LR-N14-0128, Special Report 311/14-04-00, Pursuant to the Requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.10.3, Action D, for Overpressure Protection System Used to Mitigate an RCS Pressure Transient

Special Report 311/14-04-00, Pursuant to the Requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.10.3, Action D, for Overpressure Protection System Used to Mitigate an RCS Pressure Transient

ML14133A071
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	05/13/2014
From:	Jamila Perry Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LR-N14-0128, TS 3.4.10.3, TS 6.9.2
Download: ML14133A071 (3)

Text

PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038-0236 PSE:G

!LC TS 3.4.10.3 LR-N14-0128 TS 6.9.2 MAY 1 3 2014 U.S. Nuciear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 NRC Docket No. 50-311

Subject:

Special Report 311/14-04-00, pursuant to the Requirements of Salem Unit 2 Technical Specification ( TS) 3.4.10.3, Action d, for the Unit 2 Overpressure Protection System used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient.

This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Salem Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.10.3, Action d. TS 3.4.10.3 Action d states:

"In the event either the POPS or the RCS vents (s) are used to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the POPS or vent (s) on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence."

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On 4/13/14 at 07:57 the 2PR1 Pressurizer (POPS) Relief Valve actuated during solid pressurizer operations. Solid pressurizer operations took place as part of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cool down during the Salem 2R20 refueling outage.

On 4/13/14 operations commenced filling the Unit 2 Pressurizer (PZR) solid in accordance with station procedures. With the PZR solid and PZR pressure steady at about 310 PSIG with the PZR heaters turned off, PZR pressure began rising slowly.

The Unit 2 Reactor Operator (RO) attempted to adjust pressure by raising letdown flow to lower RCS pressure. This is performed by opening the 2CV18, Letdown Pressure Control in manual. The RO; however, depressed the "close" pushbutton. This resulted in lowering letdown flow and a resultant rise in RCS pressure. The RO did not see a pressure decrease and used the closed push button again. A third close signal was given to the 2CV18.

MAY 1 3 2014 Page 2 TS 3. 4. 10. 3 LR-N14-0128 TS 6.9.2 The operator informed the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) that RCS pressure continued to rise. The CRS requested heat up status of the RCS and PZR. The RO informed the CRS that the RCS was cooling down. The CRS ordered the Plant Operator (PO) to lower charging flow to reduce pressure. The CRS asked the operator what was the amount of letdown flow. The RO then noticed that letdown flow was low (35GPM).

The RO then realized that they had closed the letdown valve instead of opening it.

The CRS then d irected the operator to raise letdown flow. At this point POPS actuated via the 2PR1, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve. The highest pressure observed by the operator on the console was 361 PSI G. The maximum pressure recorded by the plant computer was 363. 01 PSI G.

The operator began raising letdown flow. A letdown flow of 100 GPM was established .

RCS pressure was observed to lower and the operator stopped adjusting letdown flow.

RCS pressure was then observed to be 258 PSIG. The time between the initial letdown flow adjustments to POPS actuation was approximately 1.5 minutes.

Plant Engineering performed a technical evaluation in accordance with station procedures to d etermine the "the effect of the POPS or vent (s) on the transient".

Engineering reviewed plant computer data and determined that the maximum pressure reached was 363.01 PSIG which is well below the technical specification limit of 375 PSIG. The evaluation also reviewed past calibration data for POPS channels 1 and 2.

The review d etermined that the trip set points for both of the relief valves was within required tolerances and that the valves would perform correctly to prevent exceeding the technical specification limit.

No equipment was damaged during this event. Review of the data showed no challenge to plant pressure or temperature limits.

Corrective actions included delimiting the qualifications of the RO involved, creation and completion of a remediation plan for the RO, and an Operations Department stand d own reviewing the event and reinforcement of the use of human performance error reduction tools. An apparent cause evaluation is in progress to identify any additional corrective actions that may be warranted.

There are no new commitments in this letter. If there are any questions, please contact Thomas Cachaza at 856-339-5038.

Sincerely,

Salem Site Vice President

MAY 1 3 2014 Page 3 TS 3.4.10.3 LR-N14-0128 TS 6.9.2 C W. Dean, Administrator- Region 1 J. Lamb, Licensing Project Manager- Salem P. Finney, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector- Salem P. Mulligan, Manager, IV, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering T. Cachaza, Salem Commitment Coordinator L. Marabella, Corporate Commitment Coordinator