IR 05000456/1985050

Special Safety Insp Repts 50-456/85-50 & 50-457/85-48 on 851016-1114.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Welding Activities,Piping & Installation of Mechanical Equipment & Review of Allegation

ML20141E290
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	12/27/1985
From:	Danielson D, Jeffrey Jacobson, David Jones, Muffett J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20141E272	List: IR 05000456/1985050 ML20141E267
References
50-456-85-50, 50-457-85-48, NUDOCS 8601070655
Download: ML20141E290 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-456/85050(DRS); 50-457/85048(DRS)

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Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 Licenses No. CPPR-132; CPPR-133 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Braidwood Site, Braidwood, IL Inspection Co.nducted: October 16-18, 29, 30 and November 5-7, 13, 14, 1985 h

Inspectors- . W. Muffett / L7/M Date

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h.M.Jacobson /LfthW '

A Date es lE Sl Dafe /

W i Approved By: D. H. Danielson, Chief nfli/Ff" Materials and Processes Section Fite /

Inspection Summary Inspection on October 16-18, 2.9, M and November 5-7, 13, 14, 1985 (Report No. 50-456/85050(DRS); 50-%7/85048(DRS))

Areas Inspected: ticaranounced, special. safety inspection of licensee sction relating to pevious inspection findings concerning welding activities, piping and +ha installation of mechanical equipment; and a review of an allegation.

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Trie inspection involved a total of 168 inspector-hours by three NRC inspector Results: No violations or deviations were identifie "

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

M. J. Wallace

• C. W. Schroeder

• D. Shamblin

• W. Vahle M. Dougherty Phillips Getschow C J. R. Stewart The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employee * Denotes those attending the final exit interview at the Braidwood Station on November 14, 198 . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Violation (50-456/82-05-04; 50-457/82-05-04): As documented in Inspection Report 50-456/82-05; 50-457/82-05, deficiencies were found to exist in the quality assurance program for the installation and inspection of safety-related mechanical equipment. Subsequently, the licensee developed new procedures for this activity. The purpose of this inspection is to delineate the review of the new procedure and a review of a sample of the documentation associated with the new procedures. The NRC inspector reviewed the current procedure for this activity which is Phillips Getschow Company Procedure QCP-822, Equipment Installation Procedure, Re' vision The procedure was reviewed for conformance to the requirements of ANSI N45'.2.8, " Supplementary Quality Assurance Requirements for Installation, Inspection and Testing of Mechanical Equipment and Systems for the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants." The PGCo Procedure QCP-B22 is an acceptable method for fulfilling the requirements of ANSI N45. In addition, the NRC inspector reviewed the documentation packages produced under the procedure QCP-822 associated with twenty-six randomly chosen pieces of safety-related me.chanical equipmen The documentation packages reviewed are as follows:

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Documentation Package Component ICV 03F Reactor Coolant Filter 1SIO4TA Accumulator Tank (Unit 1)*

ICS01T Spray Additive Tank 2SIO4TB Accumulator Tank (Unit 2)*

1AF01PA Auxiliary Feedwater Pump ID001PD Diesel Oil Transfer Pump 1RH02AA Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger 0GWO1TA Gas Decay Tank OPL53JA Local Instrument Panel 1BR01A Moderating Heat Exchanger 10002TA Diesel Oil Day Tank OGWOITB Gas Decay Tank IPL52J Local Instrument Panel 1RH02AB Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger IVA065A Centrifugal Charging Pump Room Cubicle Cooler 2Af01PA Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2VA045B Safety Injection Pump Room Cubicle Cooler 2CV03F Reactor Coolant Filter OPL53JB Local Instrument Panel IRYO15 Pressurizer 2CV05A Letdown Reheat Heat Exchanger *

IVA025B Residual Heat Removal Pump Room Cubicle Cooler 10G015A1C Diesel Starting Air Dryer IAF01PB Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B Diesel Skid 2VA025A Residual Heat Removal Pump Room Cubicle Cooler 1CV01T Volume Control Tank

• These items added at the suggestion of L. McGregor, the NRC inspector who identified the original violatio All of the packages reviewed conformed to the requirements of QCP-82 Additional inspections are planned in this area; therefore, this item remains ope b. (Closed) Unresolved Item (456/84-21-05; 457/84-20-05): Possible insufficient qualification of electrical contractor (Comstock)

welders. A number of welders were qualified using 6" diameter, schedule 80 pipe. This thickness of pipe wall qualifies the welder for making groove welds in materials from 0.187" thickness to an unlimited maximum thickness. During inspection 50-456/84-21 it was noted that these welders had made fillet welds on unistrut and cable pans with a thickness of 0.105".

The NRC inspector reviewed AWS D1.1-75 and later editions of the Structural Welding Code and determined that the 0.187" thickness limitation applies to groove welds only. A welder qualified for

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groove welds is~ automatically qualified to make fillet welds on any thickness of materia c. (Closed) Unresolved Item (456/83-10-01c; 457/83-10-01c): Failure to address slope and high point vent.s for installation of instrument sensing lines in applicable process piping procedures. Verification that instrument sensing lines are properly pitched or have high point vents installed is addressed in the piping contractor's procedure PGCP-30, Revision 4, " Installation of ASME Section III and Safety-Related Instrument Lines."

The NRC inspector reviewed the process piping procedure QCP-B21,

" Installation of ASME Section III and Safety-Related Process Piping Systems - 2 Inch and Smaller." This procedure (Revision 6, dated December 23, 1983) has been revised to address instrument line slope and vent. requirements. Since PGCP-30 was used for installation of safety-related instrument lines, this item had no effect on hardwar d. (Closed) Open Item (456/84-08-08; 457/84-08-08): Questionable ASME Code Edition specified on licensee purchase orders for piping materials. The Braidwood FSAR specifies ASME Section III, 1974 Edition with Summer 1975 Addenda. ASME Section III requires material to be in accordance with Section II. During a review of plant Certified Material Test Reports (CMTR) it was noted that ASME piping components and material were being ordered under the requirements of the 1980 Edition with Summer 1980 Addend The NRC inspector reviewed a Field Change Request No. L-4872, dated May 11, 1982 requesting the use of Editions of ASME Section II later than the 1974 Edition with Summer 1975 Addend The A-E review and acceptance of this request is dated May 25, 198 The NRC inspector also reviewed the licensee notification of this change to the State of Illinois, dated October 8, 198 Use of the later Editions of ASME Section II for procurement of materials is common practice due to the lengthy construction schedules involve e. (0 pen) Violation (456/84-05-08; 457/84-05-08): Improper processing and storage of radiographs. Some radiographs have degenerated film quality from inadequate fixer removal and do not meet archival quality standards. The liceasee issued Nonconformance Report (NCR)

605 to identify this discrepancy and NCR 606 was issued to document the film yellowing of Southwest Fabricating. The licensee subsequently issued NCR 606, Revision 1, to document the extent of the yellowing film and a computer enhancement proces The NRC inspector reviewed the NCR, related documentation and discussed with the licensee the proposed corrective action This item will remain open pending a Seview of the final disposition of NCRs 605 and 606, Revision . (Closed) Open Item (456/84-36-03(DRS)): Licensee performance of a weld sample test program for HVAC welds ~.

The licensee conducted a weld sample test program to provide confirmation of the adequacy of HVAC welding. The sample program consisted of tensile tests on 82 welded joint samples removed from the HVAC construction at the Braidwood Station. Approximately 60%

of the tests showed yielding or fracturing of the base metal prior to attaining a load which would cause any failure of weld mata These test results demonstrate that the capacity of the weld exceeds the capacity of the base metal therefore showing the welds to be structurally adequate. Of the remaining tests, the least squares ratio of test load to design load was 1.69 with no individual test yielding a ratio less than 1.50. These results indicate capacities well in excess of design requirement (Closed) Violation (456/83-09-10b; 457/83-09-10b): Lack of a documented fit-up inspection for HVAC welds. Pullman Sheet Metal (PSM) revised Procedure B9.4.F in September 1983 to establish pre-welding fit-up checks, as required. PSM also performed a 100%

reinspection of completed welds which was finished in April 198 Those welds which could not be inspected for proper fit-up in the welded condition were dispositioned in nonconformance report In addition to the above, the licensee conducted a weld sample test program to provide confirmation of the adequacy of HVAC weldin The sample program consisted of tensile tests on 82 welded joint samples removed from the HVAC construction at the Braidwood Station. Approximately 60% of the tests showed yielding or fracturing of the base metal prior to attaining a load which would cause any failure of weld metal. These test results demonstrate that the capacity of the weld exceeds the capacity of the base metal therefore showing the welds to be structurally adequate. Of the remaining tests, the least squares ratio of test load to design load was 1.69 with no individual test yielding a ratio less than 1.50. These results indicate capacities well in excess of design requirement In addition to a review of the licensee corrective action, the NRC inspector performed a visual examination of approximately 250 welded joint During this examination, no improper fit-ups resulting in design significant weld deficiencies were note . Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Items (0 pen).50.55(e) Item (456/84-04-EE; 457/84-04-EE): "On re-review radiographs show out-of-tolerance densities in some shots taken prior to 1979." The NRC inspector reviewed the current status of the licensee's efforts in resolving the 10 CFR 5'i(e) item. The questionable'

film was reviewed, and corrective actions including repair and re-radiography was initiated. The balance of corrective actions required to resolve this concern are: (1) compete repair and/or

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re-radiography of the remaining 32 production welds; (2) close-out of Phillips Getschow NCRs 5207, 5208 and 5209; and (3) determine actions required.to resolve Power Systems, Inc. welder qualifications and implement corrective actions. A completion date for the corrective actions depends upon gaining access to the Unit 2 containment spray welds.

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This item remains open pending final, evaluation by the inspector.

, Followup on Allegation .

(Closed) ATS No. RIII-85-A-0069 t

! On March 25, 1985 an anonymous allegation was made to the Senior Resident

Inspector (construction) concerning minimum wall thickness deficiencies -

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and the use of Digital Thickness Measuring devices (DTMs) in the Material Traceability Verification Program (MTV). The purpose of the MTV program was to establish traceability for piping and piping components. The

' alleger felt that wall thickness deficiencies had been discovered and

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that the measuring technique was altered so that the deficiencies were no longer apparen NRC Review As a result of this allegation, a decision was made that the staff would take independent ' measurements of a selected sample of the potentially affected piping, using a NRC supplled CTM. Six piping components which were originally determined to be below the manufacturer's tolerance for minimum wall thickness were independently measured by the inspectors.

, These components are:

1D004AB-11" (11" Sch 80 carbon steel pipe)

1CCD9AB-2" (2" Sch 80 carbon steel pipe)

1CC97AB-2" (2" Sch 80 carbon steel pipe)

ISX17AB-2" .(2" Sch 80 carbon steel pipe)

ICCD8AB-2" (2" Sch 80 carbon steel pipe)

1D063A-2" (2" Sch 80 carbon steel pipe)

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In all of the above cases the independent measurement taken by the

inspectors were in very close agreement with the revised measurements

! taken by the licensee. It appears that the initial readings may have been in error due to the use of equipment not well suited to the task, possibly a transducer which was too large for accurate measurements of small bore pipin Conclusion-

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It was found that there was a change in the measuring technique; however, the NRC independent measurements confirmed that the current-method of measuring pipe wall thickness is acceptable.

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. ., Exit Interview $

The Region III inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted under Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on November 14,

'1985. The inspector summarized.the scope and findings of the

inspection. The licensee acknowledged this information. The inspector

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also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report

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with regard to documents or processes reviewed during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar ..

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