ML070820173
| ML070820173 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 04/27/2007 |
| From: | Thadani M NRC/NRR/ADRO/DORL/LPLIV |
| To: | Blevins M TXU Power |
| Thadani, M C, NRR/DORL/LP4, 415-1476 | |
| References | |
| TAC MD0932, TAC MD0933 | |
| Download: ML070820173 (17) | |
Text
April 27, 2007 Mr. M. R. Blevins Senior Vice President
& Chief Nuclear Officer TXU Power ATTN: Regulatory Affairs P. O. Box 1002 Glen Rose, TX 76043
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 -
ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE: REVISION TO COMPLETION TIME FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, "AC SOURCES - OPERATING" (TAC NOS. MD0932 and MD0933)
Dear Mr. Blevins:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No.138 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-87 and Amendment No.138 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-89 for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated March 22, 2006, as supplemented by letter dated September 12, 2006.
The amendments revise the TS 3.8.1 entitled, "AC Sources - Operating." Specifically, the proposed change would revise the completion time for TS 3.8.1, Condition F, Required Action F.1 from 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Currently, TS 3.8.1, Condition F requires that an inoperable safety injection (SI) sequencer must be restored to operable status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. If this completion time is not met, Condition G becomes applicable and the plant must be shut down to at least Mode 3 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The proposed change to the completion time for TS 3.8.1, Condition F, Required Action F.1 would provide more time to complete necessary repairs and required post-work testing to restore an inoperable SI sequencer to operable status prior to commencing a plant shutdown to Mode 3.
M. R. Blevins A copy of the NRC staffs related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Mohan C. Thadani, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No.138 to NPF-87
- 2. Amendment No.138 to NPF-89
- 3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: See next page
Pkg ML070820187 (Amdt./License ML070820173, TS Pgs ML070820193)
- See SE input.
OFFICE NRR/LPL4/PM NRR/LPL4/LA NRR/ITSB/BC NRR/EICB/BC OGC NRR/LPL4/BC NAME MThadani LFeizollahi TKobetz AHowe* JRund THiltz DATE 4/4/07 3/26/07 4/18/07 3/7/07 4/11/07 4/19/07 Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station cc:
Senior Resident Inspector Mr. Richard A. Ratliff, Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bureau of Radiation Control P.O. Box 2159 Texas Department of Health Glen Rose, TX 76403-2159 1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756-3189 Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Brian Almon 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Public Utility Commission Arlington, TX 76011 William B. Travis Building P.O. Box 13326 Mr. Fred W. Madden, Director 1701 North Congress Avenue Regulatory Affairs Austin, TX 78701-3326 TXU Generation Company LP P.O. Box 1002 Ms. Susan M. Jablonski Glen Rose, TX 76043 Office of Permitting, Remediation and Registration George L. Edgar, Esq. Texas Commission on Environmental Morgan Lewis Quality 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW MC-122 Washington, DC 20004 P.O. Box 13087 Austin, TX 78711-3087 County Judge P.O. Box 851 Terry Parks, Chief Inspector Glen Rose, TX 76043 Texas Department of Licensing and Regulation Environmental and Natural Boiler Program Resources Policy Director P.O. Box 12157 Office of the Governor Austin, TX 78711 P.O. Box 12428 Austin, TX 78711-3189 December 2004
TXU GENERATION COMPANY LP COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-445 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.138 License No. NPF-87
- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment by TXU Generation Company LP dated application dated March 22, 2006, as supplemented by letter dated September 12, 2006, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-87 as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment.
- 3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days from the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
Thomas G. Hiltz, Chief Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: April 27, 2007
TXU GENERATION COMPANY LP COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-446 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.138 License No. NPF-89
- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A. The application for amendment by TXU Generation Company LP dated application dated March 22, 2006, as supplemented by letter dated September 12, 2006, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-89 as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment.
- 3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days from the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
/RA/
Thomas G. Hiltz, Chief Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: April 27, 2007
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.138 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-87 AND AMENDMENT NO.138 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-89 DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446 Replace the following pages of the Facility Operating Licenses, Nos. NPF-87 and NPF-89, and Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.
Facility Operating License No. NPF-87 REMOVE INSERT Facility Operating License No. NPF-89 REMOVE INSERT Technical Specifications REMOVE INSERT 3.8-5 3.8-5
(3) TXU Generation Company LP, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time, special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage and amounts required for reactor operation, and described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended; (4) TXU Generation Company LP, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use, at any time, any byproduct, source, and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (5) TXU Generation Company LP, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required, any byproduct, source, and special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (6) TXU Generation Company LP, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.
C. This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:
(1) Maximum Power Level TXU Generation Company LP is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3458 megawatts thermal in accordance with the conditions specified herein.
(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No.138 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained l in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license. TXU Generation Company LP shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
Amendment No. 138
(3) TXU Generation Company LP, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time, special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage and amounts required for reactor operation, and described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended; (4) TXU Generation Company LP, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use, at any time, any byproduct, source, and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (5) TXU Generation Company LP, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required, any byproduct, source, and special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (6) TXU Generation Company LP, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.
C. This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:
(1) Maximum Power Level TXU Generation Company LP is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3458 megawatts thermal in accordance with the conditions specified herein.
(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 138 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained l in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this license. TXU Generation Company LP shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
(3) Antitrust Conditions DELETED Amendment No. 138
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 138 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-87 AND AMENDMENT NO. 138 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-89 TXU GENERATION COMPANY LP COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By application dated March 22, 2006 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML060900446), as supplemented by letter dated September 12, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML062640236), TXU Generation Company LP (the licensee) proposed a license amendment to change Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TSs). The proposed change would revise the completion time for restoring an inoperable Safety Injection (SI) sequencer from the current 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
An automatic load sequencer is used to step load a safety-related power source bus to avoid a power source trip from the very high starting current that results if all electrical equipment is simultaneously energized. For each CPSES Unit, two independent and redundant Solid-State Safeguards Sequencer (SSSS) cabinets are provided for sequential loading of the safeguard buses, one for Train A and one for Train B. Each cabinet houses two sequencers, one for the SI mode and one for loss of offsite power (LOOP)-only mode sequencing. Each sequencer cabinet will provide the logic for loading the train-related emergency bus in a preestablished time sequence.
The sequencer is a group of electro-mechanical relays operated by solid-state logic circuits and timers. The separate and independent timer circuits are initiated for each loading step by solid-state logic circuits. The SSSS accepts and combines SI signals from the Solid-State Protection System (SSPS) output relay cabinet and undervoltage input signals from the train-related safeguards bus, and provides output control signals to the respective train safety-related equipment required for the safe shutdown of the plant.
The SI signal is either manually generated or automatically developed by the SSPS. After receiving the SI signal, the SI sequencer starts its step timers and begins to sequence major equipment onto the power bus. Most of the major pumps must receive a safety injection system (SIS) start signal and a SSPS slave relay start signal to start the pump. The SSPS slave relay signal will already be present, and a coincident SIS sequencer signal will start the pump.
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
The regulatory requirements that the staff applied in its review of this application include:
General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, Electric power systems, of Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, to Title 10, Part 50, of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50) requires, in part, that nuclear power plants have onsite and offsite electric power systems to permit the functioning of structures, systems, and components that are important to safety. The onsite system is required to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety function, assuming a single failure.
The offsite power system is required to be supplied by two physically independent circuits that are designed and located so as to minimize, to the extent practical, the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. In addition, this criterion requires provisions to minimize the likelihood of losing electric power from the remaining electric power supplies as a result of loss of power from the unit, the offsite transmission network, or the onsite power supplies.
GDC 18, Inspection and testing of electric power systems, requires that electric power systems that are important to safety must be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing to assess the continuity of the systems and the conditions of their components.
Section 50.36 of 10 CFR, Technical specifications, requires a licensees TSs to have surveillance requirements (SRs) relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that necessary quality of systems and components are maintained, that the facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
Currently, TS 3.8.1, Condition F requires an inoperable SI sequencer be restored to operable status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. If this completion time is not met, Condition G becomes applicable and the plant must be shutdown to at least Mode 3 within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The licensee has proposed to increase the completion time for TS 3.8.1, Condition F, Required Action F.1 from the currently allowed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
TS 3.3.2, ESFAS [Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System] Instrumentation, Condition C provides the action completion time for an inoperable train of automatic actuation logic and actuation relays used to generate the SI signal in SSPS that initiates SI sequencer operation.
In comparison to the restoration time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for an inoperable SI sequencer in TS 3.8.1, the restoration time specified in TS 3.3.2 for restoring the inoperable train of SI automatic
actuation logic and actuation relays is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The licensee stated that, since all signals used to actuate the SI sequencer and all of the systems, equipment, and signals actuated by the SI sequencer are allowed to be inoperable for no less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the allowed inoperability time for the SIS sequencer can also be extended to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The proposed change from the current 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, will provide consistency in the completion times for all components in the system and, thus, allow more time to complete necessary repairs and required post-work testing to restore an inoperable SI sequencer to operable status prior to commencing a plant shutdown to Mode 3. An inoperable SI sequencer presents no greater risk and has the same impact upon accident mitigation capability as an inoperable train of SI automatic actuation logic and actuation relays, a condition that was evaluated and previously approved by the staff for the potential impact on plant risk. It is, therefore, reasonable to allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to restore an inoperable SI sequencer to operable status.
Based on the above, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff concludes that since the restoration time for an inoperable train of SI automatic actuation logic and actuation relays is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, restricting the inoperability time of the SIS sequencer to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> will not provide any safety benefit because the sequencer needs the initiation signal from the SSPS to provide the control signal to safety-related equipment to initiate safe shutdown of the plant.
Accordingly, the NRC staff finds the licensee's justification for extending restoration time of an inoperable SI sequencer, from the current 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to the proposed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, acceptable.
4.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION
DETERMINATION The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, and published for public comments, such finding in Federal Register on March 28, 2007 (72 FR 14623). Because these amendments are being issued after the 30-day comment period and before the expiration of the 60-day period providing opportunity to request a hearing, a final no significant hazards consideration determination is included in this safety evaluation.
As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee, in its submission, provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below.
- 1. Do[es] the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change to the Completion Time for TS 3.3.2, Condition F does not change the overall protection system performance which will remain within the bounds of the previously performed accident analyses since no hardware changes are proposed. The same reactor trip system (RTS) and engineered safety feature actuation system (ESFAS) instrumentation will continue to be used. The protection systems will continue to function in a manner consistent with the plant design basis. This change to the Technical Specifications does not result in a condition where the design, material, and construction standards that were applicable prior to the change are altered.
The proposed change will not modify any system interface. The proposed change will not affect the probability of any event initiators. There will be no degradation in the performance of or an increase in the number of challenges imposed on safety-related equipment assumed to function during an accident situation. There will be no change to normal plant operating parameters or accident mitigation performance. The proposed change will not alter any assumptions or change any mitigation actions in the radiological consequence evaluations in the [Final Safety Analysis Report] FSAR.
The proposed change to the Completion Time does not increase the probability of any accident previously evaluated. The proposed change does not change the response of the plant to any accidents and has no impact on the reliability of the RTS and ESFAS signals. The RTS and ESFAS will remain highly reliable and the proposed change does not result in an increase in the risk of plant operation.
The proposed change does not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is operated and maintained. The proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) from performing their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change does not affect the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed change is consistent with safety analysis assumptions and resultant consequences.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2. Do[es] the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response: No.
The proposed change involves no hardware changes nor are there any changes in the method by which any safety-related plant system performs its safety function. The proposed change will not affect the normal method of plant operation. No performance requirements will be affected or eliminated. The proposed change will not result in physical alteration to any plant system nor will there be any change in the method by which any safety-related plant system performs its safety function.
There will be no setpoint changes or changes to accident analysis assumptions.
No new accident scenarios, transient precursors, failure mechanisms, or limiting single failures are introduced as a result of this change. There will be no adverse effect or challenges imposed on any safety-related system as a result of these changes.
Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
- 3. Do[es] the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
Response: No.
The proposed change does not affect the acceptance criteria for any analyzed event nor is there a change to any Safety Analysis Limit (SAL). There will be no effect on the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for operation are determined nor will there be any effect on those plant systems necessary to assure the accomplishment of protection functions. There will be no impact on the overpower limit, [departure from nucleate boiling ratio] DNBR limits, FQ, FAH, LOCA
[loss-of-coolant accident] PCT [peak cladding temperature], peak local power density, or any other margin of safety. The radiological dose consequence acceptance criteria listed in the Standard Review Plan will continue to be met.
Redundant RTS and ESFAS trains are maintained and diversity with regard to the signals that provide reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation is also maintained. All signals credited as primary or secondary, and all operator actions credited in the accident analyses will remain the same. The proposed changes will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis.
Implementation of the proposed changes is expected to result in an overall improvement in safety since longer repair times associated with increased Completion Times will lead to higher quality repairs and improved reliability. The increased Completion Time for an inoperable Safety Injection Sequencer will provide additional time to complete test and maintenance activities while at power, potentially reducing the number of forced outages related to compliance with TS 3.3.2, Condition G which requires plant shutdown to Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Therefore the proposed change does not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.
The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis against the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c).
Based on this review, the NRC staff has determined that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff has determined that issuance of these amendments involves no significant hazards consideration.
5.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Texas State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.
6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The NRC has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards
consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published March 28, 2007 (72 FR 14623). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
7.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors: Iqbal Ahmed Om Chopra Date: April 27, 2007