IR 05000397/1986008

Insp Rept 50-397/86-08.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Changes to Emergency Preparedness Program, Public Info,Shift Staffing & Augmentation & Notifications & Communications

ML20204A408
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	04/22/1986
From:	Brown G, Fish R, Temple G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20204A405	List: IR 05000397/1986008 ML20204A404
References
50-397-86-08, 50-397-86-8, NUDOCS 8605120179
Download: ML20204A408 (12)

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U. S. NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No. 50-397/86-08 -

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Docket No. 50-397 License No. NPF-21 Licensee: Washington Public Power Supply System 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name: Washington Nuclear Project No. 2 (WNP-2)

Inspection at: WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection conducted: March 10-14 and 24-28, 1986 LInspectors: .L\\\_ kl'11l Eb Gb . Tehple '

Date Signed

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M N C. A. Brown Date Signed Approved By: _

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R.'F. Fish, Chief D4te tfigned Emergency Preparedness Section Summary:

Inspection on March 10-14 and 24-28, 1986 (Report No. 50-397/86-08)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced emergency preparedness. inspection in the areas of changes to the emergency preparedness program, public information, shift staffing and augmentation, notifications and communications, licensee audits, emergency detection and classification, protective action decision making, knowledge and performance of duties (training),-follow-up on thirteen open items identified during previous inspections and one item of interest to the inspector. Inspection procedures 82201, 82202, 82203, 82204, 82205, 82206, 82209, 82210 and 92701 were addresse Results: No significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified. Eight of the previously identified open items were closed. One open item was identified during this inspectio DR 860423 ADOCK 05000397 PDR

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' Persons Contacted C. Becker, Shift Manager M. Cates. Emergency Planner R. Chitwood , Manager, Emergency Planning and Environmental Programs

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Y. Derrer,. Senior Training Specialist

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J. Houchins., Emergency Planner T. Houchins, Madager, Audits ~

I. Jenkins, yrincipal Nuclear-Engineer M. Kappl, Shift Manager A. Klauss, Senior Emergency Planner G. Kozlik, Shift' Manager D. Larson, Manager, Radiological Programs D. Mannion, Senior Emergency Planner

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S. McCullough, Senior Information Specialist R. Mogle, Senior Emergency Planner R. Quay, Manager, General and Technical Support Training D. Queen, FacilJties Maintenance Technician F. Quinn, Principal Meteorologist R. Stickney, Manager, Technical Training S. Telander, Manager, Security Programs Action on Previous Inspection Findings <

(Closed) Open'Ites (85-10-01): The Technical Support.Conter (TSC) air monitor was inoperal)1e,due co' calibration difficulties. The inspector verified that the TSC' air monitor was in operation and.that all monitoring chanpels, including iodine, were calibrated and in use. This item is consiaered close (Closed) Open Item (85-10-02):, The data collection, storage and display system did not appear to provide an acceptable level of reliability because. (1) the data acquisition sof tware did not exclude test data and projections from the operational data, (2) did not provide confirmatory prompts and user assists t6 b,elp prevent " lock-up" and (3) permitted projection analyses to change;the displayed classification statu (1)- The licensee now has the capability to utilize signal surveillance on test data. The test signal is held in abeyance'until completion of testing. The signal is then discarded. Projected data is maintained in temporary storage files which are discarded upon user's logou (2) The " lock-up" problem was addressed as-follows:

I One cause of the " lock-up" problem was that the program was

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developed using certain makes and models of terminal However, when the program was implemented, other types of terminals, which had different configurations, were found to be incompatible for certain function This would cause the

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted C. Becker, Shift Manager M. Cates, Emergency Planner R. Chitwood, Manager, Emergency Planning and Environmental Programs Y. Derrer, Senior Training Specialist J. Houchins, Emergency Planner Houchins, Manager, Audits Jenkins, Principal Nuclear Engineer Kappl, Shift Manager Klauss, Senior Emergency Planner Kozlik. Shift Manager Larson, Manager, Radiological Programs D. Mannion, Senior Emergency Planner S. McCullough, Senior Information Specialist R. Mogle, Senior Emergency Planner R. Quay, Manager, General and Technical Support Training Queen, Facilities Maintenance Technician Quinn, Principal Meteorologist Stickney, Manager, Technical Training Telander, Manager, Security Programs 2. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item (85-10-01): The Technical Support Center (TSC) air monitor was inoperable due to calibration difficulties. The inspector verified that the TSC air monitor was in operation and that all monitoring channels, including iodine, were calibrated and in use. This item is considered close (Closed) Open Item (85-10-02): The data collection, storage and display system did not appear to provide an acceptable level of reliability because (1) the data acquisition software did not exclude test data and projections from the operational data, (2) did not provide confirmatory prompts and user assists to help prevent " lock-up" and (3) permitted projection analyses to change the displayed classification statu (1) The licensee now has the capability to utilize signal surveillance on test data. The test signal is held in abeyance until completion of testing. The signal is then discarded. Projected data is maintained in temporary storage files which are discarded upon user's logou (2) The " lock-up" problem was addressed as follows: One cause of the " lock-up" problem was that the program was developed using certain makes and models of terminal However, when the program was implemented, other types of terminals, which had different configurations, were found to be incompatible for certain functions. This would cause the

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" lock-up". The licensee has purchased new, compatible terminals to replace these, A newer computer with a larger capacity was installed which has increased response time by approximately fifty percent (50%).

This will reduce operator induced " lock-up" caused by operators who mistake slow response for real " lock-up" and perform illogical commands to regain contro The software has been modified to display the selected mode Illogical combinations are easily determined by the screen display. Additionally, the softwa a will now automatically loop back into an operative mode _ad continue instead of

" locking-up" when an illogical mode combination is selecte If, for any reason, the terminal should still " lock-up", a PRIME CPL program has been developed, to run at the mainframe, which will release the termina (3) The PRIME computer system administrator has established access control to different portions of the system by log in password, ~

location of the terminal and terminal type. This means that an individual who logs in from a particular terminal can only operate the portion of the program applicable to that terminal. The terminal will be denied access into other areas of the program by the computer system. Thus, functions such as the displayed classification status in the Control Room (CR), cannot be affected by " foreign" terminals or users. This item is considered close (Closed) Open Item (85-10-03): Modify the Emergency Dose Projection System (EDPS) software to allow correction of the inadvertent input of incompatible data without termination of the program execution. The licensee has modified the program so that upon initiation, it is brought up in the predictive mode, instead of the manual mode. This means that the operator must consciously choose the manual mode before data can be input into the system. Additionally, the program now provides that data input in the manual mode must be approved twice by the operator, before its final acceptance irto the system. The software has been made more

" user friendly" by allowing incompatible mode selections without

" lock-up". When incompatible modes are selected, the user may now return to the menu and select the correct modes without termination of program execution. The licensee's actions have adequately addressed the NRC's concern. This item is considered close (Closed) Open Item (85-10-04): The emergency modes of operation of the Plant Support Facility (PSF)/ Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

ventilation system did not allow operation of the fume hoods because of an inadequate source of air. The EOF includes a laboratory to be used as a backup for analysis of Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) sample Use of the fume hoods in the laboratory will be required to analyze the PASS samples. Originally, the design of the PSF / EOF ventilation system provided for a crossover damper network which changed the normal return flow of air to the EOF from one air handling unit to another. This was done to take advantage of a longer travel route to obtain greater dilution of air. However, outside air was sealed off, preventing intake

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necessary to operate the fume hood. The ventilation system no longer uses the crossover damper network, but continues the operation of the upper and lower floor subsystems to provide's High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtered source of air for operation of the fume hoods. The fume hood in the chemistry laboratory can now be operated during emergency modes of ventilation by activating a local switch at the fume hood. The fume hood will be exhausted through roof ventilation which is protected by two zero leakage dampers. This item is considered close (Closed) Open Item (85-10-05): Establish methods for defining unmonitored release pathway source terms. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) 13.8.1, 13.9.1 and 13.9.2, " Computerized Emergency Dose Projection System Operations", " Environmental Field Team Operations" and " Field Exposure Rate Surveys", respectively, contain directions for detecting an unmonitored release. Upon detection of such a release, an arbitrary source term is input to the EDPS to aid in determining the location of the resulting plume. Environmental field teams are then dispatched to provide field measurements. These field results are input into the EDPS to adjust the arbitrary source term. The EDPS then provides dose rate and dose predictions for the release. This item is considered close (Open) Open Item (85-10-06): Improve the primary EDPS dispersion model to include calculation of variable trajectories in time and space, to make diffusion estimates during calm wind conditions, to limit plume travel during a given time interval, and to accumulate doses. Rather than change the working program, the licensee chose to address this concern by improving the capability of its personnel to perform these functions. _ Personnel training has now been expanded to provide instruction in the ability to make subjective modifications to the EDPS projected plume travel. This item will remain open pending demonstration of the licensee's ability to accomplish these actions during the next annual exercis (Closed) Open Item (85-10-07): Review and modify MESOI/CASPAR to incorporate decay and depletion of radionuclides in transport from the release point to the receptor location. The licensee's procedures now call for use of MES01/GASPAR to direct environmental field teams to areas of contamination. Dose calculations will be based on actual field samples which will incorporate decay and depletion of radionuclides in transport from the release point to the receptor location. This item is considered close (Closed) Open Item (85-10-08): Improve documentation of the verification of the main EDPS programs. The licensee has implemented temporary procedure 8.6.9 (*r olume 8 of the Plant Procedures Manual (PPM)), which adequately addresses this NRC concern. This item is considered close (0 pen) Opra Item (85-10-09): Provide systematic verification and documentstion for the backup EDPS microcomputer program. The licensee has completed a listing and a study of the program logic. The next task is to write a design document. The estimated completion date of this document is May 31, 1986. The licensee appears to have devoted sufficient attention and resources to this concern to allow for its

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completion in a timely manner. This icem will remain open until the design document has been complete (open) Open Item (85-26-01): The NRC expressed concerns over the number of problems associated with the notification process, during the September 1985 annual exercise. Problems included improper activation of alerting signals, improper offsite local agency. notification and failure to properly follow procedure when making public address (PA)

announcements. The licensee has included monthly training which requires the CR staff to activate alerting signals and make proper PA announcements. EPIP 13.14.2, " Process for Determining Protective Action Recommendations" is being modified to emphasize proper notification of protective action recommendations. The licensee appears to be providing an adequate amount of attention and resources to this area, however, this item will remain open pending demonstration of the licensee's ability to accomplish these actions during the next annual exercis (0 pen) Open Item (85-26-02): The NRC expressed concern about the apparent lack of familiarity with emergency procedures, on the part of the TSC staff, during the September 1985 exercise. The licensee is modifying EPIP 13.14.2; 13.4.1, " Notifications"; 13.11.1, " Recovery Manager Duties" and; 13.1.2, " Plant Emergency Director Duties". These modifications will clarify and amplify when to turn over responsibilities, automatic protective action recommendations and notifications. This item will remain open pending demonstration of the licensee's ability to satisfy these concerns during the next annual exercis (Closed) Open Item (85-33-07): The licensee should consider putting a key locker in the Radwaste CR. Reference WNP2-85-33-07, this work was completed on December 3, 1985. This item is close (0 pen) O},en Item (85-33-10): Review areas with limited egress under certain operational difficultie Reference WNP2-85-33-10, some equipment installation has occurred. Pending equipment installation, scheduled to be performed during the next outage, this item will remain ope . Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program To determine if any changes to the emergency preparedness program had been made which could affect the overall state of emergency preparedness, the inspector add essed the following areas: (1) changes to the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) (i.e., TSC, EOF and Operations Support Center (OSC)), (2) changes to the emergency response organization, (3) changes to the licensee's emergency planning group, and (4) changes to the Emergency Plan (EP) and EPIPs. The inspector considered all of the changes to be improvements. Noteworthy *

improvements included an administrative method for assuring that emergency response personnel have completed training (prior to a specific assignment), stricter administrative methods for assuring that changes are not made to ERFs without permission from the Manager, Emergency Planning and Environmental Programs (EP&EP) and the addition of two new Emergency Planners to the EP&EP grou .

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The Region V Emergency Preparedness Section performs an annual review of the EP and EPIPs. The licensee's EP has just recently completed its review / revision cycle and has been sent to the NRC for concurrence. The review of the EPIPs was accomplished in the office, prior to this inspection. The following procedures were reviewe .1.1, Revision 2, " Classifying the Emergency" 13.1.2, Revision 2. " Plant Emergency Director Duties" 13.2.2, Revision 2 " Transportation Accidents" 13.2.4, Revision 2, " Missiles" 13.2.5, Revision 2 " Bomb Threats" 13.2.6, Revision 2, " Civil Disturbance" 13.3.1, Revision 2 " Earthquakes" 13.3.2, Revision 2, "High Winds / Tornados" 13.3.3, Revision 2, " Floods" 13.3.4, Revision 2. " Ash Fallout" 13.5.1, Revision 2, " Controlled Evacuation of the Protected Area" 13.5.2, Revision 2, "Immediate Evacuation of the Protected Area" 13.5.3, Revision 3. " Evacuation of Exclusion Area and/or Nearby Facilities" 13.5.5, Revision 2, " Personnel Accountability" 13.5.6, Revision 2, " Personnel Search and Rescue" 13.8.1, Revision 2, " Computerized Emergency Dose Projection System Operations" 13.10.1, Revision 3, " Control Room Operations and Shif t Manager Duties" 13.10.2, Revision 2, " Shift Technical Advisor Duties" 13.10.3, Revision 2, " Technical Support Center Operations and TSC Director's Duties" Changes made to these procedures continued to implement the EP (Revision 4), did not reduce the effectiveness of emergency preparedness and did not result in a failure to meet the performance standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b).

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No significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified during this part of the inspectio . Public Information Program The inspector verified that basic emergency response information has been disseminated to the public in the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) on an annual basis. The inspector examined the licensee's 1986 Public Information Calendar and a quarterly publication entitled "Open Lines". The calendar included the appropriate materia Other aspects of this program (i.e., transient population and State / county involvement) were discussed with a member of the licensee's Public Affairs grou No significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified during this part of the inspectio . Shift Staffing and Augmentation The inspector reviewed EPIP 13.14.5, " Emergency Organization" and verified that minimum onshift crews were consistent with the goals of Table B-1 of NUREG-0654. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's latest (April 1986) quarterly " Emergency Organization Assignment List and Training Requirements" and verified that emergency assignments have been made in accordance with EPIP 13.1 Methods used to notify and augment the onshift emergency staff were reviewed and discussed with EP&EP personnel. The licensee uses a combination of pagers and call-trees to effect notification of offshift emergency response persennel. The inspector reviewed the results of two notification drills (October and December 1985) to get an estimate of staff augmentation times. The drills included activation of the pagers and the call-trees. Those notified were not required to respond to the site. The results of the December drill were considered by the EP&EP group to be an improvement over the October drill. Based on the following results from the December drill, the inspector questioned the licensee's ability to meet the augmentation goal of 60 minute The pagers were not activated until 18 minutes after the event was classifie It took 3t minutes to complete the pager responses (49 minutes from event declaration). It took a total cf 35 minutes to complete the call-trees initiated by the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM). Twenty-two minutes to notify lead positions and 13 additional minutes to notify Table B-1 support positions requiring 60 minute respons It took a total of 64 minutes to complete the call-trees initiated by the OSC Director; 58 minutes for Table B-1 positions requiring 60 minute response and 6 additional minutes to notify the remainder of the grou .

7 It took a total of 51 minutes to complete the call-trees initiated by the Radiological Emergency Manager (REM); 35 minutes for Table B-1 positions requiring 60 minute response and 16 additionc1 minutes to notify the remainder of the grou It took a total of 54 minutes to complete the call-trees initiated by the TSC Director; 38 minutes for Table B-1 positions requiring 60 minute response and 16 additional minutes to notify the remainder of the grou EP&EP personnel stated that the drills are not conducted to test response times and that based on the results of the December drill, an automatic dialing telephone system is being investigated. It should be noted that a timed response drill was conducted in March 1984. The results of this test indicate that, in general, the 60 minute goal could be met at that time or when participants were stressed, knowing their response was being timed. The licensee should try to improve the notification times (for offshif t personnel) during future drills or consider streamlining the system to provide a better headstart toward meeting the 60 minute response goal. This matter will be tracked by the Region as "open" item (86-08-01).

No significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified during this part of the inspectio . Notifications and Communications The inspector reviewed EPIP 13.4.1, Revision 3, " Notifications" and proposed changes to this procedure which will be incorporated into Revision 4. From a procedural standpoint, the licensee is maintaining their capability to make the appropriate notification The inspector reviewed EPIP 13.14.4, Revision 3. " Emergency Equipment" and examined a sampling of communication test documentation. The inspector was able to verify that communication tests had been conducted in accordance with the aforementioned EPI No significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified during this part of the inspectio . Licensee Audits The inspector verified that an independent audit of the emergency preparedness program had been conducted on an annual basis in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(t) and Section 18 of the licensee's E Corporate Licensing and Assurance (CL6A) Audit 86-354 was reviewed. Six Quality Finding Reports (QFRs) and eighteen Items of Concern were issued as a result of the audit. Three of the QFRs were related to the PASS training and procedures, therefore, only three QFRs were directly related to the emergency preparedness progra Responses to the QFRs were submitted on time and it appeared that every effort had been made to determine appropriate corrective action r

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No significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified during this part of the inspectio . Emergency Detection and Classification This subject was examined through a review of applicable procedures and discussions with licensee personnel, including Shift Managers (SMs). The results of the SM interviews are summarized in Section 10 of this repor The inspector reviewed EPIPs 13.1.1, 13.1.2 and 13.10.1 and concluded _the-procedures contained the appropriate emergency classifications based on Emergency Action Levels (EALs), protective action recommendations, authorities and responsibilitie No significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified during this part of the inspectio . Protective Action Decisionmaking This subject was addressed through a review of applicable procedures and discussions with licensee personnel, including the SMs. The results of the SM interviews are summarized in Section 10 of this report. The inspector reviewed EPIP 13.14.2 and concluded that the appropriate information, including authorities, responsibilities and protective action recommendations based on plant conditions and dose projections, was contained in the procedure.

2 No significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified during this part of the inspection.

1 Knowledge and Performance of Duties (Training)

A review of the training program was conducted to ensure an effective

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emergency preparedness training program was established and maintaine This review included an examination of applicable training records, lesson plans, attendance sheets, procedures and other documentatio Interviews with SMs were conducted to determine their familiarity (i.e. ,

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in an emergenc Training records for thirty key emergency response personnel were

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compared with the requirements of EPIP 13.14.7, Revision 5, " Emergency i Training". The results showed that training had been conducted in accordance with this procedur It should be noted that as of December 1985, the licensee has instituted a new " phased" emergency preparedness training program. Technical Training Procedure 5.9, entitled " Emergency Preparedness Training Program Description", details the new " phased" training. Although the transition from the previous training program to

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the new one appears to be somewhat ackward, once stabilized, the new

" phased" training should be an improvement over the previous system. The inspector examined a few of the lesson plans for the new " phased" training. The lesson plans appeared to be appropriate, with emphasis in known weak areas. Exams appeared to be challenging.

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The inspector interviewed three SMs. During the interviews, the SMs were presented with nine emergency situations. The SMs were asked to classify each of the events and describe any other actions they would be required to tak The results of the interviews showed that, in general, the SMs were familiar with procedures / processes for classifying events, making notifications and making protective action recommendations. The interviews did disclose two problems. One problem resulted from a SM who felt that he knew the classification procedure well enough to classify all of the events without referring to the EPIP. This caused him to miss one of the event classifications. The SM corrected his classification after he was encouraged to check the procedure. Another problem resulted from an inconsistency between Attachment A and Attachment C of EPIP 13.14.2. Attachment A calls for an automatic recommendation to evacuate the Columbia River at a Site Area Emergency (SAE). However Attachment C, which addresses protective action recommendations based on exposure levels, includes an exposure equivalent to a SAE level, but states that there are no protective action recommendations. It should be noted that the procedure directs the user to Attachment A (correct recommendation),

not to Attachment C. One SM made an incorrect-recommendation because he

.used Attachment C, rather than Attachment A. The SM corrected his '

recommendation after he discovered that he was using the wrong Attachment. Both of these problems were brought to the Plant Manager's attention during the exit interview. The_ procedural inconsistency was discussed in detail with EP&EP personnel, prior to the exit interview, so that the inconsistency could be corrected promptly (the procedure is currently being revised), to prevent future problems. The EP&EP group was also encouraged to thoroughly review the procedure for additional inconsistencie No significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified during this part of the inspectio . Inspector Identified Area of Concern (Open) Open Item (GT-04-03): During an annual frequency test of the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS), a number of alerting radios were inadvertently activated. This caused some concern, since residents

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living in the licensee's EPZ depend on the radios for emergency notification. The licensee examined some of the radios and found that

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the radios had a broad spectrum around their assigned receiving frequency which caused them to respond to testing frequencies near their assigned

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! frequency. Tests were conducted on radios which receive in the FM ban The tests indicated that these radios will not inadvertently respond to testing frequencies of the EBS, because the FM radios have a more defined and narrower receiving band. The licensee has purchased approximately-

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200 of the FM radios. The exchange / replacement of these radios is scheduled to occur within the next few months. The licensee intends to l eventually replace all of the radios to eliminate any potential for i

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recurrence. There are approximately 750 radios distributed throughout

[ the licensee's EPZ. This item will remain open until all of the old

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radios have been replaced with the new FM radios.

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12. Exit Interview The inspector held an exit interview with the licensee on March 28, 1986, to discuss the preliminary findings of the inspection. The attachment to this report identifies the personnel who were present at the meetin The licensee was informed that no significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified during the inspection. The licensee was informed of the status of each of the previously identified "open" items desribed in Sections 2 and 11. Findings described in Sections 3-10 were briefly summarized. The inspector specifically mentioned the "open" item described in'Section 5 and the two issues that surfaced during the SM interviews (Section 10). In addition, the inspector addressed two other matters that arose during this inspection. One matter involved the wording used in the licensee's classification procedure to describe Technical Specification related Unusual Events. The inspector previously discussed this matter with the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) who assisted EP&EP personnel in writing the procedure. During those discussions, the STA stated that the words used in the procedure did not accurately reflect the licensee's intentions. The Plant Manager was informed that EP&EP personnel had agreed to change the wording in the EP and EPIP to clarify this' matter. The other matter involved event classification when almost all CR annunciators had been lost. The inspector reported that none of the SMs interviewed classified this as an event, because it was not addressed in the EPIP. Loss of almost all CR annunciators is addressed in NUREG-0654 as an example of an Alert initiating conditio The inspector stated that she had been unable to contact the previously mentioned STA to discuss this subject. It should be noted that the licensee uses a combination of " symptomatic" and " situation based" emergency action levels. This is significant to this issue because although a loss of all CR annunciators is not listed as one of the

" situation based" emergency action levels, the situation could be

" symptomatic" of another condition (i.e., loss of power) which could warrant an emergency classification. The Plant Manager responded to this discussion by stating that this particular example was not considered by them to be a credible accident (on its own) because the power related problems which would have to occur to cause this problem were unlikely or indicative of a more serjous failure. The Plant Manager also stated that perhaps the SMs' analyses of this situation could have included the events that could have resulted in this condition. The inspector concluded that the Plant Manager's response to this matter was appropriat !

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ATTACHMENT EXIT INTERVIEW ATTENDEES G. Bouchey, Director, Support Services M. Cates. Emergency Planner R.'Chitwood, Manager Emergency Planning and Environmental Programs R. Dale, Writer 1, Public Affairs / Communications Y. Derrer, Senior Training Specialist J. Houchins, Emergency Planner A. Klauss, Senior Emergency Planner M. Lyon, Health Physicist, Radiological Programs D. Mannion, Senior Emergency-Planner M. Mills, Washington State Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council R. Mogle, Senior Emergency Planner C. Powers, Plant Manager S. Telander, Manager, Security Programs C. Van Hoff, Senior State Liaison