2.
(13) Concerns exist about the response of North Anna 1 and 2, to a prolonged station blackout.
(14) The current emergency evacuation plans for North Anna 1 and 2, need to be revised to reflect the possible need to evacuate a larger area than that identified in the current emergency planning zone.
(15) Concerns exist about damage to the structural integrity of the spent fuel pool structure at North Anna 1 and 2, as represented on pages 41 and 42 of the NRC staffs technical evaluation for the restart of North Anna 1 and 2, dated November 11, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11308B406).
(16) There are concerns about lack of compliance at North Anna 1 and 2, with a public law requiring storage of potassium iodide in areas surrounding a nuclear reactor.
The NRC partially accepted the petition based on the fact that some of the concerns identified in your petition met the criteria from MD 8.11, while other concerns did not. Concerns numbered as 1, 2, 4-7, 9-11, and 13-15 above were accepted for review while concerns numbered as 3, 8, 12 and 16 above were not accepted for review. Additionally, it should be noted that concerns numbered as 9-11 and 13-15 were undergoing NRC review as part of the lessons-learned from the Fukushima event. The PRB denied the request for immediate action because there was no immediate safety concern at North Anna 1 and 2, and no undue risk to the health and safety of the public. The PRB concluded that the requirement to demonstrate to the Commission that no functional damage has occurred to those features necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public already exists in Appendix A, Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, to 10 CFR Part 100, Reactor Site Criteria.
The NRC staff sent a copy of the proposed partial Directors Decision (DD) for comment on July 10, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12165A208 and ML12165A209). The petitioners responded with comments on July 31, 2012 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12261A228 and ML12258A012), and the licensee responded on July 30, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12219A120), that they did not have comments. The comments by the petitioners and the NRC staffs response to them are included in the partial DD, enclosed. The NRC staff
issued the partial DD on October 19, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12262A156). As detailed in the partial DD, the NRR decided to partially grant the Petitioners' request.
As detailed in the partial DD, eight of these concerns were addressed. The remaining four concerns accepted for review were identified as those that may take longer than the target timeframe for reaching a decision on a petition based on the fact they were undergoing NRC review as part of the agencys response to the Fukushima event in Japan.
The remaining four concerns are summarized as follows:
(1) The licensee needs to address the possibility of both boildown and rapid draindown events at North Anna 1 and 2, spent fuel pool. (Concern Number 7 listed in Partial DD)
(2) The long-term storage of spent fuel in the spent fuel pool at North Anna 1 and 2, and at the North Anna Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations poses challenges to the public health and safety. (Concern Number 8 listed in Partial DD)
(3) Hardened on-site storage strategies for spent fuel should be used at North Anna 1 and 2.
(Concern Number 9 listed in Partial DD).
(4) The current emergency evacuation plans for North Anna 1 and 2 need to be revised to reflect the possible need to evacuate a larger area than that identified in the current emergency planning zone. (Concern Number 11 in listed Partial DD)
After reviewing the NRCs progress in responding to the Fukushima event since acceptance of the petition for review, the NRC staff has determined that these concerns have been adequately addressed. The section below discusses the remaining four petitioners concerns and the NRC response:
(7) The licensee needs to address the possibility of both boildown and rapid draindown events at the North Anna 1 and 2 spent fuel pool.
Concern 7 of this petition is within the scope of Recommendation 7 of the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) report dated July 12, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11186A950). The Commission issued Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, on March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A736), for beyond-design basis external events. Such actions significantly enhance the margins of safety from extreme natural phenomena at commercial operating reactors in the United States.
This Order requires a three-phase approach for mitigating beyond-design-basis external events. The initial phase requires the use of installed equipment and resources to maintain or restore core cooling, containment and spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling capabilities. The transition phase requires providing sufficient, portable, onsite equipment, and consumables to maintain or restore these functions until they can be accomplished with resources brought from off site. The final phase requires obtaining sufficient offsite resources to sustain those functions indefinitely.
Additionally, this Order imposes requirements to maintain or restore SFP cooling capability through the use of self-powered portable pumps via multiple connection points, including connections diverse from the spent fuel deck and ensures makeup independent of AC or direct current power.
Further, the NRC issued an Order EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, on March 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A044), which requires the licensees to install instrumentation for observing the temperature and water level in the SFP, as well as radiation levels in the SFP area. The
availability of these indications would enhance operator actions to mitigate any rapid boiling of water in the SFP and rapid draindown from the SFP.
North Anna 1 and 2 submitted its Overall Integrated Plan (ADAMS Accession No. ML13063A182) dated February 28, 2013, and three six-month updates (ADAMS Accession No. ML13242A012, dated August 23, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML14069A012, dated February 27, 2014, and ADAMS Accession No. ML14251A024, dated August 28, 2014). The licensee confirmed that based on the information available, they will be able to meet the requirements of the Order by following the revised milestone and associated target completion dates by April 2015. The NRC staff performed an interim review of the licensees plan and issued Interim Staff Evaluation and Audit Report (ADAMS Accession No. ML12228A448) dated January 29, 2014, concluding that the licensee has provided sufficient information to determine that there is reasonable assurance that the plan, when properly implemented, will meet NRC requirements. Therefore, Concern 7 is resolved and will be closed.
(8) The long-term storage of spent fuel in the spent fuel pool at North Anna 1 and 2, and at the North Anna ISFSI poses challenges to the public health and safety.
Concern 8 of this petition is within the scope of Recommendation 7 of the NTTF report and addressed by Additional Recommendation 5, Program Plan for Transfer of Spent Fuel to Dry Cask Storage, of SECY-11-0037. The NRC staffs issuance of NUREG-2157, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel - Final Report, Volumes 1 and 2, September 2014, discusses the proposed action (a rulemaking), alternatives to the proposed action, and the NRCs recommendation to the Commission. It also describes the NRCs analysis of the environmental impacts of at-reactor and away-from-reactor continued storage of spent nuclear fuel (spent fuel) over short-term, long-term, and indefinite timeframes, including the NRCs analysis of SFP leaks and fires as well as storage in ISFSIs. The NRC has
looked at the direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of continued storage for three timeframes:
short-term, long-term, and indefinite.
The long-term timeframe considers the environmental impacts of continued storage for an additional 100 years after 60 years of reactor operation including seismic events.
NUREG-2157 found that the long-term storage impacts would be small and that annual public and occupational doses would be maintained below the annual dose limits established by 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72. Licensed facilities would also be required by 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72 to maintain an as-low-as-is-reasonably achievable program, which would further reduce the doses.
The continued storage of spent nuclear fuel final rule became effective on October 20th, 2014 (79 FR 56238, September 19, 2014). The continued storage rule adopts the findings of the generic environmental impact statement regarding the environmental impacts of storing spent fuel at any reactor site after the reactors licensed period of operations. Spent fuel can be stored at reactor sites safely and without significant environmental impact either indefinitely after the end of reactors licensed lifetimes or until it is removed to an off-site repository for final disposal. As a result, those generic impacts do not need to be re-analyzed in the environmental reviews for individual licenses. The overall concern identified by the Petitioners is addressed, and therefore the Petitioners concern regarding long-term storage of spent fuel in the SFP and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) at North Anna 1 and 2, is resolved and will be closed.
(9) Hardened on-site storage strategies for spent fuel should be used at North Anna 1 and 2.
This issue has been addressed by the staffs evaluation of a petition for rulemaking (PRM), PRM 72-6, Petition for Rulemaking Submitted by C-10 Research and Education Foundation, Inc. Specifically, Petitioner Request 11 of PRM 72-6 requests the NRC to:
- 1) require Hardened On-Site Storage (HOSS) at all nuclear power plants as well as away-from-reactor dry cask storage sites; and 2) that all nuclear interim on-site or off-site dry cask storage installations or ISFSIs be fortified against attack. The status of the NRCs consideration of Petitioner Request 11 of PRM 72-6 can be found in the Federal Register Notice dated October 16, 2012 (77 FR 63254).
NRC has conducted considerable analyses regarding the safety of dry storage casks in use in the United States. The agency has consistently found that the robust nature of dry storage systems approved by the NRC under 10 CFR Part 72 assures the protection of public health, safety, and security and therefore has not mandated HOSS. Nevertheless, the NRC is in the process of reviewing a potential rulemaking regarding enhancements to the security of spent fuel dry storage facilities (SRM-SECY-10-0114 and SRM-SECY-07-0148 - ADAMS Accession Nos. ML103210025 and ML073530119, respectively). Because Concern 9 raises issues that are relevant to this rulemaking regarding enhancements to the security of spent fuel dry storage facilities, the NRC will address this item in the context of this proposed rule. Further information regarding NRC action on Petitioner Request 11 of PRM 72-6 is available at http://www.regulations.gov by searching Docket ID NRC-2009-0558.
The NRC has determined that SFPs and dry casks both provide adequate protection of the public health and safety and the environment. Therefore, there is no safety or security reason to mandate earlier transfer of fuel. In a staff requirements memorandum dated May 23, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14143A360), the Commission directed the NRC staff, based on the staffs recommendation, to cease activity on possible regulatory actions that would require the expedited transfer of spent fuel to dry storage casks. As part of that staff requirements memorandum, the Commission also directed the staff to provide an assessment of limited term operational vulnerabilities associated with SFPs. The staff completed that
assessment and provided the results to the Commission on November 26, 2014, in SECY-14-0136 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14297A232). The staff concluded that SFPs are safe and secure, that no additional regulatory action is necessary at this time. Therefore, this concern can be closed.
(11) The current emergency evacuation plans for North Anna 1 and 2 need to be revised to reflect the possible need to evacuate a larger area than that identified in the current emergency planning zone.
In SECY-12-0095, Tier 3 Program Plans and 6-Month Update in Response to Lessons Learned from Japans March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Subsequent Tsunami, dated July 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12208A210), the NRC staff determined that the existing basis for the emergency planning zones (EPZ) size remains valid including for response to multi-unit events. Additionally, the NRC plans a longer-term action that is already being evaluated by existing activities, use insights from the current Level 3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) study as well as information from the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) assessment to inform the evaluation of the potential impacts on the EPZ. If these activities conclude that changes are warranted to the existing emergency preparedness regulations, the NRC will commence rulemaking efforts.
The Commission has found that the basis for the current size of the EPZs is valid for existing reactors and proposed new reactors. Furthermore, the Commission has reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at an existing nuclear power plant. For new reactors under construction and licensed to operate, the Commission has determined that subject to the required conditions and limitations of the full-power license, adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
The NRC recently denied a similar petition for rulemaking (PRM-50-104), on April 9, 2014 (79 FR 19501), requesting that the NRC amend its regulations that govern domestic licensing of production and utilization facilities to expand existing EPZs around nuclear power plants and create a new EPZ. In SECY-13-0135, Denial of Petition for Rulemaking Requesting Amendments Regarding Emergency Planning Zone Size (PRM-50-104), the Commission stated, in part, that Nuclear power plant licensees; Federal, State, and local governments; and offsite response organizations perform comprehensive planning for these zones and routinely test and evaluate these plans through full participation exercises. The NRC concludes that emergency actions could be successfully carried out beyond the 10-mile EPZ for several reasons. The 10-mile emergency planning basis establishes an infrastructure similar to that used by other offsite response organizations, such as police and fire departments. The infrastructure consists of emergency organizations, communications capabilities, training, and equipment that can be used in the event of an accident at the facility. Coordination is enhanced by the practice of having offsite response organizations, which include local, State, and Federal responders, participate in training exercises with the licensee.
Therefore, the NRC concludes that the current size of the EPZs is valid for existing reactors, and that this concern can be closed.
III. Conclusion Based on the above, NRR has decided to close the Petitioners request for the remaining four concerns. As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this DD will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission to review. As provided for by this regulation, this Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of the Decision unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of April 2015.
For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
/RA/
Jennifer Uhle, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- Concurrence via email OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/PM NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/LA NRR/JLD/PSB/BC RII/RPB5/BC*
NAME VSreenivas SFigueroa KWitt for GBowman MKing DATE 11/07/14 11/09/14 12/05/14 11/19/14 OFFICE NSIR/ABC* NMSS/BC NRR/DPR/PGCB/PM NRR/DE/D/PRB Chair NAME CMurray CAraguas MBanic JGitter DATE 11/20/14 11/26/14 12/15/14 12/16/14 OFFICE OGC NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/BC NRR/DORL/D NRR/NRR/D NAME MLemoncelli (DCylkowski for) RPascarelli MEvans WDean DATE 01/14/15 01/21/15 03/09/15 04/17/15