IR 05000397/1987001

Insp Rept 50-397/87-01 on 870104-0214.No Violations or Deviations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Control Room Operations,Esf Status,Surveillance Programs,Maint Topics, Lers,Special Insp Topics & Listed Insp Procedures

ML20207S741
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	03/03/1987
From:	Rebecca Barr, Dodds R, Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207S736	List: IR 05000397/1987001 ML20207S735
References
50-397-87-01, 50-397-87-1, NUDOCS 8703200229
Download: ML20207S741 (7)

Text

- _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .

.

,

.

, , -

U.S.-NUCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSION

"

REGION '

s

' Report No: 50-397/87-01' -

f

. Docket No: .50-397 - .

,

Licensee: ' Washington PUblic Power Supply System-P. 0. Box 968-

~

Richland, WA 99352 Facility Name: Washington Nuclear Project No. 2 (WNP-2)

Inspection at: WNP-2SitebearRichland, Washington Inspection Conducted: January.4 - February 14, 1987 Inspectors: b . h )

dds, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed k7 3{3/87 h rr, Resident Inspector Date Signed Approved by: f3k7-P..H./ Johnson, Chief Date Signed React (of Projects Section 3 Summary:

Inspection on January 4 - February 14, 1987 (50-397/87-01)

.

Areas Inspected: . Routine inspection by the resident-inspectors of control room operations, engineered' safety feature (ESF) status, surveillance program, maintenance program, licensee event reports, special inspection topics, and licensee action on previous inspection findings. During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 30703, 40700, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 71714, 73051, 90712, 92700, 92701 and 92702 were covere Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

,

8703200229 PDR 870304 O ADOCK 05000397 PDR

,

-

. _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _-.-a

<a .

'

• '

. .

.

~. . -

DETAILS

. ,

, Persons Contacted J. Shannon, Deputy Managing Director

. . *C. Powers, Plant Manager

• J. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager

. *R.=CorcoranJ Operations Manager

• S.-McKay, Assistant-Operations Manager

• K. Cowan, Technical Manager-

• J.'Harmon,' Assistant Maintenance Manager

'

• R. Graybeal,; Health Physics and. Chemistry Manager

• D. Feldman, Plant Quality Assurance Manager

_ J. Peters, Administrative Manager P. Powell, Licensing Manager M. Wuesterfeld, Reactor Engi.neering Supervisor J. Landon, Maintenance Manager-

• S. Washington, Sr. Compliance Engineer

• H. McGilton, Manager Operational Assurance Program

_

• Personnel in attendance at exit meeting on February 19, 1987.

The inspectors also inte'rviewed various con' trol room operators, shift

, supervisors, shift managers and engineering, quality assurance, and management personnel relativerto activities..in ' progress and record '

' Plant Status The plant operated at approximately,72% power throughout the inspection perio . Operations Verifications

~

fhe resident inspectors reviewe'd the control room operator and shift manager log books on a daily basis during this report period. Reviews were also made of the Jumper / Lifted Lead Log'and Nonconformance Report Log to verify that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications and that the licensee was actively pursuing corrections to conditions listed in either log. Events involving unusual conditions of equipment were discussed with control room personnel available at the time of the review. The-events were evaluated for potential safety significance. The licensee's adherence to Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO's),

particularly those dealing with ESF and ESF electrical alignment, were observed. The inspectors routinely took note of activated annunciators on the control panels and ascertained that the control room licensed personnel on duty at the time were familiar with the reason for each annunciator and its significance. The inspectors cbserved access control, control room manning, operability of nuclear instruments and availability of onsite and offsite electrical power. The inspectors also made regular tours of accessible areas of the facility to assess equipment conditions, radiological controls, security, safety and adherence to regulatory requirements.

, -

'

.

'

.

• 2

,

.

No violations or deviations were* identifie .

, ,

4. -Surveillance Program Implementation The inspectors: ascertained that' surveillance 1of safety related systems or components was being conducted in acc^ordance with' license requirement In addition to" witnessing _and verifying ~ daily: control panel instrument

_

checks, the inspectors observed portions of severalidetailed surveillance tests performed by operators and instrument and. control technicians. The following tasks were observed-for pr'ocedural adequacy and perfo'rmers'

comp _liance to procedures:

PPM 7.4.6.1.1' Primary Containment -Integrity Verification (1/7-8/87)

PPM 7.4.1.4. Rod Worth Monitor Control Rod Sequence

- Verification (1/10/87)

PPM 7.4.3.8.2.1_ Weekly Turbine Valve Tests (1/10/87)

PPM 7.4.7. Control Room Emergency Filtration System "B"-

Operability Test (1/10/87)

PPM 7.4.1. ' Control Rod Drop Scram Timing (1/10/87)

PPM 7.4.3.1 Neutron Flux Noise in Low Flow Region, 1 Loop n

Operation Only (1/10/87 at 34% power)

Additionally, the surveillance test data were evaluated for conformance to acceptance criteri On January 10, 1987 special operations were observed in conjunction with the above tests. They included:

PP 9.3.10 Control Rod Sequence Exchange (B-1 to A-2)

T.P. 8.3.57 Single Loop Core Flow Measurement PP 9.3.~12 Plant Power Maneuvering Of the 19 control rods that were scram time tested from full power to position 05, Control Rod 26-51 was slowest with a time of 2.497 seconds to position 05. The Technical Specification limit is 7.00 second No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation Portions of selected safety related systems maintenance activities (MWR's AU 2054 and AD 7626) were observe By direct observation and review of

<

records the inspector determined whether these activities were consistent with LCOs; that the proper administrative controls and tagout procedures were followed; and that equipment was properly tested before return to service. The inspector also reviewed the outstanding job orders to determine if the licensee was giving priority to safety related maintenance and to verify that backlogs which might affect system

,

performance were not developin No violations or deviations were identifie ._. -

_

_

' ,

,

~

, <

> Engineered' Safety Feature'Vepification

'

The inspector verified.the operability of portions of the Standby Service Water (SSW).'B' System, the Low Pressure Core Spray.(LPCS) System, the

,

Standby Gas Treatment System, the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) 'A' System and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the' systems. The inspector confirmed that the licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the as built configuration. Valves were verified to be in the proper position, to have power available to their operators, and to be locked as appropriate. The licensee's procedures were verified to be

'

-

,

in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the FSA . No violations or deviations were identifie . Cold Weather Preparation Administrative Procedure PP.1.3.37, Cold Weather Operations, has been established to provide-information and increase awareness of conditions to prevent damage and/or malfunctions of both safety-related and

'non-safety-related equipment during cold weather. For each winter season the procedure is initiated by the Scheduled Maintenance System on November 1 and terminated on April 1. On December 11 and 22, 1986, a licensec QA Engineer performed surveillances on cold weather procedure implementation.' Due to earlier than predicted cold weather, the procedure was actually implemented on October 14, 1986. The QA Engineer

,

identified deficiencies in the timely implementation of certain provisions of the procedure (valve identification and periodic operator surveillances of heat trace panels). The QA Engineer believes the identified deficiencies can, for the most part, be directly attributed to the inadequacies of-the procedure. Corrective action has been initiated by adding the shiftly check of heat trace panels to the equipment operator's log sheets and repairing the out-of-service heat tracing. The rev'sion of PP 1.3.37 was under discussion between Operations and Quality Assuranc No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Reports The regional and resident inspectors performed an in-office review of the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) relative to timeliness, adequacy of description, generic implications, planned corrective actions and adequacy of codin LER 86-35-00 Spurious Control Room Emergency Filtration System Actuation (Closed)

LER 86-36-00 Control Room Emergency Filtration System Actuation

.(Closed)

LER 86-37-00 Plant Shutdown Caused by an Unqualified Component Due to Inadequate Procedures (Closed)

LER 86-38-00 Reactor Scram Due to Temporary Loss of Feedwater Due to an Inadequate Procedure (Closed)

.

-

,.

,

-

,

'LER 86-39-00 Spurious Control Room Emergency Filtration System Actuation - Flow Lamp Failure (Closed)

LER 86-41-00 Spurious Control Room Emergency Filtration System Actuation-Unknown Cause (Closed)

LER 86-42-00 Missed Fire Door Surveillance Due to Inadvertent Omission From Procedures (Closed)

LER 86-43-00 Spurious Control Room Emergency Filtration System Actuation-Unknown Cause (Closed)

The resident inspectors reviewed the preceding reports and supporting information onsite to verify that licensee management had reviewed the events, corrective actions had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identifie No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Response to Surry Feedline Rupture of 32/9/86 Wall Thinning In mid 1985 the licensee identified several instances of abnormal pipe and component erosion (turbine cross under piping, moisture separator reheater (MSR) shell and various heater drain valves). A

-

limited program was established to measure and trend wall thickness of these areas. As a result of the' trending, modifications have been planned for these components during the April-June refueling outag The licensee, in response to the Surry event,Jwill be augmenting the wall thinning program by adding approximately forty " critical" areas to the trending program during the upcoming refueling outage. The selection criteria for the " critical" areas will be based on guidelines found in EPRI-NP-3944 dated April'198 The criteria consider pipe type, location, fitting separation, flow rate, flow phase, turbulence, temperature and oxygen concentration. Future program modifications will be based on the data collected during this and future outage Potential for Actuation of Fire Protection System The licensee evaluated the potential for inappropriate actuation of fire protection systems during a feedline rupture. The licensee concluded that the control features of the Halon and the Carbon Dioxide (Cardox) Systems would not be affecte The Halon System provides fire suppression only in control room cabinets and the Cardox System provides fire suppression only in the main generator static exciter housing. These control systems are not located in areas susceptible to feedline rupture The water fire suppression system could potentially be inappropriately. activated during a feed or steam line rupture event; however, the licensee believes the actuation of the water

-

, .. y . , , w ,

,

/v , ,

K # :5 J '

,. = g,

.

( ?-

'

-

suppression system would not deter irom the_ ability to respond and

<

would be beneficial since the area would be cooled by the fire

, :

suppression wate . .

_An inspector walked-down down various fire suppression systems an verified that the cover plates for these systems and control' -

features'were securely. fastened in place. Additionally, electrical .

<

conduit was verified to' be properly seale , ' Check Valve Monitoring Program To.date, the licensee's monitoring of check valve performance has-

. been that required by ASME Boilec and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI which monitors operability of a limited set of-check valves and does not evaluate performance for degradation. 'The-licensee is in

-

the process ~ of developing a formal program to evaluate actual " check

, valve performance". The remaining element necessary to formalize the program is the "INP0 CHECK VALVE APPLICATION GUIDE" which was to

-

be published by September 1986, but-has yet to be distribute Regardless of receiving this document, the licensee plans to j evaluate'the performance of approximately twenty. check valves during the upcoming refueling outag .The licensee has previously identified some minor erosion problems-with check valves. specifically, valves RHR-V-53, RFW-FCV-15 and feedwater heater SA~ drain valves.. These valves will be included in the evaluation progra ,'1 Annunciators (Followup-Items 85-38-02, Open - Policy for long

'

standing activated alarms; 86-06-03, Closed - Awareness of plant status annunciators) '

'There continues to be a significant number of ~ activated and deactivated annunciators in control room panels'that need attention, about 35 eac In recent observations during shift turnovers, it appeared that the n Control Operators'and the Control Room Supervisor were~ cognizant of the status of the annunciators and plant equipment. Also, a weekly status report was being prepared for the Assistant Operations Manager's revie While the licensee has developed an effective means of tracking repair status, it has not~ been apparent that adequate- priority has been given to -

the correction of deficiencies. The inspector sampled the annunciator associated work planned during the upcoming ~ R-2 outage. Assuming all the planned work will.be~ accomplished, approximately one-third of the annunciator problems would be corrected. This would return the number of lighted annunciators to the post R-1 outage leve In the inspector'.s view, more aggressive action appears necessary to

. reduce ~ the number of annunciator. deficiencies to a manageable leve Licensee management agreed to evaluate annunciator status and initiate corrective action, if appropriate, to assure safety of operatio (Follow-up items 86-06-03, Closed; 85-38-02,Open)

y< dO 'l . +

.

a v g (e;r, .;

- -

'

,

v

^',,, ' "

11.: 'Procedurb1Compliancef

• '

- Trending of' plant ~eventsiover'the past four months' indicates that the

. question of procedural compliance expressed in the last SALP evaluation still warrants significant attentio Several recent procedura It jnon-compliances have.resulted:in errors in discharging effluents (LER's 86-44, 86-40),tincrease,s in the number of half-scrams, and a minor-personnel 1 injury when a craftsman worked on.the wrong sample cooler.

' > -

Singularly each event of procedural. non-compliance' had little impact on safety or plant operation. - Because these events were- self-(licensee)

identified, as yet, no regulatory acticil has teen take Collectively, o' .it appears to the inspector that-the number of events involving,

,

procedural.non-compliance indicates a need.for action by the. licensee to preclude-recurrence. .The licensee agreed to examine.recent events for f

common cause and place additional emphasis on procedural complianc Additionally, the licensee has already initiated a " human performanc *

evaluation program" with increase'd-attention on "near misses" and root .

.cause analysis. The results of the licensee's program will'be. examined-

. in the future as~ follow-up item 87-01-01. (Follow-up . item, 87-01-01)

'

12. ' Management Meeting s _

-

-

. , , i

~

During.this period'the' inspectors: met with the Plant. Manager frequently 3x to discuss. inspection finding status. Onl February ~ 19, 1987 the

. inspectors met with the-_ Plant Manager'nd a members of his~ staff to discuss the inspectionifindings during this perio '

,

,

,

e e

'

g A

\, ,

h t

<

L.