IR 05000397/1985026

Insp Rept 50-397/85-26 on 850909-13.No Significant Deficiencies or Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Preparedness Exercise & Associated Critique,Follow Up on Previous Findings & IE Info Notices & Previous Drills

ML20198E915
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	10/25/1985
From:	Fish R, Prendergast K, Temple G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20198E861	List: IR 05000397/1985026 ML20198E856
References
50-397-85-26, IEIN-85-044, IEIN-85-44, NUDOCS 8511140184
Download: ML20198E915 (10)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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. REGION V

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Report N /85-26 Docket N License N NPF-21

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Licensee: Washington Public Power Supply System f 3000 George Washington Way >

Richland, Washington 99352 -

Facility Name: Washington Nuclear Project No. 2 (WNP-2)

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l Inspection at: WNP-2

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Site, Benton County, Washington  !

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Inspection conducted: September 9-13, 1985 l  : . ,

Inspectors: M .khmb Gb M. Te%sle, Emeriency Preparedness Analyst

\OllklBT Date Signed 4 ,

. Team Leader ,

_ k.~' ~~b# M\2.5lE5 K.jM. Prendergast, Edergency Preparedness Analyst Dat'e Signed j Team Members: M. I Gaod, Comex Corporation

G. Wehmann, EG&G Services

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j Approved By:

R. F. Fist., Chief

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Dat'e Sifned i Emergency Preparedness Sertion

I Summary:

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! Inspection on September 9-13, 1985 (Report No. 50-397/85-26) I

l Areas Inspected: Announced inspection of the emergency preparedness exercise

and associated critique, follow-up on open items identified during previous

inspecticas, follow-up on an IE Information Notice and follow-up on corrective actions resulting from previous exerciscs/ drills. This inspection it.volved j about 164 hours0.0019 days <br />0.0456 hours <br />2.71164e-4 weeks <br />6.2402e-5 months <br /> onsite by two hTC inspectors and two contractor team member Inspection Procedures 82301 and 92717 were covered,

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Results: No significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were j identified.

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i i 8511140184 851025 PDR i

O ADOCK 05000397 I, PDR i

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l DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted -

L. Aeschliman, Senior Licensing Engineer D. Anderson, Mechanical Supervisor L. Barry, Supervisor,, Health Physics G. Bouchey, Director, Support. Services A. Brown, Manager, . System Projects R. Chitvood, Manager, Emergency Planning and Environmental Programs W. Davis, Principal: Environmental Scientist N. Hancock, Shift Manager S. Heath, Communication Engineer J. Hogg, Supervisor, Communication Maintenance M. Kappl, Shift Manager A. Klauss, Senior Emergency ~ Planner P. MacBeth, Engineering Specialist D. Mannion, Senior Emergency Planner R. Mazurkiewicz, Plant Manager, WNP-1 R. Mogle, Senior Emergency Planner D. Ottley, Supervisor, Radiological Services M. Painter, Computer Analyst R. Quay, Manager, General and Technical Support Training V. Shockley, Supervisor, Health Physics Support G. Sorensen, Manager, Regulatory Programs R. Stickney, Manager, Technical Training M. Wuestefield, Supervisor, Plant Systems 2. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Open) Open Item (85-04-01): Visual alarms (strobe lights) had not been installed in high noise areas. This item was identified during the preoperational emergency preparedness inspection conducted on June 20 - July 1, 1983, and documented in Inspection Report No. 50-397/83-23 as open item 83-23-24. A follow-up inspection conducted on September 12-16, 1983 (Inspection Report No. 50-397/83-43), closed this item. During a subsequent inspection conducted on January 14-18, 1985 (Inspection Report No. 50-397/85-04), the item was re-opene Discussions with licensee staff during this. inspection (September 1985)

indicated that this issue would be addressed during a Plant Operations Committee (POC) meeting to be held on September 25, 1985, and that consideration is being given to using the interim administrative procedures as a permanent solution, rather than installing the visual ala rms . This matter is of concern to the Region because of the appacent delay in resolving the issue and because consideration is being given to changing a previously committed to course of action. During the exit interview, the licensee committed to informing the Region of the results of the September- 25, 1985 POC meeting. This item is still considered to be ope (0 pen) Open Item (85-10-01): The air monitor installed in the Technical Support Center (TSC) had been inoperable due to calibration difficultie The installed NMC air monitor in the TSC has one inoperable channel that measures Iodine. A Maintenance Work Request has been submitted and

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approved to install a Barium source on the charcoal canister hold down ring. This installed source is intended to provide sufficient background

, radiation to prevent the downscale alarm which has caused the

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inoperability.of this channel. This item is still considered to be open.

, Exercise / Drill Records Review The licensee's Emergency Planning and Environmental Programs (EP&EP)

! group is responsible.for. tracking corrective actions resulting from

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deficiencies identified during exercises and drills. Weaknesses are identified during the licensee's post exercise / drill critique process,

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categorized as to their safety significance (i.e. , major deficiency, j

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minor deficiency'or item foriclarification) and entered into a Corrective

. Action Record (CAR), log * book. ; A member (s) of the EP&EP group is

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designated to' recommend corrective action and to ensure implementation of the correctiv'e action. The system provides for a determination as to

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adequacy 'of the corrective action and for signature approva , s J f

The folloking observat' ion's resulted'from the examination of the CAR log book: (1)~Some" items. app' eared to be closed before corrective actions were

, , completed (i.e., items were closed' based on a planned course of action);

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$ (2) Three minoriddficiencies~ identified during the March 1985 medical

drill wer'e'never1 entered into.: the CAR log book; and (3) In some cases, '

the EP&EP Manager was not. the. individual who signed the CAR form, I

indicatihg approval / adequacy of corrective action It should be noted

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! that observation no. 3 occurred when the EP&EP Manager was designated as the individual responsible for the e c'orrective action. Based on the

~ inspector's observations, the followi'

n gn suggestions were made to the j licensee, Documentation'related to' corrective action implementation could be i improve T

In order to aid in determining the adequacy of corrective actions,

. previous weaknesses could be factored into scenario planning and checked for reoccurrenc Concurrent with the examination of the exercise / drill records, the

. inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's March.13, 1985 Medical Emergency-Drill. The review included the drill package, drill critique and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) evaluation. Three minor deficiencies and five items for clarification were noted. Except for the apparent oversight involving the three minor deficiencies (see e observation (2) above), the results and documentation appeared to be adequat :

, 'No significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identifie t

- Follow-up-on Information Notice =

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/J The inspector. verified that the licensee had received, reviewed for

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applicability and taken or had initiated appropriate action.in response to IE Information Notice Ns. 85-44, " Emergency Communication System

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Monthly Test". Processing of this Information Notice appeared to have been conducted in accordance with applicable licensee procedure The Nuclear Safety Assurance Group had discussed Information Notice No. 85-44 with EP&EP personnel and determined that communication ter ino was conducted using the Support Services Tracking System a- 'ha -

to, ensure testing at the frequency required by Emergency Pt Implementing Procedure (EPIP)'13.14.4, Revision 2, "Emergear. t 06P"-

This item is considered close . Emergency Preparedness Exercise Planning The licensee's EP&EP group has the overall respons ter o/' eloping, conducting and evaluating the. emergency preparedt , as % (43 The EP&EP group developed the scenario package.with the asstu alcensee staff possessing appropriate expertise (e.g., reactor operations, hecith physics). Persons involved in the scenario development were not participants in the. exercise. The Director, Support Services, was designated as the Drill (Exercise) Directo . The EP&EP group, in concert with the offsite agencies, established the exercise objectives. NRC Region V and FEMA, Region X were provided with an opportunity to comment on the proposed objectives. The exercise document, generated in accordance with EPIP 13.14.8, Revision 2,

" Drills / Exercises", included the objectives and exercise limitations, player information (guidelines), exercise scenario, messages used during the exercise, initial and subsequent plant parameters, meteorological and radiological data, controller / evaluator instructions and the critique worksheets. The exercise document was tightly controlled before the exercise. Due to the complexity of the scenario, the scenario package was distributed to the controllers several days before the exercise to

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ensure that the controllers were suf ficiently familiar with the scenario events and their individual responsibilities. Advance copies of the scenario package were provided to the NRC observers and'other persons having a specific need. The players did not have access to the exercise document or information on the scenario events. The exercise was-intended to meet the requirements of IV.F.2 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and NUREG-0654 guidance concerning an unannounced exercis Controllers were stationed at each of the licensee's Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) (e.g., Control Room (CR), TSC, Operations Support Center (OSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) to provide

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messages / data where appropriat Controllers were also dispa:ched with every repair / monitoring team. A final briefing of the controllers was conducted on September 9, 1985. The contents of the exercise document were discussed in detail at the briefing. All of the NRC soservers were present for this controllers' briefin . Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario started with an event classified as an " unusual event" and ultimately escalated to a " general emergency" condition. The

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, -initiating event, which occurred at 5:45 a.m., was a range fire that threatened the plant's 115 Kv power supply. At 8:45 a.m. there were

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continuing indications of abnormal coolant chemistry (increasing main steam line radiation) which led to a partial reactor scram (some rods remained partially withdrawn) and indications that two Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) failed to close. These conditions led to the declaration of an " alert" at 8:50 a.m., At 10:45 a.m. the reactor became critical and rapidly reached approximately 30% power due to a massive Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) collet finger failure event (i.e.,

rods drifting out) caused by the abnormal coolant chemistry. This caused a " site area emergency"_to be declared at 10:55 a.m. The sudden power escalation along with the severe coolant chemistry caused additional core degradation .(approximately 30% projected core damage) which led to the declaration of a " general emergency" at 12:23 p.m. The scenario also involved t.a contamination of seviral security guards and the OSC Director suffered a heart attack. It should be noted that the exercise was put on hold for.30 minutes beginning at 7:00 a.m. due to problems with the Graphics Display System. All scenario time line events were adjusted 30 minutes after the exercise resumed. It should also be noted that the " general emergency" was declared by default (i.e., the controllers told the TSC staff that they were in a " general emergency")

due to certain calculational' assumptions made b:- the scenario developers and not by the technical staff who were players. This matter will be discussed in greater depth ~in Section . Federal Observers Four NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's response. One inspector was stationed in each of the licensee's ERFs. The NRC inspector assigned to the OSC accompanied repair / monitoring teams for the purpose of evaluating their performanc . Control Room The following aspects of CR operations were observed during the exercise:

detection and classification of emergency events, mitigation, notification and protective action recommendations. The following are NRC observations of the CR activitie An " alerting" tone (siren) was not sounded at the " unusual event" or

" alert" classification It appeared that the wrong siren was used to announce the controlled evacuation of the protected area. The immediate plant evacuation signal was used instea Notification of inplant emergency response personnel was not conducted in accordance with EPIP 13.4.1, Revision 3,

" Notifications", in that the alerting tone and follow-up public address (PA) announcement were not repeate CR operations might benefit if briefings were conducted on a regular basis. This comment is partially based on the physical size of the CR and because some messages appeared to be passed to inappropriate people during the exercise, causing delays in getting the information to the control operato .

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. Simulations detracted from event realism in that actions were considered to be done immediately, rather than imposing the time it would actually take'to complete the actio There appeared to;be some data flow problems between the CR and TSC.

! Examples:

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1) It did not appear that inplant survey results were reported back'to the C ,

2) 'It did not appear that results of the core damage estimate were returned to the.CR in accordance with their reques ) The results'of the reactor coolat, sample were provided to the

. TSC at 9:00 a.m. , however, the CR was not provided with this data until 11:30 CR operations might benefit if a dedicated communicator were use Control operators, shift manager and CR supervisor were all observed answering the TSC ringdown telephone. In a real emergency, these people would be busy trying to mitigate the accident and would not

, be available as communicator . Technical Support Center The following aspects of TSC operations were observed: activation, accident assessment / classification, dose assessment, notifications, protective action recommendations and CR support. The following are NRC observations of the TSC activitie EPIP 13.4.1 was not followed when the TSC staff contacted the Benton County Sheriff. Upon declaration of the " site area emergency", the Benton County Sheriff was contacted by the TSC staff, however, no

, protective actions were recommended. The EPIP calls for this contact only if protective actions are recommende The TSC staff was not familiar with established procedures for recommending protective action Examples:

1) With respect to item a. above, a " site area emergency" requires a recommendation to evacuate the Columbia River. The TSC staff

, appeared to be unfamiliar with this protective action since no recommendation was made to the sheriff during the notificatio The TSC staff was informed of this automatic recommendation by EOF personnel. This caused a delay in the recommendation being mad ) After the " general emergency" was declared, EOF personnel recommended protective actions, based on plant conditions, in accordance with procedures. The TSC staff questioned the

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protective actions because there were no significant radioactive releases in progres ) The TSC staff was asked by the Plant Emergency Director to continue monitoring protective action recommendations after the

" general emergency" had been declared. This responsibility had transferred to the EOF upon its activatio The TSC staff should continue to review emergency classification procedures during events. The TSC staff had to be defaulted into the " general emergency" classificatio It should be noted that there were some data calculation assumptions, regarding the core'

damage assessment, made by the scenario developers, but not the players, L.h.c contributed to this situation. However, based on the instability of the plant at the time, it was possible that a

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" general emergency" was warranted regardless of the core damage assessment value In addition, just prior to the termination of the exercise, the TSC staff determined that the event classification could be downgraded to an " alert". At the time,.the plant status appeared to warrant a potential for de-escalation to a " site area emergency?.' The responsibilities and qualifications of the NRC Liaison. assigned to the TSC should be evaluated. This individual is responsible for completing the notification to NRC, which includes completing the Event Notification Form, and for transmitting operational data to the NRC base team. Event Notification Forms were not completed 1 during the exercise and the individual may have had some difficulty obtaining and transmitting the required operational dat . Operations Support Center The following aspects of OSC operations were observed: activation, functional capabilities and disposition of various inplant teams. The following are NRC observations of the OSC activitie When habitability surveys in the OSC showed that radiation levels had reached 4 mr/hr at the windows, no effort was made to close the windows or move personnel away from the windows. If should be noted that action was taken when the levels reached 20 mr/h The plant Hazardous Area Status Board was not used during the exercise, High range pocket dosimeters were not issued to the volunteer team members who were sent to close the MSIV.

, Contamination control procedures were not followed by some of the team members exiting the Turbine Generator Building sample room (a real radiation area). Two team members were already on the step-off

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. Poor ALARA practices were observed when a security guard was left standing in a simulated 15 mr/hr radiation field while the health physics technician, who was escorting him, left to retrieve a forgotten ke Communication with inplant teams was hampered due to traffic on the only available telephon If should be noted that an additional telephone was acquired and used'towards the end of the exercis . Emergency Oherations Fac'ility The following aspects of EOF operations were observed: activation, functional capabilities, offsite dose assessment and interface with offsite officials. The following are NRC observations of-the EOF activities.

. Due to operator inexpe'rience, the Emergency Dose Projection System (EDPS) did nbt function properly during the exercis '

, It was no't obvious who had' leadership responsibility in the Meteorological-and Unified Dose Assessment Center (MUDAC).

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'c . , It 'appea' red? that the lack < of a meteorologist had a negative impact

" on both dose' assessment and field team coordination ef forts in MUDAC;

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1 Critiques .

Immediately following khe exercise,-mini-critiques were held in each of the ERFs. The controllers / evaluators held a day long work session on September 11, 1985 to develop a detailed exercise time line and to summarize their exercise findings. The EP&EP Manager and his staf f presented these~ findings to the NRC observer team during a September 12, 1985 meeting. The Director, Support Services was also present for this meeting. The formal presentation of the licensee's exercise findings was scheduled with upper licensee management, immediately following the NRC's

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exit intervie The following represent some of the licensee's exercise findings as presented to the NRC observer team during the September 12,.1985 meetin No automatic protective action recommendations were made at the

" site area emergency" by the TSC staf With the exception of a. couple of . status announcements, the effective dissemination of emergency information within MUDAC was non-existen The PA system in the TSC did not function properly during the exercise, PA announcements could not be heard in the OS *

. The briefings.given to some teams dispatched from the OSC were not always complete, A Protected Area Controlled Evacuation was not demonstrated because predetermined evacuees were not designate , The workload of the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) in the TSC should be evalua't"ed. Even with additional support, the RPM had difficulty completing.his responsibilitie . Exit Interview An exit interview to' discuss the NRC findings was held on September 13, 1985. The attachment to this report. identifies some of the licensee personnel who were present at the meeting. The NRC was represented by the ' four evaluator team members and R. S. Waite, Resident Inspector. The licensee was informed that no significant deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identified during the inspection. The observat'ons described in Detail Sections 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10 and 11 were mentione The licensee was informed that some of the NRC observations had also been s identified during the licensee's critique process. During the exit interview, the licensee was complimented on the effort involved in their critique process. The NRC expressed concerns over the number of problems associated with the notification process. Examples such as 8.a, 8.b, 8.c, 9.a and 9.c in Sections 8 and 9 were cited. The licensee was informed that resolution of this issue would be tracked by the Region, therefore, it would be flagged as an "open" item (85-26-01). The NRC also expressed concerns about the apparent lack of familiarity with emergency procedures on the part of the TSC staff. Examples such as 9.a, 9.b and 9.c in Section 9 were cited. The licensee was not specifically informed during the exit interview of the Region's intended status on this matter. However, subsequent to the inspection, the licensee was informed by telephone that this issue would also be classified as an

"open" item and tracked by the Region (85-26-02).

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ATTACIDIENT EXIT INTERVIEW ATTENDEES J. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager G. Bouchey, Director, Support Services *

R. Chitwood, Manager, Emergency Planning and Environmental Programs R. Corcoran, Manager, Operations K. Cowan, Manager, Plant Technical R. Graybeal,' Manager, Health Physics / Chemistry

~ D. Larson, Manager, Radiological Programs

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J. Martin,' Assistant Managing Director, Operatians C. Powers, Plant Manager .

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J.'Shannoin,l Deputy Managing Director G. Sorensen, , Manager, Regulatory Programs

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(A total of 35 licensee and licensee related representatives were present) .

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