IR 05000400/2022010
| ML22161A979 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/2022 |
| From: | James Baptist Division of Reactor Safety II |
| To: | Maza K Duke Energy Carolinas |
| References | |
| IR 2022010 | |
| Download: ML22161A979 (17) | |
Text
June 13, 2022
SUBJECT:
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (PROGRAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000400/2022010
Dear Ms. Maza:
On April 29, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Three findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Three of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Signed by Baptist, James on 06/13/22 James B. Baptist, Chief Engineering Br 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000400 License No. NPF-63
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number: 05000400 License Number: NPF-63 Report Number: 05000400/2022010 Enterprise Identifier: I-2022-010-0035 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Facility: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Location: New Hill, NC.
Inspection Dates: April 03-April 29, 2022 Inspectors: T. Fanelli, Senior Reactor Inspector M. Schwieg, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Zudans, Contractor Approved By: James B. Baptist, Chief Engineering Br 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection at Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Valves Anomalous Behavior Not Identified in Corrective Action Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.8] - 71111.21N.02 Systems NCV 05000400/2022010-01 Procedure Open/Closed Adherence The inspectors identified a GREEN finding and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to identify potential degradation to a containment isolation valve in the corrective action program (CAP).
Not Addressing Containment Isolation Valve Closure Requirements in Design Documents Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21N.02 Systems NCV 05000400/2022010-02 Open/Closed The NRC identified a GREEN finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B,
Criterion III for the licensees failure to address containment isolation valve closure requirements to prevent leakage.
Failure to correct nonconformance's with 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii)
Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21N.02 Systems NCV 05000400/2022010-03 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a GREEN finding and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to correct nonconformance with 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii).
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.17T - Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Sample Selection (IP Section 02.01)
The inspectors reviewed the following evaluations, screenings, and/or applicability determinations for 10 CFR 50.59 from [enter dates].
- (1) URI 05000400/2021010-01, Treatment of Class 1E interfaces and interlocks with the Turbine Trip System Design
71111.21N.02 - Design-Basis Capability of Power-Operated Valves Under 10 CFR 50.55a Requirements POV Review (IP Section 03)
The inspectors:
a determined whether the sampled POVs are being tested and maintained in accordance with NRC regulations along with the licensees commitments and/or licensing bases Specific Guidance b.
determined whether the sampled POVs are capable of performing their design-basis functions c.
determined whether testing of the sampled POVs is adequate to demonstrate the capability of the POVs to perform their safety functions under design-basis conditions d.
evaluate maintenance activities including a walkdown of the sampled POVs (if accessible)
- (3) 1AF-19 HOV AFWP "1A" Pressure Control Valve
- (5) 1CT-50 MOV Containment Spray Pump "A" Discharge to Nozzles Isolation Valve (CIV)
INSPECTION RESULTS
Valves Anomalous Behavior Not Identified in Corrective Action Program Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.8] - 71111.21N.02 Systems NCV 05000400/2022010-01 Procedure Open/Closed Adherence The inspectors identified a GREEN finding and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to identify potential degradation to a containment isolation valve in the corrective action program (CAP).
Description:
On 5/3/2021, after a valve packing replacement, Work Order (WO) 20380548 performed a post maintenance diagnostic test for Air Operated Valve (AOV) 1BD-30, Steam Generator "B" Blowdown Containment Isolation Valve (CIV). The test showed high and uneven friction anomalies indicating an issue with the valve. In addition, the diagnostic test identified a potential binding anomaly at the beginning of the closing stroke (the CIV safety function). The binding anomaly prevented a continuous and smooth closure of the valve. A qualified AOV engineer evaluated the test on 5/13/2021 and noted that the margin had been reduced significantly due to the high friction but remained acceptable. No further investigations into these anomalies were performed. No Corrective Action or Work Request (WR) was initiated until WR 20223816 was issued 4/7/2022. Procedure TMM-134, "Post Test Evaluation of AOV Diagnostic Test Data," Rev. 3, requires initiation of WR as needed to correct anomalies.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the nonconformance into the CAP and identified a second corrective action deficiency with anomalies associated with valve 1CS-231 in Action Request (AR) 02423878 Corrective Action References: NCR 2423818 and AR 02423878
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to identify anomalous behavior that could degrade the safety function of containment isolation valve performance in the corrective action program was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the anomalous behavior was on the beginning of the closure stoke and could worsen, thus degrading the valve effectiveness to perform its safety function to close and isolate containment.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance GREEN because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, but the SSC maintains its operability or PRA functionality Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. The licensee failed to identify anomalous valve behavior completely and in a timely manner in accordance with evaluation procedure TMM-134.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states, in part, that Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, since 5/3/2021, deviant valve diagnostic anomalies were not promptly identified in CAP to be corrected.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Not Addressing Containment Isolation Valve Closure Requirements in Design Documents Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21N.02 Systems NCV 05000400/2022010-02 Open/Closed The NRC identified a GREEN finding and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III for the licensees failure to address containment isolation valve closure requirements to prevent leakage.
Description:
FSAR, Section 6.2.4.2.3, Valve Operability, states, in part, that, The valve types utilized for containment isolation service are designs which provide rapid closure and near zero leakage. Therefore, essentially no leakage is anticipated through the containment isolation valves when in closed position. The licensing basis for the plant exempted approximately 36 CIV from 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, testing requirements, based on the application of a water seal for 30 days after a design basis event. However, these valves were not exempted from the rapid closure and near zero leakage requirement. The licensee program did not ensure that the valve seat stresses necessary for near zero leakage were determined and met. In addition, test control documents and subsequent corrective action documents that identified degradation on the disc and seat did not evaluate for leakage degradation. The documents specified that the valves did not need to meet any leak rate requirements because of their exemption from 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, testing requirements. The inspectors identified that the degradation could affect the valve leakage.
The valves evaluated in the inspection sample included the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) output containment isolation valves 1SI-3 and 1SI-4, Containment Sump valve 1CT-102, and Blowdown isolation valve 1BD-30. A site extent of condition is being performed to determine how many CIVs were affected by this issue. The inspectors noted that not ensuring that near zero leakage requirements were addressed in the valve program allowed degradation affecting leakage requirements to go unaddressed.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this issue into the CAP and is performing an extent of condition.
Corrective Action References: AR 2425558
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to ensure that the near zero leakage requirements for CIVs continued to be met was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The containment isolation function of these valves was not ensured in design control and test control documents for their associated design basis events leading to the failure to address potential degradation affecting their safety functions.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance GREEN because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, but the SSC maintains its operability or PRA functionality Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, states, in part, that Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in § 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.
Contrary to the above, since 4/28/2000, the site failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and design basis, as defined in § 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for containment isolation valves to which this appendix applies were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, design documents for valve capability did not address the containment isolation valve function.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to correct nonconformance's with 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii)
Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21N.02 Systems NCV 05000400/2022010-03 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a GREEN finding and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to correct nonconformance with 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii).
Description:
Differential pressure testing results for 1SI-3 and1SI-4 showed signs of degradation and instability of valve factor performance, which could affect their safety injection function and their near zero leakage design requirement for CIVs. The tests demonstrated that the valves were not in conformance with 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) and this nonconformance was not recognized following these tests. The degradation was recognized and placed in the in the CAP as part of the Motor Operated Valve (MOV) testing program in 2006. It was identified that seat lapping has not been successful in achieving low VFC [Valve Factor Close] & VFO [Valve Factor Open]. Consideration needs to be given to replacing the valve. AR# 193559 is tracking the resolution of this issue. Instead of tracking the resolution of the issue, these valves were incorrectly classified as JOG Class A (based on these tests),not requiring further testing. This was contrary to the site MOV program given the identified degradation. The valves have not been retested under differential pressure since 2006. In this case, the licensee found MOVs that do not have a stable VF and are not consistent with the 95% approach used by the approved MOV program and Joint owners Group (JOG) data used for MOV program.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered this into the CAP and is performing an extent of condition with other valves of the same type.
Corrective Action References: AR 2425557
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to correct nonconformance's with 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii)was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The identified degradation could lead to affect the effectiveness of the Safety Injection system to perform its safety functions as well as their CIV functions. These valves were identified to be used in approximately 39 procedures associated with the safe operation of the plant.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance GREEN because the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, but the SSC maintains its operability or PRA functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states, in part, that Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformance's are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, since 5/3/2006, the site failed to correct valve factor degradation in Safety Injection Valves that prevented them from meeting 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii).
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On April 29, 2022, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection results to Kim Maza and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.21N.02 Calculations 14.SI-0017 DBR Mechanical Analysis and Calculation for Gate Valve 1SI-4 04/28/2021
Bit Outlet Isolation (CIV)
CC-0009 Mechanical Analysis and Calculation for Gate Valve 1CC- 12
167 RHR Heat Exchanger B Isolation
CC-0009 JOG MOV EVALUATION REPORT 1CC-167 (HNP-1) 12
CT-0049 Mechanical Analysis and Calculation for Gate valve 1CT-50 10
Containment Spray Pump Discharge (CIV)
DC-129 Weak Link and Seismic Analysis Report for Velan Valve 12 2
Inch Class 150 Carbon Steel Bolted Bonnet Motor Operated
Gate Valve
EQDP-0311 Main Steam PORV Operator 3
HNP-15-0073 GL 89-10 MOVs 1CC-147 & 1CC-167 are Undersized 10/20/2015
HNP-APPJ Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program 0
HNP-C-EQ-1196 Weak Link Analysis of Westinghouse Valves 1S1-3 and 12/14/2001
HNP-C/EO-1203 Weak Link Analysis of Velan Valves 1CC-147 and 1CC-167 1
HNP-IST-004 HNP IST Program Plan - 4th Interval 2
HNP-M/MECH- Determination of MOV Rate of Loading Factors 6
23
HNP-M/MECH- AOV System Level Calculations for Steam Generator 0
28 Blowdown Valves (1BD-1, 1BD-11, 1BD-20,1BD-30, 1BD-
39, 1BD-49)
TMM-134 Analysis of Category 1(2) AOV Diagnostic Data, Sliding 05/03/2021
Stem Valve with Spring/Diaphragm Actuator Spring to
Close Configuration, 1BD-30
Corrective Action AR 193559-05 1SI-2 and 1SI-4 Increase Valve Factor /Margin after Seat 08/31/2006
Documents lap
Drawings 1364-003059 12 IN CS 150 lb MO Gate Valve ASME CL 3 12-GM32SB 5
1364-099223 SHT PORV EHO Assembly Drawing 0
1-2
1364-4383 SO1 Main Steam Power Operated Relief Valves Details 6
1364-4384 Main Steam Power Operated Relief Valves Details 8
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
5-S-0542 SIMPLIFIED FLOW DIAGRAM MAIN STEAM SYSTEM 27
UNIT 1
5-S-0550 SFD CONT SPRAY SYSTEM UNIT 1 18
CAR 2166 B-401 Unit No.1 Control Wiring Diagram 7
CAR 2166-B-060 Miscellaneous Electrical Details & Notes Sheet 42 4
CAR-2165 G- Flow Diagram Containment Spray System Unit 1 28
0050
CF1L-2165 Simplified Flow Diagram Component Cooling Water 7
System, Sheet 2
CPL-2165-S-1324 Simplified Flow Diagram RHR System Unit 1 12
Engineering EC 0000298557 Wedge, Valve, Gate, 12 inch, Velan, MH/FS 0
Changes EC 295206 Obsolete MS PORV EHO Replacement 6
EC 295206 Mod Test Plan, AD-EG-ALL-1155, Attachment 3 12
ESR 99-00009 RF-09, MOV Modifications for HHSI, Cont. Spray and HHSI 12/02/1999
Engineering 1CS-11 AOV Setup Datasheet 02/15/2022
Evaluations 1CS-11 Analysis of Category 2 & 3 AOV Diagnostic Data 04/19/2015
1SI-4 DP Test 4- Rising Stem Dynamic Test Analysis 04/12/2006
2-06
1SI-4 DP Test 5- Rising Stem Dynamic Test Analysis 05/04/2006
4-06
1SI-4 MOV POST-TEST DATA REVIEW WORKSHEET 04/05/2015
PTE_2015_04_05
1SI-4 MOV POST-TEST DATA REVIEW WORKSHEET 04/25/2021
PTE_2021_04_15
9500335 Document Review of Pressure-Locking Scenario for 04/04/1995
Containment
9600054 Valve Press Lock/Thermal Bind Evaluations Reqd by 95-07 02/11/1996
CT-0054 MECHANICAL ANALYSIS AND CALCULATION FOR 12
GATE VALVE 1CT-102 CONTAINMENT SUMP TO
CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP
E5-0001 ANALYSIS OF MOTOR OUTPUT TORQUE FOR AC 22
MOTOR OPERATED VALVES
HNP-M-Mech- DETERMINATION OF MOV VALVE FACTORS R6
21
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
HNP-M/MECH- AOV COMPONENT LEVEL CALCULATION FOR MAIN 1
21 STEAM ISOLATION VALVES (MSIVS)
HNP-M/MECH- DESIGN BASIS DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE REPORT 0
250 FOR MOV'S IN THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM
HNP-M/MECH- DESIGN BASIS DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE REPORT 0
252 FOR MOV'S IN THE LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION &
RHR SYSTEM
OST-1072 1CS-11 Last IST RPI 05/13/2021
OST-1865 CVCS/SI System Operability Cold Shutdown/Refueling 08/13/2021
Interval Mode 4-5-6 Or Defueled
RH-0017 JOG MOV EVALUATION REPORT 1RH-063 7
Miscellaneous 741918 50.59 Screening for EC 95206 0
99-1264 50.59 Screening for ESR 99-00009 1
AOQG OUT-TUR Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) Auxiliary Operator Outside and 3
Turbine Building Qualification Guide
CAR-SH-M-056 Main Steam Power Operated Relief Valve 8
DBD-002 Piping Stress Analysis 3
DBD-1000-V01 Harris Nuclear Plant Environmental Qualification Design 4
Basis Document
DBD-103 Chemical & Volume Control System Boron Thermal 25
Regeneration System Boron Recycle System
DBD-104 Safety Injection System 19
DBD-106 Containment Spray System 18
DBD-108 Containment Isolation System 5
DBD-125 Steam Generator, Main Steam, Extraction Steam, Steam 14
Dump and Auxiliary Steam System
DBD-126 Steam Generator Blowdown System Steam Generator 10
Blowdown System Steam Generator Chemical Addition
System
DBD-131 Component Cooling Water System 19
EPRI TR-103237 EPRI MOV Performance Prediction Program 1
- R1 - T1
MA26430 Detailed Complete Functional Acceptance Test Procedure, F
PORV Modulating Actuator MD26420, EC 95206
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
VM-FBG ACTUATORS, HYDRAMOTOR 30
Procedures AD-EG-ALL-1415 Motor Operated Valve Performance Prediction, Actuator 0
Settings and Diagnostic Test Data
AD-EG-ALL-1431 Operated Valve Scope and Characterization 2
AD-EG-ALL-1432 Air Operated Valve Design Basis Review 1
AD-EG-ALL-1433 Air Operated Valve Testing Requirements 2
CM-M0186 Main Steam Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Operator 8
Fill and Bleed
EOP-ECA-0.0 LOSS OF ALL AC POWER 10
ISI-801 Inservice Testing of Valves 77
ISI-802 Inservice Testing of Pressure Relief Devices 28
OP-126 Main Steam, Extraction Steam and Steam Dump Systems 42
OP-137 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM 46
OST-1046 Main Steam Isolation Valve with Remote Position Indication 20
Operability Test Quarterly Interval Mode 3 to 5
OST-1068 Containment Isolation Valve Remote Position Indication 14
Test Two Year Interval Modes 5, 6
OST-1077 Auxiliary Feedwater Valves Operability Test Quarterly 24
Interval Mode 4-5-6
OST-1087 MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS FULL 26
FLOW TEST QUARTERLY INTERVAL
MODE 1
OST-1104 Containment Isolation Inservice Inspection Valve Test 57
Quarterly Interval Modes 1-6
OST-1118 Containment Spray Operability Train A Quarterly Interval 58
Modes 1-4
OST-1129 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM ISI VALVE TEST 15
QUARTERLY INTERVAL MODES 5 AND 6
OST-1191 Steam Generator PORV and Block Valve Operability Test 32
Quarterly Interval Modes 1-4
OST-1316 Component Cooling Water System Operability (Pump 1C- 37
SAB In Service) Quarterly Interval Modes1-4
OST-1803 CONTAINMENT SUMP VISUAL INSPECTION 18 MONTH 17
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
INTERVAL MODE 5
OST-1839 Component Cooling Water Valve Remote Position 14
Indication Test Two Year Interval Modes 1-6
PD-EG-ALL-1430 Air Operated Valve Program 2
PLP-112 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE PROGRAM 19
PLP-400 Post Maintenance Testing 64
PM-I0054 Air Operated Valve Diagnostic Testing 20
TE-EG-ALL-1413 MOV Design Database Control, Calculation and Diagnostic 1
Test Instruction Development and Data Evaluation/Trending
Work Orders 2038486-05 MOV 1CT-50 Post Test Data Review Worksheet 05/16/2012
13321262-01 MOV 1CT-50 Post Test Data Review Worksheet 04/24/2015
13321262-06 Perform MOV PVT and PM -M0014 for 1CT-50 04/10/2015
13352259 M, 1AF-19:002, Hydromotor Actuator Long Term Reliability 04/03/2014
13352259 I, PIC-I058, Replace Hydromotor Actuator 1AF-19 04/04/2014
13366092-07 lCS-11, As Left Diagnostic Testing 04/23/2015
13484301-03 DUKE Nuclear MOV Program MOV Post-Test Data Review 01/30/2017
Worksheet, 1CC-167
13484301-03 MNT-NGGC-00 10,1CC-167, As Left Diagnostic Test 01/30/2017
20374172-01 1MS-62, Steam Leak Through Leakoff Line 12/31/2019
20380548 I, FT, PM-I0054, 1BD-30:006, As-Left AOV Diagnostic Test 05/20/2021
20394523-01 I, 1SI-4:002, MOV PVT AND PM-M0014 4/25/2021
2197059-03 DUKE Nuclear MOV Program MOV Post-Test Data Review 06/17/2014
Worksheet, 1CC-167
13