L-PI-04-053, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP)

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP)

ML041210076
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	04/21/2004
From:	Solymossy J Nuclear Management Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
L-PI-04-053
Download: ML041210076 (97)

Text

NMC Committed to Nuclear ExcIllene Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Operated by Nuclear Management Company, LLC L-PI-04-053 10CFR50.4 APR 2 1200 U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Dockets 50-282 and 50-306 License Nos. DPR-42 and DPR-60 Prairie Island Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP)

Furnished with this letter are the recent changes to the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant EPIP F3 and F8. Enclosure 1 provides a brief summary of the changes associated with these revisions. These changes have been reviewed and do not decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan and these procedures.

This submittal includes the following documents:

INDEX:

EPIP Table of Contents Emergency Operations Facility(EOF) EPIP Table of Contents REVISIONS F3-2 Classifications of Emergencies Rev. 35 F8-6 Radiological Monitoring & Control at the EOF Rev. 7 ADDITIONS:

None DELETIONS:

None TEMPORARY CHANGE DELETIONS:

None INSTRUCTIONS:

Instructions for updating the manual are included.

1717 Wakonade Drive East

• Welch, Minnesota 55089-9642 Telephone: 651.388.1121

Document Control Desk Page 2 Summary of Commitments This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

As per 10 CFR 50.4, two copies have also been provided to the NRC Region liI Office and one to the NRC Resident Inspector. If you have any questions, please contact Steve Skoyen at 651-388-1121 Extension 4156.

'Jo h M. Solymq sy Vice Preside Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant CC Steve Orth, USNRC, Region III (2 copies)

NRC Resident Inspector- Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (w/o attachment)

Attachments: Enclosure 1- Summary of Changes EPIP F3-2 Rev. 35 EPIP F8-6 Rev. 7

Enclosure 1 Summary of Changes (1 page to follow)

Summary of F3-2 EAL Changes EAL Reference Description of differences between F3-2 Rev. 34 Number and F3-2 Rev. 35 Changes:

2E 1. Plant Indications: Corrected the spelling of radiation.

Changes:

5C 1. Plant Indications: Changed the phrase "inadequate subcooling" to "inadequate subcooling margin".

Changes:

8D 1. Corrected the definition of TEDE by adding the word "Effective".

Changes:

8G 1. Added "Unexpected radiation level >1000mR/hr" as an OR indication.

2. Removed the words "in the Auxiliary Building" from "Widespread unexpected contamination" indication.

3. Changed the contamination limits from ">1,000,000 dpm/cm beta-gamma or

>50,000 dpm/cm alpha activity" to ">10,000 dpm/cm beta-gamma or

>500 dpm/cm 2 alpha activity".

Summary of F8-6 Changes (Rev. 6 to Rev.7)

• Section 4.2.7- Change in grammar

• Figure 1- Access Control for Radioactive Materials at the EOF The locations of the Step-Off-Pads were slightly changed in this figure so they would be located outside of the frisker location.

Mfst Num: 2004 - 0229 Date  : 03/26/04 FROM  : Bruce Loesch/Mary Gadient Loc  : Prairie Island TO  : UNDERWOOD, BETTY J Copy Num: 515 Holder : US NRC DOC CONTROL DESK SUBJECT : Revisions to CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS Procedure 4 Rev Title Revisions:

F8-6 7 RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING & CONTROL AT THE UPDATING INSTRUCTIONS Place this material in your Prairie Island Controlled Manual or File. Remove revised or cancelled material and recycle it. Sign and date this letter in the space provided below within ten working days and return to Bruce Loesch or Mary Gadient, Prairie Island Nuclear Plant, 1717 Wakonade Drive E.,

Welch, MN 55089.

Contact Bruce Loesch (ext 4664) or Mary Gadient (ext 4478) if you have any questions.

Received the material stated above and complied with the updating instructions Date

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR

Title:

GENERATING PLANT EOF Emerg Plan Implementing Procedures TOC l l Effective Date : 03/26/04 NOTE: This set may contain a partial distribution l of this Document Type. Please refer to the CHAMPS Approved By: I t' -Z fi lModule for specific Copy Holder Contents.l BA Designeel Document # Title Rev F8-1 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ORGANIZATION 7 F8-2 EOF RESPONSIBILITIES DURING AN ALERT, SITE AREA OR 8 GENERAL EMERGENCY F8-3 ACTIVATION & OPERATION OF THE EOF 6 F8-4 EMERGENCY SUPPORT & LOGISTICS 6 F8-5 OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSMENT & PROTECTIVE ACTION 8 RECOMMENDATIONS F8-6 RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING & CONTROL AT THE EOF 7 F8-8 OFFSITE AGENCY LIAISON ACTIVITIES 4 F8-9 EVENT TERMINATION OR TRANSITION TO RECOVERY 7 F8-10 RECORD KEEPING IN THE EOF 2 F8-11 TRANSFER TO THE BACKUP EOF 5 F8-12 EMERGENCY REMP 3 Page 1 of 1

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE NUMBER:

~F:j aAd-RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING F8-6 AND CONTROL AT THE EOF IREV: 7

• Procedure segments may be performed from memory.

• Use the procedure to verify segments are complete.

• Mark off steps within segment before continuing.

• Procedure should be available at the work location.

O.C. REVIEW DATE: OWNER: EFFECTIVE DATE Os 3 z L o e s cM. Werner 3-2 6-ol Page 1 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to provide guidance for the radiological protection of personnel responding to the EOF. Protective guidelines for EOF personnel and control of radioactive materials are discussed in this procedure.

2.0 APPLICABILITY This procedure is applicable to all EOF personnel responding in support of a declared emergency at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.

3.0 PRECAUTIONS 3.1 The dose guidelines for EOF personnel are as per F3-12, and no one may exceed 5000 mRem TEDE per year, per 10CFR20.

3.2 Monitoring of the EOF for direct radiation, contamination levels, airborne iodine and airborne particulate radioactivity SHALL be performed to ensure the habitability of the EOF.

3.3 Protective actions for individuals located in the EOF SHALL be taken at the prescribed levels of direct radiation, contamination, or airborne radioactivity.

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 The Emergency Manager has the overall responsibility for the radiological protection of the EOF personnel.

4.2 The RPSS has the following responsibilities:

4.2.1 Verify and supervise the records of exposure control.

4.2.2 Determine when individual exposure controls should be implemented.

Page 2 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 4.2.3 Assign and direct qualified personnel for dose assessment.

4.2.4 Provide the Security Force with a list of individuals who may leave the EOF with dosimetry (field survey teams, etc.).

4.2.5 Control radioactive materials and limit contamination at the EOF.

4.2.6 Initiate radiological surveys of the EOF to determine habitability and control contamination areas. Provide routine status reports of the EOF atmosphere to the EM.

4.2.7 Remind personnel on a periodic basis, as required by measured dose rates, to read their dosimeters.

4.2.8 Inform the EM when the EOF exposure levels are above administrative guidelines.

4.3 The EOF Coordinator has the responsibility to ensure personnel have been assigned to maintain EOF Entry Log, issue and collect dosimetry, and assist in establishing a radiological control point for access to the EOF as necessary.

4.4 The EOF Entrance Security Watchperson has the following responsibilities:

4.4.1 Initiate the EOF Entry Log in accordance with F8-2.

4.4.2 Issue and collect dosimetry, and record dosimeter readings upon issue and collection.

4.4.3 Notify the Security Coordinator in the event of lost, damaged, or off-scale dosimeter readings.

Page 3 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 4.5 The Radiation Protection Specialists (RPS) have the following responsibilities:

4.5.1 Establish radioactive material control measures as specified in this procedure.

4.5.2 Control access and monitor frisking of potentially contaminated personnel to EOF as appropriate.

4.5.3 Direct personnel decontamination measures in accordance with F3-19, Personnel and Equipment Monitoring and Decontamination.

4.5.4 Control receipt and transport of samples within the EOF.

4.5.5 Complete surveys within the EOF as requested by the RPSS.

4.5.6 Direct EOF facility decontamination activities as required.

5.0 DISCUSSION EOF personnel should be issued a TLD and a self-reading dosimeter upon entering the EOF. When permanently leaving the EOF, or upon completion of assigned duties, personnel should surrender the TLD and self-reading dosimeter to the EOF Entrance Security Watchperson.

At the discretion of the EOF Coordinator, personnel may be allowed to exit the EOF other than through a potentially contaminated access control area. Prior to exiting however, all personnel must follow security procedures for leaving the EOF.

During special emergency conditions, normal exposure practices may have to be waived to protect equipment and/or life.

6.0 PREREQUISITES Prairie Island Staff has declared an Emergency Classification of an Alert, Site Area, or General Emergency.

Page 4 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE NUMBER:

RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING F8-6

. ~ AND CONTROL AT THE EOF REV: 7 7.0 PROCEDURE 7.1 Radiological Access Control into the EOF for potentially contaminated personnel or radioactive materials SHALL be initiated when any of the following conditions have occurred:

7.1.1 Emergency response personnel which may have been exposed to a plume or radioactive materials require access to the EOF.

7.1.2 A release of radioactive materials has occurred and samples from the Offsite Survey Teams are being returned to the EOF for analysis.

7.1.3 Radioactive samples have been sent from the plant to the EOF for analysis.

7.1.4 Contaminated personnel have been transported to the EOF for decontamination.

7.2 Establish Radiological Access Control for personnel as follows:

7.2.1 The EOF Coordinator should direct set up of radiological access control at the rear EOF access control area in accordance with Figure 1, Access Control for Radioactive Materials at the EOF.

7.2.2 Security should ensure that the airlock door and all other doors to the EOF are CLOSED.

7.2.3 The RPS should establish a barrier rope for contamination control and radiological screening (see Figure 1). This will establish an EOF radiological access holding area.

7.2.4 The RPS should set up a Step-off-Pad and friskers (see Figure 1).

Page 5 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE T:~ NUMBER:

RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING F8-6 AND CONTROL AT THE EOF REV: 7 7.2.5 Security should direct personnel entering the EOF to pass through the control point, using the frisker to detect possible contamination. Ensure RPS is available when potentially contaminated personnel enter the EOF.

7.2.6 Personnel which have been screened and are not contaminated should be allowed access to the EOF. Personnel not involved with EOF activities (e.g. evacuated plant personnel) should be instructed to assemble in the unoccupied classrooms until they are released from site.

7.2.7 Contaminated personnel should be instructed to assemble in the EOF radiological access holding area.

7.2.8 The RPS should direct personnel decontamination in accordance with F3-19, Personnel and Equipment Monitoring and Decontamination.

The decontamination shower drains to a 1000 gallon liquid waste holding tank that is equipped with a high level alarm.

The alarm indicator is located on the South wall of the decon NOTE: shower. The RPS should notify the RPSS when the high level alarm comes in. There is a 4" withdrawal pipe outside the receiving area door for pumping out the tank.

7.2.9 After decontamination, personnel should be checked at the control point and allowed access to the EOF.

7.3 Establish Radiological Access Control for Radioactive Materials as follows:

7.3.1 The RPS should establish barriers and Step-off-Pads as specified in Figure 1, Access Control for Radioactive Materials at the EOF.

7.3.2 Security should ensure all samples are held in the access holding area until checked and released by the RPS.

Page 6 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE i- - X .. ^ z~i -NUMBER:

RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING F8-6 AND CONTROL AT THE EOF j REV: 7~

7.3.3 The RPS assigned to the EOF Count Room should ensure that, prior to transporting samples to the EOF Count Room, all samples have dose rates checked, are bagged or rebagged as necessary, before passing through clean area.

7.3.4 If necessary, samples should be rebagged and stored in the shielded sample storage area.

7.4 Specific Radiation Exposure Controls The RPSS should implement specific exposure controls if personnel exposures in the range of 10 mRem are expected at the EOF. The following actions are then necessary.

7.4.1 An RPS should have temporary personnel complete NRC-4 and NRC-5 forms.

7.4.2 If the site computer is available, the individuals' personal and exposure data should be added to the computer exposure system as per the Radiation Protection Manual.

7.4.3 If the computer is not available, the individuals' data should be added to the Emergency Weekly Exposure Record, PINGP 755.

7.4.4 Obtain current administrative dose guidelines and yearly doses from plant records for personnel who have a current plant TLD issued.

7.4.5 At the end of each shift, the RPS should record the exposures from the EOF Entry Log, and enter in the computer as per the Radiation Protection Manual; or if the computer is not available, add the exposure to the Emergency Weekly Exposure Record, PINGP 755.

7.4.6 The RPSS should track exposures received, and limit each individual's exposure in accordance with 10CFR20 NRC limits in RPIP-1 110, Administrative Dose Controls, unless the Emergency Manager authorizes higher exposure.

Page 7 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE 7.5 Protective Guidelines for EOF Personnel 7.5.1 EPA 400 Guidelines for Recommended Protective Action to limit total exposure to personnel are:

Projected TEDE Dose Limit (mrem) Activity Condition 5,000 All Lower dose not practical 10,000 Protecting valuable Lower dose not practical property 25,000 Life saving or protection Lower dose not practical of large populations

>25,000 Life saving or protection Only on a voluntary basis of large populations to persons fully aware of the risks involved.

1. Based on EPA 400-R-92-001, May 1992

2. TEDE = Total Effective Dose Equivalent

3. These are doses to nonpregnant adults from external exposure and intake during an emergency.

4. Workers should limit dose to the lens of the eye to 3 times the listed values and doses to extremities and any other organ to 10 times the doses listed above.

Page 8 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE NUMBER:

RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING F8-6 AND CONTROL AT THE EOF REV: 7 7.5.2 The following guidance may be used, at the discretion of the Emergency Manager, for determining protective actions at the EOF:

External (DDE) Exposure Protective Action Rates (mRem/hr) Comments greater than 1 Evacuate non-EOF areas of the Training Building and personnel who are not part of the emergency response organization.

greater than 15 Consider evacuation of declared pregnant women and non-essential personnel greater than 100 Consider activation of the Backup EOF. CAUTION: Consider only if Execute exposure authorization for those levels are expected to be personnel approaching administrative sustained for a significant limits and deemed by the Emergency period of time and would Manager as vital to the emergency cause excessive exposure to response effort. Evacuate all others. emergency personnel or levels are such that they seriously reduce the effectiveness of the emergency organization.

greater than 1000 Evacuation to the Backup EOF is recommended.

DDE = Deep Dose Equivalent - external dose rate in mrem/hr.

Smearable Surface Contamination Levels Protective Action Comments (cpm/100 cm2) greater than 100 Evacuate non-EOF areas of the Training Building and personnel who are not part of the emergency response organization.

Control eating, drinking and smoking.

greater than 500 Consider use of protective clothing, Operation may continue as evacuate non-essential personnel. long as restrictions on personnel movements to limit the spread of contamination do not become limiting to operations.

greater than 5000 Ensure use of protective clothing.

Page 9 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE NUMBER:

RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING F8-6 AND CONTROL AT THE EOF REV: 7 Airborne Radioactive Levels Protective Action Comments CAM - Particulate

1. 1X10-9 uCi/cc No protective action necessary.

2. >1X109 uCi/cc, Consider evacuation of but < 1X1 0-6 uCi/cc unnecessary personnel and establish a program of regular portable air samples and counting to determine the DAC.

a. If portable air sample results > .3 DAC Evacuate non-EOF areas of the This measure is to ensure Training Building and personnel that classrooms and other who are not part of the non-EOF areas do not emergency response contain personnel being organization. trained, i.e., badging classes, visitors, consultants, etc.

b. If portable air sample results > 1 DAC Consider evacuation of Prolonged exposure to unnecessary personnel and limit excessive airborne levels exposures to less than 40 without protection that would DAC-hours per week, if possible. lead to a exposure of 5000 mrem Committed Effected Dose Equivalent in one year should be avoided.

c. If portable air sample results > 10 DAC Evacuate all personnel not CAUTION: Consider deemed by the Emergency evacuation only if levels are Manager as vital to the expected to be sustained for emergency response effort. a significant period of time Consider relocation of the EOF and would cause excessive to the Backup EOF. exposure to emergency personnel or levels are such that they seriously reduce the effectiveness of the emergency organization.

3. > 1X10o 6 uCi/cc Evacuation to the Backup EOF is recommended.

Page 10 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE NUMBER:

a: RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING F8-6 AND CONTROL AT THE EOF Airborne Radioactive Levels Protective Action Comments CAM - Iodine

1. If CAM alarms for iodine (2 X 10-9 uCi/cc)

Establish a program of regular Prolonged exposure to portable air samples and excessive airborne levels counting to determine the DAC. without protection that would lead to an exposure of 5000 mrem Committed Effective Dose Equivalent in one year should be avoided.

2. If portable air sample results > 1 DAC Consider evacuation of unnecessary personnel and limit exposures to less than 40 DAC-hrs per week, if possible.

3. If portable air sample results > 10 DAC CAUTION: Consider evacuation only if levels are expected to be sustained for a significant period of time and would cause excessive Consider evacuation to the exposure to emergency Backup EOF. personnel or levels are such that they seriously reduce the effectiveness of the emergency organization.

The RPSS should recommend the use of potassium iodide pills (thyroid blocking agent) if the projected thyroid exposure approaches 25 REM. See F3-18, Thyroid Iodine Blocking Agent (Potassium Iodide), for determining projected thyroid exposures.

7.5.3 Generally, operational limits are flexible considering the "stay time" in the radiation area. A Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) in excess of 5000 mRem in one year should be avoided. Consideration to the exposure of key individuals should be used to determine the advisability of long term operation of the EOF in any area greater than 100 mR/hr.

Page 11 of 13

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE NUMBER:

F- C F8 RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND CONTROL AT THE EOF tS; REV:

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F8-6

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Radiation levels are probably from the plume. Consideration should be given to a potential wind shift and/or decrease of rad levels prior to ordering an evacuation.

The time to reach yearly limit at various radiation levels is:

Radiation Level Number of 12 Hour Shifts 5 mR/hr 80 10 mR/hr 40 25 mR/hr 16 50 mR/hr 8 100 mR/hr 4 7.5.4 When the decision to evacuate the EOF is made, refer to F8-1 1, Transfer to the Backup EOF, for specific guidance.

Page 12 of 13

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Mfst Num: 2004 - 0271 Date  : 04/09/04 FROM :Bruce Loesch/Mary Gadient Loc  : Prairie Island FTO :SCHOEN, BETH A Copy Num: 515 Holder : US NRC DOC CONTROL DESK SUBJECT : Revisions to CONTROLLED DOCUMENTS Procedure # Rev Title Revisions:

F3-2 35 CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES UPDATING INSTRUCTIONS Place this material in your Prairie Island Controlled Manual or File. Remove revised or cancelled material and recycle it. Sign and date this letter in the space provided below within ten working days and return to Bruce Loesch or Mary Gadient, Prairie Island Nuclear Plant, 1717 Wakonade Drive E.,

Welch, MN 55089.

Contact Bruce Loesch (ext 4664) or Mary Gadient (ext 4478) if you have any questions.

Received the material stated above and complied with the updating instructions Date

l PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR

Title:

I GENERATING PLANT Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures TOC lEffective l Date : 04/09/04 NOTE: This set may contain a partial distribution of this Document Type. Please refer to the CHAMPS Approved By: < Module for specific Copy Holder Contents.

l _ _ __ BA Designee l Document # Title Rev F3-1 ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION 21 F3-2 CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES 35 F3-3 RESPONSIBILITIES DURING A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL 18 EVENT F3-4 RESPONSIBILITIES DURING AN ALERT, SITE AREA, 29 OR GENERAL EMERGENCY F3-5 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 22 F3-5.1 SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR DUTIES 8 F3-5.2 RESPONSE TO FALSE SIREN ACTIVATION 10 F3-5.3 RESPONSE TO RAILROAD GRADE CROSSING BLOCKAGE 8 F3-6 ACTIVATION & OPERATION OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 18 F3-7 ACTIVATION & OPERATION OF OPERATIONAL SUPPORT 17 CENTER (OSC)

F3-8 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS 20 F3-8.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR 13 THE ON SHIFT EMERGENCY DIRECTOR /SHIFT MANAGER F3-9 EMERGENCY EVACUATION 19 F3-10 PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY 20 F3-11 SEARCH & RESCUE 8 F3-12 EMERGENCY EXPOSURE CONTROL 15 F3-13 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION 15 F3-13.3 MANUAL DOSE CALCULATIONS 11 F3-13.4 MIDAS METEOROLOGICAL DATA DISPLAY 7 F3-13.5 ALTERNATE METEOROLOGICAL DATA 5 Page 1 of 3

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR Title : Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures TOC GENERATING PLANT Effective Date : 04/09/04 Document # Title Rev F3-13.6 WEATHER FORECASTING INFORMATION 12 F3-14.1 ONSITE RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING 11 F3-14.2 OPERATIONS EMERGENCY SURVEYS 10 F3-15 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION SURVEY TEAMS 24 DURING A RADIOACTIVE AIRBORNE RELEASE F3-16 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE RADIATION SURVEY TEAMS 17 DURING A RADIOACTIVE LIQUID RELEASE F3-17 CORE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 11 F3-17.1 CORE DAMAGE DETERMINATION 0 F3-17.2 LONG TERM CORE COOLING 0 F3-18 THYROID IODINE BLOCKING AGENT (POTASSIUM IODIDE) 10 F3-19 PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT MONITORING & DECONTAMINATION 8 F3-20 DETERMINATION OF RADIOACTIVE RELEASE 18 CONCENTRATIONS F3-20.1 DETERMINATION OF STEAM LINE DOSE RATES 9 F3-20.2 DETERMINATION OF SHIELD BUILDING VENT STACK 9 DOSE RATES F3-21 ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECONDARY ACCESS CONTROL POINT 10 F3-22 PRAIRIE ISLAND RADIATION PROTECTION GROUP RESPONSE 17 TO A MONTICELLO EMERGENCY F3-23 EMERGENCY SAMPLING 19 F3-23.1 EMERGENCY HOTCELL PROCEDURE 13 F3-24 RECORD KEEPING DURING AN EMERGENCY 7 F3-25 REENTRY 8 F3-26.1 OPERATION OF THE ERCS DISPLAY 7 F3-26.2 RADIATION MONITOR DATA ON ERCS 7 F3-26.3 ERDS - NRC DATA LINK 1 Page 2 of 3

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR Title : Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures TOC GENERATING PLANT Effective Date : 04/09/04 Document # Title Rev F3-29 EMERGENCY SECURITY PROCEDURES 18 F3-30 TRANSITION TO RECOVERY 6 F3-31 RESPONSE TO SECURITY RELATED THREATS 8 F3-32 REVIEW OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DURING OR AFTER 2 NATURAL DISASTER EVENTS Page 3 of 3

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REFERENCE USE

. Procedure segments may be performed from memory.

. Use the procedure to verify segments are complete.

. Mark off steps within segment before continuing.

. Procedure should be available at the work location.

l O.C. REVIEW DATE: OWNER: EFFECTIVE DATE

( 4 6Z?

-2,, S - M. Werner lq4-q-OL Page 1 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:

F3 CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES REV:

F3-2 35 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 PURPOSE .............. 3 2.0 APPLICABILITY .............. 3 3.0 PRECAUTIONS .............. 3 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES .............. 4 5.0 DISCUSSION .............. 4 5.1 Definitions ...................................................... 4 5.2 Emergency Action Levels ...................................................... 6 5.3 The Emergency Classification/Declaration/Implementation Process .......... 6 5.4 Technical Specification Required Shutdown NUEs .................................... 8 5.5 Rapidly Escalating then De-escalating Events ........................................... 9 5.6 The Emergency Action Level Reference Manual Number ........................ 10 6.0 PREREQUISITES ............ 10 7.0 PROCEDURE ............ 11 LIST OF ATTACHMENTS Attachment 1 - Summary of Emergency Action Levels Page 2 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to specify the Emergency Action Levels that indicate an emergency condition exists and to properly classify the emergency into one (1) of the four (4) graded levels of emergency classifications. This procedure partially satisfies the requirement of 10CFR50.47 concerning the existence of an emergency classification and action level scheme.

2.0 APPLICABILITY This instruction SHALL apply to all Shift Managers (SM), Shift Supervisors (SS), Control Room Operators (CRO), Emergency Directors (ED) and Emergency Managers (EM).

3.0 PRECAUTIONS 3.1 This procedure SHALL be entered whenever there is indication of an Emergency Action Level being exceeded.

3.2 Attempt to verify the indications by checking secondary or coincident indicators.

3.3 An emergency classification should be made based on current plant conditions described in Attachment 1 of this procedure.

3.4 These emergency classifications do not apply to offsite transportation incidents that do NOT affect safe operation of the plant. Currently, the Radiation Protection group is responsible for offsite transportation incident assessment involving plant related shipments.

3.5 Continuously monitor the Control Room instrumentation, radiation monitors, or any other developments which would be indicative of further system degradation. Be prepared to escalate to a more severe emergency classification.

Page 3 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Duty Shift Manager has the responsibility to authorize the initial emergency classification.

4.2 Shift Supervisor of the unaffected unit has the responsibility to assist the Shift Manager as necessary including authorization of an emergency classification.

4.3 Shift Supervisor of the affected unit has the responsibility to direct activities related to the operation of the affected unit.

4.4 Emergency Director has the responsibility to authorize an emergency classification whenever an Alert, Site Area, or General Emergency is declared and the EOF is not activated.

4.5 If the EOF is activated and fully functional, the Emergency Manager has the responsibility to authorize an emergency classification.

4.6 Control Room Operators and affected unit Shift Supervisor have the responsibility to assist the Shift Manager or unaffected unit Shift Supervisor in the identification and verification of control board indications.

5.0 DISCUSSION 5.1 Definitions 5.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event - events that are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

Page 4 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 5.1.2 Alert - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. It is the lowest level of emergency classification when some necessity for emergency planning and offsite response is necessary.

Any releases expected are limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

5.1.3 Site Area Emerqency - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failure of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

Any releases are not expected to exceed the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels except near the site boundary.

5.1.4 General Emergency - events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with a potential for loss of containment integrity.

Releases during a General Emergency can be reasonably expected to exceed the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

5.1.5 EmerQencV Action Levels (EAL) - specific instrument readings, surface or airborne contamination levels or radiation dose rates that designate a specific emergency class requiring emergency measures for that class.

5.1.6 Safety System(s) - refers to systems that are required to be functional during and following a design basis accident or transient to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition; or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents, which could result in off-site exposures comparable to the guidelines of 10CFR1 00; or the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary. The structures and components of a Safety System are "Safety Related SSC."

Page5 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:

F3 CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES REV:

F3-2 35 5.2 Emergency Action Levels (EALs)

Attached to this procedure is a Summary of Emergency Action Levels, Attachment 1. This summary identifies the four emergency classifications, the initiating condition(s), emergency action levels for each classification, and, where applicable, specific instruments and indications to be used to detect and classify an emergency.

The emergency action levels for each classification and the instrument readings and indications listed do not reflect a complete list of instrumentation that will show abnormal indications but does list those key parameters useful in classifying the event.

The Summary of Emergency Action Levels lists are based on the initiating conditions as required by Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654, accidents analyzed in the Prairie Island USAR, and the NRC Branch Position on Acceptable Deviations Frorr NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.

5.3 The Emergency Classification/Declaration/implementation Process There are three distinct phases to consider: Classification, Declaration and Implementation.

5.3.1 Classification

The act of assessing the EALs to determine the appropriate classification for which the ongoing events are categorized.

Classification is expected to be made promptly following indication that the conditions have reached an emergency threshold in accordance with the EAL scheme. Promptly is a period not to exceed 15 minutes.

5.3.2 Declaration

The act of formally declaring the classification based on the assessment of EALs.

This is the point at which the classification time is set and the 10CFR50, App. E 15-minute offsite notification clock starts.

5.3.3 Implementation

The act of making the notification and/or augmentation of the emergency organizations.

Page 6 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 5.3.4 Classification Timeliness:

Guidance for classification timeliness is provided in NRC Branch Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions, EPPOS No. 2 and the NRC endorsed Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, NEI 99-02. The guidance is summarized as follows:

Classification is expected to be made promptly following indications that conditions have reached an emergency threshold in accordance with the EAL scheme. Promptly is a period not to exceed 15 minutes. This 15-minute criterion is a reasonable period of time for assessing and classifying emergencies.

5.3.5 Ideally, the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) should be filled out to near completion while the classification phase is being conducted. Once the declaration is made by the SM/ED/EM, the 15-minute offsite notification time starts. The SM/ED/EM should review the contents of the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) to ensure its completeness, verify the correct declaration time and then sign the form which gives permission to the Shift Emergency Communicator (or Offsite Communicator in EOF) to implement the E-Plan notifications.

5.3.6 Per 10CFR50.72 (a)(3) NRC notification is required immediately after the notification of the state and local agencies (which is completed within about 15 minutes) and not later than one hour after the emergency declaration.

Page 7 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 5.4 Technical Specification Required Shutdown NUEs 5.4.1 In some cases, exceeding Technical Specification limits (e.g., RCS leakage, reactor coolant activity, etc.) is considered to be precursors to more serious events and warrant declaration of an NUE.

5.4.2 In other cases, exceeding Technical Specification limits for the period designated in the T.S. ACTIONS Table is an analyzed condition of the plant and does not, by itself, represent an emergency. These events are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 as a non-emergencies.

However, if the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable Technical Specifications action statement time limit T.S. ACTIONS Table COMPLETION Time, then a declaration of an Unusual Event should be declared.

5.4.3 With regard to Emergency Plan classifications, Operations should handle a Technical Specification required shutdown in the following manner:

A. The conditions of the plant should come first. That is, if the condition warrants initiating power reduction immediately, do so. The E-Plan classification can appropriately follow.

B. Following the initiation of the reduction in power or temperature, the classification phase of the E-Plan is started. Review of the EALs should be done to assess for proper classification. Once the Shift Manager has determined the appropriate classification for the event, the Shift Manager should declare the classification and note the time of declaration (this begins the 15-minute offsite notification clock).

C. Once the declaration is made, the Shift Manager should review the contents of the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) to ensure its completeness, verify the correct declaration time and then sign the form which gives permission to the Shift Emergency Communicator to implement the E-Plan notifications.

Page 8 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES NUMBER:

F3 CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES REV:

F3-2 35 5.5 Rapidly Escalating then De-escalating Events In the case of an event that rapidly escalates then de-escalates or begins at a higher emergency class then rapidly de-escalates, the initial emergency classification should be based on current plant conditions.

It may be discovered that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. The NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the emergency class to be necessary in these circumstances; an ENS notification (or an ENS update if the previously reported event was misclassified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event provides an acceptable alternative.

The NRC should be informed of the current emergency classification and the highest emergency classification reached during the course of the event during the initial NRC notification via the ENS phone. The Shift Manager should ensure that this notification be performed by an appropriate individual other than the SEC using PINGP Form 666, Event Notification Worksheet.

To avoid possible confusion, other offsite authorities will be informed of the current classification during the initial notification and then given the full description of the highest emergency classification reached during the first update on the follow-up notification. In those cases where no classification is declared, then 5AWI 3.6.4, Notifications Regarding Plant Media Sensitive Events or Conditions, should be utilized to make proper calls to the state and local government organizations regarding the rapidly escalating and de-escalating event.

Page 9 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 5.6 The Emergency Action Level Reference Manual Number Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant has prepared a written manual (EAL Reference Manual) to provide general information about Emergency Action Levels to offsite authorities who are involved in nuclear plant emergency planning. This manual provides a description with text and drawings of the various conditions that might cause the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant to classify an event. By understanding what a particular condition or event means, emergency workers at the various offsite agencies should develop a clear idea of what is occurring at the plant during the emergency.

Each initiating condition in this procedure is followed by a cross reference number that corresponds to the appropriate classification condition in the EAL Reference Manual. When the Emergency Notification Report Form (PINGP 577) is completed, the initiating condition statement and the EAL Reference Manual cross reference number should be included on the form by using the label from "Emergency Initiating Conditions Labels - PINGP 1189" or writing this information as it appears in the shaded box on the appropriate page in the Summary of Emergency Action Levels.

6.0 PREREQUISITES An off-normal condition corresponding to one of the initiating events described in Attachment 1 of this procedure is occurring or has occurred.

Page 10 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 7.0 PROCEDURE 7.1 Any significant event that may be classified as an emergency condition SHALL be reported to the Shift Supervisor, Shift Manager and/or Emergency Director immediately.

lNOTE: It is an expectation that the emergency declaration will be made promptly (within 15 minutes) upon reaching the EAL threshold.

Expectations for use of "SS, SM or ED Opinion" EAL statements:

"SS, SM or ED Opinion" means that the decision maker is to ensure the declaration is made when conditions meet the EAL initiating condition statement. The "opinion" is NOT a reason to dismiss any NOTE: valid conditions that meet an EAL threshold value. Judgment is to be used for any condition not explicitly detailed as a set of EAL threshold values, which is a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. Classification of an emergency is not to be delayed pending an extended evaluation of possibilities and probabilities.

7.2 Attempt to verify the initial indication by comparing the indication to redundant instrument channels or to other related parameters, visual observations, and field reports as applicable.

7.3 The Shift Manager, unaffected unit Shift Supervisor or Emergency Director SHALL assess the situation and determine the emergency classification, using the guidelines of Attachment 1.

7.4 In those cases when an event rapidly escalates, then de-escalates or begins at a higher classification, then rapidly de-escalates, the initial emergency classification should be based on current plant conditions.

7.4.1 Inform the NRC of the current emergency classification and the highest emergency classification reached during the course of the event during the initial NRC ENS notification.

Page 11 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES F3 'CLASSICATION to EMER NUMBER:

w--.F,.^-.t'.0"CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMERGENCIES 173-2 T; :0 i0000X^0 i 0REV: 35 7.4.2 It may be discovered that a condition existed which met the emergency plan criteria but no emergency was declared and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists at the time of this discovery. This may be due to a rapidly concluded event or an oversight in the emergency classification made during the event or it may be determined during a post-event review. The NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the emergency class to be necessary in these circumstances; an ENS notification (or an ENS update if the previously reported event was misclassified) within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared (or misclassified) event provides an acceptable alternative.

7.4.3 In those cases where no classification is declared, then 5AWI 3.6.4, Notifications Regarding Plant Media Sensitive Events or Conditions, should be utilized to make proper calls to state and local government organizations regarding the event.

7.5 The Shift Supervisor of the affected unit should take immediate actions, using applicable plant operating procedures to return the plant to normal (or Mode 5, Cole Shutdown, if determined to be necessary).

7.6 IF the EOF is not activated, THEN the Shift Manager or Emergency Director SHALL declare the appropriate emergency classification and perform actions as specified in the appropriate responsibility procedure applicable to emergency classification:

7.6.1 For a Notification of Unusual Event, proceed to F3-3.

7.6.2 For an Alert, Site or General Emergency, proceed to F3-4.

IF the EOF is activated, THEN contact the Emergency Manager for consultation on whether or not to change the emergency classification. The Emergency Director is responsible to formulate the new classification while the Emergency Manager is responsible to authorize the reclassification.

7.7 Continue to assess and watch for changing parameters or visual indication of further system degradation and be prepared to escalate to a more severe emergency classification as indicated by the Emergency Action Levels in Attachment 1.

Page 12 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 7.8 As plant conditions stabilize during a Notification of an Unusual Event (NUE) or Alert, consider terminating the event classification.

7.8.1 For the NUE and Alert classifications, the event may be terminated once the following criteria are met:

A. The plant is in stable condition with at least one fission product barrier intact, and B. Radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent are being controlled within the following limits:

1. Gaseous effluent release rates (or resulting dose rates) are within plant limits as defined in Section 3.1 of H4, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), and

2. Liquid effluent release rates (or resulting concentrations) are within the plant limits as defined in "Old 10CFR20 Appendix B in Table II, Column 2 (April 1992)" located in H4, ODCM, Table 4.3 and C. The potential for future degradation of plant conditions is small.

7.8.2 Termination of an NUE classification may be performed by the Shift Manager. Review of 5AWI 1.13.0, Plant Event Investigation and Recovery, should be completed to determine if this procedure needs to be implemented and the Plant Manager informed of the review.

7.8.3 Termination of an Alert classification may be performed by the Emergency Director when the EOF is not activated. Once the EOF is fully functional, the Emergency Manager SHALL terminate the Alert classification when the conditions are met for termination.

Page 13 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 7.8.4 Termination of an Alert classification includes the dismissal of the site Emergency Response Organization. Any necessary in-plant or on-site follow-up activities should be coordinated and managed by the normal plant site organization. In some cases, conditions may require the establishment of a Recovery Organization in which case the Emergency Director and Emergency Manager should make this determination based on the extent of damage or other considerations. In this case 5AWI 1.13.0 should be reviewed and implemented as determined appropriate.

7.9 As plant conditions stabilize during a Site Area or General Emergency, consider transition to the Recovery phase.

IF the Site Area Emergency event does not require significant repairs or analysis beyond the capabilities of the

. v .  : normal plant site organization and the conditions of 7.8.1. A, NOTEX  :.B, & C are met, THEN the Site Area Emergency may be terminated without a transition to Recovery. However review and implementation of 5AWI 1.13.0 should be completed as appropriate.

7.9.1 Transition to Recovery should be directed by the Emergency Manager with coordinated recovery planning by the site Emergency Response Organization.

7.9.2 See F3-30, "Recovery", for instruction on transition to Recovery.

7.9.3 Review and implementation of 5AWI 1.13.0 should be completed as appropriate.

Page 14 of 14

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE F3 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 NUMBER:

173-2 REV: 35

SUMMARY

OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Definition of logic symbols:

NOTE:N 0 w ;AND symbol =

OR symbol =

Page 1 of 60

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE INITIATING CONDITION INDEX No. Condition Description Page 1 Safety System Functions 3 2 Abnormal Primary Leak Rate 4 3 Deleted 8 4 Abnormal Primary/Secondary Leak 9 5 Core Fuel Damage 13 6 Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers 15 7 Secondary Coolant Anomaly 21 8 Radiological Effluents 26 9 Major Electrical Failures 31 10 Control Room Evacuations 35 11 Fires 36 12 Plant Shutdown Functions 38 13 Fuel Handling Accidents 44 14 Deleted 46 15 Deleted 46 16 Security Threats 47 17 Hazards to Plant Operations 48 18 ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) Events 53 19 Natural Events 54 20 Other 59 Page 2 of 60

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 3 of 60 Condition 1: Safety System Functions Failure of a safety orrelief valIve in a safet "lated system to close following9 reduction of applicableei,~pressure. (EAL Ref Manual 1B) ss=- re...S.S......

Visual and/or audible

.Q) la- indication at discharge of open steam generator safety or relief valve Notification of Unusual Event Cu As determined by SS or SM W0)

Pressurizer safety valve outlet temperature, TI-436 8-.2 Pressurizer safety 02 valve outlet temperature, TI-437 Pressurizer relief U) valve outlet temperature, TI-438 4-1 C)

Annun Pressurizer CZ PORV Line High Temp C)

.-S Annun Pressurizer Cu Safety Valve Line A or CI) ra B High Temp N Annun Pressurizer

2) Safety/Relief Valve flow' Acoustic Monitors indicate flow from either the pressurizer PORV's or safeties

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 4 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak

'Primary system !eak rate from unidentified o unccontro~li ~gsourcseeeds.ki~ang ~.Teb"chrnicaV (EAL Ref Manual 2A)

Spcificatlions.,

Primary system leak rate, other than controlled leakage sources, exceeds - Notification of T.S.3.4.1 4 Unusual Event Requires a unit shutdown, as determined L by the SM or SS l Primary coolant leak rate greater than 50 gpm. (EAL Ref Manual 2B )

• Sum of charging line flow + seal injection flow >50 gpm more than the Alert sum of letdown flow + RCP seal leakoff flow

• Decreasing pressurizer level, as indicated by LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 R2 (Containment Area Rad Mon)

R7 (Containment Area Rad Mon)

• E~

A rapid temperature decrease in the RCS results in the same indications R-1 1(Containment Vent Rad Mon)

[Containment Position]

R-12 (Containment Vent Rad Mon)

[Containment Position]

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 5 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak

LOCAvwith leak rate in excess of available pump capacity (Charging, SI, & RHR). (Small LOCA with failure of SI or (EAL Ref Manual 2C)

Large LOCA greater than Si flow.):

SI Actuated annunciator illuminated Site Area Emergency "A" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner I "B" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner High containment radiation levels High containment sump levels High containment humidity High containment pressure RCS Pressure No SI Flow Subcooling No pressurizer level as indicated by LU-426, LU-427, LI-428 All available pumps running indicated by red light(s) at switch

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 6 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak Small LOCA and initially successful ECCS.

Subsequent failure of containment h6eatremoval (EAL Ref Manual 2D) systems over several hours could lead to core melt and likely failure of containment.

LOCA has occurred General Emergency Containment temp has become excessive, and is still rising Containment pressure is high Operating containment spray pumps Operating containment fan coil unit trains

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 7 of 60 Condition 2: Abnormal Primary Leak oSsmall an large LOCAswth Xfailure f ECCS to $

pefrm leaig osevr coedgaaino eti (EAL Ref Manual 2E) lieyfrmelt sequences ........... ~J i)' -

o 0 High Head SI failure

-J all General Low Head SI failure Emergency 0

High dose equivalent 1-131 as determined by sample a) analysis M

E Valid high radiation R-48 (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)

Valid high radiation R-49 (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)

Decreasing RCS pressure r- Low subcooling margin "A" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner "B" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner Pressurizer Low Pressure 0

Q4 Trip 0

to RCS pressure decreasing to uncontrollably 0

-j High containment radiation levels High containment sump levels High containment humidity High containment pressure

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 8 of 60 Condition 3: Abnormal Coolant Temperature/Pressure DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviations From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 9 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary / Secondary Leak Pri a Scndary leak rate exieedin e chnical (EAL Ref Manual 4A)

Sp c f c t o s SG primary to secondary 150 GPO through any 1 SG leakage exceeds Notification of T.S.3.4.14 limits Unusual Event Primary/ Secondary leak rate greater than 50pm. (EAL Ref Manual 4B)

T.S. >200 OF Mode 1,2,3, or4 Decreasing pressurizer level Alert LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 R15 (Air Ejector Rad Mon)

Sum of charging line flow plus seal injection greater than 50 gpm more than the sum of Letdown Flow and RCP Seal Leakoff flow SS, SM, ED opinion

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 10 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak Failure of stem generatortube(s)r g actuation.~: (EAL Ref Manual 4C)

"SI Actuated " annunciator illuminated on the Aqua panel Alert Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 and/or Fl-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, P1-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor Unexpected Rise in either SG level

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 11 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak Failure of steam generator tube(s) resulting in ECCS actuation and high potential for loss of containment. (EAL Ref Manual 4D)

"Si Actuated " annunciator illuminated on the Aqua panel Site Area Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 Emergency and/or FI-924 and pump discharge C. pressure corresponding to flow LU Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, P1-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least w 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 L.E R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor 0)

R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor

'-S a~ R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor Unexpected Rise in either SG level 4-0 Indications of a steam line break outside containment, upstream of the ruptured Steam Generator MSIV Failure of ruptured Steam Generator MSIV to close with indications of steam line

0. break downstream of MSIV Ruptured SG safety or relief valve opens and then fails to reseat indicated by visual and/or audible indication at discharges As determined by SS, SM, or ED If steam break is outside containment with SG tube rupture and fuel Note: failure, this may be a General Emergency. See Condition # 6, Case 2.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 12 of 60 Condition 4: Abnormal Primary /Secondary Leak Failure of steam generator tube(s) resulting in ECCS: wi!

(EAL Ref Manual 4E) actuation and loss of offsite power.

"SI Actuated " annunciator illuminated on the Aqua panel I Site Area Safety Injection Flow indicated by FI-925 Emergency and/or Fl-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo Pzr pressure; PI-429,PI-430, P1-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 R-51 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-52 Steam Line Rad Monitor R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor Unexpected Rise in either SG level 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804]

4.16 KV Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805]

4.16 KV Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806]

4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807]

D1 [D5] Tach D1 [D5] Gen Volts Safeguard Bus 15 [25] source from DG closed, Breaker 15-2 [25-2]

D2 [D6 ] Tach D2 [D61 Gen Volts Safeguard Bus 16 [26] source from DG closed, Breaker 16-9 [26-16]

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 13 of 60 Condition 5: Core Fuel Damage Fuel Damage Indication', (EAL Ref Manual 5A)

R-9 (Letdown Line Rad Mon in alarm Notification of R-9 Unusual Event R9 confirmed by portable instrumentation High coolant activity sample exceeding T.S.3.4.17 for total specific activity in primary coolant High coolant activity sample exceeding T.S.3.4.17 limit on primary coolant iodine activity which requires a unit shutdown.

,Severe Loss of fuel cladding (EAL Ref Manual 5B) 1 ~  :. I I Dose equivalent 1-131 Alert R-9 (Letdown Line Rad Mon) in alarm R-9 R-9 confirmed by portable instrumentation

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 14 of 60 Condition 5: Core Fuel Damage DI rade corew poe loss of coolable geome ry. - 1 (EAL Ref Manual 5C)

I SS, SM, or ED opinion Site Area Emergency Core Delta T increasing 0 .0 4) 104 IftoEi0 j0a0 a No core Delta T Dose Equivalent 1-131

'a

-%U "Ia Core exit thermocouples R

Q) 0 Q

RVLIS full range Inadequate Subcooling Margin

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 15 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers Loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential loss of 3rd barrier. (EAL Ref Manual 6)

GENERAL EMERGENCY

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 16 of 60

[

Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers te1: Lossof clad, loss of primary coolant bouday (LOCA), and high potential four loss-o (EAL Ref Manual 6) containment.

Valid high radiation R-48 (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)

Valid high radiation R-49 General (Containment High Range Area Emergency Rad Mon)

Dose equivalent 1-131 Pressurizer low pressure trip RCS pressure decreasing uncontrollably High containment pressure High containment humidity High containment sump levels High containment radiation levels

'A" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner "B" SG is not depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner Containment approaching design pressure and increasing Control Room containment isolation status lights for Train A and B indicate open or partially open for any containment penetration SS, SM, or ED opinion Operating containment spray pumps Operating containment fan coil unit trains

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 17 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers Case 2: Loss of clad, SG tube rupture and high potential (EAL Ref Manual 6) for loss of containment Indications of a steam line break outside containment, upstream of the ruptured SG MSIV General Emergency Failure of ruptured SG MSIV to close with indications of steam 0-ca line break Ruptured SG stuck open safety or relief valve indicated by visual and/or audible steam relief As determined by SS, SM, or ED it0 R-51 (Loop A Steam Line)

I-a R-52 (Loop B Steam Line) 01M R-15 (Air Ejector)

Unexpected Rise in either SG level SI Actuated annunciator illuminated on Aqua panel SI flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge 3-J1 pressure corresponding to flow Lo PZR pressure P1-429, P1-430, PI-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428 Dose equivalent 1-131

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 18 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers Case 3,: Loss of clad, containment failure, and a E lhigh potential for loss of the RCS boundary.

to o-()

-J Dose equivalent l-131l 1 > UUU/C General Emergency Cold leg temperature decrease in the > 100 -F C last 60 minutes RCS cold leg temperaturel <250 F Steam line break betweeni containment and the MSIVI Steam line break downstream o

0) IVSIV W MSIV open-close indicator(s) sho open or partially open CO 0

I-J Control room containment isolation status lights for Train A and B indicate open or partially open for any containment penetration SS, SMor ED opinionl

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 19 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers Ce 4: Loss of RCS oocA6, os (EAL Ref Manual 6) containment, andrhIgh ptntial for toshsof cladding Control room containment isolation status lights for Train A and B indicate open or partially open for any 0 E containment penetration 0 General C.) SS, SM,or ED opinion Emergency RVLIS full range Core exit thermocouples Pressurizer low pressure trip RCS pressure decreasing uncontrollably 0

0 "A" SG is not depressurizing I-j in an uncontrolled manner b9 "B" SG is not depressurizing C in an uncontrolled manner 0j a

High containment radiation levels High containment sump levels 0

-j High containment humidity High containment pressure

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 20 of 60 Condition 6: Loss of 2 of 3 Fission Product Barriers CAs  : LsofRCS Boundary (SG Tube Rujpture)~j, (EAL Ref Manual 6) cladding Steam line break between containment and the ruptured Steam Generator MSIV IE- General

.0I Stuck open ruptured SG Emergency 0 PORV or Safety valve Steam line break downstream of 0

-J ruptured Steam Generator MSIV MSIV open-close indicator shows open or partially open RVLIS full range Core exit thermocouples R-51 (Loop A Steam Line)

R-52 (Loop B Steam Line)

R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor a)

Unexpected Rise in either SG level Ql)

Si Actuated annunciator illuminated on Aqua panel SI flow indicated by FI-925 and/or FI-924 and pump discharge pressure corresponding to flow Lo PZR pressure P1-429, PI-430, P1-431 PZR level cannot be maintained on at least 2/3 channels LI-426, LI-427, LI-428

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 21 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly Rapid depressurization of secondaIry (EAL Ref Manual 7A) side.

Steam line pressure safety injection signal Notification of Unusual Event SS or SM opinion that a rapid reduction in secondary pressure occurred Steam Generator ANB pressure differential Increasing Containment Pressure Indications of a steam line break outside of containment Failed open Steam Dump, SG PORV, or SG Safety Valve Hi Steam Flow Lo-Lo Tavg

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 22 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly Steam linebreak inside containment with significant (greater, than 150 gpd) (EAL Ref Manual 7B) primary to secondary leak rate.

High containment pressure Alert R-1 5 Air Ejector Rad Monitor reading

.2 be Steam Line Monitor reading above i& Cmx normal background on faulted SG z 2 Q cIt Unexpected rise in faulted SG level U~0

)

Pri/Sec Leak rate calculation E Steam generator A/B pressure differential Valid Steamline low pressure safety injection signal U)

Hi steam flow Lo-Lo Tavg

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 23 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly Unisoiable steam line break outside' taient with significant (greater than150gpd) primaryto secondary leakAL Ref Manual 7C) rate.

Indications of unisolable steam line break outside containment Site Area Emergency R-15 Air Ejector Rad Monitor reading Steam Line Monitor reading above U) -.

M- normal background on faulted SG Unexpected rise in faulted SG level U)

Pri/Sec Leak rate calculation Steam generator A/B pressure 1.9 differential U) l$_ Valid Steamline low pressure safety injection signal U)

U)

Hi steam flow Lo-Lo Tavg

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 24 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly Steam, Line break in containment with greaterthan 50gpmprimayto:

(EAL Ref Manual 7D) secondary leakage and indication of fuel damage. ,

If steam line break is outside containment with SG tube rupture Note: and fuel failure, this may be a General Emergency. See condition # 6, case 2 Primary to Secondary Leakage Site Area Valid high radiation R-48 Emergency (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)

Valid high radiation R-49 (Containment High Range Area Rad Mon)

Primary sample Dose Equivalent 1-131 Steam generator A/B pressure differential [

4C High containment pressure (U

Valid steamline low pressure safety injection signal Hi steam flow Lo- Lo Tavg

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 25 of 60 Condition 7: Secondary Coolant Anomaly removal (ysier R Manolluoa 7)by~iIre

~ (EAL Ref Manual 7E)

,containmwent II .>c~re mel  ;. '-

Condensate and Main Feedwater cannot be established to either SG General Aux Feedwater flow cannot be established Emergency to either SG High Head Safety Injection flow cannot be established to the RCS 30 minutes have elapsed since implementation of step in FR-H.1 requiring actuation of Si No Condensate or Main Feedwater flow to either SG No Auxiliary Feedwater flow to either SG No High Head Safety Injection flow to the RCS "Cannot be established" means that procedural guidance for establishing condition will not be Note e- successful based on knowledge of system/component condition/availability.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 26 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents Airborne Radi logical effluent ,

(EAL Ref Manual 8A)

Technical Specifications exceeded Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or suspected to exceed Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 3.1 limits as determined by Rad Notification of Protection Unusual Event Total gaseous activity measured by Rad Chemist that a 300 second marinelli gas grab sample analysis from 1[2]R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)

Valid 1R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)

Valid 2R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon)

Liquid. Radiological effluent Technical Specification limits exceeded. (EAL Ref Manual 8B)

Unmonitored liquid release to river which exceeds the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 2.1 as determined by Notification of Rad Protection Unusual Event Liquid release exceeds the limits of Operations Manual H4,ODCM, Sect. 2.1 based on sample analysis R-21 (Circ Water Discharge Rad Mon)

>High Alarm setpoint R-18 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon)

>High Alarm setpoint 0 R-18 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close

'4.

r: R-1 9 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) >High Alarm setpoint (while blowdown is directed to river)

R-1 9 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 27 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents Liquid Radiological effluent greater than ten times Technical Specification limits., ( M Unmonitored liquid release to river which exceeds 10 times the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 2.1 as Alert determined by Rad Protection Liquid release exceeds 10 times the limits of Operations Manual H4, ODCM, Sect.

2.1 based on sample analysis R-21 (Circ Water Discharge Rad Mon)

> 10 times High Alarm setpoint R-18 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon) >

10 times High Alarm setpoint R-18 (Waste Liquid Discharge Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close a R-19 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) > 10 times w High Alarm setpoint (while blowdown is directed to river)

R-1 9 (SG Blowdown Rad Mon) isolation valve fails to close I Airborne Radiological effluents greater than ten times Technical Specification instantaneous limits (an instantaneous rate which, if continued for over two hours, would result ink about 1 mrem TEDE (EAL Ref Manual 8D) at the site boundary under average met conditions. TEDE = Total Effective Dose Equivalent).

Unmonitored gaseous release to the atmosphere which is estimated or suspected to exceed 10 times Operations Ae Manual H4, ODCM, Sect. 3.1 limits as Alert determined by Rad Protection.

Local measured count rate on 1[2]R-50 , 3000 cpm (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range Rad Mon) gas chamber by RPS.

4 Valid 1R-22 (Shield Bldg Vent Rad Mon) > 5x10 Cpm 0 Valid 2R-22 (Shield Bldg VentRad Mon) > 5x10 c m J o Valid 1R-50 (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range > 1.2 mR/hr

,rz Rad Mon)

.%-- Valid 2R-50 (Shield Bldg Vent Hi Range > 1.2 mR/hr Rad Mon)

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 28 of 60 Condition 8 Radiological Effluents Airborne Effluent monitors detect levels corrmes ding togreater than:

'1. 50 mreln/hr TEDE for one-half hour, or

2. 250 crehr Thyroid CDE for one-f hour, or 3.-500 mrem/hr TEDE for two minutes, or (EAL Ref Manual 8E)

4. 2500 mremlhr Thyroid CDE for two minutes at the site boundary for adverse meteorology.i TEDE = Total Effective Dose Equivalent.

CDE = Committed Dose Equivalent.

I > 50 mR/hr for 1/2 hr Jln.w Radiation survey teams measure

.q gamma dose rates at site boundary > 500 mR/hr for 2 min Jot"tV - _ Site Area J-, Emergency X Radiation survey teams measure field

>2500 mrem/h ir2m~in22L~

Z data at site boundary corresponding to Thyroid CDE a DValid 1R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range) I> 70 mR/hr -

u Valid 2R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)

I >70mR/hr- -------

> 250 mrem/hr for 1/2 hr -I c Thyroid CDE oftsite dose projections

at the site boundary > 2500 mrem/hr for 2 min s.

> 50 mrem/hr for 1/2 hr o TEDE offsite dose projections at the Q site boundary > 500 mrem/hr for 2 min

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 29 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents Effluecnti monitect levels correspondaingto:

2. 5 remlhr ThyroidCDE (EAL Ref Manual 8F) at the site boundary unider actual meteorological conditions..

TEDE'_ Total Effective Dose Equivalent.

CDE Cormmitted Dose Equivalent.  :

It a Radiation survey teams measure gamma I > 10OOmR/hr -3 0

4t, dose rates at or beyond the site boundary I =eneral

~ mergency U) co

4) Radiation survey teams measure field data l >5000 mrem/hr at the site boundary, corresponding to Thyroid CDE

-tz I > 1000mRlhr mR a Valid 1R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range) 0 tn fu 4)

CZ l > 1000 mR/hr Valid 2R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range)

TEDE offsite dose projections at the site IC, oo noI l > I1000 mrem/hr p z .2 Doundary 1 v Q . Thyroid CDE offsite dose projections at the I > 5000 mrem/hr 0L site boundary

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 30 of 60 Condition 8: Radiological Effluents Radiation levels or airborne contamination which 'i i.ndictea severe degradation in the control of (EAL Ref Manual 8G) radioactive materials (e.g, increase of factor of:e 1000 indirect radiation readings within facility).:

Unexpected radiation level I > 1000 mR/hr Alert Unexpected increase in plant area radiation I factor of 1000 monitors I Widespread unexpected iodine or particulate airborne concentrations as per 10CFR20 I > 1000 DAC appendix B table 1, Column 3.

> 10,000 dpm/l100cm 2 beta-gamma Widespread unexpected contamination l 500 d m/0cm2 alpha activity

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 31 of 60 Condition 9: Major Electrical Failures (EAL Ref Manual 9A) 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804] <3500Volts Notification of 4.16KV Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805]

_ 4 Unusual Event 4.16 KV Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806] < V 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [41728071 <3500 Volts 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807]l h..

D1 [D5 ] Tach 1 1 Q) 0 D1 [D5] Gen Volts 4000 - 4400 volts.

0 Safeguard Bus 15 [25] source from DG 0 closed, Breaker 15-2 [25-2]

D2 [D6 ] Tach 900 rpm [1200 rpm]

4000 - 4400 volts D2 [D6 ] Gen Volts Safeguard Bus 16 [26] source from DG closed, Breaker 16-9 [26-16.11 Los Lo ,-O qsit.6S ofost

,.AG power~dapblys.,,

-- .,M,0. (EAL Ref Manual 9B)

Loss of D1 & D2 [D5 & D6] Notification of diesel generators Unusual Event

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 32 of 60 Condition 9: Major Electrical Failures Lossfoffsitew (EAL Ref Manual 9C) 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804] <3500 Volts _l Z2 I..

0 4.16 KV Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805] <3500 Volts I P. Alert

'4- 0

-J 0 0.

(C to 0

4.16 KV Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806] <3500 Volts jC 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807] <3500 Volts L..

4.16 KV Bus 15 [251, 4191801 [4190401] <4000 Volts QC a.

4.16 KV Bus 16 [26], 4192401 [4192301] <4000 Volts Loss of offsite power and loss of onsite AC power for more than 15 minutes. (EAL Ref Manual 9D)

Blackout duration > 15 minutes Site Area Emergency 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804] <3500 Volts (C

I..

0 4.16 KV Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805l <3500 Volts I 0 0 (c 0.

(C 4.16 KV Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806] <3500 Volts 0

-J 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807] <3500 Volts 0  :%  %

4.16 KV Bus 15 [25], 4191801 [4190401 ] <4000 Volts 10 CA,,

J0 r-0 o0.

4.16 KV Bus 16 [26], 4192401 [4192301 ] <4000 Volts

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 33 of 60 Condition 9: Major Electrical Failures Failure of offsite ;tng onsite power jjoig.

with total loss of emergency feedwte makeup capability for greater than 2 (EAL Ref Manual 9E) hours. This would lead to eventual core melt and likely failure of containment.

Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater pump unavailable I General Emergency Motor Driven Aux Feedwater pump from other unit unavailablel 4.16 KV Bus 11 [21], 4119304 [4172804] 1 IS-4.16 KV Bus 12 [22], 4119305 [4172805]

a00 4.16 KV Bus 13 [23], 4119306 [4172806]

0

-.1 4.16 KV Bus 14 [24], 4119307 [4172807]

to C:

0 E o oL.

4.16 KV Bus 15 [25], 4191801 [4190401]

4.16 KV Bus 16 [26], 4192401 [4192301]

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 34 of 60 Condition 9: Major Electrical Failures Loss of all onsite DC power (see Site (EAL Ref Manual 9F)

Area Emergency -forextended loss). go <

"SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN A DC I FAILURE" 4701 8-0501 [47518-050111 Alert "SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN B DC FAILURE" 47018-0502 [47518-0502]1 Loss of all vital onsite DC power for more than 15 minutes (EAL Ref Manual 9G)

"SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN A DC FAILURE" 47018-0501 [47518-05011 Site Area Emergency "SAFEGUARD LOGIC TRAIN B DC FAILURE" 47018-0502 [47518-05021 Loss of DC power has lasted more than 15 minutes

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 35 of 60 Condition 10: Control Room Evacuations Eacuation -of the Control Room, anticipated or required with control of (EAL Ref Manual 10A) shutdown systems establishedom Hot Shutdown Panels band local stations. -

SS,SM, or ED determines evacuation of Control Room is anticipated or required with control of shutdown systems established -i Alert from Hot Shutdown Panels and local stations If reason for evacuation is fire in Control Room or Relay Room, see initiating condition 11 C, "Fire compromising the functions of safety systems" for possible reclassification.

Evacuation of the Control Room and control of shutdown systems not (EAL Ref Manual 1OB) established from Hot Shutdown Panels and local stations within 15 minutes.

Evacuation of Control Room conducted I Site Area I- Emergency Control of shutdown systems not established >15 min.

from Hot Shutdown Panels and local stations I within 15 minutes

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 36 of 60 Condition 11: Fires Fi within the plant or jSFSI lasting (EAL Ref Manual 11A) more than-10 minutes.

FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

Notification of fire or fire detection alarm in the Control Room Notification of Unusual Event Fire confirmed within the Reactor Bldg.,

Auxiliary Bldg., Turbine Bldg., Service Bldg., Rad Waste Bldg., Plant Screen House, D5/D6 Bldg., Cooling Tower Equip.

House, Transformers, or on the surface of a loaded spent fuel cask in the ISFSI Area Fire confirmed within the plant Fire not extinguished within 10-minutes of alarm or notification Fire potentially affecting safety systems. (EAL Ref Manual 11 B)

FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

Observation that a fire could affect L safety systems I Alert SS, SM, or ED opinion I l

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 37 of 60 Condition 11: Fires Fire compromising the functions of (EAL Ref Manual 11 C) safety systems. -

FIRE: is combustion characterized by heat and light (flame). Sources NOt ~ of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment

, do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT

. - .. required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

Physical observation of a fire that is affecting both trains of a safety system for Site Area the same unit Emergency SS, SM, or ED opinion

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 38 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions I" :, ~. -~.S,~,. ..

shutdown t . - , I th Control~ Romrqiigapant=

t  : (EAL Ref Manual 12B)

SS or SM opinion that annunciators or 4-a indications are nonfunctional Notification of CA -0 Unusual Event fA 0 0 Loss of NSSS Annunciator System

-U -Z ID IJ and loss of plant computer C  %

1zr Loss of BOP Annunciator System and

-M- loss of plant computer (ERCS)

Ix M r-Loss of NSSS Annunciator System and BOP Annunciator System Most or all alarms (annunciators) lost. (EAL Ref Manual 12C)

Loss of plant computer Alert (ERCS)

I-J)

'O Q) - 0 C 0 Loss of NSSS Annunciator System z 0Z

-1t 2 E .2 Loss of BOP Annunciator System

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 39 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions Most or all alarms (annunciators) lost and plant transient initiated or in' (EAL Ref Manual 12D) progress.

SS, SM, or ED opinion that a transient Site Area has occurred or is in progress Emergency Loss of NSSS Annunciator System and loss of plant computer t: 0 0 Loss of BOP Annunciator System and z -4 z. loss of plant computer (ERCS) 0.a Loss of NSSS Annunciator System and BOP Annunciator System

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 40 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions Momentary loss of core cooling needed (EAL Ref Manual 12E) for plant Mode 5, Cold Shutdown. - l T.S. <200 TF Mode 5, Cold Shutdown Notification of Unusual Event Interruption of RHR core cooling Entry into procedure E4, Core Cooling Following Loss of RHR flow Inability to maintain plant in Mode 5, i (EAL Ref Manual 12F)

Cold Shutdown. ,I Mitigation actions are unable to prevent RCS temperature > 200 F Alert exceeding 200 'F Loss of water level that has uncovered or will uncover the fuel in the reactori (EAL Ref Manual 12G) vessel while at Mode 5, Cold Shutdown.

Mode 5, Cold Shutdown Site Area Emergency Total loss of RHR system cooling Mitigating actions unable to restore makeup flow greater than inventory loss

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 41 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions Complet los ofaa nfK pIMck,JHofStadby (EAL Ref Manual 12H)

Mode 1,2, or3 Site Area Emergency Inadequate hi pressure injection capability (i.e., loss of 2/2 SI pumps and loss of all charging pumps for more than 15 minutes)

SS, SM, or ED opinion that plant functions required to maintain Mode 3, Hot Standby not available All steam generator safety valves inoperable Both steam generator PORVs inoperable All steam generator steam dump to atmosphere valves inoperable Steam generator steam dump to condenser valve inoperable No Condensate or Main Feedwater flow No Auxiliary Feedwater flow Wide range level in both SG's

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES REV. 35 ATTACHMENT 1 Page 42 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions trmen ,.. (EAL Ref Manual 121)

,,. Notification of Reactor or turbine trip due to turbine failure I Unusual Event Tbne fXr aun casing (EAL Ref Manual 12J) penefrd:tic...................n. i f As determined by visual inspection -i Alert Reactor or turbine trip due to turbine failure [-

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 43 of 60 Condition 12: Plant Shutdown Functions to tlate anwc (EAL Ref Manual 12K) b ring"s"th e racrsucica.1 Any valid reactor trip setpoint has I_

been exceeded I Alert Intermediate range detector output not decaying I shtow ytem

.. ,i.-

.:r. .. , O

, .§ ..: , I it aluetoti I:

x . x , - , . ', (EAL Ref Manual 12L)

(czontinued ipoewer gnrtotn but no

Icore da, ma. ge immediate!y. evident).  :

Failure to bring reactor subcritical with control rods inserted Site Area Emergency No indication of core damage SS, SM, or ED opinion that a transient is in progress Tranient requiig prtiono (EAL Ref Manual 12M) coremelt).m Failure to bring reactor subcritical General with control rods inserted Emergency RCS pressure Rapidly increasing containment pressure and temperature 0

Dose equivalent 1-131

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 44 of 60 Condition 13: Fuel Handling Accidents (EAL Ref Manual 13A)

During refueling operations Alert SS, SM,or ED opinion Valid R2 (containment area)

Valid R7 (containment area)

Containment vent monitor in the Containment Position Valid R1 1 (containment vent)

Valid R12 (containment vent)

D i wit,v-eIeas (EAL Ref Manual 13B) l SS, SM, or ED opinion I DI-..

Alert Valid Spent Fuel Pool Area el, 350 a/hr I ;FMI rad monitor R5 I Valid R-22 (shield bldg vent) [ > 5X104cpm Valid R-50 (shield bldg vent hi range) I

[l,1.2 mg/hr Fit-

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 45 of 60 Condition 13: Fuel Handling Accidents

-Major datmge to spent fuel in containment or fuel handling building. -.

(EAL Ref Manual 13C)

(e.g large~object damages fu6eI ardwer

.Idss below fuel level. i f5 :t SS, SM, or ED opinion Site Area Emergency E Valid R48 (containment area W hi range) hi Alarm 0 Valid R49 (containment area hi range) hi Alarm SS, SM, or ED opinion

-a Valid R50 (shield bldg vent C 9Ehi range) o1 9-I .x Valid R5 (SFP area)

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 46 of 60 Condition 14: Coolant Pump DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviation From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.

Condition 15: Contaminated Injured Person DELETED Deleted based on NRC Branch Position On Acceptable Deviation From Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 47 of 60 Condition 16: Security CredI~bmsecir.spe otifca tion org dtter44 :.!try d en'f-(EAL Ref Manual 16A)

Security determines the threat to be credible Threat would have an adverse impact on safe Notification of operation or shutdown capability of the plant Unusual Event Security discovers an unauthorized attempted entry by force or stealth (secret) into the plant's protected area The FBI confirms that an act of attempted sabotage did occur to vital plant equipment or security equipment Low Credible Security Threat notification received Per the Security Plan Onoing security omipromise (EAL Ref Manual 16B)

Security Safeguards Contingency event that results in unauthorized personnel commandeering an area within the plant _

protected area, but not controlling shutdown Alert capability or any vital areas Bomb device discovered within plant protected L area and outside of any vital area I High Credible Security Threat notificationl received Per the Security Plan Imminernt loss ,ofphy In o (EAL Ref Manual 16C) pl-ant ,,

Physical attack on the plant involving imminent occupancy of the Control Room, auxiliary [ I shutdown panels or other vital areas 0 Site Area Emergency Bomb device discovered within a vital area I Per the Security Plan I Loss of physical control of the plant. (EAL Ref Manual 16D)

• ok '(  ; S > " *f g X,a',{a.;w sr.,+..,

Physical attack on the plant has resulted in unauthorized personnel occupying the Control General Room or any other vital areas Emergency Per the Security Plan

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 48 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations Aircra k 6sh osi e6ruLuaI aircraft activity oer iility.e (EAL Ref Manual 17A)

Reported to the SS or SM I

-W

-km Notification of Visual observation by plant personnel and/or [ Unusual Event

'1 security personnel I 2

Ar!raft cash interot area. d (EAL Ref Manual 17B)

Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of an aircraft crash I

• Alert in the protected area affetingial srucuresbyimac or (EAL Ref Manual 17C) fis ih pn ni Mode5ld Shutdown.

Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of an aircraft crash T.S. >200'F Site Area within protected area and affecting vital

• Emergency structures by impact or fires with either unit in Mode 1,2,3 or4

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 49 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations Near or nst eposio (EAL Ref Manual 17D)

Visual observation by plant personnel and/or L security personnel I Notification of Reported to the SS or SM I Unusual Event KnoWn explosion daagt cilatyge *u affecting plant operation (EAL Ref Manual 17E)

Visual observation by plant personnel Alert e

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 50 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations RissI 4 pactirom hatve onfadiIit (EAL Ref Manual 17F)

Visually observed evidence by plant personnel and/or plant security personnel of missileI Alert impacts on facility from whatever source

~Se d; qro gineer ~

(EAL Ref Manual 17G)

Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 l T.S. > 200 0F i

,u -- Site Area PM1 Emergency Visually observed evidence by plant l personnel and/or plant security personnel

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 51 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations Near or onsite toxic or flammable gasizI

' =-^V+vo, release s, ' ' ,, Sl(oI ,; XHjst (EAL Ref Manual 17H)

Toxic or flammable gaseous hazard being experienced or projected onsite (outside of plant) leading to evacuation or sheltering of Notification of personnel outside the plant Unusual Event Receipt of recommendation by Local, County or State Officials to evacuate personnel from site based on an offsite hazardous or flammable gaseous release event Explosive gas concentrations being measured > explosive limits or projected onsite (outside of plant)

> 50 ppm hydrazine

> 300 ppm ammonia l

> 50 ppm hydrochloric acid Toxic gaseous concentrations being measured or projected onsite (outside of > 1400 ppm morpholine plant)

> 30 ppm ethanolamine (ETA)

> IDLH for any toxic gas (see D14.4 AOP 1' Note: IDLH =mrnmediatetyDangerous to Ute or Health.

IDLH

Reference:

NIOSH Pocket Guide to Cherrncal Hazards, June 1994.

Entry into the plant environshof toxic.or flammaible gses (EAL Ref Manual 171)

Explosive gas concentrations being l, explosive limits bv~I measured within the plant. I 0 Alert

> 50 ppm hydrazine

> 300 ppm ammonia Toxic gaseous concentrations being measured within the plant > 50 com hydrochloric acid

> 1400 ppm morpholine

> 30 ppm ethanolamine (ETi A) 1

> IDLH for any toxic gas (seE) D14.4 AOP 1)

Note: IDLH =twnxediately Dangerous to Ufe or Health.

IDLH

Reference:

NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemtical Hazards, June 1994.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 52 of 60 Condition 17: Hazards to Plant Operations a res wIth , nt nt. - in pa. M dd&5 Col Sudo n (EAL Ref Manual 17J)

Mode 1, 2, 3, or44 T.S >200 °F Site Area Emergency Explosive gas concentrations being measured in a vital area from an unisolable source > explosive limits such that further access to the vital area is being prevented at a time when it is needed

> 50 ppm hydrazine Toxic gaseous concentrations > 300 ppm ammonia being measured in a vital area > 50 ppm hydrochloric acid at the breathing zone such that further access to the vital > 1400 ppm morpholine area is being restricted at a > 30 ppm ethanolamine (Ef FA) time when it is needed ir.

> IDLH for any toxic gas (so?e D14.4 AOP 1)

Note: IDLH = Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health. IDLH

Reference:

NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, June 1994.

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 53 of 60 Condition 18 :ISFSI Events IS  ! cask tip ovrord1pe~ut1g

~~ge ca~'g sea (EAL Ref Manual 18A)

Loaded cask tipped over or dropped Am _ Notification of K-11 Unusual Event Overpressure monitoring tank [ 0 psig pressure decreasing to 0 psig I of,11"11-6 Loss (EAL Ref Manual 18B)

While loaded cask is outside the plant protected area Alert

Z

A radiation field near ISFSI cask

'- increase by a factor of 1000 above the 4ox ambient radiation field (background plus the normal radiation field from the I- cask(s))

Ma

, E Lo Widespread contamination outside the ISFSI protected area

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 54 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events (EAL Ref Manual 19A)

'Seismic Event" Annunciator received L + Notification of on the Seismograph Alarm Panel [ Unusual Event l~ - n¢_ .t v;b t_. ",f D.,.D I. - -- ,: - - ^ . - r b

. ;- - _ - rk(-  : ffi Earthquake greater tlan 0perationaI; (EAL Ref Manual 19B)

Basi Earthquake "Operational Basis Earthquake" Annunciator received on the _ Alert Seismograph Alarm Panel Earthquake greter tharDe~sigi Bs~is Et N,<

Cold Siutd~w (EAL Ref Manual 19C)

Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4 Site Area "Design Basis Earthquake" Emergency Annunciator received on the Seismograph Alarm Panel

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 55 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events "Anytorad isible frtmi"e , (EAL Ref Manual 19D)

Reported to the SS or SM I I1 Notification of Visual observation by plant L Unusual Event personnel and/or plant security I I Any tornado striking he facilty (EAL Ref Manual 19E)

Reported to the SS or SM, or ED Alert Visual observation by plant personnel and/or plant security

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 56 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events 50 Year Flood (EAL Ref Manual 19F)

River Intake Elevation Notification of

'686 ft Unusual Event Flo els leve (EAL Ref Manual 19G)

River Intake Elevation -

(USAR 2.4.3.5) - requires both units to , 692 ft _ Alert be shut down to Mode 2, 3, 4 or 5 Flood lls n deig l with platnti oe5 odSudw (EAL Ref Manual 19H)

Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 Site Area Emergency River Intake Elevation - Power operation design level (highest level > 698 a transformers will function)

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 57 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events Low ater levelisbeing experienced or,,

pr ted

- beyond -- usual levels.,' (EAL Ref Manual 191)

River intake elevation (11 /21 Cooling I <672.5 ft Notification of Water Pump - Low Water Level Trip) I Unusual Event Low o aterlevls bing xpeiencd wteI- els being ex 3rierib'e 'or'

,.Lw 0.l prolete to be near designwlevels. ^, (EAL Ref Manual 19J)

River intake elevation approxmately 669.5 ft . Alert With plant inot in Mode 5,-Cold Shutdown, low water levels bemig eexperiencedor projected to'be less than design levels, or failure of vital - (EAL Ref Manual 19K) equipment with low water level.

Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4 Site Area Emergency River intake elevation corresponding to loss of Lock &

Dam # 3 Major vital equipment failure River Intake Elevation

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 58 of 60 Condition 19: Natural Events Sustained winds being. . expeenced r pkoected neard n lvl (EAL Ref Manual 19L)

Sustained wind speed indicated by >90 mph 0 Alert met tower r . .  ; P . . .

'Sustained' winds. being. in 'ex'cess iof.' "".

'designleel bein>"g experi'"nc8dor.' (EAL Ref Manual 19M) projected w'ith plant in Mbde 5, Cold Shutdown. l:;,, ,!N\- ij, , ,

Modes 1, 2, 3, or4 T.S >200 F + Site Area Emergency Sustained wind speed indicated by met tower I

> 100 mph F-W Any major internal or 'external evetnts (e.g2., fires,earthquake, substantially (EAL Ref Manual 19N) beyond design levs) which could or.,.

has caused massive damage to plant systems 'resultingpor potential for resutingi lre rlae't ffsite he ,

envronent t in exicess f. ,. EPA .he

,Protctve AtonzGuides.

As determined by the SS, SM, or ED [ General Emergency

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 59 of 60 Condition 20: Other Beerditlons that warrn i sd stafor~itean~or ~cal6ffste (EAL Ref Manual 20A)

A&lll -~.

SM and SS concurrence that plant L Notification of conditions warrant increased awareness I

• Unusual Event to reach required Inabillty shutdownk. . K within Technica Specification Liits-<. (EAL Ref Manual 20B)

T.S.ACTION TABLE not metmet Notification of requires plant shutdown or cooldown I Unusual Event Reactor power reduction or cooldown I requirements have been exceeded Con~di~tiontat Dinove otherrtha normal controlled shutdown. -'Kn.,'g" :M (EAL Ref Manual 20C)

Reactor power reduction or cooldown has Notification of been initiated Unusual Event Emergency Safeguard Function equipment did NOT perform its function if required Cooldown rate exceeded Tech Spec Limit SS or SM opinion that lack of control of shutdown or cooldown warrants offsite agency notification

F3-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES ATTACHMENT 1 REV. 35 Page 60 of 60 Condition 20: Other el u e a(EAL Ref Manual 20D)

SS, SM, or ED opinion I Alert ea.rtheIsit Qt theipublic (EAL Ref Manual 20E)

Site Area SS, SM, or ED opinion Emergency Ohrpant cqn~ltlns exist, from -

lare a (EAL Ref Manual 20F) dtl. i as^or I General SS, SM, or ED opinion I Emergency