IR 05000408/2005003

Insp Repts 50-413/85-16 & 50-414/85-12 on 850408-0503. Violations Noted:Procedure Inadequate & Not Followed Resulting in Overpressurization of Portions of RHR & Chemical & Vol Control Sys

ML20127L173
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba, 05000408
Issue date:	05/21/1985
From:	Jape F, Mathis J, Schnebli G, Matt Thomas, Vandyne K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127L118	List: IR 05000408/2005003 ML20127L114 ML20127L140
References
50-413-85-16, 50-414-85-12, NUDOCS 8506270776
Download: ML20127L173 (8)

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UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGloN 11 hO\'d

• N ~t 101 MARIETTA STREET, ATL ANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-413/85-16 and 50-414/85-12 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and CPPR-117 Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2 Inspection nducted: April 8 - May 3,1985 Inspectors: I hSh'

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Accompanying Personnel: F. Jape J. 8, Macdonald Approved by: M J f/A/[ff F. Jape,' Section Chief (/ / Date Sfgned Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 209 inspector-hours on site and at Duke Power Company Offices in Charlotte, North Carolina, in the areas of overall preoperational test program review, preoperational test witnessing, reactor coolant system hydrostatic testing, and review of an inspector followup ite Results: Two violations were identified - (1) Procedure was inadequate and not followed resulting in overpressurization of portions of the residual heat removal system -

paragraph 9.a.(1); (2) Procedure was inadequate resulting in overpressurization of portions of the chemical and volume control system which resulted in the volume control tank being destroyed paragraph 9.a.(2).

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• J. W. Hampton, Station Manager

• H. L. Atkins, Project Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer - Mechanical H. B. Barron, Milestone Manager W. Beaver, Performance Engineer

• R. Casler, Assistant Operating Engineer

• G. Cornwell, Construction Testing Engineer

• J. W. Cox, Technical Services Superintendent

• L. R. Davison, Project QA Manager M. Glover, Startup Manager

• C. W. Graves, Jr. , Superintendent of Operations

• C. L. Hartzell, Compliance Engineer

• T. E. Holland, Operating Engineer

• R. A. Jones, Test Engineer

• P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer

• D. Llewellyn, Construction Mechanical Equipment Engineer

• K. Louvin, QA General Office

• E. B. Miller, Senior QA Engineer

• T. D. Mills, Construction Engineer - Electrical C. Muse, Operating Engineer J. Neal, Hydro Test Conductor L. Parker, Technical Associate N. Rutherford, Systems Engineer Licensing R. Sharpe, Nuclear Engineer, Licensing

• D. Tower, Shift Operating Engineer

• R. L. White, Supervisor, Catawba Station Review Group

• E. G. Williams, Project QA Technician Other licensee employees contacted included test coordinators, construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, and office personne Other Organization ANI, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance C NRC Resident Inspectors

• P. H. Skinner, Senior Resident Inspector, Operations

• P. K. Van Doorn, Senior Resident Inspector, Construction

• Attended exit interview

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2. Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 3, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The following new items were identified during this inspection:

Violation 414/85-12-01, Procedure was inadequate and not followed resulting in overpressurization of portions of the residual heat removal system paragraph 9.a.(1).

Violation 414/85-12-02, Procedure was inadequate resulting in overpressurization of portions of the chemical and volume control system which resulted in the volume control tank being destroyed -

paragraph 9.a.(2).

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

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This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

' Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identi*ied during the inspectio . Independent Inspection Effort (92706) Plant Tour The inspectors conducted a general inspection of the Unit 2 reactor building, turbine building, and auxiliary building to observe ongoing activities for compliance with NRC requirements and license commitment In addition to this tour, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's adherence to proper housekeeping and formal behavior in the control roo Chemical and Volume Control System - 3-Way Valve Unit 2 operators were actively involved with Temporary Operating Instruction T01/2/A/6150/01, Initial Filling and Venting of the Reactor Coolant System (NC) and Control of NC System for NC Hydro. All personnel appeared to be attentive to their respective assigned duties and responsibilitie During the performance of this procedure, operators identified a problem concerning flow through 2NV-172A, a three-way valve in the Chemical and Volume Control System (NV).

Subsequent investigation and inspection revealed that 2NV-172A was installed backward . _ - -

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Under normal operating conditions 2NV-172A functions to automatically control level in the Volume Control Tank (VCT) by directing letdown flow to the VCT or diverting it to a Recycle Holdup Tank (RHT) in case of high level in the VC Nonconforming Item Report (NCIR) 19605 was initiated to document and resolve the problem. The licensee determined that the incorrect installation of this valve resulted from two main reasons. First, the installation procedure lacked sufficient information to ensure correct valve orientation, and second the installing craft and quality control inspectors apparently believed orientation of the valve-side flanges was of no concer The disposition of NCIR 19605 included licensee action which is ade-quate to prevent a similar occurrence. Included are requirements to revise installation procedures and to instruct craft and inspection personnel in the proper installation of three way valve In addition, the licensee identified and evaluated the installation of all three-way valves in Ur.it 1 and Unit 2 in order for the generic implications of this problem to be addresse Of the 53 three-way valves identified, only INC-172A and 2NV-172A use both side flanges as outlets. For this reason, according to NCR 19605, only these two valves could have been installed backwards under Catawba's present construction and quality assurance programs. Installation of 2NV-172A will be corrected after the NC hydr Within the areas examined no violations or deviations were identifie . Overall Preoperational Test Program Review (70301) - Unit 2 The inspectors reviewed Catawba Nuclear Station Administrative Policy Manual for Nuclear Stations, Section 4.1, and Station Directive 3. These procedures contribute to the establishment of Catawba's preoperational (preop) test program. Major points of interest during this review were program administration and document control. Within these areas the following specific items were verified:

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Formal methods outlining turnover of plant systems or components from construction to Nuclear Production are establishe Specific roles of all station groups are delineated to bring plant systems safely and efficiently to full operating performanc Comprehensive procedures for the management of turnover exceptions are establishe f

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Formal administrative measures have been established which control test procedures preparation, review, approval, issuance, and chang The inspectors also met with Duke licensing personnel in Charlotte on April 22, 1985, and site personnel on April 23, 1985, to discuss the Unit 2 test program, licensing items remaining, and differences between Unit 1 and Unit 2 test program No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte . Preoperational Test Witnessing (70312) - Unit 2 The inspectors witnessed Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) for the chemical and volume control system, Penetration M228. Procedures used by test personnel were verified to e technically adequate, special test equipment required by procedures was calibrated and in use, and test personnel were qualifie The procedures raviewad during this inspection included the following:

PT/2/A/4200/01C Containment Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test OP/2/A/6200/20 Venting and Draining Procedure for Type C Leak Rate Tests-During the LLRT for penetration M228, valve 2NV872A, the licensee verified that the valve line-up was in accordance with Section 13.7.2.A of Procedure PT/2/A/4200/01C. An attempt was made by the test personnel to pressurize the test volume to 14.8 1 0.1 psig; however, the test volume pressure could not be maintained at the desired pressure because valve 2NV877 did not completely close. The valve indicated closed in the control room but did not seat properly. A work request was issued to reset the limit torque switch setpoint so that the valve 2NV877 would seat tightl A retest on the containment isolation valve was rescheduled following maintenanc Within the area inspected no violations or deviations were identifie . Reactor Coolant System Hydrostatic Test Procedure Review (70362) - Unit 2 The inspectors reviewed the final, approved copy of the Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Cold Hydrostatic Test Procedure, Construction Procedure 1072, and the Initial Filling and Venting the Reactor Coolant System Procedure, TOI/2/A/6150/01, to veri fy that the test procedures met regulatory requirements and licensee commitments specified in ASME Code, Section III, Division 1, Subsection NB, Section 6000, and Regulatory Guide 1.68. The review consisted of the following: The system is properly vented during the filling operation.

! Water quality is specified as required by the latest vendor specifica-tions for the temperatures to be present during the tes Reactor coolant temperature requirements are stated to ensure that primary components are maintained above the nil ductility transition temperatur . .

5 Hydrostatic test pressure and duration meet ASME code requirement Within the areas examined no violations or deviations were identifie . Reactor Coolant System Hydrostatic Test Witnessing (70462) - Unit 2 The inspectors observed licensee activities during preparations for the hydrostatic test. Two incidents which occurred during the hydrostatic test preparations were reviewed by the inspector (1) The first incident involved various piping, valves, and equipment being overpressurized to approximately 2,000 psig for approximately three hours on April 19, 198 This included portions of the residual heat removal system (RHR), boron recycle system, sampling system, and chemical and volume control syste The licensee is evaluating to determine the extent of the damag This item was reported as a potential 50.55(e) by the licensee on May 3, 198 A temporary jumper was installed (per the procedures) to bypass the check valves in the RHR cold leg injection lines. This was done in order to pressurize behind the check valves so they could be tested during the hydrostatic test. The check valves are installed in the RHR cold leg injection lines downstream of motor operated valves 2NI173A and 2NI178B. Thus, the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary for the hydrostatic test was established at the motor-operated valve These valves were required to be closed per TOI/2/A/6150/0 However, the motor-operated valves were left open when the RCS was being pressurized to approximately 2,000 psig for the " mini hydro,"

thereby allowing RCS pressure into the RHR system. In addition, the procedures were inadequate in that the header into which the relief valve for this portion of the RHR system relieved was isolated (as part of Units 1 and 2 separation) and no other relief path had been provided. It was not identified in the procedures I that there was no overpressure protection available for this i portion of the RHR system. The inspectors informed the licensee

! that failure to follow TOI/2/A/6150/01 during the " mini hydro" and

! not identifying in the procedure that no overpressure protection l

was available for portion of the RHR system constitutes a violatio This item will be identified as violation i 414/85-12-01, Procedure was inadequate art' not followed resulting in overpressurization of portions of the residual heat removal syste (2) The second incident involved overpressurization of the VCT and associated piping in the chemical and volume control system (CVCS), resulting in total destruction of the VCT on April 20, 1985. The licensee reported this item as a potential 50.55(e) on April 22, 198 The licensee is evaluating this incident to j determine the extent of the damage.

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Charging pump suction had been switched from the VCT to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) in order to increase VCT level. The charging pump was then pumping to a closed system. It appears that the VCT was inadvertently filled to a solid condition allcwing pressure to build up until the VCT ruptured. As in the first incident, procedures were inadequate in that the relief header for the VCT relief valve was isolated as part of Units 1 and 2 separation, and no other relief path had been provided. It was not identified in the procedures that overpressure protection was not available for the VCT. The inspectors informed the licensee that failure to identify in the procedures that no overpressure protection was available for the VCT constitutes a violation and will be identified as violation 414/85-12-02, Procedure was inadequate resulting in overpressurization of the chemical and volume control system which resulted in the volume control tank being destroye (3) In discussing the above incidents with licensee personnel, the inspectors expressed concerns over the controls and coordination during the time these two incidents occurred, and the decision to continue testing after the overpressure incident without thoroughly reviewing all relief valve paths and verifying that all systems and components had adequate overpressure protectio Licensee personnel stated that actions were taken after the second overpressure incident to better control activities prior to resuming the hydrostatic test. Some of the actions included better defined management controls; review of all relief valve paths; all out of normal conditions highlighted; instrumentation calibration checked; revising TOI/2/A/6150/01; operator training on operation of the CVCS while the VCT is out of servic b. After the temporary modification was completed to allow using the RWST as a surge volume for the CVCS, and, actions were taken to better control test activities, preparations for the hydrostatic test were resumed on April 29, 1985. The inspectors observed licensee activities to verify the following:

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The latest revisions of the procedures were available and in use by appropriate personne Test prerequisites were complete Valve lineup / system checklists were complete Water quality and temperature were being monitore Pressure gauges of the required range were calibrated and installe Relief valves were installed where required and relief paths verified for system overpressure protectio ,

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Proper plant systems were in servic Special test equipment required by the procedure was calibrated and in servic The test was performed as required by the procedur Adequate coordination and test control among personnel involved in the tes All data were collected by proper personne Temporary modifications installed were tracked per administrative control The required hydrostatic test pressure was reached on April 30, 1985, at approximately 6:15 The inspectors verified that test conditions regarding system temperature and pressure were within the required range and that the hydrostatic test pressure hold time was met. The licensee had assembled nine teams of Quality Control (QC)

inspectors to perform the inspection of the systems within the test boundar QA surveillance was provided during the test and several Westinghouse inspectors and authorized nuclear inspectors were available to inspect vendor-related components and ASME Section III piping and components, respectively. The inspectors accompanied QC inspection tesco s during inspection of RCS loop A, upper head injection, pressurizer, and the reactor vessel head. The inspectors verified that QC inspections of the systems and components were performed properly and test deficiencies were documented for review and resolutio Deficiencies identified were for valve leakage, which was within the design acceptance criteria. The test was completed on April 30, 198 No other violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspecte . Followup On Previously Identified Items (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 413/84-105-02, Concerning Modifications to the Cross-Over leg Whip Restraint Shims. The inspectors reviewed Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) packages 10501 and 10516 which modified the specified gaps at the cross-over leg whip restraints and the data obtained during a subsequent heatup to ensure that implementation of the NSM packages corrected the problem. IFI 413/84-105-02 is close ,