IR 05000461/2019011

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Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Team); Inspection Report 05000461/2019011 (DRS-J.Benjamin)
ML19128A329
Person / Time
Site: Clinton Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/08/2019
From: Karla Stoedter
NRC/RGN-III
To: Bryan Hanson
Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
IR 2019011
Download: ML19128A329 (21)
v • d • e


Text

SUBJECT:

CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT 1DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAM); INSPECTION REPORT 05000461/2019011

Dear Mr. Hanson:

On March 29, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Clinton Power Station, Unit 1. On April 11, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. John Kowalski and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

If you disagree with a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC resident inspector at Clinton. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Karla K. Stoedter, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Docket No.: 05000461 License No.: NPF-62

Enclosure:

IR 05000461/2019011

Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000461 License Number: NPF-62 Report Number: 05000461/2019011 Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-011-0024 Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC Facility: Clinton Power Station Location: Clinton, IL Inspection Dates: March 11, 2019, to March 29, 2019 Inspectors: J. Benjamin, Senior Reactor Inspector W. Hopf, Electrical Contractors V. Petrella, Reactor Inspector J. Robbins, Senior Reactor Inspector L. Rodriguez, Reactor Inspector R. Waters, Mechanical Contractor Approved By: Karla K. Stoedter, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Design Bases Assurance (Team) Inspection at Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.

List of Findings and Violations Failure to Have Procedures Ensuring Satisfactory Performance of Decay Heat Removal Systems during Station Blackout Event Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green None (NPP) 71111.21M FIN 05000461/2019011-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding for the licensee's failure to have procedures ensuring the satisfactory performance of the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system and the suppression pool during a station blackout out (SBO) event as delineated in NUMARC 87-00.

Specifically, Procedures Clinton Power Station (CPS) 4402.01 and CPS 4407.01 did not ensure the HPCS system and the suppression pool would remain available for decay heat removal for the duration of the SBO event.

Additional Tracking Items None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)

The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:

Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02) ===

Main article: IP 71111.21

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Turbine

  • Technical Specifications;
  • Visual non-intrusive walkdown to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards;
  • Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures;
  • Protection against internal events;
  • Protection against external events;
  • Maintenance effectiveness;
  • Overall system health;
  • Translation of vendor specifications;
  • Testing; and
  • Calculations:

o Accumulator sizing; o Maximum allowable accumulator leakage; o Minimum accumulator backup air bottle pressure o Valve weak link analysis; o Steam line pressure drop; and o Battery capacity.

Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02)

(6 Samples)

(1) Primary System Safety Relief Valve F047A
  • Technical Specifications;
  • Visual non-intrusive walkdown to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards;
  • Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures;
  • Protection against internal events;
  • Protection against external events;
  • Maintenance effectiveness;
  • Overall system health;
  • Translation of vendor specifications;
  • Testing; and
  • Calculations:

o Weak link analysis; and o Minimum voltage analysis.

(2) High Pressure Core Spray Injection Valve 1E22-F004
  • Technical Specifications;
  • Visual non-intrusive walkdown to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards;
  • Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures;
  • Protection against internal events;
  • Protection against external events;
  • Maintenance effectiveness;
  • Overall system health;
  • Translation of vendor specifications;
  • Testing; and
  • Calculations:

o Thrust margin; o Motor sizing calculation; o Minimum voltage; and o Electrical protection and coordination.

(3) Safety-related 480Vac Switchgear AP05E
  • Technical Specifications;
  • Visual non-intrusive walkdown to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards;
  • Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures;
  • Protection against internal events;
  • Protection against external events;
  • Maintenance effectiveness;
  • Overall system health;
  • Translation of vendor specifications;
  • Testing:

o Load testing; o Relay calibration; and o Terminal resistance.

  • Calculations:

o Loading; o Short circuit; o Voltage regulation; o Coordination; o Bus capacity; and o Overcurrent protection.

(4) Safety-related 4kVac Switchgear AP07E
  • Technical Specifications;
  • Visual non-intrusive walkdown to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards;
  • Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures;
  • Protection internal events;
  • Protection against external events;
  • Maintenance effectiveness;
  • Overall system health;
  • Translation of vendor specifications;
  • Testing:

o Loading; o Degraded voltage relay drop out; and o Terminal resistance.

  • Calculations:

o Bus loading; o Short circuit; o Supple voltage; o Breaker coordination; o Bus capacity; o Static VAR compensator voltage; o Overcurrent protection; and o Overload heating impact.

(5) Scram Discharge Drain Valve 1C11-F011
  • Technical Specifications;
  • Visual non-intrusive walkdown to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards;
  • Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures;
  • Protection against internal events;
  • Protection against external events;
  • Maintenance effectiveness;
  • Overall system health;
  • Translation of vendor specifications;
  • Testing; and
  • Calculations:

o Weak link analysis.

(6) 125 VDC Battery 1A
  • Technical Specifications;
  • Visual non-intrusive walkdown to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards;
  • Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures;
  • Protection against internal events;
  • Protection against external events;
  • Maintenance effectiveness;
  • Overall system health;
  • Translation of vendor specifications;
  • Testing; and
  • Calculations:

o Hydrogen generation; o Seismic qualification of battery and battery racks; o Sizing; and o Station blackout loading.

Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (5 Samples)

(1) Engineering Change (EC) 324675, "Install Static VAR Compensator Unit on Reserve Auxiliary Transformer";
(2) EC 324759, "Install Static VAR Compensator Unit on Emergency Reserve Auxiliary Transformer";
(3) EC 621081, "High Pressure Core Spray Discharge Relief Valve Modification";
(4) EC 400235, "Removal of Main Steam Line Flow Restrictor Differential Pressure Line Snubbers and Pipe Supports"; and
(5) EC 622359, "Replacement of Dry Type Transformer 1AP11E".

Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)

(1) NRC Information Notice 2017-03, "Anchor/Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Wedge Pin and Stem-Disc Separation Failures"; and
(2) NRC Information Notice 2017-06, "Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the Direct Current Distribution System".

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Have Procedures Ensuring Satisfactory Performance of Decay Heat Removal Systems during Station Blackout Event Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green None (NPP) 71111.21M FIN 05000461/2019011-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding for the licensee's failure to have procedures ensuring the satisfactory performance of the HPCS system and the suppression pool during a SBO event as delineated in NUMARC 87-00. Specifically, Procedures CPS 4402.01 and CPS 4407.01 did not ensure the HPCS system and the suppression pool would remain available for decay heat removal for the duration of the SBO event.

Description:

The licensee evaluated a SBO using the guidelines of NUMARC 87-00, "Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors." The licensee's SBO coping analysis EPU-T0903, "Extended Power Uprate Task T0903 Station Blackout," Revision 0, evaluated two different methods for responding to an SBO event using either the HPCS system or the reactor core isolation cooling system. The HPCS system is considered the licensing basis system for vessel inventory makeup and core cooling during a SBO.

Analysis EPU-T0903 concluded the suppression pool temperature could exceed the heat capacity temperature limit (HCTL) approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> into the 4-hour SBO coping period.

Usually, the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) direct operations personnel to perform an emergency depressurization of the reactor vessel when the suppression pool temperature cannot be maintained less than the HCTL. However, the SBO coping analysis assumed emergency depressurization of the reactor vessel would not be performed because it was not necessary to cope with the SBO. The coping analysis concluded the final suppression pool temperature was acceptable because it remained below the maximum suppression pool temperature limit of 185 degrees Fahrenheit. As a result, the coping analysis contained the following assumption in Section 3.2.2, "Key Assumptions," Item 15:

"Actions specified in CPS Procedures, EOP, Off-Normal Procedures, and Operating Procedures are accomplished as required, with the exception that an emergency blowdown (depressurization) as directed by EOP-6 will not be performed."

The coping analysis also contained the following recommendation in Section 3.4.1, "Recommendations," Item 3, "Revise the Primary Containment Control EOP to permit exceeding the suppression pool HCTL without requiring emergency blowdown for an SBO event."

Procedure CPS 4200.01, "Loss of AC Power," is one of the implementing procedures that would be used by the licensee during a SBO. Section 4.4.4 of the procedure designates the HPCS system as the preferred injection source. Procedure CPS 4402.01, "EOP-6 Primary Containment Control," is an EOP that would be implemented during a SBO. Procedure CPS 4402.01 directs operators to perform an emergency depressurization (i.e., blowdown)in accordance with CPS 4407.01, "EOP 3 Emergency RPV Depressurization (Blowdown),"

when the plant cannot be maintained below the HCTL. Procedure CPS 4407.01 directs operators to perform emergency depressurization as long as the action will not result in the loss of injection needed for core cooling. Therefore, when using the preferred HPCS system during a SBO, emergency depressurization would be directed because the system does not rely on reactor pressure to perform its function.

The inspectors noted Procedures CPS 4402.01 and CPS 4407.01 did not incorporate the assumption and recommendation of the SBO coping analysis that emergency depressurization would not occur during the event. Therefore, the licensee failed to meet the guidance in NUMARC 87-00, Section 2.1, "General Criteria," which states, "Procedures and equipment in light water reactors relied upon in a station blackout should ensure that satisfactory performance of necessary decay heat removal systems is maintained for the required station blackout coping duration." Specifically, Procedures CPS 4402.01 and CPS 4407.01 did not ensure the HPCS system or the suppression pool would remain available for the duration of the SBO event because they would direct emergency depressurization when the HCTL was exceeded, a scenario which was not evaluated in the SBO coping analysis.

Corrective Action(s): The licensee's immediate corrective actions included the performance of two evaluations, EC 627704, "Functionality Evaluation of Suppression Pool Temperature During Station Blackout," and EC 627757, "Evaluation of Past Plant Conditions for SBO,"

which used more realistic assumptions to demonstrate the decay heat removal functions provided by the HPCS system and the suppression pool would be maintained for the duration of a SBO event. The licensee also issued Standing Order 2019-02, "Supplemental Station Blackout Guidance," to ensure the assumptions used in the evaluations remained supported until final corrective actions could be implemented.

Corrective Action Reference(s): Action Request 04231346, "NRCID: DBAI Question Regarding RPV Blowdown During SBO."

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the licensee's failure to have procedures ensuring the satisfactory performance of the HPCS system and the suppression pool would be maintained for the duration of a SBO event as delineated in NUMARC 87-00 was a performance deficiency. Specifically, Procedures CPS 4402.01 and CPS 4407.01 did not ensure the HPCS system or the suppression pool would remain available for the duration of the SBO event because the procedures would direct emergency depressurization of the reactor vessel when the HCTL was exceeded, a scenario which was not evaluated in the SBO coping analysis.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Specifically, the failure to have procedures that incorporated the assumption and recommendation of the SBO coping analysis that emergency depressurization would not occur during the event did not ensure the availability and capability of the HPCS system and the suppression pool to cope with a SBO to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At - Power Situations. The finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because the team answered "No" to the risk screening questions listed in IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Section A.

Cross-cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On April 11, 2019, the inspector presented the Design Bases Assurance (Team)

Inspection results to Mr. John Kowalski and other members of the licensee staff.

  • On March 29, 2019, the inspector presented the Inspection Debrief to Mr. John Kowalski, Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.21M Calculations 01HP15 Development of HPCS Pump Curves and System Revision 4

Resistances

01ME77 Calcs for Flooding - Safe Shutdown Analysis 01/28/1990

01RI13 NPSH Calculation - RCIC Suction from Suppression Pool Revision 2

01RI16 RCIC Development of RCIC Pump Curves and Comparison Revision 0

with the System Resistance Curves for Operating Modes A,

B, C, D, and F

01RI17 RCIC Turbine Performance Requirements Revision 0

19-AI-60 Electrical Heat Loading in Switchgear and Battery Rooms Revision 2

Served by VX System

19-AJ-16 Overload Heater Sizing for AC Motor Operated Valves Revision 3

19-AJ-19 Voltage Analysis of 125 VDC Circuits for 4 kV Circuit Revision 2

Breakers Operating during LOCA

19-AK-13 Analysis of Load Flow, Short Circuit and Motor Starting Revision 3

Using ETAP Power Station

19-AN-04 480V ESF Switchgear Breakers and Associated Upstream Revision 13

Relay Settings

19-AN-20 Circuit Breaker Settings for 480V HPCS MCC (1E22-S002) Revision 2

19-D-19 Sizing Battery Charger 1A for Division I; Revision 0

19-D-22 Hydrogen Generated by Batteries during Charging Revision 0

19-D-23 Estimating Load for 125 VDC System - MCC 1A Revision 8

19-D-28 Review of Division 1 DC System Review 1A Revision 15

19-D-42 Station Blackout Analysis - 4 Hour Battery Capacity Revision 5

and 5A

19-D-42 Station Blackout Analysis - 4 Hour Battery Capacity Revision 5

19-G-30 Calculation for Ampacity of Power Cables in Trays Revision 1

3C10-1188-001 NUMARC 87-00 Station Blackout Equipment List 04/07/1989

CALC 01IA044A SRV Supply Air Design Basis Revision 1

CALC EH22- Piping Stress Analysis for Piping Associated with Panel Revision 15-

P041A 1H22-P041A A

CALC EPU-T0315 Extended Power Uprate Task T0315: SRV Setpoint Revision 0

Tolerance Monitoring Program Review

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

CALC IP-M-0054 Minimum Pressure Required for Div 1 ADS Backup Air Revison 0

Bottles

CQD-005460 Revised Anchor Stress Calculation for 125 V Battery Racks Revision 0

1DC01E, 02E, 03E, 04E, and 05E and 0A

CQD-020727 Seismic Battery Loads on DC Battery Terminal Revision 0

CQD-041783 Westinghouse Switchgear Door Bolting Detail 12/22/1988

DKY-98-002 Use of High Purity Nitrogen for SRV Set Pressure Testing 02/18/1998

EMD-027596 Foundation Loads for 125V Battery Racks Revision 0

IP-CL-030 Seismic Qualification of MOV 1E22F004 Revision 1,

1a, and 1b

IP-M-0001 Bounding Differential Pressure Calculations for Selected HP Revision 1a

System MOVs

IP-M-0063 ADS Accumulator Size Revision 0

IP-M-0181 Heat Content Values for Electrical Equipment Revision 1

IP-M-0233 System Response Time Evaluation for LPCS, HPCS, and Revision 0

LPCI Injection

IP-M-0381 Gate Valves Subject to Pressure Locking Revision 0

IP-M-0409 Main Control Room Temperature Rise during SBO Revision 0

IP-M-0541 RCIC Gland Steam Failure During a Fire Revision 0

IP-M-0559 Minimum Cooling Water Flow to RCIC Lube Oil Cooler Revision 0

IP-O-0123 Tech Spec Indicator Loop Uncertainty Evaluation for Battery Revision 1

Capacity, Float/Cell Voltage and Current, and Charger

Amps, SR 3.8.4.1, 2, and SR 3.8.6.1, 2, 5, 6, and TS PR

5.5.14a

IP-Q-0390 Qualify ADS and Non-ADS MSRV Air Accumulator Tanks Revision 0

Due to the Increased Internal Pressure Due to Increased

Ambient Temperature of a Small Break LOCA

MIDACALC Electrical and Motor Data, Design Thrust and Torque Revision 7

Results for Requirements

1E22F004

Corrective Action IR 00589228 1RI01T: Notice of Violation (White Finding) Related to 02/07/2007

Documents HPCS

IR 00879332 NRC ID Weakness Identified in 10 CFR 50.59 Screening 02/11/2009

Document

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

IR 02508949 Computer Point C11DA009 Displaying Bad Data 06/02/2015

IR 02523392 1DC01E DIV 1 Battery Multiple Cell Post with Blistering 07/22/2015

IR 02603377 1DC01E Cell Post Weld Blisters Noted 12/21/2015

IR 02677753 5067-8L SRV Monitoring System Trouble in MCR 06/04/2016

IR 03951292 1E51C002E - RCIC TTV Latch Level Link Pin Displacement 12/09/2016

- CCP

IR 03972881 SRV 1B21F041C Acoustic Alarm 02/11/2017

IR 03977720 UFSAR and TS Bases Discrepancy; RCIC not an ESF 02/23/2017

System

IR 040066102 NER NC-017-008-Y: LAS HP MOV Stem Disc Separation 05/03/2017

IR 04009649 1DC01E DIV 1 Battery Test Data UNSAT 05/10/2017

IR 04011221 Potentially Degraded Battery Posts on 1DC01E Battery 05/16/2017

IR 04045407 Cracks in 1DC01E Cells Observed 08/24/2017

IR 04149625 4.0 Critique of 1E22F004 Failure Response 06/22/2018

IR 04229482; DBAI - Calculation Does Not Identify Use of IEEE Standard 03/14/2019

Corrective Action IR 04229119 DBAI - UFSAR and Tech Spec Bases Discrepancy; RCIC 03/13/2019

Documents not an ESF System

Resulting from IR 04229425 NRC ID: 1WO05SJ Leak Larger than Catch Containment 03/14/2019

Inspection IR 04231346 NRCID: DBAI Question Regarding RPV Blowdown during 03/20/2019

SBO

IR 04232132 DBAI - Calculation Updates Missed during LAR Impact 03/22/2019

Review

IR 04233042 NRC DBAI Basis for 9061.11C001 Acceptance Criteria 03/26/2019

IR 04233486 DBAI Missing Evaluation for RCIC Piping Stresses at EOP 03/27/2019

Conditions

IR 04233496 NRC DBAI: Standard Temperature in ADS Supply Calcs 03/27/2019

IR 04233500 DBAI - Calculation 01RI16 Contains Incorrect Reference 03/27/2019

and Value

IR 04233902 NRC DBAI: TS Bases and USAR Inconsistent 03/28/2019

IR 04234000 NRC DBAI Observations: 9061.11C001 Temperature 03/28/2019

IR 4229588 NRC DBAI Questions Plant Risk with RAT SVC Unavailable 03/14/2019

IR 4233270 Training Lesson Plan has Inaccurate Description of HPCS 03/26/2019

Injection Valve

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Drawings 796E724 Nuclear Boiler System (NB) (B21-1010) Revision 2

D-77-269 Air Accumulator Vessel Illinois Power Company Revision 7

D-77-270 Air Accumulator Vessel Illinois Power Company Revison 5

M01-1600; Revision A

Environmental

Zone Map

Auxiliary Fuel &

Containment Plan

EL. 778-0 &

781-0

M05-1002 Sheet P&ID Main Steam Clinton Power Station Clinton Illinois Revision 0

M10-9002 Sheet P&ID/C&I Diagram Main Steam Clinton Power Station Unit 1 Revision E

Engineering EC 324756 RAT SVC Equipment Structures 08/13/1998

Changes EC 324759 Relay Setting for SVC Operation 11/13/1999

EC 338201 Revise RCIC Pump NPSH Calculation 01RI13 08/28/2002

EC 341481 125Vdc Divisions I & II Battery Cell Jumper Evaluation Revision 0

EC 386325 Replace 1B33F067 A/B RR Discharge Valve Disc with Anti- Revision 0

Rotation Disc

EC 400235 Removed Snubbers 1RB2456S, 1RB24566S, 1RB 2468S, Revision 0

1RB 2469S, 1RB 2475s, and 1RB 2457s

EC 401924 RCIC Piping Evaluation for ELAP Temperatures 05/19/2015

EC 621081 Replace HPCS Relief Valve 1E22F035 with Seal Welded 07/27/2018

Valve

EC 622359 Replacement of Dry Type Transformer 1AP11E2 Revision 2

EC 627704 Functionality Evaluation of Suppression Pool Temperature Revision 0

during Station Blackout

Engineering EPU-T0315 Extended Power Uprate Task T0315: SRV Setpoint Revision 0

Evaluations Tolerance Monitoring Program Review

Miscellaneous 07/02/1986 Revision 2 and 6

1-LUB-TX02763S;

750kVA VPE

Ventilated Dry

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Type Transformer

Seismic

Certification

Report for Class

1E Electrical

Equipment

158-AM-11X6 Amendment to FMP 11X6 Rev. 0 Storage Instruction, 05/21/1976

Inspection and Maintenance Requirements for Diaphragm

Operated Control Valves and Accessories

1E22F004 JOG MOV Evaluation Report Revision 7

A33007.F10-3947 Clinton Power Station SVC Design Report Revision 0

B21-F041 Stress Report No. G471-6 125.04.07 Revision 8

C8185-000052 Justification for Two Revisions to Fisher Product Bulletin Revision 0

Manual form 61.1:657 in VTIP Binder K2864-0001 Tab 16

and K2882-0106 Tab 1

CPS NO Safety Evaluation Screening for Modification AP-37, RAT 07/31/1999

1005.06f001 SVC Installation, ECNS 30526, 30527, and 30528

EPU-T0902 Extended Power Uprate Task Report Anticipated Transients Revision 2

without Scram

G471.6/125.04.10 Dikkers Nuclear Safety/Relief Valve Instruction Manual 10/02/1980

IST-CPS-BDOC- Clinton IST Bases Document for 1B21-F047A 05/19/2011

V-16

IST-CPS-BDOC- Clinton IST Bases Document for 1C11-F011 05/19/2011

V-20

JAP-90-034 SRV Stud Removal - MDM Process 07/18/1990

Log No 2019-02 Supplemental Station Blackout Guidance 03/24/2019

NSED Standard MOV Periodic Verification Program Scope Revision 14

MS-07-00

NSED-I-EE-6 Transmission Grid Conditions for Clinton Power Station Revision 5

Product Bulletin Type 657 and 667 Diaphragm Actuators 06/2002

61.1:657

RCIC Turbine Type GS-2 SNT-38187-A Terry Turbine

Vendor Manual

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

K2801-030

U-0763 Clinton Power Station (CPS) Unit 1 Request for Additional 11/19/1984

Information TMI Action Item II.K.3.28 (Confirmatory Issue

047)

Y-96136 Air Supply Line Testing for SRVs, ADS-SRVs and MSIVs to 01/28/1991

Satisfy Design and Licensing Bases

Y-96190 CPS 9061.11 Pressure Drop Test Acceptance Criteria 02/06/1991

Procedures 01RI15 RCIC TS SR for RCIC Pump Differential Pressure at Rated Revisions 1,

Flow 1a, and 1b

1014.11 6900, 4160, 480 Vac Switchgear Circuit Breaker Operability Revision

Program 005E

3309.01 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Revision 17e

3310.01 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RI) Revision 30d

3315.02 Leak Detection Revision 15a

3501.01 High Voltage Auxiliary Power System Revision 29

3501.01C001 Generator Backfeed Checklist Revision 10

3501E001 High Voltage Auxiliary Power System Lineup Revision 14

3504.01 346 and 138kV Switchyard 01/11/2017

3505.01 346 and 138 kV Switchgear (SY) Revision

20E

3505.01C005 RAT B - LTC Manual Switching Order Revision 0d

3506.01 Diesel Generator and Support System Electrical Lineup Revision

18C

3514.01C005 4160 V Bus 1A1 (1AP07E) Outage Revision 7

3514.01E005 4160 V Bus 6900, 4160, 480 V Circuit Breakers Revision 8c

3808.01 RCIC Turbine Overspeed Trip Test Revision 10b

4100.01 Reactor Scram Revision 23f

200.01 Loss of AC Power Revision 26

200.01C002 DC Load Shedding during a SBO Revision 5a

200.01D008 Emergency Bus 1A1 Trip Data Sheet Revision 2a

4411.03 Injection/Flooding Sources Revision 10d

4411.04 Throttling ECCS Flow Revision 5d

8491.01 Cable Pulling 03/27/2013

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

9051.02 HPCS Valve Operability Data Sheet Revision 42b

9054.01 C002 RCIC High Pressure Operability Checks 08f

9054.01 C003 RCIC Low Pressure Operability Checks Revision 05f

9054.05 RCIC RSP Operability Checks Revision 33d

9054.06 RCIC Discharge Header Filled and Flow Path Verification Revision 28

and Flow Controller Checks

CC-AA-302 Control of Cable Management Database Revision 3

CPS 3214.01 Plant Air (IA & SA) Revision 27c

CPS 8216.02 Safety/Relief Valve Removal and Installation Revision 21

EOP 1a ATWS RPV Control Revision 30

EOP 2 RPV Flooding Revision 30

EOP 3 Emergency RPV Depressurization (Blowdown) Revisions

26, 27, 28,

29, and 30

EOP 6 Primary Containment Control Revisons 26,

27, 28, 29,

and 30

EOP-1 RPV Control Revision 30

IP-M-0587 RCIC EOP Operation Maximum Suppression Pool Revision 0

Temperature

N-CL-OPS- High Pressure Core Spray System Revision 3

209002

N-CL-OPS- Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Revision 6

217000

OP-CL-101-1001- Start of Scram Choreography Revision 1a

F-02

OP-CL-102-106- Operator Response Time Master List at CPS Revision 8c

1001

P927-000001 PCI Energy Services MDM Stud Cutting Procedure Revision 0

SE-EOP-20A EOP-1A, ATWS RPV Control with a Group 1 Isolation Revision 0

Shipping Records PO # 000074880 Amergen/Exelon Clinton Nuclear Station 11/2005

Work Orders GEK-75652A; 07/02/1986

Operation and

Maintenance

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Instructions for

Automatic

Depressurization

System

WO 00973837 Overhaul Actuator and Replace Accessories 1C11F011 01/24/2008

WO 01347634 Replaced SRV with a Qualified Spare 05/11/2015

WO 01459364 LLRT HPCS Injection Valve 10/15/2013

WO 01518247 Perform Flowscan in Support of the AOV Program 10/19/2013

1C11F011

WO 01533801 9061.11R20 OP La Check Valve Operation 10/28/2013

WO 01539946 9012.01B20 VER SDV Vent and Drain Valve Operation 01/29/2014

WO 01541057 1E22F035 HPCS Injection Line Relief Valve Leaking 1-2 10/25/2017

DPM

WO 01688707 HPCS RTT (All Channels) 02/23/2017

WO 01691814 9061.11R20 OP La Check Valve Operation 05/15/2015

WO 01759037 Overhaul Actuator and Replace Accessories 1C11F011 05/23/2017

WO 01848439 9061.11R20 Op La Check Valve Operation 05/27/2017

WO 01850854 9012.01a20 OP SDV Vent and Drain Valve Operation 10/30/2015

WO 01858436 HPCS 1E22F004 Valve Functional Test 05/20/2017

WO 01868077 Removed Snubbers in Accordance with EC 400235 05/22/2017

WO 01910395 Division I Battery 1DC01E Modified Performance Test 05/04/2018

WO 04643900 SDV Drain Valves (F011 and F191) Failing 9012.01 Stroke 05/26/2017

Surveillance

WO 04644807 CAT A Valve LRT 1E22F004 HPCS Injection 04/17/2018

WO 04674876 9012.01a20 OP SDV Vent and Drain Valve Operation 10/24/2017

WO 04780286 OP SDV Vent and Drain Valve Operation 07/24/2018

WO 04812195 9012.01a20 OP SDV Vent and Drain Valve Operation 10/23/2018

WO 04832963 OP DIV I ICV and Charger Checks 12/19/2018

WO 04847752 HPCS Valve Operability (Stroke Time) 01/11/2019

WO 04851866 9012.01a20 OP SDV Vent and Drain Valve Operation 01/22/2019

WO 04856031 RCIC High Pressure Test and Valve Operability 01/23/2019

WO 05297810 Replace SRV with a Qualified Spart 02/18/2004

WO 06672060 Tail Pipe Temp Indicator Hose is Cut 02/22/2004

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

WO 07721790 Replaced SRV with a Qualified Spare 01/22/2010

18

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