IR 05000397/2022003

Integrated Inspection Report 05000397/2022003

ML22298A087
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	10/31/2022
From:	Patricia Vossmar NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/PBA
To:	Schuetz R Energy Northwest
Vossmar P
References
IR 2022003
Download: ML22298A087 (19)

Text

October 31, 2022

SUBJECT:

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000397/2022003

Dear Robert Schuetz:

On September 30, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Columbia Generating Station. On October 20, 2022, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Grover Hettel, Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Columbia Generating Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Columbia Generating Station. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Signed by Vossmar, Patricia on 10/31/22 Patricia J. Vossmar, Chief Projects Branch A Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000397 License No. NPF-21

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000397 License Number: NPF-21 Report Number: 05000397/2022003 Enterprise Identifier: I-2022-003-0004 Licensee: Energy Northwest Facility: Columbia Generating Station Location: Richland, WA Inspection Dates: July 1 to September 30, 2022 Inspectors: P. Niebaum, Senior Resident Inspector A. Donley, Resident Inspector N. Hernandez, Operations Engineer S. Hedger, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector Approved By: Patricia J. Vossmar, Chief Projects Branch A Division of Operating Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Columbia Generating Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Follow Fire Protection Program Implementation Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green [H.12] - Avoid 71111.05 NCV 05000397/2022003-01 Complacency Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS)5.4.1.d, Procedures, with two examples, when the licensee failed to follow licensee procedure 1.3.10, Plant Fire Protection Program Implementation, revision 38. The first example was identified on June 27, 2022, when the inspectors discovered welding in the cable spreading room with the suppression system out of service. The second example was identified on August 10, 2022, when the inspectors identified a transient combustible permit in the reactor building truck bay was not followed which required a continuous fire watch.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000397/2021-002-01 LER 2021-002-01 for 71153 Closed Columbia Generating Station, Integrated Leak Rate Test LER 05000397/2021-002-00 LER 2021-002-00 for 71153 Closed Columbia Generating Station, Integrated Leak Rate Test

PLANT STATUS

Columbia began the inspection period at rated thermal power (RTP). On August 23, 2022, the operators reduced power to approximately 94 percent RTP by lowering core flow as a result of an issue with the 'A' recirculation pump adjustable speed drive glycol cooling system. Following restoration of the cooling system, the operators reduced power to approximately 77 percent RTP and recovered the 1A2 adjustable speed drive. On August 24, operators began raising reactor power and achieved 100 percent RTP on August 25. On September 17, operators reduced power to approximately 80 percent RTP for a control rod pattern adjustment, isolation of a feedwater heater drain level control valve, and main turbine bypass valve testing. Columbia returned to approximately 100 percent RTP later that day and remained at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.

Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) standby service water system B while the standby service water system C was out of service for annual maintenance on July 26, 2022

(2) low-pressure core spray system on August 29, 2022

(3) high-pressure core spray system while the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC)system was out of service for maintenance on September 12, 2022

(4) standby gas treatment system (SGT) A when SGT B was out of service for maintenance on September 26, 2022

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) fire area SW-2, standby service water pumphouse 1B, on July 26, 2022

(2) fire area R-1, reactor building 441 elevation, specifically the reactor truck bay, while a heavy load flatbed trailer was stored there from August 10 through 12, 2022

(3) fire area R-3, reactor building 422 elevation, high-pressure core spray pump room, on September 28, 2022

(4) fire area SW-1, standby service water pumphouse 1A, on September 28, 2022

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the reactor building 548' elevation south pipe chase (room R511) on August 11, 2022.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during:

post-maintenance testing of HPCS-V-4 on July 30, 2022 a 5 percent power transient due to a drop in resistivity on the 1A2 drive of the adjustable speed drive system on August 23, 2022 monthly operability run of emergency diesel generator 3 on August 24, 2022

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator training scenario on August 22, 2022.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) reviewed the licensees periodic evaluation a(3) report for the period of January 2019December 2020 on July 18, 2022

(2) reviewed the performance improvement plan, corrective actions, and goals for the control air system which transitioned from a(2) to a(1) status on July 27, 2022

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Yellow risk for planned maintenance on residual heat removal pump A, low-pressure core spray minimum flow switches, and inoperable main control room remote air intake 1 on July 6, 2022

(2) Yellow risk for high-pressure core spray system outage for yearly maintenance on July 28, 2022

(3) Yellow risk for planned maintenance on residual heat removal pumps B and C, low

-pressure core injection minimum flow switches, on August 16, 2022

(4) Yellow risk for planned maintenance on the reactor core isolation cooling system on September 12, 2022

(5) Yellow risk for standby gas treatment system B outage for yearly maintenance on September 26, 2022

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) CR 435023, heavy sediment deposits found during diving in service water system A and high-pressure core spray service water pump pits, discovered on August 3, 2022

(2) CR 435640, cause determination for failed as found local leak rate testing of RHR-V-27B and impact on operability, on August 30, 2022

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) Update (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors verified the site Severe Accident Management Guidelines were updated in accordance with the boiling-water reactor generic severe accident technical guidelines and validated in accordance with NEI 14-01, Emergency Response Procedures and Guidelines for Beyond Design Basis Events and Severe Accidents, revision 1.

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

(1) work order 02164986 for reactor protection system electrical protection assemblies 3E and 3F on July 22, 2022

(2) work order 02162026 for high-pressure core spray service water following HPCS-P-2 pump replacement on July 30, 2022

(3) TSP-DG3-B502, HPCS Diesel Generator DG3 Load Testing, following a high-pressure core spray system outage for preventive maintenance on August 1, 2022

(4) work order 02166953 for high-pressure core spray service water following annual system maintenance window on August 1, 2022

(5) OSP-RHR/IST-Q704, RHR Loop C Operability Test, following residual heat removal pump C planned system outage on August 15, 2022

(6) OSP-RCIC/IST-Q701, RCIC Operability Test, following a reactor core isolation cooling system planned outage on September 14, 2022

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) work order 02165039, high risk response time testing of main steam isolation valve logic actuation on reactor level 1 A and C channels, on July 13, 2022

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated an emergency preparedness drill on September 13, 2022.

71114.08 - Exercise Evaluation - Scenario Review

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.04) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preliminary exercise scenario that was submitted to the NRC on August 17, 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22229A150) for the exercise scheduled to occur on October 25, 2022. The inspectors discussed the preliminary scenario with Ms. J. Kuklinski, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, and other members of the emergency preparedness staff on September 22, 2022. The inspectors' review does not constitute NRC approval of the scenario.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) ===

(1) July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022

MS07: High-Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022

MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022

MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022

MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)

(1) July 1, 2021, through June 30, 2022

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) CR 434636, follow up on licensee-identified instance of two reactor operators being on shift completed on August 17, 2022

71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000397/2022-002-00, Integrated Leak Rate Test, (ADAMS Accession No.

ML21333A262) and LER 05000397/2022-002-01, Integrated Leak Rate Test, (ML22160A432)

The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions and cause of the condition described in the LERs and discussed with licensee staff. No additional performance deficiencies were identified other than the performance deficiency identified and addressed in 050000397/2021012-01 Failure to perform a cause evaluation after exceeding an administrative limit during local leak rate test of containment isolation valve, (ML21306A196).

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Follow Fire Protection Program Implementation Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green [H.12] - Avoid 71111.05 NCV 05000397/2022003-01 Complacency Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS)5.4.1.d, Procedures, with two examples, when the licensee failed to follow licensee procedure 1.3.10, Plant Fire Protection Program Implementation, revision 38. The first example was identified on June 27, 2022, when the inspectors discovered welding in the cable spreading room with the suppression system out of service. The second example was identified on August 10, 2022, when the inspectors identified a transient combustible permit in the reactor building truck bay was not followed which required a continuous fire watch.

Description:

On June 27, 2022, the inspectors discovered welding activities in progress in the cable spreading room. The old fire protection piping had been removed, and the licensee was preparing the new piping for installation by welding two shorter length pipes together to form an approximate 8-foot-long section of new fire protection piping with flanges at both ends.

The licensee was planning to install the newly welded piping in the fire protection system at flanged connections after the welding was completed. The welding was taking place in an area of the cable spreading room that was free of cables and nearby combustibles. A qualified fire watch was stationed in the room to observe the welding activities as required.

The inspectors challenged Operations personnel on whether the activities were appropriate, and their initial response was that they were aware of the welding activities in the cable spreading room, but believed it was properly controlled with the approved ignition source permit 22-0029 and fire protection system impairment permit 22-0048. Section 3.1.6.a of licensee procedure 1.3.10A, Control of Ignition Sources, revision 18, stated that ignition source work shall not be permitted in sprinklered areas where the sprinkler system is impaired (unless required to prevent inadvertent actuation). According to the fire permits discussed above, ignition source work (welding) was not allowed in the area while the suppression system was out of service. By reviewing the ignition source permit, the inspectors confirmed that the suppression system was considered impaired (out of service).

Since two new pipe sections were being welded together and the welding was not occurring on the installed fire protection system piping, the inspectors determined that the welding activities should not have occurred inside the cable spreading room to ensure compliance with station procedures and fire protection system impairment permit 22-0048.

On August 10, 2022, the inspectors identified some wood in poor condition on a trailer staged in the reactor building truck bay and questioned if it was fire treated. The trailer was staged in the truck bay to transport the recirculation pump impeller to a new location in the radwaste building. The initial response from the fire marshal was that the area was under an hourly fire watch, as controlled by the transient combustible permit 22-0033, which assumed the wood was fire treated. Attachments 7.3 and 7.6 of licensee procedure 1.3.10C, Control of Combustibles, revision 24, stated that if a significant amount (greater than 20 pounds) of untreated or uncoated wood is left unattended in a vital area, a continuous fire watch shall be posted until the material is removed. The truck bay is considered a fire protection vital area per attachment 7.6 of licensee procedure 1.3.10C. Additionally, transient combustible permit 22-0033 contained a note which stated if the trailer had a wood deck that was not fire retardant treated, then a continuous fire tour was required. Further investigation by the fire marshal confirmed that the wood on the trailer was untreated, greater than 20 pounds, and as such, the reactor building truck bay should have had a continuous fire watch posted while the trailer was staged. The trailer was in the reactor building truck bay for 3 days and an hourly fire watch was completed for the duration.

Section 3.8.2 of licensee procedure 1.3.10, Plant Fire Protection Program Implementation, revision 38, required the licensee to follow procedure 1.3.10A, Control of Ignition Sources, for fire hazards associated with planned ignition source fire hazards and to follow licensee procedure 1.3.10C, Control of Combustibles, for fire hazards associated with transient combustibles.

Corrective Actions: For the first example, the licensee completed the welding activities the same day and initiated CRs 434198 and 434563 to evaluate procedure changes. For the second example, the licensee removed the trailer from the reactor building truck bay after 3 days and initiated CR 435836.

Corrective Action References: CRs 434198, 434563, 435836

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: Failure to follow section 3.8.2 of licensee procedure 1.3.10, Plant Fire Protection Program Implementation, revision 38, was a performance deficiency.

Specifically, the licensee failed to follow the procedural requirements in licensee procedures 1.3.10A, Control of Ignition Sources, revision 18, when they failed to prevent ignition source work (welding) in the cable spreading room on June 27, 2022; and 1.3.10C, Control of Combustibles, revision 24, when they failed to establish a continuous fire watch for transient combustibles in the reactor building truck bay August 10 through August 12, 2022.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, for the first example, the attribute was adversely affected since an ignition source was introduced into an impaired fire suppression area such that an equivalent level of protection for the cable spreading room was not maintained during welding. For the second example, the attribute was adversely affected since the amount of untreated wood exceeded the maximum limit. This resulted in posting an incorrect compensatory measure, an hourly fire watch, rather than a continuous fire watch.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. The inspectors evaluated this finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 attachment 04, Initial Characterization of Findings issued on December 13, 2019. Because the finding involved a failure to implement fire prevention and administrative controls, the finding was screened using IMC 0609, Appendix F, attachment 1, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Worksheet issued on May 2, 2018. As part of the Phase 1, the inspectors assigned this finding to the Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls category and reviewed IMC 0609 Appendix F, attachment 2, Degradation Rating Guidance issued May 2, 2018. Since a properly equipped and qualified fire watch was in the cable spreading room while the pipe was welded, and there was no active ignition source occurring while the truck trailer was staged with an hourly fire watch, the inspectors assigned this finding a low degradation rating.

Consistent with the guidance above, because of the low degradation rating, the finding screened as Green, very low safety significance.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. For these examples, the inspectors determined that licensee staff failed to verify assumptions used in approving the ignition source permit and transient combustible permit.

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1.d, Procedures, requires in part that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering Fire Protection Program implementation. Section 3.8.2 of licensee procedure 1.3.10, Plant Fire Protection Program Implementation, revision 38, required the licensee to follow procedure 1.3.10A for fire hazards associated with planned ignition source fire hazards and to follow licensee procedure 1.3.10C for fire hazards associated with transient combustibles. Licensee procedure 1.3.10A, Control of Ignition Sources, revision 18, section 3.1.6.a, required in part that ignition source work shall not be permitted in sprinklered areas where the sprinkler system is impaired (unless required to prevent inadvertent actuation). Licensee procedure 1.3.10C, Control of Combustibles, revision 24, attachments 7.3 and 7.6, required in part that if a significant amount (greater than 20 pounds) of untreated or uncoated wood is left unattended in a vital area, a continuous fire watch shall be posted until the material is removed. Contrary to these requirements, on June 27, 2022, the licensee failed to prevent ignition source work in the cable spreading room by allowing welding of two 6-inch diameter pipe sections while the suppression system was out of service. Also, from August 10 through August 12, 2022, the licensee failed to post a continuous fire watch while a trailer with a significant quantity of untreated wood was staged in the reactor building truck bay.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On September 22, 2022, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness exercise scenario review inspection results to J. Kuklinski, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, and other members of the licensee staff.

On October 20, 2022, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to G. Hettel, Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.04 Corrective Action Action Requests 288625, 435062, 423826, 420456, 370180, 428868, 436987,

Documents 435976, 435982

Drawings M520 Flow Diagram HPCS and LPCS System Reactor Building 105

M524-2 Flow Diagram Standby Service Water System Reactor, 124

Radwaste, D.G. Bldgs and Yard

M544 Flow Diagram HVAC-Standby Gas Treatment Reactor 076

Building

M772 Compressed Air, Fire Protection, Standby Serv Water & 031

Mics Wtr Systems Plans at 507 & 525 Radwaste Bldg

M775 Flow Diagram Emergency Chilled Water Piping System 030

Control Room

Procedures OSP- Control Room Emergency Chiller System B Operability 055

CCH/IST/M702

OSP-LPCS/IST- LPCS System Operability Test 046, 047

Q702

SOP-HPCS-LU HPCS Valve and Breaker Lineup 004

SOP-LPCS-LU LPCS Valve and Breaker Lineup 003

SOP-LPCS-STBY Placing LPCS in Standby Status 002

SOP-SGT-LU Standby Gas Treatment System Lineup 000

SOP-SGT-STBY Placing Standby Gas Treatment in Standby Status 002

SOP-SW-LU Standby Service Water System Valve & Breaker Lineup 015

SOP-SW-SPRAY Standby Service Water Spray Header Operations 000

SOP-SW-START Standby Service Water Start 008

Work Orders 02107547, 02165187, 02190527

Work Requests 29106895, 29160155, 29164101

71111.05 Calculations FP-02-85-03 Combustible Loading Calculation 011

Corrective Action Action Requests 421423, 421432, 435836, 434082

Documents

71111.05 Fire Plans PFP-MN-XFMR- MN XFMR YD Misc Bldgs 007

YD-MISC

PFP-RB-422 Reactor 422 007

PFP-RB-441 Reactor 441 005

Miscellaneous BIP 21-0269 Barrier Impairment Permit

TCP 22-0033 Transient Combustible Permit 08/10/2022

Procedures 1.3.10C Control of Combustibles 024

15.2.16 Thermal Detector - Channel Function Test 009

15.2.2 Function and Sensitivity Check of Ionization Detectors 021

Work Orders 02186800

Work Requests 29160630

71111.06 Calculations ME-02-02-02 Reactor Building Flooding Analysis 004

Corrective Action 435635

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

71111.11Q Corrective Action Action Requests 435960, 435963, 435967

Documents

Miscellaneous LR002561 Cycle 22-4 licensed operator requalification training scenario 07/06/2022

guide

Procedures ABN-POWER Unplanned Reactor Power Change 018

ARP 4.602.A13 Annunciator Response Procedure 030

SOP-RRC-ASD Reactor Recirculation ASD Operations 017

Work Orders 02189935

Work Request 02153591-05

71111.12 Corrective Action Action Requests 391839, 382165, 383381, 301063, 313942, 432057, 435499,

Documents 433259, 434911, 434921, 430580, 430585, 430642

Miscellaneous ASD System Health Reports 1Q2019,

1Q2020,

3Q2020

Procedures SYS-4-22 Maintenance Rule Program 015

SYS-4-23 Maintenance Rule Structural Baseline Inspections 001

Work Orders 02192562, 02198084

Work Requests 29166972

71111.13 Corrective Action Action Requests 435117

Documents

Miscellaneous T22-HPCS-SYS- eSoms tracker

1-001

T22-SGT-SYS-B- eSoms tracker

001

Procedures 1.3.83 Protected Equipment Program 036

ISP-RHR-X304 ECCS-LPCI (B and C) Pump Discharge Low (Minimum 009

Flow) - CC

Work Orders 02192811, 02169314, 02164164

71111.15 Corrective Action Action Requests 408940

Documents

Drawings M584 General Arrangement Plans and Sections Standby Service 010

Water Pump Houses

Engineering EC 19264

Changes EC 19403

Engineering EC 12362 Sediment in Service Water Spray Pond Pump Pits 09/20/2013

Evaluations

Procedures LLRT-01 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program 010

Work Orders 02114538, 02109072, 02164911, 02164912, 02152237

71111.18 Miscellaneous 5.0.3 EOP/SAG Flowchart Verification Records for SAG1, SAG2, 08/13/2021

SAG3 and SAG4

GO2-15-168 Letter to NRC from Energy Northwest, Commitment to 12/21/2015

Maintain Severe Accident Guidelines

TM-2120 Columbia EOP/SAG Technical Document 010

Procedures 1.2.7 EOP/SAG Program Maintenance 015

5.0.14 PSTG/SATG Differences Volume 1: Introduction, Tables, 000

Cautions, Figures

5.0.3 EOP/SAG Flowchart Verification 009

5.0.4 EOP/SAG Flowchart Validation 008

5.0.9 EOP/SAG Revision 011

5.1.1 RPV Control (Mode 1-3) 023

5.7.1 Flowchart Training Manual Volume 1, SAG1 and SAG2 008

SAG1 RPV Control SAG (Modes 1-4) 007

71111.19 Corrective Action Action Requests 434709, 434757, 434789, 434803, 434810, 434917, 434922,

Documents 435128, 435163, 435223, 435207, 426573, 435208, 435205

Procedures 10.25.48 Testing Molded Case Circuit Breakers 017

10.25.74 Testing Motor Operated Valve Motors and Controls 033

18.1.12 HPCS-P-2 Preservice Test 004

ESP-EPA3E3F- Electrical Protection Assemblies RPS-EPA-3E and RPS- 012, 013

S901 EPA-3F-CFT/CC

EWD-7E-016A Electrical Wiring Diagram High Pressure Core Spray System 003

Reactor Pressure Vessel Injection MOV HPCS-V-4 (E22-

F004)

OSP-HPCS/IST- HPCS System Operability Test 060

Q701

OSP-SW-M103 HPCS Service Water Valve Position Verification 029

SWP-TST-01 Post Maintenance Testing Program 018

Work Orders 02153007, 02153008, 02152934, 02188944, 02190770,

2169291, 02164033, 02160380, 02153591, 02187776,

2176024, 02169143

Work Requests 29166678, 29166729, 29166828

71111.22 Corrective Action Action Requests 434741

Documents

Procedures ISP-MS-B601 MSIV Isolation Logic Actuation on Reactor Level 1 Channels 008

A & C - RTT

Work Orders 02092462, 02134999

71114.06 Miscellaneous Columbia Generating Station Classification Notification 09/13/2022

Forms (CNF) 1 through 8

Procedures 13.2.2 Determining Protective Action Recommendations 020

13.4.1 Emergency Notifications 044

71114.08 Miscellaneous Energy Northwest, Columbia Generating Station, Plume 08/17/2022

Phase Exercise, October 25, 2022

Procedures 13.1.1A Classifying the Emergency - Technical Bases 34 (Minor

2)

13.2.2 Determining Protective Action Recommendations 20 (Minor

2)

13.4.1 Emergency Notifications 44 (Minor

01)

71151 Corrective Action Action Requests 429109, 424457, 426619, 428937, 422792

Documents

Engineering EC 19257 Documentation of MPR report for DG-GEN-DG2 elevated

Changes voltage

Miscellaneous MSPI Emergency AC Power System Derivation Reports 07/11/2022

MSPI High Pressure Injection System Derivation Reports 07/11/2022

MSPI Heat Removal Systems Derivation Reports 07/11/2022

MSPI Residual Heat Removal Systems Derivation Reports 07/11/2022

MSPI Cooling Water Systems Derivation Reports 07/11/2022

Control Room Operator Logs 7/1/2021 to

6/30/2022

0192-0077-RPT- Columbia EDG Blown Fuse Evaluation - Phase 2, 000

001 Evaluation of EDG High Voltage Impact on Equipment

TM-2150 Mission Time of Emergency Safety Features 000

71152A Corrective Action Action Requests 434636, 435004, 435001, 435516

Documents

Miscellaneous Emergency Plan Columbia Generating Station 067

PER 292-0961 Problem Evaluation Request 08/06/1992

Procedures 1.3.1 Operating Policies, Programs, and Practices 134

OI-09 Operations Standards and Expectation 078

SWP-FFD-04 Work Hour Controls 004

71153 Corrective Action Action Requests 435640, 432980, 425605, 393944, 421357, 425900, 427657

Documents

Engineering 19264

Changes 19403

Procedures IST-4 Inservice Testing Program Plan Fourth Ten-Year Inspection 006

Interval

LLRT-01 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program Plan 009, 010

TSP-CONT-R801 Containment Isolation Valve and Penetration Leak Test 018, 019

Program

TSP-RHR/X25B- LLRT of RHR-V-27B 003, 004

C801

TSP-RHR/X25B- LLRT of RHR-V-27B 000

C802

Work Orders 02109072, 02114538, 02164911, 02164912, 02154645

Work Requests 29165893, 29160597

16