L-13-143, LER 13-S02-00, for Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Regarding Security Weapon Left Unattended

LER 13-S02-00, for Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Regarding Security Weapon Left Unattended

ML13122A161
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	04/30/2013
From:	Kaminskas V FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-13-143 LER 13-S02-00
Download: ML13122A161 (4)

Text

Perry Nuclear Power Plant PO. Box 97 Road

-M%10 Center FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Company Perry Ohio 44081 Vito A. Kaminskas 440-280-5382 Vice President Fax: 440-280-8029 April 30, 2013 L-13-143 10 CFR 73.71(a)(4)

ATTN: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-440, License No. NPF-58 Security Licensee Event Report Submittal Enclosed is Security Licensee Event Report (SLER) 2013-S02, "Security Weapon Left Unattended." The cause analysis for this event remained under management review at the time of this report. A supplemental report will be submitted by June 28, 2013.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal.

If there are any questions or if additional information is required, please contact Mr. Thomas Veitch, Manager- Regulatory Compliance, at (440) 280-5188.

Sincerely, Vito A Kaminskas

Enclosure:

SLER 2013-S02 cc: NRC Project Manager NRC Resident Inspector NRC Region III Regional Administrator Director, Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident

Response

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 10/31/2013 (10-2010) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Pdvacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by intemet e-mail to infocollects.resource@nrc.gov, arid to the Desk Officer, Office of Information LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and (See reverse for required number of Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may digits/characters for each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 05000-440 1 OF 3

4. TITLE Security Weapon Left Unattended

5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL REV M D Y FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO. MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 03 02 2013. 2013 02 - 00 2013 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000

9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

El 20.2201(b) [] 20.2203(a)(3)(i) [I 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) Uj 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1 ] 20.2201(d) El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) U 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) E] 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

E] 20.2203(a)(1) [U 20.2203(a)(4) U 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) [j 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

U] 20.2203(a)(2)(i) EU 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) U 50.73(a)(2)(iii) [U 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL U 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) U 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) U 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) U 50.73(a)(2)(x)

U 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) U 50.36(c)(2) U 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) [ 73.71(a)(4) 093 EU 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) EU 50.46(a)(3)(ii) EU 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) U 73.71(a)(5)

E] 20.2203(a)(2)(v) [U 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) EU 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) EU OTHER Specify in Abstract below U] 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) U] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) U 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) or inNRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Robert Swartz, Compliance Engineer, Regulatory Compliance (440) 280- 7664 Z YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e.,

On March 2, 2013, at 2137 hours0.0247 days <br />0.594 hours <br />0.00353 weeks <br />8.131285e-4 months <br />, with the plant in Mode 1 (i.e., Power Operation) at 93 percent power, a Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) Site Protection Section (SPS) officer left his weapon unattended in the fire brigade room, which is located in the protected area. The loss of positive control of assigned security equipment resulted in a noncompliance with the SPS weapons control program. The security equipment was discovered by another SPS officer at approximately 2156 hours0.025 days <br />0.599 hours <br />0.00356 weeks <br />8.20358e-4 months <br />. The security equipment was taken to the central alarm station. The security equipment was inspected and no tampering was detected. The security equipment was unattended for approximately 19 minutes.

Preliminary findings of the ongoing evaluation determined the cause to be ambiguous procedure content with respect to positive weapon control that permitted officers and supervision to apply an unintended interpretation that resulted in noncompliance with the procedural requirement. Preliminary corrective actions consist of procedure changes and reinforcement of standards and expectations by SPS supervision. The cause evaluation is not complete. A supplemental report will be submitted after completion and review of the evaluation.

This report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71(a)(4). This report does not contain safeguards or personally identifiable information.

NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10.2010) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

CONTINUATION SHEET

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE SEQUENTIAL REV YEAR NUMBER NO.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant 05000-440 -2 OF 3 2013 -- S02 -- 00 NARRATIVE INTRODUCTION On March 2, 2013, at 2137 hours0.0247 days <br />0.594 hours <br />0.00353 weeks <br />8.131285e-4 months <br />, a Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) Site Protection Section (SPS) officer failed to continuously have assigned security equipment in his possession for approximately 19 minutes. The loss of positive control of the assigned equipment resulted in a noncompliance with the SPS weapons control program.

Notification was made to the NRC Operations Center (i.e., ENS Number 48803) on March 3, at 0049 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br />, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71.

EVENT DESCRIPTION A patrol response officer has additional security equipment necessary to perform their assigned duty.

The additional security equipment consists of a weapon, ammunition bag, and response position badge. Each patrol response position has its own equipment. When SPS officers assume a mobile response position they receive its assigned equipment from the officer being relieved.

On March 2, 2013, prior to 2130 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00352 weeks <br />8.10465e-4 months <br />, officer Aentered the fire brigade room and hung his security equipment on an equipment rack in close proximity to his location. At approximately 2130 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00352 weeks <br />8.10465e-4 months <br />, officer Bentered the fire brigade room and asked officer A if he was his relief. Officer A responded "yes" based on his notes from the SPS shift staffing report. Officer B physically transferred his weapon to officer A. Officer Aaccepted the weapon and also took possession of the associated ammunition bag.

Officers Aand B subsequently exited the fire brigade room, leaving officer A's original weapon and ammunition unattended on the equipment rack.

At approximately 2156 hours0.025 days <br />0.599 hours <br />0.00356 weeks <br />8.20358e-4 months <br />, officer C entered the fire brigade room and discovered and took control of the unattended security equipment. Approximately 19 minutes had elapsed since officers A and B had left the fire brigade room. Officer C transported the security equipment to the central alarm station (CAS) and transferred control to the CAS officer at approximately 2158 hours0.025 days <br />0.599 hours <br />0.00357 weeks <br />8.21119e-4 months <br />. The security equipment was placed in a locker in the CAS. The CAS officer reported the incident to the SPS shift supervisor at approximately 2200 hours0.0255 days <br />0.611 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.371e-4 months <br />.

Officer D reported to the CAS at approximately 2202 hours0.0255 days <br />0.612 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.37861e-4 months <br /> and took possession of officer A's original security equipment. Officer D performed required inspections and no tampering with the weapon or ammunition was detected. Therefore, based on officer C discovering the weapon in the same location as officer A placed it,officer D not finding any evidence of tampering, and satisfactory performance of a field test later performed on, the weapon, itwas concluded that the weapon was not disturbed during the 19 minutes itwas left unattended.

The SPS Manager was notified of the incident at approximately 2258 hours0.0261 days <br />0.627 hours <br />0.00373 weeks <br />8.59169e-4 months <br />. After all available facts were assembled and reviewed for accuracy, the control room shift manager was notified at 2355 hours0.0273 days <br />0.654 hours <br />0.00389 weeks <br />8.960775e-4 months <br />.

The control room shift manager notified the NRC Operations Center of the event on March 3, at 0049 hours5.671296e-4 days <br />0.0136 hours <br />8.101852e-5 weeks <br />1.86445e-5 months <br /> via ENF 48803.

CAUSE OF EVENT Preliminary findings of the ongoing evaluation determined the cause to be ambiguous procedure content with respect to positive weapon control that permitted officers and supervision to apply an unintended interpretation that resulted in noncompliance with the procedural requirement and less than adequate supervisory enforcement of procedurally required actions within the SPS. The SPS cultural environment permitted less than adequate compliance with procedures that provide barriers and are NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)

NRC FORM 366A U S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (10-2010) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

CONTINUATION SHEET

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE SEQUENTIAL REV YEAR NUMBER NO.

Perry Nuclear Power Plant 05000-440 3 OF 3 2013 -- S02 -- 00 NARRATIVE designed to preclude human performance errors, such as an unattended weapon.

EVENT ANALYSIS A mobile patrol response officer has additional security equipment necessary to perform his assigned duty. Each patrol response position has its own equipment. When officers assume a mobile response position they receive its assigned equipment from the officer being relieved.

Response position officers are required by procedure to wear position badges. The use of position badges was established in 2009 as a human performance tool to ensure proper position turnover. Both officers A and B had their position badges stored in their ammunition bags. Had officers A and B been wearing the position badges, itwould have been a visual reminder to both officers, and officer A would have realized he could not possess security equipment for two response positions.

Response position officers are required by procedure to perform a physical and verbal turnover of security equipment associated with the position. A formal transfer of weapon, ammunition bag, and position badges, along with verbal acknowledgement should have taken place. This formal turnover did not occur during this event.

This event was not considered risk significant and did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public. Due to redundant features and a defense-in-depth strategy of the PNPP Protective Strategy, the ability of the security force to respond to an emergency event and interdict and delay an adversarial force would not have been hindered. The security force capacity to defend the plant against the Design Basis Threat would not have been diminished, depleted, or eliminated due to the unattended equipment.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Corrective actions included revising SPS procedures to more clearly delineate equipment turnover requirements and to perform observations and assessments to ensure equipment turnover standards are consistently reinforced and complied with. Response position officers are now required to perform rotation at a fixed post. Response position badges were made more robust and wearing the badge was made mandatory.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS A review of Licensee Event Reports and the corrective action database for the past three years determined that no similar events had occurred.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (Required by Regulatory Guide 5.62)

This event did not have an impact on the operation of the unit.

PNPP utilizes a proprietary site protection force.

No Local, State, or Federal law enforcement agencies were contacted.

There was no press release for this event.

COMMITMENTS There are no regulatory commitments contained in this report. Actions described in this document represent intended or planned actions, are described for the NRC's information, and are not regulatory commitments.

NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)