IR 05000482/2018010
| ML18318A330 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 11/14/2018 |
| From: | Thomas Farnholtz Region 4 Engineering Branch 1 |
| To: | Heflin A Wolf Creek |
| References | |
| IR 2018010 | |
| Download: ML18318A330 (35) | |
Text
ber 14, 2018
SUBJECT:
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION NRC DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2018010
Dear Mr. Heflin:
On August 3, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Wolf Creek Generating Station. On August 2, 2018, the NRC team held an initial debrief of the results of this inspection with Mr. Jamie McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. On October 1, 2018, a phone call was held with Mr. Steve Smith, Vice President, Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff, to clarify the characterization of the identified findings. On November 1, 2018, an additional phone call was held with Mr. Daljit Mand, Director, Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff, to revise the characterization of the identified findings. On November 13, 2018, a final exit phone call was held with Mr. Gabe Fugate, Director, Plant Support, and other members of the licensee staff, to identify changes to the inspection findings as a result of an enforcement policy review. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC team documented four findings of very low safety significance (Green) and one licensee identified finding, in this report. These findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspectors at the Wolf Creek Generating Station.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Thomas R. Farnholtz, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
Sincerely, Docket No. 50-482 License No. NPF-42 Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000482/2018010 w/ Attachment:
Supplemental Information
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report
Docket Number: 05000482 License Number: NPF-42 Report Number: 05000482/2018010 Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-010-0041 Licensee: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation Facility: Wolf Creek Generating Station Location: Burlington, KS 66839 Inspection Dates: July 11, 2018 to August 3, 2018 Inspectors: R. Kopriva, Senior Resident Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 F. Thomas, Resident Inspector, Branch B I. Anchondo, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 A. Palmer, Senior Reactor Technology Instructor, Technical Training Center H. Leake, Contractor, Beckman and Associates J. Zudans, Contractor, Beckman and Associates Approved By: Thomas R. Farnholtz, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an Integrated Inspection at Wolf Creek Generating Station in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. NRC-identified and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations Failure to Follow Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Green None 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000482/2018010-01 Closed The team identified two examples of a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to follow procedures.
Failure to Establish an Adequate Procedure for Operator Time Critical/Time Sensitive Actions Validation Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Green None 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000482/2018010-02 Closed The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,
Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to have an adequate Procedure.
Procedure AI 21-016, Operator Time Critical Actions Validation, Revision 14, Attachment B
- Time Sensitive Action List, does not have unique identifiers for cross referencing the records to the procedure.
Failure to Correct Reoccurring Problems with Time Critical/Sensitive Action Activities Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Green [P.4] - Problem 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000482/2018010-03 Identification and Closed Resolution, Trending The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,
Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to correct reoccurring problems with Time Critical/Time Sensitive Action issues.
Failure to Identify that the 125 VDC Equalizing Voltage had Exceeded Design Requirements Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Green [H.13] - Human 71111.21M -
Systems NCV 05000482/2018010-04 Performance,
Closed Consistent Process The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III,
Design Control, for the failure to verify or check the adequacy of design calculation NK-E-001, 125 Volt Direct-Current (VDC) Class 1E Battery System Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Studies, Revision 4. The licensee failed to recognize that the actual 125 VDC Class 1E bus voltages had exceeded the maximum design limit voltages for downstream equipment identified in the calculation, and they had not placed any limits on voltages which could exceed the design limit of 140 VDC on the Class 1E System components.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs)in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21MDesign Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
From July 16, 2018 to August 3, 2018, the team reviewed the following design attributes associated with risk-significant components, permanent plant modifications, and operating experience.
Component ===
- (1) Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump PAL02.
a) Material condition of pump/turbine and pump room walkdown.
b) Condition reports and maintenance activities associated with pump and turbine.
c) Operating procedures for pump operation during a design bases loss-of-coolant accident coincident with a loss-of-offsite power.
d) Pump testing procedures and test trends associated with in-service testing.
e) System health, system descriptions, vendor technical manual and corrective action reviews.
f ) Engineering evaluations of pump non-conforming conditions.
- (2) Shutdown RCP Seals.
a) Material condition of seals, maintenance activities and corrective actions.
b) Operating procedures for pump operation in support of FLEX conditions and conformance to requirements for sealing acceptability.
c) Condition reports and maintenance activities associated with seals and seal package.
d) FLEX strategies and their implementation at Wolf Creek and conformance to regulatory requirements.
e) Reactor coolant pump seal test procedures, test results and test trends.
f ) Evolution of Generation III design and modification changes.
- (3) Reactor Coolant Pump A Circuit Breaker PA0107.
a) Design Basis documents.
b) Current system health report.
c) Selected drawings.
d) Maintenance and test procedures.
e) Condition Reports associated with the Reactor Coolant Pump Circuit Breaker PA0107.
f) Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports.
g) Electrical distribution and system load flow/voltage drop calculations.
- (4) 125 VDC Switchboard Bus NK41 a) Design basis documents.
b) Current system health report.
c) Selected drawings.
d) Maintenance and test procedures.
e) Condition Reports associated with the 125 Volts Direct Current (VDC) System Inverter Bus NK01.
f ) Battery short circuit calculations, sizing calculations, coordination studies, voltage drop calculations, and switchboard maintenance activities were appropriate for the design of the system.
g) Input and output operating voltage characteristics to verify the NK41 switchboard and downstream components can perform their design function through all input voltage ranges.
h) Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports.
I ) Preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing procedures for Class 1E 125 VDC System components.
- (5) 13.8KV AC Bus PA01 a) Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports.
b) Load flow, voltage drop, and short circuit calculations.
c) Protective device selection and settings.
d) Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing.
e) Material condition and configuration (i.e., visual inspection during a walkdown).
- (6) 4160 VAC Bus NB02 a) Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports.
b) Load flow, voltage drop, and short circuit calculations.
c) Protective device selection and settings.
d) Procedures for preventive maintenance, inspection, and testing.
e) Equipment qualification specifications.
f ) Adequacy of offsite power during design basis events.
g) Material condition and configuration (i.e., visual inspection during a walkdown).
Component Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) (1 Sample)
- (1) Containment Isolation Valve EJHV8701A a) Procedures and associated testing records for the containment and pressure isolation function.
b) Operating procedures for manual manipulation of EJHV8701A during accident conditions.
c) Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports.
Permanent Plant Modification (4 Samples)
- (1) DCP 014893, Switchgear Racking Mechanism Chain Repair,
- (2) DCP 015251, Emergency Diesel Generator Exciter Power Potential Transformer Protection,
- (3) DCP 015214, Essential Service Water - Water Hammer Vacuum Breaker Valves Spring Replacement,
- (5) DCP 014831, Improved Reactor Coolant Pump Passive Shutdown Seal.
- (6) DCP 004637, Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve Nitrogen Backup Port.
- (7) DCP 015081, New Residual Heat Removal Pressure Transmitter EJPIT0027 and NPIS
===Point.
Operating Experience (1 Sample)===
- (1) NRC Generic Letter 2006-02, Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power Evaluation of Inspection Related Operator Procedures and Actions
- (1) Control room operator actions resulting from a simulated small break Loss of Coolant Accident.
a) Control room crew was expected to implement procedures to address the loss of coolant accident and trip reactor coolant pumps when conditions were met.
b) From the time when reactor coolant system pressure drops below setpoint and conditions are met the operators must take actions to secure reactor coolant pumps within five minutes.
- (2) Control room operator actions resulted from a loss of coolant accident which emptied the reactor water storage tank water into containment sump.
a) Control room crew was expected to implement procedures to address the empty reactor water storage tank and transfer the emergency core cooling system pumps from injection mode to cold leg recirculation mode.
b) From the time the reactor water storage tank level reaches Lo Lo 1 setpoint the operators must take actions to transfer emergency core cooling system equipment from injection mode to cold leg recirculation within eight minutes nine seconds.
- (3) Control room operator actions resulted from a loss of coolant accident which emptied the reactor water storage tank water into containment sump.
a) Control room crew was expected to implement procedures to address the empty reactor water storage tank and transfer the remaining emergency core cooling system pumps from injection mode to cold leg recirculation mode.
b) From the time the reactor water storage tanks level reaches Lo Lo 2 setpoint the operators must take actions to transfer remaining emergency core cooling system equipment from injection mode to cold leg recirculation within two minutes ten seconds.
- (4) Control room operator actions resulted from a loss of component cooling water in one train with the emergency core cooling system pumps running.
a) Control room crew was expected to implement procedures to address stopping the affected emergency core cooling system pumps during a loss of component cooling water cooling in a single train.
b) From the time the component cooling water pumps are not running in a single train the operators must take actions to stop the affected emergency core cooling system pumps to prevent damage from loss of cooling within thirty minutes.
All operator action timings were completed on the simulator successfully.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Follow Procedures Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Green None 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000482/2018010-01 Closed
Introduction:
The team identified two examples of a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to follow procedures.
Example 1
Description:
The team reviewed control room time critical and time sensitive activities which are used to validate design bases criteria. Without verification and validation of time critical/sensitive activities, the licensee would not be able to confirm that timing of design bases criteria would be met.
The team selected time critical and time sensitive, non-exempt tasks to be reviewed, which are identified in Attachments A and B of Procedure AI 21-016, Operator Time Critical Actions Validation, revision 14. These nonexempt tasks are required to be validated at least once every five years. The team reviewed approximately forty nine records from 2013 to 2018, and found that when reviewing Time Verification Form AIF 21-016-02, Revision 1, most of the records provided had Block 2 and Block 3 filled out improperly. The errors included the blocks being empty or were filled out with insufficient information. Block 2 is the identification information to link the form back to the task in the Attachments A or B of the procedure.
Block 3 is the reference information to show to how it was validated using other documents.
Without correct information in Block 2, the licensee had difficulty demonstrating which task was validated. Without correct information in Block 3, the licensee had difficulty demonstrating under what conditions the task was validated, which calls into question the validity of the document. With some records left blank in Block 2 or Block 3 the licensee was left to determine how the task was validated using comments or assumptions. The team chose only nonexempt tasks to simplify the inspection. It was not clear from the records provided to the team that the licensees program is being performed as required, and was not being performed as designated in the program procedures.
Corrective Actions: The licensee has acknowledged that the forms had not been filled out properly and that Procedure AI 21-016 had not been followed. The licensee has entered this concern into their corrective action program, and will review the concern of failure to follow station procedures.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report CR-00125356.
Example 2
Description:
During a review of Operability Evaluation OE-NK-18-005, dated July 26, 2018, the team questioned whether the downstream components from Class 1E 125 VAC Bus NK01 had been considered in the extent of condition of the evaluation. The operability evaluation did not address the downstream components, as Condition Report CR-00125361 only focused on the NK batteries and chargers, without regard for the downstream components. This does not comply with the licensees procedure AP 26C-004, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment, Revision 35. Section 6.1.2.1.a requires that operability determinations should include which structures, systems, and components (SSCs) are affected by the degraded or non-conforming condition. The operability determination performed for condition report CR-125361 failed to meet this requirement in that the components downstream of the NK buses had not been considered for overvoltage effects.
Corrective Actions: On August 1, 2018, the licensee completed the revised Operability Evaluation OE NK-18-005, to address the effect of the overvoltage condition on the downstream 125 VDC rated equipment. The licensee determined that reasonable assurance exists that the systems, structures, and components, associated with the operability evaluation remained capable of performing their specified safety function. The licensee has entered this concern into their corrective action program, and will review the concern of failure to follow station procedures.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report CR-00125487
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The team determined that the licensees failure to follow procedures (Procedure AI-21-016, Operator Time Critical Actions Validation, Revision 14, and Procedure AP 26C-004, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment, Revision 35) was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The team determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, for Example 1: the licensee failed to complete Time Verification Form AIF 21-016-02, to accurately validate simulator time critical and time sensitive activities for control room and in plant activities. Without verification of time critical/sensitive activities, the licensee could not confirm the timing of design bases criteria would be met. For Example 2: the operability screening of Condition Report CR-00125361 for the 140 VDC design limit for 125 VDC System components having been exceeded only focused on battery banks NK11, NK12, NK13, NK14, and the battery chargers, but did not address the effects of overvoltage conditions on downstream equipment.
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the findings using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued October 7, 2016. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the team determined the findings to be of very low safety significance (Green)because the findings were a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather.
Cross-cutting Aspect: The team determined that the finding did not have a cross cutting aspect associated with it.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, which states Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.
Contrary to the above, prior to July 30, 2018, the licensee failed to accomplish activities affecting quality in accordance with station procedures. For Example 1; Procedure AI-21-016, Operator Time Critical Actions Validation, Revision 14, contains Form AIF 21-016-02, Time Verification Form, Revision 1. On AIF 21-016-02, Block 2 is the identification information to link the form back to the task in the Attachments A or B of the procedure. Block 3 is the reference information to show to how it was validated using other documents. On several the forms, Block 2 and Block 3 were not filled out correctly as required by the procedure. For Example 2; licensee Procedure AP 26C-004, Operability Determination and Functionality Assessment, Revision 35, Section 6.1.2, states, in part, that the scope of a Operability Determination must be sufficient to address the capability of systems, structures, and components to perform their specified safety functions. The operability screening of Condition Report CR-00125361 did not follow Procedure AP 26C-004, in that it did not address all of the capabilities of the component to perform its safety function as the effects of overvoltage conditions on downstream equipment were not analyzed.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Establish an Adequate Procedure for Operator Time Critical Actions Validation Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Green None 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000482/2018010-02 Closed
Introduction:
The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for failure to have an adequate Procedure.
Procedure AI 21-016, Operator Time Critical Actions Validation, Revision 14, Attachment B
- Time Sensitive Action List, does not have unique identifiers for cross referencing the records to the procedure.
Description:
The Design Basis Assurance inspection procedure 71111.21M, Section 03.01 b.2.b discusses operations margin and refers to components required to be operated during high risk and/or time critical operations. The team elected to review Procedure AI 21-016, Operator Time Critical Actions Validation, Revision 14, to confirm that the licensee was performing design basis time critical and time sensitive actions for operations activities. The team identified a procedure deficiency in that Attachment B, Time Sensitive Action List, did not have unique identifiers in task Block 2 similar to task Block 2 found in Attachment A. This lack of unique identifier prevents cross referencing the records for Time Sensitive Actions listed in Attachment B with the records documenting the required validation. Block 2 of Form AIF AI 21-016-02 would use this information to link the form back to the task in the procedure attachments to prove it had been validated.
As an example, in the Time Critical Action heading, each time critical action in Attachment A starts with a code TCA_SLB_S1. Attachment B just has verbiage. The records that were provided were filled out with a variety of descriptions, usually not matching the description provided in the attachment. Without this unique information identifier, it was difficult to determine which task was validated, and at times impossible to determine what was being validated.
Corrective Actions: The licensee has acknowledged that Form AIF AI 21-016-02, B, Time Sensitive Action List, did not have unique identifiers in task Block 2, and is in the process of reviewing the procedure to identify and correct deficiencies that may exist.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Reports CR-00125536 and CR-00125350.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The team determined that the licensees failure to have an adequate procedure with unique identifiers for the Time Sensitive Actions in Attachment B of Procedure AI 21-016 was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The team determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the licensee failed to have unique identifiers for the time sensitive actions so that records could be cross referenced to the procedure to document that the required tasks had been validated successfully.
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued October 7, 2016. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green)because the finding was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather.
Cross-cutting Aspect: The team determined that this finding did not have a cross cutting aspect associated with it.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, which states, Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Instructions, procedures, or drawings shall include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.
Contrary to the above, prior to July 30, 2018, the licensee failed to include appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that important activities had been satisfactorily accomplished. The licensee had failed to establish an adequate procedure for cross referencing Time Sensitive Actions listed in Attachment B with the records documenting the required validation. Specifically, Procedure AI 21-016, Attachment B -
Time Sensitive Action List, Revision 14, was inadequate in that each Time Sensitive Action did not have a unique identifier for cross referencing the records to the procedure. (Could not correlate which records were used to validate which task).
Disposition: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Correct Reoccurring Problems with Time Critical/Sensitive Action Activities Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Green [P.4] - Problem 71111.21M Systems NCV 05000482/2018010-03 Identification and Closed Resolution, Trending
Introduction:
The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to correct reoccurring problems with completing Time Critical/Time Sensitive Action issues.
Description:
The team reviewed corrective actions associated with Procedure AP 21-04, Operator Response Time Program, Revision 4B, and Procedure AI 21-016, Operator Time Critical Actions Validation, Revision 14. The team found that during the five year cycle of the program, the licensee had identified multiple (approximately 18) deficiencies in the program (i.e. source document to the form is not consistently being utilized, several of the time critical actions in AI 21-016 have not been validated, time critical actions not submitted as required, time sensitive action program requires enhancement, operations time sensitive action cannot be satisfied, several operator time critical actions are not validated and could result in operating outside of analyzed limits.) The licensees review pertaining to the identification of the problems, and resolution of the issues had resulted in inadequate identification of reoccurring problems, and problem resolution. The concerns were also identification in a Mid Cycle Self-Assessment (CR-00085924), QA Audits (CR-00104699), and an NRC Component Design Basis Inspection (CR-00103698). The corrective actions derived to answer the concerns had not prevented the problems from reoccurring. The licensee had addressed the concerns in eighteen different condition reports dating back to 2013.
The team found that over the last five years, the corrective actions taken by the licensee for the deficiencies and deviations in the Operator Time Critical Action Validations were ineffective.
Corrective Actions: The licensee has acknowledged that the corrective actions for these issues had not resolved the issues. The licensee has entered this concern into their corrective action program, and will be reviewing the issues.
Corrective Action Reference: Condition Report CR-00125533.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to promptly identify and correct deficiencies with the validation of Time Critical and Time Sensitive Actions, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The team determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the licensee did not recognize that they had failed to correct reoccurring deficiencies concerning validation of Time Critical/Time Sensitive Actions over the last five years, which could lead to inaccurate design bases assumptions or incorrect operator actions.
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued October 7, 2016. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green)because the finding was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather.
Cross-cutting Aspect: The team determined that this finding had a cross cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Trending, where the organization periodically analyzes information from the corrective action program and other assessments in the aggregate to identify programmatic and common cause issues. The licensee failed to recognize reoccurring concerns pertaining to time critical action, even after these issues had been identified in self-assessment and Quality Control audits. [P.4]
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states, in part, Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, defective materials and equipment, and nonconformances, are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, since May 2012 until August 1, 2018, the licensee failed to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, deficiencies, and nonconformances, are promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the licensee had identified multiple (approximately 18) deficiencies with Time Critical and Time Sensitive Actions and the corrective actions had been inadequate to correct the conditions, even after these issues had been identified in self-assessment and Quality Control audits.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Identify 125 VDC Equalizing Voltage Exceeded Design Requirements Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Green [H.13] - Human 71111.21M -
Systems NCV 05000482/2018010-04 Performance, Closed Consistent Process
Introduction:
The team identified a Green, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to verify or check the adequacy of design calculation NK-E-001, 125 Volt Direct-Current (VDC) Class 1E Battery System Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Studies, Revision 4. The licensee failed to recognize that the actual 125 VDC Class 1E bus voltages had exceeded the maximum design limit voltages for downstream equipment identified in the calculation, and they had not placed any limits on voltages which could exceed the design limit of 140 VDC on the Class 1E System components.
Description:
One of the components the team selected to inspect was the 125 VDC Switchboard Bus NK41. The Wolf Creek Updated Safety Analysis Report, Section 1.2.7.2 states that vital alternating current instrumentation and control power supply systems include battery systems, static inverters, and distribution panels. All of the voltages listed in that section of the updated safety analysis report are nominal values, and all electrical Class IE equipment is designed to accept the expected range in voltage. As part of the review for this component, the team reviewed design calculation NK-E-001, 125 Volt Direct-Current (VDC) Class 1E Battery System Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Studies, Revision 4. During the review of the calculation, the team identified concerns with the validation of certain criteria specified in the calculation.
The team noted that procedure MPE E050Q-05, Battery Equalizing Procedure, Revision 14, references a battery equalizing voltage range of 139.5 to 140 VDC for the 125 VDC batteries (NK11, NK12, NK13, and NK14); and procedure STS NB-005, Breaker Alignment Verification, Revision 34, Appendix B, references a required voltage range of 130 to 140 VDC for the Class 1E 125 VDC electrical distribution buses NK01, NK02, NK03, and NK04.
The team identified that design calculation NK-E-001 lists several components with maximum voltage limits that are less than the maximum voltages of 140 VDC. The team requested voltage data during the time that the battery equalize charging was in progress. The licensee provided the team data measurements that had been taken between April 10, 2018 and April 18, 2018. The data indicated that the actual NK01 bus voltage exceeded the 140 VDC procedure and calculation limit (up to 143 VDC for approximately 20 minutes during NK11 battery equalize charging). The team identified periods when components downstream of the Class 1E 125 VDC electrical distribution buses (with design limits less than 140 VDC) had been exposed to voltages that exceeded maximum design values for components listed in design calculation NK-E-001. The licensee did not have an analysis to address the concern pertaining to whether the equipment downstream of the NK01 bus could withstand voltages that exceeded design limits. Also, Procedure MPE E050Q-05 references a maximum equalizing voltage of 140 VDC for the battery banks.
According to licensee systems engineering personnel, this condition would only be expected during battery equalize charging activities. Section 7.2 of procedure MPE E050Q-05 requires that battery terminal voltage is measured and that potentiometer adjustments be made to obtain equalize values given in the table for equalize voltage range, but there were no steps that prohibited exceeding the 140 VDC maximum value. Furthermore, procedure STS NB-005, Breaker Alignment Verification, does not reference any specific steps to ensure that the 140 VDC voltage limit would not be exceeded. Neither of the procedures referenced identify any actions to be taken when the voltage limit is exceeded.
Corrective Actions. On August 1, 2018, the licensee completed Operability Evaluation OE NK-18-005, to address the effect of the overvoltage condition on the 125 VDC battery, battery charger, and equalizer. The licensee determined that reasonable assurance exists that the systems, structures, or components associated with the operability evaluation remained capable of performing their specified safety function. According to updated information in Condition Report CR-00125361, a procedure change request (PCR) was initiated to add battery voltage monitoring to procedure MPE E050Q-05 to ensure maximum voltage values are not exceeded. Furthermore, updated information in Condition Report CR-00125468, indicated that an action was initiated to review previous performance of NK buses to determine the historical amount of overvoltage that may have occurred.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports CR-00125361 and CR-00125468.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to verify or check the adequacy of design calculation NK-E-001, 125 Volt Direct-Current (VDC) Class 1E Battery System Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Studies, Revision 4, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The team determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Specifically, the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of design calculation NK-E-001, 125 Volt Direct-Current (VDC) Class 1E Battery System Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Studies, Revision 4, regarding maximum allowed Class 1E 125 VDC voltage, and procedures involving Class 1E 125 VDC system components. There had been periods of time when components downstream of the Class 1E 125 VDC electrical distribution buses (with design limits less than 140 VDC) had been exposed to voltages that exceeded maximum design values. Furthermore, procedure STS NB-005, Breaker Alignment Verification, does not reference any specific steps to ensure that the 140 VDC voltage is not exceeded, and none of the procedures reference any actions to take when the voltage limit is exceeded.
Significance: The team assessed the significance of the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued October 7, 2016. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green)because the finding was a design or qualification deficiency that did not represent a loss of operability or functionality; did not represent an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-technical specification equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: The team determined that this finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Consistent Process, where Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate.
Specifically, the licensee did not use a consistent, systematic approach for reviewing components downstream of the battery chargers for overvoltage conditions as identified in the design basis calculation. [H.13]
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states in part, Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. The design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.
Contrary to the above, prior to August 1, 2018, the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.
Specifically, the licensee failed to verify or check the adequacy of design calculation NK-E-001, Revision 4, 125 Volt Direct-Current (VDC) Class 1E Battery System Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Studies, and procedures involving Class 1E 125 VDC system components, by not recognizing that the actual 125 VDC Class 1E bus voltages had exceeded the maximum design limit voltages for downstream equipment identified in design calculation NK-E-001. Also, the licensee had not placed any voltage limits in any procedures for the 125 VDC Class 1E System which had actually exceeded the design limit of 140 VDC.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71152Problem Identification and Resolution This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states, in part, Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, prior to 2015, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a repetitive deficiency or nonconformance. Specifically, the licensee had identified a leaking flange on the residual heat removal heat exchanger since 1997. Prior to 1997 a different data base had been used to record boric acid leakage, and the data was not available during the inspection. Over the years since plant startup, the licensee had been diligent in completing boric acid evaluations on the leaking residual heat removal heat exchanger flange, indicating minimal wastage of the flange closure studs and nuts that had been subjected to boric acid.
Corrective actions included cleaning up the boric acid leakage, and checking or re-torqueing the closure nuts. These measures did not correct the problem of the leaking heat exchanger flange.
In 2015 the licensee completed an in-depth engineering evaluation of the leaking flange, including discussions with the heat exchanger manufacturer. New corrective measures included changing the torque values on the closure studs and nuts. The licensee is still evaluating the results of the corrective actions taken to preclude further leakage.
Significance/Severity Level: The team assessed the significance of the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued October 7, 2016. The team concluded the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because all questions in Exhibit 2 could be answered no.
Corrective Action Reference(s): Condition Reports CR-00057242, CR-00057267, and CR-
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
On August 2, 2018, the team presented the initial results of this design basis assurance inspection to Mr. Jamie McCoy, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On October 1, 2018, a phone call was held with Mr. Steve Smith, Vice President, Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff, to clarify the characterization of the identified findings.
On November 1, 2018, an additional phone call was held with Mr. Daljit Mand, Director, Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff, to revise the characterization of the identified findings. On November 13, 2018, a final exit phone call was held with Mr. Gabe Fugate, Director, Plant Support, and other members of the licensee staff, to identify changes to the inspection findings as a result of an enforcement policy review. The team verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Calculations
Number Title Revision
A-06-W Thermal Capability of Electrical Penetration 007
Assemblies (EPA) Versus Dual Short Circuit
Protection to Satisfy Reg. [Regulatory] Guide 1.63
H-06 Protective Relays 10
H-08 System NB Protective Relays 5
H-15 Provide RCPM Protective Relay Settings (Class 1E) 4
for UV & UF
NK-E-001 125 VDC Class 1E Battery System Sizing, Voltage 4
Drop and Short Circuit Studies
NN-E-001 Class 1E NN Inverter Loading 0
P-009A-010- Piping Stress Analysis for Essential Service Water June 20, 2017
CN001 System, Train B
PK-E-001 Non-Class 1E 125 Volt DC System 3
WCN-023-CALC- Transient water hammer analysis of the essential 1
001 service water system following a LOOP with a higher
setpoint for the vacuum breakers at the top of the loop.
XX-E-006 AC System Analysis 8
Condition Reports (CR-)
00056641 00077640 00098218 00106993 00118952
00057242 00077791 00098844 00107885 00118954
00057267 00077792 00099349 00107915 00119043
00069540 00077794 00099930 00109450 00119167-01
00070051 00082790 00099956 00109656 00120213
00070256 00085924 00099993 00109733 00121267
00070380 00088577 00100863 00109893 00121828
00070718 00088665 00101289 00110094 00122600
00071246 00091857 00101942 00110420 00123328
A1-1
Condition Reports (CR-)
00071977 00092106 00102416-01 00110546 00123329
00072165 00092324 00103150 00111571 00123660
00072426 00093748 00103658 00112981 00123843
00072496 00093748 00103698 00116051 00123902
00073206 00094365 00103918 00116852 00123908
00073240 00094366 00104699 00117311 00124694
00073244 00094627 00105147 00117441 00124822
00073443 00097769 00105480 00117639 00124997
00073445 00098177 00106923 00118853
Condition Reports Generated During the Inspection (CR-)
00125081 00125166 00125310 00125413 00125489
00125111 00125183 00125350 00125414 00125490
00125112 00125184 00125356 00125447 00125492
00125123 00125191 00125361 00125456 00125513
00125136 00125225 00125362 00125457 00125521
00125139 00125227 00125370 00125458 00125533
00125152 00125255 00125405 00125468 00125536
00125158 00125255a 00125406 00125487 00125557
Design Change Packages
Revision
Number Title
Date
014831 Improved RCP Passive Shutdown Seal 0
015040 Nitrogen Backup for EJHCV0606 and EJHCV0607 01
015070 NN Power to GK Damper 0
015081 New RHR Pressure Transmitter EJPIT0027 and 0
NPIS [Nuclear Plant Information System] Point
A1-2
Design Change Packages
Revision
Number Title
Date
015214 ESW Water Hammer Vacuum Breaker Valves Spring 0
Replacement
14923 Restore Regulatory Compliance for 10 480 V MOVs 0
CCP 11897 Transformer XNB02 Tap Change 2
DCP 13271 Turbine Trip Wiring Changes in Support of DCP 1
011354
FCN 015251 EDG Exciter Power Potential Transformer Protection 1
MCP 14893 Switchgear Racking Mechanism Chain Repair 0
PMR 04637 RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve Nitrogen Backup 0
Port
Drawings
Number Title Revision
5736 Vertical Residual H.E. Outline Drawing 5
5739 Vertical Residual Heat Exchanger Details 3
5740 Vertical Residual Heat Exchanger Details 4
E-009B-00025 Breaker Schematic G.E. 13.8KV W02
E-02PA01 Logic Diagram, Unit Auxiliary Source 13.8kV Bus 4
Feeder Breakers
E-11001 Main Single Line Diagram 11
E-11005 List of Loads Supplied by Emergency Diesel 58
Generator
E-11010 DC [Direct Current] Main Single Line Diagram 11
E-11010 DC [Direct Current] Main Single Line Diagram 11
E-11010A DC [Direct Current] Main Single Line Diagram (PK03 05
And PK04 Bus)
A1-3
Drawings
Number Title Revision
E-11010A DC [Direct Current] Main Single Line Diagram (PK03 05
And PK04 Bus)
E-11023 Relay Setting Tabulation & Coordination Curves 10
System NB
E-11030 Relay Setting Tabulation RCPM UV & UF Monitors 8
E-11032 Substation and Plant Transformer Tap Settings 5
E-11MA01 Main Generator Single Line Metering and Relaying 33
Diagram
E-11NB02 Lower Medium Voltage Sys. Class 1E 4.16 kV Single 10
Line Meter and Relay Diagram
E-11PA01 Higher Medium Voltage System 13.8 kV Single Line 13
Meter & Relay Diagram
E-11PK01 Non-Class 1E 125V System Meter & Relay Diagram 13
E-12NF01 Load Shedding and Emergency Load Sequencing 4
Logic
E-13BB01 Schematic Diagram Reactor Coolant Pumps 18
E-13N03 Schematic Diagram RHR Pump MOV 8
EID-0004 Pool Parameters 3
IP-M-18EF13-010- Hanger Details Small Pipes, Essential Water System 0
KD-7496 One Line Diagram 67
KD-7496A Distribution System Equipment Lineup Limitations 10
KL-1909 Logic Block Diagram, Load Shedding & Emergency E
Load Sequencing System (LSELS)
M-018-00077 Electrical Schematic Diesel Gen. [Generator] Control W01
NE107
M-018-00077 Electrical Schematic Diesel Gen. [Generator] Control W20
NE106
M-018-00301 Interconnection Wiring Diagram (NE107) W08
A1-4
Drawings
Number Title Revision
M-12BB01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant 37
System
M-12BB04 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Reactor Coolant 24
System
M-12EF01 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Essential Service 29
Water System
M-12EF02 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Essential Service 42
Water System
M-12EJ01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat 55
Removal System
M-12E-J01 P&ID, Residual Heat Removal System 52
M-12EM01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram High Pressure 45
Coolant Injection System
M-12EP01 Piping & Instrumentation Diagram Accumulator Safety 16
Injection
M-223F-00003 CRISPIN Model VR-41 Model Relief Check Valve W04
Flanged Ends Size 4 Fig. 150 - VR
M-724-00761 Motor Operated Gate Valve 6
WIP-J-110-00660- Wiring Diagram Termination Area Rack HF187A 00
W11-A-1 Separation Group 5
WIP-J-110-00671- Rack HF187A & 187B Loading Standardized Nuclear 00
W10-A-1 Unit Power Plant System Applicable to Unit 1, Bechtel
P.O. 10466-J-110-1
WIP-J-110-01026- Instrument Loop Diagram Residual Heat Removal 00
000-A-1 System RHR Pump Discharge Header Pressure
WIP-J-14EJ08- Instrument Isometric Drawing RHR [Residual Heat 00
2-A-1 Removal] HX [Heat Exchanger] 1B to ACCUM
[Accumulator] INJ [Injection] LP [ Loop] 3 & 4
WIP-J-17P39-000- Instrument Mounting Detail Pressure Transmitter 01
(Rosemount) Packed Manifold
WIP-M-12EJ01- Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Residual Heat 00
053-A-1 Removal System
WIP-M-13EJ10- Schematic Diagram Instrumentation 00
2-A-1
A1-5
Procedures
Number Title Revision
18-0022 Essential Reading - LBLOCA HL Break 0
AI 16C-006 Troubleshooting 8
AI 16C-007 Work Order Planning 56
AI 16F-001 Evaluation of Boric Acid Leakage 10
AI 21-016 Operator Time Critical Actions Validation 14
AI 23O-001 Functional Importance Determination 7
AI 26C-004 Technical Specification Application for Containment 7
Isolation Valves
AI 26C-004 Technical Specification Application for Containment 7A
Isolation Valves
AI 28A-010 Screening Condition Reports 29A
AI 28A-010 Screening Condition Reports 21
AI 28A-100 Condition Report Resolution 14
AI 28B-005 Evidence and Action Matrix 4
AI 30B-005 Development and Conduct of Simulator Activities for 31
Licensed Operator Training
AI 30B-015 Licensed Operator Requalification Examination 12
Guidelines
ALR 501 Standby Diesel Engine System Control Panel KJ-121 28
AP 05-002 Disposition and Change Packages 30
AP 05-002 Disposition and Change Package 30
AP 05-005 Design, Implementation and Configuration Control of 22
Modifications
AP 05-005 Design, Implementation and Configuration Control of 22, 26
Modifications
A1-6
Procedures
Number Title Revision
AP 05-013 Review of Vendor Technical Documents 8
AP 05-013 Review of Vendor Technical Documents 8
AP 05-024 Minor Change Package 0
AP 05C-004 Basic Engineering Dispositions 0, 1
AP 15C-001 Procedure Writers Guide 31
AP 15C003 Procedure Users Guide for Abnormal Plant Conditions 37
AP 16C-006 MPAC Work Request/Work Order Process Controls 21A
AP 16F-001 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program 9
AP 20E-001 Industry Operating Experience Program 27
AP 21-001 Conduct of Operations 82
AP 21-004 Operator Response Time Program 4B
AP 21A-002 Diverse and Flexible Coping Mitigation Strategies 2
(FLEX) Program
AP 21C-001 Wolf Creek Substation 21
AP 22A-001 Screening, Prioritization and Pre-Approval 22
AP 26A-003 10 CFR 50.59 Reviews 14
AP 26C-004 Operability Determination and Functionality 35
Assessment
AP 28-001 Operability Evaluations 25
AP 28-007 Nonconformance Control 10
AP 28-011 Resolving Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions 7
Impacting SSCs
AP 28A-100 Corrective Action Program 23
A1-7
Procedures
Number Title Revision
AP 28A-100 Corrective Action Program 22
BD EMG E-0 Reactor Trip of Safety Injection 28
BD EMG E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 19
BD EMG E-2 Faulted SG Isolation 14
BD EMG ES-12 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation 16
EMG E-0 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 39A
EMG E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 29
EMG E-2 Faulted SG Isolation 22
EMG ES-12 Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation 23
EMG FR-C2 Response to Degraded Cooling 17
EMG FR-P1 Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock 22
Conditions
IP-ENG-001 Standard Design Process 0
KMS-4 Mechanical Standard for Bolting 4
KMS-6 Fastener Specification for Use at the Wolf Creek 3
General Station in Both ASME and Non-ASME/ANSI
M-10EJ System Description Residual Heat Removal 4
MPE E009-01 Siemens Breaker Cubicle Maintenance, Testing, and 6
Swapping
MPE E009Q-01 13.8 kV and 4.16 kV Switchgear Inspection and 35
Testing
MPE E009Q-01 13.8 KV And 4.16 KV Switchgear Inspection and 33A
Testing
MPE E009Q-01 13.8 KV And 4.16 KV Switchgear Inspection and 35
Testing
A1-8
Procedures
Number Title Revision
MPE E050Q-05 Battery Equalizing Procedure 14
MPM M712Q-01 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Removal/Installation 25
MPM M712Q-02 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cartridge 10
Inspection/Rebuild
OFN BB-005 RCP Malfunctions 27
OFN BB-005 RCP Malfunctions 28
OFN EG-004 CCW System Malfunctions 18B
OFN EG-004 CCW System Malfunctions 18B
PWROG-14006-P Implementation Guide for Generation III Westinghouse 0-B
Seal
PWROG-16030- Time Critical Action/Time Sensitive Action Program August, 2016
NP Standard PA-PSC-0840
Record of Flex Support Guideline (FSG) Validation Process 2
Completion
STN EJ-205 RHR System Valve Test 5
STN TCA-001 Manual Time Critical Action Timing 5
STS AL-103 TDAFW Pump Inservice Test 73
STS AL-104 TDAFW ESF Response Time Test 24
STS AL-211 TDAFW Comprehensive Pump Testing and System 37
Flow Path Verification and Inservice Check Valve
STS BB-207 RCP Seal Water Injection Inservice Check Valve Test 8
STS BN-208A RWST to RHR Pump A Suction Valve Test 3A
STS BN-208B RWST to RHR Pump B Suction Valve Test 3A
STS IC-740A RHR Switchover to Recirculation Sump Test - Train A 31
A1-9
Procedures
Number Title Revision
STS IC-740B RHR Switchover to Recirculation Sump Test - Train B 28C
STS IC-805B Channel Calibration of NB02 Grid Degraded Voltage, 16
Time Delay Trip
STS IC-902A Actuation Logic Test Train A Residual Heat Removal 4A
Suction Isolation Valves
STS MT-019A 125 VDC Class 1E Quarterly Inspection For NK11 and 1B
NK13 Batteries
STS MT-028 Penetration Breaker Inspection 25
STS MT-028 Penetration Breaker Inspection 26
STS MT-079 ESW System Water Hammer Inservice Check Valve 2
Test
STS NB-005 Breaker Alignment Verification 34
STS NB-005 Breaker Alignment Verification 35
STS PE-007 Periodic Verification of Motor Operated Valves 5
STS PE-19B RHR Suction Valve Leak Test 23
STS VT-001 Verification of OMN-1, MOV Exercise Requirements 5
SYS NB-200 Transferring XNB01 Supply Between SL7 and #7 19
Transformer
SYS NK-331 De-energizing NK Buses 18
TSO 0101-21 Division of Responsibility of the Wolf Creek Substation July 13, 2018
TSO 0400-02 Wolf Creek 345 kV Bus Voltage April 30, 2018
TSO 0414-02 Monitoring Wolf Creek Contingency Study 345 kV Bus April 30, 2018
WCAP-16755-NP Operator Time Critical Action Program Standard Rev. 0
A1-10
Vendor Technical Document
Revision
Number Title
Date
6998D62 Colt Industries Type WNR Volt Reg. [Voltage January 17, 1983
Regulation] & Excitation System
E-009-00223 Instruction Manual for 13.8 kV Switchgear W33
E-009-00242 Instruction Manual for 4.16 kV Class 1E Switchgear W31
E-009-00258 IEEE 323 Qualification Program General Electric Co. July 2, 1984
E-009-00342 Metal-Clad Switchgear W09
E-009B-00001 Qualification Plan for Siemens 5-AF-GER-350-1200- W05
and 5-3AF-GER-350-2000-78
E-009B-00006 Third Party Qualification Plan for Siemens 52STA W01
Switch Mechanisms
E-009B-00009 Instruction Manual for Siemens Type 3AF-GER W06
Vertical Lift Direct Replacement Circuit Breakers
E-009B-00018 Third Party Qualification Report for Siemens Types 5- W01
3AF-GER-350-1200-78 and 5-3AF-GER-350-2000-78
Vertical Lift Vacuum Circuit Breakers and 52STA
Switch Mechanisms
E-009B-00029 Siemens Vacuum Circuit Breakers (Vehicle) W02
E-009B-00029 Siemens Circuit Breakers (Vehicle) Type GER 5kV to
15kV
E-009B-00044 Siemens Type-3AFS Vacuum Circuit Breakers W01
E-009B-00044 Siemens Type-3AFS Vacuum Circuit Breakers W01
E-020-00055 Installation and Maintenance Instructions - AV-Line
Switchboards (GEH-2621C)
E-020-00055 Instructions (GEH-3042A) - Mounting and Connecting
Hardware for QMR Double Branch Panelboard Units,30-100 Amperes
E-020-00055 Instructions (GEH-3043) - Mounting and Connecting
Hardware for QMR Double Branch Panelboard Units,30-600 Amperes
E-050A-00011 Lucent Technologies Lineage 2000 Round Cell Battery W03
A1-11
Vendor Technical Document
Revision
Number Title
Date
M-021-00061 Instruction Manual for Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps W29
M-072-00024 Operation/Maintenance for Cooling Water Heat W07
Exchangers
M-072-00052 Instruction Manual for Auxiliary Heat Exchangers W11
M-223F-00003 Crispin Model VR-41 Model Relief Check Valve W04
Flanged Ends Size 4 Fig. 150 - VR
M-712-00068 Instruction Manual for Reactor Coolant Pump W38
WIP-M-223F- Crispin Mode VR-41 Relief Check Valve Flanged Size W02
00004-W01-A-1 4 150 LB Carbon Steel With Resilient Seat.
Work Orders (WO)
2-242150-013 12-359883-000 13-381325-001 15-399466 16-420373-000
05-273137-002 13-364867-000 13-381325-002 15-399467 16-420373-001
05-277630 13-376820-000 14-385969-000 15-401047-002 17-421126-000
07-295699 13-376820-000 14-385969-001 15-401047-005 17-423640-000
2-357898 13-376820-005 14-394162 15-404075-000 17-434455-000
2-357899 13-376846-000 15-396644-000 15-404395-000 17-434455-001
2-359817-000 13-381325-000 15-398783 15-409923-001
Miscellaneous
Revision
Number Title
Date
NERC Interface Coordination Agreement for the Wolf April 28, 2018
Creek Substation
015214 Applicability Determination 01
015214 50.59 Screen 01
07381 Gaskets and Bolting Change Package 1
A1-12
Miscellaneous
Revision
Number Title
Date
14831 Applicability Determination 0
14831 10CFR 50.59 Screening 0
15040 Applicability Determination 0
15040 10 CFR 50.59 Screening 0
17-00365 Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1 Safety August 2, 2017
Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating
Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-
2-051
2012-0003 DCP 14016 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation 0
BED for CR Evaluation of Voids in Suction Piping for Auxiliary Feed 1
46330 Rev. 1 Water Pumps
BED for SWO 15- Expected Life Evaluation for ESW Vacuum Breaker March 10, 2016
401047-002 and Valves
15-401047-005
E-009 Technical Specification for Metal-Clad Switchboard 8
E-020 Technical Specification for DC Distribution 08
Switchboards for the Standardized Nuclear Unit Power
Plant System (SNUPPS)
E-020 Specification: DC Distribution Switchboards 09
E-058 Technical Specification for 600 Volt Single & Multiple 13
Conductor Copper Power Cable for Wolf Creek Nuclear
Operating Corporation
E-10NB System Description, Lower Medium Voltage System 0
4.16 kV (Class 1E Power System
E-10NE System Description, Standby Power Supply System 1
E-10NF System Description, Load Shedding and Emergency 1
Load Sequencing
E-10NK System Description for 125-Volt DC System (Class 1E 07
Power System)
A1-13
Miscellaneous
Revision
Number Title
Date
E-10PA System Description, Higher Medium Voltage System 0
13.8 kV (Non-Class 1E Power System)
E-10PA System Description for Higher Medium Voltage System 00
- 13.8 KV (Non-Class IE Power System)
EFV0482 IST Basis Report for Valve EF V0482 N/A
EFV0484 IST Basis Report for Valve EF V0484 N/A
EMG C-12 LOCA Outside Containment 15
ET-17-0003 Docket no. 50-482: Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating January 19, 2017
Corporations Compliance Report for the
Implementation of Order EA-12-049
FD-SL-01-WC Functional Description, Auxiliary Power System 5
LR1400302 Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) 0
LTR-RES-13-108 Input to an Operability Determination Associated with 0
the Shutdown Seal (SDS) Failure to Actuate During
Post-Service Testing
M-021-00061 Instruction Manual For Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps W29
M-10AL Auxiliary Feedwater System, System Description 0
M-10BB Reactor Coolant System 04
M-10BB System Description for Reactor Coolant Systems 04
M-10EF System Description Essential Service Water System 12
M-712-00210 Use of Westinghouse Shield Passive Shutdown Seal 1
for Flex Strategies
MGE LT-006 Maintenance of Limotorque Valve Operators Type 9
SMB-0 Thru 4
NEI 12-06 [Rev 5] Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) 5
Implementation Guide
NEI 16-07 Improving the Effectiveness of Issue Resolution to 0
Enhance Safety and Efficiency
A1-14
Miscellaneous
Revision
Number Title
Date
NK System Health Report for 125 VDC (1E) (July 1, 2017 -
December 31,
2017)
NRC Final Safety Topical Report WCAP-17100-P/NP, REVISION 1, April 29, 2011
Evaluation Report PRA Model for the Westinghouse Shut Down Seal AL"
(PA-RMSC-0499) Pressurized Water Reactor Owners
Group, Project no. 694
NSAL-13-6 SHIELD Passive Thermal Shutdown Seal (SDS) Failure July 26, 2013
to Actuate During Post-Service Test
OE NK-18-005 Operability Evaluation: NK001, NK002, NK003, NK004 July 31, 2018
25 VDC Bus Switchboard and Component
Downstream of the NK Bus Are Listed in Calculation
NK-E-001 Appendix E
OFN BB-031 Shutdown LOCA 32
OFN EJ-15 Loss of RHR Cooling 29B
ONF EJ-40 CL Recirculation During Mode 3, with Accumulator 8
Isolated in Mode 4, 5, or 6
PA System Health Report for High-Medium Voltage 13.8 (July 1, 2017 -
kV December 31,
2017)
PM FILE 49330 A RCP no. 3 Seal Leak-off Flush n/a
QH-2018-1612 USAR Self-Assessment for 2018 DBAI July 19,2018
REVISION TO Compliance with Order EA-12-049, 2
JLD-ISG-2012-01 Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to
Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for
Beyond-Design-Basis External Events
SCA-05-0028 Safety Classification Analysis, NB Syst. Magna Blast 0
Breaker Elevating Mechanism Roller Assembly
System Health Reactor Coolant System (BB) July 1, 2017 -
Report December 31,
2017
System Health Auxiliary Feedwater System AL, AP, FC-1 July 1, 2017 -
Report December 31,
2017
A1-15
Miscellaneous
Revision
Number Title
Date
TDAFWP Test IST Hydraulic and Vibration Trends for TDAFWP and Various dates
Trends
Screen Shots from Data Program
WO 14-0023 Docket No. 50-482: Request for Schedule Relaxation of March 31, 2014
NRC Order EA-12-049, Requirement lV.A.2, at Wolf
Creek Generating Station
A1-16
SUNSI Review ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:
By: RAK Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive NRC-002
OFFICE
NAME RKopriva FThomas IAnchondo APalmer TFarnholtz NTaylor
SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
DATE 11/01/18 10/26/18 10/23/18 11/02/18 11/05/18 11/12/18
OFFICE
NAME TFarnholtz
SIGNATURE /RA/
DATE 11/14/18